Military Strategies

[General_Sun]

Now this might be a semi-rant/semi-strategy section, but hopefully it'll be entertaining and useful.

I wonder now, how many of us consider yourselves brilliant military strategist?

I personally am not. Onceupon a time, I believed that I was, and now I realized that I was wrong. On paper, I could draw up formations, deep anti-phalanx/anti-legion strategies, and they would work terrifically in battle.

I now noticed a few things, each time, before the battle even started, I would have an advantage.

Now who among you would say that you would win a battle when you're out numbered 3:1 with equal troops and even terrain? I dare say not 1.

So there is no brilliant military strategies to be had. It's all obvious and simple stuff.

IE, flank from the side, rush cav from behind, divide and conquer, etc...

I once read this thread where some people described the perfect anti-phalanx formations/tatics.

Most of them said this, move your armies behind the enemy. Or bring your cav to attack the phalanxes rear so that the phalanxes will turn around to fight the cav at which point your infantry can hit them from the front.

Let me see, to do this, you would either
1. have to OUTNUMBER THE PHALANXES, or
2. be in a situation where you have cav and the phalanxes do not.

Now obviously, if you have more units than the enemy, you should win, if you have cav when fighting phalanxes and the enemy do not, you should win. IN BOTH situations, you have the upper hand... So how to beat phalanxes when you have LESS, lower quality men? You CAN"T!

Now of course you can do things like physcological warfare, but the game doesn't really let you do innovative things. (for example, in ROTK, there was a general with an unguarded city, an enemy army outside it. the general opened the city gates and allowed the enemy to march in. The city appeared deserted and the enemy army fearing a trap, escaped. Thus the city was saved).

So folks, there's no military strategy. Only military doctrine, if you can follow it, if you can read a textbook, you're good.

The rest is just monkey bullsh*t.

[Khorak]

There are many who can consider themselves brilliant strategists within the limits of this game. In real life however, no-one here would be a brilliant strategist. Hell, most of the time the strategy would happen before the battle, then the king/general would have to sit back and watch everything succeed or fail based upon the talents of his men and captain. Alexander could get away with personally taking the the field at the front in every battle.

[General_Sun]

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that there is no brilliant strategies. All strategies are made BEFORE the battle. The supply of your men, their pre battle morale, their equipment, their training. etc. All those things matter a lot more than battlefield tatics. All you have to do is to apply standard military doctrine and the thing unfolds...

Then of course there's dumb luck...

[drone]

This can all be summed up by a great military saying: "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics."

If you can get the right troops to the battlefield at the right time, you should win.

The true "tactical" genius is one who can take a crap hand dealt to him and stun the enemy with the unsuspected. Within the R:TW game, there are certain things you can do to steal a victory, but these require timing, creativity, a little bit of luck, and a brain-lock by the AI (the usual state, so I guess just the first three things). It is best to avoid this situation altogether, hence logistics are more important.

If you haven't already, play some multiplayer battles. These eliminate the logistical aspect, and human players can come up with some freaky ideas...

Another great saying: "No plan survives the first contact with the enemy."

[Khorak]

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that there is no brilliant strategies. All strategies are made BEFORE the battle. The supply of your men, their pre battle morale, their equipment, their training. etc. All those things matter a lot more than battlefield tatics. All you have to do is to apply standard military doctrine and the thing unfolds...

Then of course there's dumb luck...

Going by what you just said, you could simply march at an enemy with a group of well supplied, well trained men with high morale and expect to win. This is nonsense. Grand strategy, such as the movement of armies, conducting a battlefront properly, and the logistics of supplies and properly trained men are only half the battle.
You must have a grasp of general field combat tactics or you are doomed to be crushed by a superior general who will use troops of inferior quality in a vastly superior manner. Generalship isn't like a game, it's not a case of screaming at men to go here and there and kill this or that. It's about choosing the right men for the right jobs, making sure your people know what is expected of them and devising a plan they can all follow.

Good example? Hannibal. With inferior numbers and in general, lower quality men, crushed the Romans utterly many times on their own lands. He was a superior tactical general. He was actually rather crap at grand strategy, he just kept on winning the battles he ended up in, even if he was laughably unable to actually conduct the campaigns grand strategy with any success.

[Maedhros]

building on that point it is important to note the difference between a tactical strategy and a strategic one.

A war can't be won without winning both. The Vietnamese after world war II lost the tactival war to the French, and the Americans, but one the strategic war on both counts.

Winning on the battlefield is important, but if you can't keep a supply of money, equipment, and morale going then you will lose eventually.

Tactical battles are about exploiting your opponents weaknesses through skill or pure audacity. Strategic battles are fought on a truly grand scale and too complicated to ever fully comprehend. Thousand of variables all interacting with one another.

To be great on that level you must be gifted, inteligent, decisive, and still able to compensate for the butterfly a world away nobody thought to consider.

[General_Sun]

Going by what you just said, you could simply march at an enemy with a group of well supplied, well trained men with high morale and expect to win. This is nonsense. Grand strategy, such as the movement of armies, conducting a battlefront properly, and the logistics of supplies and properly trained men are only half the battle.
You must have a grasp of general field combat tactics or you are doomed to be crushed by a superior general who will use troops of inferior quality in a vastly superior manner. Generalship isn't like a game, it's not a case of screaming at men to go here and there and kill this or that. It's about choosing the right men for the right jobs, making sure your people know what is expected of them and devising a plan they can all follow.

Good example? Hannibal. With inferior numbers and in general, lower quality men, crushed the Romans utterly many times on their own lands. He was a superior tactical general. He was actually rather crap at grand strategy, he just kept on winning the battles he ended up in, even if he was laughably unable to actually conduct the campaigns grand strategy with any success.

Guys, first of all I want to make clear that I do not think that any of you are stupid or whatnot, and I have no intent to flame. I merely wish to spark an intellectual debate...

With that said...

You seem to be my stiffest resistance so I'll reply directly to you...

You said: Going by what you just said, you could simply march at an enemy with a group of well supplied, well trained men with high morale and expect to win. This is nonsense.

I say: You're wrong. Name 1 instance where it did not occur.

You say: Hannibal at Cannae

I say: That breaks the premises of the disscussion, ie, knowing military doctrine, which includes flanking.

You said: You must have a grasp of general field combat tactics or you are doomed to be crushed by a superior general who will use troops of inferior quality in a vastly superior manner.

I say: That's excatly what I said dude... You must know military doctrine

You said: Generalship isn't like a game, it's not a case of screaming at men to go here and there and kill this or that. It's about choosing the right men for the right jobs, making sure your people know what is expected of them and devising a plan they can all follow.

I say: That breaks the premises of the disscussion, disciplned troops will not be screaming and killing. They will do things according to plan in a orderly faction following standard military doctrine... And btw, you cast generals in an even lower light. You make them sound like nannys....
Also, choosing the right men for the right job is part of logitics, not battlefield tatics...

You said: Good example? Hannibal. With inferior numbers and in general, lower quality men, crushed the Romans utterly many times on their own lands. He was a superior tactical general. He was actually rather crap at grand strategy, he just kept on winning the battles he ended up in, even if he was laughably unable to actually conduct the campaigns grand strategy with any success.

I say: Do you think that if the Romans had a book on military doctrine they would've still lost? Imagine if the Romans had spread out instead of bunched up. The tital wave would've totally knocked Hannibal aside and obliverated him. Again, you're not fulling the basis of the disscussion, MILITARY DOCTRINE!

And of course no plans survives contact with the enemy. Making generals and plans even more useless... You just have to follow military doctrine and hope for the best...

AKA, there's no such thing as a grand uber tatic...
And we're all dimbos who just follows known military doctrine...

PS: and I've played online. There's nobody I met that proved to be a challenge to me yet... And appearantly I'm still the only one who thinks that we're just a mediocre tatician...

[HicRic]

General Sun, I'm not sure what you're trying to argue. Military understanding is necessary to win a battle. You said "Making generals and plans even more useless... You just have to follow military doctrine and hope for the best...", but surely military doctrine would suggest you come up with a plan that best uses your strengths and the enemy's weaknesses, therefore making a plan worthwhile and not useless? And then you need a general to carry out the military principles, again meaning generals aren't useless.

I don't understand what your point is. ~:confused:

However, I do agree that most or all of us are mediocre tacticians. Being good at somehting like the very fixed environment of a game like RTW does not translate into real terms where there are many more variables to consider.

[Parmenio]

RTW doesn't support morale, terrain factors and limited command strongly enough to allow the use of more creative battlefield tactics. There is also a very limited ammount of choice concerning the battlefied itself.

