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    Default In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    ACIN's post in the Watchtower and Lysimachus' recent contributions have inspired me to create some semi-original content of my own for my favorite subforum of the .org. While contemplating a subject to write about, I happened to glance at my sig and a topic became clear. The following is my educated opinion on the German Tiger II tank that operated in the later stages of WW2. It is not meant to be an exhaustive history, but more of a refutation of some common myths about the tank - and an opportunity to share some interesting pictures I have collected of it. It is based primarily on the work of historians Thomas Jentz and Christian Ankerstjerne, with some Wiki quotes (that are also based on Jentz) thrown in for emphasis. Feel free to criticize my work as much of this is from memory, and my apologies for my rather lacking writing skills!



    German Propaganda Newsreel Featuring the Tiger II


    In WW2 media the Tiger II is often portrayed as a slow, lumbering behemoth that took up valuable resources that would have been better spent on smaller tanks. Countless History/Military Channel top ten shows and pop history 'Tanks of WW2' books from less than reputable publishers reinforce this popular myth, yielding scores of discussion threads on the interwebs that mimic it. In reality, the Tiger II was a very capable, potent fighting machine with a proven combat record of success.

    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
    I personally believe the myths surrounding this machine have arisen out of the natural bias towards the Western Allies that is common in much WW2 literature. It is far more flattering to promulgate the belief that the Allies deliberately chose a strategy of producing vast numbers of smaller, less sophisticated, and faster tanks whilst the Germans chose a strategy of pursuing smaller numbers of heavily armored, over engineered AFVs. In such a scenario, the Allies appear to have chosen wisely. However, the reality is that both sides had medium and heavy tank programs and produced as many of the former as possible. Allied industry simply won out. The German heavy tank program filled a small scale, specialized role in the Panzerwaffe and had little effect on industrial output. The fact that Shermans and Cromwells were forced to fight Panthers, Tigers, and King Tigers was not part of any grand strategy. The Western Allies simply didn't have anything capable of matching them.




    Tiger II in Ambush camouflage Pattern


    Example of Ambush Pattern Colors

    The culmination of everything the Germans had learned about tank development during WW2, the Tiger II, often referred to as the "King Tiger", and more seldomly the "Royal Tiger", was the last German heavy tank to see service during WW2. It debuted in the battle of Normandy and fought on both the Western and Eastern Fronts in the Wehrmacht and SS heavy tank battalions in limited numbers throughout the rest of the war. As a heavy tank meant to replace the original Tiger, its role was to attack obstacles and enemy strong points, create breakthroughs, and engage enemy armored formations.

    Quote Originally Posted by wiki
    The heavy armor and powerful long-range gun gave the Tiger II an advantage against all opposing Western Allied and Soviet tanks attempting to engage it from head on. This was especially true on the Western Front, where until the arrival of the few M26 Pershing in 1945 neither the British nor U.S. forces had brought heavy tanks into service. Only the British QF 17 pounder (76.2 mm) gun using Armour-piercing discarding sabot shot was theoretically capable of penetrating the front of the Tiger II's turret and nose (lower front hull) at 1,100 and 1,200 yd (1,000 and 1,100 m) respectively.[28] Flanking maneuvers were used against the Tiger II to attempt a shot at the thinner side and rear armor, giving a tactical advantage to the Tiger II in most engagements.[47] Moreover, the main armament of the Tiger II was capable of knocking out any Allied tank frontally at ranges exceeding 2.5 kilometres (1.6 mi), beyond the effective range of Allied tank gun.


    Tiger II Cutaway (1)


    The tank had a 5 man crew, including the commander, driver, gunner, hull machine-gunner, and radio operator. It incorporated sloped armor (which, by the way, was present in German tank designs long before encounters with the T-34 - another myth), Germany's (and arguably the world's) best gun during WW2 - the KwK 43 L/71, a wide-track suspension system that made it even more maneuverable in muddy and sandy conditions than the Sherman and many other allied vehicles due to reduced ground pressure, and a more modular platform designed for ease of production. It was in every way an advancement upon its predecessor, the already formidable Tiger I. More notably, it was a better performing tank than it’s more lauded little brother, the Panther.



    Tiger II Exploded (2)


    Despite this, the King Tiger is often criticized incorrectly on a number of factors.

    Speed:

    This is probably the most propagated, yet demonstrably false, myth about the Tiger II (and Tiger I btw).

    Despite being a heavy tank, the Tiger II was as fast as the Panther and faster than all other German AFVs.

