Article: The phalanx revolution

[Rosacrux redux]

Hello all

In RL I am a journalist and professional writer and my last addition to the long list of magazines I write for (freelancing) is a Military History magazine. I am currently putting the finishing touches on a rather looooong article (word count: 5819 and rising…) about the Macedonian phalanx – origins, ascension, purpose, tactics, armament, decisive battles, decline and fall.

In order to get some constructive criticism from fellow history buffs and also bring some knowledge about this subject into the forum – perhaps some people here don’t know the specifics of the Macedonian phalanx and wish to read about it – I decided to translate my article and post it here. Unfortunately piece-by-piece, because I have very little spare time right now so I can only afford about half hour of translation every day – and not even on all days….

Please keep in mind that

a) I am not a historian, just an experienced writer and journalist with a special interest in ancient history. I’ve done my homework, but some data might be controversial (and most certainly I add my spin here and there…)

b) I am not a native English speaker, and although I’ve done some professional translation work, my rendition of the Greek text might be far from perfect. Also, I haven't time for more than a single proofreading, so please don’t be too harsh ;)

c) The magazine is a popular one so they don’t want extremely detailed bibliography, ample references, or excessive footnotes. This is why this article looks like a magazine article, not like a PhD paper (as some other articles on similar subjects).

d) The article is copyrighted material of a Greek publication so you can’t use it in any way as is or in parts. After the magazine is printed featuring this article, you might use parts of it or not – I’ll have to ask my chief editor of their policy on this. In any way, even if you can use parts of it, you have to cite your source. I’ll let you know when it comes out, and after that if you feel like using some of it, please contact me.

Here is the first part of it. Hope you enjoy it – actually I hope some peeps here is interested in it... Objections, criticism, rants&raves, even praise (:p) welcome – if you have different data than what appears in my work, please state the source you use if possible (would be very helpful). I hope I can upload it in three parts in total, but don’t hold your breath.

PART 1

Macedonian Phalanx: Philip’s and Alexander’s revolution in warfare

Approaching the 2nd half of the 4th BC century, the City-state institution was decaying rapidly in the southern Balkans – for reasons that are not relevant to this article and so will not be discussed further. In the Helladic area a power vacuum was created – a vacuum no city-state was able to fill, neither the traditional powers as Athens or Sparta, nor the newcomer Thebes. During these times a young, able hegemon of an up until recently rather backwards Greek kingdom, was probing for an opportunity to lead his country to greatness, fill the power void and lead all the Hellenes… to conquer the world. Philip II of Macedonia - this is the young hegemon – was in dire need of an effective military system in order to achieve the ambitious goals he has set. His quest for such a system resulted in the Macedonian phalanx… and the rest, as they say, is history…

Origins of the phalanx

Macedonian phalanx is not a product of parthenogenesis
To be more precise, we should say that it is the product of at least four different parameters – all weighing equally towards the impressive outcome – and a long process involving these.

- The first is the military tradition of the warring tribes in the area of the southwestern Balkans. Some (few) Thracian tribes have been reportedly using extraordinarily long spears – pikes, actually – for a long time by Philip’s era. Although the Greeks, even the less refined Macedonians, never quite followed this tradition – unlike the peltast, another Thracian invention, that was very popular throughout Greece – the pike-bearers must have originally appeared in Thrace.
- The second defining parameter was the military system in use in southern Greece. The hoplite phalanx, massed heavily armed and armored spear-wielding footmen fighting in a close formation, a military system that appeared in Argos during the 8th century BC and was perfected in the subsequent years in the confinements of the city-states of the area.
- The third parameter is the revolutionary ideas that changed hoplite warfare rapidly, especially by two men: In the tactical field, Epameinondas, the general of Thebes, victor against Sparta and creator of the skewed phalanx. In the field of hoplite armament, Iphikrates, the Athenian general of the mercenaries.
- The fourth and maybe more critical parameter: the genius of Philip II of Macedonia, the man who opened the way for Alexander III of Macedonia, the one we remember as “the Great”.

Before the times of Philip the Macedonian infantry was mainly an amalgam of a great number of light infantry, especially peltasts, and smaller numbers of hoplites. The former was an adoption to the nature of enemies the Macedonians had to face: mostly light, mobile infantry of Illyrian or Thracian descent. The latter was an adoption to the southern Greeks and their ways.
Generally, though, the Macedonian army was based on its cavalry. The landowners “nobles” consisting the body of the “Vasilikoi heteroi” (King’s companions) was the more prominent arm of the Macedonian army.


Philip’s influences
Philip altered all that. Most historians agree that the main inspirations for the young – at the time – king of Macedonia, were two: the first is probably the radical development of the hoplite warfare system as materialized by Epameinondas in Thebes (Philip had spend quite some time in Thebes as a royal hostage). The great Theban general – inspiration and subject of study for several great leaders throughout the ages like Napoleon, Frederick the Great and Karl Gustav of Sweden among others – has changed almost everything in the traditional, dull, rather static push-fest that was the hoplite phalanx warfare for the greater part. Epameinondas altered the depth of the phalanx, adopting it to momentum, inspiration, specific battle plan etc.– instead of 8, 12 or 16 ranks deep, he would even use 50 rank deep phalanx if needed. Also, he put into use breakthrough tactics in the field – flanking with elements (back rows, specifically appointed units etc.) of the ultra-deep phalanx, hitting selected spots in the enemy’s formation, gradual engagement of the phalanx in the battle.

The second inspiration might have been – although we don’t have any ancient sources verifying this – the other revolution in hoplite warfare of the era, the one led by the Athenian general Iphikrates. The Iphikratian peltasts were a dominant force in the late classical battlefield, by adopting a series of changer regarding the equipment (lighter thorax- linen instead of metal – neglecting greaves, carrying a smaller rimless shield and armed with a long spear and a long sword) and their operating tactics. Most importantly, Iphikrates was extremely obsessed with drilling and training and his men were the best-trained infantrymen of his era. Drilling and training was Philip’s obsession as well.

Historians can’t agree on who actually should be awarded with the “inventor of the Macedonian phalanx” badge. Most people believe that Philip was the one that armed the Macedonian farmers and cattle-herders with the sarisa and gave them the small rimless shield, but this might – if we are to believe a number of historians – just be a common misconception. According to some sources one of the two predecessors to Philip, Alexander II or Perdikkas III, was the one who replaced the peltast or hoplite gear of his men with pikes and round, rimless shields. We don’t have any accounts, though, of use of such footmen in action – not even in the battle where Perdikkas lost his life along with 4.000 other Macedonians defending his kingdom from the Illyrians. Some historians go even back to the era of Alexander I philelen (the king of Macedonia during the Persian wars and probably the most successful king of this northern Greek tribe before Philip) as the time when the long pikes first appeared in the Macedonian army, but this is probably very wrong indeed. At least one primary source, though, Diodorus the Sicilian (Diodoros Sikeliotes) credits Philip 100% with the invention of the phalanx (both armament and formation-tactics)

Anyway, whoever the creator of the pike phalanx was, the one that formulated its tactical dogma, compiled the combined arms approach and utilized the varying elements it was consisted from, to create the most formidable military system of the ancient world was Philip II and he should be credited with the title.

Special characteristics
There is not much objection to the notion that the pike phalanx is an offspring of the hoplite phalanx – or more likely a radical evolution of it. But there are huge differences in the armament and tactical use of the two phalanxes. Those are:

The first difference is the spear. The phalangites were armed with the sarisa pikes, not hoplite spears. A typical sarisa of this period, as we can tell by the sources and by the huge spear points dating to Philip’s times we have found, was 5.2 to 5.5 meters long. The sarisa kept on growing though – in the 2nd century a length of 6 meters was the standard and some armies used sarisas up to 6.4 meters long. Using such a great instrument of death (8 to 9 kg weight) with one hand – as the hoplites did – was out of the question. So, a method similar to the one Iphikrates used for his pike-armed “peltasts” was employed: A small, rimless shield (up to 65 cm. diameter) was attached to the soldiers shoulder with a strap.

The other change had to do with the armor. During the Peloponnesian wars the heavy all-metal armor (thorax) was by large abandoned for a lighter linen thorax, while some armies neglected the breastplate altogether and relied only on their shield for protection. In the subsequent decades, though, especially after the 380s, the metal thorax made an impressive come back and was once more standard gear for Greek hoplites – thanks especially to the skewed phalanx tactics. Macedonian peasants and artisans, the backbone of the phalanx, did not have the means to afford the expensive gear in most occasions, so in order to recruit more of them Philip had to forget about that requirement. Most artistic depictions show the Phalangites of Philip of Alexander with similar “uniforms”, wearing metallic or linen panoplies. Well, even though some historians tend to believe that the Macedonian phalangites wore a short red tunic (some sort of “uniform”) most of the soldiers actually wore no thorax at all. We should assume that the first 2-3 ranks (maybe even 4) had armor – some of them even metallic, most linen and even leather vests with iron supplements – but in the following rows armor was sparse at best. The last few ranks were most probably completely unarmored. Those who had some sort of thorax either had the financial means to buy one, or had acquired one as loot in some battle. There are no credible accounts of the state providing anyone with armor – although the standard practice for officers wearing armor (in order to increase their survival rate so the command structure would remain intact during battle) implies that perhaps such an arrangement was in limited use. The state provided its infantrymen only with the sarisa and shield – the men themselves should acquire the rest of their gear.