Anyone had any success with an echelon attack?

[The_Mark]

Interesting discussion.


You said: Good example? Hannibal. With inferior numbers and in general, lower quality men, crushed the Romans utterly many times on their own lands. He was a superior tactical general. He was actually rather crap at grand strategy, he just kept on winning the battles he ended up in, even if he was laughably unable to actually conduct the campaigns grand strategy with any success.

I say: Do you think that if the Romans had a book on military doctrine they would've still lost? Imagine if the Romans had spread out instead of bunched up. The tital wave would've totally knocked Hannibal aside and obliverated him. Again, you're not fulling the basis of the disscussion, MILITARY DOCTRINE!

And of course no plans survives contact with the enemy. Making generals and plans even more useless... You just have to follow military doctrine and hope for the best...

But I'd add that Hannibal actually had a plan, which, not only survived the initial contact with the enemy, smashed them completely.

I don't think that withdrawing central infantry units in a battle is part of any known military doctrine, although the result, flanking the enemy, is. Hannibal used some brilliant battlefield tactics to apply military doctrine to the situation, thus destroying the enemy.


Making generals and plans even more useless

If this was true, why we even have heard about some great general or tactician who lived some two thousand years ago? They followed military doctrine of course (or did it better than their enemy), or used a plan and tactics to create a situation where they could follow military doctrine better then their enemy.

[Arrowhead]

(for example, in ROTK, there was a general with an unguarded city, an enemy army outside it. the general opened the city gates and allowed the enemy to march in. The city appeared deserted and the enemy army fearing a trap, escaped. Thus the city was saved).
Can everyone stop quoting ROTK. IT IS NOT REAL!!

[Ar7]

Saying that generals are useless, that they are there just to tell the men to follow the doctrine everybody knows, is stupid.

Yes, there is the doctrine, that every general should know, that is true. But one can not win a battle with only the knowledge of pin the enemy and flank. Perhaps you can do it in RTW, but not in a real battle. A war is based on that doctrine, but in every battle you need a general to make it work, he is the person in charge of examining the terrain and setting up the plan to actually make the troops pin and flank. The general is the man who takes a wider look at the battle, a soldiers task is easy - go and fight where you are told. But, the general is there to make sure every one of those men knows where to go, what to do and how to do it right.

Sure, here you can say that the group leaders ( e.g. centurions in the Roman army ) do the absolute same thing. This is the place where you are wrong again, count how many centurions are there on the battle field, they need to work together, and the man who coordinates them is the general. If you take him away then you have chaos, each group leader will do what he sees best and the army will loose. Those group leaders are important as they help bring the will of the general to every warrior on the field. Those group leaders make sure that every man they are incharge of fulfills his orders and thus the order given by the general. Thus it is quite clear that strategy and the overall flow of the battle is brought to life by the general, the group leaders only make the army controllable and help execute the orders the general gave them.

Why do you think a general is considered a head of the army, during a battle the enemy tries to kill the leader of the opposing force, simple, because then the army is uncontrollable and that is usually followed by chaos and defeat.

Not to mention that if the men realise that they have somebody incharge it gives them a feeling of security, thus raising their morale> Psychological tests have shown that people are afraid of responsibility and they are afraid to be in charge. People like it more when somebody tells them what to do, general has that position. A leader is responsible for the moral side of the army as well, he is symbol of the army and gives the individual warriors a reason to fight.

Thus saying that a general is useless is completly wrong. Humans never do anything without a reason and if you look at the modern day earth and at it's history, then you will see that there have always been generals.

[General_Sun]

Umm... Guys, you are taking quotes out of context... I meant the other guy said generals are useless and he was wrong... And the rest of the sentence was mocking him... You know, being sarcastic?

*sighs

Generals are of course important, but that's not my point...

And dude, ROTK is real, just that the romance part came from the book where they dramatiized everything and made it a soap opera... But all the historical stuff are real.

The_Mark makes a good point, however, the strategy that was employed by hannibal would not have worked vs a general who had read the textbook.

So your point is moot. Good discussion everyone. Of the 3 forums that I've posted this on, you've come closest to convincing me that I am wrong. Congraluations.

[Red Harvest]

Now who among you would say that you would win a battle when you're out numbered 3:1 with equal troops and even terrain? I dare say not 1.


I don't consider myself a brilliant military strategist, just a passionate war gamer. Against the RTW AI I do the above fairly frequently on very hard/very hard. Although giving the AI such odds is generally not something I intend to do since 3:1 is pushing it. I've learned I can get away with quite alot when the AI is my opponent and the AI tends to throw everything but the kitchen sink at me, so I am often outnumbered. Others that post here also seem to do well whipping the AI in a much inferior position so I'm not deluding myself into thinking that my play is somehow unique. Most of the "vets" here probably lose no more than 1 out of 50 battles vs. the AI on VH/VH. It is not unusual for me to win 100 straight on VH/VH. With some factions a single early loss will often scuttle a VH/VH campaign.

What do you consider "equal troops"? I rarely see the same army composition on both sides, and for most faction match ups it is not possible. As has been said logistics and strategy are the keys to tactical victories. Bringing a small cav and skirmisher force to face a large army of hoplites and a few cav would be crazy vs. a decent human. But it is a fairly easy win vs. the AI. Switching sides, it is easy for a human to defeat reasonably sized cav forces with phalangites and some light troops, because the AI can be tricked into frontal charges (often there is not time for trickery, the AI just goes daffy and charges a formed pikewall.) On the other hand, I don't like taking melee infantry up against other melee infantry in RTW, the +7 differential in attack (plus morale effects) is a killer. Infantry are inferior to cav and archers in RTW, so it would be foolish for me to rely on them anymore than I must. Knowing one's opponent and the odds makes all the difference.

The problem with "equal" is that most of us use the special abilities of our forces to work over our AI opponent. We don't build armies that are poorly matched vs. what the AI will bring to the field. Among the many, many ploys that might be used:
1. Neutralizing AI cav by drawing them into an ill advised charge (like getting them to chase your outnumbered cav into a waiting pikewall or drawing them out individually to be destroyed serially by multiple units of cav and/or infantry.)
2. Getting phalangites to turn so that they can be routed by a flank charge.
3. Hitting infantry front and rear or flank at the same time so that they rout quickly. Repeat.
4. Using mounted missile units in cantabrian circle to deal with nasty elite archer units or to chase off other skirmishers.
5. Using a phalangite wall to pin the enemy while smashing a flank.
6. Peppering the AI with missile fire and withdrawing, killing any weakened extended troops within cav charge range.
7. Dividing in two or three and flanking both ends of the line.
8. Waiting for the AI general to charge a pikewall.
9. Taking the high ground. The AI almost always allows this.
10. Getting the AI to chase around until it is tired, then killing it piecemeal.

I submit that no good general would go into a planned battle without identifying some sort of winning advantage that they would attempt to exploit. Good tactics is working with what you have brought and executing well. Good strategy is making sure that you have brought the right force to the right place to fight the right enemy at the right time.

[zhuge]

Now who among you would say that you would win a battle when you're out numbered 3:1 with equal troops and even terrain? I dare say not 1.

It depends on the situation. If it's a straightforward infantry match up: 1 unit of Hoplites Vs 3 units of Hoplites, armor, weapons, XP all being equal, level ground, VH/VH settings, I really don't see any viable way out apart from withdrawing. To tell the truth, even if it's 1 Hoplite unit Vs 1 Hoplite unit on VH/VH, I can't see any good way to maneuver out of it either and a direct confrontation will result in that +7 attack kicking in and most probably carrying the day.

However, once you throw in a mix of units things start getting more complicated. There certainly can be cases where you can defeat the AI even if the odds ratio show 3:1 or maybe even worse. I do agree with Red Harvest that 3:1 is stretching it a bit but it really all depends how much you can exploit the AI. If a unit is going to sit in the town square taking shots, obviously troop strength doesn't matter. The only thing that would matter in that situation would be the enemy unit's armor.

I won't add much apart from saying that I agree with all of Red Harvest's ploys and have used quite a number of them myself in different battles.

Instead I'll provide an example of a 3:1 field battle that can be won on first try on VH/VH.
Just download http://www.sharemation.com/zhuge/AntigonosThrace.zip
Click end turn and you'll fight a battle against Thracian forces (which are split up in 2 armies).

