10 greatest operational generals in history

[nokhor]

as a counterpoint to kurando's excellent topic, i am looking for generals who planned brilliant, original campaigns that dumbfounded their foes.

[FwSeal]

1. Saladin. Richard was perhaps superior in the tactical field, but Saladin was his strategic better. His destruction of the European army at Hattin was in particular a great victory.

2. von Manstein, whose brilliant counterattack at Karkov was one of the biggest turn-arounds of WWII.

3. Gehghis Khan.

4. US Grant. Grant's firm resolve to stay and fight in Virginia even after the Wilderness and Cold Harbor (events which would have sent men like Burnside and Hooker fleeing to the north) decided the war.

5. Zhukov.

[Kurando]

Heinz Guderian, Monash, Orde Wingate, Rear-Admiral Raymond Spruance (USN).

[Anssi Hakkinen]

von Manstein tops my list easily - of all the master planners of the world, he was the most masterful. The invasion of France took everyone, and I mean everyone, by surprise. Karl Dönitz also deserves a mention for the U-Boat Operation Drumbeat (and later the wolfpacks).

Zhukov counts, as might Rokossovski. I might want to name a Finn (such as Hjalmar Siilasvuo) for balance, but ultimately the Finnish military theory was more about improvisation than careful pre-planning.

Also, I might be sticking my toe into hot water here, but I can't help Pearl Harbor and Yamamoto from popping into mind. Admittedly, a surprise attack didn't require much strategic innovation, but how about his use of massed carrier fleets when battleships were still considered the Navy staple by most?

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"2. Yu: bravery tinged with heroism."

[This message has been edited by Anssi Hakkinen (edited 04-29-2001).]

[Choco]

Runner ups:

Manstein all the way.
Not just for his brillant actions in Russia. Also remember that in 1940 he was the creator of the excellent plan to defeat Belgium, Netherlands and France and kick the British out of continental Europe.

Lee.
He made some stupid things like in Gettysburg. But he was a master on defensive war. He knew hot to force a draw against an adversary with had more and better resources.

Grant.
He knew how to deal with Lee and he kept pushing on that objective with no remorse.

Mac Arthur.
He knew what was urgent and what was important. His frogjump strategy in WWII was superb.

Alexander the great.
Militar and political genious. The way he managed with a tiny army and kingdom to conquest and control such big empires is a incredible achievement.


BUT here are the real masters:

Ho chi Minh and The leader of Vietnam army (I can't remember the name but I think he was Giap):
They had a rag tag third world army going against the first military power in the world and they won. Nuff said.

They understood war not just as a military activity. They saw it as a full militar/political/social process and laid and ran their plans based on that.

They knew how to take advantage of their adversaries' weakeness, how to maximize gains and minimize losses, how to keep pushing a plan when necessary and when to be flexible and just run http://www.totalwar.org/ubb/smile.gif

In other words they knew how to keep your plans, options and objectives alive and reachables regardless the losses and setbacks.

That is to be a strategic master http://www.totalwar.org/ubb/wink.gif



[This message has been edited by Choco (edited 04-28-2001).]

[Irving]

admiral donitz, oven

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Chaos is born from order.
Cowardice is born from bravery.
Weakness is born from strength.
-Sun Tzu

[smoothdragon]

Mao Tse Tung: Developed the principles of guerrilla warfare that was (and still is) used throughout the world.

Hannibal: He was a strategic genius, and this strategies, such as the double envelopment, is still studied to this day.

Alexander the Great: He was a master of tactics and terrain. He also revolutionized warfare by stressing the use of combined arms effectively.

Sun Tzu: He established the principles of waging war to serve both political and strategic ends. Although his existence is questioned, his teachings are not.

Rommel: He wasn't called the Desert Fox for nothing. His "sword and shield" strategy with tanks/anti-tank guns made him extremely formidable and undefeated until El-Alemein.

Zhukov: He understood the use of massed tanks and men, and broke with the traditional Russian "steam roll", and instead learned to wait for the enemy, i.e. Kursk and Stalingrad.

Napolean: He learned to fuse the people's fervor with weapons and forged a near invinceable army.

[Tone]

Somehow i've managed to wangle my favourites into both lists.

Caius Claudius Nero (metaurus campaign)

Faced with Hannibal occupying southern Italy and Hasdrubal invading northern Italy. He marches his whole army south, decisively outmanouvres Hannibal then pins his whole army with just 7000 men. Turns the rest of his army around and marches it north the length of Italy, gathering up Rome's retreating northern forces as he goes. Intercepts Hasdrubal's advance on Rome at the Metaurus river and crushes his army (killing Hasdrubal). Then turns south again and decisively defeats Hannibal.

