Some time ago, in the "New Factions"-thread, I posted a short account on the Aitolian league, in which Keravnos noted some unclarities, and strange statements, both due to lacking sources, and my complete inability to write coherently. However, some time thereafter, when searching through the local library on a completely unrelated matter, I happened to find a book about just the Aitolian league. I skimmed through it, and found it quite interesting, so I decided to do a little informal research on the subject.
As it has been said that 9 out of 10 factions have been decided upon, I thought I might as well present what I have found as a case for the Aitolian league being the 10:th (If there is indeed to be a 10:th), however I did not feel like posting it in the New Factions section, as that thread is so grotesquely long already, so I made an all new thread.
Here goes:
Aitolian League (Κοινόν τών Αίτωλών)
Origins of the League
The origins of the Aitolian League can perhaps be traced as far back as the early fourth century B.C. One possible date for its formation could be 370. One reason for this, put forth by Grainger (Grainger 1999, p. 34), is an Athenian inscription from the early 360’s, mentioning the Aitolian koinon. This seems to suggest that the cities of Aitolia were unified in some sort of political entity, but to what extent is unknown. One theory is that the league was formed by Epaminondas, during the age of Theban hegemony
The Aitolians were known to have acted collectively in defense of their homeland prior to this, however. Thucydides mentions that the Athenian Demosthenes attempted to invade Aitolia in 426 B.C, but was defeated. Although it appears as though several of the Aitolian tribes cooperated in this campaign, Grainger does not find any evidence to support the theory that they were indeed organized in any substantial way, besides concluding an alliance against the threat of a common enemy (Grainger 1999, p. 33). However, this alliance may have been the seed from which the league later emerged.
At any rate, during the latter half of the fourth century B.C, there was indeed an organized Aitolian federation. This entity’s function was primarily defensive, however (Scholten 2000, p. 28.), and the Aitolians do not seem to have had any intentions of expanding their realm, had fate not decided otherwise.
The social and political system of Aitolia
Before I continue my narrative of the history of Aitolia, I find it necessary to discuss, at some length, how Aitolian society was organized, and how the league was governed politically. Firstly in order to give the reader an idea of how the governing process worked, but also to make the reader acquainted with terms and titles that will be used in later paragraphs.
The Aitolians were known since archaic times as plunderers and pirates, and this, of course, gave them a less than admirable reputation among their fellow Greeks, or, in the words of Polybios: “In the past, because of their lust for plunder, the Aitolians had thought almost any excuse good enough to justify attacking those who had done them no wrong” (Pol. 2.46.4.). It even seems as though the Aitolians considered raiding anyone involved in any form of conflict justified (Pol. 18.5.1.). The Aitolians even issued grants of protection against piracy, so called asylia (ασυλία), and other forms of protection and grants to foreign cities or states, to increase Aitolian influence, so called proxenia (προξενία) and isopoliteia (ίσοπολιτεία).
The terrain of Aitolia is rugged and mountainous, without any major agrarian areas, except the coastal areas. This meant that urban centers were small and uncommon, with the majority of the population living in smaller villages. Aitolia was rather scarcely populated, though, and remains such still today. The major urban center in Aitolia would have been Thermon, with its temple to Apollon, around which a cult to that god was centered. This was also where the Aitolian assembly held its main meeting, making it the de-facto capital of the league. Other major cities in Aitolia proper would have been Kalydon, Kallion and Naupactos.
The Aitolian League was governed by a form of council, the assembly, or “εκκλησία”. This assembly met twice every year, once in spring and once in autumn, in connection with local festivals, according to Polybios. Some of the primary objectives of the assembly seem to have been to handle diplomatic issues, such as declarations of war. Apparently, another council, called the Synedrion (συνέδριον) also existed, that met more frequently, but was subordinated to the assembly (Grainger 1999, p.173). The Synedrion was made up of elected representatives from the different communities of Aitolia, and the number of delegates each community sent depended on its size (Grainger 1999, p. 174; Scholten 2000, p. 27). This meant that the Synedrion consisted of a substantial number of delegates, which may have changed when new poleis were added to the league.