    Tiger II - Maximum Speed = 41.5 km/h, Road Speed = 38 km/h, Cross Country Speed = 15-20 km/h

    Panther - Maximum Speed = 46 km/h, Road Speed = 30-35 km/h, Cross Country Speed = 20 km/h

    Pz.IV - Maximum Speed = 38-42 km/h, Road Speed = 25 km/h, Cross Country Speed = 20 km/h

    StuG - Maximum Speed = 40 km/h, Road Speed = 20 km/h, Cross Country Speed = 12-15km/h

    For comparison, the top speeds of the main Allied medium tanks were:

    T-34 - 53.5 km/h
    Sherman - 38-46 km/h (dependent on the variant)

    And their heavy tanks:

    IS-2 - 37 km/h
    M26 Pershing - 40 km/h, 8.4 km/h (off-road)

    (Apologies for not having detailed speed information on road speed and cross-country speed for these models.)

    Obviously, the Tiger II was not a slow tank by any objective standards.

    Size:



    Tiger II at Rest in Budapest

    At nearly 70 tonnes, 6.4 meters in length and 3.75 meters in width (platform only), the Tiger II was an enormous tank for the period. However, myths about limitations due to size are greatly exaggerated, specifically those about bridge crossing. The tank’s designers took the structural limitations of European bridges into consideration when developing the tank, and German combat engineers in the field were highly skilled at determining a bridge’s structural limits. In most cases, bridges too small and/or too weak to hold a Tiger II were built over rivers that could easily be forded, due to an advanced snorkel system. In the rare event that a Tiger II could not cross on a bridge or ford one, the standard German 16-ton engineer bridge could carry it.



    Navigating Tight Urban Streets


    Certainly tanks of all sizes and makes got bogged down or fell through bridges on occasion, but the Tiger II did not do so at greater rates than other AFVs. Further, combat operations were not compromised in any significant way to accommodate the Tiger II.

    Mobility:



    Propaganda Shot


    Despite its weight, the Tiger II's advanced suspension system and powerful engine provided it not only superior mobility to Allied heavy tanks, but to their medium tanks as well. Crews loved the Tiger II for its maneuverability over virtually any terrain.

    According to historian Thomas Jentz:

    The Tiger II was remarkably agile for such a heavy vehicle. Contemporary German records indicate that its mobility was as good as or better than most German or Allied tanks.
    Reliability:



    Maintenance


    As with every new tank design during the war, including the much vaunted for reliability T-34, the Tiger II went through a teething process. The main cause of these issues was the added stress to the engine, which was essentially the same one used in the 12 tonne lighter Tiger I. This was exacerbated by inexperienced crews who were sent directly from the classroom into combat.

    As the issues were identified, a number of strengthened engine components and new crew guidelines were developed and distributed. After these initial fixes, the Tiger II design proved to be a very reliable, far more so than the Tiger I. In fact, the Tiger II’s teething process was far shorter than that of the T-34 and the Panther which both ate transmissions for a year or more after development, or its direct competitor, the M26 Pershing, which was so inherently unreliable that it still couldn’t function competently in Korea and had to be pulled from combat.

    Jentz says:

    Reliability was improved over time with the continuous introduction of modified seals, gaskets and drive train components, driver training, and sufficient maintenance. Statistics from 15 March 1945 compare the availability of Tiger IIs with respect to other tanks: 62 percent of Panzer IVs, 59 percent of Tiger IIs and 48 percent of Panthers were operational by this period of the war.
    Fuel Consumption:

    This criticism has some basis, but has been blown way out of proportion. While indeed high at 4.9 l/km, the Tiger II’s consumption was not inordinately so.

    Here are fuel consumption rates of some common late war tanks.

    Medium
    T-34/85 = 1.8 l/km
    Sherman = 2.0 l/km
    Panzer IV = 2.35 l/km
    Panther = 2.8 l/km

    Heavy
    IS2 = 3.5
    Pershing = 4.32

    While the Tiger II is often singled out as a fuel hog, the reality is that its fuel consumption was in line with other vehicles of its size. The truth is that after Romania fell, German AFVs of all shapes and sizes were lost due to fuel shortages towards the end of the war. Under more normal circumstances, the Tiger II's fuel consumption would not have been such an acute weakness.

    Cost efficiency:

    This is the murkiest myth to debunk against the Tiger II as it does include a bit of subjectivity. I don’t know how many times I have read some variation of “the Germans should have made more low quality tanks instead of a few high quality ones”.

