Is Caesar overrated as general?

[Intranetusa]

I have to commend Caesar for being able to write a book bragging about how he lead a large army of well equipped and well trained professional soldiers from a nation with huge resources and manpower in order to defeat a dying Gallic tribe of barely equipped, half starved, and poorly trained farmers led by a person in charge of a nation who had to rebel against his own nobility since they supported the Romans...whose nation was already falling apart and dirt poor from centuries of civil war with other Gallic tribes, as well as essentially being a Roman tributary.

[seienchin]

I have to commend Caesar for being able to write a book bragging about how he lead a large army of well equipped and well trained professional soldiers from a nation with huge resources and manpower in order to defeat a dying Gallic tribe of barely equipped, half starved, and poorly trained farmers led by a person in charge of a nation who had to rebel against his own nobility since they supported the Romans...whose nation was already falling apart and dirt poor from centuries of civil war with other Gallic tribes, as well as essentially being a Roman tributary.

Maybe you should read more about the gallic wars... There is no evidence that the gallic tribes were half starved poorly trained farmers or are you talking about the battle of bibracte? Please dont tell me you mean Vercincetorix uprising...

[Mulceber]

Maybe you should read more about the gallic wars... There is no evidence that the gallic tribes were half starved poorly trained farmers or are you talking about the battle of bibracte? Please dont tell me you mean Vercincetorix uprising...

Agreed. The whole point of this mod is that all the cultures are valid. The Gauls deserve better. -M

[Intranetusa]

Maybe you should read more about the gallic wars... There is no evidence that the gallic tribes were half starved poorly trained farmers or are you talking about the battle of bibracte? Please dont tell me you mean Vercincetorix uprising...

Yes, I mean Vercingetorix. By the time Caesar came around, the Gallic tribes were exhausted from centuries of civil war. Most of their good warriors were dead and their resources exhausted.

The army Vercingetorix raised was mostly a rag tag band of barely trained farmers who had just beat their farming tools into spears...especially during his revolt against his own nobility. Whatever well equipped and well trained warriors he did have were few in number. I'm sure the number of actual warriors in his army increased later on, but I'd say most of his army wasn't exactly well trained nor well equipped.

As for half starving, the Gauls were short on supplies resources. And they were pretty much starved-to-death by the time Caesar won Alesia.


IMO, Caesar's victories are entirely overrated since it was entirely an asymettrical war. Rome near its post-Marian Republican height with far more resources, manpower, etc VS the Gallic tribes who were half dead from fighting each other and many of which had already essentially become Roman tributaries.

[SwissBarbar]

Yes, that's why I said, that Caesar is not a great general because of his victories over the gauls, but because of his victories over pompeius

[Macilrille]

Yes, I mean Vercingetorix. By the time Caesar came around, the Gallic tribes were exhausted from centuries of civil war. Most of their good warriors were dead and their resources exhausted.

The army Vercingetorix raised was mostly a rag tag band of barely trained farmers who had just beat their farming tools into spears...especially during his revolt against his own nobility. Whatever well equipped and well trained warriors he did have were few in number. I'm sure the number of actual warriors in his army increased later on, but I'd say most of his army wasn't exactly well trained nor well equipped.

As for half starving, the Gauls were short on supplies resources. And they were pretty much starved-to-death by the time Caesar won Alesia.


IMO, Caesar's victories are entirely overrated since it was entirely an asymettrical war. Rome near its post-Marian Republican height with far more resources, manpower, etc VS the Gallic tribes who were half dead from fighting each other and many of which had already essentially become Roman tributaries.

I am, to say the least, very interested in your sources for this?

I am also a bit puzzled at how everybody here inevitably claims that it whenever one of Rome's famous victories gets mentioned they always ascribe it not to skill, organisation and training, but always to manpower, as if Rome was a sort of antique version of 1940 USSR.
Throughout the late Republic, from the Grachii and on to the early empire manpower was always a great problem for Romans in raising armies. In his volumnious study of Roman manpower that I have mentioned several times, Brunt concludes:

1) In the 2nd Punic War Rome lost 20- 25% of its manpower. This means that the argument that Rome only defeated mighty Macedonia because mighty Macedonia had been involved in centuries of warfare and intercinene strife, depleting its manpower is moot. With 25% of its men of fighting age dead, Rome was at least as depleted as Macedonia, nor were the men fighting the 2nd Macedonian re-enlisted veterans (Evocatii), according to Brunt, only one legion consisted of such men.

2) At the time of The Civil Wars, manpower was again a problem after 2-3 generations of bloody wars and civil wars, and many legions were quite low on manpower. Much like, if not as bad (I do not have Brunt to hand, so I do not remember the actual numbers), the German "Shadow Dvisions" of late WWII. Before embarking on his conquest of Gaul, Caivs Ivlivs raised one of his legions from Cisalpine Gauls who were not even citizens and retroactively gave them citizenship- thus causing an uproar amongst the Boni back home. However, the men were just not available for his army, so he had to find other solutions. Again, Rome had suffered some very- very bloody defeats (amongst it Arausio, Rome's greatest defeat ever), then been involved in the bloody Social and Civil Wars. It is no coincidence that Germanicus found Legions revolting because the men were dissatisfied with long service. There simply were few Italian men left to draft.

Further, I know of no evidence, written ancient or archeological that says that Gaul was "exhausted by civil war", that their "good warriors were dead", nor that "they were starving to death". AFAIK Gaul was thriving as the Celtic Iron Age drew to a close, the mere name of that period sort of hints that Celts were economically and culturally dominant in Europe N of the Alps. Feel free to present evidence to the contrary and enlighten me. But I fail to see that Gaul would have been more exhausted than Italy. And before you talk of civil strife within Gaul, remember that amobngst Celts and Germans low-level civil strife was the norm. Antropologically/socialogically speaking such is the consequence of the early state and its evolution, but to the northern barbarians it was a matter of honour and resources, and a way of life.

So, as I see it, it was hardly because Caesar went for an exhausted and depleted Gaul that he won, rather the opposite. In fact Caesar was desperate for riches, why would he go for a devastated area devoid of people (to till the land and create income and to be sold as slaves) and wealth? When he was through with Gaul it was depleted, but certainly not before.

IMO Caesar was great because he thought out of the box of traditional Roman thinking and defeated all comers; Barbarian War Host, guerrilla and a supposedly equal opponent raising Roman, Spanish and N. African style Roman armies against him (do not forget Rome believed Pompey to be one of their best commanders who needed but stamp his foot and legions would spring up- further, he was likely more rich than Crassus after his conquests in the very wealthy east). So no matter who he fought, he adapted and overcame them. He also had a grand vision for his politics in Rome, apparently envisioning more integration, less segregation and thus a strengthening of Rome's Empire. IMO these things make him great, just like the exact same skills made Alexander great; defeating all comers no matter the nature of their armies/tactic, and possessing a vision for their realms.

[Mulceber]

Gotta say, I think that deserves a balloon, Macilrille. -M

[Macilrille]

Thanks, but I dunno, Intranetusa might have acces to information I have not come across and can thus enlighten my possible lack of knowledge.

[Power2the1]

Further, I know of no evidence, written ancient or archeological that says that Gaul was "exhausted by civil war", that their "good warriors were dead", nor that "they were starving to death". AFAIK Gaul was thriving as the Celtic Iron Age drew to a close, the mere name of that period sort of hints that Celts were economically and culturally dominant in Europe N of the Alps. Feel free to present evidence to the contrary and enlighten me. But I fail to see that Gaul would have been more exhausted than Italy. And before you talk of civil strife within Gaul, remember that amobngst Celts and Germans low-level civil strife was the norm. Antropologically/socialogically speaking such is the consequence of the early state and its evolution, but to the northern barbarians it was a matter of honour and resources, and a way of life.

I shall enlighten.

There are many sources that refer to the pre-Caesarian conflict in Gaul. People often make the mistake in defining the war in Gaul with total war (which Gauls did NOT do) vs. military depletion on the battlefield. Theres a big difference in this as the former refers to total destruction basically anything of value including sometimes non combatants. The latter is primarily focused on the the actual fighters and those in the military. Anyway, source info:

The Druids and Romanization:

Such an approximation of national unity must be
sought in the period before 121 B.C., at the latest, for in that
year the pan-Gallic confederation led by the Arverni was destroyed
by Rome.18 This blow was followed by the invasions
of the Teutons and Cimbri, which left Gaul desolate and further
disunited.19 Subsequently a trend toward republican
government becomes historically recognizable; 20 the result of
forces, perhaps, that had been at work for some time. And
whereas kings, through a system of alliances, or under the
hegemony of one acknowledged leader, were apparently able
to maintain a certain degree of national unity, the nobility,
which supported the new constitutional governments, tended
to confine its political vision to its particular state. Thus, as
we know, in Caesar's time Gaul was split into warring factions.
21 To this latter period, following a half-century of
poverty, strife, and political change, the idealized Druidism
can hardly belong; it is rather to be referred to a period when
the peace and unity of Gaul made possible a pan-Gallic
organization.

The Germans of Caesar:

These same Helvetians had
recently proved themselves no match for the Romans, and if
Ariovistus had defeated the Gauls it was after they had been exhausted
by internal struggles, and, further, it had been more by
strategy than valour.