The highest title an official could hold in the League was the office of Strategos (στρατηγός), which literally means general. The office was held for terms of one year, during which the Strategos commanded the league’s armed forces, and also handled diplomatic negotiations (Scholten 2000, p. 26). Other high offices were the Grammateus (γραμματεύς) and the Hipparchos (ϊππαρχος), and these were also elected for a term of one year. The grammateus was the council’s secretary, and the hipparchos, as the name implies, was the commander of the cavalry. This last office was basically the strategos’s second-in-command, but seems to have appeared later than the former two, as the first known hipparchos is a certain Antochos, who’s term of office encompassed the years 273/272 B.C.
The Aitolian army was never very big, according to Grainger, who estimates its size to have been 15 000 at its largest (Grainger 1999, p. 202 & 213). In many early sources, it appears as though the Aitolian forces consisted primarily of light troops; however, the Aitolian army at Thermopylae in 278 consisted primarily of Hoplites, with only a few hundred light troops in support. (7000 hoplites and 790 light troops, based on Pausanias account of the battle (Grainger 1999, p. 204)). The cavalry force was apparently never bigger than 500 men (Grainger 1999, p. 213), but was generally considered to be of good quality. Otherwise, the Aitolians sometimes relied on mercenaries, and were also often employed as such.
The Celtic incursion of 279 B.C.
In 279 B.C, a large host of Celtic warriors entered the southern Balkans. Their primary reason for this may have been terrestrial expansion, as a result of growing Celtic populations in central Europe (Mitchell 2003, p. 288). Most ancient authors, on the other hand, imply that their motive was the lure of plunder, and it is not impossible that this was also a motive in reality. After ravaging Macedonia, the Celtic host continued south, and at the pass of Thermopylae, where Leonidas and his Spartans had made their stand against the Persians ca. 200 years earlier, the Celts encountered a Greek army, summoned from all parts of Greece. However, the main part of this army consisted of Aitolians. Why the Aitolians would so suddenly change their policy of strict territorial defense is not known, but Grainger suggests that the reason behind this was that their location would be the most exposed, should the Greeks fail (Grainger 1999, p. 100).
The Greeks managed to hold the enemy of for some time, but just like their Persian predecessors, 200 years earlier, the Celts managed to get around. This time, however, many Greeks managed to get out of the pass, and thus save their lives, but the Celts were now free to continue south. The Celtic host was split up into several parts, one of which continued into Aitolia proper. The Celts ravaged the city of Kallion, and threatened the whole of Aitolia, which caused many Aitolians to abandon Thermopylae, to return to defend their homes (Scholten 2000, p. 32). Another part of their force continued into Phocis, and approached the sanctuary of Apollon at Delphi. A host of Greeks, with a huge contingent of Aitolians, met them in the field, not far from the sanctuary. Despite their numerical superiority, the Celts were crushed, (And their leader killed). This brave stand by the Aitolians not only saved their homeland and the sanctuary of Apollon from being looted, but the southern, more populous areas of Greece were also spared.
The consolidation of the League
The Aitolians were not slow to cash in on the newly gained prestige from saving Greece from the scourge of the Celts. From the early 270:s onwards, it seems as though several neighboring poleis were incorporated into the league. Indeed, areas in Lokris had come under Aitolian influence even before the Celtic invasion, and only the year before, the Aitolians had defeated the Spartans and their king Areus when they tried to drive the Aitolians from the area around Delphi (Grainger 1999, p. 96), and they also annexed the originally Spartan colony of Herakleia in Oitia, apparently without violence. This might have been to gain control of the area around Thermopylae, in order to more effectively defend against the approaching Celts (Grainger 1999, p. 97-98).
This growth would inevitably bring them into conflict with the Macedonians, who at the moment were recuperating from the Celtic ravaging a few years earlier. The Aitolians might have taken advantage of this situation as they began expanding their power northwards into Dolopia, and later Ainis, whereupon the league’s borders started closing in on the Macedonian controlled Thessaly.
In Macedonia, Antigonos Gonatas, the son of the dead king Demetrios Poliorketes, defeated a Celtic force at Lysimachea in 277, gaining him much esteem from his countrymen, and enough prestige to claim kingship (Scholten 2003, p. 144). His power was however challenged by the Epeirote king Pyrrhos, who indeed defeated Gonatas in battle in 273 B.C, driving the latter from central Macedonia, but after Pyrrhos’s demise at Argos the following year, Gonatas quickly restored his power in Macedonia (Scholten 2003, p. 145), and now shifted his attention south, towards Greece. Here, he was challenged by the Chremonidian alliance, which was comprised of a number of Greek states, most notably the Athenians and Spartans, backed by the Ptolemaioi in Egypt. Gonatas war-effort was very successful, with Athens forced into submission, and the Spartan king Areus being killed (Scholten 2003, p. 146), reinvigorating Macedonian hegemony over Greece. The Aitolians, however, remained passive during this conflict, only giving indirect support to their long-time ally Alexandros II of Epeiros, son of the late king Pyrrhos. The League did, however, maintain friendly relations towards Gonatas as well. Their alliance with the Epeirotes did bear fruit, however, as the Aitolians and Epeirotes decided to divide Akarnania between themselves during the 250:s B.C. (Scholten 2000, p. 90), a date to which Grainger also agrees (Grainger 1999, p. 134-135), bringing the bounds of the league all the way to the coasts of the Adriatic.