You will have the Greeks:
12 General Bodyguards (XP4), 38 Cretan Archers (XP5), 19 Peltasts (XP2), 29 Peltasts (XP2), 23 Militia Hoplites (XP1)

The AI will have the Thracians:
3 General Bodyguards (XP2), 12 General Bodyguards (XP1), 11 General Bodyguards, 27 Militia Cavalry & 28 Militia Cavalry, 27 Militia Cavalry, 41 Falxmen, 41 Falxmen, 40 Militia Hoplites, 40 Peltasts, 40 Peltasts, 40 Peltasts, 40 Peltasts

No mention of XP = XP0. While there are some small slopes, the battle will be mostly fought on flat ground. The odds here are rated as 3:1. Whether this is a fair assessment is debatable but since the computer uses this particular set of values we will stick with it for now for the sake of making easier comparisons. Of course it certainly doesn't mean having a higher troop strength from the odds ratio is necessarily stronger Vs an arbitrary army. Some troops will be more effective aginst others and having just the right type of troops as a counter will certainly make the impact of troop strength ratio diminish.

In the battle above, proper initial placement and isolating their fast troops will enable the player to defeat them piecemeal. As usual, there are a few things which the player can attempt to exploit such as the fact that when enemy troops have their sights fixed on a particular unit, they rarely change their targets even if another unit would be more vulnerable. More often in their single-mindedness to chase a particular target they will fight only when first struck by friendly units which enables some fast early kills. As Maltz put it quite succinctly in a particular RTW story, for archers, distance = time = damage, therefore the idea is to buy enough time for your Cretan Archers to inflict casualties. By isolating and charging weakened units, a fast rout is possible and with some luck a mass rout can be initiated and with enough remaining forces to give chase, enemy forces will not recover from it.


Playing against another person on the other hand, going up 3:1, is almost certain defeat. It doesn't mean tactics aren't important or generals aren't important. It just means facing a human means he/she will be able to deal with exploits a lot more effectively and the final result will be closer to the actual troop odds as compared to when facing the AI.

I fully agree with Red Harvest that some form of an advantage/exploit is usually sought before contact is made (especially when playing at higher difficulties levels), though in certain cases the aim is but for that "winning advantage" to inflict the maximum number of casualties before withdrawing instead of battling on to a defeat.
Perhaps some regard these as just military doctrine or common sense but to be able to use that military doctrine as effectively as possible, taking into consideration multiple factors such as current troop composition, terrain and even weather is IMHO the hallmark of a competent tactician.

[Didz]

Getting back to your original question.

I think my victories are largely down to the choice (limit) of troops I deploy in my armies and the correct delpoyment of them on the field.

I am playing Egyptain (huge units) and so I have to rely heavily on the mercenaries that are available the vast majority of which are Libyan Skirmishers and Arabic Horse Archers. My native levies are therefore limited to the spearmen, archers and cavalry needed to give my army a backbone.

The net result is that most of my field armies are skirmisher heavy and missile dependant. This worked fine against slow phalanx heavy armies like the Seleucids and I found it quite easy to destroy armies containing 3,000+ pikemen.

However, against the Romans it is getting more difficult, mainly because of Roman Cavalry and I am finding myself having to employ more and more of my own cavalry to counter them.

My general battlefield strategy is to deploy my spearmen and mercenary hoplites in an almost static defensive line using desert axemen or eastern infantry to protect their exposed flanks. Which in turn are defended by flank units of cavalry, horse archers and chariots.

The front of the infantry line is then screened by all my Libyans sometimes in a two deep line and sandwiched in between these skirmishers and my main battle line are my archers.

The intention is that the enemy attack this line taking heavy missile fire all the way in whilst gradually driving my light troops back onto my solid defence line behind. If they actually rwach this line (and most don't) then they must face my heavy infantry whilst being harrassed to both flanks by any light troops they haven't dealt with and if I really need to I can send cavalry across the front of my own line to take them in the flank.

On the offensive this entire formation just moves forward steadily until within missile range of the enemy and the only change involves moving the archers to the front line ahead of the Libyans.

Enemy archers are sometimes a problem but rarely in enough numbers to matter. I normally field close to 1,000 archers per army.

But enemy cavalry is a real pain. Frequently the Romans will field 500+ cavalry in their armies and these can severely upset my skirmish lines. They normally throw them at my flanks trying to avoid the pike armed infantry in the centre and the battle then hinges on the outcome of the cavalry battles on the flanks.

If the Romans win these flank battles things can get very messy and I have been forced to sacrifice skirmishers to keep enemy cavalry busy whilst I fight off a major infantry assault on my front line. Certainly if this Roman tactic becomes more common I will need to increase the cavalry compliment of my armies to deal with it.

In general I don't find myself using clever maneouvres to win battles, it mostly hinges on careful deployment and commitment of troops to the fight. The trick is to understand what works best for the type of army you employ and the type of enemy army you are fighting. I'm not interested in click fest battles where one or two cavalry units rush about defeating ten times their number so I don't bother trying.

[Baiae]

I think that there are some very good points made in this thread but as usual, everyone tends to overstate their points somewhat.

On the original point that "there's no military strategy. Only military doctrine", This is true to a point, that you can base your tactics purely on standard military dogma and be a successful general but there is room for improvisation and the application of inspiration. For example the battle of Ferozeshah




You said: Going by what you just said, you could simply march at an enemy with a group of well supplied, well trained men with high morale and expect to win. This is nonsense.

I say: You're wrong. Name 1 instance where it did not occur.



Ferozeshah is one instance where a highly motivated, well trained and supplied army failed to defeat a numerically inferior foe. Why? There were two key moments where a moment of tactical genius altered the course of the battle. Firstly when the British infantry were taking severe damage from Khalsa artillery, Hugh Gough, the British commander drew the cannons' fire but galloping away from the main battle line. This act, pretty much at contrast with any standard military doctrine, bought valuable time for the British infantry to recover. Secondly, when the Khalsa heavy cavalry were charging towards the British line, the pitifully small British cavalry brigade, outnumbered and exhausted, charged the Khalsa cavalry in the flank, disrupting their attack and demoralising the Khalsa sufficiently for them to withdraw.

"Ah", you say "but that was just applying standard mlitary doctrine by using a flank attack". This is true to an extent but the real reason for the success of the charge was not where the attack hit but when it did. The split-second timing of the charge was a example of true tactical genius.

Another good example of non-standard military tactics bringing great success is Robert E Lee's daring division of his forces at Chancellorsville. In that case the Confederate Army, undernourished, poorly supplied and outnumbered, inflicted a significant defeat on the Union Army, who, I would argue, were as motivated as their enemy.

Furthermore you ignore the possibility that over time good military doctrine can become bad military doctrine. Exceptional commanders can spot this before it becomes problematic. Good examples of this include the horrific frontal cavalry charges of the Franco-Prussian War. Perfectly standard tactics for the previous major European wars, suicidal in 1870. Similarly Lee's massed Napoleonic assault at Gettysburg led to the conclusive defeat of the Confederate forces.

So that's my arguement. Thanks for starting an interesting and challenging thread on the org. Congratulations.

P.S. I've got to agree with Arrowhead on the ROTK thing. Too many people use it as an example of what happened "in real life".

[Somebody Else]

Dare I mention Alcibiades, who captured Selymbria with fifty men? He had had peope within the city open the gates for him - when the signal was given (a bit early) he still rushed in, with fifty men. Once inside, he was completely surrounded and outnumbered. He merely asked them to surrender and they did, by the time they knew what was happening, the rest of his army had turned up.

Does speed count as standard military doctrine? Or can it be admitted that certain generals may well have a flair for being able to judge when turning up in the right place at the right time can tip the balance.

[Vanya]

GAH!

"In soup, the head of a great general tastes the same as that of a grubby peasant."
-- Vanya

"The vanquished constantly whine about their strategic and tactical shortcommings, while the victors march on collecting heads in their triumphal campaigns without giving much thought to anything."
-- Vanya

"The difference between winners and losers is one simply dies sooner."
-- Vanya

:bow: :bow: :bow:

GAH!

[Daevyll]

Now who among you would say that you would win a battle when you're out numbered 3:1 with equal troops and even terrain?

If you allow yourself to be outnumbered 3:1 with equal troops on even terrain, you're an awful strategist by default.
You'd have to be a pretty good tactician to get yourself out of it however.

[Red Harvest]

GAH!

"In soup, the head of a great general tastes the same as that of a grubby peasant."
-- Vanya



I've always found the peasant's head soup a bit gamey and thin with the occasional off taste. General's head soup has a cleaner more subtle palette and it seems much more filling. But when one is very hungry, either will do just fine.