Secondly Zhukov:

Commands the defence of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad. Responsible for halting the German advances on all 3 sectors of the Eastern front. Before going on to mastermind battles such as the destruction of the German Sixth Army and the counter-attack at the Kursk salient. "The General who never lost a battle."

[solypsist]

I don't mean to sound facetious, but I suppose the best generals were/are the ones who manage to win their struggle without actually fighting a battle, or as close to it as they can get.
The Duke of Marlborough (John Churchill)comes to mind; won a few wars against France with only a handfull (about 4) battles through several years*.

*source: my West Point "Dawn of Modern Warfare: textbook.

[LordTed]

u lot forget great battles of Napoeleon b4 water loo and b4 he got power crazed he was fighting Britian the russians the prusians and the austrians.

thats quite good going

[High Voltage]

Alexander the Great
Philip II(Alexander's father)
Hannibal
Genghis Kahn
Darius I of Persia
Robert E. Lee(especially at Chancellorsville)

[ShaiHulud]

Smooth... Mao...gotta disagree... The "Long March" was interesting but Mao didn't innovate... he'd just learned well. Btw, the FIRST to develop guerilla tactics and put them into writing are the Vietnamese( VERY long ago)... too bad we (the US) didn't know that...lol

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Wind fells blossoms, rain
fells steel,yet bamboo bends and drinks

[Tone]

LordTed

That does sound impressive, but is also disingenuous. Too many people consider the Napoleonic Wars as France fighting the rest of Europe. It sounds alot less impressive when you consider that at the time of Napoleons heyday Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and most of Germany were fighting for him and that the Austro-Hungarian armies didn't enter the war until 1813 after Napoleon had already been defeated in Russia.

[smoothdragon]

ShaiHulud, I am Vietnamese http://www.totalwar.org/ubb/smile.gif. The Vietnamese used Mao's book on guerrilla warfare, and Giap added about seven more to Mao's list of ten principles to combat the Americans.

[Kurando]

I guess when you really get right to the heart of the matter General Giap was probably the most successful General of the 20th Century. A truly remarkable man, he is way too often overlooked historians, (and even more so by amateurs such as we).

One of the most fascinating Special Operations of the Vietnam Conflict was the covert assassination attemp on Giap mounted by the British SAS in 1967. -He was obviously very respect/feared by the Allied Coalition; after all, they thought enough of him to send the very best...

[smoothdragon]

I believe the French killed Giap's wife when he was fighting the Vietnamese Independence War with France. Giap was a remarkable general who was very resourceful. Although his army lacked the brute strength and firepower to combat the U.S. in the open, he made up for that by attacking U.S. units piecemeal and demoralizing them with guerrilla warfare. His attack at Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive lacked proper foresight, since he was hoping that the Southerners would rise up against the U.S. and lead to mass encirclement of units. They didn't and the Viet Cong lost an irreplacable portion of their guerrilla units, the NVA lost a portion of their assault division at Khe Sanh.

[Choco]

One of the most incredible achievements in military history is the survival of Giap and the Vietnamese High Command.

The americans tried every possible trick and device for years to locate and eliminate the Vietcong and NV Army HQ and commanders. and before them the French.

They never succed and that is one of the reasons to explain USA's final defeat.

If the ability to survive against an enemy who has superior resources in every fields is a sight of genious then the Vietnam guys were genious.

[Anjin-san]

Well, this could get ugly. As far as Vietnam goes, on the military side, it was a disaster for the North. Yes, they won and I'm not a sore loser, but they won not because of any military victory. TET, was a disaster on a epic scale. Forget ideas about a successful guerilla war. It didn't happen that way. When the war ended because North Vietnam's final push was a Armored Divisional (3) blitzkrieg into the South. It was our lack of resolve, politicians fighting the war, and because we would not invade the North.

[Choco]

Anjin I don't disagree with you in the sense that in "traditional" military terms (body count) the war Vietnam war was a disaster for the Vietcong and North Vietnam.

But how could have that been different after all we are talking of a third world irregular guerrilla and rag tag army fighting a first world super power. Evidently using an ortodox analysis USA HAD to win the war anyway.

Vietnam's extraordinary achievement is the fact that they SURVIVED against overwhiling odds and eventually got away with their plans. Beaten but not dead. That is the point.

They were able to survive and bide their time. And it is true that the lack of political commitment and eagerness to face losses at the end caused USA to leave the field. But one reason for that attitude was that USA simply got tired of fighting a war against an enemy impossible to beat once for all.

