Hello Parallel Pain,
Yes, it's that Osprey, the link in post 117 http://books.google.nl/books?id=xFaC...hl=nl#PPA72,M1
It's showing a few pages only to tease.
It's not that easy to obtain books, a couple of years ago, even Osprey or plain Turnbull books were harder to get (didn't see them in the bookstores).
It's always difficult to learn what has happened, no matter what the source is. This took place over 400 years ago in a totally different culture. On top of that, already colored and incomplete accounts had to 'survive' extra colouring during the Tokugawa era.
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There's a book by Dr. Mitsuo Kure. He graduated in medical school but started a research into Japanese history. He is not a history scholar, but being schooled into any art doesn't mean you know the truth about the subject.
His book discusses the battle too.
Katsuyori answered the call of the puppet Ashikaga Yoshiaki. Oda Nobunaga himself 'installed' him as shogun. The puppet was working behind his back to get Oda down.
This book doesn't mention the whole campaign, the reader gets the impression that Katsuyori marches straight up to Nagashino castle in June. Osprey mentions that Nagashino was only the consolation price after a failed tough raid.
The book mentions a few things and some of them do sound logical if you look at what seems to be happening. His main source seems to be a document written by Ota Guichi, a Nobunaga retainer (was he there?).
It mentions 30,000 for the allies and 15,000 for Takeda. The actual number doesn't matter all that much, just that it again states Oda to have a numerical advantage (for starters).
At that time, Oda thought that Takeda was stronger, so they decided to fight defensively. Furthermore, the forces were strictly forbidden to leave the palisade.
My comment: why would Oda, having a 2 to 1 advantage and also a allied castle in Katsuyoris back, not simply march up. I think there's even more reason to that than just thinking he was weaker despite the numbers.
Excavation revealed the defense to be fairly massive: three lines of ditches, earthen walls and timber palisades. It also mentions though, that the used palisades would not suffice to stop a cavalry charge. My comment: it's not the insignificant fence around our garden, but it's not a solid wall either.
The attempt to answer why Katsuyori attacked:
-Because the allied army threatened his rear and forced him to attack.
My comment: The yellow arrow shows how Sakai Tadagatsu flanked. The black arrow shows how Takeda finally routed.
Takeda was in enemy territory and trouble could come from both east and west, realistically only from west though. The major problem was in the west though, camping on the east bank, where they were, would have given a fair defensive position and also an escape to home.
But even after crossing the river, they were not trapped and the retreat back home was always open. There was no tactical urge to attack. The Takeda generals advised a retreat: how could they advise that if there was no option to do so?
The timing of the manoeuvres is a point of discussion then, Osprey even suggests Katsuyori even wasn't aware while he was engaged, but he moved out of a good position himself and ignored the retreat (he could rout home after hours of fighting and losing his army, he could retreat too).
-Katsuyori was a young man, overconfident in his splendid army.
His scouts were killed and thus he didn't get proper report of what defenses were there. Rain and mist My comment (and no doubt also surrounding woods) obscured his own view.
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What happened according to this book?
The first Takeda wave consisted of sappers to clear the path My comment: so they did see something and decided to quickly clear that first.
This wave failed, but the second reached the palisade and teared it down. Only to face a second line.
The attacks on this second line failed and eventually Katsuyori withdrew.
The book mentions another thing in a caption, the first makes sense, the second I question:
Arquebusses are black powder weapons, and the smoke of the first volley would have hindered the accuracy of the second, while the Takeda could have used that window to advance. The second is that the allies (Oda and Tokugawa) would not have won if the Takeda launched one big push.
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"We will take Shinano, then move into Echigo. After that we will hit Suruga. Once we have done all that our country will be so strong that no one can stop us."
What goes up, must come down. This nobody is going to stop us is just boasting. The problem with getting big is that you get more enemies and/or that you'll make a mistake somewhere.
Katsuyoris strategic mindset seems to have been: 'I must destroy Oda now'. Yes, Oda was growing. That also means he's accumulating enemies (he did) and maybe he isn't tough anymore next year or still tough but occupied in a conflict in the west. A 'we must defeat him' by hit and run raids from all sides, would have sorted more effect in the long run than knocking oneself out one by one.
The book suggests that Oda thought himself to be weaker. That could be their thought (either in quality and/or quantity). But the Takeda army was in 'their' territory for about a month, so they should know better. Maybe he feared the quality? The fence was there to give the ashigaru the idea of safety. The several layers did make it really tough too. He also mixed tougher bushi to prevent a rout.
But was it in Oda's interest to get rid of Takeda? Did he really want to destroy them completely right now?
The alliance knew the war was long and far from over. Nobunaga wasn't famous for kindness and while the other two weren't either, they seemed more cunning.
What could the alliance have won by destroying Takeda? Heavy losses on their own side, less men to fight other ongoing conflicts and a powervacuum in the east. What is Hojo going to do, or Uesugi? Many warlords have the (sleeping) ambition to rule the nation and/or dislike Oda.
I think plan A would be that Takeda just pulls back.
Plan B would be even nicer: Katsuyori is drawn into an attack, the alliance loses little, Takeda a lot and is forced to withdraw. No more Takeda raids and he's still a buffer to stop Hojo and Uesugi so the alliance can focus west.
I think the alliance knew about the Takeda disagreement and about Katsuyoris sentiments.
And so happened: they kept the escape door open, denied Katsuyori proper information, feigned weakness, perhaps even allowed the first fence to be broken. Takeda was only erased years later after the Ikko were destroyed in the west.
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