[drone]

Originally posted by Baiae

Furthermore you ignore the possibility that over time good military doctrine can become bad military doctrine. Exceptional commanders can spot this before it becomes problematic.
I think this says it all. Yes, there are set tactics that have been proven to work, many of them listed in this thread. These tactics are the result of trial and error, research in military history, and a lot of wasted blood. They work, and this is why we use them in the game. But situations will arise where they will not work, and new technology/fighting methods can supercede them. The good commander recognizes that things have changed, and does not keep trying to pound the square peg into the round hole. If he doesn't alter his tactics, he gets his men killed. I think World War I is a very good example of the latter. Lot of dead soldiers, not many famous (but many infamous) generals.

From a R:TW standpoint, do you use the same tactics against the Greeks as you do against the Parthians? Of course not. And as the game goes on, troop types become available that make certain tactics obsolete. This seemed to be more apparent in M:TW, but it still applies.

[Vanya]

I've always found the peasant's head soup a bit gamey and thin with the occasional off taste. General's head soup has a cleaner more subtle palette and it seems much more filling. But when one is very hungry, either will do just fine.


GAH!

What kind of peasants do you use in your recipes? Do you use farmed, cultivate peasants, or wild ones?

Vanya finds the genetically enhanced farmed species to be more bulky and heavier. But they also tend to be laden with a lot of extra fat. And not to mention, those farm heads also tend to be stuffed and soaked in all kinds of bizarre preservatives and chemicals to make them stay "fresh" longer. Personally, Vanya not like the taste of formaldehyde in the morning. Vanya prefer organically grown heads, prepared in the traditional ways, and served fresh at the moment of harvest. Sure they are leaner, and require much more work to prepare, but they are also tastier.

Vanya suggest Red go out and skip the "Sizzler" and "Applebee" type places, as they tend to use farm heads.

Lastly, Vanya suggest that for Easter, youz avoid painting eggs and instead paint and hide heads. It will make for great fun when your neigbors find their cat's or son's head painted with woad stuffed under a bush.

WARNING: Heads left out in sun may soon acquire funky aroma. Do not eat unless you need to cleanse your bowels thoroughly!

~:cheers:

GAH!

[AquaLurker]

Sorry off topic a little

P.S. I've got to agree with Arrowhead on the ROTK thing. Too many people use it as an example of what happened "in real life".[/QUOTE]

I think that a lot of people misuse ROTK in their examples, most or the battles strategies describe in ROTKs are 'Psychological' warefare. When it comes to field battles tactics it was very unclear, in fact we do not really know what really happen on the field other than who won and lose, usually due to the success of certain plans. So it is really irrelevant to use ROTK as an example in any cases regarding battlefield tactics unless we are talking about general strategies.

But like General Sun said, ROTK is a real historical event, the people and battles describe in it is real minus the exagarations and over dramatics combat scenes. The 'empty city trick'(sorry direct translation here) is not real because it was clarified by some chinese historian that it was just another real event dramatised to make Zhuge Liang look good(in ROTK), what really happens is that Zhuge Liang made a successful withdrawal from the city without incurring heavy loses and while keeping his army intact.

There are actually two version of it, the actuall historical Three Kingdoms and the dramatize literature version 'Romance of Three Kingdom' which is very entertaining and more popular to us common folks.

[Proletariat]

Generals are of course important, but that's not my point...

So what is?



And dude, ROTK is real, just that the romance part came from the book where they dramatiized everything and made it a soap opera... But all the historical stuff are real.

The_Mark makes a good point, however, the strategy that was employed by hannibal would not have worked vs a general who had read the textbook.

So your point is moot. Good discussion everyone. Of the 3 forums that I've posted this on, you've come closest to convincing me that I am wrong. Congraluations.


Either you are truly thick, or just are having a laugh caused by your semantic confusion. To be so arrogant with such a weak premise is amazing. Have you read "The War with Hannibal" Book XXII by Livy? If you had, (or had and also understood it) I think you wouldn't so simply conclude the Consul Varro as an imbecile who hadn't the most elementary grasp of 'military doctrine,' as you put it. Please explain what you mean by 'military doctrine.'



Oh, also thank you for allowing us a chance at whittling at the position of such an almighty 'thinker'!! Where other forums failed miserably, we only failed! What an honor! Thank you, your Grand Cerebralness!

[zhuge]

Oh, also thank you for allowing us a chance at whittling at the position of such an almighty 'thinker'!! Where other forums failed miserably, we only failed! What an honor! Thank you, your Grand Cerebralness!

Ouch, that was fairly vicious.
But anyway, we can always see for ourselves how the other forums replied/performed, instead of basing it off someone's view.

Strategic Command Center:
http://www.stratcommandcenter.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=4020

Total War Center:
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/index.php?showtopic=18453

[Didz]

Perfectly standard tactics for the previous major European wars, suicidal in 1870. Similarly Lee's massed Napoleonic assault at Gettysburg led to the conclusive defeat of the Confederate forces.

I've always felt that the defeat of the Confederate Army at Gettysburg was actually brought about by Lee's decision to fight the battle at all and to take the offensive.

I would also challenge the imagery that Pickets charge was in any way realted to Napoleonic infantry tactic's. My reading of the deployment and tactic's employed suggest that it was conducted in a total different way. It was not for example a massed column attack.

On the left Pettigrew's division of four brigades advanced in one line, with Trimble's two brigades of Lane and Scales in the rear and right as supports.

Pickett's division on the right advanced with the brigades of Kemper and Garnett in the front line and Armistead's brigade in rear of Garnett's on the left.

Twenty minutes after these two division began to advance the brigades of Wilcox and Perry were to join them by advancing on Pickett's right to repel any attempted flanking movement from the Union position.

Thus looking at the delpoyment one can see immediately that this assault was being made on a two divisional frontage and that at its deepest was only two lines (4/6 ranks) deep. This therefore was not a concentration of manpower aimed at overwheming a single piont in the enemy line. In fact some histories claim that Lee had always intended Picketts assault to be supported on an even broader front by A.P.Hill.

To make matters worse in the smoke and confusion of the advance Picketts line drifted left leaving Wilcox and Perry's advance twenty minutes later totally isolated.

Pettigrews Division had more distance to cover (1300 yards) whilst Pickett was only (900 yards) from its objective and yet the advance began in Echlon with Pettigrews division deployed further back. Nevertheless by the time Pickett reached the Emmitsburg Road Pettigrews Division had caught them up and the entire two division line crossed the road together. Presumably if Pickets line was drifting left then Pettigrew's must have been doing like wise for the two formations to avoid becoming intertwined.

Soon after this Pettigrew's left brigade, began taking flanking fire from Hays' troops and Woodruff's battery and after the loss of only twenty-five killed, this Brigade stalled and either retreated, surrendered, or threw themselves on the ground for protection, taking no further part in the attack.

However, Pettigrews, others brigade as well as those of Trimble, advanced as far as the stone wall, and stayed there until they finally surrendered.

The drifting of Pickett's division had exposed his right brigade (Kemper) to the fire of Doubleday's division, a part of which moved to conform to Pickett's movement, thus continuing its deadly volleys, while Stannard's Union brigade actually, changed front to the right, in order to open a most destructive fire upon Kemper's flank which could not be covered by Wilcox and Perry because of the earlier drifting during the advance.

Under this fire Armistead's, Kempers and Garnetts, brigades focussed their advance upon the angle of the stone wall held by Webb's Philadelphia brigade dressing their ranks on the left and thus drifting even further in that direction and no doubt trying to distance themselves from the flanking fire on the right. Two guns of Cushing's battery at the wall were silenced and the two companies, of Webb's regiment overwhelmed. The union line was driven back at this point on a frontage of some one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet.

The three brigades then attempted to cross the wall, Armistead, putting his hat on his sword and rushing toward the other guns of Cushing's battery, fell dead almost immediately. The Union forces now began a counter-attack against both the front and flanks of the Conderate troops cowering behind the stone wall. Pickett was still on the far side of the Emmitsberg Road, Garnett and Armistead were already dead and Kemper was wounded and captured. The men now cowering behind the stone wall fought for as long as the could and then fled or surrendered.

If one compares that imagery with say D'Erlons assault on the Ridge at Waterloo, its quite different. The key doctrinal difference being the abasence of a cavalry threat, which, if it had existed at Gettysburg would have forced Pickett to use a much denser formation. But the main tactical difference was the absence of any attempt to gain numerical dominance over a limited frontage. The advance was made on a broad front by Divisions in line and therefore presumbly brought no more men to bear on any given point of the defenders line as the defenders had themselves.

In fact the capture of the angle of the stone wall by Armistead, Kempers and Gernett's Brigade was attributed to the fact that the Union line at this point had been weakened by the insertion of Cushing Battery into the middle of Webbs regiment which left the defenders with only two companies available to defend the wall against the survivors of three Brigades.