You can win a war by K.O. but if you win a war for boring and tiring to death your enemy that is still a victory.

In a war sometimes you must realize that there is not way to win in a traditional "head to head" fight and you need to do your best.

Had the Vietnamese tried to fight a traditional war (like in the Tet offensive) they would have been wiped out in no time. Just ask Saddam Hussein and his Mother of all the battles what happens when you try to fight a traditional war against a super power like USA.

[This message has been edited by Choco (edited 05-12-2001).]

[This message has been edited by Choco (edited 05-12-2001).]

[smoothdragon]

I wrote a thesis paper on this:

The Vietnam War was a struggle of the Vietnamese people to expel foreign powers from their land and gain independence. The charismatic Ho Chi Minh led the rag-tag Vietnamese forces to defeat the French Imperialist forces and later the Americans to unify the fractured country. But General Giap, Ho Chi Minh’s commander-in-chief, could not have defeated the Americans by fighting a conventional war. Instead, he used a tactic that was frowned upon by Westerners and deemed very wasteful in terms of life. General Giap’s use of guerrilla warfare was an effective and devastating tactic in the war against foreign powers.

The type of guerrilla warfare that Giap waged against the French and later against the Americans was taken from the Chinese leader Mao Se Dong. Mao had successfully defeated the Japanese and later the Kuomintang by developing his own principles of guerrilla warfare. Befriending the natives living in the impoverished areas of Yunnan, Mao learned that winning the support of the people is necessary to engaging any enemy in guerrilla warfare. Combating the Japanese, he learned how to defeat an army with modern equipment and weaponry using groups of soldiers to harass the enemy with small arms. Combating the Kuomintang, Mao learned to strike first and maintain the initiative.

Giap’s use of guerrilla warfare is greatly disputed. Many military experts argue that Giap’s guerrilla tactics were ineffective against American firepower, stating that 600,000 Vietnamese soldiers were killed in the Vietnam War compared to only 58,000 American soldiers. But the Vietnamese were unfazed by those staggering losses, with Ho Chi Minh saying, “You can kill 10 of my men for every one I kill of yours, yet even at those odds, you will lose and I will win.”

General Giap first implemented guerrilla warfare against the French following the end of World War II. Viet Minh forces swept throughout the countrywide, taking over farms and winning the people’s support. French forces were forced to defend the big cities such as Hanoi and Hue from guerrilla attacks. By isolating the French into the big cities and seizing the rural areas, Giap had put the French on the defensive and captured land with which he could draft soldiers from.

The siege of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was a battle in which the guerrilla tactics inherited from Mao would be put to the test against French modern weapons. The French general Navarre was confident that the Viet Minh could not possibly take Dien Bien Phu without modern aircraft and without suffering heavy losses from French artillery. Navarre established a position at the intersection of several major roads near the Laotian border to cut off the anticipated invasion and lure Vietminh main units into open battle. In a broad valley surrounded by hills as high as 1,000 feet, he constructed a garrison ringed with barbed wire and bunkers and hastily dispatched twelve battalions of 12,000 regulars supported by aircraft and heavy artillery.

American and French experts had predicted that it would be impossible to get artillery up to the high ground surrounding the garrison. But the Vietminh formed “human anthills” carrying disassembled weapons up piece-by-piece, then reassembling them and camouflaging them so effectively that they were impervious to artillery and strafing. The heavy Vietminh guns quickly knocked out the airfield, making re-supply impossible except by parachute drop and leaving the garrison of 12,000 men isolated and vulnerable. The French fought doggedly to resist the Viet Minh’s bombardment of the fort but were starved of supplies such as food and ammunition. The French garrison surrendered May 7th after the Viet Minh began storming the fort. The French suffered 2000 casualties and 10,000 soldiers were taken prisoner. Viet Minh losses were estimated at 25,000.

The Vietminh victory over the French shocked the world. The idea of a guerrilla army of third-world peasants defeating an elite French army was unthinkable. The Americans laid the blame of defeat squarely with the French, stating that the French did not use their air power to its full potential. The American mindset of air superiority over ground forces carried over to the Vietnam War, which lead Americans to utilize airpower in every major engagement with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).

Giap’s David army collided with the American Goliath after Congress approved the Tonkin Resolution in 1964. The Americans were confident that the Vietnam War could be won in a matter of months. It was thought that American’s superior firepower and weaponry would be sufficient to decimate Giap’s peasant troops. But Giap would again surprise the world.