Thus, by 250 B.C, Aitolia had created a strong power base in central Greece, without ever having had to resort to violence since the Celtic invasion (Grainger 1999, p. 140). The Aitolians did make an unsuccessful attempt at overthrowing, Nikokles, the Tyrant of Sikyon in 251, but both Scholten and Grainger argue that this might not have been an official Aitolian campaign, but a private enterprise, undertaken by Aitolians (Grainger 1999, p. 140; Scholten 2000, p. 85). That Aitolia did grow during this period can be attested by the growth of the number of Aitolian delegates at the Delphic-Anthelic Amphiktyonia. When new areas were added to the league, their votes on the council went up into the Aitolian representation, eventually resulting in a substantial Aitolian domination of the Amphiktyonia. This view is questioned by Walbank (Walbank 1984, p. 234), who argues that the Aitolians may simply have sent delegates to vote on behalf of areas to which the league was laying claim, thus, the portion of Aiotolian delegates at the amphiktyonic council may be larger than the actual size of the league. At any rate, Aitolia entered the 240:s as one of the major powers of Greece, but their hitherto peaceful existence would from now on be challenged by several other players in the area.
Enemies: Struggles against Achaia and Macedonia
The event that sparked the latent conflict with Achaia, for there had long been great animosity between the Aitolians and the Achaians, was the revolt of Antigonos Gonatas nephew, Alexandros, who was in command of the Macedonian holdings in Greece (Scholten 2003, p. 149; Grainger 1999, p. 147). The Achaian league, which was a coalition of cities in Achaia in the Peloponnese, chose to side with the traitor, and so did Aratos, the new tyrant of Sikyon, possibly as a response to the failed Aitolian attempt to overthrow the regime in his city. This in itself might not have lured the Aitolians into an open conflict, had the Achaians not managed to convince the Boiotians to abandon their alliance with the Aitolians, and instead declare war upon them. The Boiotian war-effort did not fare well, however, as in 245, at Chaironeia, the Boiotians, commanded by Abaiokritos, were defeated in a pitched battle against the Aitolians, before Aratos, who was now Achaian Strategos (Grainger 1999, p. 149), and his 10 000 men strong Achaian relief force could come to their assistance, (Walbank 1984, p. 249; though Walbank doubts the number of men), and they were subsequently forced back into alliance with the Aitolians.
Meanwhile, Alexandros died, making it possible for Gonatas to retake his southern possessions, even though Corinth was captured by Aratos soon thereafter, and became part of the Achaian league (Scholten 2003, p. 150). The Aitolians were, at the same time, trying to strengthen their influence in the Peloponnese. For example an Aitolian force sacked the city of Pellene in 241 B.C, before being driven off with heavy casualties by Aratos (Walbank 1984, p. 254), and apparently, Aitolian influence in the southwestern parts of the Peloponnese had been increased by treaties, and threatening Achaia (Walbank 1984, p. 250). Plutarch even mentions an event, when Aitolians attacked Laconia, and managed to capture several thousand slaves (Plut. Cleom 18.3; Walbank 1984, p. 254). Sparta and Achaia had earlier been engaged in an alliance against Aitolia, which was supported by the City of Elis in the western Peloponnese. Walbank traces this alliance to an Aitolian reprisal attack on Achaia, after Aratos failed to take the Elean-controlled city of Cynathea (Walbank 1984, p. 253-254). The reason for attacking the Spartans at this point, however, when the previous regime had been overthrown, might have been in support of allied cities in the Peloponnese (Grainger 1999, p. 162-163). According to Polybios, “these cities [Tegea, Mantinea and Orchomenus] were not only allies of the Aitolians, but members of their own league” (Pol. 2.46.3). This seems to indicate that the Aitolians were indeed trying to gain a foothold in the Peloponnese. This would have worried the Achaians, who found themselves more and more surrounded by Aitolians and their allies. Aitolia, on the other hand, seems to have been backed by Gonatas and Macedonia, who were on less than friendly terms with the Achaians, since their capture of Corinth.