The phalangites also wore helmets (Thracian/Phrygian in the times of Philip, mostly Boeotian in the times of Alexander, but many other types were in use simultaneously) and the men in the first few ranks and those with the financial means also wore greaves. The secondary weapon of the phalangites was a short sword, usually of the kopis family (but much shorter than other versions of the kopis).

Organization and structure
Philip organized the phalanx to fight in a cohesive formation, usually 16 men deep. We have some accounts of the phalanx operating in 8 ranks or 32 ranks, but most of the time the 16 ranks were the standard formation. A critical aspect of Philip’s advances was the obligation of the infantrymen to drill regularly. Drilling allowed the Macedonian phalanx, despite its shortcomings, to become a relatively mobile and flexible formation in the times of Philip and Alexander.

The Greek city-states relied on citizen armies but a kingdom with an aim for greatness through conquest, as was Philip’s vision, couldn’t afford the same. Citizen armies could only operate for a limited period of time (a couple of months every year was the most) and then had to be dispatched to return to their everyday duties. Philip needed a standing army, more or less professional and he proceeded to create one. The core of the army, the hypaspists, was the purely professional branch of the Macedonian forces, along with the non-Macedonian mercenaries. But the whole army would receive adequate payment – along with the loot they’d get – to provide men with an incentive to leave their homes, businesses, fields or cattle and take part in a long campaign. It is true that Philip, despite having secured early in his reign the endless riches of the Paggeon goldmines and receiving tributes from a number of cities, tribes and kingdoms, by death left only empty coffins. At large – besides Philip’s tendency for fancy and expensive feasts, certainly a trait running in the family as Alexander proved – this was due to the ample payment and extra gifts the army (men and officers alike) received.

END of part 1

(PART 2 follows in the next week, if some of you believe it's actually worth it)

[Rosacrux redux]

PART II


During Philips times the specifics of the organization of the phalanx remains for the greater part unknown. What we do know is that the top organization unit of the phalanx was the “taxis”, but we don’t have specific data on how large it was really and what the vertical structure was. We also know that Philip has maintained the tradition to man each taxis from a specific geographical region.

Regarding Alexander’s times, we have ample data regarding the organizational structure of the phalanx. The largest unit is once more the Taxis, numbering 1536 men. The commander of the Taxis is called Taxiarchos. Every Taxis consists of 6 Syntagmata or Lochous (different sources provide one or the other name) of 256 men each. Every Syntagma/Lochos has 16 Lochous or Dekarchies (again, different names used by different sources) of 16 men each. According to some sources, there is an even more detailed breakdown, into “Imilochies” (half-lochoi or dekarchies) and “Enomoties” (1/4 of a Lochos/Dekarchia) with the corresponding commanders. Note that Dekarchia means “10 men unit” and so we assume that originally, before Alexander’s times, that was the case. Most probably, Alexander bolstered the numbers of all units.

In the times of the successors, we have references only for Taxis or, more often and interchangeably, Chiliarchies (“1000 men units”), and Pentakosiarchies (the name stands for “500 men units”). No mentioning of a detailed vertical structure from the times of the successors exists, and many historians tend to believe that the previous system was abandoned. In the armies of the Macedonian Kingdom only two distinctive groups survived in the times of the Roman intervention in Greece: the division in two “Kerata” (literary “horns”, meaning “wings”). The Right “Keras” (Argyraspides – Silver Shields) and the Left Keras (Chalkaspides – Bronze Shields).
We have reasons to believe that abandoning the organization scheme of Alexander’s (and possibly Philip’s) times was a decisive factor in the decline of the later phalanxes.



The hammer and anvil approach

Tactical innovations
Philip had now a very reliable, highly motivated, extremely effective heavy infantry force. But this force had all the intricate shortcomings of it’s forefather, the hoplite phalanx: Reduced mobility, vulnerable to flanking, difficulties on rugged terrain. Most of those weaknesses, because of the changes introduced in the Pike Phalanx, were magnified, while still the Macedonians lacked – due to lack of armor in most cases and due to the smaller shield – the high degree of protection from missiles the hoplite phalanx enjoyed. This is where the rest of the arms of the Macedonian fighting force, and especially the cavalry, are entering the picture.

The Macedonian cavalry, along with the Thessalian, was the best of the Greek world Since the early days of the Macedonian kingdom, cavalry was honed with the focal position in all armies the King could produce. To understand what brought the Macedonians into the position to have such an extraordinary cavalry, we have to realize some social facts about that kingdom. For the greater part of its history, this state was a decentralized, agrarian society. Where in the city-states an urban culture arose, in the Macedonian plains and highlands things remained pretty much in the times of the Achaean kingdoms. No settlements larger than a medium village, few landowners owning large chunks of the land, a numerous and rather poor peasantry (almost serfs) – that was how Macedonia was. Very few free citizens with their own land or trade – those people manned the hoplite phalanx in the city-states. Macedonia failed to follow the main Greek world, as did Epirus – both caught up only in the 4th century BC and still maintained their traditional political systems (monarchy, although far from “absolute”, the Macedonian monarchy more than anything resembled the feudal monarchies in Western Europe at the middle ages). The first Macedonian hegemon to have tried to bring his subjects closer to their southern Greek cousins, was Alexander I “philelen” (498-454 BC), who was also the first Macedonian to enter the Olympics (the “Greeks only” event of the ancient world).

Ironically enough, Alexander was also the king which subdued a number of “barbarian” tribes in the north and east of the Macedonian heartlands, adding them in his territories and thus creating much hassle for the future – the King of Macedonia became not only master of the (Hellenic) Macedonians, but also of several Thracian and Illyrian tribes.
This political, social and economic backwardness, and the lack of an urban culture, was also the main reason why the hoplite never became popular in Macedonia. For the greater part, only the colonies of the southern city-states had hoplite armies in Macedonia, although Alexander I and his successors tried to amplify the strength of their cavalry-based armies with small numbers of hoplites.

The Macedonian cavalry was extremely effective, but its numbers were nowhere near adequate. When Philip rose to the Maceonian throne, the “Heteroi” (Companions) numbered only 600 men. Only three decades later, Alexander would venture into Asia with 1.800 Companions, leaving behind a smaller number of them to Antipater (Antipatros), to watch over the northern neighbors and the rather reluctant southern allies. Also, Alexander had with him a contigent of light cavalry (Prodromoi – the Macedonian prodromoi, not to be confused with the other segment of light cavalry of Alexander’s army, like the Paeonian, under the same name) probably 500 men strong. The Thessalian cavalry was also an integral part of the Macedonian army, even in the times of Philip (he was lord of Thessaly too). Later, after succes against the Persian, many Thessalian joined the Heteroi.

Before the times of Philip, the tactical use of the Macedonian cavalry was not different than the typical use of cavalry in that era: flanking, clashing with the opposing cavalry, chasing away light infantry and hunting down routing enemy. This was, truly, a waste of heavy, effective cavalry as the Macedonian was and definitely did not suit Philip’s plans for a combined arms approach. The heavy infantry was still the part of the army that would conclude the battle.

Under Philips guidance the heavy cavalry became the dominant force of the battlefield – although to witness the full effect of Philips reforms a leader who would utilize the new structure to its limits, like Alexander, was needed. The heavy infantry, now the pike-phalanx, was still the strong arm of the Macedonian army, but the heavy cavalry could, and on occasion would, be the decisive factor now would be the cavalry. A head-on charge would often decide the battle, when the phalanx had engaged and pinned the bulk of the enemy forces. Philip presented the new evolutionary system for the first time in Chaeronia, when a coalision of City states clashed with his almighty army. A devastating charge of the Companion cavalry led by the young Alexander, crushed the hoplites and brought victory home to Pella, when things were not looking so good for the pike phalanx. This is the first battle showing in quite a decisive manner, that the new Macedonian army wasn’t all about the impressive long sticks but had lots more under the hood. Most historians and military historians – at least those not completely under the spell of the stirrups and the couched lance – agree that the first shock cavalry in history was the Macedonian cavalry, as used by Alexander the Great.