At the onset of war, the Americans depended on strategic bombing to cripple Viet Cong positions in South and Central Vietnam. “The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm, until the other side cracks”, said General William Depuy. The Johnson administration initiated Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the program of gradually intensified air attacks against the North Vietnamese. Sorties against North Vietnam increased from 25,000 in 1965 to 79,000 in 1966 and 108,000 in 1967; bomb tonnage increased from 63,000 to 136,000 to 226,000. Throughout 1965, ROLLING THUNDER concentrated on military bases, supply depots, and infiltration routes in the southern part of the country. From early 1966 on, air strikes were increasingly directed against the North Vietnamese industrial and transportation systems and moved steadily northward.

In the summer of 1966, Johnson authorized massive strikes against petroleum storage facilities and transportation networks. A year later, he permitted attacks on steel factories, power plants, and other targets around Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as on previously restricted areas along the Chinese border. The bombing inflicted an estimated $600 million damage on a nation still struggling to develop a viable, modern economy. The air attacks crippled North Vietnam’s industrial productivity and disrupted its agriculture. Some cities were virtually leveled, others severely damaged. Giant B-52s, carrying payloads of 58,000 pounds, relentlessly attacked the areas leading to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, leaving the countryside scarred with huge craters and littered with debris.

North Vietnam demonstrated great ingenuity and dogged perseverance in coping with the bombing. Civilians were evacuated from the cities and dispersed across the countryside; industries and storage facilities were scattered and in many cases concealed in caves and under the ground. The government claimed to have dug over 30,000 miles of tunnels, and in heavily bombed areas the people spent much of their lives underground. An estimated 500,000 North Vietnamese, many of them women and children, worked full-time repairing bridges and railroads and piles of gravel were kept along the major roadways, enabling “Youth Shock Brigades” to fill craters within hours after the bombs fell. “Caucasians cannot really imagine what ant labor can do,” an American remarked.

Concrete and steel bridges were replaced by ferries and pontoon bridges made of bamboo stalks, which were sunk during the day to avoid detection. Truck drivers covered vehicles with palm fronds and banana leaves and traveled at night, without headlights, guided only by white markers along the roads. B-52s blasted the narrow roads through the Mu Gia Pass leading to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but to American amazement trucks moved back through within several days. Losses in military equipment, raw materials, and vehicles were more than offset by drastically increased aid from the Soviet Union and China.

Despite heavy bombing, infiltration increased from about 35,000 men in 1965 to as many as 90,000 in 1967. The NVA and National Liberation Front (NLF) required only 34 tons of supplies a day from outside South Vietnam, a trickle too small for airpower to stop. By 1967, the United States was paying a heavy price for no more than marginal gains. The cost of a B-52 mission ran to $30,000 per sortie in bombs. According to one estimate, for each $1 of damage inflicted on North Vietnam, the United States spent $9.60.

In 1967, the NLF engaged U.S. forces in major actions around the demilitarized zone, giving themselves short supply lines and convenient sanctuary and hoping to draw the Americans away from the population areas and leave the countryside vulnerable to the NLF. Tactically, the North Vietnamese relied on ambushes and hit-and-run operations and sought to combat Americans within close-quarters to minimize the impact of the vastly superior U.S. firepower. An estimated 200,000 North Vietnamese reached drafting age each year, and Hanoi was able to replace losses and match each American escalation. Moreover, the conditions under which the war was fought permitted the enemy to control its casualties. The NVA and NLF remained extraordinarily elusive and were generally able to avoid contact when it suited them. They fought at times and places of their own choosing and on ground favorable to them. If losses reached unacceptable levels, they simply melted into the jungle or retreated into sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Recognizing that the South Vietnamese government and army and American public opinion were their enemies’ most vulnerable points, the NVA and NLF attempted through intensive guerrilla and main unit operations to put maximum military pressure on the South Vietnamese and keep U.S. casualties as high as possible in hopes that the Americans might weary of war. American casualties were small compared with Vietnamese, but the number killed in action rose to 13,500 by late 1967, and swelling draft calls and mounting casualties brought rising opposition to the war at home.

The Tet Offensive, a coordinated uprising of Viet Cong and NVA troops all over Vietnam, manifested to the American commanders that victory was far from their groping hands. Giap developed a strategy to lure American troops away from the major population centers and maintain heavy U.S. casualties. A number of large-scale diversionary attacks were to be launched in remote areas and would be followed by coordinated guerrilla assaults against the major cities and towns of South Vietnam. This was designed to weaken the government and ignite a general uprising among the population. The North Vietnamese hoped through these coordinated actions to get the bombing stopped, weaken the Saigon regime, and intensify pressures for a change in U.S. policy.