    First, who would crew these tanks? Despite the Allied bombing campaign and the huge stresses on German industry, towards the end of the war there were always more tanks available than crews to fill them. Wartime pressures including fuel shortages and Allied air raids crippled the flow of trained crews to the Panzerwaffe. It became so dire that fresh crews with only minimal classroom training were given command of expensive, technologically advanced AFVs such as Panthers and Tiger IIs, with predictable results.

    Second, the Germans learned early on that the most valuable component of a tank is its crew. The Tiger II preserved and enhanced the one advantage the Panzerwaffe had that endured throughout the war – their experienced tank crews. Under the command of these crews, the tank delivered devastating results on the battlefield far beyond its limited numbers – which will be discussed below.

    Finally, that oft-quoted sentiment betrays a lack of understanding about German armored doctrine. Said doctrine dictated the need for a heavy tank, and the German heavy tank program was a limited endeavor meant to fill a limited role in the overall armored structure. Only 1500 Tiger II's were ordered, and it replaced the Tiger 1’s production lines on one floor of the Henschel plant. One may disagree with the need for a heavy tank at all, but the program did not significantly affect other tank production in any meaningful way. Germany produced 50,439 AFVs during WW2, only 1839 of which were Tiger I and II heavy tanks (1347 Tiger I's and 492 Tiger II's).

    Despite this, the Tiger II is often held up as an example of German waste, when in reality the decision to replace the PzIV with the Panther is far more debatable.


    Of course the Tiger II did suffer from some weaknesses. However, these were attributable far more to German late war circumstances than any inherent design flaws.

    Late war German logistics: Tiger II's were far more likely to be lost due to a lack of fuel or spare parts than to enemy fire.

    Crews: As could be expected, Tiger II performance varied greatly based on crew experience.

    Deployment: Much like the first two weaknesses, the late war German position(and Hitler's interference) forced commanders to deploy their weapons systems in less than optimal situations. Tiger II's attempting to navigate the densely forested Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge would be the most obvious example.


    Combat Record



    Moving into Position: D-Day + ?


    The Tiger II's combat record is often written about purely in terms of its performance on the Western Front, and then only during the Ardennes Offensive. The tank performed well in Normandy in the defense of Caen, particularly during the blunting of Operation Atlantic. However, the dense hedgerows that characterize the area were certainly not ideal "tank country" and the Tiger II's main advantage - its standoff capability - was rendered virtually useless, as engagements were conducted at very short range. Still, the tank's superior armor made it a fearsome opponent. Again in Operation Market Garden, the Tiger II was called on to help blunt an Allied armored offensive.



    Under Cover in Normandy

    One day a Tiger Royal tank got within 150 yards of my tank and knocked me out. Five of our tanks opened up on him from ranges of 200 to 600 yards and got five or six hits on the front of the Tiger. They all just glanced off and the Tiger backed off and got away. If we had a tank like Tiger, we would all be home today.
    - Report by tank commander Sergeant Clyde D. Brunson from 2nd Armored Division, 1945.



    Of course, the Tiger II's most widely known campaign - and the one from which most "evidence" of its failings is drawn from - was in support of Operation Watch on the Rhine. There the Tiger II faced a "perfect storm" of the three weaknesses mentioned above - poor logistics, inexperienced crews, and deployment in less than suitable conditions. The dense forests negated the tanks advantages even more so than the Hedgerows of Normandy.



    American Inspection


    Stories of Tiger II's being disable by determined American bazooka crews, getting bogged down, and running out of fuel abound - and are all true. What is not said, however, is that the same fate befell German and Allied (minus the fuel shortage) AFVs of all shapes and sizes. The terrain was simply not hospitable to armored warfare - which was the reason it was neglected by the Allies in the first place.



    Knocked Out in the Ardennes



    Not Penetrated


    Further, what is not often mentioned is that the Tiger II performed very well in its role as a breakout tank during the Bulge. While a few tanks were lost to enemy action, and a greater number to mechanical issues and terrain difficulties, the majority of Tiger IIs sliced through Allied lines nearly imperviously until German forces inevitably ran out of fuel. That fuel shortage was predicted by German commanders before the operation and effected the whole of the German forces. It was certainly not unique to units operating the Tiger II.



