In philosophical theory, maybe. Evolutionarily-speaking, though, why should it be surprising that 'the ability of a brain to factor its own operations into its operations' would be behaviorally efficacious, if that's what's at stake?
The problem with philosophical zombies is that inevitably the removal of the factor of consciousness networks would entail significant, possibly gross, discrepancies between neuroanatomies. It's like asking, what if there were a society exactly like ours [i.e. the 'world's'] except everyone thought cannibalism was a great fun time. That's the problem with these philosophical jambalayas: prepare them rigorously and with proper ingredients or else you'll give someone mental diarrhea. Incidentally, [joke about college students with respect to this analogy].
Experimentally, what needs to be done is to more precisely identify the brain function behind consciousness, then the granular anatomy behind consciousness, and finally to selectively excite and inhibit the relevant systems to elucidate the behavioral effect of such interference, and by the same token the behavioral role of typically-functioning consciousness.
That would answer many of your questions, I think, and it is ultimately not something a theorist can personally do unless he's, like, director of his own lab or institute or something.
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