The offensive against the cities was timed to coincide with the beginning of Tet, the lunar New Year and the most festive of Vietnamese holidays. While the Americans and South Vietnamese prepared for the holidays, NLF units readied themselves for the bloodiest battles of the war. Within twenty-four hours after the beginning of Tet, January 30, 1968, the NLF launched a series of attacks extending from the demilitarized zone to the Ca Mau Peninsula on the southern tip of Vietnam. In all, they struck thirty-six of forty-four provincial capitals, five of the six major cities, sixty-four district capitals, and fifty hamlets.

United States and the South Vietnamese were taken back at first, but responded quickly and crushed the rebellion in several days. The Tet Offensive discredited Westmoreland’s optimism that victory was near and proved to the world that the Vietnamese can and will fight the Americans until their last man falls. The Tet Offensive caused public support for LBJ to plummet, and the public demanded de-escalation of the war. It marked the turning point in the war when the Americans were forced to reduce their forces in Vietnam and eventually pull out.

Through the use of guerrilla tactics, Giap was able to defeat the Americans and forced their exit from Vietnam. Giap knew the weaknesses of his enemies and focused his attacks on them. Giap’s forces decimated the poorly led ARVN and he was able to deplete the American public support by maintaining a high kill rate. Despite the heavy casualties inflicted on the Vietnamese by the Americans, Giap was confident he would eventually claim victory of the war. “Twenty years, maybe 100 years – as long as it took to win, regardless of cost,” replied Giap when asked how long he would fight. Vietnamese losses were replaceable and their tenacity was unbendable.

Guerrilla warfare instilled terror in Giap’s enemy troops who were not adapted to wage that type of warfare. Front lines did not exist in the jungle and soldiers were prone to ambush by guerrillas. Giap’s guerrilla tactics gave the Vietnamese people a strategy that could counter the American superior firepower and technology. For the Americans fighting an enemy in foreign terrain that could not be killed meant victory was uncertain and defeat was eminent.

[This message has been edited by smoothdragon (edited 05-12-2001).]

[ShaiHulud]

Smooth... And whose book were they(Vietnamese) quoting from when they confounded the Mongols???

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Wind fells blossoms, rain
fells steel,yet bamboo bends and drinks

[ShaiHulud]

Two things come to mind....

1. The Tet Offensive served two purposes. Giap properly judged the political effect it would have in America. Despite disastrous losses for the VC the American media treated
Tet as an American loss. The die was cast for an American withdrawal.

2. The Tet Offensive, because of the losses, removed any SOUTHERN VC who could potentially have opposed Northern dominance after the war was won. The irregular forces that died in droves were the heart of Southern VC power. A similar strategy was used when Russia refrained from attacking Poland AFTER encouraging the Polish Underground to come out and fight the Nazis. When Russia came in the Polish resistance was dead.


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Wind fells blossoms, rain
fells steel,yet bamboo bends and drinks

[Choco]

.... uh?

My brain is half dead now after reading SmothDragon' thesis http://www.totalwar.org/ubb/frown.gif


Anyway a real joke:
It seems that during the final years (73-75) of the Vietnm war the American High Command created a computer war game to analyze the Vietnam war and predict what was going to happen. They fed the computer with real data on many topics as casualties, economic damage, forces, etc, etc, etc. And then waited for the computer's prediction on the outcome of the war.

The computer's answer was: "We already won the war in 1962" http://www.totalwar.org/ubb/wink.gif

I thought it was just a joke, but recently I read a book about strategig wargaming and it seems this really happened including the computer's answer.

[smoothdragon]

"Smooth... And whose book were they(Vietnamese) quoting from when they confounded the Mongols???"

I did not say Mao invented guerrilla warfare. I only stated that he was the first to formalize it into a book of principles, such as Sun Tzu formalize the principles of warfare into a book. Guerrilla warfare had been waged even before the Vietnamese, when William Wallace and his band would ravage English towns and villages. And war was fought before Sun Tzu's time when the Egyptians were at war wtih the Hittites. After each book was written, people did read and practice the respective principles. And yes, the Vietnamese did practice guerrilla warfare that Mao had expoused in his book.

[Obake]

Ho Chi Minh and Giap did use the books on guerilla warfare written by Mao, but the question is what was the source material for Mao.

