WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military [Archive]

PanzerJaeger

02-01-2009, 23:45

This is a thread to discuss the composition and capabilities of the Japanese military forces during WW2.

I have not spent nearly as much time reading about the Pacific Theatre as the European one, and the Japanese have always been slightly perplexing to me. Two general narratives seem to have emerged surrounding their forces in historical literature. I have seen them portrayed as an advanced military with an emphasis on technology, training, and daring new doctrines. In contrast, they have also been depicted as an almost primitive force – relying on outdated weaponry (including swords) and the suicidal dedication of their troops instead of proper tactics (Banzai charges).

And it seems history bears both representations out. In the beginning of their conflict with Western powers, Japan was unquestionably dominant – in the air, land and sea, kicking the colonial powers around at will. Their emphasis on combined arms tactics (air + land, not so much armor) on land rivaled the Germans, while their carrier-born naval operations were far beyond their counterparts. This all seems to have culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor – an excellently planned and executed attack utilizing (for the time) advanced carrier, air, and torpedo technology along with highly trained personnel.

From there, however, it all seems to have gone downhill. Besides some notably good late war airplane designs and other advanced tech that never made it into production, Japanese weaponry seemed to lacked updates throughout the war – including small arms, artillery, and ships. More importantly, Japanese tactics and training seemed to drop off both severely and quickly.

As opposed to the Germans who arguably maintained a technological and tactical lead on their adversaries throughout the war and were at least able to keep their troops adequately trained during the latter years, the Japanese seemed to have been quickly outclassed by their American (& Allied) counterparts and forced to resort to the suicidal tactics mentioned above. Witness the air battles around the Marianas, where the Japanese did have significant numbers of decent aircraft yet no skilled pilots; or the many island battles where American casualties were just a fraction of their Japanese rivals.

Finally, Japanese grand strategy during the war seems questionable to me. It seems to have revolved around risky resource grabs with no real coherent and cohesive overall goal other than the creation of a vague co-prosperity sphere. To that note, was the attack on the United States necessary? I know it was based largely on the oil embargo, but was there no other way to secure those resources? Even if the US had sued for peace, it does not seem like that would have guaranteed a lifting of said embargo – as the Japanese were never truly able to threaten the continental US.

It is obvious looking back that the Japanese were destined to lose WW2 based on their industrial capacity, and much of the reason for their military’s sad state of affairs later in the war was due to that reality, but it seems to me that their leadership made some odd and/or poor decisions, and their once dominant capabilities fell disproportionately fast.

What do you think?

(Some interesting pics i found... )

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/b17.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/b3.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/bat1.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/t7.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/t9.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/t2.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/si1.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/si5.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/si2.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/si6.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/p7.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/o7.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/g6.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/g7.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/hk5.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/ma3.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/ma2.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/m7_608.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/m6_432.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/m4_102.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/m14_162.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/g31.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/g3.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/de7.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/de9.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/de6.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/de5.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/g16.jpg

Spoils...

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/cars_hk.jpg

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/cars_sing.jpg

Strike For The South

02-02-2009, 00:08

I agree. The Japanese original goal was to sue for peace once they took resource rich regions. They were not dumb they knew they had limitations. However the oil embargo forced there hand. In a best case scenario they wanted to cripple the pacific fleet and make the "weak" Americans open the spigot again.

They lost there best pilots at midway and never were able to train enough again (hence the kamakazie tactics) The zero was a dang fine plane they just never really improved on it.

Towards the end the Japanese were still hoping that the island hopping casualties would make America come to the table and they may have been right. Truman and his brain trust were arguing about the invasion. Then of course came the bomb.

The Japanese were a good honorable enemy. But in the end the Americans simply buried them.

CBR

02-02-2009, 00:12

All the resources they needed were located in non-US colonies so technically they did not have to attack USA. Problem was if USA was going to allow that. If not then USA both had a strong navy as well as the bases to strike back from.

So in short term it made sense to attack USA right away, deal a blow to their navy and quickly take the Philippines.

The big flaw was of course that they expected that USA would either sue for peace or that Japan had the capability to defend against the full might of a USA gearing up for war. I guess they expected it to be a similar situation as the war against Russia back in 1904-05.

CBR

Sarmatian

02-02-2009, 02:46

I have similar opinion as CBR.

I just don't understand one thing - why didn't they attack Soviet Union? Ok, they were trounced in 1939, but in in 1941 Soviets were taking a heavy beating from Germany. Wouldn't it be smarter to attack them and possibly delay American entry in the war? It would be naive to think that US would stay out of the war entirely but this could have bought months. Soviets were already pressed to their limits in Europe, no chance they could reinforce Far East and at the same time Germans might have reached Moscow...

The other interesting what if is what would have happened if carriers were at Pearl Harbour...

CBR

02-02-2009, 03:13

IIRC oil was running out so a delay would only have hurt Japan. Attacking the Soviets would also not really have benefited Japan in any way so why break the non-aggression treaty. Although I don't know how many troops were left in the far east, but in the few border skirmishes they had in the late thirties the Japanese army showed some big weaknesses so why take risks for no real benefit.

One interesting scenario would have been if Japan did not attack USA. Could Roosevelt even get involved and declare war when America was not even interested in Europe. Even if they had and the war was long, how many losses would the public be willing to take and just how many warbonds would they have bought?

CBR

Seamus Fermanagh

02-02-2009, 05:03

The Japanese were a good honorable enemy. But in the end the Americans simply buried them.

Their treatment of prisoners or war was repulsive as was their treatment of the Chinese people and many others. The disdain which too many Japanese of the era heaped upon anyone who was of a differing ethnicity darkens their honor.

U.S. forces not only buried them logistically ( as we had Germany) but unlike the war in Europe we outclassed them in almost all categories from Late 1943 on.

Strike For The South

02-02-2009, 05:14

Their treatment of prisoners or war was repulsive as was their treatment of the Chinese people and many others. The disdain which too many Japanese of the era heaped upon anyone who was of a differing ethnicity darkens their honor.

U.S. forces not only buried them logistically ( as we had Germany) but unlike the war in Europe we outclassed them in almost all categories from Late 1943 on.

Tough may have been a better word. I agree there is no love lost here. Many a granddad and great uncle have told me some horror stories.

Apparently the Koreans wern't much better (according to my elders)

Lord Winter

02-02-2009, 07:25

One interesting scenario would have been if Japan did not attack USA. Could Roosevelt even get involved and declare war when America was not even interested in Europe. Even if they had and the war was long, how many losses would the public be willing to take and just how many warbonds would they have bought?

CBR

As I understand, realations were already at a resounding low right before pearl harbor. Everyone knew that war was coming it was just a matter of who started it and when.

seireikhaan

02-02-2009, 08:20

I'll stick my :2cents: in.

It was pretty clear that the Japanese didn't have the resources to compete in a one vs one with the United States, never mind local resistances that needed to be put down, or the efforts put forth by the Commonwealth states. They couldn't afford to put forth extensive training, by all accounts. Perhaps it was the constant series of wars that had been gradually killing off their more skilled soldiery, and an inability, be it real or perceived, to put forth the resources needed to train skilled soldiers. As pointed out, the combat abilities of their pilots by late in the war were shockingly awful to anyone who had observed their campaigns over the last half-century. Particularly when oil is in short supply, it makes it extremely tough to get a lot of pilots the training needed to compete with the Allied pilots. So, basically, they stopped trying and did the most(kamikaze bombings) with what they felt they could hope to achieve.

As for the bit about attacking the Soviets- for what? Japan had already seized Manchuria, and most of East Russia just frankly isn't worth picking a fight over, unless Tojo really fancied a summer vacation home in Siberia...

EDIT: for the sake of scrolling sanity, could we get the pictures put in spoils?

PanzerJaeger

02-02-2009, 11:06

It was pretty clear that the Japanese didn't have the resources to compete in a one vs one with the United States, never mind local resistances that needed to be put down, or the efforts put forth by the Commonwealth states. They couldn't afford to put forth extensive training, by all accounts. Perhaps it was the constant series of wars that had been gradually killing off their more skilled soldiery, and an inability, be it real or perceived, to put forth the resources needed to train skilled soldiers. As pointed out, the combat abilities of their pilots by late in the war were shockingly awful to anyone who had observed their campaigns over the last half-century. Particularly when oil is in short supply, it makes it extremely tough to get a lot of pilots the training needed to compete with the Allied pilots. So, basically, they stopped trying and did the most(kamikaze bombings) with what they felt they could hope to achieve.

It seems the Japanese must have had an extremely small cadre of very well trained pilots. From what I've been reading, Guadalcanal took most of them.

I know that the Germans had a controversial system that kept their aces in the air, instead of rotating them back for training purposes like the Allies(and war bond sales :beam:). I can only assume the Japanese had the same setup. Even in '45, though, the Germans were still able to field a powerful and effective air corps. (Baseplate)

What is really interesting to me is how fast the Japanese deteriorated. It seems like almost within a year to a year and a half they completely expended all of their best forces. They had excellent naval, air, and ground forces - yet, seemingly, no effort was made to replace them. Resources, resources...

As for the bit about attacking the Soviets- for what? Japan had already seized Manchuria, and most of East Russia just frankly isn't worth picking a fight over, unless Tojo really fancied a summer vacation home in Siberia...

Well, the Siberian divisions that stopped the Germans at the outskirts of Moscow were pulled from the border with Manchuria. It can be argued that, had the Axis coordinated their efforts better and been able to knock Russia out of the war, Japan would have benefitted from German support.

As CBR said, it could have been disastrous for the Japanese. It may have been worth it to open a second from against Russia, however.

EDIT: for the sake of scrolling sanity, could we get the pictures put in spoils?

Good idea! :oops:

CBR

02-02-2009, 14:28

It seems the Japanese must have had an extremely small cadre of very well trained pilots. From what I've been reading, Guadalcanal took most of them.

I know that the Germans had a controversial system that kept their aces in the air, instead of rotating them back for training purposes like the Allies(and war bond sales :beam:). I can only assume the Japanese had the same setup. Even in '45, though, the Germans were still able to field a powerful and effective air corps. (Baseplate)

What is really interesting to me is how fast the Japanese deteriorated. It seems like almost within a year to a year and a half they completely expended all of their best forces. They had excellent naval, air, and ground forces - yet, seemingly, no effort was made to replace them. Resources, resources...

I'd say Bodenplatte showed Luftwaffe for what it was in early '45: an empty shell of what it had been earlier in the war.

Midway and the horrible attrition of Guadalcanal took out lots of Japanese veterans so within around 15 months from Pearl Harbor the Japanese airforce had deteriorated fast. But the Luftwaffe experience was very similar actually. Sure it had been fighting for much longer and had taken losses but it was nothing compared to what it experienced in 1943 when it finally faced increasing allied superiority on all 3 fronts, especially from the summer 1943 where Luftwaffe ended up quitting most of its Mediterranean and Eastern Front fighter activity and focused on protecting Germany.

So already by the end of 1943 Luftwaffe was in a pretty desperate state, with average monthly losses of around 10+ % of ready fighter pilots, and during the first half of 1944 pilot losses quickly rose to 20+ % a month.

So both the German and Japanese airforce was wrecked in a year or so when USA entered the two theaters of war. Neither of them were prepared for such attrition and they could not replace the losses.

Although I don't have actual numbers, I could imagine that the Luftwaffe had a slight advantage as fighters shot down near a frontline or over Germany had a higher chance of not being lost whereas the Japanese fight over Guadalcanal meant a near 100% pilot loss for every plane shot down.

CBR

lars573

02-02-2009, 17:28

It seems the Japanese must have had an extremely small cadre of very well trained pilots. From what I've been reading, Guadalcanal took most of them.