    Working with Fallschirmjager in the Ardennes



    American POWs File Past a Tiger II


    Despite the unfavorable conditions previously discussed, the lead element of the German assault, Kampfgruppe Peiper, utilizing Tiger IIs, left a path of destruction in its wake, including decimating American defensive positions and tank battalions. The kampfgruppe was later cut off and ran out of fuel, forcing its men had to abandon their equipment and retreat back to German lines on foot. The eventual fate of the kampfgruppe, however, was the result of logistics and operational issues that were the natural results of the insanity that was the Ardennes Offensive- not the Tiger II.



    Artist's Rendering of the Infamous Kampfgruppe Peiper



    American Use During the Bulge


    Left out of many discussions about the tank is the Tiger II's service on the Eastern Front. Here in more suitable conditions and under the command of well trained, experienced crews, the tank's abilities were fully exploited. The tank's reliability actually surpassed that of the Panther, and Wehrmacht and SS heavy tank battalions were used both on the defense and the offence to great effect.



    Tiger II in Budapest (1)



    Tiger II in Budapest (2) Accompanied by German Infantry


    Of particular note is the SS Heavy Tank Battalion 503, which played a key role in the critical Battle of Debrecen, which kept Hungary in the fight for Germany.



    Street Fighting in Budapest

    Quote Originally Posted by wiki
    The 503rd remained in the Hungarian theater of operations for 166 days, during which it accounted for at least 121 Soviet tanks, 244 anti-tank guns and artillery pieces, five aircraft and a train. This was at the loss of 25 Tiger IIs; ten were knocked out by Soviet troops and burned out, two were sent back to Vienna for a factory overhaul, while thirteen were blown up by their crews for various reasons, usually to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Kurt Knispel, the highest scoring tank ace of all time (162 enemy AFVs destroyed), also served with the 503rd, and was killed in action on 29 April 1945 in his Tiger II.

    The Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 503 (s.SS Pz.Abt. 503) claimed approximately 500 kills in the period from January to April 1945 on the Eastern Front for the loss of 45 Tiger IIs (most of which were abandoned and destroyed by their own crews after mechanical breakdowns or for lack of fuel.


    Operating on the Eastern Front


    On the road from Bollersdorf to Strausberg stood a further 11 Stalin tanks, and away on the egde of the village itself were around 120-150 enemy tanks in the process of being refuelled and re-armed. I opened fire and destroyed first and last of the 11 Stalin tanks on the road….My own personal score of enemy tanks destroyed in this action was 39.
    -SS-Hauptscharführer Karl Körner, schwere SS Panzer Abteilung (103) 503 / III SS Panzer Corps, East Germany, April of 1945.



    In many ways, the Tiger II, like the Panther, represented the realization of the main battle tank concept. The traditional dynamic of speed, armor, and firepower where one had to be sacrificed to achieve gains in the other two no longer held. Technology had progressed to such an extent that the Tiger II boasted formidable specifications in all three areas. Operated by an experienced crew in the role it was intended to fill, the Tiger II was nearly invincible on the battlefield, and boasted a combat prowess beyond anything the Allies fielded during the war. Of course, the Tiger II was not flawless, but it was a very capable amored fighting vehicle - arguably the best performing tank of the war - and it merits some historical revision.
    Last edited by PanzerJaeger; 01-07-2011 at 12:04.

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  2. #2
    Nur-ad-Din Forum Administrator TosaInu's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Interesting post PanzerJaeger,

    I don't know much about thanks, only bits, and likely also information that isn't the best.

    I do know about (some of) the too big arguments and I can see that big isn't the best in all conditions. 'But when that is so bad, why do we still make big tanks today?' So, it was nice for me to read this.
    Ja mata

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    pardon my klatchian Member al Roumi's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Yes, very interesting -thanks PJ. Interesting contrast to the Panther too and your points addressing criticism of German manufacturing & priorities is pertinent, given the manpower constraints they faced.

    One myth you don't mention -and may or may not have affected the Tiger II, is cases of defective armour due to low grade steel. Part and parcel with the shortage of other strategic resources felt by Germany.

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    Nur-ad-Din Forum Administrator TosaInu's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    What was the normal way to make high grade steel back then alh_p? Did the Germans make it anyway or was there a nifty work around?
    Ja mata

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    pardon my klatchian Member al Roumi's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Quote Originally Posted by TosaInu View Post
    What was the normal way to make high grade steel back then alh_p? Did the Germans make it anyway or was there a nifty work around?
    ahem, wish I knew tbh although my first question was actually due to experience of playing the beta of "World of Tanks", a psuedo-realistic MMO where HE shells are available as a purchaseable extra.