And we say “Alexander” and not “Philip”, because the latter had the chance only once to decide a battle with a cavalry charge – in Chaeronia. Usually, Philip’s army would face Illyrians and Thracians, on terrain (mountains and hills) not suitable for a coordinated cavalry charge. In those engagements, the pike phalanx, supported by the light infantry and the heavy cavalry, won the day. On the contrary, Alexander in all his battles used his extraordinary cavalry as the arm that would decide the outcome. Philip, though, was the one that laid the foundations for that: he quadrupled the number of Companions, used them for the first time as shock cavalry-likes, and insisted on elements of training – of both the riders and the mounts – crucial to the creation of an effective shock cavalry.

Combined arms
While analyzing the above, we are led to the conclusion that the Macedonian phalanx was not designed to operate as a stand-alone military system. Unlike it’s predecessor, the hoplite phalanx, it was not a do-it-all system, able to easily prevail in large scale confrontations without the support of further elements – particularly against highly mobile armies. In the armies of the southern Greeks, at least until Iphikrates created his version of the peltast, the light infantry (“psiloi”) and the cavalry only supplemented the phalanx and never played a decisive role in battle. Even states with very good cavalry, like the Thebans, relied fully on their heavy infantry to win a battle. In the military system created by Philip and perfected by Alexander, the light infantry and, especially, the cavalry, were not only integral parts, but also decisive factors in the battle. The pike phalanx itself was practically impenetrable frontally – if the soldiers were drilled and could hold ranks – but it was far from invulnerable from the flanks and rear. Just imagine how hard to is for a concrete formation of men wielding 6-meter pikes, to wheel and face a threat coming from the side or rear. Also, the phalanx was quite vulnerable to arrow shower (small shield, most men had no armor) and certainly needed level ground to fully utilize its strengths.

By the extensive use of cavalry and skirmishers, Alexander managed to alleviate these shortcomings. The cavalry, depending on wether it was light or heavy, would have a specific role in battle: skirmishing, fighting off the opposing cavalry, protecting the phalanx’s flanks, and take advantage of any tactical situation that offered the chance to charge into the enemy formation, especially (but not only) into a breach created by the action of the heavy infantry. The latter was precisely the element setting the Macedonian cavalry on their very own league in the respective timeframe and giving them the title of a true shock cavalry.

Every different unit had its specific duties during the battle. Light cavalry (mostly the Paeonian scouts) usually would skirmish, cover the flanks, chase down light infantry and routing enemies. The non-companion heavy cavalry (Thessalians, other Greeks) would usually fight against the opposing cavalry and if prevalent, would try to flank pinned enemy formations. Similar duties had the Macedonian prodromoi, equipped with the “ippiki sarisa”, the “cavalry version” of the sarisa pike (up to 4 meters, at least a meter longer than the “Xyston” the Companions used and even longer than the Dory of the Thessalians). Sometimes those fleet riders would even charge home, despite riding completely unarmored. But the main shock cavalry, those who’s charge would decide the outcome, was the Companion cavalry. Alexander would charge the Heteroi, in wedge formation, into a break in the enemy ranks, aiming either (like in Gaugamela-Issos) at a key point of the line (for instance, the location of the enemy leader) or at widening the break, demoralize the enemy and provide the infantry with a chance to exploit.

A quite popular saying among military historians dealing with the era is that “the companion cavalry was the hammer and the phalanx the anvil of the Macedonian army”.

Where in that picture, you might ask, would the light infantry fit? Well, it was neither the hammer or the anvil, but without it the Macedonian phalanx would never achieve what it did. The “psiloi” (javelin-armed and bowmen) maintained their own distinctive role in the Macedonian army. They would skirmish, deal with the opposing skirmishers (always a threat to the pike phalanx) deal with unusual threats (elephants, chariots for instance) guard the flanks and create disarray in the enemy ranks by raining arrows. Light infrantry in Alexander’s army – but also in Philip’s – played a central role, elevating the meager “psiloi” (even the name sounds abasing…) to heights never seen in any hoplite army.

The light infantry was always a field of professional soldiers, requiring skill and training. A hoplite was alright if he could maintain his place in the phalanx and hold the ranks. A light infantryman needed much, much more. That is even more true for the archers, because archery required intensive training for many years. This is why Alexander, trying to alleviate the lack of high quality light infantry among the Macedonian conscripts, supplemented his army with mercenaries (Cretan archers, Rhodian slingers) or allies (Agriannes javelinmen, Thracian peltasts).

A rather significant feature of the phalangites in the times of Philip and Alexander, was their adaptive nature and their ability to operate effectively in a variety of terrains, even under circumstances completely improper for the deployment of the phalanx. This had been achieved by the training of the Macedonian troops, so they could operate under any circumstances and on any ground, and by providing them with the right arms for any instance (when operating on mountains, they would of course get rid of their unwieldy sarisa and arm themselves with javelins).


Lethal Weapon
All those elements – different as they seem at first glance – had to be bound together to create the most effective killing machine ever appeared in the ancient world. Coordinating and commandment of this force, was an extremely demanding duty, requiring a general possessing a rare tactical genius and extraordinary perception. The lack of such commanders, along with a series of other parameters we’ll discuss more in the last part of this article, was a rather significant factor in the decline of the phalanx military system and played a pivotal role in the devastating defeats the states they used it suffered in the hands of more mobile and adaptive military systems. But in the times of Philip, the decline was still very far away and the pezetairoi, along with the rest of the Macedonian force, presented a new way of waging war and crushed every opponent they met.

The innovations of the 4th century warfare and the genius of Philip and Alexander combined in the best way to create a military system that has revolutionized the way to conduct a battle or wage war. No more endless push-fests, no more immobile infantry in minimum-casualties half-ceremonial battles. As stated by the controversial Victor Davis Hanson in “Carnage and Culture”, “the coordination between infantry and cavalry was a completely new invention in the history of western warfare and was designed to make numerical superiority unnecessary. Philip’s battles were not extensive push contests between two phalanxes, but abrupt Napoleonic assaults in specific points, that would break along with the enemy’s moral” (P.S. this passage is translated back to English from the Greek translation of Hanson’s book so the wording is probably different than the original)

This extraordinary killing machine would reach its apogee in the times of Alexander the Great, who utilized it not just to prevail over his enemies, but also to utterly crush them.

[Rosacrux redux]

Space reserved redux

[L'Impresario]

I haven't read the whole first part (I 'll do so later) but I would be interested to know what words you employed in the original for "spear" and "pike". I'm not sure there is a greek word exclusively for pike, thus "spear" is interexchangeable with "pike", at least when you don't use "sarissa" to show the difference. "Dori" would be the spear, but what about the pike? Although I'm more interested in how the pikes of later periods were called tbh heh

Might I ask which magazine that one is?;)

[Rosacrux redux]

L'impressario

You are right, there is no word for "pike" in the Greek language. I am using the same word ("Dory", spear) but when I talk about the pike, I am mostly using the word "Sarisa", which is well-known and used in several instances as "pike" (in the case of the Swiss pikemen of the renaissance world, we often call them "Elveti Sarisophoroi", Swiss sarisa-bearers).

In general, all pikes, spears etc. in Greek are called "dory" (plural "dorata"). Some use the word "akondio" but this is plain wrong, because akondio means literaly "something that is thrown", and should be used only for javelins or very short spears usable as javelins as well.

And, the magazine is not out yet. It's a new one. details, when it comes out. Do you know the Greek magazines dealing with military history?

Please provide with feedback when you read the first part.

[Rosacrux redux]

Hmm... not a single comment? Is it so lousy? has anyone even read it?

[L'Impresario]

I just read it, I won't comment on any grammatical etc errors (as it'll be in greek anyway an I'm not a native english speaker as well), but so far I think its pretty informative and if it has any omissions, then I can't directly point them out without consulting "my books". It covers all basic points one should know about the macedonian phalanx so far; I suspect that analysis of confrontations and the results of clashes with different military styles and cultures will follow, in order to highlight its defects mostly, as possibly some part of the greek "audience" can only relate the downfall of the phalanx to the political instability after Alexander's death, as well as the hard time the city-state coalitions had while facing the romans, at least those that tried heh
So pointing out its natural deficiencies could be a nice follow up (but that's only my guess as I said).

About greek military magazines, I read mostly the publications of Periskopio editions, though sometimes I'm a bit annoyed by some writers' approaches.

[Marcellus]

A very good and informative article. I look forward to the next part.

[Alexanderofmacedon]

I like it ~;)

Look at my name

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Very nice, one tiny little thing that jumped out straight away though. The Phalanx may well predate the 8th Century, it may be as old as 1,200-1,400BC. All that we can say is that it was in use by the 8th Century.

[L'Impresario]

Well, Homer allows us to know that at least during the timeframe of the Trojan Wars, no phalanx formation was being employed. Ofcourse, there is a relative Dark Age in Greece during the couple of centuries predating the 7th cent.

[Mouzafphaerre]

Hmm... not a single comment? Is it so lousy? has anyone even read it?
.
Subscribed to the thread. :bow:
.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Well, Homer allows us to know that at least during the timeframe of the Trojan Wars, no phalanx formation was being employed. Ofcourse, there is a relative Dark Age in Greece during the couple of centuries predating the 7th cent.