I'm not suggestng for a minute that Pickets assault would have succeeded if he had formed two divisional columns and stormed the ridge with the bayonet. In fact I suspect that with the advances in artillery technology and increased use of rifled muskets would have resulted in even greater slaughter. If anything I think the Conferate tactic's made the best of an impossible situation, but it wasn't anything like a Napoleonic assault.

[Agravain of Orkney]

Interesting discussion. I think it comes down to making a distinction between strategy and tactics. Strategy is the process of deciding who you are going to fight, when you are going to fight, where you are going to fight, what kind of units you are going to bring to the fight, your initial deployment of troops, and your overall plan for how you want to engage your enemy once the fight begins. Tactics is everything that happens after you push the "start" button on the battle screen, until the fight comes to an end.

[Didz]

Yep! I think its generally accepted that Napoleon for instance was a great strategist but a lousy tactician.

Wellington by contrast tended the other way frequently managing to pull his fat out of the fire through his attention to tactical detail.

[Ptah]

It's usually this way around;

economics > politics > strategy > tactics

[Baiae]

but it wasn't anything like a Napoleonic assault.

Yeah, sorry. I didn't mean Napoleonic tactically but the concept that you could march your troops across an open field into the teeth of the enemy was outdated by the 1860's and belonged to the Napoleonic era, when range and accuracy of weapons, especially infantry weapons, was much more limited.

[GFX707]

There's no time for strategy in this game when two armies meet on an open battlefield, you deploy your units, march them towards the enemy (taking maybe 3 minutes) then they clash and evapourate while you madly click on a bunch of unimpressive antlike dots from miles away and one lot runs away (all of which takes maybe 15 seconds) which sucks really....the only time you get to zoom in is when your army is chasing the other army away

As the greeks or romans my usual strategy was a semicircle of hoplites or legionaries around 6 or 7 archer units, with the general at the back....worked every damn time with 10 to 1 casualties for the enemy and mine were mostly from my archers shooting my own troops!

This game is kinda broken

[General_Sun]

I just realized that I cannot handle arguing on 3 forums at once....

So you can either take this as a white flag, or come to the stratcommandcenter, where I will be continuing this discussion. Many thanks.

[Didz]

There's no time for strategy in this game when two armies meet on an open battlefield, you deploy your units, march them towards the enemy (taking maybe 3 minutes) then they clash and evapourate while you madly click on a bunch of unimpressive antlike dots from miles away and one lot runs away (all of which takes maybe 15 seconds) which sucks really....the only time you get to zoom in is when your army is chasing the other army away

Funnily enough thats not my experience at all.

Admittedly in a real time environment there is only a limited reaction time but nevertheless I have managed to enjoy some quite epic battles. Mind you I think it depends on the game settings.

I'm playing Medium/Huge Units/No Timer, so I'm not under a time constraint which requires me to charge at the enemy bald-headed and can take the time to develop a position.

I have also been impressed by some of the reactions of the AI. I've noticed that it frequently uses its light cavalry effectively to drive in my skirmish lines before making its main assault, whenever possible brings forward its archers to harrass my elephants with fire arrows and frequently tries to drive in my flank guards with its heavy cavalry.

From what I've heard and read ancient warfare was not that tactically sophisticated anyway. I was watching a program on Alexanders famous Battle at Issus which was basically won and lost because both Darius and Alexander chose a tactical plan at the start and stuck to it. It didn't sound like any clever tactical ploys were introduced during play, everyone was too busy killing each other.

[Didz]

Yeah, sorry. I didn't mean Napoleonic tactically but the concept that you could march your troops across an open field into the teeth of the enemy was outdated by the 1860's and belonged to the Napoleonic era, when range and accuracy of weapons, especially infantry weapons, was much more limited.

The problem was of course that tactical doctrine and training had not evolved any alternatives.

Certainly much more use was made of line and extended line in the ACW than during the Napoleonic wars but lets face it men were still being ordered to advance over open ground into the teeth of the enemy fire in WW1. the only thing that began to break the mould was the invention of the tank and even then things reverted to norm whenever the tank was not available.

Japanese Banzai charges and the Chinese assaults in the Korean war to give just two examples.

[Marshal Murat]

Military Doctrine to Strategy???

Personally it lies in the merits of the general.

A very large well equiped, motivated army (Union army Civil War) led by a lousy general (Burnsides, McClellan, Hooker, etc.) the army would eventually fail.

(A argument against this can be that Lee was against them, but they all went to West Point, merit of the general)

A perfect example of many of the doctrines that fails in use are
Franco-Prussian War
WWI
WWII
American Civil War
probably many others,

In the Franco-Prussian War, the French seemed to have all the advantages (the machine gun at the top)
However, the use of the machine gun as a artillery piece, large cavalry charges, doomed to fail.

WWI With the large charges across no mans land, failed.

WWII with the Maginot line against the blitz, failed.

American Civil War (Cold Harbor) where thousands of Union troops charges the trenches of the Confederates, and were slaughtered.

Doctrine, even at Cannae (Hannibal could have adapted) Doctrine, when it becomes to far behind the innovation, or when used against a adaptable general, then it will fail.

Strategy, when applied correctly, along with the correct military doctrine will defeat the enemy.

For example, one army of Parthian HA and Catapracts (way to underpowered) against a equal of light Greek CAV, and phalanx. The Parthians will win (Sometimes not by the AI, but at least by me)

[Didz]

Personally it lies in the merits of the general.

A very large well equiped, motivated army (Union army Civil War) led by a lousy general (Burnsides, McClellan, Hooker, etc.) the army would eventually fail.

(A argument against this can be that Lee was against them, but they all went to West Point, merit of the general)

Personally, I have never bought this theory, but then I'm not from the US, so I'm looking at the war from the outside.

The way I see it the difference between the Confederate and Federal armies was not so much the quality of the generals as the quality of the men.

The avarage Conferate soldier was more motivated, determined and had better combat and survival skills than his average union opposite number. He was fighting to defend his homeland aganist a violent aggressor and he really hated his opponent.

The avarage Union soldier was better equipped, better fed and better armed. But he was fighting on foriegn soil. In many cases for a nation he hardly knew and in some cases had only just arrived in. He was lucky in some cases if he even spoke the language. He probably only had the vaguest idea about why he was fighting and in many cases those reason had more to do with a personal rite of passage for him and his family than any glorious intent. His main objective being to do the time and survive to reap the benefits.

The generals as you say mostly came from the same stock and many on the Union side were as highly regarded prior to the war as those on the Confederate. The real problem for the Union Generals was that they were constantly hounded by their political masters to 'do something' and thus many of their actions were driven by political motives rather than strategic ones.

By comparison the Confederate Generals were left a relatively free hand and were able to dictate both policy and doctrine and able to apply personal influence over their men. Generally, they were able to retain their personal honour code and standards of morality thus appearing both fair and just in the eyes of their troops which in turn enhanced the loyalty they received in return. My favourite example of this was Lee's proclamation that he would never force a Confederate soldier to trespass on the land of his brother, that they had joined his army to fight for their homeland not to invade the home of another and therefore those who wished to stay behind could do so. Statement like that show that the Condfederate Generals honestly beleived they had right on their side and were able to expliot that honest belief to motivate their men and enhance their own influence.

The final victory however was not dependant upon military or political superiority but upon economic factors. The South was merely blockaded to death denying it the resources to counter the production capacity of the northern states. It basicly got smothered and many of the final battles were the desperate acts of principled men refusing bow to the inevitable.

[Sinner]

Like Agravain I would say that General Sun's first point of confusion was refering to strategies when the subject should have been tactics given that he discussed battlefield command.

But back to General Sun's opinion that the key to success in battle is simply following military doctrine. In effect that's saying that anybody who reads this hypothetical doctrine will be able to command equally well in a given situation. I have a one word reply to that: wrong.

What is doctrine? It's nothing more than the collected wisdom of other commanders, the lessons they have learned in battle. It would be hoped that what those commanders have recorded is correct, but that's not certain. If the doctrine is incorrect, then the commander who just follows doctrine will fail. And what about situations not encountered by those other commanders? What do you do when operating in unfamiliar terrain or fighting a previously unknown foe or either side uses new technology? In those instances doctrine may help but equally might be totally wrong.

Within a simulation like RTW it is possible to eventually produce a closer attempt to a perfect doctrine since we have far less factors to deal with, having a very limited selection of terrain and troops, but the validity of what becomes doctrine does still have to be considered.

