Why Do The Greatest Generals Always "Lose?"

[Strike For The South]

Lee Rommel and Napoleon were all some of the best generals of all time...So this begs the question why does the losing side always or most always produce better generals? Is it because of a devil may care attitude throw everything at'em there may not be a tomorrow or is it something more?

[CBR]

Always? Even if we accept the idea that the three generals mentioned were the greatest (and all certainly had their flaws) I seem to recall many if not most of the best generals being on the winning side.

Oh and Napoleon might have lost in the end but he won severals wars and generally faced inferior opponents in his victories.


CBR

[Strike For The South]

Always? Even if we accept the idea that the three generals mentioned were the greatest (and all certainly had their flaws) I seem to recall many if not most of the best generals being on the winning side.

Oh and Napoleon might have lost in the end but he won severals wars and generally faced inferior opponents in his victories.


CBR

More than not I'd wager. Confederate, French and German generals were always considered to be better yet were crushed by opponents with inexhaustible resources. Why?

[CBR]

Frederick the Great managed to win the Seven Years War against opponents who had more resources than him. Frederick William III got blown to bits within weeks against Napoleon in 1806

Marlborough outclassed all the French generals he faced in the War of Spanish Succession. Suvorov beat up a bunch of future French marshals in northern Italy in 1799. The French were outclassed by Moltke in the Franco-German War.

No one would have talked much about Lee if he had faced someone who had just slightly more guts than what McClellan showed in the Peninsula Campaign and yet again at Antietam.

The late Prussian military tradition created a professionalism that can be considered without equal for its time. But in wars of attrition a general like Rommel, who perhaps at best was a good corps commander, just cannot decide a war on his own.


CBR

[Strike For The South]

Frederick the Great managed to win the Seven Years War against opponents who had more resources than him. Frederick William III got blown to bits within weeks against Napoleon in 1806

Marlborough outclassed all the French generals he faced in the War of Spanish Succession. Suvorov beat up a bunch of future French marshals in northern Italy in 1799. The French were outclassed by Moltke in the Franco-German War.

No one would have talked much about Lee if he had faced someone who had just slightly more guts than what McClellan showed in the Peninsula Campaign and yet again at Antietam.

The late Prussian military tradition created a professionalism that can be considered without equal for its time. But in wars of attrition a general like Rommel, who perhaps at best was a good corps commander, just cannot decide a war on his own.


CBR

I contend Lee, Jackson, Bearguread and Johnston were all equal or better than Grant or Sherman. Although you are probably right I am rather cherry picking the topic at hand.

[KarlXII]

For Lee and Rommel, it was simple. The enemy could afford the losses it endured, it also could produce more than they could. For Lee, this meant much needed reinforcements and ammunition, for Rommel, this meant tanks, reinforcement, artillery, etc. Plus the Oberkommand considered the North African Front a sideshow in comparison to the Russian campaign that was in effect.

[Uesugi Kenshin]

I think losing generals just get to show their genius a lot more often than winning generals. If you give me 30 tanks and five platoons of infantry to smash a village of 100 shoddily armed partisans I'm not going to get much credit for crushing them, while they'll be praised for being able to hold off the inevitable for a little while and inflict some casualties.

To make it a bit more clear, if you're fighting a superior force you're going to use all of your wits and cunning, while if you are leading a superior force you are more likely to get a little lazy. At the same time any victory of an inferior force will be praised much more highly no matter the circumstances.

Last generalization: People love to root for the underdog, so if you know a guy lost a war, but it lasted a while or he made some good moves you're more likely to idealize him as a noble warrior trying to stem off the inevitable who just needed a little more manpower or whatever.

On another note I think Lee's tactical ability would have to be overshadowed at the very least by Sherman's innovative total war on the South. Though I haven't done a ton of research on that so really I could easily be off base there.

[PanzerJaeger]

I too have reservations about the accuracy of that statement.

Anyway...

There are tons of variables at play between, say, the Confederate and German militaries; but if you're looking for one overarching commonality, I would say it was the availability of resources.

Both the US in the ACW and the Allies in WW2 could afford tactical weaknesses. Therefore some level of mediocrity could exist and value was placed on attributes other than pure martial skill. Neither the CSA nor the Axis could afford to lose battles, men, or resources in such a way.

For example, in the ACW, Lincoln could afford to keep McClellan around after a string of failed battles hoping that he would eventually improve. He had plenty of men and material available, and was fighting an enemy that had adopted a largely defensive strategy. On the other hand, the CSA was working with very finite resources and their strategy revolved largely around decisive and demoralizing battlefield victories to try and convince the North it wasn't worth it.

Also, you'll also note that the most highly recognized Union generals - Grant and Sherman - were valued for very different reasons than their Confederate opponents. Neither man was particularly skilled during pitched battle, but they both had the tenacity required for attritional warfare. Grant didn't bother trying draw Lee into a decisive battle and defeat him outright, he simply kept the pressure on until the resources ran out. The end of the ACW in Virginia very much resembled the WW1trench system.

The situation between the Germans and the Allies was similar.

Since the days of Prussia, the Germans had operated under the assumption that they would have to use superior skill as a force multiplier against larger opponents and this mindset was supported in WW1. Even as early as the French Campaign, the Germans were at a serious numerical and material disadvantage, so tactical skill was valued above all else including logistical ability, social class, and even schooling. Loss of precious German soldiers or equipment due to poor leadership could not be tolerated. The German military was unique among other major militaries in the ability of the common soldier to ascend through the ranks into important leadership roles based on skill - as the Germans realized that their fate rested upon decisive military victory.

Apart from some stand outs such as Patton, the allied militaries were geared very differently. They could afford to lose battles as long as the greater strategic situation went their way. With the vast resources at their disposal and the long distances those resources had to be transported, the Western Allies - especially the Americans - placed more value on logistically skilled leaders such as Bradley. In the East, Stalin promoted men who understood attritional warfare. He wasn't concerned with how many men, tanks, or airplanes were lost as long as Germans were being killed.

So, I would say that the phenomenon that was highlighted in the original post is a result of necessity and resource inequality. Any nation that is at a serious resource disadvantage is going to place higher value on the most efficient use of the men and material they do have. Just a guess though...

[PanzerJaeger]

For Lee and Rommel, it was simple. The enemy could afford the losses it endured, it also could produce more than they could. For Lee, this meant much needed reinforcements and ammunition, for Rommel, this meant tanks, reinforcement, artillery, etc.

Ok - you essentially made my point in about 1000 less words... :shame:

[seireikhaan]

Chinggis Khaan didn't "lose". Alexander the Great didn't "lose". Humanity caught them.

As the industrial eras and modern eras advanced, it became progressively harder to maintain a "perfection" of sorts, especially in Europe where there were often so many extranious factors and potential opponents.

And as for the confederate generals; if you look at the manpower, industrial power, and rail power, the Confederates should not have had even the slightest of chances. Instead, the South had at least two chances to actually make direct moves upon either Philly or Washington D.C., but ultimately couldn't cut it.

[Mangudai]

I contend Lee, Jackson, Bearguread and Johnston were all equal or better than Grant or Sherman. Although you are probably right I am rather cherry picking the topic at hand.

You contend that Johnston was better than Sherman. What are you smoking? And, pass it over.

Sherman did not distinguish himself so much in the heat of battle. But, his mastery of operational maneuver is difficult to match. He outmaneuvered Johnston all the way from Chattanooga to Atlanta over very difficult ground. Then later he managed to cross all the salt marshes of South Carolina where Johnston's small force could have easily checked him.


Chinggis Khaan didn't "lose". Alexander the Great didn't "lose". Humanity caught them.
Genghis Khan did lose his first battle against another mongol tribe. Subotai never lost.

[Strike For The South]

You contend that Johnston was better than Sherman. What are you smoking? And, pass it over.

Sherman did not distinguish himself so much in the heat of battle. But, his mastery of operational maneuver is difficult to match. He outmaneuvered Johnston all the way from Chattanooga to Atlanta over very difficult ground. Then later he managed to cross all the salt marshes of South Carolina where Johnston's small force could have easily checked him.


Genghis Khan did lose his first battle against another mongol tribe. Subotai never lost.

The battle of Shiloh.

[Mangudai]

Oh you meant Albert Sidney Johnston, I thought you were talking about Joe Johnston. In any case the Union won at Shiloh.

[Lord Winter]

Its not the Union didn't have good generals in the east. It was more that they had to work around supior officers that were ethier outdated, or there for political reasons. After all look at Hancock, Reynolds, Couch, Meade each of those could match most confederate Division commanders.

[Mangudai]

We humans have a distorted perspective, hindsight bias. When we look at a great risk that succeeded we say it was genius. When we look at a great risk that failed we say it was a blunder. Napoleon and Lee were great risk takers and most of the time they were lucky.

The greatest generals manage to defeat their foes without ever exposing their own forces to the risk of destruction. As a corollary, the greatest generals were not involved in history's most famous battles.

As an exception to my last statement. Hannibal in Italy performed some of the most remarkable generalship ever, and he was involved in some of history's most famous battles. At Lake Trasamene he scored a brilliant victory after first ensuring all factors were in his favor. At Cannae he took more risk. He managed to operate most of that very long campaign without ever exposing himself to the possibility of defeat, while bringing much of Italy over to his side.

[Pannonian]

Genghis Khan did lose his first battle against another mongol tribe. Subotai never lost.
Chinggis started off as a pretender to the established leaders, and he had to build up a great deal even to get to that stage, with a childhood as an outcast beyond even the lowest rung of Mongol society, and a youth spent fighting to establish himself. I doubt any other leader rose quite as much as he did. In contrast, Subedei was given already established armies to work with, with a Mongol army and society that had been revolutionised by Chinggis. Imagine if a beggar boy in medieval England rose to become Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, transforming feudal England into a modern democracy along the way and establishing the British Empire. That's the scale of Chinggis' achievements.

[Sarmatian]

I find skill of a general overrated. Not in the sense that they didn't have the skill or it wasn't decisive in some battles, but their skill didn't matter much in the grand scale of things. In 99.9% of the cases the side that has superior manpower and resources, that can absorb the defeat and fight again another day is going to win, and it was true in the antiquity as much as in modern warfare. Hannibal campaign in Italy and German campaign in Russia are proofs of that. Someone mentioned Seven Years War, and how Frederick won the war against opponents who had much more resources than him, but it's more complicated than that. Prussia was subsidized heavily by Britain and that incredible stroke of luck that Russian empress Elizabeth died and was succeeded by pro-Prussian Peter III at the point when Prussia pretty much lost the war, who signed white peace with Frederick, returned all conquered territory to him and put pressure on Sweden to drop out of the war, even though Russians and Austrians were in Berlin.

[KrooK]

Greatest? Maybe its a bit "hard" to show your skills when you have big advantage over your opponent. Into this situation everyone exept victory and person of general is not on first screen. For me its not a great victory to win battle and then loose war. For me general who got advantage, doesn't waste it and finally win war with small loses is at least as good as general who win some battles into hard conditions and then loose.

[Orda Khan]

Just for the record, Chinggis Khan/Temujin was no pretender, he was the son of a Mongol Khan. That fate left him in a lowly position, does not alter this.

Subedei never lost? After the victory at Kalka river the Mongol force was driven off by the Volga Bulgars. Earlier than that, he and Jebe were forced to withdraw from engagement with Khwarazmian troops.

[Decker]

Why do they lose?? Well, they could make the best and most well laid plans anyone has ever seen, but his men that fight for him might not be able to execute them or just get out fought. Another could be that over a period of time, like Lee, they could fight a series of very costly battles and eventually one day, get beaten out, and badly. All of them are human and have their faults, Patton was built for the break out and his costly battles when up against a dug-in foe showed off his greatest weakness which led to some very costly operations that tried to get the ball rolling. There are always going to be winners and losers, history and who wins usually decides who the best are in these circumstances.

[CountArach]

Alexander never lost a battle.

Caesar lost battles, but they were not the most significant ones in the campaigns.

Napoleon didn't lose too many battles except when he was using an under-resourced French army (As per late 1812-1814 - though he won some under-appreciated victories through 1814 using armies of almost entirely Raw French soldiers).

Lee's record was far better than almost any other general of the time. He lost battles, but his victories were always special (Antietam/Sharpesburg anyone?).

So what sets these people apart? As I said with Lee, their victories were special. Alexander won against overwhelming odds numerous times - he also conducted one of the longest and most far-reaching campaigns of all time. He set the stage for the next several centuries. Caesar was a tactical mastermind (At least if we believe Caesar... :tongue: ). He was capable of motivating his men to perform acts of inhuman bravery and this is one of the key thing that all great generals are capable of - at least the 4 I mentioned. Napoleon won many battles against the odds - such as Austerlitz and his entire first Italian campaign against Austria. His downfall was the inability to factor in some aspects of reality, such as the weather. Without the Russian winter he would have made it to Moscow and perhaps have won the war. So he was a great general on the Tactical level, though not so great on the Strategic war (Of course he did perform some great Strategic wars as well, such as 1814). Lee won many battles against the odds and was further constrained by his nation having far fewer men and resources than their opponents.

So what sets them apart? They all won special victories in some ways and truly defined their age for general ship. Were there better generals of the time? Quite possibly (I believe that Davout was a better general than Napoleon at the Corps level), but no other generals of the time were able to call the age 'theirs'.

[Mangudai]

Just for the record, Chinggis Khan/Temujin was no pretender, he was the son of a Mongol Khan. That fate left him in a lowly position, does not alter this.

Subedei never lost? After the victory at Kalka river the Mongol force was driven off by the Volga Bulgars. Earlier than that, he and Jebe were forced to withdraw from engagement with Khwarazmian troops.

Withdrawal is not the same as defeat, especially in the Mongol method of warfare.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

More than not I'd wager. Confederate, French and German generals were always considered to be better yet were crushed by opponents with inexhaustible resources. Why?

You answer your own question. There is an old maxim that suggests "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics."

In terms of accomplishments versus numbers, the greatest army in history is almost certainly the German military of World War II (though Alexander and the Mongols are very close). They fought so many in so many varied conditions for so long and so well that it is simply scary.

[Orda Khan]

Withdrawal is not the same as defeat, especially in the Mongol method of warfare.
In the case of being driven off by the Volga Bulgars, they were defeated. They underestimated the resilience of their enemy.
Against the Khwarazmian troops the battle was inconclusive on the first day, however the Mongols stole away at night realising they had overstretched themselves.
Both incidents were far from being feigned retreat as it was over ten years before they returned to either.

[Caius]

Didnt Napoleon lost at Fointainebleau (sp?) against Wellington, even though he surrendered?

[Incongruous]

Napoleon was fantastic when it came to leading smaller groups of men, trying to outflank a larger enemy as it trundled around the place. Thus, he did score some amazing victories in the defence of France.

But at a larger scale, I believe he lacked much of what is required to be considered great, his actions against the Russians are astounding when one considers him to be a singular genius.

I believe Wellington was very much his match.

[Ibn-Khaldun]

Genghis Khan did lose his first battle against another mongol tribe. Subotai never lost.

I remember that someone have said that - "In order to win you must have felt defeat!" (Or something like that)
I'm not sure from where I heard it but I think it means that if you have 'lost' then you probably try not to loose again and be more carefull. But when you have always won then you probably get too overconfident.
But all that talk about resources and stuff like that.. it's probably important too. ~:)

[nokhor]

And as for the confederate generals; if you look at the manpower, industrial power, and rail power, the Confederates should not have had even the slightest of chances.

if you compare the relative strength of the confedarates vs the union at the beginning of that war and compare that to the relative strength of the american revolutionaries vs the british empire at the beginning of that war, i think its easy to see that the revolutionaries were at a much greater disadvantage than the confederates. not only were the revolutionaries outclassed in terms of manpower and industrial capacity, but it was faster to send redcoats from britain to the western border of the colonies than it was for the union to send an army overland to the western border of the confederacy. the british at the time were enormously wealth compared to their rivals, had the best navy of the time, and the redcoats were the best land army of the time. the americans never won a major pitched battle against the redcoats.

the confederate leaders certainly felt that if their ancestors could emerge victorious with such odds stacked against them, then they could do as well with less disparity. of course the americans won by utilizing a lot of soft power against the british. they took advantage of the animosity towards the british in europe. they gained a french fleet, a prussian drillmaster, a polish, and a french general, and just managed to hold on long enough until the british got sucked into another dynastic european conflict.

i'm just saying that the stats at the beginning of a war don't always foretell how a conflict will end. a lot of times emotions, ideology, personality clashes, national rivalries etc and a lot of other such intangibles that can't be quantified can have a much greater impact than resource capacity or military victories.

so my answer to the original question is that the 'great generals' that are able to thrive in a hostile, alien culture not just through force or threat of force but are able to get some of the locals to support or even love them made them even 'greater' than the regular 'great' battle winners. out of the 'greats' that are usually mentioned, only hannibal and alexander seemed to have fulfilled this requirement. one of them lost, one of them didn't.