    In game, the HE shells tended to immobilise or damage vehicles quite easily. The accuracy of this effect of HE shells compared to standard AP ammo was discussed on the forums, the consensus/winning argument (not neccessarily correct!) was that degrading quality of steels used by the German armaments industry resulted in a fragility to extremes of heat (or another effect of HE shells) in German tank armour.

    Here's an exeprt from wiki on the Panther tank:

    As the war progressed, Germany was forced to reduce or no longer use certain critical alloy materials in the production of armor plate, such as nickel, tungsten, molybdenum, and manganese; this did result in lower impact resistance levels compared to earlier armor.[51] Manganese from mines in the Ukraine ceased when the German Army lost control of this territory in February 1944. Allied bombers struck the Knabe mine in Norway and stopped a key source of molybdenum; other supplies from Finland and Japan were also cut off. The loss of molybdenum, and its replacement with other substitutes to maintain hardness, as well as a general loss of quality control resulted in an increased brittleness in German armor plate, which developed a tendency to fracture when struck with a shell. Testing by U.S. Army officers in August 1944 in Isigny, France showed catastrophic cracking of the armor plate on two out of three Panthers examined.[52][53]

    Basicaly, (and assuming I correctly remember basic metalurgy from my degreee!) Steel is iron mixed with a small ammount of carbon to make it harder. Different alloys of steel are created with different proportions of carbon and the addition of other small quantities of fancy materials -for example Chromium, Tungsten, Molybdenum... Here's a quick explanation based on the steels used in bicycles. If you don't have access to these materials, some of which were quite exotic at the time, you can't make steel as strong without choosing different materials -which might lead to altogether different properties, e.g. higher weight, more fragmentation, harder to weld/manufacture...
    Last edited by al Roumi; 01-07-2011 at 16:45.

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    Senior Member Senior Member Fisherking's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Most of what you have to say is very clear and I tend to agree that the Tiger II was a fine AFV.

    It did have mobility problems, in that it took excellent bridges and infrastructure to support its movement.

    Germans still over engineer almost everything using machined parts where cast parts will serve just as well. This ,naturally, lead to slower production.

    The M-26 was the only allied tank mounting a 90mm gun and it only arrived in small numbers at the end of the war. But the allied tank destroyers were equipped with better guns and better ammunition to deal with German Armor.

    On a whole, I would say that the western allies philosophy on armor was seriously flawed. Their doctrine was to have tank destroyers deal with tanks while the tanks dealt with infantry support tasks.

    The flaws in that strategy were apparent, or should have been by the American entry into the war in 1942.

    Self appointed experts often find fault, particularly with the losing side but if you asked an armor crewman which tank he would rather go into combat in I don’t think the allied tanks would have many takers.

    I would treat most of the criticism as sour grapes. The allies sacrificed their crews while the Germans sought to preserve them. Of course they would say it is an extravagant use of resources.


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    and conceals from the stupid,
    the vast limits of their knowledge.
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    Member Member Marcvs julius's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Quote Originally Posted by al Roumi View Post
    One myth you don't mention -and may or may not have affected the Tiger II, is cases of defective armour due to low grade steel. Part and parcel with the shortage of other strategic resources felt by Germany.
    yes that is also a good point.

    I like tank's a lot but you did not mencion the alied air superiority it destroid many german tanks and the tiger II, as any otlher tank of the time was vunerable to air atack.

  8. #8

    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Quote Originally Posted by TosaInu View Post
    I do know about (some of) the too big arguments and I can see that big isn't the best in all conditions. 'But when that is so bad, why do we still make big tanks today?' So, it was nice for me to read this.
    That is a good point. The American Abrams and German Leopard II tank, built to fight on the same European battlefields (and in many cases cross the same bridges) as the Tiger II, both weigh around 65 tonnes compared to the 70 ton Tiger II. The hull length of the Abrams is 7.93m and 8.49m for the Leopard II, compared to 6.4m for the Tiger II. The Abrams is 3.66m in width and the Leopard II is 3.75m, compared to the Tiger II at 3.755m.


    Quote Originally Posted by alh_p
    One myth you don't mention -and may or may not have affected the Tiger II, is cases of defective armour due to low grade steel. Part and parcel with the shortage of other strategic resources felt by Germany.
    I knew I forgot something. There is actually quite a controversy surrounding the Tiger II's armor.