It certainly was NOT his experiences against General Chiang and the "Nationalists". Prior to the Long March Mao and the Communists were decisively beaten by them at every turn. It was only in seclusion after the Long March that Mao turned to Sun Tzu and developed his tactics based on the Art of War and his experiences fighting the Chiang. He was able to perfect his tactics and confounded the Nationalists by adopting Sun Tzu and applying it to HIS situation. That he was successful gave credence to his methods which were adopted by Giap and Ho Chi Minh to devastating effect against the French, who prior to the end of WW2 had promised them independence (the true reason for the French Indochina War). The Soviets (communists) were more than happy to supply the Vietnamese with support as they were fighting against the "Imperialists". The US in turn entered VietNam in order to halt the perceived expansion of communism. The Vietnamese saw this as another Imperial incursion and the stage was set. US forces had never fought anything other than a "conventional" war (as were the Nationalists in China) and were woefully unprepared for the tactics employed against them. Tet was the only conventional operation by the North Vietnamese during the whole war and look at the tactical results.

Strategically it was a decisive victory for the Vietnamese, tactically it was a disaster. Their military for all practical intents and purposes ceased to exist following Tet. They only recovered due to the pressure in the US to withdraw, thereby allowing the Vietnamese the needed time to recover.

Innovation on the part of ANY of these generals.....no. But I'll give Giap, Ho Chi Minh and Mao for that matter the credit for adapting to their situation and turning it to their advantage.

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Obake

I warned you, but did you listen? Ohh, no...it's just a harmless little bunny, isn't it?

[Anjin-san]

Listen, this is my big problem with smoothdragons paper..

"The Vietnam War was a struggle of the Vietnamese people to expel foreign powers from their land and gain independence"

I'm sorry, that about makes me vomit. It sounds like the American Revolution. The democratic loving people of Vietnam didn't have a clue, just their Communitist overloards. I'm sure things got a lot better for them when the foreign devils..sure.

We've got too much leftish residue left over from this era. The Communist were in their process of taking over the world. We, the United States, were attempting to stop them. End of story. I rather not here about an oppresed people fighting off the yoke or western imperialists. Thank god Ronald Reagan finally came around to put a stake through the Soviet Union.

[solypsist]

lol, what a load of...opinion.
i dont want to get OT, so I'll quit at this sentence.

[Kurando]

Quote Thank god Ronald Reagan finally came around to put a stake through the Soviet Union.[/QUOTE]

I'll take over then soly.

Like virtually everyone else's statement here this is just an opinion; (mind you since I am the only one present who actually grew up in the Eastern Block I think it is a somewhat informed opinion.) http://www.totalwar.org/ubb/smile.gif

It is of note that one person who very rarely receives any credit for his role in the collapse of the Soviet Union is Pope John Paul II, (or more specifically), his Holiness' visit with Gorbachev in 1989 in which they entered into discourse about plight of Poland. Gorbachev, (the first Soviet leader ever to set foot in the Vatican), has since stated that he had a "Religious experience" during that particular meeting which was the basis for most, (if not all), of his post-Perestroika changes.

Don't get me wrong here, I appreciate Regan for what he was: a great President, but in the Eastern Block we were very insolated, and I can't really see that the U.S. could have done anything that would have swayed us one way or the other. -Look at it this way: if the Germans couldn't effect any changes in us even after wiping out 20 Million people it's hard to believe that the U.S. could have done anything meaningful with mere foreign policy.

This having been said however, the real truth, (as far as I am concerned), is that Communism is an inherently flawed system, and that once it is given a chance to run it's course it will always buckle under it's own weight regardless of any outside pressures or happenstance.

[Anjin-san]

You are correct Kurando, I did forget the Pope and the church. But don't underestimate what Reagan did. For once, and the last time, an American President, from the only country in the world that could, told the Soviet Union that they had enough. He wanted to win the cold war, not just keep it going.

I'm sorry that solypsist doesn't know or realize what Reagan did for this country and for the world. I'm sorry solypsist my friend, but the facts and history back up my "opinion", not yours. Communism wasn't in decline until Reagan took over. From then, they were beat back and our greatest enemy was defeated. I hope that solypist and others that think that way will learn the truth one day.

I'm not sure if I agree with you Kurando that Communism would fall. Communism is a just another form of totalatarionism. That's been around forever. Sure it could fall, but when? And when had the entire world been in as much danger? As I said above, Communism in the late 70's was on the march, in Afghanistan, Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America. With Ronald Reagan, the United States, and the church, they were defeated. The United States is not Germany. We are infinitely more powerful. What we say or do can alter the fate of the world. We were the 'only' nation that could stem the tide of the evil of communism.