[seireikhaan]

if you compare the relative strength of the confedarates vs the union at the beginning of that war and compare that to the relative strength of the american revolutionaries vs the british empire at the beginning of that war, i think its easy to see that the revolutionaries were at a much greater disadvantage than the confederates. not only were the revolutionaries outclassed in terms of manpower and industrial capacity, but it was faster to send redcoats from britain to the western border of the colonies than it was for the union to send an army overland to the western border of the confederacy. the british at the time were enormously wealth compared to their rivals, had the best navy of the time, and the redcoats were the best land army of the time. the americans never won a major pitched battle against the redcoats.

the confederate leaders certainly felt that if their ancestors could emerge victorious with such odds stacked against them, then they could do as well with less disparity. of course the americans won by utilizing a lot of soft power against the british. they took advantage of the animosity towards the british in europe. they gained a french fleet, a prussian drillmaster, a polish, and a french general, and just managed to hold on long enough until the british got sucked into another dynastic european conflict.

i'm just saying that the stats at the beginning of a war don't always foretell how a conflict will end. a lot of times emotions, ideology, personality clashes, national rivalries etc and a lot of other such intangibles that can't be quantified can have a much greater impact than resource capacity or military victories.

so my answer to the original question is that the 'great generals' that are able to thrive in a hostile, alien culture not just through force or threat of force but are able to get some of the locals to support or even love them made them even 'greater' than the regular 'great' battle winners. out of the 'greats' that are usually mentioned, only hannibal and alexander seemed to have fulfilled this requirement. one of them lost, one of them didn't.
True on many accounts.

However, there's a few things you're forgetting.

First of all; Britain was a massive empire, with a lot of commitments not only across the globe in terms of colonial rule, but also in terms of concerns "at home" with Europe. For example, the 7 years war was endured not long before the Revolution occurred. The seven years war, in addition to causing a lot of war weariness and casualties, also incurred a debt prior to the revolution; partly the cause of many of the taxes which contributed to revolutionary fervor in America. The Union had little in the way of such weariness and debt, which enabled them to hang longer than Britain during the revolution. And, as you pointed out, there were other factors which contributed to the revolution, such as French naval aid, as well as British in-competition at high command. So, I would still maintain the confederacy had a more difficult task, though is close enough that a true comparison is still going to be pretty subjective.

Also, I doubt many would contest that Hannibal and Alexander were two of the greats. :yes:

[Alexanderofmacedon]

More than not I'd wager. Confederate, French and German generals were always considered to be better yet were crushed by opponents with inexhaustible resources. Why?

I think you answered your own question. Inexhaustible resources.

EDIT: I see I was beaten to the punch.

[hellenes]

Alexander The Great never lost....And he was the greatest military commander of the hellenic world...and the ancient world toghether...

[Orda Khan]

Didn't he initially fail against the Scythians? I may be wrong but I seem to remember reading that he learnt from his previous mistakes.

[Marshal Murat]

Technically, he never fought the Scythians as a commanding general, at least I've never heard anything like that.

I do know that Cyrus failed to pierce the Scythian borders.

[CBR]

He crossed the river of Jaxartes and defeated some Scythian rebels.


CBR

[Pontius Pilate]

Alexander The Great never lost....And he was the greatest military commander of the hellenic world...and the ancient world toghether...

yes, this is true, Alexander never lost a battle and he is considered by some to be the greatest general ever. But the real reason, I think, that some of the greatest, most brilliant generals lose, is because in the end they are still human and can make mistakes. regardless of resources and what not, they are still people.

[General Appo]

Havn´t read anything but the OP, but the obvious question would seem to be that these generals are so famous because they mostly fought against overwhelming odds yet almost always won. Well, a lot of them eventually lost anyway.

[Orda Khan]

Three years of building more fortresses than anywhere else in his empire and losing more of his men than in any other area in an attempt to secure his boundaries, finally finding convenient political settlement through marriage sounds a little more than putting down some rebels. It stands to reason that his armies lost some battles regardless that peace was eventually established.

[hellenes]

Three years of building more fortresses than anywhere else in his empire and losing more of his men than in any other area in an attempt to secure his boundaries, finally finding convenient political settlement through marriage sounds a little more than putting down some rebels. It stands to reason that his armies lost some battles regardless that peace was eventually established.

In the face of the lack of historical evidence of these losses I doubt that....

[Pontius Pilate]

Three years of building more fortresses than anywhere else in his empire and losing more of his men than in any other area in an attempt to secure his boundaries, finally finding convenient political settlement through marriage sounds a little more than putting down some rebels. It stands to reason that his armies lost some battles regardless that peace was eventually established.


wait, who are you talking about here? Alexander??

[Orda Khan]

Yes, Alexander.
Bogged down for three years to secure that border. I don't accept that in those three years he suffered no defeats at all.

[General Appo]

Of course he never lost a single skirmish in his entire career, I´m certain he lost skirmishes against Darius and everyone one else too, but you can´t say he lost the war. He won the war and that´s what really counts, no?

[Megas Methuselah]

He won the war and that´s what really counts, no?

Yes, that's exactly what counts. Human losses are insignificant. :snobby:

[Sarmatian]

There's also the argument that Alexander died very young and didn't live to see that it is easier to conquer an empire than to preserve it...

[Pontius Pilate]

There's also the argument that Alexander died very young and didn't live to see that it is easier to conquer an empire than to preserve it...

yeah, I agree here. much easier to build an empire rather than maintain it.

[Cambyses]

The Wellington vs Napoleon debate will probably never be answered decisively, but it does introduce another element to the discussion, that great generals can be beaten by brilliant opponents. And eventually most empires/states will find a champion in adversity. Exceptions exist of course (ie Alexander).

It is disingenious to overlook the ability of Montgomery when looking at Rommell, or of Scipio when looking at Hannibal.

[Fisherking]

It is disingenious to overlook the ability of Montgomery when looking at Rommell, or of Scipio when looking at Hannibal.


Monty vs. Rommel! That is an easy one. Monty was extremely cautious. He had numerical, material, and air superiority. It was just about as one sided as it can get. The fact that it took him so long to attack and the fact that Afrika Corps got away should have been reason enough to sack him…but Britton needed a hero after all those losses against an inferior opponent.

Look at the wonderful jobs he did at Cean and Operation Market Garden. :oops:

With any military leader there is only so much that can be done against great odds. Winning battles is not the one hallmark of a Great General, it is just the one most sited. I would rather have a leader like Nathaniel Green who lost almost every engagement but blead the enemy white and got away, than I would a Grant or Monty who overwhelmed the enemy with numbers and attrition.

In a fight who is the more to be admired, three guys beating up some poor slob, or the guy that takes on six others and wins? Even if he only managed to best four of the six you hat needs to come off to him even if he ultimately lost.


The same is true of Generalship. Winning is not everything. It just seems that that is all we can remember.

[Sarmatian]

The Wellington vs Napoleon debate will probably never be answered decisively,

Excuse me? You're comparing Wellington and Napoleon? :dizzy2:

[Cambyses]

Excuse me? You're comparing Wellington and Napoleon? :dizzy2:

Indeed I am. Who, afterall, won?

Im not saying with any of my above comparisons that one is better than or superior to another. I am simply pointing out that great generals dont lose on their own. Someone has to beat actually beat them, and to look simply at the man himself without considering his nemesis is, as I say, disingenious.

In the case of Wellington btw, I think it is a well accepted fact that he was at worst a very competent commander. There are several examples of his ability during the peninsular war you might want to look at (leaving aside Waterloo). He was also Prime Minister of UK on two occassions and didnt spend any part of his life in exile on an island in the middle of nowhere.

Personally, I see winning the war as the most important attribute of a great general.

[Fisherking]

Personally, I see winning the war as the most important attribute of a great general.


No! I don’t buy that one. It takes a lot more to make a good General than just being on the winning side.

It is like saying that the winning side had the best equipment, that is why they won. It just is not so.

There are a lot of reasons countries loose wars and you can’t always pin it on the Generals.

Monty and Ike were on the winning side. Do you think that the other side had no one of equal skill?

Some times odds play a part, sometimes there are other factors. The British lost the American Revolution. Does that mean that their soldiers and officers were of lower quality than the Americans?

One could argue that the Americans won the War of 1812 because they survived. So that would put Wellington on the loosing side…

The best Generals don’t always win the Wars they are fighting in. But they do make a large impact.

[CountArach]

In the case of Wellington btw, I think it is a well accepted fact that he was at worst a very competent commander. There are several examples of his ability during the peninsular war you might want to look at (leaving aside Waterloo).
Yes he was a very competent general but ranking him against Napoleon at his peak would be a mistake. Wellington could not have won at Austerlitz - he was far too cautious and did not have the vision that Napoleon had. As for his activity in the Peninusla - I believe he was certainly a great general there, but he wasn't really up against the greatest parts of the French army. The French command was never truly unified or stood a realistic chance of winning the war.

[Cambyses]

Well, I think I didnt really explain myself properly. The question was 'why do the greatest generals always "lose"'. I am not saying that losing makes them less great. It would be absurd to argue that Hannibal or Napoleon werent great generals for example. What I am saying is that they got beaten by somebody, they didnt lose on their own.

If a general's superior reputation and ability is already well established then it inspires (usually) their opponent to be more precise, probably more cautious. History shows us that in these circumstances the opponent will rarely take risks and often only push forward with overwhelming odds. Sometimes these great generals can still win the resulting battles (Gaugamela, Cannae) but frequently they will not (Chalons, El Alamein, Overland Campaign/Seige of Petersburg).

In addition to that their "nemesis" will probably have spent considerable time studying their tactics and will often position themselves to negate any possible advantage, and indeed to showcase their own ability (Zama, Waterloo).

On the subject of Wellington vs Napoleon, I mostly agree with you Count Arach. However IMHO no other general of the time (if any in fact) could have done what Wellington did in Spain and Portugal, in addition to India before that, and decisively defeat his rival, one of the greatest generals in world history, at Waterloo.

[Sarmatian]

Napoleon at Waterloo wasn't the same Napoleon that was at Austerlitz or in Russia. Also, Blucher's contribution is often conveniently ignored, as it was the Prussian timely arrival the turned the tide against Napoleon.

Nevertheless, I agree with you that Wellington was very competent commander, no doubt about that, but not on par with Napoleon.

My opinion is that Wellington is overrated as battle of Waterloo itself is. Napoleons was already defeated and at Waterloo Wellington was just there to remind him of that.

[PanzerJaeger]

It is disingenious to overlook the ability of Montgomery when looking at Rommell...

Hmm... :inquisitive:

None of the Allied commanders are comparable to their German or later Russian equivalents, not even the vaunted Patton. Their doctrines, based on attrition and logistics, proved successful due to the enormous material and numerical advantages the Allies had. However, they also ensured very little tactical skill was utilized in the higher levels of command.

[Aemilius Paulus]

It is very simple:

"Adversity reveals genius, good fortune conceals it."
-Horace

The winning generals never had to face something so hard that they lost - obviously, while the losing generals did their best in the toughest situations, but still lost. Despite this, they revealed more genius, due to the fact that they were required to do so.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Napoleon at Waterloo wasn't the same Napoleon that was at Austerlitz or in Russia. Also, Blucher's contribution is often conveniently ignored, as it was the Prussian timely arrival the turned the tide against Napoleon.

Nevertheless, I agree with you that Wellington was very competent commander, no doubt about that, but not on par with Napoleon.

My opinion is that Wellington is overrated as battle of Waterloo itself is. Napoleons was already defeated and at Waterloo Wellington was just there to remind him of that.


Without Blucher, Wateroloo would have been a bloody draw like Ligny and Quatre Bras. Wellington had taken Napoleon's best shots and stopped them cold, however, a not-too-common achievement.

It's hard to say which one was "better." If you'd switched places, would Wellington have had the dash to transform the siege of Toulon or the restless energy of the Italian campaign? Could Napoleon have operated effectively on a logistical shoe-string in mountainous terrain with sem-reliable allies against a well-equipped and numerically superior opponent? Both men were products of their own experiences and ideas. Both -- to the intent such a thing is possible -- imposed their will on the chaos that is battle.

[Yoyoma1910]

Here's a question. Would Lee have lost if he hadn't lost his greatest general?

[MilesGregarius]

Here's a question. Would Lee have lost if he hadn't lost his greatest general?

Conversely, would he have won without without him? Swap Jackson for O.O.Howard, and who wins at Chancellorsville, Lee or Hooker?

As to the OP, I think the perception of great generals regularly losing is based largely on a few prominient, and often glorified, examples. You would be hard pressed to find three more popular episodes of military history than the Napoleonic Wars, the ACW, and WWII, four if you add the Punic Wars. All these particular episodes do indeed have the side with the arguably better genersals losing, but that hardly indicates it to be the norm.

A wider sampling would show plenty of great generals vanquishing lesser, or at best, equal opponents. For every Hannibal, every Napoleon, every Lee there is a Scipio, a Marlborough, a Togo who triumphs due to their martial skills. The Hannibals, the Napoleons, the Lees better capture our imagination, however.

Another factor, beyond those mentioned, is that great generals often times come from more belligerent societies, The same bellicosity that grooms these generals at times also condemns said societies to eventual defeat by their inability to step back from war. Had Napoleon been able to force a comprehensive peace following his victory over the Fourth Coalition, rather than bogging himself down in Spain and breaking his army in Russia, history might have turned out very differently. The same elements of Southern culture that gave rise to Lee, to Jackson, to Stuart led not only to secession, but to the shelling of Fort Sumter and all that ensued. Similarly German generals of WWII, as good as they were, stood no chance of prevailing after the fatal mistakes of Barbarossa and and the declaration of war on the US post-Pearl Harbor.

[Brenus]

“None of the Allied commanders are comparable to their German or later Russian equivalents, not even the vaunted Patton. Their doctrines, based on attrition and logistics, proved successful due to the enormous material and numerical advantages the Allies had. However, they also ensured very little tactical skill was utilized in the higher levels of command.”
I agree. No Western Allies invented a new tactic or concept. But they apply a long strategy of attrition which proved successful at the end.
The German lack of Strategic Bombers proved fatal when the blitzkrieg showed it limits…
We all know about Patton and it movement during the Bulges and Remengen Bridge episode, but if you compare with the German move in 1940 against French and English forces then in 1940 against the Russian well, it is a little bit short (especially Remengen bridge which was fatal in Montgomery’s plan in shifting the Allies effort on the wrong aisle of the German Front).
Look at Moscow, Rokossovsky campaign, or Kursk Battle: First the Russian invented an answer to the German war tactic, then develop their own tactic adapted to their troops and material.

[PanzerJaeger]

“None of the Allied commanders are comparable to their German or later Russian equivalents, not even the vaunted Patton. Their doctrines, based on attrition and logistics, proved successful due to the enormous material and numerical advantages the Allies had. However, they also ensured very little tactical skill was utilized in the higher levels of command.”
I agree. No Western Allies invented a new tactic or concept. But they apply a long strategy of attrition which proved successful at the end.
The German lack of Strategic Bombers proved fatal when the blitzkrieg showed it limits…
We all know about Patton and it movement during the Bulges and Remengen Bridge episode, but if you compare with the German move in 1940 against French and English forces then in 1940 against the Russian well, it is a little bit short (especially Remengen bridge which was fatal in Montgomery’s plan in shifting the Allies effort on the wrong aisle of the German Front).
Look at Moscow, Rokossovsky campaign, or Kursk Battle: First the Russian invented an answer to the German war tactic, then develop their own tactic adapted to their troops and material.