I know that the Germans had a controversial system that kept their aces in the air, instead of rotating them back for training purposes like the Allies(and war bond sales :beam:). I can only assume the Japanese had the same setup. Even in '45, though, the Germans were still able to field a powerful and effective air corps. (Baseplate)

What is really interesting to me is how fast the Japanese deteriorated. It seems like almost within a year to a year and a half they completely expended all of their best forces. They had excellent naval, air, and ground forces - yet, seemingly, no effort was made to replace them. Resources, resources...

Well, the Siberian divisions that stopped the Germans at the outskirts of Moscow were pulled from the border with Manchuria. It can be argued that, had the Axis coordinated their efforts better and been able to knock Russia out of the war, Japan would have benefitted from German support.

As CBR said, it could have been disastrous for the Japanese. It may have been worth it to open a second from against Russia, however.

Good idea! :oops:
Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the man who planned the Pearl Harbour attack. Knew full well what Japan's limitations were (time and resources, oil chiefly). He was of the opinion that Japan must defeat the US in 1 years time or they'd be finished. He also predicted that the decisive battle to decide whose way things would go would come in 6 months from Pearl Harbour. We call this the battle of Midway. And he also opined that to win against the US they would have to dictate terms from Washington DC.

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians.. [who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war].. have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.

He had studied at U.S. Naval War College and Harvard University. He knew the US pretty well.

The only way the Japanese could have helped Germany against the Soviets would be if they weren't engaged in a full scale (but undeclared) war with China. Japan's Chinese front had something like 3 million troops.

seireikhaan

02-02-2009, 17:30

Well, the Siberian divisions that stopped the Germans at the outskirts of Moscow were pulled from the border with Manchuria. It can be argued that, had the Axis coordinated their efforts better and been able to knock Russia out of the war, Japan would have benefitted from German support.

As CBR said, it could have been disastrous for the Japanese. It may have been worth it to open a second from against Russia, however.
The point, however, is this: when it comes down to it, Russia is simply too big. Let's Japan occupies half of Siberia. And? How does this knock the Soviets out? At this point, Siberia is vast, sparsely populated, industrially desolate, and the winter can kill you. Russia could afford to temporarily fork over large amounts of their eastern lands if it meant having to shift troops to stop the Germans. It would take at least two years of campaigning for the Japanese to put any actual, meaningful pressure on the Soviets. To make the campaign westwards means one of two things: a four month per year campaign through Siberia, whereupon the campaign would have to cease due to inclement weather, or else to trudge through the Gobi desert, which would likely be more disastrous. Simply put, it wouldn't have been possible to be able to apply real and meaningful pressure in time due to the sheer logistical nightmare it would have presented to any invading force.

Sarmatian

02-02-2009, 21:42

Soviets intended to use those forces against the Japanese should they attack. Only after spies confirmed Japan won't attack were those forced moved. So, in theory, just by pinning down Siberian divisions Japan could have helped Germany a lot.

Other points still stand, though. Although it may have helped Germany, there would have been little gain for Japan. Maybe if Germans managed to take Moscow in the spring and if Soviet Union capitulated, but that is highly unlikely.

PanzerJaeger

02-02-2009, 21:48

I'd say Bodenplatte showed Luftwaffe for what it was in early '45: an empty shell of what it had been earlier in the war.

Well, yes and no.

Baseplate was certainly not short on the errors and inexperience that would be associated with the attritional nature of the latter part of the war that you mentioned. The precision of the planning and the skill of many of the pilots involved could definitely be described as a shell of former Luftwaffe operations, as well.

However, Baseplate was a tactical success. Was it the kind of massively lopsided victory the German air corps had grown accustomed to in their heyday? No, but it was a success nonetheless. Despite its numerous problems at this stage, the Luftwaffe was able to plan and execute a powerful strike against the far superior Allied air forces. IIRC, the Allies lost around 500 planes while the Germans lost only half that number, and a large portion of that was due to friendly fire losses due to a failure to alert the flak batteries that German planes would be flying over them. Had American manufacturing not have been so overwhelmingly superior, such a loss would have been a major blow to the Allied air corps - achieved 4 months before the war in Europe was over.

Contrast that to the Japanese operations at the time, which seemingly revolved around the best ways in which to hurl their planes into American ships. That relates back to my original sense that the Japanese deterioration was suprisingly acute.

The point, however, is this: when it comes down to it, Russia is simply too big. Let's Japan occupies half of Siberia. And? How does this knock the Soviets out?

Well, conceivably the effect would be cumulative. Russia was not the monolithic giant with endless supplies of men and material that it is sometimes portrayed to be. Just like any nation, the USSR had its limit - as has been discussed recently in relation to Lend-Lease. In 1941, its breaking point was surely smaller than in the years after.

It can be argued that had Japan applied pressure in the East at that critical time, allowing Germany to take Moscow and the other major cities and push the Russians behind the Urals, they're capabilities would largely be diminished.

Surely Stalin may have been able to use the vastness of the environment to elude total defeat for a time, but even with as much Russian industry as he was able to move - being trapped in the middle of undeveloped Russia would have him strangled for resources and the ability to launch offensive operations.

In any event, I believe better coordination between the two powers leading to a Japanese attack on Russia would have been a far better decision for the overall Axis effort than bringing the US into the war. Of course, taking their entire fleet into the middle of the Pacific and scuttling it would have also been a far better decision than bringing the US in, so hindsight is 20/20. :beam:

PanzerJaeger

02-02-2009, 22:09

An interesting, yet generalized, article on the Japanese marines, who made life very difficult on Tarawa. If anybody has anything more specific on the SNLF's, it would be much appreciated.

http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/SNLF.html

The SNLFs in combat 1941-1945

In December 1941 several Special Naval Landing Forces participated in the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, and especially the multiple landing operations aimed at the main northern island of Luzon. The naval command had created the "Sasebo Combined Naval Landing Force" by grouping together the 1st and 2nd Sasebo SNLF's, under the command of Navy Commander Kunizo Mori. From this formation 490 men were put ashore with the first wave in Lamon Bay, while another 490 first occupied Batan Island in the Luzon Strait, then moved on (accompanied by a seaplane tender) to land on Camiguin Island, where the Japanese intended to establish a base for their floatplanes. However, the seas surrounding the island were found to be too rough for operating the seaplanes, and so the force was withdrawn to Formosa.

The main Luzon landing at Legaspi had 575 men from the 1st Kure SNLF in its forefront. Another 245 men of the 1st Kure accompanied the third Luzon landing at Davao, and then reboarded their ships and occuppied Jolo Island. The 2nd Yokosuka SNLF acted in a conventional amphibious role to occupy Calayan Island in the Luzon Strait, where the Japanese hastily hacked out a small emergency landing strip, before returning to their base on Formosa. A smaller, more improvised SNLF known as the Amatsukaze SNLF-- organized from shipboard marine contingents from the cruiser Jintsu and the destroyer Kuroshio, and composed of less than 30 men-- also landed in the Davao area, its mission to release Japanese civilians who had been interned by the Filipinos. It set 29 Japanese nationals free. A day earlier the Bandasan SNLF, comprising about 60 men from the same two ships, also landed at Davao with the same intent, and "liberated" two locations where Japanese had been interned, rescuing a total of 435 Japanese civilians. But these ad hoc landing forces were not really in the same category as the standard SNLF's, and were essentially one-shot expedients scared up to deal with a specific situation [ 1 ].

Meanwhile, also in December 1941, the Maizuru Independent SNLF Company provided 350 men (plus one company of 6th Base Force with 310 men) to attack the US Pacific outpost of Wake Island. When the first assault was repulsed by the determined resistance of the small US Marine garrison there, reinforcements from the 2nd Maizuru SNLF, which had been part of the garrison force at the Japanese Navy's main central Pacific base of Truk, were sent in to finally overwhelm the outnumbered Americans and secure the island.

Operations aimed against Dutch East Indies and the great oil supplies Japan coveted also began in December 1941, and again the Special Naval Landing Forces were in the forefront. The 2nd Yokosuka SNLF naval infantrymen came in by boat to land at Miri in British Borneo, and within two and a half hours had secured its objective, the Lutong oil refinery. Eight days later elements of the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF carried out another landing at Kuching, the main port of south Borneo. The 1st and 2nd Kure, 1st and 2nd Sasebo, and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Yokosuka SNLF's were all detailed for the prolonged Indonesian operations. In January 1942, the 2nd Kure SNLF (along with one Army regiment) landed at Tarakan Island, Borneo. As related in the previous post concerning airborne operations, the 1st Yokosuka SNLF paratroopers carried out Japan's first ever combat air drop at Menado on Celebes, on January 11th. Four hours before the airborne landings, the 1st Sasebo SNLF had come ashore by sea a bit further north. Later in the month, 1st Kure SNLF occupied Amboina Island, site of an important airfield. Finally, in late February 1942, the Sasebo Combined Special Naval Landing Force were landed amphibiously and fought as ground troops in the battle for Koepang on Timor Island. Several days before the 3rd Yokosuka SNLF (a naval parachute unit) was airdropped at Koepang, suffering heavy casualties in the forthcoming battles.

The early successes of the SNLF's led to the creation of further such units, although it is possible that some drop-off in quality of the men's training and combat effectiveness was already noticeable in this "second wave." The Special Naval Landing Forces thus continued to play a role in Japanese Navy offensive operations, which were now concentrated primarily in the Solomons and New Guinea area. Both the older and new SNLF's became involved. The 3rd Kure SNLF led the way when the Japanese landed on Tulagi to establish a seaplane base there (also occupied the adjacent small islands of Gavutu and Tanambogo). These units put up a pretty fierce resistance against the US Marine landings there in August. Meanwhile the 5th Yokosuka SNLF was the only real fighting force established on Guadalcanal once the Japanese started to construct an airstrip there-- in contrast to the forces on and around Tulagi, these essentially melted away into the jungle when the Marines started coming ashore.

On New Guinea, also in August 1942, the Japanese conceived a fairly ambitious island to secure Milne Bay on the island's eastern tip. The initial landing force conisted of 612 men from the 5th Kure SNLF, 197 men of the 5th Sasebo SNLF, and 362 (non-combat) troops of the 16th Naval Construction Unit. This force was commanded by Navy Commander Shojiro Hayashi. These landed from two transport ships, escorted by cruisers, in a driving rain on the night of August 25th. The plan called for an additional 353 men of the 5th Sasebo SNLF, carried in seven large wooden motor barges, to land on the Solomon Sea side and make a separate approach by marching over the mountains. But the Japanese plan miscarried almost from the start. The Allies, too, were interested in constructing an airfield at Milne Bay, and they in fact had 4,500 Australian infantry troops in the area already, along with almost the same number of artillerymen, engineers, and construction troops (including 1,300 Americans). Even after reinforcements were sent in on August 29th, in the form of 568 men from the 3rd Kure SNLF and 200 SNLF soldiers (fighting as infantry) from the 5th Yokosuka SNLF (with them arrived Navy Commander Yano, who then took over as he had seniority over Hayashi), this left the Japanese outnumbered two to one in combat troops, and almost four to one overall, hardly promising conditions for an offensive. The Japanese naval troops did put ashore two light tanks, but these soon got bogged down in deep mud and were not able to accomplish much.

After August 1942 the Special Naval Landing Forces found themselves fighting a much different kind of war. Now they were almost exclusively involved in defensive fighting, holding various island outposts against the growing US offensive. In the Solomons, the next battle after Guadalcanal centered on New Georgia. The Japanese Navy in this area had the 6th Kure and 7th Yokosuka SNLF's (the latter sometimes cited as an example of the deficiencies in equipment, training, and hence combat performance which came to characterize SNLF operations as the war progressed). These were joined together as the 8th Combined Special Naval Landing Force, under Rear-Admiral Minoru Ota*. In the New Georgia fighting, the 6th Kure SNLF was initially on New Georgia itself (with one company on Rendova, which was actually the first island in the group attacked by the Americans). The 7th Yokosuka SNLF was brought over from the adjacent island of Kolombangara to reinforce the New Georgia force as the battle developed.