In 239, however, Antigonos Gonatas died, leaving his kingdom to his son, Demetrios II. At roughly the same time, Alexandros II of Epeiros, Aitolia’s old ally, died. The Aitolians invaded the Epeirote part of Akarnania, and Alexandros widow and the de-facto ruler of Epeiros, queen Olympias, was too weak to respond, and appealed to Demetrios for help (Walbank 1984, p. 446). This unlikely alliance resulted, however, in yet another unlikely alliance, as the age old enemies, the Achaians and Aitolians, realizing the threat the combined power of Macedonia and Epeiros could pose, joined up in an alliance. Very soon, hostilities broke out, as Demetrios invaded Boiotia (Grainger 1999, p. 221-222), which was basically an Aitolian vassal, and captured it, and the Aitolians were driven back from western Akarnania.
As things turned out, though, the last members of the Aiakid dynasty in Epeiros were killed in a riot in 234 B.C, possibly instigated by the Aitolians, and a democratic state was formed with its capital at Phoinike, while the Aitolians annexed the southern parts of Epeiros, including the former capital at Ambrakia (Walbank 1984, p. 452). The league also tried to strengthen its position in Akarnania, and Demetrios, who wanted to avoid this but was too occupied fighting against the Dardanian kingdom in the north, brought a new player onto the scene, the kingdom of Illyria (Grainger 1999, p. 230). The Illyrians managed to force the Aitolians to abandon their siege of Medeon, but when the Illyrians returned the next year and attacked Epeiros, a joint Aitolian-Achaian force marched north, and the Illyrians retreated without battle, probably due to a revolt back in Illyria (Grainger 1999, p. 232; Scholten 2000, p. 148).
However, Demetrios war against the Dardanians did not go well, and he died in 229 B.C, possibly in battle against the Dardanians (Scholten 2003, p. 152). This situation was exploited by the Aitolians, who instigated revolts in southern Thessaly, causing much of it to come under Aitolian control (Grainger 1999, p. 239-240; Scholten 2000, p. 166). The new ruler of Macedonia, the boy-king Philip V, was yet too young to rule, and therefore, Antigonos “Doson”, who was the late king Demetrios’ cousin, assumed the position of regent (Walbank 1984, p. 453). Doson’s first action as regent, was to defeat the Dardanians, and thus, having his back free, he could concentrate on the situation in the south (Scholten 2003, p. 153). He put down the pro-Aitolian revolts in Thessaly, and put pressure on the Aitolian heartlands. At the same time, Kleomenes II of Sparta campaigned in the Peloponnese, capturing several of the Aitolian cities there, apparently without facing much resistance from the Aitolians. Polybios claims that the Aitolians didn’t resist, as they wanted Sparta to become a counterweight against the Achaian League in the Peloponnese (Pol. 2.46.4). This, obviously, had a negative effect on Achaian-Aitolian relations. It is however likely that another reason for the Aitolians’ passivity was the fact that they were fully occupied fighting against Doson, and could not spare any troops to protect their Peloponnesian holdings.
The Achaians, feeling threatened, requested Doson’s assistance, which he was willing to give, if the Achaians would return Corinth to Macedonia. The Achaians agreed, and after his Carian campaign, Doson arrived in the Peloponnese, where he organized an alliance of friendly Greek states, called the Hellenic Alliance, to join him in his campaign against Sparta (Scholten 2003, p. 155). The Aitolians, obviously, did not take part in this alliance. Doson marched on Sparta, and defeated Kleomenes’ army in battle. Kleomenes fled to Egypt, and Doson entered Sparta as a conqueror, the first foreigner ever to do so (Scholten 2003, p. 155). As a result of his victories, at the time of his death in 221 B.C, Doson had once again made Macedonia the major power in the southern Balkans, and more importantly, the Aitolian league had been all but subdued.