Caesar's Strategy in the Gallic War states:
The Gauls....For the most part
they were not veterans, but men hastily levied for a specific purpose.
The speed with which they mustered great numbers was equaled
only by the speed of their dispersal, often rendered imperative through
lack of supplies...On the other hand is a force often overwhelmingly
superior in numbers, spurred on by rash courage and love of country,
but yet undisciplined, inexperienced in Roman warfare, badly organized,
ill furnished with supplies, and following now this leader and
now that until the encroaching progress of the Romans and the
genius of Vercingetorix welded all factions together in a last stand
for Gallic freedom

The Gallic War says:

he (Vercingetorix) did not however desist, but held in the country a levy of the needy and desperate. Having collected such a body of troops, he brings over to his sentiments such of his fellow-citizens as he has access to: he exhorts them to take up arms in behalf of the general freedom, and having assembled great forces he drives from the state his opponents, by whom he had been expelled a short time previously.

that with these the Aedui and their dependents had repeatedly struggled in arms - that they had been routed, and had sustained a great calamity - had lost all their nobility, all their senate, all their cavalry

obviously they did not loose*all* against the Germans, but they must have lost quite a few and this was before Caesar went against them

"That there were two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stood at the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other. After these had been violently struggling with one another for the superiority for many years

when the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor.
Note that this is against the Germans, on top of what losses they sustained against the Arverni and Sequani

O' Hogain The Celts A History and Celtic Warriors here:

By this time the Celtic World was under great pressure, and this is reflected by the civil wars between the inhabitants of Transalpine Gaul.

Theres more than this in fact. However, I have yet to see a source that says Gaul was a land without resource and wealth. The war between the Aedui, Averni, and Sequani was directed at the combatants mainly (although Caesar turned it into a butchery contest and brought the war against the innocent), and little in the Gallic War or other sources supports that the war carried itself needlessly far into the environment or food supply. The Gallic aristocracy and veteran warrior class is what would have done most/all of the fighting, and that also means most/all of the dying too. By the time Caesar came around, he was not fighting the 'cream of the crop', but what was mainly left of it. Of course hunger would have been a factor in some areas hit, but I do not read that large scale famine and that kind of thing occurred.

[Macilrille]

There are many sources that refer to the pre-Caesarian conflict in Gaul. People often make the mistake in defining the war in Gaul with total war (which Gauls did NOT do) vs. military depletion on the battlefield. Theres a big difference in this as the former refers to total destruction basically anything of value including sometimes non combatants. The latter is primarily focused on the the actual fighters and those in the military.

Yes, as I said, the anthropologists has a fancy name for it, but I forgot- my brain is not working properly today. However, I fail to see this and your last statement as contradicting me. Except that I find it hard to believe that all the top-level warriors were gone. In my interpretation of things, the constant internal strife within the Gallic and especially German tribes and lands would keep the warriors well-trained and used to war. Veterans of a sort, and the urbanisation that preceeded the Roman takeover would be (as is the traditional interpretation of urbanisation) a step in the centralisation and strengthening of State(s).

I fail to see the sources for your quote 1, and do not know where you found it. What is his sources? If "A Short History of the Roman Republic" by W. E. Heitland; Cambridge University Press, 1911 I am sorry, but much new evidence and interpretations has been presented since then, so I do not know it it is much more valid than Gibbon's thesis on the collapse of Rome. It may be, but I find it suspect.


The quote on Ariovistus I believe would be this one

If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor.

in this translation.

However it is part of a much larger content, so let us look at that and apply the Historian's trademark, source criticism.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Chapter 39

While he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge stature, of incredible valor and practice in arms - that oftentimes they, on encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and the fierceness of their eyes) - so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of these men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar, that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance in consequence of their fear.

Chapter 40

When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely reprimanded them, "particularly, for supposing that it belonged to them to inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching, or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's] consulship, had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his part was persuaded, that, when his demands were known and the fairness of the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the Roman people's favor. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of? - or why should they despair either of their own valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself. It had been made lately, too, in Italy, during the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however, the experience and training which they had received from us, assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the advantages which resolution carries with it inasmuch as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterward vanquished, when well armed and flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet can not have been a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a pretense about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness of the roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew, that in the case of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or, that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearly proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a sense of honor and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them. But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be his praetorian cohort." This legion Caesar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its valor, placed the greatest confidence.

Chapter 41

Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in a surprising manner, and the highest ardor and eagerness for prosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first to return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having expressed this most favorable opinion of them; and assured him that they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions endeavored, through their military tribunes and the centurions of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Having accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitered by Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith [he found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only four and twenty miles distant from ours.

Now, of course it is all part of the larger context of showing the danger of the Germans in order to justify Caesar's actions against them, and highlight his skill as a commander. However, there can be little doubt that there was fear in the advancing Roman army. Not only is there always some sense of fear before battle, but there was also the well-known "Barbarian Fear" of Romans, most especially they feared the wild Germans, partly because they were largely an unknown factor and we always tend to let our imagination run wild about such. So, caesar gives a speech in which he calms the fears of the soldiers. he does this by making light of the Germans' prowess saying that they themselves had beaten the helvetii who often beat the germans, and that only the exhaustion of a long war had allowed them to beat the Aedui (though of course the Suebi campaigning away from their homelands would have been at least as bad off, living on campaign...). he then goes on to other encouragements. However, the crucial thing in his eulogi is the context. In such contexts exaggerations were often used, not least by Caesar (and in this very speech as well). It can be compared to the belief before "Market garden" and "Wacht am Rhein" that Germany was devoid of resources and had only boys and old men for defence. So as I see it, this is no evidence of how things were. the Aedui might have been weak, but were they more weak than usual and would their manpower have suffered worse than what the past three generations of Roman bloodletting had? We have no idea from this quote.


As for Caesar's Strategy in the Gallic War I must again ask for its sources and age. What sources makes its author state as he does? Where does he have his information from? It also sound pretty high on the rhetorical (and possibly biased) side, but that may just be sugaring the pill (most historians write as boringly as I), but blanket statements full of rhetoric... It is not my cup of tea. To me, it looks suspect and he states no sources at all. As long as he does not, I have to dismiss it again.

Vercingetorix' levy is the most convincing hint. However, right before he is menyioned, lots of other nobles are and as the carnutes operate effectively already with their traditional warbands of nobles, this might again be rhetorics for the reason of underlining Caesar's deeds. It may also be by the simple explanation that in order to oppose the Legions the normal small elite warbands will not suffice and a levy has to be raised. This is the usual practise of barbarians after all, who cannot afford large standing armies. In fact Vercingetorix starts by summoning his dependents, IE the minor nobles in his alliance depending on his leadership and forming his retinue. the word desperate might be a mere trick of the author to show the folly of resisting Caesar. Thus, though tantalising, that quote presents us with no evidence that Gaul was exhausted, starving and depleted of warriors, and certainly not that the bloodletting in Gaul before the invasion was worse than that in Italy.

O' Hogain is right though. The germans and Romans both made inroad in the Celtic world and this might have led to internal strife, but external pressure is one of the things that is important in the formation of states; the communication of autopoietic systems if you will. And the combination Celtic-German did also lead to at least one very strong and thriving tribe, the Marcomanni, not merely to the annihilation of the Celts.

that has little to do with the original bones of contention:

1) Whether gaul was devoid of warriors and resources and Caesar thus merely had to waltz in and take what he wished from the few starving inhabitants. And thus Caesar not being a great general at all.

2) Whether the bloodletting in Gaul, which P2T1 has hinted might have been worse than usual in the last century before the conquest (but merely hinted), was worse than that of the late Roman Republic.

And in none of these do I see us actually contradict each other.

So thanks, but I feel little more enlightened than before and eagerly await Intranetusa's analysis and evidence on which he builds his statements.


Sorry, my shift key is not as it should be.

[Power2the1]

Yes, as I said, the anthropologists has a fancy name for it, but I forgot- my brain is not working properly today. However, I fail to see this and your last statement as contradicting me. Except that I find it hard to believe that all the top-level warriors were gone. In my interpretation of things, the constant internal strife within the Gallic and especially German tribes and lands would keep the warriors well-trained and used to war. Veterans of a sort, and the urbanisation that preceeded the Roman takeover would be (as is the traditional interpretation of urbanisation) a step in the centralisation and strengthening of State(s).

I fail to see the sources for your quote 1, and do not know where you found it. What is his sources? If "A Short History of the Roman Republic" by W. E. Heitland; Cambridge University Press, 1911 I am sorry, but much new evidence and interpretations has been presented since then, so I do not know it it is much more valid than Gibbon's thesis on the collapse of Rome. It may be, but I find it suspect.


As for Caesar's Strategy in the Gallic War I must again ask for its sources and age. What sources makes its author state as he does? Where does he have his information from? It also sound pretty high on the rhetorical (and possibly biased) side, but that may just be sugaring the pill (most historians write as boringly as I), but blanket statements full of rhetoric... It is not my cup of tea. To me, it looks suspect and he states no sources at all. As long as he does not, I have to dismiss it again.