Ah, hah!

If you re-read the Iliad you will see reference to Hector throwing himself against the wall of the Greek's shields and being unable to brake them. This suggests a proto-phalanx, further these men are described as being the better fighters, falling between the heros and the levies.

I'm paraphrasing because my copy of the Iliad is in a box waiting to go to Uni. Classicists aggree that the passage does refer to some form of phalanx, however there is debate about whether Homer included it because it was familiar to his own time or because it was part of the history of the Trojan War.

Further there are depictions on Mycenaean pottery of armoured soldiers standing in line with spear and shield. As the Greeks lost the ability to write around 1,200BC hundred and the Acheans weren't big on anything other than record keeping its impossible to prove one way or the other.

[L'Impresario]

Ah, hah!

If you re-read the Iliad you will see reference to Hector throwing himself against the wall of the Greek's shields and being unable to brake them. This suggests a proto-phalanx, further these men are described as being the better fighters, falling between the heros and the levies.



Heh, I can argue this point of view in great length, but it's true that no one can be 100% sure. When I'll have time (that is tomorrow afternoon or on Monday) to present my basic objections to a Mycenaean phalanx that resembled closely the one we know and love (or hate), I'll start by mentioning the following word(s): city-state.
Also,the existance of a proto-phalanx isn't to be denied, but the passages in the Iliad that refer to them are most likely an anachronism. I hope that I'll be able to clarify this by following the development of the "polis" and the connection between the nature of a society and its military customs and practices. Nothing is born by itself, so the phalanx had somewhere it's origins, and we can note that many neighbouring people used the spear in numbers and quite close formation. Why they didn't develop the phalanx is what I'm going to refer to.
And in the end, we 'll end up having a "to push or not to push" argument again heh - honestly I can't take any more obscene tiny references that lead to nowhere :dizzy2: ....but they did push ~;)

[Red Harvest]

Looks like a very good start to me. It is hard to summarize such things and strike a balance, rather than taking sides. There are so many competing theories.

I find it fascinating that there is still a great deal of debate about how the soldiers actually fought in the Macedonian and hoplite phalanx. I'm still puzzled about some aspects of the Macedonian phalangite's shield, and how it was employed for example.

One part that could use some further development, is to cover the defining characteristic of single vs. two handed weapon use. That transition is pivotal--and the attachment of the shield is of course a key part of the new system.

Something that is missing from your list of items that were key to the development was that the phalanx system had a socio-economic advantage over the older property owner hoplite system. You went into some detail about this later, but you omitted it from your initial list of fundamental changes (lumping it under Philip's genius.) It allowed a draft of the masses--increasing the "military pool" and standing professional army. (A parallel may be found with the Rome's evolution from hoplite to legionaire and the steadily changing property/citizenship requirements.) As an aside: a worthy contrast might also be the liability of the exclusivity of the Spartan hoplite. The Spartans went to the opposite extreme. The Spartans had become so elite their numbers were insufficient; a single major defeat could effectively break them.

On the question of when did the phalanx arise. That's a very good question. There are the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Sumerian reliefs that *suggest* some sort of more organized spear formations. However they fought, they were superior to their foes in specific periods, but when these Easterner's successors faced the hoplite phalanx they were badly outmatched. So the hoplites were special/different and superior.

I'm no historian either...but I share the hobby interest in history.

[caesar44]

The questions are - If the phalanx was there for centuries , why Phillip's one was the best ? Why the Macedonians did not used it against the world before ? If the Greeks had their phalanx why they lost it to Phillip's one (beside the cavalry thing) ? Why the Persians managed to deal with the Greek phalanx but lost their empire with in 5 years to Alexander's ?

Until now I thought that the Phillipo-Macedonian phalanx was a revolutionary weapon , what now ?

[Rosacrux redux]

Ah, some feedback!

Thank you for the kind words and comments, I am just trying to put forth an informative piece, without ommiting any critical data, trying to produce an easy read at the same time. Hope I am getting somewhere with it. I know it has some shortcomings (and, as I said, I add my personal spin here and there) but I hope it ain't really lousy.

About the question of the phalanx and its roots... well, the Macedonian phalanx (or pike phalanx, if you like) is a different animal than the hoplite phalanx, although not too far distant a relative. Yes, caesar, it was a revolutionary weapon but that was not - just - the phalanx itself, but the whole military system - the "hammer and anvil" or combined arms approach.

Generally the phalanx as: heavy infantrymen fighting in a tight, cohesive formation, with a distinct effort to hold the ranks ...this is a Greek invention. The heavily armed and armoured infantryman first appeared in the Achean world and the first time the same infantryman was used during (according to evidence - we don't really know if it appeared previously, during the "dark ages" - although it is highly unlikely) the 8th century, starting from Argos and spreading out to the whole helladic area.

It was a military system and a way of fighting pretty much region-specific (southern greece specific) and that was due to a number of parameters (land, people, political and social organization, climate, lack or abundance of specific materials etc. etc.) that never before combined anywhere else.

A very primitive form of phalanx, but with unarmoured infantrymen and without the shield wall (synaspismos) was employed by the Sumerians - neither Egyptians nor Assyrians ever had anything resembling a cohesive infantry formation.

I am currently gathering data about an article describing the phalanx in general (from the Sumerians to the Tercios...) and it looks like a huge undertaking. I'll keep you posted about that, but that will take a couple of months at least...

as for this article, I hope I can post the part 2 in two or three days. I've finished the Greek version, but haven't found enough time to translate properly...

Impressario, I am mostly reading the magazines of the same publications and the problem with the political views in ALL greek military history magazines is a rather serious one. But I try to keep an open mind and usually end up sending rather vulgar e-mails to the authors of certain articles... oh well...

[Narayanese]

Read the article, interesting.

8-9 kg for a pike sounds very heavy... were they forced to hold them upright until the enemy was very close?

[Casmin]

Well, Homer allows us to know that at least during the timeframe of the Trojan Wars, no phalanx formation was being employed. Ofcourse, there is a relative Dark Age in Greece during the couple of centuries predating the 7th cent.

I'm a little confused about your post because Homer's Illiad was anachronistic. It wasn't a portrayal of the 12th c. but rather the times Homer was living in. I'm not a Homer expert but am I correct?

[L'Impresario]

I'm a little confused about your post because Homer's Illiad was anachronistic. It wasn't a portrayal of the 12th c. but rather the times Homer was living in. I'm not a Homer expert but am I correct?

Yes, it's partially so, but don't take everything mentioned in there as an anachronism. There are certain cultural references which changed over the years, as the epics were initially transmited solely through oral means. So as we approach the definitive version of the story, we see traditions and customs that weren't really around the trojan war years, eg. the burial ceremony procedures of the time being replaced by the ones from Homer's period.


Impressario, I am mostly reading the magazines of the same publications and the problem with the political views in ALL greek military history magazines is a rather serious one. But I try to keep an open mind and usually end up sending rather vulgar e-mails to the authors of certain articles... oh well...

Hehe, I think it has to do with the kind of many people that are interested in military history and subjects in Greece. This reminds me of that instance not long ago, when I went to a well-known bookstore in the city center that specialices in military books, with a friend of mine that happened to be wearing a jacket that had a small german flag on the left-arm side. When leaving, my friend told me that a guy (I think he was working there as well) next to the fellow behind the counter, fixed his eyes on his arm and then approvingly nodded with a smile. Now, a person could have done that for a variety of reasons, but I think flirting, appreciation of the Nationalmannschaft and a good taste in clothing would have been pretty improbable, given the place and the "reputation" of military-stuff reading fellows.


Rosacrux also provided the main gist of what I was going to refer to regarding the phalanx's supposed appearance.


It was a military system and a way of fighting pretty much region-specific (southern greece specific) and that was due to a number of parameters (land, people, political and social organization, climate, lack or abundance of specific materials etc. etc.) that never before combined anywhere else.

During the Dark Ages, it would have been hard to get all those factors together, at least in a scale that allows us to make any statements that will tear down previous conceptions. 100% one can be not - I don't monitor closely all things written about the subject so I can be wrong.

[conon394]

Rosacrux redux

I have some problems with the characterization of Iphicrates and his peltasts.


The Iphikratian peltasts were a dominant force in the late classical battlefield, by adopting a series of changer regarding the equipment (lighter thorax- linen instead of metal – neglecting greaves, carrying a smaller rimless shield and armed with a long spear and a long sword) and their operating tactics

First why call Iphicrates a general of mercenaries, he was an Athenian, an elected general and commanded at various times Athenian troops, and ships, mercenaries (largly in the service of Athens, or her allies), and fought for Persia (at the behest of Athens). Why not just Athenian general?