Hehe, I am at times forced to conceal a "~:rolleyes:" when some of my fellow American military buffs opine on the virtues of Patton's desire to take the fight to the Red Army.

While I agree with the sentiment, the GIs would have had their clocks cleaned.

[King Jan III Sobieski]

You win some, you lose some.

Sometimes the winning side has crappy generals and the losing side has great generals. Perhaps the crappy ones just "got lucky", no? :smg::hmg::smg::hmg:

[Yoyoma1910]

“None of the Allied commanders are comparable to their German or later Russian equivalents, not even the vaunted Patton. Their doctrines, based on attrition and logistics, proved successful due to the enormous material and numerical advantages the Allies had. However, they also ensured very little tactical skill was utilized in the higher levels of command.”
I agree. No Western Allies invented a new tactic or concept. But they apply a long strategy of attrition which proved successful at the end.
The German lack of Strategic Bombers proved fatal when the blitzkrieg showed it limits…
We all know about Patton and it movement during the Bulges and Remengen Bridge episode, but if you compare with the German move in 1940 against French and English forces then in 1940 against the Russian well, it is a little bit short (especially Remengen bridge which was fatal in Montgomery’s plan in shifting the Allies effort on the wrong aisle of the German Front).
Look at Moscow, Rokossovsky campaign, or Kursk Battle: First the Russian invented an answer to the German war tactic, then develop their own tactic adapted to their troops and material.

"Hitler claimed total credit for the success of the campaign in the West. The plan for it came from him, he said. "I have again and again", he told us, "read Colonel De Gaulle's book on methods of modern warfare employing fully motorized units, and I have learned a great deal from it"." in Albert Speer, Inside The Third Reich

[Watchman]

Adolf would have been totally lying through his teeth there, not that it were anything unusual for the man... Nonetheless, for example de Gaulle (who commanded increasingly large armoured formations during the Battle of France) was among the younger generation of officers across Europe who had grasped something essential about the way technology was changing warfare.

In WW2 the Germans were really just being innovative out of pure desperation. They were painfully well aware of how bad their strategic situation was should the war become a protracted one, and were thus willing - if not forced - to take enormous gambles in the hope of quick triumph. Sometimes it worked - usually, because somebody else was screwing up - and sometimes not really. Sometimes it backfired rather spectacularly. Sometimes it offered short-term benefit and came back to bite them in the ass later on. Much of the time, they just didn't have much alternative but to try something and hope for the best.

Not surprisingly, such circumstances rather helped imaginative and daring officers rise to prominence. Necessity being the mother of invention, they also helped focus the mind nicely for problem-solving. (Not that this kept Guderian from getting cashiered for some time for his de facto mutiny after Sedan...)

The Allies were in pretty much the opposite position. They were entirely conscious of their advantage in resources and industrial capacity in a drawn-out war, and duly the onus of their strategic planning was to create one - basically, block and contain the Germans and then unceremoniously bleed and starve them out. Had it not been for some pretty spectacular screwing up in strategic decision-making early on they might well have succeeded; as it was, they had to go at it without continental Europe.

It must be remembered the Allies, especially the Western ones, were a pretty creative bunch. The Brits in particular distinguished themselves on the field of coming up with really weird stuff that worked just fine for one purpose or another. (The Allied "secret gimmick" projects had a tendency to actually serve some meaningful purpose without being excessively wasteful; conversely, the Germans' gadget-projects they turned to with increasing desperation after the tide broke in '42 had a bad habit of amounting to hideously expensive "impressive but useless" junk that chiefly benefited the victors after the war and neither could not did have much impact on the course of events.) But they had no need for the kind of exciting but risky military brinkmanship the Germans were out of necessity hooked on; as soon as the strategic situation stabilised their main concern was to systematically reduce the Axis position without incurring excessive casualties themselves. This basic paradigm is perhaps particularly well illustrated in the Monty-Rommel duel in North Africa, which can be taken as something of an example of how the systematic grinding down of an opponent by weight of studiously applied superiority in resources overcame the daring gambling the Germans banked on.

This is a difference in the whole basic paradigm the respective combatants were operating with, not in "skill" per se - because what amounted to "skill" was different for each side. For the Germans it was achieving lots with limited resources ASAP, in a brief frenzied burst. For the Allies conversely it was warding off such "all out" lunges, conserving and accumulating their own power and productively and efficiently applying their resource advantage on the long run. They got pretty darn good at it after the initial fumbles, too.

The Soviets for assorted reasons favoured the "large blunt object" approach, not really unreasonably given the mind-boggling resource pool they could tap, but until Stalin finally got his head out of his rear end around halfway to the war were decidedly clumsy and cumbersome about it. This was painfully apparent already in the downright farcical showing the Red Army made in the Winter War with Finland, and grotesquely in the rather unbelievably degree of all-around screwing up even the basics of modern warfare that allowed the Germans to all but obliterate the backbone of Soviet armies in the west in about the first week of Barbarossa.
Once they stopped grabbing the Idiot Ball and got their act together they started to wield that large blunt object with rather enough sense and planning to make things very, very dire for the Germans who had started finding out why gambling and hubris probably aren't the best recipe for success in modern industrial war.
The hard way.


While I agree with the sentiment, the GIs would have had their clocks cleaned.You sure about that ? I'm under the impression the Soviets were getting rather exhausted when Germany fell; circa twenty million dead and some of the more productive parts of your country being laid waste is wont to do that. Plus they had to sit on their 'recent aquisitions' in Eastern and Central Europe to boot so they were starting to get dangerously overstretched. Conversely the Western powers were on the whole in rather better shape, had little potential "rear area" trouble to worry about, no particular logistical problems and, oh yeah, owned the oceans.

And let's be honest here, the Soviet troops and officers weren't really the best trained around.

Had the chips gone down Stalin would of course have fought back; but one rather suspects he'd rather not have had to fight anymore in the first place, given the shell-shocked and burned-out shape his empire was in.

[PanzerJaeger]

"Hitler claimed total credit for the success of the campaign in the West. The plan for it came from him, he said. "I have again and again", he told us, "read Colonel De Gaulle's book on methods of modern warfare employing fully motorized units, and I have learned a great deal from it"." in Albert Speer, Inside The Third Reich

Fortunately, Hitler did not plan or execute the campaign. It's not surprising, though, that he would attribute the success to someone other than his own generals. The love-hate relationship he had with the heer dated back to his years on the Western Front during WW1.

After WW1, mobilized warfare was on everyone's mind. It was the Germans including Guderian who were able to turn their theories into workable doctrines most effectively.

The French, for example, developed far superior tanks than the Germans. However, they handicapped them with poor doctrines and an inability to communicate with each other.

The same can be seen over and over again in the desert. Despite vast superiority in all the elements needed for successful combined arms fighting, the British were continually outfought because they just didn't know what to do with them. They knew they needed tanks and planes, but when they got them they had no clue as to how to use them effectively. Even on the offense, they were terrible. Crusader was one of the most ham-handed, poorly executed offensives of the war up to that point, but would become common of Allied assaults.

[PanzerJaeger]

Adolf would have been totally lying through his teeth there, not that it were anything unusual for the man... Nonetheless, for example de Gaulle (who commanded increasingly large armoured formations during the Battle of France) was among the younger generation of officers across Europe who had grasped something essential about the way technology was changing warfare.

In WW2 the Germans were really just being innovative out of pure desperation. They were painfully well aware of how bad their strategic situation was should the war become a protracted one, and were thus willing - if not forced - to take enormous gambles in the hope of quick triumph. Sometimes it worked - usually, because somebody else was screwing up - and sometimes not really. Sometimes it backfired rather spectacularly. Sometimes it offered short-term benefit and came back to bite them in the ass later on. Much of the time, they just didn't have much alternative but to try something and hope for the best.

Not surprisingly, such circumstances rather helped imaginative and daring officers rise to prominence. Necessity being the mother of invention, they also helped focus the mind nicely for problem-solving. (Not that this kept Guderian from getting cashiered for some time for his de facto mutiny after Sedan...)

The Allies were in pretty much the opposite position. They were entirely conscious of their advantage in resources and industrial capacity in a drawn-out war, and duly the onus of their strategic planning was to create one - basically, block and contain the Germans and then unceremoniously bleed and starve them out. Had it not been for some pretty spectacular screwing up in strategic decision-making early on they might well have succeeded; as it was, they had to go at it without continental Europe.

It must be remembered the Allies, especially the Western ones, were a pretty creative bunch. The Brits in particular distinguished themselves on the field of coming up with really weird stuff that worked just fine for one purpose or another. (The Allied "secret gimmick" projects had a tendency to actually serve some meaningful purpose without being excessively wasteful; conversely, the Germans' gadget-projects they turned to with increasing desperation after the tide broke in '42 had a bad habit of amounting to hideously expensive "impressive but useless" junk that chiefly benefited the victors after the war and neither could not did have much impact on the course of events.) But they had no need for the kind of exciting but risky military brinkmanship the Germans were out of necessity hooked on; as soon as the strategic situation stabilised their main concern was to systematically reduce the Axis position without incurring excessive casualties themselves. This basic paradigm is perhaps particularly well illustrated in the Monty-Rommel duel in North Africa, which can be taken as something of an example of how the systematic grinding down of an opponent by weight of studiously applied superiority in resources overcame the daring gambling the Germans banked on.

This is a difference in the whole basic paradigm the respective combatants were operating with, not in "skill" per se - because what amounted to "skill" was different for each side. For the Germans it was achieving lots with limited resources ASAP, in a brief frenzied burst. For the Allies conversely it was warding off such "all out" lunges, conserving and accumulating their own power and productively and efficiently applying their resource advantage on the long run. They got pretty darn good at it after the initial fumbles, too.

The Soviets for assorted reasons favoured the "large blunt object" approach, not really unreasonably given the mind-boggling resource pool they could tap, but until Stalin finally got his head out of his rear end around halfway to the war were decidedly clumsy and cumbersome about it. This was painfully apparent already in the downright farcical showing the Red Army made in the Winter War with Finland, and grotesquely in the rather unbelievably degree of all-around screwing up even the basics of modern warfare that allowed the Germans to all but obliterate the backbone of Soviet armies in the west in about the first week of Barbarossa.
Once they stopped grabbing the Idiot Ball and got their act together they started to wield that large blunt object with rather enough sense and planning to make things very, very dire for the Germans who had started finding out why gambling and hubris probably aren't the best recipe for success in modern industrial war.
The hard way.

I'm not sure if I agree with the notion that German success relied on luck and desperation, and that the Allies' failures were just screw ups in what was an essentially effective strategy. Certainly those factors all played a part, but IMO the greatest factor was German doctrinal and military superiority. They were just better at it.

North Africa is a great example. Possibly in the end it was an example of "systematic grinding down of an opponent by weight of studiously applied superiority in resources", but for years Rommel had a far superior force with their backs against the wall. The complete routing that was Gazala was not in the master plan, I would think. And that battle was not in the beginning of the war, but after the British had ample experience fighting against the Germans.

IMO, the Germans only became desperate after the situation in Russia became fully evident. While their military operations did involve a larger degree of risk than was standard at the time, they were also carefully planned and executed endeavors performed by a superior military. Had Hitler not sent the majority of his military into Russia, surely the Allied strategies would have proved disastrous.




You sure about that ? I'm under the impression the Soviets were getting rather exhausted when Germany fell; circa twenty million dead and some of the more productive parts of your country being laid waste is wont to do that. Plus they had to sit on their 'recent aquisitions' in Eastern and Central Europe to boot so they were starting to get dangerously overstretched. Conversely the Western powers were on the whole in rather better shape, had little potential "rear area" trouble to worry about, no particular logistical problems and, oh yeah, owned the oceans.

True enough. The Red Army was exhausted, but not spent. Also, their industrial base was largely untouched and out of bomber range - having been moved out of the areas of destruction prior to said destruction - and they weren't hurting for manpower despite their massive casualties.


And let's be honest here, the Soviet troops and officers weren't really the best trained around.

Compared to the Germans, yes. The Allies? eh...

I would bet on the best Russian commanders against the best the Allies had to offer any day, even Patton. Not only did they have the experience and knowledge gained from fighting true mobile warfare on a grand scale against the best of the German military for years, they had also developed their own strategies suited to their own forces, such as Deep Operations, which were superior to anything the Allies had. And what the Soviet troops lacked in training was made up for in experience. Those millions of casualties sustained taught those that did make it through the best methods of surviving and succeeding on the battlefield. By '45, they had developed a great core of low level officers and NCOs - all earned in extraordinary amounts of blood, though.

Conversely, the Allied campaigns were something of a sideshow. The Allied leadership had grown accustomed to fighting second tier German armies tinged with a few high quality divisions who were vastly numerically inferior in every way - and they didn't do all too well at it. Whether it was Gazala as I mentioned before, Kasserine Pass, Monte Cassino, Caen, Market Garden or even the Bulge, the Allies were constantly stymied when they should have easily succeeded with their numbers. As for the training and the troopers, I wouldn't put much stock in it. Much of what was learned in boot camp had to be unlearned in the field. Experience was far superior to training in what made strong divisions, and the Russians oozed it.

The Allies essentially bumbled to victory fighting what was deemed too weak to go to Russia or too exhausted to go back to Russia, with exceptions of course. I think when faced with an enemy with any degree of numerical equity and the vast fighting experience which the Russians had acquired they would have been easily routed.

Of course this is all hypothetical and doesn't take into account atomic weapons and such. :bow:

[Fisherking]

I'm not sure if I agree with the notion that German success relied on luck and desperation, and that the Allies' failures were just screw ups in what was an essentially effective strategy. Certainly those factors all played a part, but IMO the greatest factor was German doctrinal and military superiority. They were just better at it.

North Africa is a great example. Possibly in the end it was an example of "systematic grinding down of an opponent by weight of studiously applied superiority in resources", but for years Rommel had a far superior force with their backs against the wall. The complete routing that was Gazala was not in the master plan, I would think. And that battle was not in the beginning of the war, but after the British had ample experience fighting against the Germans.

IMO, the Germans only became desperate after the situation in Russia became fully evident. While their military operations did involve a larger degree of risk than was standard at the time, they were also carefully planned and executed endeavors performed by a superior military. Had Hitler not sent the majority of his military into Russia, surely the Allied strategies would have proved disastrous.





True enough. The Red Army was exhausted, but not spent. Also, their industrial base was largely untouched and out of bomber range - having been moved out of the areas of destruction prior to said destruction - and they weren't hurting for manpower despite their massive casualties.



Compared to the Germans, yes. The Allies? eh...

I would bet on the best Russian commanders against the best the Allies had to offer any day, even Patton. Not only did they have the experience and knowledge gained from fighting true mobile warfare on a grand scale against the best of the German military for years, they had also developed their own strategies suited to their own forces, such as Deep Operations, which were superior to anything the Allies had. And what the Soviet troops lacked in training was made up for in experience. Those millions of casualties sustained taught those that did make it through the best methods of surviving and succeeding on the battlefield. By '45, they had developed a great core of low level officers and NCOs - all earned in extraordinary amounts of blood, though.

Conversely, the Allied campaigns were something of a sideshow. The Allied leadership had grown accustomed to fighting second tier German armies tinged with a few high quality divisions who were vastly numerically inferior in every way - and they didn't do all too well at it. Whether it was Gazala as I mentioned before, Kasserine Pass, Monte Cassino, Caen, Market Garden or even the Bulge, the Allies were constantly stymied when they should have easily succeeded with their numbers. As for the training and the troopers, I wouldn't put much stock in it. Much of what was learned in boot camp had to be unlearned in the field. Experience was far superior to training in what made strong divisions, and the Russians oozed it.

The Allies essentially bumbled to victory fighting what was deemed too weak to go to Russia or too exhausted to go back to Russia, with exceptions of course. I think when faced with an enemy with any degree of numerical equity and the vast fighting experience which the Russians had acquired they would have been easily routed.

Of course this is all hypothetical and doesn't take into account atomic weapons and such. :bow:

I disagree!