Vercingetorix' levy is the most convincing hint. However, right before he is menyioned, lots of other nobles are and as the carnutes operate effectively already with their traditional warbands of nobles, this might again be rhetorics for the reason of underlining Caesar's deeds. It may also be by the simple explanation that in order to oppose the Legions the normal small elite warbands will not suffice and a levy has to be raised. This is the usual practise of barbarians after all, who cannot afford large standing armies. In fact Vercingetorix starts by summoning his dependents, IE the minor nobles in his alliance depending on his leadership and forming his retinue. the word desperate might be a mere trick of the author to show the folly of resisting Caesar. Thus, though tantalising, that quote presents us with no evidence that Gaul was exhausted, starving and depleted of warriors, and certainly not that the bloodletting in Gaul before the invasion was worse than that in Italy.

O' Hogain is right though. The germans and Romans both made inroad in the Celtic world and this might have led to internal strife, but external pressure is one of the things that is important in the formation of states; the communication of autopoietic systems if you will. And the combination Celtic-German did also lead to at least one very strong and thriving tribe, the Marcomanni, not merely to the annihilation of the Celts.

that has little to do with the original bones of contention:

1) Whether gaul was devoid of warriors and resources and Caesar thus merely had to waltz in and take what he wished from the few starving inhabitants. And thus Caesar not being a great general at all.

2) Whether the bloodletting in Gaul, which P2T1 has hinted might have been worse than usual in the last century before the conquest (but merely hinted), was worse than that of the late Roman Republic.

And in none of these do I see us actually contradict each other.

So thanks, but I feel little more enlightened than before and eagerly await Intranetusa's analysis and evidence on which he builds his statements.


Sorry, my shift key is not as it should be.

No prob man. The article are rather 'old' and there is a reason for this. They hold their weight today and have certainly not been overruled. Compare the few new articles on this topic vs. the older ones, say pre 1960. You find much more information and a break down of paragraphs/passages in the older articles, this I guarantee. Newer articles are exceedingly brief and tend to rush through everything sadly. Again, this I have seen for myself. A class example is World of the Celts, by Simon James. He it states that Gaul was rather well off overall and alludes to the agricultural level and the infrastructure (which is not at all contested by newer or older sources), but here says nothing about the condition of the military, not even a paragraph or a couple sentences. The topic of the Gallic military in the Gallic War seems to be (but is not) taboo among modern authors. You'll be lucky to get more that two sentences about it, that is, detailing the warriors and the overall situation itself against their enemies.. The older ones,despite their 'age,' delve right in and give a great amount of opinions and facts which one surprisingly learns much more.

If you have access to academic databases like Blackwell, Wiley, and JSTOR, yo can read much on these things.

I cannot tell you how many time I have started, but stopped, on a .pdf with sweeping information about the Gallic military long before and leading up to and in the Gallic War. I really should stick with it next time. I can release it to the public without a copyright issue

Really, if you take the Gallic War alone, Caesar does mention the violent warfare between the Aedui and Arverni. This is not a 'hint' at all but a statement of fact. In 121 B.C. the Romans defeated, heavily, the Arverni. The power vacuum would have certainly resulted in typical warfare as he Arverni tried to maintain their control of trade and hegemony among the 'lesser' tribes and their allies and dependents. from there the conflict might have started, or it could have achieved impetus much later on. We do not know. We know the Cimbri and Teutone were no friends of the Aedui and Arverni either, but little is said about what went on in Gaul militarily, at this time (one would think that 100,000's of families and people moving through would need food, and the breadbasket was Gaul above all others). But what we do know is these two powers sought supremacy through warfare, and apparently the "many years" of this ongoing war were not going to end anytime soon. Thus Caesar ride in and saves the Gauls from themselves and the Germans.

[Macilrille]

The article are rather 'old' and there is a reason for this. They hold their weight today and have certainly not been overruled. Compare the few new articles on this topic vs. the older ones, say pre 1960. You find much more information and a break down of paragraphs/passages in the older articles, this I guarantee. Newer articles are exceedingly brief and tend to rush through everything sadly. Again, this I have seen for myself. A class example is World of the Celts, by Simon James. He it states that Gaul was rather well off overall and alludes to the agricultural level and the infrastructure (which is not at all contested by newer or older sources), but here says nothing about the condition of the military, not even a paragraph or a couple sentences. The topic of the Gallic military in the Gallic War seems to be (but is not) taboo among modern authors. You'll be lucky to get more that two sentences about it, that is, detailing the warriors and the overall situation itself against their enemies.. The older ones,despite their 'age,' delve right in and give a great amount of opinions and facts which one surprisingly learns much more.

Maybe, but the problem with the old fellows is that back then source critisicism was not really applied- or in its infancy. And that new interpretations have come forth. I know little of gaul, but if we look at the Danish viking and middle ages where I am an expert (and have myself had no little part in the new understanding), little of what was written 100 years ago has any usefulness. There are many reasons for this and things will get boring if I start rambling. But much has happened in historical scholarship the last century.

If you have access to academic databases like Blackwell, Wiley, and JSTOR, yo can read much on these things.

I do not, I probably could get it, but TBH I am not too keen on Celts. It is my own history I am interested in, IE Denmark-> Germans and Rome.

Really, if you take the Gallic War alone, Caesar does mention the violent warfare between the Aedui and Arverni. This is not a 'hint' at all but a statement of fact.

No it is not, as I have shown above the statement should not be taken at face value, but have source criticism applied to it. I did this in my last post and believe that I exhibited both how one applies S C (the tool of trade of any historian and the only thing distinguishing us from artists and writers of fiction), and that Caesar's statement does not hold up to scrutiny as a statement of fact. If you believed such statements consider that Hitler stated as fact that UK was finished and the war over in 1940. And that Montgomery et al stated as fact that the Germans had only old men and young boys left with which to defend. Find any veteran of Arnhem and ask him about the truth of that statement.
You cannot believe such, for the actual application of Source Criticism to Caesar, see my last post.

In 121 B.C. the Romans defeated, heavily, the Arverni. The power vacuum would have certainly resulted in typical warfare as he Arverni tried to maintain their control of trade and hegemony among the 'lesser' tribes and their allies and dependents. from there the conflict might have started, or it could have achieved impetus much later on. We do not know. We know the Cimbri and Teutone were no friends of the Aedui and Arverni either, but little is said about what went on in Gaul militarily, at this time (one would think that 100,000's of families and people moving through would need food, and the breadbasket was Gaul above all others). But what we do know is these two powers sought supremacy through warfare, and apparently the "many years" of this ongoing war were not going to end anytime soon. Thus Caesar ride in and saves the Gauls from themselves and the Germans.

The crucial thing here is, as you say, We do not know", it is all interpretation and guesswork. And again, you should not take the numbers of the Kêmbroz literally, the numbers given for them in the ancient sources would have comprised an estimated half to third of the population of Germany at this point. Ancient sources always exaggerate enemy nymbers and hide their own losses. In this very thread was mentioned L. C. Sulla's 20-man loss, as an evident example.

If the warfare and losses in Gaul were so bad we would not see a rising urbanisation and trade, quite the opposite. Urbanisation and trade cannot thrive in an environment of strife and violence. Cities are too juicy targets for enemies if there is no strong protection. Now, I do not know much about Gallic history, but I do know that we see an increase in urbanisation and trade. This would be evidence against the dearth of warriors and power vacuum. I also very well know the application of source criticism, I was good at it before I took my degree and it was hammered in further during the years at uni.

So, I persist in saying that we can say nothing of the losses of Gallic warriors on the basis of the sources cited. I also persist especially in saying that Intranetusa is mistaken to claim that Caesar had but to walk in and kick a few old men and starving women and Gaul was his. And lastly I definately persist in claiming that Caivs Ivlivs Caesar deserves praise as one of the great military and political minds of our history.

[Power2the1]

There are more critcisms of Caesar and classical authors than one can imagine...its everywhere. I do not keep up with roman things of that nature unless it deals directly with the Celts. I fully agree with the view, that you echo, about new interpretations coming to light. I laugh to myself when I see Celtic info from the 19th century; good stuff that is! Let me ask you something so I can gauge your own 'discipline' on historical interpretations: If published material is not modern, yet hold views that are either accepted, or not overturned through new discoveries, do you accept it or give it a skeptical slant? Just curious is all and I am not forcing anyone to subscribe to anything, however, whats interesting to me at least is my old EB1 predecessors in the Celtic area all agreed that from what Caesar said, and did not say (indirect evidence), that the Gauls were worse off against the Romans and Germans due to what warfare/conflict had already been going on for some great length of time between themselves.

I honestly wish there was some kind of effort to publish a nice article on the Celts/Gauls by those who have more time than I do to do so.

[Macilrille]

I treat all sources and interpretations of sources the same. I filter them through my own critical eye and test them as much as I am able to against other sources and information. that is, after all, what I was brainwashed to do at uni- and did already ;-)

At the H-War mailing list there was just (is still in fact) a discussion on how to treat david Irvine's work as Unis in Australia directly downgrade students who quote him no matter what they quote him on. Now David irvine is a Holocaust denier and revisionist and as such I spit upon him and refuse to believe that part of his work, but some of his earlier stuff is actually good scholarship, so where it has nothing to do with revisionism and Holocaust denial, it is usable. Everything must always be reviewed by the critical eye of the scholar before he uses it. Nothing accepted at face value or taken for granted.