More importantly I think you are overstating the importance of Iphicrates here and a bit earlier. To be the dominate force on the battlefield I would think Iphicrates and his peltasts (or at last the professional peltasts of some other state) would need to have decided the out come of several if not the majority of the era’s major battles, but they did not in fact do that. Nemea, Coronea, Tegyra, Leuctra, Mantinea, Tamynai, Crimisus, Chaeronea, Lamia, Crannon; all were decided by heavy infantry (hoplites or sarissa armed troops) and cavalry. Iphicrates never managed to shut the Isthmus of Corinth against Epaminondas with his peltasts. Even in his seminal victory over the Spartans it was not peltasts vs. hoplites, but rather well led Athenian hoplites and peltasts against Spartan hoplites and poorly lead cavalry.

On the training side other successful generals in the 4th century such as Charbrias (an Athenian) and the more famous Theban generals Epaminondas and Pelopidas are also noted as maintaining a high degree of training and drill in their troops. More generally, all of the major Greek powers of the 4th century developed more comprehensive training and professional elements. It seems inaccurate to me to ascribe a general trend to just one particular commander.


though, especially after the 380s, the metal thorax made an impressive come back and was once more standard gear for Greek hoplites – thanks especially to the skewed phalanx tactics

I’m not sure the causality is clear here. After all the oblique phalanx was largely the forte of just Epaminondas, yet the Bronze muscled cuirass remained (or if you really but into the whole unarmed hoplite thing, became) popular not just with the Thebens but across the Greek world in general.

caesar44


Why the Persians managed to deal with the Greek phalanx but

When did the Persians ever manage to deal with the Greek phalanx, except by hiring a mercenary Greek phalanx of their own?

[Rosacrux redux]

Rosacrux redux

I have some problems with the characterization of Iphicrates and his peltasts.



First why call Iphicrates a general of mercenaries, he was an Athenian, an elected general and commanded at various times Athenian troops, and ships, mercenaries (largly in the service of Athens, or her allies), and fought for Persia (at the behest of Athens). Why not just Athenian general?

Iphicrates was mostly a mercenary captain, as were lots and lots of Greek generals at the time - even many Spartans generals. He had a large band of mercenaries as his army, not the army of Athens, and he rented that army to Athens on occassion.

It makes sense to call him "general of mercenaries" as it makes sense to call him Athenian general - he was both. I trust you have read Polybious lives, no? He makes several mentions of Iphicrates there (in Agesilaus' live and in a couple of others) and usually he points out the affection of Iphicrates for the mercenaries. This passage is quite eloquent: "Iphicrates the Athenian used to say that it is best to have a mercenary soldier fond of money and of pleasures, for thus he will fight the more boldly, to procure the means to gratify his desires".


More importantly I think you are overstating the importance of Iphicrates here and a bit earlier. To be the dominate force on the battlefield I would think Iphicrates and his peltasts (or at last the professional peltasts of some other state) would need to have decided the out come of several if not the majority of the era’s major battles, but they did not in fact do that. Nemea, Coronea, Tegyra, Leuctra, Mantinea, Tamynai, Crimisus, Chaeronea, Lamia, Crannon; all were decided by heavy infantry (hoplites or sarissa armed troops) and cavalry. Iphicrates never managed to shut the Isthmus of Corinth against Epaminondas with his peltasts. Even in his seminal victory over the Spartans it was not peltasts vs. hoplites, but rather well led Athenian hoplites and peltasts against Spartan hoplites and poorly lead cavalry.

Partly right, partly wrong. The victory of Iphicrates against the Spartans was one of a well-led contigent of Peltasts only - the Athenian hoplites were a few miles away, close to Corinthus and quite away from the battle. That's the wrong part.

The right part is that they didn't actually won any major battle (well, slaughtering and/or capturing a Spartan mora is major as in itself, although not significant in the greater scope of things).

I think how important or not Iphicrates and his reforms were, is pretty much a matter of perception. I have evaluated him and his job as highly important, as to his changes in the armament opened the way for the phalangite, his tactics had an even greater impact, his military thinking and innovations were so important as to be quoted and reffered to regularly by writers that lived even 4 centuries after him. Indirect importance, you might say. But I consider it of utter importance. A matter of perception, as I say.


On the training side other successful generals in the 4th century such as Charbrias (an Athenian) and the more famous Theban generals Epaminondas and Pelopidas are also noted as maintaining a high degree of training and drill in their troops. More generally, all of the major Greek powers of the 4th century developed more comprehensive training and professional elements. It seems inaccurate to me to ascribe a general trend to just one particular commander.

I don't think training and drilling as Iphicrates did it, was anything close to a "general trend". Sure he wasn't alone in it, but he was alone in the field of having a large, fully professional, full-time soldier force at his disposal. Again, it is a matter of perception, but there is a solid fact here: the standing army any city state would maintain, was usually very small. The Thebans had 300 men, the rest were citizen conscripts. A citizen is not a full-time warrior and hasn't got the time to drill and train in the way Iphicrates did with his men.


I’m not sure the causality is clear here. After all the oblique phalanx was largely the forte of just Epaminondas, yet the Bronze muscled cuirass remained (or if you really but into the whole unarmed hoplite thing, became) popular not just with the Thebens but across the Greek world in general.

I meant that the Thebans, in need of good protection to carry through with their very aggressive tactics, brought the thorax back and the rest responded. Not very clear through the sources, of course, so it's mostly personal opinion (and evaluation).

Thank you for the comments, I think it's crucial to have that kind of exchange of ideas.

[caesar44]

Rosacrux redux

When did the Persians ever manage to deal with the Greek phalanx, except by hiring a mercenary Greek phalanx of their own?


When ? From 490 to 334 .
"hiring a mercenary Greek phalanx" - They did it also in 334 , so , I ask again .

[Rosacrux redux]

Hmm... caesar, if my memory serves me right, Persian forces only in very, very few battles managed to deal with Greek phalanxes: During the Ionian revolt, they won victories in a few pitched battles - one is relatively widely known, two others are partly documented and that's it. They managed to win over mediocre hoplite armies (of the Ionian city-states) mostly by raining arrows and using their superior cavalry. Those tactics never worked against adequately trained, highly disciplined and heavily armored hoplites of mainland Greece.

The rest of the engagements of Persian forces against Greek phalanxes, throughout the 5th and 4th century, have proven ruinous for the Persian side. This is the reason every Persian hegemon, be it the King of Kings or a petty satrap, always employed Greek mercenaries as their prime fighting force- they didn't have a counter measure for Greek heavy infantry operating in a phalanx.

[caesar44]

Hmm... caesar, if my memory serves me right, Persian forces only in very, very few battles managed to deal with Greek phalanxes: During the Ionian revolt, they won victories in a few pitched battles - one is relatively widely known, two others are partly documented and that's it. They managed to win over mediocre hoplite armies (of the Ionian city-states) mostly by raining arrows and using their superior cavalry. Those tactics never worked against adequately trained, highly disciplined and heavily armored hoplites of mainland Greece.

The rest of the engagements of Persian forces against Greek phalanxes, throughout the 5th and 4th century, have proven ruinous for the Persian side. This is the reason every Persian hegemon, be it the King of Kings or a petty satrap, always employed Greek mercenaries as their prime fighting force- they didn't have a counter measure for Greek heavy infantry operating in a phalanx.


Rosacrux ,
The simple fact is that the Persian took Athens (for a short time) and ruled for many years very large parts of the Greek world .
Now , if the greeks had "the phalanx" why they did not beat the Persians out of the Greek wrold and waited until Alexander the Macedonian to used it against them (the Persians) ?
Again , imho , the Phillipo phalanx was not the Greek phalanx .

[Rosacrux redux]

I think this is hijacking a thread that has not that purpose originally. If you wish to discuss this in depth, please open a relevant topic and I'll be more happy to contribute as much as I can.

PART II IS NOW ON - PLEASE REFER TO POST 2

[Red Harvest]

Rosacrux ,
The simple fact is that the Persian took Athens (for a short time) and ruled for many years very large parts of the Greek world .
Now , if the greeks had "the phalanx" why they did not beat the Persians out of the Greek wrold and waited until Alexander the Macedonian to used it against them (the Persians) ?
Again , imho , the Phillipo phalanx was not the Greek phalanx .

caesar,

It was a case of sheer numbers. The size of the Persian army (and fleet) was so much greater that the Persians, at great cost, forced their way to Athens. The scale was different, it was the assembly of a large empire attacking groups of city states. And the Persians couldn't hang on at sea or in the field. They were defeated in both areas and expelled.

There is no "if" the greeks had the phalanx. The hoplite phalanx is how they fought at the time. The Macedonian phalanx differed...but that wasn't the issue.

You don't seem to understand how the Greeks worked. They were only rarely unified. They operated as shifting factions of city states and spent a great deal of effort fighting one another. This hampered them in responding to the Persian invasion. It wasn't until Philip/Alexander came along and subdued the Greek city states that an operation into Persia was feasible. Political considerations were over riding. You can't invade Persia without securing your rear.