Then there's the question of the commander (player) applying that doctrine. We are not all equal, some of us can think faster, recognize situations quicker, see solutions others cannot, handle pressure better, the list goes on. And that's not counting that we all have bad days and we all make mistakes no matter how knowledgable or well trained.

A poor commander - one lacking intelligence or simply hesitant due to nerves perhaps - would struggle to apply the doctrine he has learned, perhaps applying the wrong solution to a particular battlefield situation or maybe the right solution but at the wrong time, and so would lose battles that should have been won.

A good commander would be able to think outside the doctrinal box, to adapt to unfamiliar circumstances, to recognize where doctrine is wrong and create a correct solution, and be better able to exploit mistakes of others and avoid or compensate for their own.

Military doctrine does have its uses, it can be of great help teaching the basics, but it's no substitute for a good commander.


Another issue General Sun addressed is quality, but what really makes one unit of troops higher quality than another?

Imagine two equal sized groups, of the same physical state and demeanor, and both armed with the same weapons. One group has been sent out to fight with no training while the other has been trained for months and has already experienced battle. The latter group will be far more likely to win, being more skilled in the use of their weapons and fighting as a unit, and suffering less shock at the effects of combat. From this we can deduce that training and experience make one unit higher quality than another.

Now repeat the experiment with both forces equally armed, trained and experienced, however one now has shields. The unit with shields would be far more likely to win, suffering less casualties due to their superior defences. So equipment also effects quality.

However, a unit well equipped in one situation would be poorly equipped in another, such as heavy infantry trying to chase down skirmishers, or archers after they run out of arrows. So even though training, experience and equipment are relatively fixed, quality has a fluid, subjective nature due to the changeable circumstances the troops find themselves in.

General Sun says that it's not possible to beat a phalanx force given fewer, lesser quality men, but given that quality is such a subjective term that's an invalid assertion. Take 300 hoplites, well equipped and trained, and veterans of many bloody battles. Then take 100 peltasts, skilled enough at throwing javelins but not experienced or well trained in melee, with just a light shield for armour and a handful of javelins. The hoplites are definitely greater in number and overall one would say that they're of greater quality, but deployed correctly the peltasts would still have a chance of defeating them, even moreso in the real world than in RTW where they wouldn't be limited by the artificial constraint or remaining in a regular unit formation.

[derF]

This can all be summed up by a great military saying: "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

This explains my view completely.

Everything has a weakness. Some weaknesses are less obvious than others.

The weakness of the phalanx os that it is - slow and vulnerable to missile fire. So an immediate remedy is to pelt it with arrows and charge from the rear with fast cavilry.

In relevance to the discussion about great generals, i understand your point. But a great general isnt so just due to his ability to win against impossible odds. A good general of the quality we are concerned with has to have many good characteristics.

- He needs to have a profound knowledge of the limitations and abilites of his men and the enemies men.

- He has to know that risk is largely unprofitable.

- He has to accept defeat and the impossible.

- But most of all, he fights battles that only he can win.

[Marshal Murat]

The way I see it the difference between the Confederate and Federal armies was not so much the quality of the generals as the quality of the men.

The avarage Conferate soldier was more motivated, determined and had better combat and survival skills than his average union opposite number. He was fighting to defend his homeland aganist a violent aggressor and he really hated his opponent.

The avarage Union soldier was better equipped, better fed and better armed. But he was fighting on foriegn soil. In many cases for a nation he hardly knew and in some cases had only just arrived in. He was lucky in some cases if he even spoke the language. He probably only had the vaguest idea about why he was fighting and in many cases those reason had more to do with a personal rite of passage for him and his family than any glorious intent. His main objective being to do the time and survive to reap the benefits.

The generals as you say mostly came from the same stock and many on the Union side were as highly regarded prior to the war as those on the Confederate. The real problem for the Union Generals was that they were constantly hounded by their political masters to 'do something' and thus many of their actions were driven by political motives rather than strategic ones.

By comparison the Confederate Generals were left a relatively free hand and were able to dictate both policy and doctrine and able to apply personal influence over their men. Generally, they were able to retain their personal honour code and standards of morality thus appearing both fair and just in the eyes of their troops which in turn enhanced the loyalty they received in return. My favourite example of this was Lee's proclamation that he would never force a Confederate soldier to trespass on the land of his brother, that they had joined his army to fight for their homeland not to invade the home of another and therefore those who wished to stay behind could do so. Statement like that show that the Condfederate Generals honestly beleived they had right on their side and were able to expliot that honest belief to motivate their men and enhance their own influence.

Although you are looking from the outside, there are many failures.


There were no differences in language, everyone spoke "American" be it the Louisana Bayou southern drawl, to the annoying speech of the New Yorkers, to the immigrant Irish.

Both of the armies were american, no differences in languages (save the occasional immigrant that spoke maybe German)

Another part is the idea of the Union soldiers.
He was just as motivated as his southern counterpart. Most were farm boys looking for adventure. Sometimes they went against thier parents wishes. Both sides, had thier own views as to why the other was the enemy.
Northern motivations-Unite the Union
Southern motivations-to peserve states rights.

Another part, was the Northern political hounding.
Lincoln only hounded a few generals, and those are Eastern theater generals.
Grant, Sherman, never needed hounding.

McClellan relied on Pinkerton, a faulty detective, inflated Confederate numbers three times the average numbers, and thus McClellan became very cautious (Antietam, when Mc had Lees orders, he moved slowly). All he ever did was train his men.

Burnside was just as cautious as Mc, and Hooker was taken by surprise. Lincoln had a good right to hound them.

The Confederate generals, there were those that were terrible. Most of the Confederates were revered for thier,
A. Personal Example
B. Ability to whip Yankees

Great examples of the Personal example were
Hood, Stonewall, Stuart, Forrest

Ability to whip Yankees,
Lee, Longstreet, Johnson, and Stonewall

Lastly, the reson that the South lost, was because of
the blockade,
the North (the north had many millions more men then the south and able to pound away at the Southern army)

[Red Harvest]

There are a lot of elements of truth in that, Didz, but I don't believe the inevitability was necessarily there. I don't see that the south could conquer the north, but it was possible for them to win a limited invasion well enough to force the Union to agree to a peace. For the most part southern armies were better led. The key was that the largest, most critical southern army was well led, while for much of the war the largest Union army was not. The same cannot be said for the war in the west where it was a mixed bag on both sides.

A problem with people looking at the American Civil War is the focus on the east. Things were very different in the west. In the west the Confederate armies had been largely defeated long before. Leadership and quality of troops was more closely matched early in the war. In fact, Conderate armies were often larger locally (look at Missouri/Arkansas) and Union armies were not supplied properly. Western armies were as likely to be mishandled by the rebels as by the federals. Grant's successes in the west led to him receiving total command of the Union effort. Grant was a fighter. He bumbled at times and was not wary enough when in close proximity of the enemy, but he understood that to win, one had to fight. His tenacity was the key to winning.

If you look at the war in the west you get a different perspective of the men and armies: Grant's capture of Ft. Donelson, the battles of Shiloh, Corinth, the siege of Vicksburg. In the west there were setbacks for the Union (Chickamauga, the Red River campaign, various short sallies by armies in Missippi, etc.) Leadership and troop quality were closer in the west. The death blow to the Confederacy was dealt from the west with the march through Atlanta.

Because of the improvements in weapons it was easier to fight a defensive fight than an offensive one. Despite the Union's greater manpower it did need overwhelming might to be sure of victory. The Union had little in the way of a cavalry arm at the beginning of the war and was very much outclassed by the quality rebel cav, but the Union developed good mounted infantry by the end. The shift from cavalry mentality to mounted infantry was key. Fighting from horseback made one a very big target. But mounted infantry had the mobility to sieze key positions and hold them as infantry while the regular infantry came up. As the Union mounted arm improved, the rebels found it impossible to prevent heavy incursions and raids.

Fighting for one's own soil certainly makes a difference. Plus the changes in equipment had made defense easier. But don't forget that the defender also has a considerable advantage in scouting/intelligence as well--less "fog of war." The attacker must also spend more resources protecting his lines of communication and supply, while the defender can utilize local militia and the like as a supplement. Antietam and Gettysburg were both invasions by the south that ended in defeat and near catastrophe, and I think they illustrate the problems posed by invasion (by either side) quite well.

[Red Harvest]

Murat,

A bit different view on some of the commanders:
Hood was a horrible general, one dimensional. He was certainly personally brave and did well with divisional command, but he should never have been put in charge of a whole army. He utterly destroyed his army at Franklin.