The allied troops were just as competent as their adversaries by the end of the war. Whether they were as good as the best the Axis had at their height of abilities is somewhat arguable, but also moot.

The tactics imposed on the Generals, due to material were sound enough to win, but they were imposed because of the decisions to manufacture substandard products in an overwhelming amount.

For that you can fault neither the General nor his troops. Patton did some amazing things with the troops and equipment he had to work with. He made mistakes but he also overcame them.

In my estimation the Allies would have been able to do to the Soviets what they did to the Germans. It would be no walk in the park, but eventually. Distance and manpower would no longer have been the protection it had been.

You seem also to forget the massive aid the allies sent to Russia to sustain them even to the end of the war. You are also neglecting the Air Power issue. Centers of production would no longer be safe from bomber attack nor could the Soviets protect them with the assets they had at the time.

What would have happened is only conjecture but it would have been a multi front war and the Soviets would have been eventually strangled.

Remember also that quality equipment was becoming available on the allied side by then so that the technical edge would no longer be such a factor.


:bow:

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I disagree!

The allied troops were just as competent as their adversaries by the end of the war. Whether they were as good as the best the Axis had at their height of abilities is somewhat arguable, but also moot.

The tactics imposed on the Generals, due to material were sound enough to win, but they were imposed because of the decisions to manufacture substandard products in an overwhelming amount.

For that you can fault neither the General nor his troops. Patton did some amazing things with the troops and equipment he had to work with. He made mistakes but he also overcame them.

In my estimation the Allies would have been able to do to the Soviets what they did to the Germans. It would be no walk in the park, but eventually. Distance and manpower would no longer have been the protection it had been.

You seem also to forget the massive aid the allies sent to Russia to sustain them even to the end of the war. You are also neglecting the Air Power issue. Centers of production would no longer be safe from bomber attack nor could the Soviets protect them with the assets they had at the time.

What would have happened is only conjecture but it would have been a multi front war and the Soviets would have been eventually strangled.

Remember also that quality equipment was becoming available on the allied side by then so that the technical edge would no longer be such a factor.


:bow:


In a US/Sov conflict, assuming we began such in 1945 as Germany came apart, the Sovs would have had the tactical advantage. Their tanks were a notch better (t34-85 was better armored and a smaller profile target than an M4; standard ammo showed the 85mm Russian gun to be better than the US 75mm -- though sabot reversed the equation); they had WAY more infantry in place, trained, and experienced; their air force was a good tactical tool with skilled pilots flying solid aircraft.

The Sovs would have been unable to launch successful, sustained offensives because of the transpo/supply paralysis Western air power would have enacted. They simply didn't have the ability to replace rail and truck units fast enough, nor would their somewhat marginal road/rail network have fared well under Western attack. They would also have suffered from the damage exacted by Western naval and naviation forces operating in the Baltic and Black seas -- portions of their industrial and petroleum resources would have been quite vulnerable to this.


Result = semi-fluid stalemate in Central Europe followed by the atomic immolation of several Soviet cities in 1946. The Soviet Union would have been forced to sue for peace and give up Eastern Europe, but would have responded by becoming a People's Republic of China brooding and oppressive isolationist state. Casuaties in the West would have been horrific, quickly doubling -- or more -- the total casualties absorbed by the Western Allies throughout the war. Soviet casualties would have been incalcuable.

[Watchman]

Probably worth remembering that the UK and US rolled out a whole new generation of quality tanks - essentially full-blown modern MBTs already - at the very end of the war in Europe and the immediate aftermath. Plus they were getting pretty clever with highly useful little gadgets like gyrostabilisation for the main gun...
I daresay any qualitative advantage the Soviets might have had in tanks would have been short-lived indeed. And doubly so once the effects of air cover are factored in. Plus, the US and Commonwealth already had proper man-portable AT weapons in use and proper doctrines developed - while the Soviets would doubtless have wasted no time adding the same capability to their own troops, that's still have been an initial advantage for the Western powers.

And the Soviets would probably have been very right seriously screwed in the air war. I'm not quite sure of what Soviet aviation was like at the end of the war, but I've some doubts if it was the equal of the USAF and RAF when it came to the calibre of pilots and planes. Plus the RAF already had the Gloster Meteor fighter jet operational...

And then there's the deep bombers. The USSR wouldn't have anything comparable for a while, whereas the Western Allies boasted downright scary heavy bomber forces that had just pounded Germany and Japan into so much rubble abd the ability to build lots more if necessary. Given that by using bases around the Mediterranean they should've had little trouble torching the oilfields of Ploesti and the Caucasus (the French floated the latter idea already back in '39-40 during the Winter War...), the Red war machine could well have suddenly found itself rather starved of fuel.

As for the infantry, it is certainly true that the Red Army boasted vast numbers of very experienced formations. But they were also pretty bad at keeping their soldiers alive, which ought to have rather diluted the effect as fresh replacements had to be constantly fed in plus I'm pretty sure their basic training was still fairly rudimentary too. Conversely the Brits had been stuck in the trenches for even longer and been rather more concerned with preserving their manpower pool, with the side effect of actually retaining the accumulated experience to a rather higher degree... Ditto for the Americans, save obviously they hadn't been accumulating hard combat credit as long.

And of course there was also the option of recruiting assistance from liberated continental Europe. Up to and including giving the hardened Germans their guns back - they'd be the first in line to get gobbled up by the Red juggernaut after all, so they could probably actually be trusted to indeed fight the Soviets rather than get some dumb revanchist ideas towards the Westerners...

[Sarmatian]

It's really hard to predict those things. If you take a look how much Red Army improved between 1941-1945, it's mind-boggling. In case of the war between West and Soviet Union, it is impossible to predict what would happen in that case. What would eastern Europeans states do? Would they rebel against Soviets or not? Would increased war weariness encourage communist movements in western European countries? What would happen in China? There are literally millions of issues and we can possibly take them all into account.

[Watchman]

IIRC China was still busy with the homegrown Civil War... although also IIRC there was a smattering of minor US bases there. Airfields and such - didn't the bombers of the Doolittle raid land on such ?

[Fisherking]

Don’t forget all the troops and aircraft in the Pacific. It would not have been a single front war. It would be foolish to fight it that way.

The Soviets had their hand full fighting on one front. Had the Allies opened fronts in the North, South, East, & West coupled with the bombing range of B-29s it would have not have had a chance.

As to China, it fell due to the lack Allied support. Had there been a war with the Soviets, do you actually believe that we would still have turned our backs on the situation?

[Watchman]

It's really hard to predict those things. If you take a look how much Red Army improved between 1941-1945, it's mind-boggling.OTOH, the farcical incompetence Stalin had imposed on the Red Army left the starting point pretty mind-boggling too...

There's also the little detail that even though their tactics, leadership and weaponry indeed did improve massively over the course of the conflict, they always had a bit of a problem with what might be called "finesse" - when it came to technique and technology both. After all, while they did indeed get rather good at it their tactical approach nevertheless never quite lost the "big hammer" quality, and was wont to be rather heavy on losses; and while they did indeed produce quite good "heavy metal" - tanks, guns etc. - more sophisticated bits like gun sights, radar etc. remained rather rudimentary. Not sure about the aircraft, but I've the impression most of the lot were anything but stellar performers compared to the cutting-edge stuff the USAF and Commonwealth air forces wielded en masse.

It's also perhaps worth noting that the Soviet organisational doctrine had a number of weaknesses - above all a certain rigidity and vertical hierarchiness of the chain-of-command - that came to bite Soviet-backed and -trained forces in the ass repeatedly during the Cold War.

Inconvenient traits the Western powers most definitely didn't share. And when one considers the amount of impressive-but-useless German gadgetry that fell into their hands, and the drive a major war with the USSR would have created to make something useful out of it right now, on top of that... After all, the US could afford to sink a billion dollars into the Manhattan Project without really even breaking a sweat, and the Brits made "Wizards' War" something of an art form on much lower budgets right from the start.

[Sarmatian]

Yeah, but it is not that simple. NATO wasn't established yet. Are you sure that each western country would welcome the chance to have a go at the Soviet Union (I assume we are still discussing that part, that West should have attacked SU after the war)? Complex relations, many countries often having different opinions is sometimes a problem nowadays, don't you think it would have been so back then? I don't think that Italians, for example, would jump from joy if somebody told them that Americans want to fight the Soviet Union and that they should pick up their stuff and go to Leningrad. If Americans pressured them, then they would be seen as the bad guys as they're starting the war and are pressuring other nations to fight in it. What would happen in the African colonies? What would happen in India? What would happen in Japan? Keep in mind that we're talking about scenario happening right after WW2, there was no love in Japan for US. Are you sure that they would try to resist the Soviets? Soviet Union was in better position to attack Japan then US to defend it. Put a tank on a train in Moscow in it's on the Pacific coast in a couple of days. Put a tank on a boat in the US and it's in Japan in weeks... At the end of the war, Japan had virtually no planes, no ships and no means to produce them and we've seen how complicated operations and how much troops and equipment was needed just take a small island. Now imagine how harder it would be to mount an invasion on Russian Pacific coast. How long it takes to transport troops there? How you're going to resupply them in winter, even if they do secure a bridgehead.

Russian managed to capture much more German scientists, although West got the top ones. Nevertheless, Soviets had the upper hand there. They had better technology in rocketry, they've sent the first satellite into space, they had the first man into space etc... I wouldn't say they were behind the West in terms of technology, in many ways they were ahead. First American and Russian jet fighter after the war were pretty similar, very much looked alike, since they were both based on German plans...

China would certainly be a major factor. Both sides would be helping different political movements and we can't know what would become of it. West had the advantage in money and resources but SU had logistical advantage. It would have been far easier for SU to deliver aid to China or even deploy armies there...

From European countries, I see only Britain joining in. I'm pretty sure other countries won't be so quick to join the attack. At least there would be heavy opposition. They've just seen the end of a one long war, their country is bad shape, they want to be home and have children. They wouldn't want to attack Soviets just because Americans think now is the right time...

When I said how much Red Army improved 1941-1945 I was trying to emphasize how things can change in very short amount of time. Any Western-Soviet conflict would certainly not be a short one. We can't possibly predict what would happen. My Soviet army would disintegrate. Maybe it would improve even more. Maybe eastern European country would rebel and join the West. Maybe there would have been a communist revolution in western Europe. There just are too much variables to consider and statements like, yeah, we would have attacked those Ruskies from four sides and obliterated them is just "fanboyism" and wishful thinking. We are talking about a conflict larger in scope then WW2. Do you think anyone in 1939 would have said that Germany would defeat France so easily and in such a short time?

[Cambyses]

From European countries, I see only Britain joining in. I'm pretty sure other countries won't be so quick to join the attack. At least there would be heavy opposition. They've just seen the end of a one long war, their country is bad shape, they want to be home and have children. They wouldn't want to attack Soviets just because Americans think now is the right time...

This is an interesting discussion. Lots of what ifs, as a great many unknown variables are involved. However, my personal take on it is that there would have been a very large coalition formed against the USSR. There were already many Polish and other eastern european exiles living in Britain (and elsewhere) opposed to the Soviets. Events immediately after the war proved their hostility to the Russians and dont forget there was a long history of alliance between Poland and the UK/France. Resistance movements in those states would have been common place. Also there is no doubt at all in my mind the French would have been involved. They were determined that they were still a major world power and had a somewhat unique situation in that there population had not been fighting and taking heavy losses for several years.

It would also have been a chance for them to win back the trust and respect of the "western allies". For my money the Italians (new american backed regime, communists all over the adriatic...) definitely would have known what side their bread was buttered - as would a lot of other smaller states (scandinavia, central asia, turkey etc). Anyway, just my opinion, but an anti-communist alliance would have been in many people's best interests after the war. As indeed actually happened to some extent.

Fascinating discussion.

[Fisherking]

:no:
Rather than Hijack this thread:oops: I am opening one on this subject. It is worth a discussion.:yes:

[lonewolf371]

Yeah, but it is not that simple. NATO wasn't established yet. Are you sure that each western country would welcome the chance to have a go at the Soviet Union (I assume we are still discussing that part, that West should have attacked SU after the war)? Complex relations, many countries often having different opinions is sometimes a problem nowadays, don't you think it would have been so back then? I don't think that Italians, for example, would jump from joy if somebody told them that Americans want to fight the Soviet Union and that they should pick up their stuff and go to Leningrad. If Americans pressured them, then they would be seen as the bad guys as they're starting the war and are pressuring other nations to fight in it. What would happen in the African colonies? What would happen in India? What would happen in Japan? Keep in mind that we're talking about scenario happening right after WW2, there was no love in Japan for US. Are you sure that they would try to resist the Soviets? Soviet Union was in better position to attack Japan then US to defend it. Put a tank on a train in Moscow in it's on the Pacific coast in a couple of days. Put a tank on a boat in the US and it's in Japan in weeks... At the end of the war, Japan had virtually no planes, no ships and no means to produce them and we've seen how complicated operations and how much troops and equipment was needed just take a small island. Now imagine how harder it would be to mount an invasion on Russian Pacific coast. How long it takes to transport troops there? How you're going to resupply them in winter, even if they do secure a bridgehead.

Russian managed to capture much more German scientists, although West got the top ones. Nevertheless, Soviets had the upper hand there. They had better technology in rocketry, they've sent the first satellite into space, they had the first man into space etc... I wouldn't say they were behind the West in terms of technology, in many ways they were ahead. First American and Russian jet fighter after the war were pretty similar, very much looked alike, since they were both based on German plans...

China would certainly be a major factor. Both sides would be helping different political movements and we can't know what would become of it. West had the advantage in money and resources but SU had logistical advantage. It would have been far easier for SU to deliver aid to China or even deploy armies there...

From European countries, I see only Britain joining in. I'm pretty sure other countries won't be so quick to join the attack. At least there would be heavy opposition. They've just seen the end of a one long war, their country is bad shape, they want to be home and have children. They wouldn't want to attack Soviets just because Americans think now is the right time...

When I said how much Red Army improved 1941-1945 I was trying to emphasize how things can change in very short amount of time. Any Western-Soviet conflict would certainly not be a short one. We can't possibly predict what would happen. My Soviet army would disintegrate. Maybe it would improve even more. Maybe eastern European country would rebel and join the West. Maybe there would have been a communist revolution in western Europe. There just are too much variables to consider and statements like, yeah, we would have attacked those Ruskies from four sides and obliterated them is just "fanboyism" and wishful thinking. We are talking about a conflict larger in scope then WW2. Do you think anyone in 1939 would have said that Germany would defeat France so easily and in such a short time?
What navy were the Soviets going to use to attack Japan? What air force were they going to use to win the battle in Europe? It seems to me that many people are forgetting the fact that air power dominated the war in every theater by its end, and the U.S. was by far and away the unquestioned leader in that area. The Soviets were, with all due respect, not quite as great in that department by the war's end and didn't recover for awhile. Their solution was to copy the B-29 and subsequently dump the many copies they built once jet planes came along.

And I don't see how the Allies "bumbled" their way to victory, when they were able to dupe Germany into thinking the invasion was at Calais and the invasion at Normandy was a diversion, even after it had already begun. The Allies had intelligence superiority, air superiority, and the invasion of Normandy was expertly planned and executed. And how was their doctrine inferior? After all, by the time things got rolling in France as soon as a Panzer reared its head a P-47 would be called in and obliterate it. The Bulge only partially succeeded because of weather. Under good weather, which would invariably come about with time, the Allied force in France was vastly superior to the German force.

The Allies would have won the war without Soviet intervention. The Soviets helped, but the Germans wasted the Luftwaffe (shame, they had some great planes and pilots) in the battle of Britain. The involvement of the United States and the subsequent destruction of the German infrastructure by air power and blockade would have led to an Allied victory either way. Look at Napoleon.

[Sarmatian]

What navy were the Soviets going to use to attack Japan? What air force were they going to use to win the battle in Europe? It seems to me that many people are forgetting the fact that air power dominated the war in every theater by its end, and the U.S. was by far and away the unquestioned leader in that area. The Soviets were, with all due respect, not quite as great in that department by the war's end and didn't recover for awhile. Their solution was to copy the B-29 and subsequently dump the many copies they built once jet planes came along.