[caesar44]

caesar,

It was a case of sheer numbers. The size of the Persian army (and fleet) was so much greater that the Persians, at great cost, forced their way to Athens. The scale was different, it was the assembly of a large empire attacking groups of city states. And the Persians couldn't hang on at sea or in the field. They were defeated in both areas and expelled.

There is no "if" the greeks had the phalanx. The hoplite phalanx is how they fought at the time. The Macedonian phalanx differed...but that wasn't the issue.

You don't seem to understand how the Greeks worked. They were only rarely unified. They operated as shifting factions of city states and spent a great deal of effort fighting one another. This hampered them in responding to the Persian invasion. It wasn't until Philip/Alexander came along and subdued the Greek city states that an operation into Persia was feasible. Political considerations were over riding. You can't invade Persia without securing your rear.



Red , I "don't seem to understand how the Greeks worked" ?
They fought one another ?
They were City states ?
Please , You are talking about a common (?) knowledge here...give the monastery patrons a little credit , ha ?

Back to the Phalanx - Why Phillip's phalanx won the Greek one ? Again I say , the Hoplite phalanx was not the same as the Macedonian one - "Unlike earlier hoplites, phalangites were unarmored except possibly those of the first row, and carried only tiny shields." (http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/LX/MacedonianPhalanx.html)

[Red Harvest]

Red , I "don't seem to understand how the Greeks worked" ?
They fought one another ?
They were City states ?
Please , You are talking about a common (?) knowledge here...give the monastery patrons a little credit , ha ?

Back to the Phalanx - Why Phillip's phalanx won the Greek one ? Again I say , the Hoplite phalanx was not the same as the Macedonian one - "Unlike earlier hoplites, phalangites were unarmored except possibly those of the first row, and carried only tiny shields." (http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/LX/MacedonianPhalanx.html)

I'll give you more credit when you can quote battles to illustrate your point, since none of us know of any. I'll give you more credit when you realize that everyone you are conversing with in this topic already knows the difference between a Macedonian and a hoplite phalanx. No, I still don't think you appreciate the reasons it took until Philip/Alexander for the conditions to be right for conquest of Persia. They are socio-political. Philip/Alexander used combined arms as well...well beyond the norm of hoplite warfare of the time. Cavalry was used sparingly by most Greek states at the time.

Quoting a website with a screeinie from RTW is not advancing your argument (as the link attempts to point out.) The RTW shield size is wrong anyway from what I've read. It was not salad plate sized (like some sort of simple buckler.)

Rosacrux is right, you are hijacking his thread.

[caesar44]

I'll give you more credit when you can quote battles to illustrate your point, since none of us know of any. I'll give you more credit when you realize that everyone you are conversing with in this topic already knows the difference between a Macedonian and a hoplite phalanx. No, I still don't think you appreciate the reasons it took until Philip/Alexander for the conditions to be right for conquest of Persia. They are socio-political. Philip/Alexander used combined arms as well...well beyond the norm of hoplite warfare of the time. Cavalry was used sparingly by most Greek states at the time.

Quoting a website with a screeinie from RTW is not advancing your argument (as the link attempts to point out.) The RTW shield size is wrong anyway from what I've read. It was not salad plate sized (like some sort of simple buckler.)

Rosacrux is right, you are hijacking his thread.


Are you upset ? does it something I did ? I have counted 8 "you"...
Btw , about "hijacking" - Sue me...

[Geoffrey S]

Rosacrux redux, a fascinating article and a worthy addition to the monastery. It's a great in-depth essay on the evolution of a phalanx' mechanisms, and a good read aswell; looking forward to the third part!

[Red Harvest]

Are you upset ? does it something I did ? I have counted 8 "you"...
Btw , about "hijacking" - Sue me...

I'm speaking directly to you, not anyone else at this point. So yes, I will use the appropriate pronoun.

If you want to go off on a tangent, open a new thread. Otherwise, you are simply being a jerk.

[Kraxis]

Actually Sparta was well on her way to conquer Asia Minor prior to Leuktra and after the Pellopponesian war. But as with most other cases, troubled brewed up at home and forced the king to retreat home. Persian gold... Persian gold...

Quite impressive in my mind that a simple, not too big city-state was on the verge of beatingthe crap out of Persia. The resulting peaceagreement had the Persian king agree to never bring the royal army into Asia Minor (and he never did until Alexander, just prior to Issus).

[Alexanderofmacedon]

Hmm... not a single comment? Is it so lousy? has anyone even read it?

No, no great! Well...I copied into Word. I'll read it when I have more time. I'm sure it's good, though. It looks good

[Gregoshi]

Can we at least have the courtesy of honouring Rosacrux redux's request to stay on topic? He's going out of his way to share some of his work with us - something he doesn't have to do. He obviously respects the opinions of his fellow Monastery patrons. Let's show a little respect towards him in return. Thank you.

[Rosacrux redux]

Thank you Greg and all thank you to all those who've read this article so far. Please provide with more input, if you feel like it.

[Kralizec]

A great article Rosacrux, very informative!

[Del Arroyo]

I think what's interesting about the spear-and-sword-and-shield-wall form of fighting is that we find it all over history. If we believe the Illiad, the Achaens and Trojans were using primitive forms of it during that war, and we can see it in use during the European Dark Ages and beyond.

I would say that one major reason for this is the flexibility of the model. It's an ideal way to must heavy infantry forces in a less organized, feudal environment-- put the elite- with their superior armor and shields and martial skill, up front, and let the rest of the mass fall in behind. It also has a number of tactical strengths which are only amplified when applied in a more methodical, disciplined way-- as the Spartans-- at least-- demonstrated amply.

A skillfully-wielded spear provides superior hitting range on the thrust, and can even be thrown to take out the enemy at longer ranges. Rear ranks can support the front ranks by thrusting over their comrades' shoulders, throwing their spears, or simply passing their spears up to the front to replace those that have been either thrown or broken (I think there is considerable evidence to suggest that spears broke quite frequently).

The shield wall provides defensive solidity to the formation independent of the effective presentation of serried ranks of spears. The sword and the shield make each soldier effective in close combat if the spears fail.

While some more-disciplined forms did not throw their spears (such as most later Greek Hoplites-- I think) and many less-disciplined forms did not make use of the shield wall, I think it is easy to see why this broad tactical form was used so broadly over the centuries.

DA

[Idomeneas]

Rosacrux
Πραγματικά πολύ ενδιαφέρων καλογραμμένο και περιεκτικό άρθρο. Δίνει συμπυκνωμένη γνώση και αποτελεί μια απο τις καλύτερες εισαγωγές για ένα αναγνώστη στους αρχαίους τρόπους του μάχεσθαι. Αλήθεια για ποιο περιοδικό προορίζεται? Διαβάζω κατα καιρούς αρκετά ανάλογα περιοδικά - αν και δεν συμφωνώ πάντα με το ύφος τους- οχι μόνο απο ενδιαφέρων για τα κείμενα αλλα και τις εικονογραφήσεις καθότι γραφίστας ων ~:) .

Παραπιπτώντος μην δίνεις καμία σημασία στο γνωστο καραγκιοζάκι (φαντάζομαι κατάλαβες ποιόν εννοώ) που θεωρει υποχρεωμένο τον εαυτο του να βγαλει χολή προς οποιοδήποτε ελληνικό θέμα. Αποδεδειγμένα το ύψος της μαλακίας του ανθρώπου αυτού είναι δυσθεώρειτο. Αν αυτοι οι δυσκοίλιοι ψευδοευγενικοι διαχειριστές του φόρουμ το επέτρεπαν θα τον συγύριζα κατα πώς του πρέπει.

Και πάλι τα συγχαρητήρια μου.

[Gregoshi]

Thanks for the kind words of support Idomenea. I'm truly flattered. :wink3: Next time post your compliments in English so we can all enjoy the full meaning of your words.

[Rosacrux redux]

~D

Thank you Idomeneas, Strijder


Greg, ain't that Greek to you? :dizzy2:

Idomeneas, I appreciate the comments but I think it would be better to write in English when in public. The magazine ain't out yet, it will start off either on December or January. I'll let you know when.

All,

PART III will be delayed somewhat. I've had a pile of translating work to do for my regular job, so I am quite fed up with translating and the last part won't be probably on until weekend, maybe Monday.

I'll keep you updated.

[Del Arroyo]

A note Rosacrux-- "ain't" in English is something that, if used at all, should be used very sparingly. It is hard to make it convincing-- it is an utterance that is generally associated only with certain classes and types of people. For anyone else to use it generally requires the perfect context and a perfect delivery, and even then it can sound kind of stale.

And it's even harder to use written. Spoken, I might personally say something like "Iaingonna saynudin", but would be more likely to say "I'm not gonna say anything".