Perhaps the most famous defensive stand by the Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces came at Tarawa Atoll in November 1943. Here there were no Japanese Army troops-- only 1,497 men of the 7th Sasebo SNLF, and a little more than 1,100 members of the 3rd Special Base Unit. With more than 100 machineguns pointed at the Marine landing bases and fifty various pieces of artillery supporting them, the Japanese naval troops in their strong bunkers withstood a ferocious bombardment and still emerged to cause one of the worst bloodbaths in US military history. More than 3,000 Marines became casualties before the vicious fighting was over, one of the few times in the entire Pacific war when the Japanese forces actually inflicted greater casualties than they themselves suffered on any given island. The Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces would continue to be encountered in most subsequent major campaigns-- they were present on Saipan (where the paratroopers of the 1st and 3rd Yokosuka SNLF's, consolidated into a single unit, were essentially wiped out fighting as conventional infantry), they were on Iwo Jima Island, and naval ground troops of all kinds were very prevalent in the fighting in Manila and Manila Bay in the Phillipines (it was naval ground forces, in defiance of Yamashita's orders, who defended the city of Manila and turned it into a horrible massacre, running amok among the civilian population, about 100,000 of whom died, before the city was liberated. Naval infantry also held Corregidor and several smaller fortress islands). And there were about 10,000 naval ground troops on Okinawa, the actions of Ota's group being described done in notes. But most of the Special Naval Landing Forces and the more improvised naval ground units raised in the final two years of the war were a far cry from the well-trained units which led the way in the early successful Pacific offensives [ 2 ].

seireikhaan

02-02-2009, 22:37

Well, conceivably the effect would be cumulative. Russia was not the monolithic giant with endless supplies of men and material that it is sometimes portrayed to be. Just like any nation, the USSR had its limit - as has been discussed recently in relation to Lend-Lease. In 1941, its breaking point was surely smaller than in the years after.

It can be argued that had Japan applied pressure in the East at that critical time, allowing Germany to take Moscow and the other major cities and push the Russians behind the Urals, they're capabilities would largely be diminished.

Surely Stalin may have been able to use the vastness of the environment to elude total defeat for a time, but even with as much Russian industry as he was able to move - being trapped in the middle of undeveloped Russia would have him strangled for resources and the ability to launch offensive operations.

In any event, I believe better coordination between the two powers leading to a Japanese attack on Russia would have been a far better decision for the overall Axis effort than bringing the US into the war. Of course, taking their entire fleet into the middle of the Pacific and scuttling it would have also been a far better decision than bringing the US in, so hindsight is 20/20. :beam:
Couple points:

1) My point wasn't so much that the Soviets themselves would have worn the Japanese down. Moreso, the logistical challenge of causing any kind of meaningful dent in the Soviet empire from the east is simply mindboggling. The only city of any value in the eastern Siberia was probably Vladivostok- and that's on the coast, not of great value when the campaign would have needed to turn to the west. Simply put, trying to make a prolonged push into Russia would have been suicidal. Winter was too long, too harsh. Supply lines would have been a nightmare. There's simply too much land, too much winter, not enough civilized areas to support a marching army, particularly when Japan was still having to keep their territories in East Asia subjugated.

2) Let's say Japan, instead of attacking Pearl Harbor, instead attacks the Soviets. What does this do to America's involvement in the war? Would America have come to the aid of their allies in western Europe regardless of Pearl Harbor? If so... what does this do to the resources America puts forth in Western Europe? I realize the general strategy was "Germany first, Japan second", but if Japan had not attacked America, would a war in the Pacific been delayed? America may have been able to make a more concerted push in Europe against the Germans, negating any potential benefit from the Soviets lacking the extra troops. As Machiavelli put it "Don't delay a war when it will only come later, to your disadvantage". I think America would have come to the battlefields of Europe regardless an attack by Japan. And, I believe, this would have worked to the detriment of Germany.

Caveat- of course, if Hitler hadn't totally lost his mind, he could have taken Moscow regardless and cut off a large portion of Soviet rails that ran through the city. This would have likely forced the Soviets out of the war regardless of Japanese aid.

Agent Miles

02-03-2009, 21:21

Husar

02-03-2009, 21:25

That is similar to what I always thought.
when the japanese attacked the US had almost nothing but a few ships in the theatre.
Actually loads of ships but almost no planes and the ones there were mostly old so the japanese could probably have secured air superiority easily and the rest would have been securing the craters, similar to the modern US strategy. ~;)

Strike For The South

02-03-2009, 23:07

The Japanese failure in WW2 is a failure of strategy. All of the forces that were directed at sandy beaches and jungle swamps should have fallen on the U.S. alone. The strike at PH should have been coordinated with a simultaneous assault on Midway. The IJN had enough carriers to do this. Then take Hawaii with all the divisions that can float backed up by ten carriers vs. three U.S. The U.S. military was totally unprepared to defend the West Coast in 1942. FDR would have to sign a truce on the deck of the Yamato in the Japanese colony of Los Angeles. With the U.S. knocked out, taking the rest of the Pacific would have been a fait accompli. Boom baby!

Thats what the civilians in Los Angeles thought. There is no way this would happen. For the simple fact of the resources it would've cost. Not to mention the Japanese couldn't had committed land forces and kept supply lines open.

The Japanese mistake was attacking the USA in the first place.

Sarmatian

02-03-2009, 23:57

The Japanese failure in WW2 is a failure of strategy. All of the forces that were directed at sandy beaches and jungle swamps should have fallen on the U.S. alone. The strike at PH should have been coordinated with a simultaneous assault on Midway. The IJN had enough carriers to do this. Then take Hawaii with all the divisions that can float backed up by ten carriers vs. three U.S. The U.S. military was totally unprepared to defend the West Coast in 1942. FDR would have to sign a truce on the deck of the Yamato in the Japanese colony of Los Angeles. With the U.S. knocked out, taking the rest of the Pacific would have been a fait accompli. Boom baby!

Maybe in an alternate universe. They didn't have the manpower or the resources to do that. Their oil reserves couldn't last a year.

The reason they invaded all those islands was to get oil (and other resources, not just oil). The best Japan could have hoped for was crippling US fleet, getting withing striking distance of American Pacific coast and pray that US would sue for peace rather than let its western cities be bombed. Their entire strategy was that US act similar to Russia in 1905.

But an actual invasion of continental US across the Pacific??? Impossible... That would have been more ludicrous than trying to reach Moscow through Siberia...

Don Esteban

02-04-2009, 09:44

As I understand it the plan was to knock out all the US' aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbour so that they couldn't defend the Pacific. With freedom to cruise around the pacific Japan would be able to threaten the west coast with bombing raids rather than a land invasion and this should have been enough to make the US come to terms.

Yamamoto predicted that the Japanese could invade freely for a year and then would be in trouble and he was fully aware that Japan would lose once they failed to catch the aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbour. Also he was supposedly against declaring war on the US in the first place but was overulled.

Agent Miles

02-04-2009, 15:44

The Japanese eventually got around to a very possible Midway invasion, so that they could invade Hawaii. Nothing less than miraculous luck really made it impossible even that late in 1942. All of the supplies and fuel that were used to gobble up empty islands should have been directed right from the start at the U.S. The Japanese seemed to have the supplies to overrun the south Pacific from their logistics base at Truk so I think that they could have done the same to the West Coast from a base in Hawaii.
Remember, The U.S. was totally unprepared to defend the West Coast. The Japanese army that had raped Nanking is most likely going to take L.A., even if they will run out of supplies. Now you assure FDR that the Japs don’t have the logistics to win a protracted war and so what if one quarter of the U.S. aircraft industry is in or around L.A. The President would have to choose to watch California undergo a destruction that would have made Sherman’s march to the sea pale in comparison, just to win this logistics war. In the meantime, Britain and Russia would surely starve as the U.S. was fighting for its life. PH was a tragic embarrassment. This would have been a disaster that could only be avoided by a truce.
"L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace!"

CBR

02-04-2009, 18:22

And this article shows the logistical impossibility of invading Pearl Harbor. http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm

But one Japanese error at Pearl Harbor was that they did not send in a third wave to hit the fuel depots and machine shops. Another error was not using their submarines to hit US freighters and tankers when they had a good chance at doing a lot of damage in the first months.

That could have set back the US effort maybe a year back or more. Of course one can doubt if it would have changed the overall outcome.

CBR

Agent Miles

02-04-2009, 19:00

And that article by a PC gamer discusses an invasion after the conquest of all the jungles that the Japanese wasted their effort on. That probably is true, except, that I ‘m talking about a DoW on the U.S. only, followed by a blitzkrieg aimed at the West Coast. Every bit of logistics that was used to move troops thousands of miles to take places like Rabaul, etc., instead is aimed at Midway and then Hawaii. The entire IJN focused on one immediate goal, Invasion U.S.A. We can be very jaded today about how incredibly lucky we were, but that doesn’t change the situation as it really was. The Japanese had the best fighter in the world, pilots with thousands of combat hours, more carriers and battlewagons, better optics, heavy cruisers with killer torpedoes, a light infantry army that didn’t need miles of trucks to supply it, and years of experience at the business at hand. Somehow it takes more logistics to take L.A. than to do all the other conquests that the Japanese managed instead? That’s everyone’s point, right?

Meneldil

02-04-2009, 19:08

The error of Japan was not to attack the US or to not try a land invasion of the west coast, but to think that this war was similar to 19th-century wars.

They expected the US to surrender right after PH, just like Russia did in 1905 after losing (badly) its Eastern navy.
The thing is, the US were contempting entering the war against Germany, and FDR perfectly knew that what was going on was a total war on a global scale. Not some 'I defeated you once so you have to accept my peace treaty" old kind of war, but a "We'll fight till one of us is almost dead and beg for his life" one.

Unlike Germany, Japan wasn't ready for a total-full-scale war. Things got out of hands in China because the Kuomintang (and later, the CCP) were too stuborn to give up, and because the local japanese generals went crazy (against the IJA headquarters' opinion), not because Japan wanted to conquer whole China and exterminate the Chinese population. They did it because they couldn't force the nationalists to accept peace, and thus, had to fight to death.

I'm pretty sure that even a land invasion in California wouldn't have been enough to impose a peace treaty to the US. Japan would likely have had to invade the whole country, and completely defeat the will of the american population, which is probably even more impossible than invading Russia.

Agent Miles

02-04-2009, 19:52

After the war, Stalin confided in his daughter that at one point, his staff raced out to his dacha, where normally he was never disturbed, to tell him that German scout units had been sighted near Moscow. Stalin told her that he was initially certain that his staff had come out to shoot him and surrender to the Fascists. What if his staff had done this? If Stalin was fearful, then it came that close. A smug plan to defeat a nation over several years by burying them with numbers doesn’t work if you are beaten in several months.
FDR wanted to beat Hitler first, perhaps because of Einstein’s expressed fear that the Nazis were developing the bomb. A Japanese invasion would certainly monopolize U.S. resources. T-34’s may have stopped the Wehrmacht, but lend-lease fed the Russians and the UK. To stop the Japanese in the U.S., FDR would have to turn his back on Stalin and Churchill. The Japanese don’t have to cross the Mississippi and take D.C. FDR could not afford an invasion and a protracted war in the U.S. Imagine a Bataan death march by millions of Californians.

CBR

02-04-2009, 20:00

Well, yes and no.

However, Baseplate was a tactical success. Was it the kind of massively lopsided victory the German air corps had grown accustomed to in their heyday? No, but it was a success nonetheless. Despite its numerous problems at this stage, the Luftwaffe was able to plan and execute a powerful strike against the far superior Allied air forces. IIRC, the Allies lost around 500 planes while the Germans lost only half that number, and a large portion of that was due to friendly fire losses due to a failure to alert the flak batteries that German planes would be flying over them. Had American manufacturing not have been so overwhelmingly superior, such a loss would have been a major blow to the Allied air corps - achieved 4 months before the war in Europe was over.

