As mentioned above, the analysis of some of the discrete military events described in this book were made possible by use of the TNDM, a computer assisted, mathematical model of combat. The origins of the TNDM go back to 1965 when I was working on a research study for the US Army, which had for its purpose an evaluation of the trends in the lethality of weapons over history. I developed a concept of measuring this in terms of their ability to inflict casualties, or to do other damage, over a period of time. the result was a methodology for calculating the Operational Lethality Index (OLI) of any weapon at any time in history. The characteristics considered were accuracy, reliability, number of human targets rendered, casualties for each 'strike' of a weapon, the range at which it could do damage and the density of the target array. For mobile fighting machines like tanks or aircraft or warships, which combine one or more direct fire weapons with mobility and protection, consideration was given to factors representing the speed of the machine, its range or radius of operation and its ability to survive when hit by hostile weapons. The calculations in applying these considerations and characteristics of a given weapon produced a numerical proving ground value representing the number of casualties the weapon could inflict in one hour under ideal circumstances.
The next step in the development of a model of combat was the derivation of the Quantified Judgment Method, which used historical experience to consider all the factors affecting the actual ability of all the weapons in a military force to inflict damage upon an opponent on a battlefield. Among the many physical variables affecting the effectiveness of weapons - and forces equipped with weapons - were such obvious factors as terrain, weather and season, as well as more complex but nevertheless important factors such as mobility and vulnerability. Values or methods of calculating values, for these factors were obtained by detailed analysis of 60 WWII battles which took place in Italy in 1943-44. these values were tested and confirmed (or in a few instances slightly modified) by applying them to battle data for about 150 additional battles or engagements, mostly from other theatres of WWII, but including 15 battles from World War I and about sixty from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, plus 2 from the Napoleonic Wars and 2 from the American Civil War.
One thing which became very evident in this process of quantitative historical analysis was the overwhelming importance of human factors. But what also became evident is that - dispute the vagaries of human nature and behavior - values representing human factors fell into clear patterns. One need only look at the application of actuarial analysis to insurance and medicine to realize that this is typical of human nature and human behavior in all fields of endeavor and activity and under any and all circumstances. When human beings are involved, there will always be exceptions to the patterns; for instance, the survival of some people to ages of more than 1oo years. But the patterns are clear.
Since my colleagues and I were dealing with a large number of examples - initially 60, later more than 200 - our analysis was actuarial. Others like American military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge about a century ago , have flirted with the concept of patterns in battles and warfare. but, prior to the development of the Quantified Judgment Method, no one had attempted to do this systematically and scientifically.
The first human factor I was able to quantify was that of surprise. Next and possibly most important, was that of relative combat effectiveness. It is evident from the most cursory look at history that some armies and generals have performed better than others, regardless of circumstances. Our detailed analysis of the first 60 battles in Italy forced us (reluctantly I must say) to the conclusion that the Germans were consistently better than the allies (British and Americans) by a margin of about 20%. This meant that, on average, the quantified predictions of a battle's outcome could be matched by the quantified results, only if a factor of 1.2 were applied to the Germans. Yet we also discovered that one or two American divisions performed as well as some of the best German divisions; further analysis revealed that this was a reflection of leadership qualities. On the Eastern Front, the relative combat effectiveness value (CEV) of German superiority over Soviets averaged an amazing 2.5 from 1941 to 1943 and was still about 1.8 at the end of the war. In other words, given comparable equipment, 100 German soldiers were the equivalent of about 120 American or British soldiers and about 250 Soviet soldiers. This does not mean that the Germans were stronger, smarter, braver or more highly motivated that their Allied opponents; they were simply more professional.
Similarly, we discovered an average Israeli CEV superiority of 2.0 over Arab opponents in the Arab-Israeli wars. Thus on average, 100 Israeli soldiers in those wars were the equivalent of 200 Arab soldiers. the differences between the Arabs - in clear patterns - was also interesting. The Jordanians were the best, having a CEV with respect of the Israelis of about 0.6 (in other words, the Israeli CEV was about 1.6 with respect to the Jordanians. The Jordanian CEV relationship to the other Arab forces was as follows: Egyptians 1.15, Syrians 1.3, Iraqis 1.8. Again we do not believe that the Israelis were smarter, stronger braver or more highly motivated than the Arabs, or that the Jordanians were some kind of super Arab. It is simply through a combination of cultural and professional phenomena the Israelis have proven themselves able to utilize their forces more effectively than have their opponents and that the Jordanians are evidently professionally superior to the other Arab forces.
Fighting Power
hit the fan, at least.
Anyway, comments on these data/arguments? Oh, and these notes cover at best a quarter of the book, so read this ( http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com.../chapter4.aspx) review for a better idea of the book's premises and conclusions.
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Originally Posted by Montmorency
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