As for Celts, they do not hold much interest for me; they got third place in the competetion with Germans and Romans for power in N Europe. All very simplified off course. Thing is, for some reason it is Germans and Rome that interests me- perhaps because the merger of those two made Europe of today, perhaps because I am a war-liking psycho, perhaps because the Celts lost, perhaps because I am a "German", I dunno.

An in-depth analysis of Gallic history with all known evidence taken into account would be interesting though. I might read that as Celts did have a huge impact on Germans and was conquered by one of my favorite Romans.

[Intranetusa]

I am, to say the least, very interested in your sources for this?

I am also a bit puzzled at how everybody here inevitably claims that it whenever one of Rome's famous victories gets mentioned they always ascribe it not to skill, organisation and training, but always to manpower, as if Rome was a sort of antique version of 1940 USSR.
Throughout the late Republic, from the Grachii and on to the early empire manpower was always a great problem for Romans in raising armies. In his volumnious study of Roman manpower that I have mentioned several times, Brunt concludes:

1) In the 2nd Punic War Rome lost 20- 25% of its manpower. This means that the argument that Rome only defeated mighty Macedonia because mighty Macedonia had been involved in centuries of warfare and intercinene strife, depleting its manpower is moot. With 25% of its men of fighting age dead, Rome was at least as depleted as Macedonia, nor were the men fighting the 2nd Macedonian re-enlisted veterans (Evocatii), according to Brunt, only one legion consisted of such men.

2) At the time of The Civil Wars, manpower was again a problem after 2-3 generations of bloody wars and civil wars, and many legions were quite low on manpower. Much like, if not as bad (I do not have Brunt to hand, so I do not remember the actual numbers), the German "Shadow Dvisions" of late WWII. Before embarking on his conquest of Gaul, Caivs Ivlivs raised one of his legions from Cisalpine Gauls who were not even citizens and retroactively gave them citizenship- thus causing an uproar amongst the Boni back home. However, the men were just not available for his army, so he had to find other solutions. Again, Rome had suffered some very- very bloody defeats (amongst it Arausio, Rome's greatest defeat ever), then been involved in the bloody Social and Civil Wars. It is no coincidence that Germanicus found Legions revolting because the men were dissatisfied with long service. There simply were few Italian men left to draft.

Further, I know of no evidence, written ancient or archeological that says that Gaul was "exhausted by civil war", that their "good warriors were dead", nor that "they were starving to death". AFAIK Gaul was thriving as the Celtic Iron Age drew to a close, the mere name of that period sort of hints that Celts were economically and culturally dominant in Europe N of the Alps. Feel free to present evidence to the contrary and enlighten me. But I fail to see that Gaul would have been more exhausted than Italy. And before you talk of civil strife within Gaul, remember that amobngst Celts and Germans low-level civil strife was the norm. Antropologically/socialogically speaking such is the consequence of the early state and its evolution, but to the northern barbarians it was a matter of honour and resources, and a way of life.

So, as I see it, it was hardly because Caesar went for an exhausted and depleted Gaul that he won, rather the opposite. In fact Caesar was desperate for riches, why would he go for a devastated area devoid of people (to till the land and create income and to be sold as slaves) and wealth? When he was through with Gaul it was depleted, but certainly not before.

IMO Caesar was great because he thought out of the box of traditional Roman thinking and defeated all comers; Barbarian War Host, guerrilla and a supposedly equal opponent raising Roman, Spanish and N. African style Roman armies against him (do not forget Rome believed Pompey to be one of their best commanders who needed but stamp his foot and legions would spring up- further, he was likely more rich than Crassus after his conquests in the very wealthy east). So no matter who he fought, he adapted and overcame them. He also had a grand vision for his politics in Rome, apparently envisioning more integration, less segregation and thus a strengthening of Rome's Empire. IMO these things make him great, just like the exact same skills made Alexander great; defeating all comers no matter the nature of their armies/tactic, and possessing a vision for their realms.

Rome was a settled agrarian culture that was able to support large populations – increasing their population after warfare wasn't too difficult. This is in contrast to the Gallic nations. Furthermore, the Gallic civil wars were many decades to centuries of prolonged warfare. The Roman war with other nations and civil wars only lasted a few generations.

The Romans emerged from the 2nd Punic War bloodied, but they gained plenty of land, wealth and former territories of Carthage. The Romans also always had a large population to begin with.
By the time the 3rd Macedonian War rolled around 5 decades later, Rome had pretty much recovered much of their strength.

So yes, the Romans took a large populaton hit. But they also had a large base population and could rebound quickly. IMO, the Roman conquest of Macedon was not as much of a pushover as Caear's conquest of Vercingetorix. Nonetheless, Macedon also had been in constant warfare for centuries with the Greeks, sucessor states, etc. I think the conquest of Macedonia as a far greater achievement than the conquest of Vercingetorix's Avernai.



My argument isn't towards Rome in general, but against Caesar, who I think is entirely overrated.

Caesar had 2 failed invasions of Germany, 2 failed invasions of Britain. His conquest of Gaul is put to shame by far greater Roman wars that took place on a more leveled playing field.

By the time Caesar came rolling around, many of the Gallic kingdoms had allied themselves with the Romans. The rest who opposed him stood little chance anyways.
Gaul by Caesar's time was already almost under Roman control. Vercingetroix had to rebel against the nobles in his own kingdom so he could raise an army against Rome. The Romans at the time criticized Caesar for mounting an expensive and senseless Gallic campaign since most of Gaul paid tribute to Rome, and the Gauls were becoming Romanized anyways.

Victory or not, Caesar's decision to destroy the last remaining tribes that resisted was more like euthanizing road kill that was already dying...not some grand conquest.

[Mulceber]

The Romans emerged from the 2nd Punic War bloodied, but they gained plenty of land, wealth and former territories of Carthage.

None of which translate to a larger body of citizens. More people under your command? Yes. More citizens? No.

The Romans also always had a large population to begin with.

For a classical society in which half the troops are being provided by one city (the other half being provided by the Italian Allies), a couple hundred thousand deaths is A LOT. Rome did have a large population, but I have no doubt that the frequent and bloody wars in which they were involved were making it progressively more difficult to supply troops.

Caesar had 2 failed invasions of Germany, 2 failed invasions of Britain.

Those weren't failures. I think you misunderstand the purpose of those invasions: they weren't designed to conquer Germany or Britain, they were designed to send messages to the Germani and the Britanni to stay out of Gallic affairs and stop giving aid to the enemy. Why do you think Caesar built that bridge over the Rhine, crossed it, and marched around with his army a bit, not really fighting anyone and then marched back over the bridge and destroyed it? He wasn't attempting to conquer, but to persuade allies of the Gauls that they didn't want to get involved. And in that he succeeded eminently.

Victory or not, Caesar's decision to destroy the last remaining tribes that resisted was more like euthanizing road kill that was already dying...not some grand conquest.

No...by the time of the Vercingetorix revolt, virtually all (if not all) of Rome's Gallic allies had turned on her and Caesar was fighting the entire Gallic nation.

The Romans at the time criticized Caesar for mounting an expensive and senseless Gallic campaign since most of Gaul paid tribute to Rome, and the Gauls were becoming Romanized anyways.

They criticized Caesar because most of them were aware that he had started that war and Rome traditionally liked to have some pretext for war. -M

[Parallel Pain]

If the warfare and losses in Gaul were so bad we would not see a rising urbanisation and trade, quite the opposite. Urbanisation and trade cannot thrive in an environment of strife and violence. Cities are too juicy targets for enemies if there is no strong protection. Now, I do not know much about Gallic history, but I do know that we see an increase in urbanisation and trade. This would be evidence against the dearth of warriors and power vacuum. I also very well know the application of source criticism, I was good at it before I took my degree and it was hammered in further during the years at uni.

Sorry I have to disagree with this. The city walls are great protection against an enemy army. Trade goods are a necessity of war.

During prolonged period of war, like say over a century of constant warfare, someone somewhere down the line would realize that centralizing power would allow them to mobilize more troops which means they have a higher chance of winning. Cities aid in administration, which increases centralization. Warfare requires improving travel/communication infrastructure for troops/information travel, which both increases centralization and is made better by a centralized government. This also allows merchants to travel around better. Governments also need food to feed troops, iron to make weapons and armors for troops, and money to pay troops. What better way to get these stuff than making merchants do it? Even during times of Total War warring nations could agree not hindering merchants of any party unless they were caught as spies. This is because trade is paying everyone, and it would hurt one's own nation more to blockade and stop trade than increase its chance of victory over rivals.

During these periods urbanization would also increase. Against a squad of 10 pillaging soldiers a farming family is just prey. But what about 10 farming families? What about 30 gathered together in a small village with pallisades around it? What about a citiy with thousands of families and a huge wall? The people would gather together for mutual protection. They would also take advantage of trading/administrative opportunities to go to towns and cities, further increasing urbanization.

I bring you the Chinese Spring and Autumn/Warring States period and the Japanese Sengoku Jidai, both of which could be classified as "Total War"

Now I am not saying that's what happened in Gaul. I am saying you can't say because there was an increase in urbanization and trade it is impossible for the period to have been during or immediately after a period of extremely bloody conflict and civil strife. I think what determines whether the "civil wars" leads to "ruralization" and "power vacuum" leads to "power sharing", or if they lead to "urbanization" and "centralization of power (locally)" is population number. Whether or not during this time of conflict there has been enough babies being born to replace the ones dying of violence, famine, and disease which all inevitablly increase during such periods. If the answer is yes, or that there is more than enough and population's actually increasing (centralization+ urbanization = better irrigation/agricultural project = increase food output = increase in population) then prolonged periods of war leads to urbanization and centralization.