Contrast that to the Japanese operations at the time, which seemingly revolved around the best ways in which to hurl their planes into American ships. That relates back to my original sense that the Japanese deterioration was suprisingly acute.

Looking at losses provided by Wikipedia which comes from the book " Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope" then the Allied lost 336 planes and had 190 damaged versus Luftwaffe losses of 271 lost and 65 damaged. Destroying 24% more than you lose could be considered a tactical success I guess but when looking at permanent pilot losses (213 KIA or POW) for the Luftwaffe, while the allied lost nowhere near that as many planes were destroyed on the ground, then it was an utter failure.

If this had been an operation in a very short war of a few days duration, then the pilot losses would not have mattered that much perhaps and it could even be considered a small success, especially if damaged planes cannot be repaired in time, but when you are fighting a long war of attrition you dont want to waste pilots like that.

To compare with Japan: Late '44 the average Navy fighter pilot had 40 hours of flying time and the Army apparently were down to 60 or 70 hours. But have found one claim that said 100 hours for the Navy so not sure which number is correct.

Luftwaffe training had been cut down to around 100-110 hours by '44. In the summer that year a survey of their pilots found that a majority of the pilots had seen between 8 to 30 days active service. Only a small percentage had an average of 3 months of service.

So depending on what number we pick the two airforces either had similar training or it was worse for the Japanese. If it was worse that would partially explain why their late war performance was worse than the Luftwaffe.

Sources for numbers:
http://www.allworldwars.com/The%20Defeat%20of%20the%20German%20Air%20Force.html
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/F/i/Fighter_Pilots.htm
http://www.combinedfleet.com/ijnaf.htm

CBR

CBR

02-04-2009, 20:13

Somehow it takes more logistics to take L.A. than to do all the other conquests that the Japanese managed instead? That’s everyone’s point, right?
A quick look on a map (Google maps will do just fine) will show you the difference in distance from Japan-US west coast compared with Japan-Indonesia.

Not only do you need to have shipping capacity to transport the units you also need shipping to supply them. Japan barely had capacity enough to take its objectives in SE Asia.

CBR

Agent Miles

02-04-2009, 20:48

Strike For The South

02-04-2009, 21:41

Uesugi Kenshin

02-04-2009, 22:45

Right, so the Japanese live off the land while they destroy a quarter of the U.S. aircraft industry and slaughter millions of Americans. How many ships fed the Japanese soldiers that surrendered in the Philipines in the 1960’s? You want FDR to let Europe starve while you scorch the west coast? I don't think that Churchill or Stalin would agree to a Japan first strategy.
As you point out, Japan took those objectives in SE Asia.

Ummm the guys who surrendered after the '40's were tiny groups weren't they? It's much harder for a few thousand men, not to mention the number of men required to do anything on the US West Coast, to survive off the land than it is for four or five guys.

I think you're completely off-base with your idea that Japan could attack the US mainland. There is some chance that the Japanese could have done something to Hawaii, but the west coast was completely out of their reach. Even if they landed troops there they would have basically been left there with no supplies and US forces would have been quickly organized to stamp them out. Millions would not have been slaughtered.

Husar

02-04-2009, 22:58

The japanese could have quickly taken the whole west coast, held parts of the population hostage, then secured the corn fields in the midwest and starved the rest of the US, the US could have never reacted to such a blitz strategy in time and would have been on the defensive before they had really gathered any men while millions of japanese would come from the west coast.
Pretty easy victory, they would've had the supplies they needed before the US president had been informed, I mean it's not like the whole west coast was empty with no food to be found anywhere.

Meneldil

02-04-2009, 23:36

I'm not going to go in the what-if game, because there are simply too many factors to take into account. I'll just say that :
- A large part of the Japanese army was stuck in China, fighting a more and more organized opponent.
- The Japanese barely had the logistics to conquer a few islands in the pacific. Successfully invading and holding the American West coast would have been much more demanding.
- The US wouldn't have starved to death by losing the Midwest, just like USSR wasn't starved to death by loosing Ukrainia and most of its western part, just like China wasn't starved to death when it lost most of its coastal areas.
- By 1941, it was pretty obvious that what was going on was *big*, and that losing would probably mean you're screwed for good. Churchill understood it, Stalin understood it later. I doubt FDR would have been oblivious of that fact.
- Japan has been traditionally cautious of Gaijins (and still is, I'd say). Hence why most of the -somewhat- rational japanese leaders were against a full-scale war against the US.

As for the japanese army's capabilities proper, I'm not sure I agree with the idea that the early IJA was a perfect warmachine. They fought mostly badly outnumbered (colonial forces in Asia) or underequiped (Chinese) opponents.
I mean, they fought against colonial garrisons (mostly unexperienced and outnumbered), or armies that were badly equiped and organized. Add to that the fact Japanese did a great job at hiring locals to fight with them (warlords in China, nationalists in Burma, Indonesia and Indochina).

As for the whole suicide thing, I'm not sure it was considered as a viable strategy (except for the Kamikaze), but more as a way to die honorably when a battle was apparently lost. Funny thing is that Kamikaze didn't have much choice as well, since they didn't have the oil to go back to Japan after their raids.
That probably explain also why the IJA asked civilians to kill themselves (or murdered them) when everything was going wrong.

CBR

02-04-2009, 23:57

Right, so the Japanese live off the land while they destroy a quarter of the U.S. aircraft industry and slaughter millions of Americans.
We are talking modern day armies. They cannot live off the land like an army could do 200 years ago. Shells and bullets don't grow on trees. One might get lucky to take fuel but otherwise that has to be transported too.

How many ships fed the Japanese soldiers that surrendered in the Philipines in the 1960’s?
I fail to see how a few fanatic survivors compares with a fully functioning army.

You want Japan to attack and occupy Midway and Hawaii and then move on to US west coast right?

Even if we assume Japan had the capacity to transport all the 11 divisions how long would it have taken to neutralize Hawaii? A few days, a few weeks? How long to embark all troops minus losses and forces needed to occupy the islands. Then maybe another 10 days for freighters to reach the coast of California. I doubt in invasion could have been possible before early January 1942 and that is assuming everything runs by the clock, and Clausewitz had something to say about war and friction but hey never mind that.

So assuming no troubles from US carriers or submarines the Japanese armada finally spots the coast of California. That should be a piece of cake right?

Maybe we should look at the historical US response to Pearl Harbor. By early February 1942 the Western Defense Command had about 250,000 soldiers incl 6 infantry divisions, a cavalry regiment and 14 AA regiments. Even by late December 1941 3 infantry divisions were located there.

A couple of weeks after Pearl Harbor they actually relaxed a bit as it became obvious that there was no immediate threat. So we can safely assume troops would have been sent there faster if they actually thought there was going to be an invasion.

So even if assuming that the few hundred aircrafts that had been gathered there was not enough to upset Japanese air superiority, and assuming that the US troops were green, would a Japanese army of maybe 9 divisions and 4,500 miles from home just have a walkover when they invaded California?

Well you can guess what I think of their chances...

And then there are pesky things like the Philippines having even more time to mobilize but of course that does not matter much as long as the Japanese are losing on the other side of the Pacific.

CBR

PanzerJaeger

02-05-2009, 00:31

Looking at losses provided by Wikipedia which comes from the book " Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope" then the Allied lost 336 planes and had 190 damaged versus Luftwaffe losses of 271 lost and 65 damaged. Destroying 24% more than you lose could be considered a tactical success I guess but when looking at permanent pilot losses (213 KIA or POW) for the Luftwaffe, while the allied lost nowhere near that as many planes were destroyed on the ground, then it was an utter failure.

As mentioned, a not insignificant portion of the Luftwaffe losses can be attributed to their own Flak guns due to clerical oversight. I'm not sure that should be involved in a comparison of their performance against their targets. In any event, any German loss at this point could be considered irreplaceable as they were so numerically inferior - whether it be a pilot or a simple rifleman. Had the US forces had any equity of scale with their German counterparts, I think Baseplate would have been a significant achievement. In fact, their ability to launch the operation at all and the success they did manage was a significant achievement, albeit insignificant to the overall effort. :dizzy2:

To compare with Japan: Late '44 the average Navy fighter pilot had 40 hours of flying time and the Army apparently were down to 60 or 70 hours. But have found one claim that said 100 hours for the Navy so not sure which number is correct.

Luftwaffe training had been cut down to around 100-110 hours by '44. In the summer that year a survey of their pilots found that a majority of the pilots had seen between 8 to 30 days active service. Only a small percentage had an average of 3 months of service.

So depending on what number we pick the two airforces either had similar training or it was worse for the Japanese. If it was worse that would partially explain why their late war performance was worse than the Luftwaffe.

Sources for numbers:
http://www.allworldwars.com/The%20Defeat%20of%20the%20German%20Air%20Force.html
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/F/i/Fighter_Pilots.htm
http://www.combinedfleet.com/ijnaf.htm

CBR

Very interesting. This is the type of info I was looking for. :bow:

The Japanese forces don't seem to be as well documented as the other combatants. There is definitely info out there - especially on the technical specs of their ships and planes, but not the wealth and detail that there is on the others.

Any info on the tactics and training of the ground forces?

Things got out of hands in China because the Kuomintang (and later, the CCP) were too stuborn to give up, and because the local japanese generals went crazy (against the IJA headquarters' opinion), not because Japan wanted to conquer whole China and exterminate the Chinese population. They did it because they couldn't force the nationalists to accept peace, and thus, had to fight to death.

Could you expand on that some?

CBR

02-05-2009, 01:39

As mentioned, a not insignificant portion of the Luftwaffe losses can be attributed to their own Flak guns due to clerical oversight. I'm not sure that should be involved in a comparison of their performance against their targets. In any event, any German loss at this point could be considered irreplaceable as they were so numerically inferior - whether it be a pilot or a simple rifleman. Had the US forces had any equity of scale with their German counterparts, I think Baseplate would have been a significant achievement. In fact, their ability to launch the operation at all and the success they did manage was a significant achievement, albeit insignificant to the overall effort. :dizzy2:
First I'll have to make a small correction as I forgot to add the few Ju88's that was lost/damaged too so total German loss was 280/69. It says 84 were shot down by their own AAA (another 88 from Allied AAA)

I'm not judging their performance based on losses. And of course there are several ways to judge it. One way of looking at it would be losses from air to air combat only. In that case it appears to be 62/25 in favor of the Allies but maybe having bomb loads would have had an effect. But there is no doubt there was a difference in skill.

I'm merely looking at the consequences of the operation. It hurt the Luftwaffe more than it hurt the Allies. And yes there is no denying that they did manage to launch an operation like that and even achieve surprise but that is just half the battle and they failed in the other half as it was just too ambitious. Adolf Galland was also against the operation according to Wiki.

In the end it would not have mattered much because as you say any loss was irreplaceable and the war was to end in defeat in a few months anyway. But if one looks at the way they could have done the most damage to the Allies then Bodenplatte was the wrong way. Not sure about the survival rates but it might have been somewhere between 50-70% (unless at low altitude) so as long as the pilot is shot down over friendly area he can jump into another fighter after a quick smoke and coffee :beam:

The Japanese forces don't seem to be as well documented as the other combatants. There is definitely info out there - especially on the technical specs of their ships and planes, but not the wealth and detail that there is on the others.

Any info on the tactics and training of the ground forces?
Well I gotta admit I'm more attracted to their sexy looking warships and airplanes than their army. Although they managed to show some strategic skill that surprised the allies in the beginning of the war, my impression of their army is that it was somewhat lacking.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp for the Soviet-Japanese conflict of 1939. There is some stuff about their weapons and doctrine.