This peace would not be long-lasting, though. By 220, the Aitolians were once again conducting raids in the Peloponnese, and seeing that the Macedonians were losing their grip on the Hellenic Alliance, which was beginning to fracture, they started making plans for reclaiming their past power. This time, they were also backed financially by both the Ptolemaioi in Egypt, and the Attalids of Pergamon. Skillful diplomacy managed to get both the Boiotians and the Epeirotes to stay out of the conflict, while the old friends at Elis gave the Aitolians their support, and even more surprisingly, the former enemies, the Spartans, allied with the Aitolians (Scholten 2000, p. 208-211).
As war broke out, Aitolia once again focused its activity to Thessaly, and inflicted heavy losses on the Macedonians. The tide soon turned, though, when Philp managed to capture Pthiotic Thebes, south of Thessaly, and defeated the Aitolians’ Elean allies in the Peloponnese, and in 218, he even marched on Thermon itself (Scholten 2000, p. 223). Faced by such setbacks, the Aitolians were forced to sue for peace. It was by now obvious, that the success-story that was the Aitolian League was indeed going towards its end.
Enter the Romans
At this time, a new power had arrived in the area. The Romans had initially begun to intervene in the Adriatic to put an end to Illyrian raids, but by 215, they were at war with Philip of Macedonia. Apparently, at this time, Philip had entered into an alliance with Hannibal (Pol. 7.9). The Aitolians had had connections with the Romans since the 270:s, and though the Aitolians initially remained Neutral, the Romans, seeing the need for an ally in mainland Greece, approached the Aitolians, and convinced them to join them in the war against Philip (Grainger 1999, p. 305-306). This might have been because the Romans were far too occupied fighting against the Carthaginians in Spain and Italy to send any substantial force, and wanted the Aitolians to do the fighting for them (Derow 2003, p. 54). Several Greek states joined in, and so did Attalos too. So closely aligned was he to the Aitolians, that he even received the honorary title of Strategos of the League in 210 B.C. (Grainger 1999, p. 319).
Despite their support, neither Attalos, nor the Romans committed any substantial force to the war, and Aitolia was left alone to fight Philip. As the war dragged on, however, Philip once again started to gain the upper hand, after some initial setbacks. The Aitolians abandoned Elis and soon Philip had defeated them in battle several times, broken through the pass at Thermopylae, and forced the Roman navy, which was dependent on Attalid support, to withdraw, as Attalos was forced to turn his attention to a war against Prusias, the king of Bithynia (Grainger 1999, p. 328-329). Philips main goal with the war was the Roman holdings in Illyria, so he focused his attention towards the Aitolians first, and even captured Ambrakia in 207 B.C (Grainger 1999, p. 331-332), before forcing them to make peace in 206 B.C. This allowed him to move towards the Roman holdings in Illyria, where he captured a few Roman-held positions, before a truce was agreed between the two parts in 205 B.C.
In 201, the Aitolians sent an embassy to Rome, trying to convince them to take up the fight against Philip again, as they thought that they had been badly treated by him (Derow 2003, p. 59). The Romans rejected this plea, but when an Attalid emissary also requested assistance against Philip, the Romans complied. They put forth demands to Philip, which he could not agree to, and war broke out again.
The war began in 200 B.C, and the Aitolian war-effort was once again concentrated to southern Thessaly, where they fought with some success, but were eventually defeated by Philip at Pharkadon (Grainger 1999, p. 370). From there he continued towards Aitolia, and besieged the Aitolian fortress of Thaumakoi, but was driven off by an Aitolian counter-attack. The first few years of the war were otherwise quiet, but by 198 B.C, Titus Quinticus Flaminius, who was also consul that year, took over the command in Greece. Beside the Aitolians, who were already on the Roman side in the conflict, Flaminius managed to make alliances with several other Greek factions. The war was stalled by negotiations, allowing the Romans to build up, and in 197, the both sides met in battle at Kynoskephalai. The Romans, aided by an Aitolian force consisting of 6000 infantry and 500 cavalry, defeated the Macedonians. Philip’s army was utterly crushed, and he was forced to negotiate for peace (Derow 2003, p. 61).
In the peace negotiations, the Aitolians demanded several Thessalian cities, which had been captured from them during earlier wars with Macedonia, to be handed back to them, but the Romans, who feared that the Aitolian league might thus grow too strong, and threaten their aspirations to hegemony in Greece, did not agree to the terms, nor did they take any notice of Aitolian interests in the Hellespontine/Thraikian Bosphorus area, such as Lysimachea, Kios and Kalchedon, that had previously been within the Aitolians sphere of interest (Grainger 1999, p. 412), they might even have been members of the Aitolian league (Pol 18.3.11), and even though the league received land in Phocis and Lokris, the Aitolians were displeased with the settlement. Therefore, in 193 B.C, the Aitolians agreed to invite Antiochos III, the Seleucid king, to “liberate the Greeks”. Antiochos had a string of recent military successes behind him, among them the conquest of Thraikia, and thus seemed a far better ally than Philip of Macedon, who was weakened after his previous wars.