And I don't see how the Allies "bumbled" their way to victory, when they were able to dupe Germany into thinking the invasion was at Calais and the invasion at Normandy was a diversion, even after it had already begun. The Allies had intelligence superiority, air superiority, and the invasion of Normandy was expertly planned and executed. And how was their doctrine inferior? After all, by the time things got rolling in France as soon as a Panzer reared its head a P-47 would be called in and obliterate it. The Bulge only partially succeeded because of weather. Under good weather, which would invariably come about with time, the Allied force in France was vastly superior to the German force.

The Allies would have won the war without Soviet intervention. The Soviets helped, but the Germans wasted the Luftwaffe (shame, they had some great planes and pilots) in the battle of Britain. The involvement of the United States and the subsequent destruction of the German infrastructure by air power and blockade would have led to an Allied victory either way. Look at Napoleon.

Sorry to burst your bubble, but that discussion was continued here (https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showthread.php?t=111163).

[Seamus Fermanagh]

The Allies would have won the war without Soviet intervention. The Soviets helped, but the Germans wasted the Luftwaffe (shame, they had some great planes and pilots) in the battle of Britain. The involvement of the United States and the subsequent destruction of the German infrastructure by air power and blockade would have led to an Allied victory either way. Look at Napoleon.

Not a chance. The Sovs absorbed the attention of 2/3 or more of the German Army and a think slice of the Luftwaffe as well. Concentrate ALL those resources against US/UK/FF with a neutral Soviet Union and there is no way the Allies do more than conquer Africa/Sicily. Anywhere in France, Italy, the Balkans, or Scandanavia ends up in a stalemate.

With ALL of the advantages you name and with the Wermacht putting most of its effort on the Russian Front, we still took more than a month to get out of Normandy....even though the Germans really did fear a Calais attack for several weeks of that time period.

[Spino]

Great generals do not need to be paradigms of perfection. All that is required for greatness is for them to consistently exert a decisive and unmistakably positive influence on any and all matters relevant to their endeavors... especially in lieu of adverse conditions.


Napoleon was fantastic when it came to leading smaller groups of men, trying to outflank a larger enemy as it trundled around the place. Thus, he did score some amazing victories in the defence of France.

1814 demonstrated that Napoleon still had 'it' because his back was against the wall, not because he was commanding a smaller force. He was quite effective with larger forces as well, his campaigns in 1813 were quite impressive considering his lack of cavalry and the bumblings of his subordinates (i.e. Ney and his horrendous incompetency when given an independent command and ordered to take Berlin).


But at a larger scale, I believe he lacked much of what is required to be considered great, his actions against the Russians are astounding when one considers him to be a singular genius.

I believe Wellington was very much his match.

The terms 'genius', 'great' and 'perfect' are not mutually inclusive terms. One can still be considered both a genius and great and still fail, even if some of those failures are spectacular. Far too many people treat Alexander or Genghis Khan as the model for greatness despite the fact that they were clearly the exceptions to the rule. They were among the few commanders in history who managed to conduct their campaigns & battles with near perfect execution... thanks in no small part to the shortcomings and mistakes of their enemies and a healthy dollop of luck. In Napoleon's case his accomplishments were simply extraordinary considering the number, quality and wealth of his enemies.

Many military historians agree that 1806/1807 was Napoleon's high water mark, he was never as skilled or as sharp in subsequent campaigns. George Nafziger wrote something to the effect that after 1806/1807 Napoleon fought more like an emperor looking to retain his territory & prestige than a general looking to decisively defeat his enemies.

Napoleon's campaigns in Russia and Spain truly embodied the triumph of the ego over the genius. Against his better judgment and the counsel of his best Marshals (i.e. Davout) Napoleon embarked on an invasion of Russia and once committed, continued to chase Kutusov even after it became obvious the latter was using Fabian tactics to avoid a pitched battle. In fact the battle of Borodino took place only because Tsar Alexander ordered Kutusov to turn and make a stand before the French reached Moscow! A wiser course of action for the French would have been to stop chasing Kutusov deep into Russia, 'liberate' and mobilize French friendly areas like Lithuania and the Baltic States and force Tsar Alexander to deal with Napoleon on his own diplomatic terms or force the Tsar to risk his armies in an attempt to reclaim those parts of his empire back. However Napoleon's ego would never allow for such a concession in light of his ultimate goal which was to achieve a decisive Austerlitz style victory against Kutusov thus forcing the Tsar to admit defeat.

Furthermore to answer some other posts on Napoleon's Russian campaign it was desertion, disease and eventually the lack of food & supplies that doomed his army in Russia, not the infamous Russian Winter. From the moment the French crossed the Niemen to the moment they entered the gates of Moscow desertion and disease did more to thin the ranks of Napoleon's multi-national army than any other factor. By the time the battle of Borodino took place Napoleon's combined forces had lost well over half their numbers! Once Moscow was set ablaze and the retreat began Napoleon chose to march back to Poland through the same territories his army had practically stripped bare on the march into Russia! Once again, this was against the counsel of his best Marshal (Davout again) who encouraged Napoleon to take a southern, untouched and more 'fruitful' route out of Russia so as to not destroy his army by the time it reached Poland. When General Winter finally made an appearance Napoleon's army was already in full retreat, starving and all but broken. The Russian winter simply made an already horrendous situation unbearable.

This graphic spells out reality in no uncertain terms...

https://img299.imageshack.us/img299/2386/napoleonarmy1812qc2.gif (https://imageshack.us)


Without Blucher, Wateroloo would have been a bloody draw like Ligny and Quatre Bras. Wellington had taken Napoleon's best shots and stopped them cold, however, a not-too-common achievement.

Ligny was a French victory, not a draw. The Prussians lost badly (moreso in morale than manpower) and beat a retreat north but they were not broken. Regardless of the sources the Prussians suffered more casualties (Elting cites sources that show the casualties to be more lopsided than cited in popular sources) and came off the worse for it. Had Ney not botched Quatre Bras, panicked and recalled D'erlon's Corps from marching on the Prussians' weak right flank at Ligny it would have been a decisive victory for the French. However Marshal Blucher's extraordinary charisma and fanatical hatred of the French was enough to keep the Prussians in the game for Wavre and Waterloo.

I disagree in part about Waterloo being a draw in the absence of the Prussians. Wellington himself declared Waterloo 'a near run thing' and for good reason, his Allied army came perilously close to breaking that day. Despite repelling the French attacks Wellington's own multi-national army was still suffering and being continously demoralized by French artillery all day (the French had considerably more guns on the field and better crews to boot). Adjusting for desertions & captured French losses (most of which took place after Napoleon retreated off the field) the final casualty count for Waterloo was roughly split between the the Allied & French armies, ~22,000 and ~25,000 respectively. Wellington's army suffered terribly despite defending on favorable terrain and emerging the victor. Had the Prussians not made an appearance the French, despite the late start due to the muddy ground, Napoleon's ill health and underestimation of the Allied army and Ney's boneheaded moves would have probably pulled out a marginal, albeit costly victory (quite possibly a Pyrrhic one). Napoleon was in poor form and having an incredibly bad day and yet still came close to winning it, impressive eh?


It's hard to say which one was "better." If you'd switched places, would Wellington have had the dash to transform the siege of Toulon or the restless energy of the Italian campaign? Could Napoleon have operated effectively on a logistical shoe-string in mountainous terrain with sem-reliable allies against a well-equipped and numerically superior opponent? Both men were products of their own experiences and ideas. Both -- to the intent such a thing is possible -- imposed their will on the chaos that is battle.

Well let's not forget Napoleon practically worked miracles in Italy in 1796/97 under worse conditions than Wellington experienced in Portugal & Spain. This is not to say that Wellington wasn't great, he certainly was and with the arguable exception of Archduke Charles was the best the Allies had to offer. However one bout against a champion past his prime does not lend itself to concrete conclusions that the contender would have always come out on top. I will say Wellington was the perfect match for Napoleon at Waterloo, he had shown himself to be particularly deft when defending and Napoleon's decision to mount a frontal assault played directly to his strengths. Overall I'd still take Napoleon over Wellington, he consistently pulled out more victories under greater adversity.

Sorry for the wall of text, some of which was not even relevant to this thread. It's painfully obvious I love talking about this stuff... :yes:

[Geezer57]

Sorry for the wall of text, some of which was not even relevant to this thread. It's painfully obvious I love talking about this stuff... :yes:

As one who lurks here at lot, I have to say please keep putting up your walls. They're thought-provoking and highly enjoyable to read. :bow:

[PanzerJaeger]

Sorry for the wall of text, some of which was not even relevant to this thread. It's painfully obvious I love talking about this stuff... :yes:

No need to apologize. It was illuminating. :bow:



What navy were the Soviets going to use to attack Japan? What air force were they going to use to win the battle in Europe? It seems to me that many people are forgetting the fact that air power dominated the war in every theater by its end, and the U.S. was by far and away the unquestioned leader in that area. The Soviets were, with all due respect, not quite as great in that department by the war's end and didn't recover for awhile. Their solution was to copy the B-29 and subsequently dump the many copies they built once jet planes came along.

I would disagree with your assertions on a few levels.

First of all, while air power was a powerful tool in the Allied arsenal and certainly caused a great deal of damage to the Axis, it is quite a stretch to say it dominated any Second World War battlefield - especially in the way it was employed by the Allies. In fact, it arguably had the most impact in the beginning of the war when it was used most effectively by the Germans in combined arms operations. The Allies never quite managed to get that down.

In actuality, the only major campaign where Allied air power can even be seen as a decisive factor (excluding air-only battles of course) would be Normandy, where German movements were genuinely hindered. This was mainly due to the relatively small area of operations which allowed the Allies to concentrate their forces, compounded by the small number of German armor, especially the critical Pz.V,VI, and VII models - in which every loss was especially damaging. Losing just one Tiger could significantly diminish German fighting capacity in certain areas.

Even so, if you examine the records, it is clear that Allied air power is quite over stated. It did not cause the massive damage to the panzerkorps that the History Channel would lead you to believe - the Germans themselves did that as they ran out of fuel, and it barely had any impact on infantry operations. The main success was in slowing German movement, as they were forced to move armor at night.

As for the Allied strategic air assets, these are again over stated in their effectiveness. While they took a toll on the dense German industry, by the end of the war essential production was moved underground. It is important to note that the Germans never ran out of tanks or airplanes - they ran out of trained crews and fuel. They were producing right up until the end.

The point is that Allied air power is often over estimated and that the factors that made it successful against Germany would not easily transfer to the Soviet Union, who had no numerical disadvantages and very dispersed industry.


Second, I'm not sure your assessment of the Soviet air force is entirely accurate. In fact, Russia had a very strong tactical air corps, with highly experienced fighter and fighter-bomber pilots in models that ranged from entirely adequate to superb in their design.(Sturmovik) The Allies definitely had a strategic advantage, but it could only be useful with relative air superiority. The Russians did not need to have the best air force to largely negate the Allied advantage, only a competent one. While the Luftwaffe was only able to put up a couple of interceptors per bomber fleet to pick at them, the Russians would be able to field hundreds at a time. Of course those bombers would have had a hard time seeing combat, as the Russians had the numbers to seriously contest air superiority.

And that is the dynamic that is most important in this discussion - numbers. IMO, the Germans had better pilots and better planes throughout most of the war, but too few of both. However, even during Bodenplatte in '45 when most had been killed off, the Luftwaffe was able to deliver a crippling blow to the Allied air forces with mostly rookie pilots. However, the Allies were able to recoup those losses within weeks while the Germans could not replace their lost pilots. Conversely, the Russians had the numbers to consistently keep planes in the air - which meant less Allied engagement of Russian ground forces.



And I don't see how the Allies "bumbled" their way to victory, when they were able to dupe Germany into thinking the invasion was at Calais and the invasion at Normandy was a diversion, even after it had already begun.

And the Germans were able to amass a huge force right in front of the Allies that winter... Deception and misinformation are important to many a military strategy, but they say little about an army's fighting abilities.

I hate to, again, badmouth the Allies, as they were in large part extremely brave, committed soldiers. However, their training, doctrines, and leadership just didn't match up to either the German or Russian equivalents. Their battles, bloodshed, and sacrifices - while noble - were little more than sideshows to the main affair in the East. This is not my opinion, but that of the German leadership, who allocated their forces accordingly.

You seem to be focused on Normandy, and I'll get to that, but lets examine events prior.

When faced with the full force of the German military, the numerically superior forces of France and Britain crumbled fairly easily. At this early juncture, it is important to note that this is the last time the Allies ever faced any first rate and/or full strength German armies. Next, Britain does get credit for fighting off the Luftwaffe, but then immediately loses it in the desert (& Greece), where they were completely outfought by a small German legion and the Italians - again despite vast numerical superiority. Rommel was defeated by his own ambitions and a complete lack of reinforcements and supplies, not the British. This is where the Americans come in and are immediately trounced by a ragtag rearguard force at Kasserine. Although it had become quite common for the British by now, it was the first time the Americans were caught and defeated despite massive numerical superiority, though it wouldn't be the last.

Moving on to Italy... The Allies had new armies, new leaders, and momentum. Everything seemed to be going well in Sicily - except of course that in the cloud of ego and hubris, the Germans were allowed to simply walk.. err.. float away. Big mistake. Everything went downhill from there, despite, yet again, even larger numerical superiority. The Allies were stymied on line after line of Kesselring's defenses, including those around Monte Cassino. The flipping of the Italians did little to help them, nor did the botched operation at Anzio.

On to Normandy, truly the Ally’s greatest victory. This was, however, thanks in no small part to Hitler himself. It was certainly a well planned and fairly well executed operation, botched drops and all. It is important, though, to recognize that German troop quality during the campaign was a mixed bag at best, and in all actuality a poor collection of low quality and/or destroyed Wehrmacht divisions sprinkled with a few elite SS ones. The Allies should rightly be praised for keeping the Germans off-balance during the first critical hours which allowed them a foothold. However, Hitler also deserves a large peice of that pie.

What is often not mentioned is how quickly, and IMO masterfully, the Germans were able to stabilize the situation - despite, again, even larger numerical superiority than in Italy. (can you spot the pattern?) The Allies were largely fought to a standstill, with Monty being completely halted at Caen by some well-led boys. This was the true strength of the German military late in the war - the Kampfgruppe doctrine that always put them 3 steps ahead of their adversaries.

Of course, attrition would have eventually forced a German retreat, but the front fell apart in the drastic way it did (Falaise), solely due to Hitler. Against the strong objections of his field commanders, he ordered a suicidal attack which was immediately thrown back and turned on the Germans. Had that fateful attack not been forced upon them, the Germans could have sustained the Western Front for some time.

Post-Normandy was certainly not bereft of Allied missteps either. Considering the condition of the German military during this period, the Allied performance was especially egregious. Market Garden was a total debacle. Such a waste of excellent British paras. Monty should have been fired on the spot. Hurtgen Forest was another example of lazy, meat-grinder strategy that fed men into an excellent defensive position because they had more than the Germans and there was no reason to come up with anything more inspired. Model’s defenses had cost the Allies 17,000 and 33,000 soldiers respectively for those two defenses for a fraction of that in German lives, IIRC. Worse yet, no one bothered to wonder why the Germans were so fierce in their defense of that sector, which led to the last major Allied blunder. I mean, who would think the Germans would attack through the Ardennes?

The Germans had no business launching an assault in December of 1944. The Allies knew it, the Germans knew it… everyone knew it except for Hitler. The German military was a shell of its former self, in men, material, and most importantly - experience. Despite all the Wehrmacht’s troubles, despite the ballooning of the US military presence in Europe to truly massive proportions, and despite the tightening noose in the East, Hitler launched his attack and, had it not been for a critical shortage of fuel, it may just have been successful in reaching Antwerp! Nearly 100,000 men lost. Whole divisions wiped from the map. The Allied air force caught and crippled on the ground. In 1945! Eisenhower and the lot of them should have been fired on the spot. It would be utterly inconceivable today had it not actually happened. Possibly the only thing more amazing than the incompetence surrounding that period is the willingness for Western historians to ignore it. For days, Allied leadership was in a perpetual state of WTF.