CBR

Agent Miles

02-05-2009, 14:59

The Japanese were in a total war with us. We did nuke two of their cities. I am pretty sure that the IJA would do whatever their Emperor ordered.
The Japanese would get to the West Coast with enough supplies to take their objectives, just as they did in SE Asia. Then they could live off the land like I said, unless FDR burned California to the ground. The “divisions” that the U.S. called up in two months were no more trained soldiers of a professional army than those colonial forces that the Japanese defeated in SE Asia. The Wehrmacht was poorly supplied in Russia that first winter. It didn’t stop them from destroying half that country. Sure we would still defeat the Japanese. The choice is, stubbornly continue to fight Japan or sign a truce. Millions of Americans would have died and the country would have been ruined. In the meantime, Hitler could conquer a starving Russia in the summer of ’42 and Churchill would have to do the best he could with a starving Britain alone against Fascist Europe.
The U.S. was prostrate in early 1942. Our army was totally untrained. The main power of our navy was in ruins except for a few aircraft carriers and a new theory of naval power that 90% of the naval commanders didn’t even believe in (we still built battleships after PH). Our aircraft were obsolete or outclassed by the Japanese. We had totally underestimated our foe the way all of you still do today.

Sarmatian

02-05-2009, 16:07

Even if I do agree that US troops lacked training and experience, I certainly wouldn't equate them with colonial troops IJA defeated in SE Asia. Those colonial troops were little more than a police force, they weren't reinforced or properly supplied and they lacked armour. Japan's infantrymen were fierce fighters, due to their rigorous training and discipline but they couldn't compete against a modern mechanized army which uses combined arms, as was evident at Khalkin Gol, where they were trounced by the Soviets. Read the article provided by CBR (thanks for the article CBR btw, great read)

It is impossible for a modern army to live of the land. Even if they do manage to find enough food (which is questionable), they would still need medical supplies, ammunition, spare parts etc... Where did you see a WW2 army living of the land? Those isolated groups of 5-10 soldiers that got lost in various jungles in SE Asia can't be considered an army.

Even if it were remotely possible for them to actually land on west coast, the end result would be the loss of all those troops and defeat of Japan much before 1945. Surprisingly, that's the reason they didn't try it...

Agent Miles

02-05-2009, 16:44

The U.S. didn't have a modern mechanized army in 1942. We didn't have anything resembling that in Jan. '42. Why does everyone seem to think that Patton's Third Army would have defended the West Coast?

Here's a link by a USN Commander about sealift in WW2.
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/wwii-campaigns.html
Specifically the Japanese:
"The rate of successful delivery of military supplies to front line units averaged 96% in 1942, declining to 83% in 1943, 67% in 1944 and 51% in 1945.(90) These statistics fail to capture the extraordinary indirect effects of both U.S. submarine and air attacks on Japanese merchants as the Japanese had to resort to carrying much of their supplies within the combat zones by slow, inefficient means such as barges, fishing boats and the like. These direct and indirect effects of U.S. attacks clearly impacted Japanese army units. Throughout the war, munitions deliveries were 15% below front line needs, and 33 to 50% of all food sent to the front was lost due to attack or spoilage.(91) Accounts from front line units depict significant efforts to make up for lack of food deliveries by gardening, fishing, or bartering with natives with sporadic accounts of cannibalism in especially poorly supplied areas like New Guinea.(92)"

This hardly describes a situation in which the Japanese would be starving. They had 6 million tons of merchant shipping. We only had 16 M tons in the Pacific at the end of the war. The torpedoes on U.S. subs didn't even work at the beginning of the war.

1.4 million draftees were taken into the U.S. army in the summer of ’41. Although seven months training may give you a half-way trained private, it certainly isn’t enough time to train sergeants or officers to lead them. Even by Kasserine, we still weren’t ready. Only skilled pilots knew how to survive combat with Zeros and you have to survive that combat to become a skilled pilot. Our tanks were ridiculous. As with the navy commanders, 90% of our Army officers were ready to fight WW1 again. Now all this formidable war machine must do is protect a thousand miles of coastline from a real army.

CBR

02-05-2009, 17:12

The Japanese were in a total war with us.
That is the problem isn't? Japan did not plan nor prepare for a total war as they thought they could win with a bit of shock and awe that would make the decadent and weak Americans cave in. That was the problem for the Axis powers in general really: the Allies thought in longterm for both production and training and won the war on attrition.

We did nuke two of their cities.
The US ability and willingness to use nuclear weapons in 1945 says nothing about Japanese ability and realistic objectives in 1941.

I am pretty sure that the IJA would do whatever their Emperor ordered.
Most of the Japanese army was busy in China so it does not matter what the Emperor wanted. Even if they magically produced 200 divisions out of thin air they would also have to magically produce a large freighter fleet to transport such an army.

The Japanese would get to the West Coast with enough supplies to take their objectives, just as they did in SE Asia. Then they could live off the land like I said, unless FDR burned California to the ground. The “divisions” that the U.S. called up in two months were no more trained soldiers of a professional army than those colonial forces that the Japanese defeated in SE Asia. The Wehrmacht was poorly supplied in Russia that first winter. It didn’t stop them from destroying half that country.
I don't see how you can even compare the ability or ~10 Japanese divisions to 150+ Axis divisions in Russia. And yes they had trouble with supplies in the winter '41 and had been advancing for several months with more or less proper supplies. A modern army does not work unless it has supplies. The ammunition takes up more weight than its food.

If you noticed in my Pearl Harbor link it is even stated that the Japanese High Command admitted before the Midway operation that they could not even supply a garrison there. So that invasion would ultimately have been temporary.

Here is an interesting Time Magazine article from March 1942 talking about the problems with lack of shipping. It also mentions how 3.5 tons of shipping was needed so supply one soldier in France in WW1 and that number now was higher. Such a number would also increase the further away one has to transport stuff and the Pacific is a bigger ocean than the Atlantic: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,773059-1,00.html

Luckily someone did all the calculations for a Japanese invasion of Hawaii. It is a very long post that involves lots of numbers and logistics.

Here is one quote regarding shipping needs for one division:

Calculating IJA shipping requirements.

The TO&E of a typical IJA triangular division (reinforced) is here

ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japa.../hb-17.jpg

24,600 men
7,930 Horses
3,500 Horse carts (assumed)
411 LMG's
453 50mm knee mortars
78 A/T rifles
114 x HMG's
18 x 37mm A.A.
72 x 70 or 75 mm gun
12 x 105 mm gun
7 Tanks
284 trucks.
15 cars.

Food supplies: 2 months.
Units of fire: 2
Supplies: gasoline, lubricants: 2 months

Summary: Cubic Feet / % of total lift

Using the USMC tables and the assumptions described above, the shipping costs for the reinforced IJA division at the link above are:

Men and Baggage: 2,263,200 cubic feet. = 40%
Horses, baggage and equipment: 1,732,560 cubic feet = 30.7%
Tanks: 7,091 cubic feet = Negligible
Divisional weapons: 42,332 cubic feet = 1%
Vehicles: 328,099 cubic feet = 4.9%
Support and construction: 21,066 cubic feet = negligible
Ammunition: 354,295 cubic feet = 6.3%
Food (Horses and men): 863,244 cubic feet = 15.3%
Gasoline and lubricants: 39,973 cubic feet = 1%

Total cubic volume: 5,651,861 cubic feet.
Shipping required @ 30 cubic feet per ship ton = 188,395 tons.

So 188,395 tons for one division. When looking at the total amount of shipping it becomes obvious that Japan did not have the capacity for more than a few divisions.

But the conclusion is that it was possible but not a sure thing. And also we would now be looking at late Jan/early Feb before that operation is even over. Even if it was possible to go further and invade California it would most likely be March if they were unrealistically quick. And still not involve a lot of troops.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=65&t=120787

CBR

Geezer57

02-05-2009, 17:22

The hypothetical Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor is explored in-depth by author/historian Harry Turtledove (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Turtledove) in his novels Days of Infamy (http://www.amazon.com/Infamy-Pearl-Harbor-Harry-Turtledove/dp/0451460561/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233850501&sr=1-2) and End of the Beginning (http://www.amazon.com/Beginning-Pearl-Harbor-Harry-Turtledove/dp/0451460782/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233850501&sr=1-1). The author captures the flavor of the period extremely well, both novels are solidly written, and get good reviews. Given his historian background, no glaring historical anomalies are found here. Good stuff - recommended. :2thumbsup:

Agent Miles

02-05-2009, 19:07

Uesugi Kenshin

02-05-2009, 21:00

1.4 million draftees were taken into the U.S. army in the summer of ’41. Although seven months training may give you a half-way trained private, it certainly isn’t enough time to train sergeants or officers to lead them. Even by Kasserine, we still weren’t ready. Only skilled pilots knew how to survive combat with Zeros and you have to survive that combat to become a skilled pilot. Our tanks were ridiculous. As with the navy commanders, 90% of our Army officers were ready to fight WW1 again. Now all this formidable war machine must do is protect a thousand miles of coastline from a real army.

If our tanks were ridiculous the Japanese tanks were more like paper-covered rickshaws. The M-3 Lee would probably have been a sufficient tank to combat the Japanese tank forces at the time and it was just an interim solution for us.

Not only have you completely failed to show that the Japanese would have been able to put any number of divisions on the shores of California, but you have also assumed that the American populace wouldn't fight back, the US army would be powerless to stop the relatively ineffective force that was the IJA, and that the US would be willing to surrender to the Japanese even though Roosevelt was looking for a reason to get into the war, but couldn't for a while because of the lack of domestic support.

Agent Miles

02-05-2009, 21:37

The Japanese airpower would rule the battlefield, even against a large militia. Again, I’m not talking about the Japanese defeating America. I have always said truce. They will punish us so badly that FDR must sue for peace or lose the war in Europe. Attacking the U.S. mainland would do what the Japanese did not accomplish. Millions of Chinese citizens resisted too. They were slaughtered and much of their country was occupied. Are you saying that the Japanese could not scrape together enough tonnage to invade the U.S. with several divisions of trained professionals and make any headway because citizens would stop them?

Seamus Fermanagh

02-05-2009, 21:53

To clarify, I was not talking about the Japanese doing everything they did in WW2 and then invading the U.S. As CBR's earlier link argued, that would not work. I was always arguing that the Japanese manpower, sealift and supplies that they did have and did use in SE Asia and the Pacific taking their objectives should have been used in a blitzkrieg directed against Midway (when it was defenseless), then Hawaii before it was reinforced (B-17s can fly to Hawaii, but not fighters and you cannot reinforce or hold anything without control of the air) and then the West Coast (when a paper army was our only defense). Everything that could be spared would focus on this goal the way Clausewitz would want it. The Japanese would still lose a protracted war, but to fight this protracted war instead of signing a truce, FDR would have to abandon Russia to Hitler (T-34 crews don’t fight well if they don’t eat our lend-lease food and we literally fed Russia) and perhaps force Churchill to a truce with a Nazi dominated Europe. Millions of Americans would perish and we would have to fight the battle for Okinawa a thousand times to retake California.
I have shown that the IJN had enough sealift to do this and that their forces would generate enough combat power to meet this goal. If need be, the IJA in China could suck it up for a few months so that a maximum effort could be made against the U.S. The Japanese sealift would be taking supplies to the West Coast and bringing back whatever can be plundered, to include slave labor. U.S. subs operating from, Panama I suppose would be using the torpedoes that didn’t work against these merchant ships. As soon as FDR sees the light, you give back the continental possessions in return for a truce with open trade, and then gear up to overrun Asia.
No one has demonstrated how the Japanese supplies and sealift that did exist at that time and were used effectively would somehow only work everywhere except against the U.S. mainland. No one has explained how the real U.S. military that existed in early 1942 would manage to stop this despite inferior equipment, training and skill.

While your concept for creating victory was better than that used by the Japanese Empire, Japan simply didn't have the tools to follow it through.