Antiochos agreed to help, if the Aitolians showed that they were committed to the cause (Grainger 1999, p. 435). The Aitolians therefore conceived a plan of action, which was to capture the “Fetters of Greece”; Demetrias, Chalkis and Corinth. The problem was that Corinth was held by the Achaian league, and the Aitolians could not afford to be at war with both them and Rome at the same time. The Aitolians did come up with a plan for bringing the Achaians over to their side, however. The reason for the Achaian dependency on Rome was their ongoing war with Sparta, to which the Romans had promised the Achaians assistance, but did not send any. The Aitolians gave the war a quick ending, however, by assassinating the Spartan king Nabis. This brought the Spartan-Achaian war to an end, and angered the Romans, resulting in colder relations between Rome and Achaia (Grainger 1999, p. 441-442). The Aitolians had meanwhile captured Demetrias, however they failed to capture Chalkis, which proved too heavily defended. Then, seeing that the Aitolians had made proper preparations, Antiochos landed at Demetrias with his army. Within a short time, Antiochos and the Aitolians met to prepare the campaign, and Antiochos was even voted honorary strategos. A Roman army arrived in Illyria faster than expected, though, and Aitolian and Seleucid attempts to win the Achaians over to their side failed. Instead, the Achaians declared war on the allies, but were then faced by the old Aitolian friends in Elis, who were also reinforced by Seleucid troops (Grainger 1999, p. 453).
Antiochus then sent a force towards Chalkis. The Seleucids defeated a Roman force sent to reinforce the city, and then attacked the city, held by a joint force of Achaians, Attalids and Romans, which soon surrendered. This managed to bring several previously neutral states over to the Seleucid side, and strengthening Antiochos position. However, the promising start ended in utter failure: A Roman army moving south through Thessaly soon approached the northernmost of the Aitolian holdings, apparently while Antiochos was campaigning in Akarnania, which was loyal to Rome (Grainger 1999, p. 460). A joint Aitolian-Seleucid force met the Roman army at the Pass of Thermopylae, but was defeated. Antiochos was forced to abandon his Greek campaign and was subsequently defeated by the Romans at Magnesia in Asia Minor in 190 B.C. This left the Aitolians to alone fight the Romans, and without foreign support, this was a rather hopeless quest, and by 189 B.C, the Aitolians had been subdued, and forced into Roman vassalage. After 100 B.C, Grainger claims it is no longer possible to verify whether the league still existed or not (Grainger 1999, p. 543), and even if it did, its role was purely symbolic.
Conclusion
Summing this up, we find that the Aitolian League was, for the major part of the 3:rd century, one of the primary factions on the Greek stage. Beginning from the early 270:s, the Aitolians built up a power base in central Greece, from which they were eventually even able to challenge the Macedonian hegemony over the area. Through grants of Proxenia and Asylia, the league also extended its influence throughout the Aegean, and even beyond, and some cities in the Aegean, and even as far off as Bithynia might even have been league members. By thus including new states in the federation, and giving their citizens similar rights as Aitolians (Isopoliteia was a grant of just citizen rights), the Aitolians managed to create a league that was able to act and influence Greece and the Aegean to a greater extent than any other Greek state of the period, and also with a high degree of stability (at least up until 245 B.C).
One interesting point, put forward by Scholten (Scholten 2003, p. 157), is that the idea of federations of city states, like the Aitolians, were a new feature on the Greek political scene in the 3:rd century, and that the cooperation between leagues of this type, like the alliance between Achaia and Aitolia, in time might had evolved into a Greek federation, able to withstand foreign pressure. After all, it was the diversified and fractional nature of Greece, which in many ways enabled the Romans to get a foothold in the area.