The Allies won the war, and that cannot be taken from them – nor should anyone try. The fought hard and sacrificed many lives to earn victory. However, the Normandy-centric focus of Western literature and pop culture belies some core realities of the conflict. Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union ensured strategic victory for the Allies, yet they experienced terrible tactical setbacks throughout the war considering their advantages. Conversely, while German armies could be found in terrible strategic positions from Moscow to North Africa, they maintained their tactical mastery of the battlefield throughout the conflict.



The Allies had intelligence superiority, air superiority, and the invasion of Normandy was expertly planned and executed.

Yes, yes, and… sort of. I would say Normandy was well planned and decently executed. Again though, the success at Normandy can be attributed to many things, but superior Allied tactical ability is not one of them. I would encourage you to pick up the book SS: Steel Rain, as it has some excellent accounts of some of the heaviest fighting around Normandy.


And how was their doctrine inferior?

Attritional instead of maneuver-based.



After all, by the time things got rolling in France as soon as a Panzer reared its head a P-47 would be called in and obliterate it.

This is more myth than reality. German tankers were not stupid and adjusted their tactics to avoid Jabos. Allied artillery was more of a threat than fighter-bombers.




The Bulge only partially succeeded because of weather. Under good weather, which would invariably come about with time, the Allied force in France was vastly superior to the German force.

If you are thinking in terms of manpower, material strength, and supplies then I would agree. However, when you start to examine factors such as leadership, doctrines, and training; the situation changes quite a bit.



The Allies would have won the war without Soviet intervention. The Soviets helped, but the Germans wasted the Luftwaffe (shame, they had some great planes and pilots) in the battle of Britain. The involvement of the United States and the subsequent destruction of the German infrastructure by air power and blockade would have led to an Allied victory either way. Look at Napoleon.

I could not disagree more. WW2 was decided on the Eastern Front. I could go on and on but its simple enough to say that the Allies would not have been able to face the German army that marched into Russia in 1941. The American and British public would not have put up with the lost battles and casualties over France. Also, in your blockade scenario, you forget that Germany was quasi-allied to Russia before Barbarossa, which significantly weakens an embargo.

[Strike For The South]

I could not disagree more. WW2 was decided on the Eastern Front. I could go on and on but its simple enough to say that the Allies would not have been able to face the German army that marched into Russia in 1941. The American and British public would not have put up with the lost battles and casualties over France. Also, in your blockade scenario, you forget that Germany was quasi-allied to Russia before Barbarossa, which significantly weakens an embargo.

If there is no invasion in the Eastern front you lose all those crack wehrmacht troops, no? I'll also point out the Americans lost allot of men in the pacific theatre in much more horrific ways and we still fought on. The Axis powers thought the same as you did as has every country that has fought America going back to the Mexican-American war.

Simply because the Americans did not use the same meat grinder techniques as the Soviets does not mean we couldn't see it through.

I've never understood this revisionist love affair with the Soviets. People seem to equate stupidity and Stalins ego with some sort of mythical toughness. That is utterly laughable. Who isn't going to fight for the country when there families have been killed and cities destroyed.

I don't think FDR nor Churchill would've allowed there countries to slip into complacency.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

If there is no invasion in the Eastern front you lose all those crack wehrmacht troops, no? I'll also point out the Americans lost allot of men in the pacific theatre in much more horrific ways and we still fought on. The Axis powers thought the same as you did as has every country that has fought America going back to the Mexican-American war.

Simply because the Americans did not use the same meat grinder techniques as the Soviets does not mean we couldn't see it through.

I've never understood this revisionist love affair with the Soviets. People seem to equate stupidity and Stalins ego with some sort of mythical toughness. That is utterly laughable. Who isn't going to fight for the country when there families have been killed and cities destroyed.

I don't think FDR nor Churchill would've allowed there countries to slip into complacency.

My point was not that Germany could have defeated the USA and Great Britain, but that absent the amazing drain represented by the Eastern Front, Germany would have been able to force a stalemate conventionally, losing only after the deployment of atomic weaponry.

The demonstrated ability of the 2nd World War Wermacht was staggeringly good. Even after their offensive abilities were largely shot, they were still capable of an aggressive and effective defense that belied their comparatively limited resources. While they had some technical advantages, notably quality of AFVs and anti-tank weaponry, their real strength was doctrinal. The kampgruppe concept and the integration of combined arms tactics and thinking down almost to the platoon level made them incredibly flexible and resourceful.

Interestingly, only the USA of the other major combatants regularly demonstrated this combination of flexibility and integrative thinking -- but we were 3-4 years behind the Germans in experience in putting it into practice.

The Soviets only briefly managed to approach that quality level in late 1944 and early 1945, but never institutionalized the concepts learned to the same degree the USA and GB did after the war.

Without the Eastern Front, USA/GB cannot make real headway in the West prior to the success of the Manhattan project. Germany could not have won as it lacked the naval and air capability to cross the Channel (much less the Atlantic), but the USA/GB forces lacked the technical and doctrinal edge needed to make their superior logistics effective against a Germany that was not facing a massive war in the East. Absent the Eastern Front, Nazi Germany dies under atomic bombardment in late 1945 early 1946.

However, positing a WW2 WITHOUT an "Eastern Front" is unlikely. Left to his own devices, Stalin would not have kept the peace. He not only gleefully acquired the Baltic states in his deal with Hitler, he attacked Finland in 1940 and was preparing other efforts (slowed by the officers purge). It has been argued that part of the success of Barbarossa in June of 1941 is attributable to the Soviet Army being way too "forward deployed" and with far to much of its power deployed South of Brest Litovsk. In other words, Stalin was gearing up to take Rumania and the Ploesti oil fields and begin absorbing the Balkans while Germany dealt with extant opposition in the West (the UK). There is little to suggest that Soviet aggressiveness was curbed.

[Strike For The South]

Alright, I can live with that.

[Sarmatian]

Without the Eastern Front, USA/GB cannot make real headway in the West prior to the success of the Manhattan project. Germany could not have won as it lacked the naval and air capability to cross the Channel (much less the Atlantic), but the USA/GB forces lacked the technical and doctrinal edge needed to make their superior logistics effective against a Germany that was not facing a massive war in the East. Absent the Eastern Front, Nazi Germany dies under atomic bombardment in late 1945 early 1946.


That is a pretty bold conclusion to make. What makes you think that in those circumstances US would have been the first to develop the bomb? Germany worked on it, too. With more resources at its disposal (not having to fight on the Eastern Front) Germany could have been the first. Also, it would be hard to imagine that there would have been total stalemate for 4-5 years after German conquest of western Europe. Either some kind of peace deal would have been made or a weapon for breaking the stalemate would have been developed by one side. After all, the entire A-bomb idea was introduced when two German scientists published the results of their experiments with uranium fission...

[Seamus Fermanagh]

That is a pretty bold conclusion to make. What makes you think that in those circumstances US would have been the first to develop the bomb? Germany worked on it, too. With more resources at its disposal (not having to fight on the Eastern Front) Germany could have been the first. Also, it would be hard to imagine that there would have been total stalemate for 4-5 years after German conquest of western Europe. Either some kind of peace deal would have been made or a weapon for breaking the stalemate would have been developed by one side. After all, the entire A-bomb idea was introduced when two German scientists published the results of their experiments with uranium fission...

Germany never fast-tracked the research as did the US/UK, and their policies has pushed out too many of the best physicists they had. Your point about a prolonged stalement generateing a peace deal of some form is a good issue.

[Cambyses]

This whole "what if" surrounding the eastern front is quite a major one. For me its almost as big as removing the pacific war from the equation, with the resultant increase in manpower and resources that would have favoured the allies.

The US and UK worked very hard with the Russians throughout the war. The Eastern Front and its effects on Germany etc was a big part of their strategic thinking and I honestly dont think it can be removed from the scene as almost everything would have changed without it. For example Britain would have been left fighting the full might of the Germans virtually alone for an additional 6 months. This surely would have effected when or even if the US entered the war. Let alone how the Soviets freed up army may or may not have become involved in the east.

[PanzerJaeger]

If there is no invasion in the Eastern front you lose all those crack wehrmacht troops, no?

No, they would gain them. The vast majority - and more importantly - the best German troops were sent to Russia throughout the war.



I'll also point out the Americans lost allot of men in the pacific theatre in much more horrific ways and we still fought on.


The US lost 106,207 killed and 248,316 wounded and missing in the Pacific. The USSR lost roughly 11 million soldiers dead and many more wounded fighting the Germans. Double that and you've got a very conservative estimate of the total deaths the Russians suffered during WW2 including civilians. Its difficult to quantify horrific death, but I'd put the fighting on the Eastern Front right up there with the fighting in the Pacific.

More importantly, the Soviets endured massive defeats. City after city fell while army after army was surrounded and annihilated before any progress was made. While the Europeans suffered a string of defeats in the Pacific(and were pretty much ready to call it quits), the US only really suffered one major defeat after Pearl Harbor. After Mac left the Philippines, it was all uphill from there.

Now the Russians didn't really have a choice, but the point still stands.



The Axis powers thought the same as you did as has every country that has fought America going back to the Mexican-American war.


Well, there are a few things to consider here.

First, Japan attacked and humiliated America while Hitler simply declared war in support of an ally (which was immeasurably unintelligent, but that’s another issue). This means a lot in terms of how much determination the American public had to defeat Japan versus Germany, and also the losses they were willing to take.

Second, as I mentioned before, the Americans almost immediately went on the offensive in the Pacific and in Europe. The same can be said about the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, and WW1. Taking losses while making progress is far more acceptable to the public.

Finally, it is important to consider America's location and the isolationist feelings of many Americans at the time. Unlike Russia and the Europeans, the USA was not in a position where they had to fight for their survival.

IMO, had Germany had the majority of their military available to engage the Allies in the West, the USA would have been forced to the table or at least into a Korea-like situation, as they would not have been able to defeat the Germans on the battlefield, or even break into Europe at all, and the American public, with a large German minority, would not have supported taking huge losses trying. (Also, remember that there was a large degree of support for the Nazi regime among many powerful Americans while they were ascendant.)

The nuclear situation, and whoever finished first, changes everything of course.


Simply because the Americans did not use the same meat grinder techniques as the Soviets does not mean we couldn't see it through.

As I said above, I just don't think there was the ability or the will to defeat the Germans had they not have expended their best in the East.



I've never understood this revisionist love affair with the Soviets. People seem to equate stupidity and Stalins ego with some sort of mythical toughness. That is utterly laughable. Who isn't going to fight for the country when there families have been killed and cities destroyed.

Nothing revisionist here, and certainly no love for the Soviets. :laugh4:

You have to remember, though, that the Russian military advanced quite a bit throughout the war. Stalin's natural selection left them with some very talented commanders, and their experience yielded very good doctrines.

Quite honestly, I would even say the pre-war Russian military was more advanced than those of the Allies, especially before the purges. Their thoughts on air and armored power were definitely more innovative than their Allied equivalents. For example, the Deep Operations doctrine was conceived pre-war, as was the T-34/76(a design the Americans passed on btw).



I don't think FDR nor Churchill would've allowed there countries to slip into complacency.

I don't know if they would have had a choice. With the Eastern Front, it was just a matter of keeping up the pressure and waiting for the Germans to collapse. Without it, well… I’d hate to have seen what Manstein with a full strength German army would have had up his sleeve in the West.

[Strike For The South]

Panzer that was well thought out. As much as I would like to blame my lack of sobriety. I simply can't. You know more than me in this issue. I am humbled and that doesnt happen very often so enjoy it you Übermensch you.

:unitedstates: :unitedstates: :unitedstates:

[PanzerJaeger]

Panzer that was well thought out. As much as I would like to blame my lack of sobriety. I simply can't. You know more than me in this issue. I am humbled and that doesnt happen very often so enjoy it you Übermensch you.

Haha. Maybe, maybe not. What's certain is that you're having a much better time than me this Saturday night. :beam:


:unitedstates: :unitedstates: :unitedstates:


:2thumbsup:

[Meneldil]

I've never understood this revisionist love affair with the Soviets. People seem to equate stupidity and Stalins ego with some sort of mythical toughness. That is utterly laughable. Who isn't going to fight for the country when there families have been killed and cities destroyed.

It's quite more complicated than that. Not only did the soviets had to face huge loss of men (I think the total military+civilians reached the 20 millions), but they also almost got wiped out from the map.

A few months after Barbarossa, who could have thought that the USSR would end up as the #1 military power at the end the war (without taking the A-Bomb into account)? The Germans were about to take Moscow, Leningrad, Novgorod and Stalingrad, many Soviet armies had been annihilated easily.

Some countries had the cities destroyed, yet decided to give up the fight. Belgium, Netherland, France, Greece, etc.
The soviet had no choice, simply because:
- they were considered subhumans by the Nazis, and were thus harshly treated. Being a soviet PoW wasn't a lot of fun, and that is, if the guys were willing to take you as a PoW rather than simply kill you so you don't bother them.
- they were considered cannonfodder by their own hierarchy. Either you go forward or we kill you.

There's no love affair revisionnism, and while I certainly appreciate the effort made by the Americans to liberate not only Europe, but most of Asia, I still think the Soviets had a much harder time, made much more efforts, went through much more sacrifices and are quite worthy of respect for what they have done overall - a respect they haven't been given in popular culture, except for a few movies here and there (the only one I can think of is Enemy at the Gate).

To sum it up bluntly, Europe would probably have been "liberated" (notice the quotation marks, I'm not sure I would have liked living in socialist republic) without the US, but it would likely not have been liberated without USSR. Of course, that's arguable, and there's a crapload of what if's, but still.
I know this is quite a touchy topic for americans, but I swear there's no anti-americanism in this statement. You just have to admit that some nations did more or as much as the US during WWII, sometimes with much less capabilities and resources (UK, USSR and China being the 3 other big guys).

[Fisherking]

It's quite more complicated than that. Not only did the soviets had to face huge loss of men (I think the total military+civilians reached the 20 millions), but they also almost got wiped out from the map.

A few months after Barbarossa, who could have thought that the USSR would end up as the #1 military power at the end the war (without taking the A-Bomb into account)? The Germans were about to take Moscow, Leningrad, Novgorod and Stalingrad, many Soviet armies had been annihilated easily.

Some countries had the cities destroyed, yet decided to give up the fight. Belgium, Netherland, France, Greece, etc.
The soviet had no choice, simply because:
- they were considered subhumans by the Nazis, and were thus harshly treated. Being a soviet PoW wasn't a lot of fun, and that is, if the guys were willing to take you as a PoW rather than simply kill you so you don't bother them.
- they were considered cannonfodder by their own hierarchy. Either you go forward or we kill you.

There's no love affair revisionnism, and while I certainly appreciate the effort made by the Americans to liberate not only Europe, but most of Asia, I still think the Soviets had a much harder time, made much more efforts, went through much more sacrifices and are quite worthy of respect for what they have done overall - a respect they haven't been given in popular culture, except for a few movies here and there (the only one I can think of is Enemy at the Gate).

To sum it up bluntly, Europe would probably have been "liberated" (notice the quotation marks, I'm not sure I would have liked living in socialist republic) without the US, but it would likely not have been liberated without USSR. Of course, that's arguable, and there's a crapload of what if's, but still.
I know this is quite a touchy topic for americans, but I swear there's no anti-americanism in this statement. You just have to admit that some nations did more or as much as the US during WWII, sometimes with much less capabilities and resources (UK, USSR and China being the 3 other big guys).

It took a coalition to defeat the Germans in WWII. It could not have been done without the efforts of all involved.

The Soviets would have lost had it not been for western military aid. The Soviets made a fantastic turn around but that was not without help.

The Russians had vast manpower resources and with the aid of western materials in 1942 and early 1943 allowed them to rebuild their industrial might out of reach of the Germans. Without that and the necessary draw off of forces to the Mediterranean the Germans may well have been on the offensive in 1943 and Kursk may gone a completely different way.

Had the US maintained strict neutrality of adopted a pro German stance it is unlikely that even Brittan would have remained in the war.

It took all the players to accomplish what they did and without any of them the war would at the very least have ground into a stalemate, if not ending in German Victory.

As for Russian PoWs, they were doomed either way. You do know what Stalin had done to them don’t you?

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Stalin would never have been selected as Miss Congeniality.


