Conditions for the US forces in Afghanistan

[m52nickerson]

This is what a US fire base in Afghanistan.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/27304836#27284450

That is why we are failing there.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

This is what a US fire base in Afghanistan.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/27304836#27284450

That is why we are failing there.

I don't read that as negatively as do you. However, let us assume you are correct. What should be done to enhance success chances?

btw, this really isn't election analysis, per se, so you may see your post and mine split off by the watchful kukri.

[Banquo's Ghost]

Or indeed, his less attentive but cuddlier sidekick. :beam:

Please continue the discussion in this thread.

:bow:

[Husar]

Well, for a start, it might make sense to either retreat from there and fight elsewhere or send more soldiers and equipment in and clean the area.
But one thing made me wonder, first the Taliban are hard to spot even when they fire at the camp they say and later it's hard to move around unnoticed in the area? :inquisitive:

[Mikeus Caesar]

In a region like that, it's not exactly a case of instantly winning. In other parts of Afghanistan, other forces are doing moderately better because the terrain is different i.e Helmand, which isn't so mountainous or full of trees, where the British use constantly moving convoys as a method of fighting.

[spmetla]

But one thing made me wonder, first the Taliban are hard to spot even when they fire at the camp they say and later it's hard to move around unnoticed in the area? :inquisitive:

That's because coalition forces usually go around in vehicles. Do to the lack of political will to send more forces to Afghanistan as well sustain heavy casualties there are not enough soldiers to send as dismounted infantry to comb the hills for the enemy and root them out. Instead we generally patrol in armored vehicles on various roads and trails which are naturally ease to monitor.

[PanzerJaeger]

Not sure how that's "failing", but it is an example of the typical near-clueless war reporting done by a lot of these jokers..

[rory_20_uk]

The locals don't seem to want us there. I don't see why we are. If we've got limited interests to protect we should look after them and disregard the rest of the country.

If the locals are prepared to fight for their own country then it's worth helping them. Currently I don't see the point.

~:smoking:

[rvg]

We need to resurrect General Sherman and place him in charge of the Afghan campaign.

[Husar]

That's because coalition forces usually go around in vehicles. Do to the lack of political will to send more forces to Afghanistan as well sustain heavy casualties there are not enough soldiers to send as dismounted infantry to comb the hills for the enemy and root them out. Instead we generally patrol in armored vehicles on various roads and trails which are naturally ease to monitor.

Thanks, but in the video they say they cannot use vehicles in the hills there so they walk around on foot, meaning your explanation doesn't apply to the example/problem at hand. ~;)
But I agree with you that they should send more than 20 guys and a toilet there if they ever want to make progress.

[spmetla]

Missed that, guess your right. Then again it's probably not too difficult for the enemy to have some guy watch the FOB and tell the others when a patrol leaves. To clear the mountains it'd probably take a few battalions of light infantry with plenty of aerial resupply and fire support, that is if the enemy would actually fight instead of fade away into the local population.

So long as there aren't enough soldiers to be able to prevent attacks against their own FOBs and clear out the surrounding hillsides then there is no way that the locals will side with the US. If it appears that we can't stop them from harassing our FOBs then why would local villager risk his life and that of his family to oppose the Taliban when he knows we can't protect the village. We need a lot more troops to do the job right.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

We need to resurrect General Sherman and place him in charge of the Afghan campaign.

Catch-22. Yes, those tactics are the ones most likely to work (note our experience in the Phillipines in 1900-1905), but the harshness of such an approach, and the inevitable number of innocents harmed as a byproduct, would have a lot of "blowback" issues as well.

The world has changed, and such an approach is no longer acceptable for a Western power.