However I do have to agree that such a long period of warfare would have created a large number of fighting professionals and maintained or even increased that number compaired to previous. Constant warfare lasting multiple generations would not have decreased this number (at this percentage wise) in general but increased it. The only time when it would decrease would be after a certain devastating battle/campaign/war that is part of the general period. And that number would recover (though it would take time).

In the end what made the difference I believe (besides Caesar's personal genius) was that the Celtic military AFAIK comprised of a core and relatively small number of professional fighting elites backed by large number of seasonal untrained levies. This was the system during many age and place in the far east as well. The bad side being of course the untrained farmer levies are unreliable, their quality varied greatly, lower morale, seasonal campaigning, and depending greatly on the cores of elites for inspiration. Facing these the Romans had a professional conscript force with at least basic training, better logistical organization, year round (in theory) campaigning ability, and a heck of a lot of other edges over the former kind of military.


@Intranetusa
I have to say that is not the best point to argue against Caesar. It has been repeatedly mentioned in this thread that the Gallic Wars are not Caesar's only triumph. He did pretty much completely flatten all opposition in the Civil Wars.
Also he killing off all remaining resistence has nothing to do with military ability. Was it cruel? Sure. But it was a more or less exceptable practice. And it would only darken his reputation as a conqueror, not as a military genius.

[Macilrille]

Your argument seems twofold, first the population issue.

Rome was a settled agrarian culture that was able to support large populations – increasing their population after warfare wasn't too difficult. This is in contrast to the Gallic nations. Furthermore, the Gallic civil wars were many decades to centuries of prolonged warfare. The Roman war with other nations and civil wars only lasted a few generations.

The Romans emerged from the 2nd Punic War bloodied, but they gained plenty of land, wealth and former territories of Carthage. The Romans also always had a large population to begin with.
By the time the 3rd Macedonian War rolled around 5 decades later, Rome had pretty much recovered much of their strength.

So yes, the Romans took a large populaton hit. But they also had a large base population and could rebound quickly. IMO, the Roman conquest of Macedon was not as much of a pushover as Caear's conquest of Vercingetorix. Nonetheless, Macedon also had been in constant warfare for centuries with the Greeks, sucessor states, etc. I think the conquest of Macedonia as a far greater achievement than the conquest of Vercingetorix's Avernai.

Now, I did not in fact talk only of the 2nd Punic War- 2nd Macedonian War as I thought was evident in mentioning Arausio. In fact manpower was a persistent problem for Rome from the 2nd Punic War onwards. It is evident in Brunt's 800+ pages analysis "Italian Manpower", and his shorter "Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic" where he summs up and elaborates. It also permeates all our ancient sources and even the most basic high school textbook on Roman history mentions it. Perhaps you believe the Romans to win all their wars with few losses, but such was not the case. Look up Quintus Pompeius, Gaius Hostilius Mancinus, Gnaeus Papirius Carbo and Quintus Servilius Caepio should you think so. And that is merely a short list.

Fact is, Rome was always short on manpower as they started to expand, even Marius' reforms did not alleviate this in the long run. Granting citizenship to all Italy did slightly, but only for a while, for Italy too, was bled white. It is difficult indeed to replenish your manpower when all your free farmers have died in war, their farms been sold and their land is now tilled by slaves of some patrician's Latifundie. That is basically what happened.
How can you not acknowledge this when it is commonly acknowledged to be one of the major causes for the fall of the Republic?

Instead you repeat the argument that there was "centuries of bloody warfare" in Gaul. More bloody than Rome's? More bloody than anywhere around the Med till the Romans enforced Pax Romana for that matter?
What are your sources for this? P2T1 has already mentioned sources that I by and large dismissed, can you bring new ones to light? It is hard to lend credibility to blanket statements with no sources.
As I also mentioned earlier, low-level warfare was an integral fact of life for the northern barbarians. Every account we have of the Germans for example, mentions it, and it did not seem to hinder their ability to wage war on their neighbours. Quite the contrary; it kept their warriors lean and mean. So warfare was an integral part of the way of life for Gauls and Germans, we know this. How was the last century more bloody than the preceeding ones? And how more bloody than Rome's and for that matter Germany's? And if this was so, why do we see an increase in urbanisation?

Mulceber has already adressed your alleged failed invasions of Germany and Britain. No Roman was stupid enough to launch any invasion anywhere with an eye on conquest without their logistical base firmly secure and ample supply for the armies ready. All our sources and all analysis shows this, Caesar would not have invaded either without it. So Mulceber is right, Caesar was merely making demonstrations, and successfully so. It even secured him German allies, not a bad thing, and typical Roman to keep a buffer between them and their enemies.

You add no new arguments to P2T1'a, and he cited sources, so please have a look above for me refutation of the statement that Vercingetorix had to summon the poor and needy only. There is plenty of evidence that other nobles were also rebelling. But such is merely natural in such a situation. Some nobles will see the advantage of allying themselves with Rome, other in resisting it. For comparison, look at the events of A.D. 9; before he annihilated Varus, Arminus held/attended a feast/meeting of Cherusci nobles. Some were pro-Roman (Segestes and his faction), some were pro-rebel. In fact Arminus' brother Flavius kept faith with Rome all through the campaigns of Germanicus, and his uncle Ingiumerus only joined late. In germanicus' campaign too, it is seen how Arminus rouse the tribes to battle, high and low. So if you compare the rebel leaders, their situation is remarkably similar. Both face resistance from other nobles, but also support. I bet you if we look (could look) at other Roman wars you would se pro- and anti-Romans in them; Divide and conquer...

No, I maintain that Caesar was a great general as he succeeded in forming an army that was absolutely and almost fanatically loyal to him, and with it to defeat:
Barbarian War-host
Guerrilla in rough terrain with little infrastructure
A Roman army under an acknowledges great general (by his peers, Pompeius)
Roman armies with N African and Iberian flavour, both had proven difficult to others commanders.

Further he was superb in selecting junior officers, another sign of a great commander.

He also had a vision for Rome and its empire, but that is more the political arena.

To me, Caesar was a great commander and you will have to come up with some more substantial evidence than unsupported statements to convince me otherwise. Sorry, and sorry too if I seem arrogant. That is by no means the intension.

[Power2the1]

However I do have to agree that such a long period of warfare would have created a large number of fighting professionals and maintained or even increased that number compaired to previous. Constant warfare lasting multiple generations would not have decreased this number (at this percentage wise) in general but increased it. The only time when it would decrease would be after a certain devastating battle/campaign/war that is part of the general period. And that number would recover (though it would take time).

In the end what made the difference I believe (besides Caesar's personal genius) was that the Celtic military AFAIK comprised of a core and relatively small number of professional fighting elites backed by large number of seasonal untrained levies. This was the system during many age and place in the far east as well. The bad side being of course the untrained farmer levies are unreliable, their quality varied greatly, lower morale, seasonal campaigning, and depending greatly on the cores of elites for inspiration. Facing these the Romans had a professional conscript force with at least basic training, better logistical organization, year round (in theory) campaigning ability, and a heck of a lot of other edges over the former kind of military.

Well said. I do see where you are coming from, however, I am in slight disagreement with the statement of prolonged war would equate to more fighting professional warriors. Its undisputed that the Gauls at this time were under the fist of a small group of powerful nobles within their respective state or tribe. When the Arverni and Aedui go to war, certainly the main deaths would be from this circle of professionals (Marines go ashore to engage the enemy and people die, its not to be guys still on the ship becoming casualties). These professionals were the main ones soaking up the losses and if they did levy a host of other non professionals, they would have soaked up the casualties too. Loss of life would be the major effect of this warfare. Gauls were not big on extending the war to non combatants generally, nor demolishing and rampaging everything in their path, and I know for a fact that theres no sign of large scale burning and destruction in the archaeological record at this time. Replacement of skilled and professional warriors cannot sustain casualties when you are already a small group to begin with and waiting 16 years for a son of a noble to grow up learn the ropes is too long to reinforce your ranks. The only logical thing to do is go and help where you may be weak in numbers, such as the Germans, to supplement your already worn out forces. When you look at ancient warfare, mercs are generally not hired in if you have all the means to get the job done and achieve you goals without spending tons of money on those mercs. They are hired to bolster you forces and/or replace your losses, or even tip the numbers of warriors in your favor.

Regardless, your overall premise is what I agree with as it jives with what is known overall in publications about the Celts and the Gallic War.

No it is not, as I have shown above the statement should not be taken at face value, but have source criticism applied to it. I did this in my last post and believe that I exhibited both how one applies S C (the tool of trade of any historian and the only thing distinguishing us from artists and writers of fiction), and that Caesar's statement does not hold up to scrutiny as a statement of fact. If you believed such statements consider that Hitler stated as fact that UK was finished and the war over in 1940. And that Montgomery et al stated as fact that the Germans had only old men and young boys left with which to defend. Find any veteran of Arnhem and ask him about the truth of that statement.
You cannot believe such, for the actual application of Source Criticism to Caesar, see my last post.