I've always wondered if the CCCP could have survived without US/UK aid. I've always suspected the answer was "yes" though I think they'd have been hard pressed to run offensives as successfully as they did in 1944 and 1945 without all of the supply trucks we sent (something like $500M worth in 1940 dollars). Holding ground is one thing, re-taking it is another.

[Meneldil]

It took a coalition to defeat the Germans in WWII. It could not have been done without the efforts of all involved.

The Soviets would have lost had it not been for western military aid. The Soviets made a fantastic turn around but that was not without help.

As I said, there's a lot of 'what if'. I know the Soviet weren't actually alone, and received help from the western allies, either cash or actual manpower. Of course, it wouldn't have been possible without the US.

Still, the Germans were stoped long before this help could be effectively used. Stalingrad was mostly fought without the effects of the foreign aid.



Had the US maintained strict neutrality of adopted a pro German stance it is unlikely that even Brittan would have remained in the war.

It took all the players to accomplish what they did and without any of them the war would at the very least have ground into a stalemate, if not ending in German Victory.

As for Russian PoWs, they were doomed either way. You do know what Stalin had done to them don’t you?

Again, my point wasn't to say "ZOMG Soviets are teh awesome". I'm just a bit baffled by the fact WWII is in general, considered solely as an American success, while many people from many nations fought just as hard, if not harder, and for much longer.
Just look at SFTS' comment: praising the Soviets is a "revisionist love affair". Now, I don't know how history is taught in the US, but I can certainly find it offensive. I would consider it highly insulting if I were a russian, and I'm not even one of the nationalist crazy nutjobs.

To put it simply, WWII wasn't "GERMANY WAS PWNING EVERYONE, WE (the US) CAME IN AND SAVED THE WORLD EVEN THOUGH IT WAS PAINFULL, WOOHOOO". It was much more complicated than that.

It is my personal opinion that Germany could have been dealt with without the US, and that if the US actually played a large role, most of the work had been done when they landed in Europe. The same is obviously not true in Asia, where bar a few victories, the Allies were apparently doomed to lose, and where China was nowhere capable of effectively fighting the Japanese invaders.

[Brenus]

“Holding ground is one thing, re-taking it is another”; Holding? :beam: The first counter-offensive (successful one) was done in 1941 at the doors of Moscow. The T34 and the Siberian Divisions pushed back the Germans so hard that without the bad weather and the order from Hitler to hold the ground it would have been worst… No Allies’ help in this case, USA were even not at war…

“The Soviets would have lost had it not been for western military aid.” ? :laugh4:
The material provided by the Allies was essentially logistic: Trains, trucks, jeeps, that the Soviets did appreciated. However, Airacobra, Hurricane, Mathilda and even Shermans were inferior to the local material and use only by low level divisions.
And again, the Soviets inflicted major defeats to the Germans long time before the Allies’ help had reach their shores…

“It took all the players to accomplish what they did and without any of them the war would at the very least have ground into a stalemate, if not ending in German Victory.”: Hold on, just have a look at the map for the June the 6th 1944, please, and note where the Russians tanks…are. :beam:
Yeap, doesn’t look like a stalemate but a good old defeat for the Germans and their allies…:2thumbsup:

The war was lost for the Germans, D-day or not. It was lost when the Plan to destroy the Red Army at the borders failed.
Some generals did understand this. Some even said it to Hitler, but most of them disagreed.
Von Rundstedt was aware of the limits of the blitzkrieg. Note that the Germans and the Russians did train together during the Reichwehr…
So, like Napoleon, the Germans were obliged to pursuit the enemy, without the proper logistic, without the well maintain roads like in France, with a railways system having different length, and no petrol stations…
Why is it so difficult to admit the Red Army would have won against the Germans, whatever the cost?:wall:

“I've never understood this revisionist love affair with the Soviets. People seem to equate stupidity and Stalins ego with some sort of mythical toughness. That is utterly laughable. Who isn't going to fight for the country when there families have been killed and cities destroyed?”
Er, they did fight when their families have been killed and their cities destroyed. Remember Leningrad (300 days of siege) Stalingrad, Minsk, Kharkov and Sebastopol. They fought until the end (what we call fanatics when somebody we don’t like does it and heroism and spirit of sacrifice when it is ours soldiers doing it). Read the letters sent to their mothers, or their comrades: We are 5 left, we have no ammunition. We will die tomorrow, Hurrah Stalin, Na Rodina… It is still on the walls…

They had no choice: At least with Stalin, they had a chance…

[Spino]

Lend Lease had a stupefyingly, jaw droppingly, gob smackingly enormous impact on the Soviet Union's ability to wage war against Nazi Germany. And it began almost immediately after Nazi Germany invaded the USSR.

Regardless of the qualities of the T-34 (hardly a 'war winning tank' thanks in no small part to always sporting a mediocre cannon and routinely faring poorly against Germany's mid-late war tanks & AT guns) it was the logistical impact of Lend Lease on the Soviet war effort that allowed them to push Germany's armed forces all the way back to Berlin by early 1945. The tens of thousands of fighter planes and tanks the Allies gave the Soviet Union were just the tip of the massive iceberg. The Soviet Union received an avalanche of supply trucks (250,000+!), jeeps, cargo aircraft (nearly 20,000 planes of all types!), locomotives (nearly 2000!), rifles, pistols, uniforms, boots, food, etc. Every conceivable bit of material that could be used to wage a modern war was shipped off to the Soviet Union from the USA and UK in bulk quantities.

The Soviets simply didn't appreciate the logistical help from the US & UK, it needed it... desperately. As the saying goes, "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics." On its own Soviet industry was hard pressed to keep pace with its material losses, especially when you consider the degree to which they treated everything in their military (living or not) as being highly expendable. Take away all that logistical aid and suddenly Soviet industry is forced to make everything it needs instead of just concentrating on criticals items. A steady stream of T-34s rolling to the front lines suddenly becomes a trickle.

It is difficult to say exactly how much Lend Lease affected the Soviet war effort but I think it's safe to say it made the difference between say, reaching Poland's border instead of penetrating Germany and besieging Berlin in 1945.

[PanzerJaeger]

The war was lost for the Germans, D-day or not. It was lost when the Plan to destroy the Red Army at the borders failed.


Hehe, this is such a contentious subject.

IMO, the Germans could have turned things around even as late as '43 had Hitler chosen Manstein's "Backhand Blow" instead of "Citadel".

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Lend Lease had a stupefyingly, jaw droppingly, gob smackingly enormous impact on the Soviet Union's ability to wage war against Nazi Germany. And it began almost immediately after Nazi Germany invaded the USSR.

Regardless of the qualities of the T-34 (hardly a 'war winning tank' thanks in no small part to always sporting a mediocre cannon and routinely faring poorly against Germany's mid-late war tanks & AT guns) it was the logistical impact of Lend Lease on the Soviet war effort that allowed them to push Germany's armed forces all the way back to Berlin by early 1945. The tens of thousands of fighter planes and tanks the Allies gave the Soviet Union were just the tip of the massive iceberg. The Soviet Union received an avalanche of supply trucks (250,000+!), jeeps, cargo aircraft (nearly 20,000 planes of all types!), locomotives (nearly 2000!), rifles, pistols, uniforms, boots, food, etc. Every conceivable bit of material that could be used to wage a modern war was shipped off to the Soviet Union from the USA and UK in bulk quantities.

The Soviets simply didn't appreciate the logistical help from the US & UK, it needed it... desperately. As the saying goes, "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics." On its own Soviet industry was hard pressed to keep pace with its material losses, especially when you consider the degree to which they treated everything in their military (living or not) as being highly expendable. Take away all that logistical aid and suddenly Soviet industry is forced to make everything it needs instead of just concentrating on criticals items. A steady stream of T-34s rolling to the front lines suddenly becomes a trickle.

It is difficult to say exactly how much Lend Lease affected the Soviet war effort but I think it's safe to say it made the difference between say, reaching Poland's border instead of penetrating Germany and besieging Berlin in 1945.

Agreed on the logistics Spino, as I'd pointed to earlier. Brenus, the Russians stopped the Germans more or less unaided by anyone save General Winter. The famous Siberian divisions DID launch a powerful counterattack that pushed the Germans back some distance. However, Hitler's "hold where you are" orders AIDED the Russian attack by limiting the German's preferred method of defense. That counterattack did NOT break the Germans or prevent their ability to wage an offensive campaign as the Caucasus campaign the following summer underlines. Again, I think the Russians had stopped the Germans on their own. After that, the impact of Lend Lease logistics on their ability to become an offensive force is hard to downplay.

Spino: I wouldn't be so harsh against the T-34. I agree that the Russian 76 used by the A-C versions did not keep pace with the German 75s in hitting power, but the tank was reliable as heck, handled miserable conditions well, and the 76 could not be ignored. By the time they had the turret rebuilt around the 85, they had a very useful main battle tank. Certainly it outclassed most of the M4s we sent over there. Yes, German AFVs were consistently better in tank-on-tank engagements, but then again, given the numbers, they simply had to be.

Brenus, the Russians took all the P-39s and P-63s we could give them. Many other non-transport planes sent over there received only a luke-warm reception, but the Aircobra series suited Russian tactical doctrine quite well.

[Fisherking]

@ Brenus


Try not to allow fervent patriotism cloud your judgment too much.

Too many Americans do the same, thinking they won the war single-handed, but it just isn’t so.:shame:

As already pointed out, the US and Britain were supplying the Soviets with money and material from June 1941 until the Japanese Surrender.

Yes the Soviets launched a Counteroffensive in Dec 1941 and it lasted until Apr 1942, and then what happened?

Without the aid what would have happened at Stalingrad? What would 1943 have been with an unsupplied Soviet Army and no allies tying down troop in the West and Med?

Lets just say, since all this is what if, anyway, that Britain made peace and the US didn’t care or was only involved with Japan, what then?

Turkey and Spain would have fallen into the Axis Camp easily enough! Japan’s attack on the US was pretty much because the US was already at war with the Axis anyway…if they were disinterested the Japanese would have just gone on in China and maybe the Soviet Far East. It was something Stalin definitely feared would happen.

Even without that it would mean that Germany would have had no shortage of strategic materials and could receive them from the rest of the world. With an unhampered industrial base and unlimited supplies and the manpower of most of Western Europe there is just no way that the Soviet State of that time could have withstood the Nazis. Its scary but its so!

And this is what you are talking about when you say that the Soviets could have gone it alone!

:yes:

[Sarmatian]

@ Brenus
Try not to allow fervent patriotism cloud your judgment too much.


If he did, that would be the first case of Russian patriotism in a French national :laugh4:

[Brenus]

“hardly a 'war winning tank' thanks in no small part to always sporting a mediocre cannon and routinely faring poorly against Germany's mid-late war tanks & AT guns)” Knowing the T34 A was contemporary of the Pz II and III (equipped with machine gun and 35mm short barrel gun), Matilda, Grant and others Renault FT it is not so bad to succeed until the middle of the war.:beam:
Why don’t you acknowledge that the Pz IV 75 mm was an answer to the T34, which become T84/85 (85 mm). Then the Germans copied and upgraded the model and produced the Panther, and the Tiger.
Knowing as well that the most tanks in the German Army in 1941-mid 1942 were the Pz III and T 35 (Czech).

So according to your criteria, the Panzer III (spear head of the German victories until late Barbarossa) was “hardly a 'war winning tank' thanks in no small part to always sporting a mediocre cannon and routinely faring poorly against Soviet/USA/English's mid-late war tanks & AT guns”.:laugh4:

“it was the logistical impact of Lend Lease”: Bof -in French in the text-. Claim during Cold War and never really established.
The problem is I don’t believe the hundred of thousands planes and tanks provided by the US and UK. I do think it help, especially in holding the Germans, but the real job was done by Russian material for the good reason it was far better than Western Allies one.

“Soviet industry is forced to make everything it needs instead of just concentrating on criticals items” :inquisitive:
And? Their industries was in the Ural mountains, out of reach of German bomber (especially as the German hadn’t Strategic Bombers), oil and mineral were not a problem.
Panzer and I disagree a lot about when the Germans lost the war, but even he never said that supplies were problematic for the Soviets. And they hadn’t to cross an ocean infested by U-boats. Just read about the Grey Wolves and you will see if so much material really reached Russia harbours in the 1941-1943 period of time.
Even UK supplies were in danger.:whip:
So, supplies to Soviet Union arrived largely AFTER the main battles, the one which broke the Germans battle machine.

“IMO, the Germans could have turned things around even as late as '43 had Hitler chosen Manstein's "Backhand Blow" instead of "Citadel".” Don’t think so. But I agree to disagree. I think you over estimate Manstein.:yes:

“the Russians stopped the Germans more or less unaided by anyone save General Winter.”
Seamus, general Winter is neutral and favours only the one prepared to it.
Rokossovsky in his Memoires wrote that the snow SAVED the Germans of a total annihilation.
His explanations are:
Deep snow that even the T34 couldn’t cross gave the upper hand to the German crews, far better trained than the Soviet at this period.
Snow and fog stucked the Stormovik and all the Assault planes on the ground.
It covered and protected their retreat and slow down the Soviet momentum.
And the order by Hitler to hold is recognised today as a good decision which deprived the Soviet of a hot pursuit.
So, when during the Cold War, the Former German Generals blamed Hitler for all bad decisions and pretended they could have won the war… It was a little bit of a lie.

“That counterattack did NOT break the Germans or prevent their ability to wage an offensive campaign as the Caucasus campaign the following summer underlines”: Well, it did as result the Germans never took Moscow.
And in order to wage this offensive which will end in Stalingrad and Crimea, Hitler shifted from Leningrad few Armoured Divisions (saving the town from a direct assault).
It will take more time for the Germans to recover from these loses than for the Russians.
“Yes, German AFVs were consistently better in tank-on-tank engagements, but then again, given the numbers, they simply had to be.” That could be said for the US, English, French or other allies’ crews.
A 88 mm gun engaged all enemy from far and the only way to take them was what did the Russian at Kursk: The shield and Sword tactic: Fox holes (machine-gun, anti-tanks rifles, 47 mm gun etc) which obliged the enemies to use fuel and ammunitions on “light” targets they can’t ignored, then charge and closed combat. The Tigers’ turret electrical motor was too slow and couldn’t cope.

“the Russians took all the P-39s and P-63s we could give them” Yeah, I know that. They did like the 30 mm canon:yes:… Especially used against the Germans tanks…

“the US and Britain were supplying the Soviets with money and material from June 1941” Er, how? The US had no real material and the English had problem in equipping their own armies… Just have a look on the 8th Army’s equipment in Africa, and compare with what the Soviet had: KV2 and T34, or Crusaders and Grant? Lee Enfield or Mosing Nagan?

“Yes the Soviets launched a Counteroffensive in Dec 1941 and it lasted until Apr 1942, and then what happened?” Er, Stalingrad, Leningrad, Sebastopol, Kursk, Karkov, the Germans thanks to good tactic and generals succeeding in defensive battle to slow down the way to defeat, but never again regain the initiative on the Eastern Front.

« Even without that it would mean that Germany would have had no shortage of strategic materials and could receive them from the rest of the world. With an unhampered industrial base and unlimited supplies and the manpower of most of Western Europe there is just no way that the Soviet State of that time could have withstood the Nazis. It’s scary but its so! »
Er, the German industry produced more plane and tanks in 1945 than in 1942 thanks to Albert Speer… Production wasn’t a problem.
And they had the manpower of most of Western Europe and they lost.

They lost because they were not prepared for this after-blitzkrieg: because the material and the German doctrine failed in Russia, because Zhukov and Stalin gain time with the blood of the Red Army and the Russian soldiers.