Jeb Stuart is over rated in my opinion. Hampton was better. Stuart was too enamoured of the glamour of cavalry sabre fighting and dashing about. He got caught with his pants down at Brandy Station and quite nearly lost--he was probably saved by one of the Union pincer commanders who proved utterly incompetent and failed to engage. Stuart failed Lee by gallavanting around the countryside at Gettysburg. Mounted infantry was the critical aspect of horse warfare in the ACW. Hampton and Sheridan understood, but Stuart was a cavalry man.

Forrest was a great divisional level/small army commander, but his fighting style and impetuosity made him unsuited for full command of much larger armies. He was a military genius.

Burnside probably isn't given proper credit. His Carolina expedition was well handled and showed he had some understanding of the logistics of an invasion. He had some imagination for conducting invasions as well. Unfortunately, he failed when given command of the Army of the Potomac.

[Didz]

Although you are looking from the outside, there are many failures.

Hmm! Then clearly my reading on the subject is misleading.

Let me quote just a few references from Davis' book Fighting Men of the Civil War.


There were no differences in language, everyone spoke "American" be it the Louisana Bayou southern drawl, to the annoying speech of the New Yorkers, to the immigrant Irish.

Both of the armies were american, no differences in languages (save the occasional immigrant that spoke maybe German)

Davis says on this subject:

"...tens of thousands of foreigners of every caste and nationalty. Company H of the 8th Michigan numbered 47 New Yorkers, 37 Michiganders, 26 Native Americans, 7 Canadians, 5 Englishmen, 4 Germans, 2 Irishmen, 1 Dutchmen and one man whose nationality is stated as "The Ocean".

Some camps were vurtual babel. In one Yankee regiment hosting fifteen different national origins, the colonel had to give orders in seven seperate languages.

Many immigrants spoke English indifferently at best making communication a nightmare. In Major General Franz Sigels command of 1864 his orders were given in German and had to go through three successive translations from German to Hungarian, to English, and back to German, before they filtered through his international staff to his German-born men in the ranks. He was never a great general but given the party game nature of his chain of command it was a miracle that all of his men even marched in the same direction.

Nearly a third of the male population of the North were foriegn born.

Over 200,000 Germans served in the Northern Army with several Regiments composed entirely of them. The 9th Wisconsin did not number a single non-German in its ranks. New York furnished 10 regiments that were predominantly German and Ohio did the same.

150,000 Irishmen also served in the Union Army and whilst many joined to save the Union the most often quoted sentiment of these men was that they had joined the army becuase they liked a good fight.

Felix Brannigan (79th New York) wrote: "There is an elasticity in the Irish temperament which enables its possessor to boldly stare fate in the face, and laugh at all the reverses of fortune."

20 Union Regiments were composed almost entirely of Irishmen. Meaghers Irish Brigade (9th, 63rd, 88th New York) was almost entirely made up of native Irishmen.

60,000 Englishmen and Canadians also served with the Union, plus Frenchmen, Scandinavians, Hungarians and even a few orientals. the 79th New York were mostly Scotsmen and even wore kilts at first.

Foriegn elements in the Conferate ranks did exist but in smaller numbers. There was one Irish Brigade, a few German Regiments and a Polish Legion. A European Brigade was raised in Louisiana and was commanded by Count Camille Armand Jules Marie, Prince of Polignac, a frenchman commonly referred to as "Polecat" by his men. He gave his orders in French.

One incredulous native Southern watching the European Brigade deploy noted "That-thur furriner, he calls our a lot er gibberish, an thum thar dagoes jes maneuvers-up like hell-beatin-tan-bark! Jes like he was talking sense."

12,000 Native Americans served with the Confederacy forming 11 Regiments of Infantry and 7 of Cavalry. 6,000 served with the Union.

Mexican's also served in the Union army, in the Martinez Militia (officially known as the 1st New Mexico and two of the Colorado Regiments contained more Mexicans that native born Americans.

On the Conferdate side the 33rd Texas Regiment was mostly Mexican.


Another part is the idea of the Union soldiers.
He was just as motivated as his southern counterpart. Most were farm boys looking for adventure. Sometimes they went against thier parents wishes. Both sides, had thier own views as to why the other was the enemy.
Northern motivations-Unite the Union
Southern motivations-to peserve states rights.

According to Davis two thirds of the Confederate recruits were farm boys, whilst only about half of the Union Army came from a rural background. The vast majority of the Union army were clerks, carpenters, labourers and students made up most of the rest.

The average Confederate recruit had been indoctrinated for generations with the belief that all Northerners were hypocritical fanatic's bent on destroying the constitution, and were thoroughly convinced on the righteousness of their cause. They were also naturally militant in their attitudes and confident that they were by nature better soldiers than Yankee shop-keepers.

They considered the defence of the South as no lesser crusade than that faced by Washington during the American Revolution.

Such military inclinations did not dwell in the North to the same degree as they did below the Potomac but mostly joined out of a sense of duty.

As to the respective value of their military skills Davis quotes Colonel Lyman of General George Meades staff who complained in 1864 "By the Lord. I wish these gentlemen who would overwhelm us with Germans, Negro's, and the off-scourings of great cities could only see a Rebel Regiment. In all their rags and squalor. If they had eyes they would know that these men are like wolf-hounds and not to be beaten by turnspits."


Another part, was the Northern political hounding.
Lincoln only hounded a few generals, and those are Eastern theater generals.
Grant, Sherman, never needed hounding.

I would not have classified Grant or Sherman as one of those Generals who were considered inferior to their Southern counterparts. They also inherited a Union army which by then had seen the elephant and contained a number of veteran troops.

Their predecessors had not been so lucky and whilst they have been critised for doing nothing but train their men the point is worth making that perhaps those men needed the training and being forced to commit them to battle too early merely caused needless losses.


Lastly, the reson that the South lost, was because of
the blockade,
the North (the north had many millions more men then the south and able to pound away at the Southern army)

Even in the final battles of the war the evidence suggests that all other things being equal a Confederate Unit would beat a Union one. The problem was that rarely were things equal, basically the Union had more of everything. But most of all it had more money and that in itself ensured that it could continue to field more men, more and better weapons and more and better ships.

Without that money the Union could not have explioted the millions of men it had at its disposal and if the Confederacy had had equal money it could have attracted the resources it needed to prevail. The reason for instance that immigrants flooded into New York and not New Orleans was because that was were the money was. The Union soldier was even paid $2 more than his Southern counterpart.

[drone]

What!?!?! The South lost?

Sorry, a little southern US humor, for some people here the war is still going.

The South is generally considered to have had "better" generals. The upper level officers were essentially southern nobility, this may have given them an edge at leadership over the troops. Maybe the men just had more faith in their abilities. Some Union general (can't remember, maybe Grant) even said the more southern officers killed during the war, the easier the occupation and subjugation would be. Something about "the flower of southern manhood", or some such crap.

There was some political interference from the southern side. Johnston was fighting a measured retreat towards Atlanta, outnumbered but delaying Sherman's advance. Davis replaced him with Hood, who promptly attacked, lost, and Atlanta was taken before the presidential election.

McClellan was much loved by his troops, probably because he kept them alive by not attacking. Grant knew the way to win was to keep attacking, eventually the northern supply/industry/manpower would grind Lee down.

At little trivia, you may or may not know this. Arlington National Cemetery is located on Lee's plantation in northern Virginia, right across the river from Washington DC. The North occupied the plantation in 1861, and in 1864 Gen. Meigs decided to turn it into a military burial ground so Lee could not use it after the war. Sort of a punishment for being so good at what he did.

[Marshal Murat]

Forward Stars and Bars!!!

Agreed Hood was no good at commanding large amounts of men.
Jeb, although a cavalier at heart and very impulsive to charge ahead, he did keep Lee resonably well informed most of the time, (Famous ride around McClellan)

Agreed, there were some camps that were Babel, but the highest percentage spoke English.

Okay, I forgot the shopkeepers, granted

But the last points are just insane.

Grant and Sherman both were at Shiloh where the second largest amount of men were lost during the entire war. Thats where most of the Union soldiers saw the elephant. After that, they won most of the battles, (Some exceptions, namely at Chickamauga where Rosencrans pulled brigades to help Thomas but was run over by Hood)

Hood was a fighter, but in the bigger scope of things, you need more than fight (Johnson would get points with his delaying actions)

And the last point about the money.
The North always had more money, because they had industry.
The immigrants came to New York because thats were the industry was. The only gunpowder mill in the entire south was somewhere in Georgia. The North could also have always exploited its manpower by draft. If the South had the same amount of money, they could rarely use it, because of the blockade.

[Baiae]

The South is generally considered to have had "better" generals. The upper level officers were essentially southern nobility, this may have given them an edge at leadership over the troops.