P2T1 has already mentioned sources that I by and large dismissed

Which is fine, but I must ask you for sources that counter or refute all of this in the context of the Gallic War.

Of all the source criticisms I have ever read about Caesar and the Gallic War (I hate Caesar and equate him with the likes of Hitler and Stalin in the similar methods of war, so I love seeing him get ripped), and thing pertinent to this topic, none of these reviews have ever denied this event, much less mentioned the Aedui v. Arverni warfare as being something other than what it is.


EDIT: It should also be said that Gaul was a very divided place. Theres mention of pro and anti Roman factions within the tribe, and Caesar (or was is Posidonius?) mentioned that these divisions go much deeper that political circles, but go down to clans and families as well. I doubt that every warrior in Gaul was pro Roman, but when you look at how little resistance Caesar received initially, you can tell that the Gallic aristocracy all over were not exactly hostile to Romans right at the start, especially as its thought that the upper class was largely Romanized. Thus, it was years into the campaign before serious resistance became realized. One could argue it was a manner of who do you want as your master?: The backstabbing power hungry Roman, or the backstabbing power hungry Gaul.

[mrjade06]

a few quick thoughts on this. I personally believe that Rome had VERY few great leaders. Their remarkable military success was brought about by their far superior weaponry, logistics, training, discipline, and tactics which were essentially unmatched at that time and place in the world. In most modern armies, the most crucial element outside of logistics for a particular nation's success is not the general leading it, but instead the junior officers and NCOs leading it. These were/are the most respected, experienced men in the military who lead at the front rather than plan grand tactics from the rear. In fact due to the Iraq/Afghanistan war, the US military has grave concerns over the turnover of men who would make NCO if they reupped, and NCOs leaving the service, thus the average NCO in the US military today has a lot less service time in the military compared to 10 years ago. Now why do I bring this up you ask? The Romans also had a system of Junior officers and NCOs, and these men were usually hardened veterans with years of experience and training...thus by the time Caesar faced Gaul, it wasnt even close to a fair fight. This wasn't due to any tactical brilliance on Caesar's part (although there was some no doubt), but due to military machine that Rome had created. The Gauls had vast amounts of levies and great individual warriors, but the romans had a well drilled, well supplied military machine led by experienced and grizzled veteran NCOs and JOs from the front that fought as a unit rather than as individuals. NUMBERS mean NOTHING in warfare, however training and leadership from the front means EVERYTHING. A good more modern example of this would be the South's fight against the North in the American Civil war. While certain Southern leaders such as Lee and Jackson stand out were undoubtedly brilliant, the overall argument which I made as part of my graduate thesis was that the South had the majority of the experienced and trained NCOs and Junior officers at the start of the war, which helped lead to many of the early victory's of the South, as the two army's average soldier had about the same background and training, and the casualty figures for many of the battles were about the same. Which leads to my next point...

For the most part, Generals throughout history receive far too much of the credit for victories, and all the blame as well. Alexander was a brillant military leader no doubt, but you also must understand that his military was unrivaled in training, tactics, and leadership compared to those of his opponents. Therefore, in my book, Caesar was a brilliant politician, a great opportunist, and leader of an unrivaled and unparalleled military machine. Must other 'great' Roman generals were much the same. The notable exceptions in my book may be Scipio and Marius. However if we want to talk about the ONE truly great Roman general who to me stands out above all generals in history, although some may say calling him Roman may be a bit of a stretch, we must talk about Flavius Belisarius. He managed to make Justinian out to be a great emperor, reconquering much of the Roman empire with ZERO logistics, no hope of resupply or support, being badly outnumbered, and with a military machine which had passed its zenith and was equaled by many of his opponents. He won victory after victory against all comers, and I don't believe there is a general in history and especially in the Roman Empire who equals him in sheer tactical brilliance, and being able to essentially create victory where there should have been statistically no chance.


I would also say that Quintus Sertorius was a far above average Roman leader...and Macilrille if you would like sources on the things you ask for I would gladly PM you them when I get back to the states as I have many many many. Caesar...great leader, politician, opportunist even visionary YES, a General? Eh not so much. He was a product of the machine, not the creator...

[Mulceber]

@ MrJade06 - Just wanted to point out that at the start of the Gallic war, much of Caesar's army was raw recruits - as Proconsul of Gaul he was given 2 legions, and then he gave citizenship to and conscripted 2 more legions. So half his army was inexperienced. I imagine that his junior officers had experience, but probably not a whole lot - although I could be wrong. So Rome's war machine going into the Gallic war wasn't quite as experienced as you portray. Also, with regard to the claim that Caesar just had great logistics behind him, I'd like to contest that. Many modern analyses of Pompeius argue that he wasn't really a great tactician, but instead had experience and a great eye for logistics. In other words, he is someone just like what you describe. Yet he was decisively defeated by Caesar. There were also plenty of Roman commanders of Caesar's era who had that same logistical system behind them and failed miserably (Crassus leaps to mind). So I think we should give Caesar more credit for tactical skill. -M

[mrjade06]

@ Mulceber:

Perhaps I went a little too far in tearing down what I like to call "the myth of Caesar". Let me explain. Caesar was a good leader...extremely inspirational...he was a competent commander, rarely made tactical mistakes, but he DID lose battles. In fact I'm VERY glad you brought up Pompey. Pompey by all rights had Caesar cornered, trapped, starving, and demoralized. In fact if he was able to do what he wanted it is extremely likely that Caesar WOULDNT have defeated Pompey Magnus. Pompey had already defeated Caesar at Dyrrhachium, and although he didn't perhaps exploit this victory as much as he could have, had Caesar right where he wanted him. However the Senate wanted a great, glorious, crushing victory over Caesar, and didnt like the decidedly (in their opinion) inglorious tactics of Pompey and forced him to do something he did not want to do. Therefore he was forced into a disadvantageous attack against Caesar's far more experienced fighting force...and well I'm sure you know the rest.

For some odd reason we in Western culture have turned Caesar into a great commander, and legendary beloved figure, perhaps it stems from the time of Rome itself, and Caesar being very popular with the people, perhaps from Shakespeare's play. I don't know. What I do know is that in Caesar's case, the myth is far greater than the man himself, although no doubt Caesar was a very great man. Caesar was a decent good general yes, but when compared to others throughout time? No.

As for Crassus...well I think what happened to him could have happened to nearly any Roman leader. Arrogance and hubris, combined with an enemy operating on its own soil, using different tactics and weapons than what the Romans were accustomed to facing, against a well equipped, trained, and led picked force of elite soldiers using asymmetric warfare and especially with false intelligence supplied about an enemy's disposition=disaster. This could have easily happened to Caesar as well, although Crassus was a bit of a fool.

As for Caesars original army...yes some or even many may have been raw recruits...but they were still trained and led by experienced NCO's and junior officers...who are the backbone of any good army. And that Roman training was to put it lightly, brutal, and incredibly effective. Properly led, freshly trained Roman soldiers (at this point in history) using their tactics could defeat 90% of their opponents easily in a stand-up battle of annihilation. You must remember, that using asymmetrical guerrilla tactics, Vercingetorix defeated Caesar on a number of occasions, and only whe he was caught in Alesia, and forced to give Caesar the decisive battle he so desired, was Caesar able to defeat him.

[Mulceber]

For some odd reason we in Western culture have turned Caesar into a great commander, and legendary beloved figure, perhaps it stems from the time of Rome itself, and Caesar being very popular with the people, perhaps from Shakespeare's play. I don't know. What I do know is that in Caesar's case, the myth is far greater than the man himself, although no doubt Caesar was a very great man. Caesar was a decent good general yes, but when compared to others throughout time? No.

I think I can answer that. As far as I'm concerned, Caesar was a brilliant politician, a brilliant orator (although we don't have his speeches, just attestations by Cicero), a very good strategist, a very good writer and an above-average general. I think the reason Caesar tends to receive so much admiration (and the reason I admire him) is because of the Civil War: Caesar was given a choice to either give up arms and surrender himself to the Senate or fight to save his own political career. This is something that was certainly very selfish, condemning thousands of men to death to save his political career. But there's something that I think people admire in that. I think there's a part of every person that wishes they could just throw off their obligations and do what they want. As Christian Meier puts it in his book, "...ultimately our susceptibility to Caesar's greatness derives from an ideal that we all secretly cherish - the ideal of self-sufficiency, of being able to act as we wish and to be what we choose to be" (p. 483). Caesar was an individual in the truest sense of the word. I think that's why he has been romanticized by history.

As for Crassus...well I think what happened to him could have happened to nearly any Roman leader. Arrogance and hubris, combined with an enemy operating on its own soil, using different tactics and weapons than what the Romans were accustomed to facing, against a well equipped, trained, and led picked force of elite soldiers using asymmetric warfare and especially with false intelligence supplied about an enemy's disposition=disaster. This could have easily happened to Caesar as well, although Crassus was a bit of a fool.

I think Plutarch's point is appropriate here: Crassus thought that extreme wealth equaled greatness. He was wrong.

As for Caesars original army...yes some or even many may have been raw recruits...but they were still trained and led by experienced NCO's and junior officers...who are the backbone of any good army. And that Roman training was to put it lightly, brutal, and incredibly effective. Properly led, freshly trained Roman soldiers (at this point in history) using their tactics could defeat 90% of their opponents easily in a stand-up battle of annihilation. You must remember, that using asymmetrical guerrilla tactics, Vercingetorix defeated Caesar on a number of occasions, and only whe he was caught in Alesia, and forced to give Caesar the decisive battle he so desired, was Caesar able to defeat him.