The IJA had a little over 51 divisions in 1941, the IJN could have fielded 5 or so more. Even if we assume that China/Korea could be sopped off with only 10 divisions or so, and even assuming that the Phillipines and Commonwealth forces would do nothing, we still have a force of no more than 45 divisions that could be deployed.

Deploying that force for a two-month operation, as noted above, would take approximately 10.6M tons of shipping. At the outset of the war, Japan had roughly 6.4M tonnes of available shipping. Since Destroyers doubled as fast transports for the IJN, we can add a bit more to that, but using virtually everything in Japan produces a total maximum force of 39 Divisions.

Let us assume that 1 Division is employed for taking out the small bases such as Midway and Johnston Island, and 3 Divisions are deployed to Hawaii to take out the defenders there. That leaves 35 divisions. This sounds like a huge force, but....

Vancouver through Tiajuana is a HUGE swath of territory. Yes, forces present in the area could have done no more than delay Japanese advances, but the USA would have had 30 plus divisions on the line within 90 days, and many more thereafter. Yes, their traing would have been horrible and casualties high, but they would have started better equipped than all but the Japanese Guard formations. Given the comparative supply lines involved, the turnaround would have been rapid.

Moreover, subjugating the populace would have been impossible. Even more so than the East, Western Americans of the era were well supplied with weapons, and once some of the initial shock wore off, would willingly have used them on anyone with an epicanthic fold. With an attack on the Mainland, the ensuing bloodbath would have been hideous. Nor would any forgiveness have been offered. Japan would have been eradicated root and branch.

Any effort to invade and occupy the US mainland would have been a disaster, however costly for the USA.

Now, occupying Hawaii with a massive surprise invasion and launching large scale raids against the USA at the same time might have worked. Instead of sending 35 divisions on a hopeless quest, you send 5 to Panama, 3 to Hawaii, and 3 each to SFO, LA, Diego, and the Puget sound with the intent of wrecking everything they can't steal but also of being back on their boats in 2 weeks or less (except in Hawaii and possibly Panama) This would have ripped holes in the aircraft industry, the naval building program, and destroyed the Galliard cut in Panama. Full recovery would have taken years and the USA would have been on the defensive for closer to two years instead of 6 months. Opsec for so much activity would have been difficult to say the least, but....

CBR

02-05-2009, 23:00

At the outset of the war, Japan had roughly 6.4M tonnes of available shipping. Since Destroyers doubled as fast transports for the IJN, we can add a bit more to that, but using virtually everything in Japan produces a total maximum force of 39 Divisions.

And if the Japanese Navy needed 1.4 million tons then I guess they had a good reason for it. Unless shutting down the Japanese industry(a bit odd when you go off to war) and civilian economy there would also be a need for the 2.7 million tons that had been allocated to that.

That leaves around 2.1-2.5 million tons for the army with a third of that needed for supplying China.

The operation described in the axis history forum link I gave use about half of the remaining army shipping. So unless we accept the "If need be, the IJA in China could suck it up for a few months" which is again rather odd since the army was fighting and even losing a large battle in the days and weeks after PH, then we can expect an army effort twice as strong as in the Axis History link.

Going through the use of tankers in that link Japan uses about half of their overall capacity and it would have to be increased by 50% for the extra range needed to reach California(3 instead of 2 tanker groups cycling back to Japan)

And if we then double the army shipping capacity or even triple it and forget about China then I'm starting to doubt if the remaining 25-30% tanker capacity was enough.

CBR

Seamus Fermanagh

02-06-2009, 05:05

And if the Japanese Navy needed 1.4 million tons then I guess they had a good reason for it. Unless shutting down the Japanese industry(a bit odd when you go off to war) and civilian economy there would also be a need for the 2.7 million tons that had been allocated to that.

That leaves around 2.1-2.5 million tons for the army with a third of that needed for supplying China.

The operation described in the axis history forum link I gave use about half of the remaining army shipping. So unless we accept the "If need be, the IJA in China could suck it up for a few months" which is again rather odd since the army was fighting and even losing a large battle in the days and weeks after PH, then we can expect an army effort twice as strong as in the Axis History link.

Going through the use of tankers in that link Japan uses about half of their overall capacity and it would have to be increased by 50% for the extra range needed to reach California(3 instead of 2 tanker groups cycling back to Japan)

And if we then double the army shipping capacity or even triple it and forget about China then I'm starting to doubt if the remaining 25-30% tanker capacity was enough.

CBR

Good points. I was just suggesting that no read of their sealift says an invasion of anything past Hawaii was doable (and that would have been tough). My thoughts on a large raid would be a "best case" for Japan -- if the ships weren't back moving supplies inside 6 weeks, Japan would have ground to a halt.

CBR

02-06-2009, 06:13

Good points. I was just suggesting that no read of their sealift says an invasion of anything past Hawaii was doable (and that would have been tough). My thoughts on a large raid would be a "best case" for Japan -- if the ships weren't back moving supplies inside 6 weeks, Japan would have ground to a halt.
Yeah sure, I merely wanted to add some numbers for the "regular case"

CBR

Agent Miles

02-06-2009, 15:51

http://www.tribo.org/nanking/

http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/nanking.htm

http://rapeofnanking.tv/

How many Americans can you slaughter with 50,000 bayonets?

When you say that the Japanese chose not to fight a total war and couldn’t spare shipping for an invasion because it would have been really tough, you’re saying what I originally posted. Their failure is a failure of strategy. They did not make the strategic sacrifice necessary (no matter how tough) to use the military that they had with the merchant fleet they had and the supplies they had to rapidly and immediately do god awful damage to the U.S. when our attention needed to be on stopping Hitler. Yes, they would still lose…if FDR really wanted Rommel to overrun North Africa (because the Brits wouldn’t be getting any of our M-3 juggernauts) and the Russians to literally starve to death by the millions.
Untrained soldiers and an NRA militia are no more an army than a pile of bricks is a house. We had no answer to the Zero. Our aircraft would have been slaughtered and our ground troops pounded relentlessly. They would do to us what we did to the Germans in Normandy.
Either the Japanese destroy California and slaughter millions of Americans or FDR scorches California and throws human waves at their army, both of which have the same end result. Sure we can defeat the Japanese. In this case, however, we just lose the war in Europe, and don’t forget, Einstein told FDR that Hitler is the real enemy. Japan did exactly the wrong thing by building a Co-Prosperity Sphere and then just sitting there while the world took care of Hitler.
The link you gave CBR to the Kaigun homepage, is by two guys who turned their hobby into a book and a homepage. They don’t have one day of military service between them. Their conclusions are like two Catholic Priests saying that a three-way is just not possible.

CBR

02-06-2009, 16:20

The link you gave CBR, is by two guys who turned their hobby into a book and a homepage. They don’t have one day of military service between them. Their conclusions are like two Catholic Priests saying that a three-way is just not possible.
Sounds like an ad hominem argument to me. Finding holes in their logistical arguments would do you more credit or are we just to trust your military experience?

CBR

Kagemusha

02-06-2009, 16:46

Right, so the Japanese live off the land while they destroy a quarter of the U.S. aircraft industry and slaughter millions of Americans. How many ships fed the Japanese soldiers that surrendered in the Philipines in the 1960’s? You want FDR to let Europe starve while you scorch the west coast? I don't think that Churchill or Stalin would agree to a Japan first strategy.
As you point out, Japan took those objectives in SE Asia.

You think that US would have capitulated if invaded? I think the opposite. Surely invasion might have positive effect on European war for Germany, since US would have made it sure to focus on completely defeating Japan as their top priority.
With the huge depth of US, they could have even evacuated West coast to midwest, while gearing up their own forces. I see no chance not so ever for any hypothetical Japanese invasion to succeed.

Agent Miles

02-06-2009, 19:49

Well after 21 years in the army, I know what doesn’t make an army and that you cannot operate anywhere without control of the air. Bean counters will tell you that Hannibal can’t get elephants over the Alps or that Rommel doesn’t have a mountain of supplies, so don't worry about him.
I never, ever, said that the Japanese would win.
TRUCE TRUCE TRUCE TRUCE TRUCE
FDR could ignore everyone else and become Abraham Lincoln in an American tragedy, or he could appease the Japanese and prevent Hitler from nuking the bajesus out of England (I know this was not possible, but FDR most certainly did not.).
That’s all I ever said. The Japanese should have gone right for the jugular if they wanted to get a truce. The international situation demanded U.S. involvement elsewhere. If the invasion failed they would lose no matter what. This was a better strategy than hiding in bunkers on worthless islands until the U.S. could afford to destroy them.

PanzerJaeger

02-07-2009, 00:03

Well after 21 years in the army, I know what doesn’t make an army and that you cannot operate anywhere without control of the air.

Disagree. Maybe with today's planes and technology, but not during WW2.

Look at the war in Europe. Russia completely lost air superiority, and even the ability to contest it, within the first days of Barbarossa. They were still able to operate for several years, mounting successful defensive and offensive operations without it. And when the tables turned, the Germans, too, were able to operate effectively.

Air power arguably played the most decisive role in Normandy. It was an unusually small front where the Allied air assets could be concentrated, and the German armor present was irreplaceable, making each loss especially detrimental. However, the Germans were still able to operate successfully against the Allies. The eventual collapse of that front was due indirectly to massive numerical inequalities between the two sides and more directly due to Hitler's insistence on a suicidal offensive - not Allied air power.

Air superiority was definitely an asset that commanders wanted on their side, but it was not necessary to operate effectively. I believe any "American" front opened by the Japanese on the West Coast would resemble the Eastern Front far more than Normandy. Japanese air superiority would be largely negated by the size of the front they would have to manage.

CBR

02-09-2009, 03:31

Bean counters will tell you that Hannibal can’t get elephants over the Alps or that Rommel doesn’t have a mountain of supplies, so don't worry about him.
Sounds like a straw man to me. No one here has said anything like that and even if they had and whether they are right or wrong has nothing to do with Japan in December 1941.

There are lots of "bean counter" examples in WW2. To mention a few: Patton ran out of fuel by late August 1944 as distance increased although the depots in Normandy were loaded with fuel.

Rommel ended up with a similar problem as he became overextended when he reached El Alamein. There were many thousand tons of supplies at Tobruk, Benghazi and further back at Tripoli. But not enough trucks to bring them forward.

Your comments seem to just dismiss logistics which I find rather odd.

The Japanese should have gone right for the jugular if they wanted to get a truce.
Yes that is true. To even have a chance at either making peace with USA right away or later, by making it too difficult and bloody for USA to win, Japan had to do more or perhaps a lot less, than they did.

But you seem to be saying that what Japan had to do was also what they could do.

You claim that FDR would want a truce but why would he want to do that? If Japan is only attacking USA then you cannot even be sure Hitler would declare war on USA in the first place. So FDR might not even have to worry about two fronts. Even if he did, the situation in December 1941 (or rather February/March 1942) hardly looked bleak for the Allies. Sending supplies to Russia or Britain would only be slowed down if the situation was truly desperate for USA. A front still had to be opened in the European theater which took time so no need to hurry there.

I'm sure most troops could still be considered rather green by early 1942 and yes they had trouble when facing the Germans for the first time in North Africa. But there is certainly also a big difference between facing crack German panzer truppen and then a Japanese army that still used horses for transport and had less artillery than US infantry divisions.

In August/September the Louisiana maneuvers were held that involved 19 divisions with more than 400,000 men. Sure one exercise does not make a veteran army but they along with other divisions really should not be a walkover for a Japanese army that would find itself outnumbered and outgunned.

And the Japanese would have been outnumbered as the absolute maximum available number of divisions (used in the SE Asia offense plus reserves in Japan) would have been around 14 and that included several lower quality divisions. The rest were needed in China and if Japan wanted to give up on China (which was not an option politically) then they might as well just do that and have USA drop the oil embargo.