[solypsist]

I find it hard to praise a president who (through alzheimers) probably never realized he was president, but thought he was just acting in a movie! If you feel some affinity for events that happened in the 80's, praise his administration (still misguided) but Reagan the man...nope.

as for Communism, it wouldve ended sometime, plain & simple. Thanking Reagan for ending Communism is like thanking the weatherman for sunny weather. Contemporary evidence has proven the Russians never had the capability or inclination to take over the world. My own opinion is that the US "culture" is even more insidious than the former USSR's ever could've been. We (the USA) are simply picking up where Communism left-off, economically and militarily.

what your posts have to do with "greatest operational generals", I have no idea.
anyway, it's obvious we both disagree, but I appreciate your civil manner and congeniality, so cheers.


[This message has been edited by solypsist (edited 05-16-2001).]

[Kurando]

Heh, clearly the most intelligent thing thing which has been said is in the past few posts is soly's expressing his respect for the integrity of someone else's thread. He's dead right too; we should be talking about Operational Generals here, not Communism et al + sorry for assing up your thread nokhor.

[ShaiHulud]

I'd promote Giap because of his VERY long view. When he'd tapped out the French and the US arrived, it was just a continuation of his previous strategy that he used to win yet again. And, he laid it out at the beginning!

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Wind fells blossoms, rain
fells steel,yet bamboo bends and drinks

[smoothdragon]

So yes, Giap and Mao were very effective generals http://www.totalwar.org/ubb/smile.gif.

[Obake]

The worst part of the whole VietNam debacle was that we knew that it was going to happen at the end of WW2. I can't remember what the US General's name was that was in operational control of that specific theatre, but I do remember a quote from him saying essentially that if we did not make friends with Ho Chi Minh and Giap in particular, that we (the US) would have to face him as an enemy.

Needless to say, Washington "strategists" felt that it was moreso in our interests to back the French than it was to side with the independence-minded Vietnamese. One can only wonder how different it would have been had we used our influence to get the French to back down and grant Vietnam it's independence following WW2.

Be that as it may, Giap and Minh certainly should rank among the great operational generals. Top 10 I'm not so sure about, but if not damn close!

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Obake

I warned you, but did you listen? Ohh, no...it's just a harmless little bunny, isn't it?

[ShaiHulud]

An interesting note is that Ho approached the US because we had kept our word and relinquished control over the Phillipines. He hoped we'd view his fight with France much as our own revolution against England. In light of our release of the Phillipines he had reason to believe we weren't building our own empire.

At the behest of France and due to our own anti-communist stance we sent him packing. Tho we'd supported him against the Japanese our ideological differences made him persona non grata.

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Wind fells blossoms, rain
fells steel,yet bamboo bends and drinks

[Vanya]

I'd add the following:

1. Julius Caesar -- Conquest of Gaul was a masterpiece.

2. Francisco Pizarro -- Was holed up in Cajamarca, with Inca emperor outside with 50,000 warriors. And Pizarro had just 180 men! When the emperor entered to challenge them, they seized him hostage, ransomed him for a crapload of loot, killed him when they paid the ransom and then cut through thousands of Inca warriors. The ambush they laid is a classic how-to on musketry (would work well here in STW). And in all that, not a single spaniard was killed. "SPANIARD! SPANIARD!"

[Anssi Hakkinen]

I would classify both of those Vanya-san mentioned to the Field Generals thread (http://www.totalwar.org/ubb/Forum3/HTML/000160.html) - their craft was improvisation and leadership, not careful planning and meticulous execution.

[Teng Fuh]

1. Suebedai (Right Magyar Khan? I have seen at least half a dozen variations on this one guys name). Went something like 60+-0, had Hungary and most of the Balkans at his mercy after Mohi (Once again stupid spelling?).

2. Manstein smoked French (but then again, who hasn't?), took Sebastopol (I have something about these weird place names don't I?), ran 200 miles through Baltic states in about a week? or was is three days? I forget, then his riposte and slugging it out with the Soviets after Kursk (operation Piece of Zhit-idelle)

[Scipio Valorus]

I am a big Von Manstein fan, but I feel Gotthard Heinrici deserves some attention, having fallen out of favor with the Nazi elite, they put him out to pasture until 1945, when he commanded the masterful counter-invasion of Hungary and supervised the brilliant last defense of Berlin on the Vistula and Oder rivers. He knew his enemy, he knew himself, and he won, tatically, but obviously no amount of brilliant tactical victories were going to stop the red hordes by that point, but what he did, with what he had, has passed to military legend.

Read "The Last Battle" by Cornelius Ryan, writer of such greats as "The Longest Day" and "A Bridge too Far".