A fair point, although the only battle that I know of in which Caesar was actually in command against Vercingetorix in which he lost was Gergovia. I think the best way to put it is that as a tactician, Caesar was competent, maybe slightly above average, but it was in strategy (ie. what you do between battles, where you decide to attack, etc.) where he really shines. It was once said of Hannibal that he knew how to gain a victory, but not how to use it. Caesar was average or slightly above average at gaining victories, but he was extremely good at using them. -M

[DionCaesar]

It seems like this has become a discussion solely about Caesar. The question has shifted from 'Who's the greatest Roman general' to 'Is Caesar a hero or not'?
If you want to answer the original question, you shouldn't only focus on Jvlivs Caesar, but on the entire Roman timeframe. You'll see a quantity of Roman generals who all conquered large area's and defeated many enemies. They rose to power each in their own way, either climbing the military ladder or pursuing a political career. Pompey, for example, wasn't involved with politics until he and Sulla returned to Rome. Generals like Marius got to lead an army after becoming consul.
Another thing which has to be taken into consideration, is the fact that it was easier to obtain glory in certain periods of time than in others. Saving the empire from disaster makes more of an impression than conquering Britain while Roma itself is save.
Thirdly, we must think how the people who lived at the time of the person we discuss thought of him, and how he got them to think of him like that. Some commanders were very skillful in gaining positive public opinion. I think this is part of being commander too, getting the loyalty of both soldiers and citizens.
Now that I've made this clear, I think it's time to give my personal opinion.


Without any doubt, the greatest Roman commander there has ever been, is Gaivs Jvlivs Caesar. I have too many reasons for this, but I'll mention only a few.
First of all, his road to getting commander is unseen and spectacular. Uniting to arch rivals which happened to be the two most powerful men of Roma, is a remarkable achievement.
Caesar was apparently extremely charismatic. Holding back 370.000 Helvetii (of which approx. 1/4th men) with only 1 legion is an epic deed. Using the engineering skills which the Roman army was famous about in the best possible way, he bought himself time to lead his other legions (through the Alps) to the Rhône, where he defeated the entire migration. The excuses he uses are both original and believable, at least to the people of his time.
It was this ability of thinking of excuses that allowed him to march deep into Gaul, and causing conflicts between tribes, which effectively divided them. Why would you fight them all at once, when you can divide them and 'remove' them separately? This is, in my opinion, part of being a successful commander too.
To make a long story short, he conquered all of Gaul, defeated the fearsome German warlord Ariovistus, the British Cassivelaunos, great Gauls like Vercingetorix and Dumnorix, using his own, unseen methods. The most special about this is that he managed to keep the Roman people behind him, and letting them know what he was doing. Despite that, the senate didn't trust him so ran off, like we all know.

Caesar was famous for never using large fleets, except for transport. Through bravery and personal motivation, he managed to lead his demotivated and exhausted legions to victory in Greece, defeating an equally equipped army of fellow Romans. Following was his, also famous, clemency, with which he reassured the Roman people that he had the best intentions. After this he conquered Egypt, large parts of Africa, Pontus and Spain. He knew exactly when he had to be where, and achieved these victories by taking risks no other general dared to take. They did sometimes go wrong, but it is typical for Caesar that he wasn't blamed personally. In the end, he brought peace to the Roman world and planned a Dacian and Parthian campaign, when he was assassinated. If that hadn't happened, he might as well have conquered the above mentioned territories as well, reassuring that he deserves the title of Greatest Roman Commander Ever.

As others also said, this is only my opinion, and I wrote this way quicker than I wanted to, but as I am short of time at the moment, I didn't get to improve my story and arguments.

Vale

[mrjade06]

DionCaesar,

You say,

Caesar was apparently extremely charismatic. Holding back 370.000 Helvetii (of which approx. 1/4th men) with only 1 legion is an epic deed. Using the engineering skills which the Roman army was famous about in the best possible way, he bought himself time to lead his other legions (through the Alps) to the Rhône, where he defeated the entire migration. The excuses he uses are both original and believable, at least to the people of his time.

The 370,000 Helvetii many historians believe today was a gross form of exageration at best...and even then only 100,000 were of fighting age...at any rate most modern historians believe that there were only around 110,000 Helvetii, and only 15,000 or so were actual fighters, and that the Helvetii were actually outnumbered in the battle.

You'll see a quantity of Roman generals who all conquered large area's and defeated many enemies. They rose to power each in their own way, either climbing the military ladder or pursuing a political career. Pompey, for example, wasn't involved with politics until he and Sulla returned to Rome. Generals like Marius got to lead an army after becoming consul.
Another thing which has to be taken into consideration, is the fact that it was easier to obtain glory in certain periods of time than in others. Saving the empire from disaster makes more of an impression than conquering Britain while Roma itself is save.
Thirdly, we must think how the people who lived at the time of the person we discuss thought of him, and how he got them to think of him like that. Some commanders were very skillful in gaining positive public opinion. I think this is part of being commander too, getting the loyalty of both soldiers and citizens.

Here you reinforce my point and I totally agree with you. Caesar was a product of the superior Roman military, not the other way around. He was an incredibly skilled politician and orator as was mentioned above, however as a general he had his fair share of defeats and reverses. He had many many great qualities as a great politician, an extremely decisive shrewd leader, tremendous public speaker, was no doubt incredibly smart, but as I've mentioned in a previous post Pompey by all rights SHOULD have and WOULD have defeated Caesar if he wasnt forced into a foolhardy plan by the Senate. Caesar no doubt was a great man, but your post is just dripping of pure Caesarian propaganda that was produced at the time. Yes Caesar was indeed one of the greatest, and most brilliant men of Rome, but as I have said...the myth of Caesar is far greater than the man himself. Caesar was a solid, good general who rarely made mistakes, and was fortunate to have the finest army of the day at his back at the time. To say Caesar was the greatest general Rome ever had is to say Rome had no great generals. Caesar was a great man no doubt, but his ability as a general has been over inflated no doubt like other famous men/generals such as George Washington, who in reality was an awful general in many respects, however his status is almost legendary here in the United States, while Benedict Arnold, was a far greater commander, but that is not what is remembered about him today...however Caesar is of course a far greater leader than Washington, but both are given far more credit than they deserve).

Now in order to properly ascertain who was the greatest General of Rome, you need to have some honest criteria to go by:
1. Did he face another great general?
2. Was his army superior to his opponent in numbers, tactics, training, experience etc, or were the armies equal?
3. Did his victories bring lasting conquests, or stave off a crushing defeat?
4. Was he faced with tremendous obstacles or odds, and still won where a lesser man wouldn't have?
5. How did he win his battles/wars? Were they through superior tactics, strategy, logistics, training, or a combination of all? Because one can be great one of these but not be a truly overall great General.
6. Was he defeated? And if so was he able to come back from said defeat, learn from it and eventually defeat his opponent?
7. Did he bring revolutionary tactics/equipment/unit type that forever changed the face of warfare?
8. Was Rome losing a war before he became a commander and was able to reverse the tide?

If I were to list a few Generals Rome had who in my honest estimation were far better generals than Caesar, but of FAR less fame:

Flavius Belisarius (who I have argued was only rivaled in some ways by Hannibal, and was a perhaps the greatest general ever to walk this earth)
Flavius Aetius
Quintus Sertorius
Scipio Africanus
Sulla
Marius

There are also a few others I could throw in there, but those are ones who undoubtedly were superior generals to Caesar

[mrjade06]

Mulceber,

I think Plutarch's point is appropriate here: Crassus thought that extreme wealth equaled greatness. He was wrong.

Plutarch, while a historian, was also very much a Roman propagandist for the Roman Empire, of who Caesar was the founding father. One must be aware of this when they read anything he writes. A lot of what he has written is either outright propaganda, or of doubtful historical accuracy. He had a tendency to skew facts to make them fit.

I think the best way to put it is that as a tactician, Caesar was competent, maybe slightly above average, but it was in strategy (ie. what you do between battles, where you decide to attack, etc.) where he really shines. It was once said of Hannibal that he knew how to gain a victory, but not how to use it. Caesar was average or slightly above average at gaining victories, but he was extremely good at using them.

I totally agree with you on the point that he was a slightly above average tactician. Now as for strategy, to be honest the great masters of strategy are rarely remembered today as great generals, with the notable exceptions of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli. To me one of the greatest people in history at strategic warfare was William Pitt, but you rarely hear of him mentioned in the same breath as for example Napoleon. As for Hannibal not knowing how to use a victory, that is incredibly debatable in my opinion. I personally think Hannibal never truly had the opportunity to really exploit a victory. He did what he could with what he had, but with zero support, and being back-stabbed from rival factions in Carthage, he wasnt able to really do too much. Had he gained reinforcements from Hasdrubal, the story might have ended a bit differently. However I digress a bit here, and yes Caesar was a good strategist, but can you really say he was a master strategist? No.

[Mulceber]

Plutarch, while a historian, was also very much a Roman propagandist for the Roman Empire, of who Caesar was the founding father. One must be aware of this when they read anything he writes. A lot of what he has written is either outright propaganda, or of doubtful historical accuracy. He had a tendency to skew facts to make them fit.