That still leaves the problem with finding shipping for all 14 divisions which would have had to be taken from the shipping that barely was enough to supply Japan. That really is not a great option either, especially when we are talking about an operation(s) that would take several months.

Japanese naval and air superiority would also be somewhat questioned. Of course we can only guess what type of naval actions that could take place during the Hawaii operation but at the time of Pearl Harbor 3 US carriers were in the Pacific with a fourth (Yorktown) leaving Norfolk Dec 16 and reaching San Diego Dec 30. If USA had felt seriously threatened it would be odd if not one or two more would have been sent from the Atlantic.

The Wildcat fighter might not have been the best but US carriers still managed to do some damage in the battles in the first half of 1942. So it would be rather dubious to outright dismiss the threat from just the historical US navy deployment even before the Japanese finally had taken Hawaii.

Even if USA gave up on Hawaii the Japanese invasion navy, with 6 fleet carriers, would have faced 4-6 US carriers that were supported by land based aircraft(perhaps not many but still) They would have been a serious threat to transports and hindered the Japanese ability to support their ground troops.

Now I'm not familiar with the locations of aircraft factories in California (if we assume that is an objective to protect for the army) but I doubt they were far away from major cities so it should not have been that difficult to protect. And with a slow moving fleet of transports and no clear air superiority it would have been difficult to achieve surprise. Even if the landing itself was unopposed the US army should have units and time enough to contain and eliminate the invasion force.

The combination of numerical superiority, surprise and supply line length that enabled Japan to take most of its objectives in SE Asia simply aren't there for a drive across the Pacific against USA. I cannot see how an American President would ever feel he would have to make peace/truce even with Japanese troops landing in California.

Just because we know that the historical strategy let to defeat does not mean any other strategy would have been better. Invading Hawaii would have been a better option than the California invasion, although still very risky. An even better option, also risky, would have been not to attack USA at all.

CBR

Seamus Fermanagh

02-09-2009, 22:31

Now I'm not familiar with the locations of aircraft factories in California (if we assume that is an objective to protect for the army) but I doubt they were far away from major cities so it should not have been that difficult to protect. And with a slow moving fleet of transports and no clear air superiority it would have been difficult to achieve surprise. Even if the landing itself was unopposed the US army should have units and time enough to contain and eliminate the invasion force.

Boeing was HQ'd in Seattle. Martin, Lockheed, and Hughes all had facilities in the LA/Long Beach/Santa Ana area. Numerous others sprung up.

Agent Miles

02-11-2009, 19:13

Taiheiyo sensou (太平洋戦争) – or the Pacific War (version 2.0)

http://www.japan-101.com/history/hull_note_document.htm
Japan must abandon its possessions in China and French Indochina or face economic starvation from the U.S. and U.K./CW/Dutch. So the Japanese chose war.

http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/japan/administrativearmy1941.html
Order of Battle (notice the truck brigades that moved supplies around)
http://niehorster.orbat.com/014_japan/41-12-08_army/ija_ground-units/_4-rgt_organization.html
1941 Japanese Division (Square) which was the Table of Organization and Equipment for the first 18 divisions,
http://niehorster.orbat.com/014_japan/41-12-08_army/ija_ground-units/_3-rgt_organization.html
1941 Japanese Division (Triangular) the TOE of all the other divisions

The twelve divisions that the IJN supplied and moved for the invasion of the Philippines and Malaysia/Burma (which were: the Guard, 2nd, 5th, 16th, 18th, 33rd, 38th, 48th, 51st, 55th, 56th and 104th), as well as many separate brigades, are instead supplied and moved to Midway and then Hawaii. These were trained soldiers led by experienced officers who knew how to ‘shoot, move and communicate’.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm
CBR’s link kindly reports that the Japanese had earmarked 4 million tons of shipping to the war effort in their plan, which would more than suffice to move and supply twelve divisions in my scenario. Midway would have been a speed bump and the two divisions on Hawaii would not stand a chance against twelve divisions. All the carriers in the IJN would have easily attained air superiority against untrained, ill-equipped U.S. pilots.
http://www.world-war-2-planes.com/mitsubishi-a6m-zero-japanes-aircraft.html
A6M Zero was the best plane in the world.
Only two USN carriers would be available to stop this attack in January ’42.
Admiral Halsey knew that his pilots could barely hit training targets, let alone combat ships.
Now, with twelve divisions on Hawaii and the most powerful carrier fleet in the world with 600+ ground based Zeros for use, the Japanese would be poised for an attack on the west coast by Feb./Mach ‘42
.
Of course, the U.S. would simply sink those four million tons of cargo ships.
http://www.historynet.com/us-torpedo-troubles-during-world-war-ii.htm
The Torpedo problem
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-4.html
Actual Japanese Merchant Shipping losses

Failing this, 1.4 million draftees that could barely march together and had never fired a shot in anger, would defend 1200 miles of coastline that led to 25% of the U.S. aircraft production. During an invasion, they would have to learn to shoot, move and communicate while being bombed and strafed. Their HQ, supply dumps, transportation pools, artillery parks, and communication centers that they depended on would be bombed and strafed. Mechanized convoys, troop concentrations, airfields and any counterattacking units would be bombed and strafed. Anything that moved would be…well, you guessed it. All they have to do is keep a quarter of a million Japanese soldiers from plundering a major city and slaughtering the inhabitants.

Of course, the four CV’s and four CVL’s of the USN would stop this the same way only three CV’s did at the real Battle of Midway.
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-list.asp

Let’s look at Midway. The Japanese thought that they had crippled the USN carrier forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea. They weren’t expecting three carriers (which they most certainly would be for an invasion). Even with the element of surprise at Midway, the U.S. victory owed much to simple good luck. The attack was launched from a distance where the Wildcats could not escort the strike. Without fighters, the torpedo bombers found the target and were annihilated. The commander of a squadron of dive bombers was sent to the wrong location, figured out in his head where the Japanese should be and followed a hunch before his fuel ran out. When he arrived, all of the fighters and flak were focused on the torpedo bombers and overlooked his squadron, who saved the day. So all FDR has to plan on for the defense of the continental U.S. is a total freaking miracle.

No less than Churchill, Stalin, Einstein and most likely Gen. Marshall would explain to him what a great idea this would be.
That is why he would sign a truce.

Spino

02-12-2009, 00:33

Excellent thread so far, I'm throughly enjoying everyone's input!

The Japanese empire's overall strategy during WW2 was a curious mix of clever and daring strategy combined with close minded conservatism and ego fueled foolishness. For a nation that sported a GDP and industrial base slightly larger than France's and a population less than half that of the United States the choice to go to war with US begged the question "What in blazes were they thinking?"

Nice chart on Axis & Allied GDP during the war. It really highlights the futility of fighting a war of attrition, let alone any other kind of war, against the US. Take note of how the US' GPD nearly doubled between 1938 and 1945....
http://www.onwar.com/articles/0302.htm

Imperial Japan's war effort was, like those of its fellow Axis members, plagued with mistakes. However unlike Germany which had a much larger GDP and industrial base which helped offset some of its losses Japan's limited means meant it could ill afford to make one major mistake, let alone a series of short sighted decisions and outright blunders. Were it not for the vast expanse of the Pacific ocean and America's 'Germany First' strategy it is entirely possible that Japan could have been knocked out of the war by 1943.

Industry:
Japan's military industrial complex built a dizzying array of planes, vehicles, submarines and warships when it should have concentrated its efforts building a few effective and proven designs. It compounded this error by continuing to build obsolete equipment well into the later years of the war (especially equipment that reinforced failed or obsolete strategies). Oddly enough both Japan and Italy followed this diverse building strategy to the detriment of their forces.

Case in point, the vaunted Japanese Zero. The A6M Zero was a great, early war carrier aircraft that became effectively outdated by late 1942/early 1943. When unnecessary losses began to mount in light of the Zero's fundamental weaknesses (poor high speed performance, no armor, no self-sealing fuel tanks & fragile airframe) all early marks should have been phased out immediately in favor of upgraded ones which redressed these faults. And yet both Japan's high command and it's pilots continued to resist the idea of adopting such upgrades or plane designs that traded maneuverability & range for speed, power & survivability! The Japanese Army was equally arrogant and close minded as illustrated with its reliance upon the Ki-43, a plane inferior to the A6M Zero in every category save maneuverability. And yet Japan continued to build and field the Ki-43 until the end of the war! And yet unlike the Navy the Army had better alternatives on hand early on. The Allies had more respect for less numerous marks like the Ki-44 ('Tojo') and Ki-61 Hien ('Tony') which were faster & more rugged than the Ki-43 and Zero. Even excellent later war designs such as the Ki-84 Hayate ('Frank') and N1K1 Shiden ('George') were initially resisted by Japanese pilots. This close minded mentality had horrendous consequences considering Japan could ill afford to lose skilled pilots, let alone equipment.

This excellent website sports a page which highlights the incredible disparity in wartime production between the US and Japan.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Strategy:
Fleet operations - Japan built a sizeable, state of the art carrier force but given its industrial capacity it could barely afford to lose a single carrier without seriously hindering its ability to project power. And yet Japan risked more fleet carriers in piecemeal operations (i.e. Coral Sea) during the early years of the war than did the United States which took greater pains to consolidate what few carriers it had on hand in the Pacific.

Submarine strategy - Despite the fact that the Japanese military routinely brutalized conquered populations and mistreated enemy POWs it adopted this inexplicable strategy of refusing to allow its submarines to engage in the 'dishonorable' pursuit of attacking enemy merchant shipping at the onset of hostilities! A foolish decision considering Japan had the best torpedoes of the war; they were the fastest, most reliable, longest running and packed the most punch of any torpedo fielded by any nation. And yet rather than unleash its sizeable submarine fleet against vulnerable Allied merchant ships and convoys in the early stages of the war it squandered them needlessly in recon missions and in hunts to destroy Allied warships. Had Japan unleashed those submarines on those lone merchant ships and poorly protected (if protected at all) supply convoys bound for Australia, New Guinea and the Solomons in early 1942 the US' efforts to strengthen Noumea and seize Guadacanal might have been pushed back several months. In spite of its flawed doctrine Japan's submarine fleet went on to sink approximately one million tons of Allied shipping. Eventually Allied ASW and code breaking caught up with the Japanese submarine fleet which was eventually relegated to delivering supplies & troops to isolated island bases.

Convoys - Speaking of submarines, even in light of terrible merchant losses suffered to Allied submarines the Japanese high command resisted the idea of implementing convoys until 1944!

The interesting thing is had the Japanese simply forced themselves to work out a grand strategy that did not directly involve the US they could have had free run of SE Asia and the rest of the Pacific. FDR had a devil of a time convincing Congress & the US population that another world was was in their best interest. Without the attack on Pearl Harbor the US population would have simply maintained its apathy about all things relating to Asia and the Pacific.

US Invasion
The problem with a scenario where the Japanese Empire invades the US is that it doesn't factor in an extremely well armed and patriotic population. And whatever the condition of the American military at the onset of the war you can bet it wouldn't take long for every single soldier stationed in the contiguous 48 states to be put on every commandeered train, plane, ship and automobile and sent straight to the point(s) of invasion. After that toss in every rabid Japanese hating hunter & patriot with a rifle taking pot shots at the invaders. After an initial, brilliant surprise attack and beach landing(s) the Japanese invasion force would eventually be crippled by attrition and the host of problems that accompany incredibly lengthy and vulnerable supply lines.

We also have to take into account the probability that the US government would engage in scorched earth policies so as to deny the Japanese all possible means of feeding & maintaining its invasion forces which would no doubt be relying heavily upon foraging and pillaging for its needs. Furthermore in order for Japan to adequately secure and protect its invasion sites it would also have to block and/or disrupt naval reinforcements arriving via the Panama canal and/or from around the southern tip of South America. This would further dilute its carrier presence & air support for the west coast invasion beaches. When it comes down to it Japan simply didn't have the means or the numbers to conquer and subdue a massive chunk of such a large, industrialized and fiercely patriotic nation.