I think you get me wrong. I have no admiration for Stalin, and I have little sympathy for Zhukov, Krutchev or other Russian Generals. I do like Rokosovsky for his fantastic advance but acknowledge what price the German population paid for this… Even if I know it was a pay-back time, they were brutal, merciless… They gave to the Soviet Union a great victory but what price to pay…
However, I still feel the pride and the joy of the Russian soldier who put the Red Flag on the Reichstag…

Due to Patton’s strategic mistake and rivalry to Monty, the Western Allies were not able to push to Berlin and to gain the upper hand on the Soviet.:beam:

[Seamus Fermanagh]

“the Russians stopped the Germans more or less unaided by anyone save General Winter.”
Seamus, general Winter is neutral and favours only the one prepared to it.
Rokossovsky in his Memoires wrote that the snow SAVED the Germans of a total annihilation.
His explanations are:
Deep snow that even the T34 couldn’t cross gave the upper hand to the German crews, far better trained than the Soviet at this period.
Snow and fog stucked the Stormovik and all the Assault planes on the ground.
It covered and protected their retreat and slow down the Soviet momentum.
And the order by Hitler to hold is recognised today as a good decision which deprived the Soviet of a hot pursuit.
So, when during the Cold War, the Former German Generals blamed Hitler for all bad decisions and pretended they could have won the war… It was a little bit of a lie.

Some truth to that, of course. While more prepared for winter than the Germans, at the worst of it, the winter would have made almost ANY efforts moot.


“That counterattack did NOT break the Germans or prevent their ability to wage an offensive campaign as the Caucasus campaign the following summer underlines”: Well, it did as result the Germans never took Moscow.
And in order to wage this offensive which will end in Stalingrad and Crimea, Hitler shifted from Leningrad few Armoured Divisions (saving the town from a direct assault).
It will take more time for the Germans to recover from these loses than for the Russians.

Agreed, but my point was meant to note that the Dec41-Apr42 Russian offensive was the only one conducted wherein you could argue that Allied lend lease had relatively little impact. My assertion is that, while the Soviet counterattack did put Moscow and its industries "out of reach" more or less permanently, the 41/42 counterattack did more to prevent a German victory than it did to promote a Soviet victory. After that point, the influx of materials from the Western Allies -- notably the logistics tools that were sent over -- materially enhanced the Soviets ability to conduct and sustain an offensive. I would suggest that this capability would not have been so well developed without that aid, as Soviet efforts emphasized munitions and weapons more than logistic components.


“Yes, German AFVs were consistently better in tank-on-tank engagements, but then again, given the numbers, they simply had to be.” That could be said for the US, English, French or other allies’ crews.
A 88 mm gun engaged all enemy from far and the only way to take them was what did the Russian at Kursk: The shield and Sword tactic: Fox holes (machine-gun, anti-tanks rifles, 47 mm gun etc) which obliged the enemies to use fuel and ammunitions on “light” targets they can’t ignored, then charge and closed combat. The Tigers’ turret electrical motor was too slow and couldn’t cope.

German AFVs outclassed those fielded by the US/UK/FF forces from about 10/42 through late 1944 and arguably later. Our best AT weapons -- the British 16lbr and the US 90mm -- really only performed as well or better than their German counterparts while using the comparitively rare and expensive sabot ammo. The t34/85 was equal or superior to anything fielded by the USA prior to the M-26 and the M4 was (at best) comparable to a t34/76c....and arguably not as good.


“the US and Britain were supplying the Soviets with money and material from June 1941” Er, how? The US had no real material and the English had problem in equipping their own armies… Just have a look on the 8th Army’s equipment in Africa, and compare with what the Soviet had: KV2 and T34, or Crusaders and Grant? Lee Enfield or Mosing Nagan?

Support early on was more monetary than anything else -- though as Thucydides and others have asserted, money is a pretty useful war tool -- measurable physical support in terms of trucks equipment and the like ramped up significantly after the start of 1942.

[Brenus]

“Our best AT weapons -- the British 16lbr and the US 90mm”: Yeap. And the question is why the British never used this great AA gun against tanks and, as the Germans did with the 88mm.
The British tanks, I think until the Churchill, were always under gun.

“though as Thucydides and others have asserted, money is a pretty useful war tool”: I often refer to Philipp of Macedonia: Make a hole in the wall big enough for a donkey loaded with gold and the town is yours…:beam:

[PanzerJaeger]

“IMO, the Germans could have turned things around even as late as '43 had Hitler chosen Manstein's "Backhand Blow" instead of "Citadel".” Don’t think so. But I agree to disagree. I think you over estimate Manstein.:yes:

I'm surprised we agree on so much considering some of the our past discussions. :beam:

IMO, Manstein was one of the best, if not the greatest military mind of the 20th century. He was at the forefront of post-Blitzkrieg thinking which, as you mentioned, some of the German leadership had difficulty with. You'd be loathe to find that kind of strategic and tactical depth in the doctrine and leadership of today's most advanced militaries - despite both the Russian and American military's in depth research on him after the war.

It is important to note that the German forces in the East in '43 were still a force to be reckoned with. The Soviets were just as badly mauled after Stalingrad as the Germans, if not more so, and - more importantly - were still wholly inferior to the Germans in tactical skill. For example, under strength 11th Panzer Division destroyed an entire Soviet Tank Army by itself, as did 6th Panzer Division in the fighting to relieve the city.

Most people assume that the war in the East turned at Stalingrad. However, Manstein's "counterstroke" during February and March of '43 regained the German initiative going into the optimal summer months for the Germans.

Kursk saw the greatest build up of German armored forces - specifically the "big cats" - of the war. (Although the Panther A's have been much maligned due to their mechanical issues, they were still effective.) Despite being sent against extremely well prepared defenses, they were still able to punch through in many areas and came close to victory. Although he was strongly against the attack, Manstein disagreed with calling it off as he believed he had achieved local superiority.

IMO, "Backhand Blow" could have completely turned the situation in the East on its head, as it was exactly what the Russians were not expecting. Whereas Kursk went against everything the Germans had learned about offensive operations, "Backhand" would have employed that massive buildup of German forces not in a slug match with the well entrenched positions of a numerically superior enemy, but in a way that would have taken advantage of the German strengths in maneuver and tactical ability.



“the Russians stopped the Germans more or less unaided by anyone save General Winter.”
Seamus, general Winter is neutral and favours only the one prepared to it.
Rokossovsky in his Memoires wrote that the snow SAVED the Germans of a total annihilation.
His explanations are:
Deep snow that even the T34 couldn’t cross gave the upper hand to the German crews, far better trained than the Soviet at this period.
Snow and fog stucked the Stormovik and all the Assault planes on the ground.
It covered and protected their retreat and slow down the Soviet momentum.

While it is true that the snow hindered both sides, Rokossavsky tends to exaggerate. Although I'm sure he'd like us to believe that he would have been able to lead his troops in an annihilation of the German forces had the snow not kept him down, that simply is not reality. Even with the vaunted Siberian divisions, the Russian military was in no position to do such a thing in the winter of '41. They were only as successful as they were due more to poor German planning (both in the winter clothing issues and the overstretching of their forces) than their own ability.



And the order by Hitler to hold is recognised today as a good decision which deprived the Soviet of a hot pursuit.
So, when during the Cold War, the Former German Generals blamed Hitler for all bad decisions and pretended they could have won the war… It was a little bit of a lie.

That’s debatable. There are both advantages and disadvantages to both scenarios. For example, it has been postulated that had the Germans pulled the Russians into that "hot pursuit", they would have been over-stretched and out of steam by the next summer - just in time for a crushing offensive.

In any event, although the German commanders did like to place all blame at the feet of Hitler to gloss over their own shortcomings, in many cases their contempt was well placed. His interference bungled many an operation.

[Brenus]

“I'm surprised we agree on so much considering some of the our past discussions.” I agree to disagree, no more…:laugh4:

“were still wholly inferior to the Germans in tactical skill” Yeap, no question about this.
As you mentioned about Air Forces, the Germans couldn’t afford loses in good and well trained troops and crew.
So it became asymmetric: More the Germans were losing well trained people and had to recruit younger and older people, better the Russians (or others) became.

“Manstein disagreed with calling it off as he believed he had achieved local superiority.” Hitler HAD to pull off the attack. He needed the Panzer for Italy…
And Manstein just refuse to acknowledge his success was absolutely nothing if you considered the depth of the Russian lines…
Again, without a proper prepared material, the German troopers did miracle. However, the Russian stiff and heroic resistance first put a halt in the advance, then came the counter-offensive…
Hitler and Stalin were both bloody dictators, and living under one or others is not really a choice. However, Stalin had more common sense and agreed with his generals about:
Germans soldiers better trained
New German tanks superior to Russian Y34.
So they built a war tactic around these 2 facts.
So priority was given to artillery, and closed combat… Don’t try very complex well timing operations, go simple…

“they were still able to punch through in many areas and came close to victory.” Never. They had perhaps a light chance to reach the first defence line (and even not sure they can break through) but how many lines were built?
No, Kursk was the definitive answer to what was left from the blitzkrieg. It was a good answer against the French and British but lesson from the campaign of France were not learned.
The French resistance in the last day was better. I don’t have time to research the name of the battle, but 2 infantry division helped by very well organised artillery just obliged to Pz divisions to withdraw, this even with the full and complete German Air Superiority.
But due to the taste of the quite unexpected and quick victory, the Germans didn’t see it and forget it… But it was a taste of what will come…

« Rokossovsky tends to exaggerate » Yeap. Of course. But so did the Germans generals… However, this arguments hold water… And he never admitt to be always under Zukhov any way...:beam:
History is written not by victors, but by survivors…

“they would have been over-stretched and out of steam” They did.
The initial plan was to push the Germans out of Moscow. But Stalin, enthusiastic about the result, order to push over, so momentum was lost, German sense of organisation, better trained soldiers and soviet overstretch logistic lines did the job…

“His interference bungled many an operation” Indeed. However, and I am not a Hitler defender, most of his decision were politically motivated, or more geographical-strategically motivated. Oil field and natural resources grabbing…
Apparently Kursk was planned as secret negotiations were held for a peace treaty between Russia and Germany. To show to Stalin that Germany still had teeth… It failed because Stalin wanted a return to the borders of 1941…
Imagine his Hitler agreed…

[PanzerJaeger]

“Manstein disagreed with calling it off as he believed he had achieved local superiority.” Hitler HAD to pull off the attack. He needed the Panzer for Italy…

It would have taken 3 months for a panzer division to reach Italy, far too long to effect the situation one way or another. Although he initially ordered the entirety of the SS to Italy, only SS-LAH ended up on a train - without its equipment.


“they were still able to punch through in many areas and came close to victory.” Never. They had perhaps a light chance to reach the first defence line (and even not sure they can break through) but how many lines were built?

IIRC, there were 5 main defensive lines, the first and second being the strongest and the fourth and fifth being left undefended - essentially fall back positions.

In the North, Model only managed to break into the first line due to logistical hang ups and massive Soviet artillery barrages which caused his forces to be committed piecemeal and not decisively. However, in the South Manstein was able to break the first and second line and came close to piercing through the third. In the last two lines, the Russians would not have had the heavy weaponry available to them that they had in the first lines. What is important to remember is that only one of the pincers needed to be successful in order to break the salient, as the Germans would then be able to operate freely behind to Soviet lines. Also remember that the Germans destroyed an immensely disproportionate amount of armor, which was critical in the central sector.

[Fisherking]

I know I shouldn‘t bother with this topic any more because it is difficult to have a discussion when only one side is listening.

Some refuse to look at facts and reasonable arguments or do their own research, while taking assertions out of context in order to bolster their arguments.

It is not my part to Win Arguments, but rather to discuss the History and it implications.

With that in mind, here is some information on Allied aid to the Soviets in WWII and why I feel it was necessary to Russia in their war effort over Nazi Germany.



Lend-Lease
Delivery was via the Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route. The Pacific Route was used for about half of Lend-Lease aid: by convoy from the US west coast to the Soviet Far East, via Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian railway. After America’s entry in the war, only Soviet (or Soviet-flagged) ships were used, and there was some interference by Japan with them. The Alaska-Siberia Air Route, known as Alsib, was used for air deliveries and passengers from 7 October 1942.

Persian Corridor http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Corridor


Much of the aid can be better understood when considering the economic distortions caused by the war. Most belligerent powers cut back on production of nonessentials severely, concentrating on producing weapons. This inevitably produced shortages of related products needed by the military or as part of the military/industrial economy.
For example, the USSR was highly dependent on trains, yet the desperate need to produce weapons meant that only about 92 locomotives were produced in the USSR during the entire war. In this context, the supply of 1,981 US locomotives can be better understood. Likewise, the Soviet air force was enhanced by 18,700 aircraft, which amounted to about 14% of Soviet aircraft production (19% for military aircraft).
Although most Red Army tank units were equipped with Soviet-built tanks, their logistical support was provided by hundreds of thousands of US-made trucks. Indeed by 1945 nearly two-thirds of the truck strength of the Red Army was U.S.-built. Trucks such as the Dodge ¾ ton and Studebaker 2.5 ton, were easily the best trucks available in their class on either side on the Eastern Front. US supplies of telephone cable, aluminum, canned rations and fur boots were also critical, the latter providing a crucial advantage in the winter defense of Moscow.Lend Lease was a critical factor that brought the US into the war, especially on the European front. Hitler cited the Lend-Lease program and its significance in aiding the Allied war effort when he declared war on the US on 11 December 1941.


Book & Review:

Russia's Life-saver: Lend-lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II


Thomas Titura (Traisen, Austria)
Important facts about US aid to Stalin's Soviet Union, 28 Jun 2004
The long-time observer and analyst of the Soviet Union, Prof. Weeks, documents an important chapter of US and Soviet history during World War II.
Based on the latest research from Russia, Weeks presents new findings about the vital importance of US aid to the Soviet Union under Dictator Joseph Stalin. Under the Soviet Regime, especially during Stalin's life-time, it was a rule to ignore or at least downplay the significance of any foreign aid to the Soviet victory in World War II. But the facts that Prof. Weeks is able to present to the Western reader demonstrate that the opposite is true. Weeks cites a recent statement by President Putin, who officially acknowledged the vital importance of US Lend-Lease deliveries for the Soviet victory in World War II.
Weeks uses research by post-Soviet scholars in Russia that clearly shows the crucial importance of Lend-Lease deliveries to Stalin's USSR. There are many facts and statistics about the amount of American aid to Russia that will be new to most readers. But Prof. Weeks doesn't stop there, he also paints a lively picture of the political developments leading to the decision of President Roosevelt to come to the rescue of the bloodiest Dictator of the 20th century, Joseph Stalin, in his fight against his opponent and recent collaborator, Hitler.
Prof. Weeks also demonstrates that Stalin was actively working through the channels of his espionage agencies to influence the US administration to deliver material aid to the USSR (he cites the Venona decrypts and material from Russia, most notably the NKVD's "Operation Snow"). It becomes clear that the large-scale infiltration of various US government branches by the Soviet espionage agencies played an important role in the speedy decision to send vast amounts of military and civilian goods to Stalin's Soviet Union. Stalin also ordered his agents to obtain military secrets from the US, both before and during the war, even when the Soviet Union was a nominal ally of the US.
At times, aid to the USSR was even given preference over aid to Britain by President Roosevelt. Roosevelt's dubious and naïve role in his dealings with Stalin is presented in some detail as well.
Weeks also shows that Stalin always rightly understood the might and potential of the American economic power. US technical assistance had already played a major role in the mechanisation of both Soviet agriculture and the Red Army. Stalin has been able to use the huge "tractor factories", built with the help of Ford, among others, to establish the necessary industrial base for the mechanisation of his huge tank forces before the outbreak of the Second World War.
The excellent mastery of both Russian and Soviet history allows the author to put the history of Lend-Lease into the wider context of American-Russian and American-Soviet political and economic relations, starting in Tsarist times.
After presenting Stalin's offensive war plans against Hitler in his equally superb book "Stalin's Other War. Soviet Grand Strategy 1939-45", Weeks again delivers important historical facts and puts them into proper context.
Despite the amount of data (quite rightfully) used in the book, Weeks' writing style makes reading about this often neglected aspect of history easy.
For any serious student of US-Soviet war-time relations, this is a must-read.
German offencive operations did not ceise until after Kursk in 1943, long after US entry into the war and long after the effects of lend-lease had made their effects felt.

German forces were being tied down in the west and troops where on the ground in the Mediterranean.

Had those forces been available on the Eastern Front it is reasonable if not provable that a German Summer Offensive in1943 would have succeeded in again pushing the Soviets farther east, just as they had done in the past two summers.