[NinjaKilla]

Just flicked through this thread and noticed that no one has mentioned Frederick the Great. Talk about amazing! He took and held Silesia for about 15 years (I think) despite opposition from Europe's superpowers!

Napoleon was probably the best battlefield general. Although he evetually got beat, his victories early on in his career are amazing!

[Koga No Goshi]

Tokugawa Ieyasu.

Saw battle as three dimensional, not just tactical, included elements of politics and psychological warfare to win. One example:

Mikata Ga Hara.

As we know from Shogun, he was outnumbered 3:1 by Shingen Takeda. Takeda had 20,000 troops divided into four units of 5,000. Each unit was almost a numerical match for the entire size of the Tokugawa force. He sent in one unit at a time, recalled it before long, and sent in a fresh unit. By nightfall Tokugawa was forced to retreat. The men arranged the bodies so that the men who died fighting were laying down facing forwards, the men shot down while retreating were laid on their backs facing up. Then when Tokugawa returned to Hammamatsu castle he ordered the gates to be left open. Shingen's two senior generals went ahead scouting and reportedly said "Look at the quality of the Mikawa samurai, the ones who died in the fight lay face down and the ones who died in the retreat lie face up. Not one of them turned their backs to the enemy." Then, when seeing Hammamatsu's gate open, they assumed Tokugawa had some scheme in mind and Shingen began to doubt what the real strength of Tokugawa was, and decided to retire back to Kai without achieving his objective. Also, to rally morale when he returned to Hammamatsu, Tokugawa had the head of a samurai carried around and proclaimed as the head of Takeda Shingen, so Takeda's army was further confused when hearing victory shouts and cheering from inside the castle, and became very dubious as to why a badly defeated army would be in such high spirits.



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Goshi of Koga

[Yoko Kono]

Quote Originally posted by Koga No Goshi:
Tokugawa Ieyasu.
..The men arranged the bodies so that the men who died fighting were laying down facing forwards, the men shot down while retreating were laid on their backs facing up...[/QUOTE]

You really beleive that do u?
An army retreating in dissaray would stop and move EVERY single body.
I doubt that very much.
Virtually all stories from the sengoku peroid and before are legends, or at best wildly exagerated accounts.
The legend of the samurai has a mythical and magical aura to it, and such stories are all almost certainly huge distortions of the truth

[NinjaKilla]

Did you know that the Japanese were one of the first nations to ever use snipers. There are stories of retreating generals leaving snipers behind to pick off pursuing officers.

[Koga No Goshi]

Tokugawa Ieyasu was almost neurotically anal-retentive about exact, meticulous, accurate accounts of military events. He strictly chastised more than once any of his officers he found exaggerating and even publically humiliated Hideyoshi for claiming to be "undefeated" in Court once. He felt that polishing up the story when it came to military activity did no one any services because if your account was inaccurate leaders to follow after you could not learn much from your experience. And also, Tokugawa's retreat was both secret and done after nightfall, when the enemy could not see what the Tokugawa army was doing. So yes, I believe it.



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Goshi of Koga

[DarkSword]

The Victor will always write the book!
thats all i have to say...ehheheh

[Shuko]

I think Marshal Zhukov at the Battle for Moscow (started on 30th September 1941 when Guderian completely surprised the Russians at Viazma-Briansk) as he orders were to defend Moscow not by resistance but by counter attack!

The Soviet Government had already abandoned the city, Stalin was still there, and most of the world thought it would fall soon. Then the real fight for the city of Moscow started on 16th November 1941. You know the outcome, it was the turning point of WW2 together with Roosevelt entering the USA in the war.

Zhukov's Red Army was down to 2,300,000 soldiers by January 1942, it had been over 5,000,000 in June 1941! He was a very brilliant general/field marshal and performed when Russia was in her darkest hour of need. Remember also that in 1937 - 1938 the Red Army purges had eliminated 3 marshals, 13 army commanders, 57 corps commanders, 110 divisional commanders and 220 brigade commanders ie. about half of its senior officers. Zhukov coped with a tremendous workload under extreme pressure and won that battle and many others.



[This message has been edited by Shuko (edited 07-04-2001).]

[FwSeal]

Zhukov's handy victory over the Japanese prior to World War II would also have important consequences. The Japanese realized that they could be beaten, and were not thrilled at the prospect of trying their luck again in Russia. Some have argued that this contributed to Japan's decision to focus on the Southern area...

[MagyarKhans Cham]

Subudei

[Minamoto Yoritomo]

Mao Zedong defeated the Japanese in China? That's a misleading oversimplification if I ever heard one...