In sum, there are two major contending approaches to Gulf security: U.S. hegemony and principled multilateralism. If the United States were to adopt the Bush administration's approach, Gulf relations would be patterned along the following lines:
• Gulf security would be exclusionary, with U.S. "friends and allies" on one side, and U.S. enemies such as Iran on the other. The United States would make a decision on who is excluded, based on factors such as internal regime structure, support of terrorism and WMD aspirations.
• Confidence-building measures in the military realm (such as arms limitations, cooperative military exercises or transparency on arms buildups) would only apply to friends and allies.
• The ultimate goal would be to target those "rogue" states outside the established order, isolate them, and bring about a "regime conversion" or regime change.
• The legitimate right to self-defense would not be recognized for all actors, but only for those who agree with U.S. policy approaches and the U.S. definition of security threats.
• WMD would not be viewed as dangerous in and of themselves. Rather, the character of the state obtaining WMD would be the primary criterion for counterproliferation efforts. Implicitly, Israel would not be the target of nonproliferation efforts, and "friends" next door to the Gulf, such as Pakistan and India, would not be pressured to moderate their nuclear behavior because of the potentially negative effects of their nuclear arsenals and missile programs on Gulf states' security.
• Arab friends and allies would not base security on their own indigenous capabilities but rather on continued dependence on the United States as an outside power, through bilateral agreements.
The hegemonic strategy does not deviate from U.S. policies in previous periods and thus risks more policy failure. Bilateral ties, by themselves, will neither solve outstanding political conflicts nor prevent new conflicts from arising among the Gulf states. In fact, dependence on the United States is only going to increase the domestic pressures against current Arab regimes.
In stark contrast to the approach of hegemony, a principled multilateral approach to Gulf security would have the following attributes:
• Gulf security would be inclusive. Even if Iran were not integrated into the collective military structure of U.S. allies, Iran would still be included through myriad economic or security ties, as opportunities for common action arose.
• Gulf security would be built on a rule-based order in which universal principles would apply to all actors in the Gulf, including the United States.
• There would be basic recognition of the inherent right to legitimate measures for self-defense on the part of all states in the region, whether or not the United States considered those states to be friends or allies. Thus, Iran's right to self-defense, including the maintenance of a viable military, would be recognized and allowed. The demand side of WMD proliferation would be addressed, because every actor's security concerns would be taken into account.
• The goal would not be to end competition through regime change, but rather to manage competition between all governments as they are currently constituted.
• WMD would be viewed as a general problem requiring equal rules and constraints that apply to all parties, including the United States, Israel, Pakistan and India.
In general, the central assumption of the strategy of principled multilateralism is that security is sought with other states, rather than against them, and that domestic developments in the Gulf will follow a more beneficial course if all states are gradually intertwined in a web of military and economic agreements that create strong interdependence. Time will tell whether the United States and its global and regional partners have the foresight to adopt this revolutionary strategy for providing security in the Gulf in the twenty-first century.
Whatever approach is adopted, a genuinely new set of policies for security and prosperity in the region is desperately needed – before the status quo practice of Realpolitik bilateralism breaks down once again, with predictably negative results.
My Iraq Opinion.
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Originally Posted by PanzerJager
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