DA

[Gregoshi]

I thought the "ain't" was used perfectly. :cowboy:


I finally got around to reading parts 1 & 2. First of all, nice work Rosacrux. Lots of good stuff for a phalanx newbie like me to absorb.

I just had one specific comment. In Part 2, The Hammer and Anvil Approach, Tactical Innovations, paragraph 6, the phrase "– at least those not completely under the spell of the stirrups and the couched lance –" seemed grossly out of place with everything else in the article. When I read it, it felt like we stepped out of the article for a moment to make an unflattering remark ("under the spell" = "can't think for themselves") about historians who have a differing view on what was considered the first shock cavalry. Removing this out-of-place phrase makes the sentence more to the point and consistent with the rest of the article.

[Rosacrux redux]

LOL @ "ain't"

I can't help it. I've learned "american english" (was raised very close to an USAAF base) and some things won't go no matter what ~D

Oh, well, Greg... in Greek the phrase (if we translate it literaly) would read something like "- at least not those who can't accept any notion of shock cavalry without the use of stirrups and couched lance". I thought the little paraphrase would serve the English text better. Was I mistaken perhaps? "Under the spell" in this context does not mean "can't think for themselves" but mostly "obsessed with" or "really fond of".

[conon394]

Iphicrates was mostly a mercenary captain

I think you falling into the decline trap that hangs over so much historical work on 4th century Greece. By the first quarter of the 4th Century all Athenian ephebes were trained to fight as peltasts as practicing archery and catapult operation. Modern historians have all too often simply interpreted peltast as automatically equaling mercenary. More importantly in modern usage ‘Mercenary Captain’ rings quite close to condottieri which suggest that Ipicrates was for sale to the highest bidder. In fact he commanded major bodies of Athenian troops and ships as often as mercenaries and had a active political career, and as far as I know even when on loan to Persia or a Thracian king, answered first to the Assembly at Athens.


I don't think training and drilling as Iphicrates did it, was anything close to a "general trend". Sure he wasn't alone in it, but he was alone in the field of having a large, fully professional, full-time soldier force at his disposal. Again, it is a matter of perception, but there is a solid fact here: the standing army any city state would maintain, was usually very small. The Thebans had 300 men, the rest were citizen conscripts. A citizen is not a full-time warrior and hasn't got the time to drill and train in the way Iphicrates did with his men.

No he was not unique in this. His contemporary Chabrias, was if anything more famous than Iphicrates for his well drilled and disciplined mercenary hoplites. He received the honor of a statue at Athens while still alive, for facing down Agesilaos and the Spartan army with his troops. In terms of influencing Philip, I would suggest more important than Athenian generals, would be the success the Phocians (Onomarchus etc) had with the professional mercenary force they raised and maintained on a permanent basis by looting the treasury at Delphi.

On a city state’s standing army, I do think there is evidence of a general trend. The sacred band at Thebes was not the rule but exception in that it was so small. The Argives deployed a professional select force of hoplites (epilektoi) in the 5th century of a 1000. By the mid forth century Athens had 1000 select hoplites, a professional cavalry force, its force of hamippoi like those at Thebes were professionals. Even tiny Philius seems to have joined the trend deploying a force of select hoplites and regular cavalry has its main fighting force. Considering Athens is just about the only city state that is well documented, it’s also worth noting Athens steadily improved it training and oversight of it troops both ephebes, hoplites and cavalry from the early to late 4th century. It’s a guess but I would suggest it reflects Athens’ adopting ideals from the Boeotia of Epaminondas. As Thebes moved from ally to rival in the 4th century Athens had no choice but to impove her land forces, Philip and Sparta could potentially be held at arms length, but not Thebes.


Polybious lives

I take it you mean Plutarch’s Lives?

True but again it’s important to consider Plutarch was writing at a time when the citizen soldier was a thing ancient history. Usage and terminology was not fixed, consider for example that in Iphicrates’s day hoplon was almost certainly never a reference to just the Argive aspis shield, yet by Plutarch’s day it could certainly be used in that fashion. Plutarch was intelligent, and had access to histories and works now lost, but he was also not able to access the kind of linguistic tools available today.


Partly right, partly wrong. The victory of Iphicrates against the Spartans was one of a well-led contigent of Peltasts only - the Athenian hoplites were a few miles away, close to Corinthus and quite away from the battle. That's the wrong part.

I don’t see how you get ‘a few miles away’ out of Xenophon Hell. 4.5.11. Rather, Xenophon repeatedly mentions that Callais (General of the Hoplites) and Iphicrates planned and executed the battle together. The formed and ready Athenian phalanx was critical for the plan, without its threat nothing constrains either the pursuit of the Spartans or their cavalry.



his tactics had an even greater impact, his military thinking and innovations were so important as to be quoted and referred to regularly by writers that lived even 4 centuries after him. Indirect importance, you might say. But I consider it of utter importance. A matter of perception, as I say.

But they were explicitly dismissed by the foremost Greek captain of the era, Epaminondas (Plutarch ‘Sayings of Kings and Commanders’). Also I would be careful of source survival. If Plutarch’s life of Epaminondas was still extent, you might well be talking about his attention to training and discipline. Iphicrates benefits from the dominate position of Attic material both now and in the classical era. The attihistographers, the works of the Attic orators, the weight of Athenian records may well give a skewed perspective.


The innovations of the 4th century warfare and the genius of Philip and Alexander combined in the best way to create a military system that has revolutionized the way to conduct a battle or wage war. No more endless push-fests, no more immobile infantry in minimum-casualties half-ceremonial battles. As stated by the controversial Victor Davis Hanson in “Carnage and Culture”, “the coordination between infantry and cavalry was a completely new invention in the history of western warfare and was designed to make numerical superiority unnecessary. Philip’s battles were not extensive push contests between two phalanxes, but abrupt Napoleonic assaults in specific points, that would break along with the enemy’s moral” (P.S. this passage is translated back to English from the Greek translation of Hanson’s book so the wording is probably different than the original)
This extraordinary killing machine would reach its apogee in the times of Alexander the Great, who utilized it not just to prevail over his enemies, but also to utterly crush them.


Be careful of V.D. Hanson he stakes out a rather extreme point of view, particularly on the ‘push fest’. You are I think over crediting Philip and Alexander here. Epaminondas and Pelopidas did not fight endless push fests but very calculated battles designed to concentrates a killing blow against their enemy’s key forces – and wipe them out. In the aggregate they look to have not produced many casualties, but they (unlike some modern historians) realized the key factor was to kill Spartans and Spartan officers, not uninspired, and unwilling allies. At the battle of Tegyra for example; Pelopidas carried an aggressive assault aimed directly at the Spartan command, followed their destruction up with by a fierce general attack routing the Spartan force (which outnumber the Thebans by some 2 or 3 to 1). After winning he used his cavalry to execute an extensive pursuit, only called off when the fugitive Spartans approached friendly garrisons. All in all as aggressive a battle as anything Alexander led (Alexander might well be said to be copying Boeotian tactics). Even in the fifth century I not sure that generals like Brasidas, Demosthenes, Lamachus or Tolmides can really be described as pursuing semi-ritualized push-fests.

[Del Arroyo]

While "ain't" is prevalent in dialects spoken by a significant minority of the population, it is dying fast even in rural areas. It is not a part of standard American English as it is spoken currently.

I wasn't saying the usage was incorrect, more that it was tacky. But whatever, I know the bad habits we learn in foreign languages are always the most fun. It took long time for people to get me stop pronouncing "Michoacán" and "Yucatán" as "MichoacáM" and "YucatáM"-- it's a common pronunciation among some groups of Mexican peasants, but it drives alot of other people nuts ~;)

DA

[Rosacrux redux]

I think you falling into the decline trap that hangs over so much historical work on 4th century Greece. By the first quarter of the 4th Century all Athenian ephebes were trained to fight as peltasts as practicing archery and catapult operation. Modern historians have all too often simply interpreted peltast as automatically equaling mercenary. More importantly in modern usage ‘Mercenary Captain’ rings quite close to condottieri which suggest that Ipicrates was for sale to the highest bidder. In fact he commanded major bodies of Athenian troops and ships as often as mercenaries and had a active political career, and as far as I know even when on loan to Persia or a Thracian king, answered first to the Assembly at Athens.
First, I think you are reading too much into my thoughts. Secondly, and since you refer to Xenophon, he specifically calls Iphicrates “captain of mercenaries” and in most references he talks about Iphicrates and his men as “Iphicrates and his mercenaries” (of course he uses “Iphicrates and his peltasts” as well). Methinks our most reliable source tells us that Iphicrates was indeed a captain of mercenaries.
Of course, this did not – at this timeframe – mean a soldier of fortune in the modern context or even the medieval (since you talk about condottieri). This is a different discussion altogether. But since his contemporaries called Iphicrates “captain of mercenaries”, I find it quite ok to do the same.