Sources
Grainger, John D: The League of the Aitolians, 1999
Scholten, Joseph B: The Politics of Plunder, 2000
Polybios: Histories
Plutarch: Lives
From A companion to the Hellenistic World, Blackwell publishing, edited by Andrew Erskine, 2003
Derow, Peter: The Arrival of Rome: from the Illyrian Wars to the Fall of Macedon
Mitchell, Stephen: The Galatians: Representation and Reality
Scholten, Joseph B: Macedon and the Mainland
From The Cambridge Ancient History Vol. VII part I, The Hellenistic World, Cambridge University Press, edited by Frank W. Walbank, 1984:
Walbank, Frank W: Macedonia and Greece
Walbank, Frank W: Macedonia and the Greek Leagues
Some notes about the text:
As you can see, this text does not fulfill all the standards that a real academic paper should, but that was, of course, never my intention. Especially the notation might seem a bit arbitrary at times, but hopefully, the point will still be clear. For those articles that are part of a bigger volume, I have used the page number of the entire volume, not the article itself.
Having presented the cold facts, I thought I'd finish off by elaborating a bit on how it could work as a faction.
As a faction, the league could possibly have a teutonic-style family tree, with the faction leader being the Strategos, and the "heir" the Hipparchos. This would maybe not fit perfectly, as they were chosen yearly, but it fits better than an ordinary family tree. What the factional symbol would be, I don't know, however one possible symbol could be the one which is seen on many Aitolian coins, depicting a figure sitting on top of a pile of celtic weapons and shields (To celebrate the Aitolian victory over the Celts).
The units of the league would probably be similar to other Greek factions (KH), focusing on hoplites and psiloi-units, with some cavalry support.
So, thats it, folks!
If anyone has any comments, I'd be glad to hear them. Hopefully, someone, maybe even the EB-team, will find this useful and interesting, but if not, at least I have now fulfilled the terms of the EB license agreement.
Cheers!
EDIT: My god! It's enormous! How do I create one of those Hide/show thingies?
Last edited by Mithridates VI Eupator; 10-22-2008 at 22:00.
Very interesting. It's really a shame that there is so little space on the EB map to really fill out the map of Hellas and such, but this is a very good read.
Yes a great post, Mithridates. Unfortunately the sheer volume of factions in Hellas makes a new faction there highly unlikely. If Aitoleian league were to be added it would probably take the place of KH rather than be added separately. I'll let the Hellenic Historians take a look at this and no doubt some useful stuff will come from the discussion.
Thanks, guys! Glad you appreciate it.
It took some hours of reading, to say the least
Originally Posted by Foot
Unfortunately the sheer volume of factions in Hellas makes a new faction there highly unlikely. If Aitoleian league were to be added it would probably take the place of KH rather than be added separately.
Yeah, I figured as much.
I think two minor Greek factions could be fun, but, as you say, what can be implemented is pretty much subject to the engine limitations; there is basically no Eleutheroi provinces in Greece, and even with a remade map for EB II, and PSF:s, there is only so many things you can add in one place. I'm just fond of the "Greek City-state squabble" - style wars.
I have to say great work Mithridates VI Eupator! And I have to say I saw simpler 'academic articles' than your case essay which you wrote above.
I am also planning to use same way of yours to represent new faction in totaly new post. Nice way...and this way also prevents to lost your essay/article between posts chats too...
Well unfortunately as mentioned by Foot before damm engine limitations probably makes it near to impossible to make Aitolian League as a seperate faction (province limitations, faction limititations, etc etc...).
But,
If someone still wants to say 'may be' ( ;) ) I got these suggestions/ideas for Aitolian League in EBII,
*Teutonic family member system seems to be great idea.And also an addition to Strategos and Hipparchos (as faction leader and heir) titles, the Grammateus title also can be hold by one another general as a 'trait'.
*Aitolian League seems to be have lesser number of cavalry. This can be represented by reducing 'unit avalaiblity' for cavalry units for Aitolian League's MICs for native units.
*May be some permanent forts help to to raise factions holds.
*As I remember Create was once a member of Aitolian League (unfortuntaley I can't remember date when they first joined but probably time around EBII's starting date 272 BC). This adds more interesting Hellenic wars in Aegean Sea.
These are all the ones which come to my mind after I read your essay!... Go on Mithridates VI Eupator :D
[QUOTE=Ludens;2041687]Spoilers and expanded text can be added by using the [spoil] [/ spoil] and [ex] [/ ex] tags (without the space following the slash, obviously).
QUOTE]
Very well done, Mithridates. I don't want to spoil anything our guys have been working on, but I don't think you'll be much disappointed.
"The mere statement of fact, though it may excite our interest, is of no benefit to us, but when the knowledge of the cause is added, then the study of history becomes fruitful." -Polybios
I don't want to spoil anything our guys have been working on, but I don't think you'll be much disappointed.