    During August 1944, a number of Tiger II tanks were captured by the Soviets near Sandomierz and were soon moved to their testing grounds at Kubinka. The Soviet team gave the opinion that the tests revealed the tanks to be severely defective; the transmission and suspension broke down very frequently and the engine was prone to overheating and consequential failure. Additionally, the Soviets opinion was of deficiencies in the armor after firing many anti-tank rounds at the same target. Not only did they report that the metal was of shoddy quality (a problem not particular to the Tiger II—as the war progressed, the Germans found it harder and harder to obtain the alloys needed for high-quality steel), but the welding was also, despite "careful workmanship", extremely poor. As a result, even when shells did not penetrate the armor, there was a large amount of spalling, and the armor plating cracked at the welds when struck by multiple heavy shells, rendering the tank inoperable.[39][48]
    While German metallurgy had certainly deteriorated to some extent towards the end of the war, the sloped nature of the Tiger II's armor along with its sheer thickness seem to have compensated for it. Ankerstjerne argues that the tests - even if wholly accurate, which is in doubt - cannot be used as evidence of a critical deficiency in the armor as the tank was shot at literally hundreds of times, far more than would be experienced in combat. Each time a tank's armor is hit, it weakens the whole structure.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ankerstjerne
    The mere number of shots would have weakened the armour structure so much it is admirable that the vehicle held together for so long in the first place.
    Further, there are no field reports of cracking or spalling (which is of particular danger to a tank crew) in combat. In fact, IIRC, there are no recorded incidences of a Tiger II's frontal armor being penetrated in combat by any weapon during the war.


    Quote Originally Posted by Fisherking
    The M-26 was the only allied tank mounting a 90mm gun and it only arrived in small numbers at the end of the war. But the allied tank destroyers were equipped with better guns and better ammunition to deal with German Armor.
    IIRC, only the M36, which debuted also in '44 in very limited numbers, could conceivably defeat a Tiger II, and then only with a very lucky shot.

  9. #9
    Clan Takiyama Senior Member CBR's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Quote Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger View Post
    As a heavy tank meant to replace the original Tiger, its role was to attack obstacles and enemy strong points, create breakthroughs, and engage enemy armored formations.
    And that is the first point on the list of problems. A tank designed for a role that just did not exist anymore as Germany was on the defensive.

    Some of the following comes from Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II

    It used same engine as the Tiger I and the Panther, so it had the lowest HP/weight ratio of the three.

    It also had the lowest operational range. That is not the best thing for a tank and especially not when Germany was heavily outnumbered and needed to shift armoured forces to stop enemy breakthroughs.

    Its weight did cause issues as seen in Operation Konrad III where the bridge over Sarviz Canal were blown up by the Russians, forcing IV SS-Panzer Corps to fight on without Heavy Tank Battalion 509.

    The deep fording equipment was only installed on a few tanks for testing.

    The reliability might have ended up being better than the Tiger I but that does unfortunately not say much as the Tiger I was bad. I don't know about the statistics from March 1945 as it would depend a lot on whether units were in action or in reserve.

    Either way, good reliability less than 2 months before it was all over did not help much when it was needed in summer/autumn '44: in early August nearly all the Tiger II of Battalion 501 broke down during a 50 Km roadmarch and delayed a counter attack for several days.

    The Russians tested a few captured Tiger II: http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?...282&Itemid=124

    They could only get a 90 km range instead of the 120 claimed in the manual. Nor was the speed really impressive.

    I don’t know how many times I have read some variation of “the Germans should have made more low quality tanks instead of a few high quality ones”.
    Well, it should perhaps read more like "Germany should have made cheaper and reliable tanks instead of fewer overly complex tanks"

    It seems one of the easiest way of killing a Tiger was to attack somewhere else and force the heavy battalions to die by mechanical breakdowns in the retreat. And it was rather easy to find a spot to attack, as Germany did not have high numbers of such tanks.

    The manpower problem was similar to the lack of trained fighter pilots: not running out of men but rather not training enough men. And it is always better to have easy to maintain tanks for lesser skilled crews anyway.

    Tank crews might be saved by its heavy armour but how many frontschwein had to die while waiting for armour support?

    Without doubt the heavy Tigers were good at killing stuff but it did come at a cost. Was the cost worth it? That is a good question. Could all that labour and steel have been used for a better purpose? What Germany so desperately needed in the last 2 years were more tanks and assaultguns and they never had enough to plug the holes.
    Last edited by CBR; 01-08-2011 at 05:24.