No he was not unique in this. His contemporary Chabrias, was if anything more famous than Iphicrates for his well drilled and disciplined mercenary hoplites. He received the honor of a statue at Athens while still alive, for facing down Agesilaos and the Spartan army with his troops.

Interesting… I’ll try to find more data on this, might prove useful. Any primary source with references to Chabrias?


In terms of influencing Philip, I would suggest more important than Athenian generals, would be the success the Phocians (Onomarchus etc) had with the professional mercenary force they raised and maintained on a permanent basis by looting the treasury at Delphi.

I don’t understand… in what way did they influence Philip? A standing mercenary army was not a novelty, not even in Hellas.


On a city state’s standing army, I do think there is evidence of a general trend.

Talking about 4 cities out of… how many? There are few more that had a standing army. Actually, most city-states had standing armies but they were tiny-to-small (Athens at its peak could field… how many? maybe 14.000 hoplites and 30.000 more manning the fleet? and for all these, they kept 1.000 full-time soldiers. 1.000 out of 44.000 is not very impressive).
Iphicrates considered mercenaries to be reliable and citizen armies not to be reliable. In that manner, he was surely an inspiration to wannabe-world rulers as Philip was.

I take it you mean Plutarch’s Lives?
I do this all the times… mea culpa


True but again it’s important to consider Plutarch was writing at a time when the citizen soldier was a thing ancient history. Usage and terminology was not fixed, consider for example that in Iphicrates’s day hoplon was almost certainly never a reference to just the Argive aspis shield, yet by Plutarch’s day it could certainly be used in that fashion. Plutarch was intelligent, and had access to histories and works now lost, but he was also not able to access the kind of linguistic tools available today.
He is one of our best sources for the era, despite him writing a few centuries after it.


I don’t see how you get ‘a few miles away’ out of Xenophon Hell. 4.5.11. Rather, Xenophon repeatedly mentions that Callais (General of the Hoplites) and Iphicrates planned and executed the battle together. The formed and ready Athenian phalanx was critical for the plan, without its threat nothing constrains either the pursuit of the Spartans or their cavalry.
I don’t see how this passage indicates that Kallias and his hoplites joined the battle in any fashion:

and Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who was in command of the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates at the head of his peltasts, saw no risk in attacking with the light brigade. Since if the enemy continued his march by the high road, he would be cut up by showers of javelins on his exposed right flank; or if he were tempted to take the offensive, they with their peltasts, the nimblest of all light troops, would easily slip out of the grasp of his hoplites.

With this clearly-conceived idea they led out their troops; and while Callias drew up his heavy infantry in line at no great distance from the city, Iphicrates and his peltasts made a dash at the returning division.

And, later, when the hit-and-run of Iphicrates’ men has already exhausted two attacks of the Spartans, the Lakedemonian cavalry comes back

they were joined by their returning cavalry, in whose company they once again attempted a charge. The light infantry gave way, but the attack of the cavalry was feebly enforced. Instead of pressing home the charge until at least they had sabred some of the enemy, they kept their horses abreast of their infantry skirmishers, charging and wheeling side by side.

The only mentioning of the hoplites in the actual fight, is this:

And now, in the very slough of despair, being so sorely troubled as man after man dropped dead, and unable to strike a blow, to crown their distress they saw the enemy's heavy infantry advancing. Then they took to flight;

So, Kallias' heavy infantry did never join the fight, they only acted as a scarecrow in the last phase of the fight, "aiding" the Spartans to commit to a full flight.


But they were explicitly dismissed by the foremost Greek captain of the era, Epaminondas (Plutarch ‘Sayings of Kings and Commanders’). Also I would be careful of source survival. If Plutarch’s life of Epaminondas was still extent, you might well be talking about his attention to training and discipline. Iphicrates benefits from the dominate position of Attic material both now and in the classical era. The attihistographers, the works of the Attic orators, the weight of Athenian records may well give a skewed perspective.

Yes, that is a known problem about classical Greece. But to draw conclusions without supporting evidence might provide an even more skewed perspective, no?


Be careful of V.D. Hanson he stakes out a rather extreme point of view, particularly on the ‘push fest’. You are I think over crediting Philip and Alexander here. Epaminondas and Pelopidas did not fight endless push fests but very calculated battles designed to concentrates a killing blow against their enemy’s key forces – and wipe them out. In the aggregate they look to have not produced many casualties, but they (unlike some modern historians) realized the key factor was to kill Spartans and Spartan officers, not uninspired, and unwilling allies. At the battle of Tegyra for example; Pelopidas carried an aggressive assault aimed directly at the Spartan command, followed their destruction up with by a fierce general attack routing the Spartan force (which outnumber the Thebans by some 2 or 3 to 1). After winning he used his cavalry to execute an extensive pursuit, only called off when the fugitive Spartans approached friendly garrisons. All in all as aggressive a battle as anything Alexander led (Alexander might well be said to be copying Boeotian tactics). Even in the fifth century I not sure that generals like Brasidas, Demosthenes, Lamachus or Tolmides can really be described as pursuing semi-ritualized push-fests.

I am very aware of Hanson’s misdemeanours and mostly his obsessions with certain aspects of warfare (not to mention his utter disrespect for historical facts when they contradict with his own bias). He does give credit to the Greeks for several things, though. And I think he is right when he says that the type of warfare Greeks employed originally was designed as to minimise casualties while at the same time give a very decisive outcome of the clash. That wasn’t the case in all battles, though.

The Greek warfare was usually not “to the last man” before the Macedonians entered the picture. Even Epameinondas (to whom I give ample credit for the “new type of warfare” in that era, as you must’ve noticed – some even might believe I was suggesting that the Macedonian phalanx was the Theban tactics executed by a pike-phalanx instead of a hoplite one) and Pelopidas (I should’ve mentioned him too, at least in association with Epameinondas) didn’t go as far as Alexander and even Philipos did on that trend.

[Templar Knight]

Nice work Rosacrux, very informative and well written.

[cunobelinus]

were can i buy this magazine u write coz i am very interested in buying it.

[Templar Knight]

You can subscribe online http://www.historynet.com/mh/

Most good newsagents usually have a copy

[Alexanderofmacedon]

Rosacrux
Πραγματικά πολύ ενδιαφέρων καλογραμμένο και περιεκτικό άρθρο. Δίνει συμπυκνωμένη γνώση και αποτελεί μια απο τις καλύτερες εισαγωγές για ένα αναγνώστη στους αρχαίους τρόπους του μάχεσθαι. Αλήθεια για ποιο περιοδικό προορίζεται? Διαβάζω κατα καιρούς αρκετά ανάλογα περιοδικά - αν και δεν συμφωνώ πάντα με το ύφος τους- οχι μόνο απο ενδιαφέρων για τα κείμενα αλλα και τις εικονογραφήσεις καθότι γραφίστας ων ~:) .

Παραπιπτώντος μην δίνεις καμία σημασία στο γνωστο καραγκιοζάκι (φαντάζομαι κατάλαβες ποιόν εννοώ) που θεωρει υποχρεωμένο τον εαυτο του να βγαλει χολή προς οποιοδήποτε ελληνικό θέμα. Αποδεδειγμένα το ύψος της μαλακίας του ανθρώπου αυτού είναι δυσθεώρειτο. Αν αυτοι οι δυσκοίλιοι ψευδοευγενικοι διαχειριστές του φόρουμ το επέτρεπαν θα τον συγύριζα κατα πώς του πρέπει.

Και πάλι τα συγχαρητήρια μου.

Babelfish says: (http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr)
Really very interesting kalogramme'no and comprehensive article. It gives condensed knowledge and constitutes one from the better imports for reader in the ancient ways ma'hescaj. Truth for who magazine it is intended? I read at times enough proportional magazines - even if I do not always agree with their style - not only from interesting on the texts but also the illustrations kaco'tj grafj'stas wn. Parapjptw'ntos you do not give no importance in the known karagkjoza'kj (I imagine you understood who I mean) that it considers compelled it removes bile to any Greek subject. Apodedejgme'na the height of this malakj'as person is dyscew'rejto. If these constipated beydoeygenjkoj administrators of forum him allowed sygy'rjza at how he should. Once again syghariti'rja my.

Online translators suck...I need to learn Greek:dizzy2:

[Rosacrux redux]

Littleganon,

the magazine isn't out yet, shall be in January for the first time and it will be written in Greek (if you are Greek, you'll probably appreciate it).

Templar Knight,

As far as I am aware of, I am not writing (yet ~;) ) for the Military History Magazine (http://www.historynet.com/mh/). Thanks for the kind comments though.

Are you looking for skilled writers from abroad? ~D

[Templar Knight]

Sorry Rosacrux, my mistake :bow:

[ah_dut]

Rosacrux, very informative...however, I've got something to say that's perhaps as important. Easy to read and concise, I can't say better then that

[Alexanderofmacedon]

Very good article.

9 out of 10 happy faces


~D ~D ~D ~D ~D ~D ~D ~D ~D