Actually, by Plutarch's time, Caesar wasn't as popular anymore as he was seen as having set the ball rolling for the institution that gave the Romans Caligular, Nero and Domitian. And indeed, from my memory of his life of Caesar he doesn't seem to be wild about him. Perhaps he doesn't totally condemn him, but he doesn't have a high opinion of Caesar's moral character. I agree though that Plutarch can be inaccurate, but I wasn't using him to contradict your statement about Crassus - I was actually agreeing you and using a tidbit from a classical author which would back up your point. -M

[mrjade06]

Ahhh sorry I was a bit confused by what you were saying at the time. My humble apologies dear Mulceber.

[Intranetusa]

None of which translate to a larger body of citizens. More people under your command? Yes. More citizens? No.

More farmland, more wealth - those factors lead to an increase in population growth.

For a classical society in which half the troops are being provided by one city (the other half being provided by the Italian Allies), a couple hundred thousand deaths is A LOT. Rome did have a large population, but I have no doubt that the frequent and bloody wars in which they were involved were making it progressively more difficult to supply troops.

I don't doubt Rome lost a good portion of their population. But Rome went to war every few generations, and it was by no means constant. Rome is an agrarian civilization which was able to repopulate their borders rather quickly.

Those weren't failures. I think you misunderstand the purpose of those invasions: they weren't designed to conquer Germany or Britain, they were designed to send messages to the Germani and the Britanni to stay out of Gallic affairs and stop giving aid to the enemy. Why do you think Caesar built that bridge over the Rhine, crossed it, and marched around with his army a bit, not really fighting anyone and then marched back over the bridge and destroyed it? He wasn't attempting to conquer, but to persuade allies of the Gauls that they didn't want to get involved. And in that he succeeded eminently.

Caesar''s first landing in Britain was a complete failure. As for Caesar's 2nd invasion, sure he was able to subdue one of the regional kings. But the long term effects was nill since British kings continued to meddle in the Gallic-Roman wars on the side of the Gauls.

So in regards to Britain, if they were invasions, Caesar failed. If they were just mere power-projection maneuvers, Caesar still failed.

As for the German invasion, you are correct. Caesar didn't actually attempt an invasion. He just built a bridge to show the few German tribes along the Rhine that he could easily cross the river.

No...by the time of the Vercingetorix revolt, virtually all (if not all) of Rome's Gallic allies had turned on her and Caesar was fighting the entire Gallic nation.

Yes, and by the time they united against Rome, wasn't it far too late? By Caesar's time, it was the mid 1st century CE. Rome's population had already reached over 5 million. Rome was already the only major power left in the western Mediterranean.
Rome at this point had far more resources than all of Gaul combined. Their ability to make war would've thus been far greater than anything Vercingetorix had.

Like I said, it was entirely an asymmetrical war.

They criticized Caesar because most of them were aware that he had started that war and Rome traditionally liked to have some pretext for war. -M

Or they criticized Caesar for starting something rather senseless and using troops and resources to hasten what was inevitable anyways.

[Intranetusa]

@Intranetusa
I have to say that is not the best point to argue against Caesar. It has been repeatedly mentioned in this thread that the Gallic Wars are not Caesar's only triumph. He did pretty much completely flatten all opposition in the Civil Wars.
Also he killing off all remaining resistence has nothing to do with military ability. Was it cruel? Sure. But it was a more or less exceptable practice. And it would only darken his reputation as a conqueror, not as a military genius.

I agree. But why don't we ever learn about Caesar's other battles as opposed to the Gallic Wars?

IMO, the Gallic Wars are one of the least significant achievements of Caesar. It was an asymmetrical war and a total pushover.

Probably the main reason why it's so popular is because Caesar wrote a book about it.

Your argument seems twofold, first the population issue.Now, I did not in fact talk only of the 2nd Punic War- 2nd Macedonian War as I thought was evident in mentioning Arausio. In fact manpower was a persistent problem for Rome from the 2nd Punic War onwards. It is evident in Brunt's 800+ pages analysis "Italian Manpower", and his shorter "Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic" where he summs up and elaborates. It also permeates all our ancient sources and even the most basic high school textbook on Roman history mentions it. Perhaps you believe the Romans to win all their wars with few losses, but such was not the case. Look up Quintus Pompeius, Gaius Hostilius Mancinus, Gnaeus Papirius Carbo and Quintus Servilius Caepio should you think so. And that is merely a short list.

Sure, Rome was short on manpower for their well trained, well equipped soldiers. But how many well trained, well equipped soldiers did Vercingetorix have - as opposed to how many of them were barely trained, poorly equipped levies?

I'm sure Rome could have organized a giant levy army of all able bodied males if the situation was dire enough.

I'd say the population issue is relative...Rome may have been short on manpower, but so was everyone else they fought...and probably Rome's enemies to a greater degree.

Fact is, Rome was always short on manpower as they started to expand, even Marius' reforms did not alleviate this in the long run. Granting citizenship to all Italy did slightly, but only for a while, for Italy too, was bled white. It is difficult indeed to replenish your manpower when all your free farmers have died in war, their farms been sold and their land is now tilled by slaves of some patrician's Latifundie. That is basically what happened. How can you not acknowledge this when it is commonly acknowledged to be one of the major causes for the fall of the Republic?

I think you're oversimplifying latifunads and exaggerating the population issue in relations to it.

The rise of latifundas is more attributable to the redistribution of conquered lands, rather than farmers dying in war. Rome's
overall population numbered in the tens of millions by Caesar's time...there would not have been any real shortage of manpower to work the farms. Wealthy individuals just found it cheaper to use slaves for giant plantations...and the smaller farmers could not compete and were driven to poverty.

How many people died in the brief civil wars before Caesar's time? They were a drop in the bucket compared to Rome's total population and after taking into consideration how fast Rome's population rebounded.

Instead you repeat the argument that there was "centuries of bloody warfare" in Gaul. More bloody than Rome's? More bloody than anywhere around the Med till the Romans enforced Pax Romana for that matter?

Did Roman wars or civil wars last centuries? Prolonged constant warfare is always far worse brief intense wars. When a war is dragged out over a long period of time, resources and population are depleted and there is no opportunity to replenish them.
This is in contrast to Rome, which did not have continuous wars.

As I also mentioned earlier, low-level warfare was an integral fact of life for the northern barbarians. Every account we have of the Germans for example, mentions it, and it did not seem to hinder their ability to wage war on their neighbours. Quite the contrary; it kept their warriors lean and mean. So warfare was an integral part of the way of life for Gauls and Germans, we know this. How was the last century more bloody than the preceeding ones? And how more bloody than Rome's and for that matter Germany's? And if this was so, why do we see an increase in urbanisation?

That's another reason why the Gauls didn't really stand a chance against the Romans. A fractured, essentially non-agrarian nations constantly fighting each other for power, with less resources and the ability to wage war compared to the Romans.

Mulceber has already adressed your alleged failed invasions of Germany and Britain. No Roman was stupid enough to launch any invasion anywhere with an eye on conquest without their logistical base firmly secure and ample supply for the armies ready. All our sources and all analysis shows this, Caesar would not have invaded either without it. So Mulceber is right, Caesar was merely making demonstrations, and successfully so. It even secured him German allies, not a bad thing, and typical Roman to keep a buffer between them and their enemies.

Yes, that's true - they were not actually invasions. But guess what? The common perception out there is that Caesar did conquer Britain. Another one of the popular myths contributing to the perception of how great Caesar was.

You add no new arguments to P2T1'a, and he cited sources, so please have a look above for me refutation of the statement that Vercingetorix had to summon the poor and needy only. There is plenty of evidence that other nobles were also rebelling. But such is merely natural in such a situation. Some nobles will see the advantage of allying themselves with Rome, other in resisting it. For comparison, look at the events of A.D. 9; before he annihilated Varus, Arminus held/attended a feast/meeting of Cherusci nobles. Some were pro-Roman (Segestes and his faction), some were pro-rebel. In fact Arminus' brother Flavius kept faith with Rome all through the campaigns of Germanicus, and his uncle Ingiumerus only joined late. In germanicus' campaign too, it is seen how Arminus rouse the tribes to battle, high and low. So if you compare the rebel leaders, their situation is remarkably similar. Both face resistance from other nobles, but also support. I bet you if we look (could look) at other Roman wars you would se pro- and anti-Romans in them; Divide and conquer...

I never said he summoned the poor and needy only. I said the majority of his army was not the well trained soldiers or the nobility - the majority were the untrained levies.

No, I maintain that Caesar was a great general as he succeeded in forming an army that was absolutely and almost fanatically loyal to him, and with it to defeat:Barbarian War-hostGuerrilla in rough terrain with little infrastructure...Further he was superb in selecting junior officers, another sign of a great commander.He also had a vision for Rome and its empire, but that is more the political arena....

As those above have mentioned, I would agree with the idea that Caesar was a better politician than general. His achievements in the Civil War were notable. But to me, the Gallic Wars were not, and entirely overrated.

My main point is that Caesar was by no means Rome's greatest general as popular perception makes him out to be. I'd choose generals such as Marius during the Cimbrian Wars over Caesar during the Gallic Wars any day.