  10. #10
    master of the pwniverse Member Fragony's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    The only weakness that thing had was at the factory. Very expensive to produce, tank itself was a beauty but you got to make them first

  11. #11
    Senior Member Senior Member Fisherking's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Allied doctrine was for TDs to kill tanks and tanks to kill everything else. The only time the TD doctrine worked was in North Africa when two Bn.s stopped the 10th pz div.

    Both the Germans and the Allies estimated that it took 17 M4s to kill a Tiger. Funny enough, (which is not funny at all), 17 tanks was the number of tanks in US Army company. That means that a platoon of Tigers was a match for a whole Bn of tanks. That generally applied to the Tiger I. Most were actually killed by aircraft. The Panther was easier, that only took about a dozen.

    The TD units had different organization and tactics that added up to better results, as well as better guns and ammunition. Still, the light armor and open tops were far from ideal tank killers.

    To prevent them being used as tanks, they lacked coax and hull mounted machineguns.. Crews and some Bns built armored tops and moved the 50 cal. machineguns to the front of the vehicles to provide protection from ground attack by infantry.

    The M-36 carried the very same gun as the M-26. The M-18 mounted a 76mm purpose built anti-tank gun, the same as the firefly. In fact the M-18 was the only AFV designed from the ground up to be a TD built by the allies. It had a road speed of 97km/h and was the fastest AFV of the war. The M-10 mounted a 3 inch (76mm) gun that was later fitted to the M4A3 but the tank destroyers had better AP ammunition not given to tank crews. By the end of the war in Europe most TD Bns were using the M-36.

    The criticism more rightly placed on the German war machine was that they produced too many types of AFVs. Rather than replacing the production of older models with newer ones, the older models were still produced or converted to tank destroyer variants which lead to logistical problems, in the supplying of parts and maintenance for a wide range of vehicles.

    All AFVs are prone to breakdown. It is still a truism that a tank requires 8 hours of maintenance for every hour of operation.

    Much of what is said using hindsight is not applicable to a vehicles worth. The Tiger II was successful in its role. Most of the shortcomings frequently cited have more to do with Germany’s position. Had it been built by an allied nation I am sure it would have been viewed as an unqualified success, as was the M-26, which was quickly replaced by first the M-46 and then the M-47. All of these were phased out by the late 1950s and replaced by the M-48, all having had a service life of under 5 years.

    My conclusion is that the Tiger II was not a dog. The overall design was good and it filled it role on the battle field. It was not perfect but it did what it was meant to do.
    Whether it was better to build one of these or two Panthers is a whole other topic in its self.


    Education: that which reveals to the wise,
    and conceals from the stupid,
    the vast limits of their knowledge.
    Mark Twain

  12. #12
    Clan Takiyama Senior Member CBR's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Quote Originally Posted by Fisherking View Post
    Most were actually killed by aircraft.
    Of the 134 Tiger tanks involved in Normandy, 60 was destroyed by direct or indirect fire, 58 destroyed or abandoned by crew and 13 destroyed by air attack. The Tigers knocked out 510 Allied tanks. The kill ratio in direct combat was 10.6 to 1 and 3.9 to 1 when losses from all causes are included.

    Two heavy battalions (504 and 508) were involved in Italy. Battalion 504 lost 87 tanks and about 13 of them from combat. Of the 74 tanks destroyed by own crews, 30 were in the final month so perhaps not so important. They destroyed 100+ Allied tanks and in direct combat the ratio was 7.7 to 1. For battalion 508 the loss was 78 Tigers and 48 of them were by own crews. They also destroyed about 100 Allied tanks.

    Italy was the least successful deployment for the Tigers and the rugged terrain caused high losses in retreats.

  13. #13
    Senior Member Senior Member ReluctantSamurai's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Self appointed experts often find fault, particularly with the losing side but if you asked an armor crewman which tank he would rather go into combat in I don’t think the allied tanks would have many takers.
    Statistically, you were more likely to survive a penetration hit in a Sherman than in most any other tank. The US TD's (M10, M18, M36) had the lowest casualty rate of any AFV in the ETO, yet had the thinnest armor. At least 50% of casualties suffered by tank crews happened after they exited the tank...from MG, small arms and mortar fire.

    It seems one of the easiest way of killing a Tiger was to attack somewhere else and force the heavy battalions to die by mechanical breakdowns in the retreat. And it was rather easy to find a spot to attack, as Germany did not have high numbers of such tanks.
    A tactic used by the Soviets for Operation Bagration. No small coincidence that most of the Soviet armored breakthroughs were in areas where there were no Tigers of any kind.