*falls of chair*
I demand the EB team stop portioning out these sort of comments on a regular basis. Simply visiting this forum has become a serious health risk to me, as there is always an acute risk a comment such as the above one will cause me to fall from chair.
If this continues and my health continue to detoriate I will be left with no option but to sue the EB team for causing me grave physical damage.
Last edited by General Appo; 10-23-2008 at 19:24.
The Appomination
I don't come here a lot any more. You know why? Because you suck. That's right, I'm talking to you. Your annoying attitude, bad grammar, illogical arguments, false beliefs and pathetic attempts at humour have driven me and many other nice people from this forum. You should feel ashamed. Report here at once to recieve your punishment. Scumbag.
I demand the EB team stop portioning out these sort of comments on a regular basis. Simply visiting this forum has become a serious health risk to me, as there is always an acute risk a comment such as the above one will cause me to fall from chair.
If this continues and my health continue to detoriate I will be left with no option but to sue the EB team for causing me grave physical damage.
make your floor out of pillows, it doesn't hurt and it super duppy fluffy
Yeah great plan! Sue the EB team!! As we all know, EB II only take that long to finish because the EB team is so busy counting the vast stockpiles of cash they earned with EB I. Squeeze 'em, they got it big time!!
Great essay, Mithridates! I enjoyed reading it very much.
Last edited by machinor; 10-25-2008 at 09:10.
Originally Posted by NickTheGreek
"Dahae always ride single file to hid their numbers, these tracks are side by side. And these arrow wounds, too accurate for Dahae, only Pahlavi Zradha Shivatir are so precise..."
<-- My "From Basileion to Arche - A Makedonian AAR" Memorial Balloon.
Yeah great plan! Sue the EB team!! As we all know, EB II only take that long to finish because the EB team is so busy counting the vast stockpiles of cash they earned with EB I. Squeeze 'em, they got it big time!!
Great essay, Mithridates! I enjoyed reading it very much.
thats not true ...
did they gain any money for EB 1 ?
Edvard0
Only the evil will triumph if good men do nothing .
Edmund . . . .
I demand the EB team stop portioning out these sort of comments on a regular basis. Simply visiting this forum has become a serious health risk to me, as there is always an acute risk a comment such as the above one will cause me to fall from chair.
If this continues and my health continue to detoriate I will be left with no option but to sue the EB team for causing me grave physical damage.
EB comes with the expressed warning that we accept no liability, nor can be held responsible for any damage resulting from using the product. Obviously, comments about all that exciting new work, of which you can bet that quite a few EB members are enjoying the awesomeness, are all part of the game.
Last edited by Tellos Athenaios; 10-27-2008 at 14:47.
One interesting point, put forward by Scholten (Scholten 2003, p. 157), is that the idea of federations of city states, like the Aitolians, were a new feature on the Greek political scene in the 3:rd century, and that the cooperation between leagues of this type, like the alliance between Achaia and Aitolia, in time might had evolved into a Greek federation, able to withstand foreign pressure. After all, it was the diversified and fractional nature of Greece, which in many ways enabled the Romans to get a foothold in the area.
This and the "Hellenic alliance" of Doson in 224 BCE is the two driving factors of KH development.
Excellent essay. Very well documented and I tend to agree on all but for a minor mistake at "Isopoliteia" at the beginning. In the end though, you hit the nail in the head.
This and the "Hellenic alliance" of Doson in 224 BCE is the two driving factors of KH development.
Excellent essay. Very well documented and I tend to agree on all but for a minor mistake at "Isopoliteia" at the beginning. In the end though, you hit the nail in the head.
Excellent work, btw.
Thanks, K.
Appreciation from a Greek-History-Giant (GHG), such as yourself is, of course, very welcome!
BTW, might I ask how the definition of "Iopoliteia" and its implementation really should be? The description in the book I read was "fuzzy", to say the least.
A factional case essay
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Re: A factional case essay
Originally Posted by Foot
I demand the EB team stop portioning out these sort of comments on a regular basis. Simply visiting this forum has become a serious health risk to me, as there is always an acute risk a comment such as the above one will cause me to fall from chair. 
<-- My "From Basileion to Arche - A Makedonian AAR" Memorial Balloon. 
("Welcome to EB" from T.A.)
), such as yourself is, of course, very welcome!
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