I always thought that by the end of the war the Generals on both sides were roughly equal in ability; it just took the North longer to find them.

Of the Southern Generals to command an army, Lee was exceptional, Joseph E. Johnson competent but uninspired, Albert S. Johnson was arguably too careless with his own safety, Beauregard didn't see much action and didn't always cover himself in glory when he did have the opportunity to command, Kirby-Smith never commanded a major army, Bragg was emotionally unstable and Hood simply incompetent when commanding an army.

So of the seven Confederate Army commanders only Lee was particularly good. The North eventually managed to produce two exceptional commanders (Sherman and Grant) and a whole cluster on competent ones (Meade, Thomas, arguably McDowell...) as well as some good generals unsuited to battlefield command (McClelland, Burnside, Rosecrans) and some truly hopeless ones (Banks, Howard, possibly Pope)




There was some political interference from the southern side. Johnston was fighting a measured retreat towards Atlanta, outnumbered but delaying Sherman's advance. Davis replaced him with Hood, who promptly attacked, lost, and Atlanta was taken before the presidential election.



I always thought Davis interfered with his generals rather more than Lincoln did because he was an ex-army officer himself.

[Marshal Murat]

What the F**k you forgot Stonewall Jackson, you shall die!!!
Kidding, hehe
Davis graduated from West Point along with the rest of the generals that fought during the war.

[drone]

Originally Posted by Baiae

I always thought that by the end of the war the Generals on both sides were roughly equal in ability; it just took the North longer to find them.
I didn't mean that the southern generals were better, just that they are considered better, at least here in the states. This may be a side-effect of people trying to figure out why it took 4 years for the Union, with much better strategic resources, to win the war. From a military-strategy standpoint, there were a fair share of boneheads on both sides. But what I meant was that the southern generals were better leaders (at least in the eyes of their men), and definitely got more out of the troops than the Union generals. Pickett's charge was a foolish move, but there were not many Union leaders who could have gotten his men anywhere near as far up the hill.

I wouldn't say Grant was exceptional, he just knew how to use his strategic advantage. He could afford a war of attrition, and forced Lee into fighting it that way. Sort of like the endgame of a TW campaign...

[Red Harvest]

Both of the CSA Johnston's were good commanders. They are not getting due credit because they were up against good Union generals. As a result, the disparities in men and material were telling. Against someone less tenaciuos than Grant, Shiloh would have been a tremendous CSA victory. You could make a valid comparison of Shiloh with Gettysburg--in both the CSA attack was repulsed. The difference was Grant not only hung on, he followed up. Lee's bacon was saved several times by a Union commander's failure to follow up: Gettysburg and Antietam were prime examples. He was fortunate not to be facing a commander like Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan on those occasions.

The Union was unfortunate in losing Nathaniel Lyon right at the start of the war at Wilson's creek. He was an aggressive, smart general, who secured Missouri from the very active insurgency, and he nearly destroyed the much larger confederate force before it could go on the offensive.

Language did play some role, but I think Didz has much overstated it. The biggest language issues I'm aware of came from the German's. There were several excellent German regiments who had drilled in preparation for war and Lyon relied on them. The loss of Lyon contributed to the rise of his subordinate Franz Sigel, who proved a very ineffective commander, and had muffed his flank attack at Wilson's Creek.

The Union had trouble with troop quality in the eastern armies, partly because they were more urban but also because they were often conscripted and NEW. The Union had suffered so many major defeats in the east that its volunteer units had largely been unable to gain experience and survive, and those that had were demoralized by a string of lackluster commanders and too frequent defeats. "Seeing the elephant" does you no good if you get squished under its feet. Their CSA counterparts survived, though depleted, to form a coherent veteran core.

[Didz]

My own view is that relationship between the Southern Soldier and the Southern General tended to be one of mutual confidence and thus they worked well as a team. If anything I think sometimes Lee had too much confidence in the abilities of his troops and often expected more from them than was reasonable.

From what I have read the Union soldier seemed to have confidence in his generals too, but I get the distinct impression that at least in the early stages of the war this confidence was not returned and that this led to the caution and reluctance to of Union generals to engage.

[Red Harvest]

Pickett's charge was a foolish move, but there were not many Union leaders who could have gotten his men anywhere near as far up the hill.


I disagree about that. Despite a lot of bad press about their valour, the Union soldiers made plenty of truly hopeless frontal assaults: Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, etc. When men are pinning their name to their uniform before an assault, so that their grave marker might bear their name, you have to admire their courage (they did so at Cold Harbor and elsewhere.)



I wouldn't say Grant was exceptional, he just knew how to use his strategic advantage. He could afford a war of attrition, and forced Lee into fighting it that way. Sort of like the endgame of a TW campaign...


Agreed. He understood what must be done, and like a pit bull, would not deviate from it.

[Baiae]

What the F**k you forgot Stonewall Jackson, you shall die!!!


I was trying to just include Generals who commanded major armies


He understood what must be done, and like a pit bull, would not deviate from it.

Isn't that the mark of an exceptional commander?

[Red Harvest]

Isn't that the mark of an exceptional commander?

Not in my book, but it is a subjective judgement. A good commander? Yes. To me an exceptional commander is able to take inferior forces/situations and regularly win with them (Jackson, Lee, Forrest.) Grant had larger forces, better supply, and a much better artillery arm. He made mistakes frequently enough, but he recovered from them. He was reliable, and a fighter--the right man in the right place at the right time. His strategic vision was exceptional, but he was not an exceptional field commander--although he certainly had some of the traits of one.

[Baiae]

...And we're back to the tactical/strategic discussion again.

[drone]

...And we're back to the tactical/strategic discussion again.
Exactly.

I've seen several posts by players saying they have huge fields of crossed swords in front of heavily contested cities. "The enemy just keeps coming and coming, and I keep slaughtering them". That is all well and good, but a really good player is going to get a troop stack together, sneak it into the enemy's backfield with some spies for scouting, and do a little "strategic bombing". Find the weak points and start damaging the enemy's ability to create these suicidal stacks. Take a city, loot it, destroy the buildings, and move on. Blockade ports, sit on trade routes. Attack small stacks before they can assemble into hordes. Destroy or seige cities that can create elite troops. You can do a lot of economic damage with dirty tricks (assuming the AI doesn't cheat with the cash).

That is the beauty of a game like TW. You don't need to be exceptional, just competent, on the combat map, if you know to exploit the strategic map. And vice-versa.

[Didz]

In my book an exceptional commander is the one who achieves his goals without fighting. Any commander who has to resort to military action has in my opinion already failed.

[Khorak]

In my book an exceptional commander is the one who achieves his goals without fighting. Any commander who has to resort to military action has in my opinion already failed.

Tell that to Eastern Europe when the Mongols arrived.
"Hello, welcome to Pola-"
*fwip* *fwip* *fwip*
*drops dead with half a million arrows in him*

[Didz]

Tell that to Eastern Europe when the Mongols arrived.

You mean they're coming back :charge:

[zhuge]

In my book an exceptional commander is the one who achieves his goals without fighting. Any commander who has to resort to military action has in my opinion already failed.

Well, in real life, I suppose I can agree. After all, Sun Tzu did say:
"to subjugate the enemy's army without doing battle is the highest of excellence."
But hey, what would R:TW be without battles, so I say, ignore the exceptional, on with the fighting and make more head soup. :charge: ~D

[Mikeus Caesar]

Military stratagy? My strategy is either: When i'm defending a city, kill as many people as i can with the archers, and once out of arrows, i end out my greek cavalry to attack the enemies flanks. Once i have lost too many horses, i make them retreat to the city, and bring out my hoplites. The idiot enemy just walk up to me, i killed a few more of their men, and flabra-cadabra, i win. It never fails. When i'm in the field fighting a battle, i send in the cavalry first to attack their flanks and front, and once i've lost quite a few, i let them retreat back to my own lines. Then i start firing onagers at the enemy, for more demoralisation, and then i let the enemy run into my hoplites. This method has a 90% chance of success.

[Khorak]

You mean they're coming back :charge:

They will be if everyone thinks that fighting at all is a loss! ~D :bow:

[Baiae]

But hey, what would R:TW be without battles, so I say, ignore the exceptional, on with the fighting and make more head soup. :charge: ~D

Admirable sentiments

[Marshal Murat]

I agree that to subjugate a enemy without fighting is a pinnacle of excellence. Besides that, let blood flow.

I always (especially with cavalry powerhouses Parthia for example) ride circles around the enemy (Romans are always easy pickings) Horse archers and merc raiders namely. Always go with range.