    Both the Germans and the Allies estimated that it took 17 M4s to kill a Tiger. Funny enough, (which is not funny at all), 17 tanks was the number of tanks in US Army company. That means that a platoon of Tigers was a match for a whole Bn of tanks. That generally applied to the Tiger I. Most were actually killed by aircraft. The Panther was easier, that only took about a dozen.
    I would suspect that this is an offshoot of the 5 for 1 (Sherman vs. The Cats) myth. I would like to see some statistical evidence to support this.

    Still, the light armor and open tops were far from ideal tank killers.
    And yet, US TD's achieved a 3 :1 kill ratio across the board for all units, with some having kill ratios up in the 10 : 1 range, which would place them in the same position as some of the elite Tiger battalions.

    The M-10 mounted a 3 inch (76mm) gun that was later fitted to the M4A3 but the tank destroyers had better AP ammunition not given to tank crews.
    Point of note: the M10 mounted a 76mm M7 L/53 derived from an anti-aircraft gun; the M4A3 used the 76mm M1A2 L/55. The ammo for the guns was not interchangeable.

    Both Tiger variants made for excellent defensive platforms, as proved repeatedly on both the Eastern Front and in Europe. This pretty much fit in with the position that Germany found itself in when the Cats began appearing on the battlefield in numbers. But as an offensive weapon....not so good. Breakdowns were frequent on forced marches, and the fuel consumption would be something fierce. Something never mentioned for figures of AFV fuel consumption numbers is that they are usually given for road travel. Off-road consumption is much higher.

    It has been sometimes mentioned that the Tigers would have been more useful if they had been distributed in company size to Korps assets instead of being used individually in battalion strength. The idea being that it didn't take many Tigers to make an impact on the battlefield, and this would save the forced marches that were often necessary. It made it more likely that the Tigers would've been much closer to the action, and harder to avoid.
    Last edited by ReluctantSamurai; 01-08-2011 at 15:37.
    High Plains Drifter

  14. #14

    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    Quote Originally Posted by Fisherking View Post
    Both the Germans and the Allies estimated that it took 17 M4s to kill a Tiger.
    The myth states five M4s for one Tiger I, and that the short-barreled 75mm gun could only penetrate at point blank range from the rear. However, in actuality, it was effective against the sides out to 300 yards, according to Soviet firing tests. I did find one documented case of a Sherman successfully ambushing a Tiger I from the side (at close range): the 75mm projectile punched through the side armor into the engine compartment and ignited the fuel. The crew escaped but the tank was immolated.

    The M-36 carried the very same gun as the M-26.
    2000+ were built, and with T30E16 ammunition, which reached the front lines in January 1945, it could pierce the front glacis plate of the King Tiger out to 100 yards and the front of the turret out to 800 yards. Ordinary APC would pierce the sides and rear at typical combat ranges.

    The M-18 mounted a 76mm purpose built anti-tank gun, the same as the firefly.
    The M18 mounted the 76mm M1 gun, while the Firefly mounted the 17-pounder. The M1 had much poorer anti-armor performance, but the M18's agility and fast-turning turret gave it some advantages over the cumbersome German heavies. Late in the war, one M18 commander wrote in his unit records concerning the big Panzers that 'the enemy could be easily outmaneuvered and is highly susceptible to two-way attack ...' and that the weapon they feared most was the Pak 40 75mm antitank gun.

    The M-10 mounted a 3 inch (76mm) gun that was later fitted to the M4A3 but the tank destroyers had better AP ammunition not given to tank crews.
    The 3-inch was not used with the Shermans; the 76mm M1 developed from it was used instead. As for HVAP ammunition, it was issued to the Shermans as well, but anecdotally in limited quantities.

    ... as was the M-26, which was quickly replaced by first the M-46 and then the M-47. All of these were phased out by the late 1950s and replaced by the M-48, all having had a service life of under 5 years.
    The M46 and M47 were stopgap efforts, but the M48 was in service with U.S. forces into the Nineties.

  15. #15
    master of the pwniverse Member Fragony's Avatar
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    Default Re: In Defense of the German Tiger II Tank (Warning - Pic Heavy Post)

    First I hear anything that would be bad about it, except the costs. Saw one up close, what a monster. I can totally understand why they were feared so much.

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