Speaking as to fun specifics had the Japanese actually invaded the mainland they would have eventually learned the futility of fighting early war American tanks. The Japanese were mauled by Russian armored formations at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol; they could barely handle Russian BT-5s, BT-7s and T-26's (all light tanks) so how they would have handled the M5 Stuart, M3 Lee and M4 Sherman with their weak AT guns and virtually non-existent infantry AT weapons is anyone's guess. Furthermore whatever the shortcomings of the F4F Wildcat it would have been the P-40 Warhawk and P-39 Airacobra that would have been relied upon to deal with Japan's carrier planes during an invasion. The P-40 Warhawk was superior to the F4F Wildcat in every way save perhaps durability (the P-40 was no dog, it was effective against the Bf-109E in N. Africa and Russia). By late 1941 the Flying Tigers also proved that, when used properly, the P-40 was more than a match for Japan's Oscars and Zeros.

Last but not least simply compare the massive naval & air assets the US military required as being essential for the invasion of Okinawa in 1945 (as well as what it intended on using for the planned invasion of the Japanese mainland) to what the Japanese Empire had at its disposal in 1942. It's like comparing a mountain to a mole hill.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Okinawa

The total strength of the Allied fleet at Okinawa was 1,600 ships, including 40 aircraft carriers, 18 battleships, 32 cruisers and 200 destroyers. The U.S. Navy sustained greater casualties in this operation than in any other battle of the war.
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/okinawa/default.aspx

The United States Navy assembled an unprecedented armada in April of 1945, with 1,300 ships laying in wait off the coast of Okinawa.[18] In fact, the effort in the spring offensive of 1945 was far greater than the previous spring offensive in Europe. During the Normandy invasion, the Allies had employed 150,000 troops, 284 ships, and 570,000 tons of supplies, all of which required a very short supply line. On Okinawa, in Japan's back yard, maintaining the supply line seemed an incomprehensible feat. In the invasion of Okinawa, there were 183,000 troops, 327 ships, and 750,000 tons of supplies.[19]
This page sports a fantastic breakdown of what went into the American invasion at Okinawa. Simply astounding.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/okinawa/

Here's what the Imperial Japanese Navy had in 1941... and unlike the Okinawa invasion force this was everything the Japanese had that could float and fight...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy

In 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy possessed 10 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, 38 cruisers (heavy and light), 112 destroyers, 65 submarines, and various auxiliary ships.[35]
Of those 10 aircraft carriers only six were fleet carriers (Zuikaku, Shokaku, Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu & Soryu), the remainder were smaller escort carriers. Nonetheless six fleet carriers is impressive, but the IJN would need to keep that fleet fully fueled, supplied and loaded with replacements for whatever losses it experienced during the invasion. The modest damage and pilot losses sustained at the Battle of the Coral Sea forced the IJN to plan the Midway invasion without their best carriers, the Shokaku and Zuikaku. That's 1/3 of Japan's total fleet carrier force knocked out from one battle with only two American carriers. If you're going to invade the USA, even a poorly prepared USA, you're going to need to bring more than what Japan could bring, alot more. And if Japan brings her entire navy along to take the west coast what would remain behind to stave off the remaining British fleet and keep the newly secured Asian empire under control?

In 1942 the Imperial Japanese Navy was a fraction of the size of the US fleet that undertook the invasion of the small island of Okinawa. The Japanese navy could barely keep its forward bases at Guadacanal, Rabaul, Tobruk and Saipan fully supplied during the war. A Japanese invasion of the US mainland? Not a chance in hell of succeeding.

Agent Miles

02-12-2009, 17:17

Spino

02-12-2009, 20:24

Once again, either the Japanese destroy the west coast and butcher millions of Americans, or FDR scorches the west coast and uses human waves of patriots to stop the invasion. I already considered this possibility. This would have the same end effect. These patriots weren’t even a trained militia like we had in the Revolution. Who is going to feed them? They would end up diseased and useless. If they just drove to California or hopped on a train, then they would clog the very transport lines that the Army must use to get supplies to the 1.4 million soldiers. If you can’t explain how the actual Army would credibly stop the Japanese, then how should someone believe that a patriotic rabble would do it?

I never said 'patriotic rabble' would stop the Japanese, I said they would play a part. Well armed patriots compelled by extreme nationalism and/or racial hatred can work wonders. For stellar examples of the effectiveness of well armed guerilla insurgencies during WW2 simply look up the accomplishments of Polish & Soviet partisans on the eastern front.

The Japanese have 4 million tons of shipping to keep their invasion force supplied. As CBR inadvertently pointed out in considerable detail, that is more than enough to sealift the invasion force along with two months supply and then continue to supply it. The USN subs are armed with dud torpedoes, so what is going to attack these ships, the USN carriers? The USN did not have surface raiders and the carriers would not have been risked. Remember, a damaged carrier must go to the east coast for repair or set in San Diego as a target. So how are the Japanese supply lines vulnerable?

Four million tons of shipping... dedicated entirely to the taking of the US west coast?!? So this is an all or nothing venture? So what about the rest of Japan's empire in SE Asia and the SW Pacific? How do they get all that iron, tin, rubber, oil, etc. from the newly conquered Asian/Pacific territories to Japan, by truck? So we are operating under the assumption that prior to an invasion of the US mainland the Japanese have effectively neutralized the Hawaiian islands and Pearl Harbor? Has the battle of the Coral Sea taken place? Where are all the US carriers that survived Pearl Harbor? What about the remaining US carriers? Are we assuming all eight US carriers (seven fleet, one escort) that were not present at Pearl Harbor were destroyed as well (Lexington, Saratoga, Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet, Wasp, Ranger & Long Island)?

And as I posted before, with all Japanese naval assets diverted towards a US invasion what are they going to use to stave off the British naval presence based out of India? Once Nazi Germany abandoned its plans of invading Britain the UK was able to deal with pressing issues not related to staving off an invasion or sinking U-Boats. How do the Japanese deal with the possiblity of a few British carriers wreaking havoc with their recent conquests in the west? From the Japanese perspective the entire point to the war was to bring into the fold the raw materials of the Pacific Rim that Japan did not possess, not throw everything they had in a foolish bid to conquer the western US.

The IJN does not have to send its forces to Panama or the southern tip of South America, the USN must do this. A concentrated IJN can wait and pounce on a split USN. The Atlantic fleet must steam up the coast or the USN Pacific flee must flee down the coast to meet this force and thus leave the west coast undefended.

So you would give the American fleet a chance to consolidate before hitting it?!? Hitting the canal itself and rendering it useless before American ships have a chance to use it would be ideal. Hitting the US Atlantic fleet as it travelled throught the canal and emerged on the Pacific side would be the next best thing. Either way you need to create a dedicated strike force to do the job which will take away from the invasion force's overall effectiveness and element of surprise. Keep in mind the US navy actually played out wargame exercises prior to the war where the adversary carrier fleet did just that, take out the canal. If you're going to attack the US mainland you have to deal with the canal and anything that tries to use it. Failure to do so means the Panama canal region gets transformed into a massive naval base and staging area.

The early war U.S. tanks would have been little more than burning wrecks without control of the air. The Japanese would have done to the U.S. what we did to the German tanks in Normandy. Don’t forget that the Japanese lost to no less than Gen. Zhukov in that battle with the Soviets. We did not have a Guderian. We built a mechanized army long before we knew how to use it.

The Japanese navy had no dedicated close air support aircraft other than the D3A Aichi 'Val' dive bomber. Dive bombing is only so effective against enemy tanks and if you only have a few hundred dive bombers on hand (taken from all 10 aircraft carriers) there's only so many tanks you're going to take out while taking into account other targets of opportunity. Even the Stuka had some difficulty delivering bombs with pinpoint accuracy on moving targets (especially tanks) on the eastern front. Furthermore as with the Zero the D3A and B5N 'Kate' torpedo/bomber sported zero armor and no self-sealing fuel tanks. The Japanese lost 29 aircraft out of the 353 that participated in two successive waves at Pearl Harbor, that's a 8-9% attrition rate for one day's work, not bad. Now imagine the attrition rate after several months of intense fighting on the west coast. How quickly do you think Kido Butai could replace its lost planes and more importantly, its dead pilots?!? And how quickly would it take the Japanese navy to ship naval and army squadrons from Asia and get them set up in the US? Cargo and supply ships take alot longer to reach their destination than warships and regardless of whether you're traveling from Japan to Hawaii or straight from Japan to the US mainland, either way that's a loooong haul.

As to your Zhukov reference... you are forgetting that in 1941 the Americans had someone by the name of Patton. Even before the war he was widely acknowledged as being our best armored formation commander and a driving force behind the creation of our armored forces. You can bet he would have been given command of one of the Corps assigned to kick the Japanese off the US mainland.

The Zero was the best fighter in the world not just the best carrier plane. The P-40 and P-39 were no match, read some history. Only experienced pilots like those in China had learned how to survive against Zeros. The tactic they used was that if you had altitude and if you surprised the Zero, then you could dive on them from behind and get in one attack. Then you must immediately use the speed boost from the dive to break away before you got shot down. Of course, you can’t exactly do this if you are escorting bombers to a target, or if you don’t have surprise, or more altitude, or if you have to stay around and say, actually defend ground troops or something like that. The information that they had sent to the U.S. was largely ignored by racist officers who refused to believe the Japanese could even build such a superior aircraft. Actually, most American officers from MacArthur on down totally underestimated the Japanese. Imagine that!

The Zero was not the best fighter in the world in late 41/early-mid 42 but it was flown by some of the best pilots. The Flying Tigers proved the Zero was hardly invincible, let alone superior to the P-40. You could certainly make a strong argument that the Zero was the best carrier borne fighter aircraft during 1941 and 1942. Truth be told in 1941/42 the best fighter in the world was a toss up between the Spitfire V, the Focke Wulf 190A and the Bf-109F.

The U.S. invaded a strongly defended fortress where the fortifications had been constructed for years on Okinawa. The Japanese would not face anything like what was on Okinawa. The size of the Okinawa task force proves nothing. The Japanese took Luzon when they were out-numbered 3:2. The U.S. force on the west coast would be spread out over 1200 miles and the Japanese would be concentrated at the point of attack. The Japanese wouldn’t be waiting on the beaches like we did at Anzio. They would be driving all over as they did throughout the Pacific.

Yes but Luzon was practically next door to the Japanese empire (within reasonable range of its friendly territories and island bases) compared to the US west coast which was on the far side of the Pacific. Japanese would also be confronted with a much larger, and wide open front on the US west coast. That means more options for a US counterattack and alot more ground for the Japanese to defend. Furthermore US infrastructure was pretty damn good in 1941/42; we had numerous ways of getting reinforcements and supplies to the west coast in a timely fashion.

People keep arguing with a U.S. military that would not exist for months or even years. How would the military in March 1942 stop an invasion? The Japanese had a window of opportunity where they could savage the U.S. to the detriment of the war effort against Hitler. Even you suggest that the U.S. would just scorch one quarter of our aircraft industry along with the west coast and sacrifice millions of citizens as though this is a solution. Yes, we win against the Japanese, if we want a Nazi Europe. Nothing you have said would convince FDR to destroy half the country rather than sign a truce.

Considering the bulk of US industry and agriculture lie to the far east of the Rocky Mountains it is entirely reasonable to think a scorched earth campaign would be considered if it could exert an enormously negative influence on the invaders. The American people screamed for blood after Pearl Harbor, how do you think they would have reacted if the Japanese invaded the mainland and committed atrocities against civilians?!? The day after Pearl Harbor it was not uncommon to see lines stretch around the block at recruiting offices throughout the country. There would be little need for the government to motivate the nation with propaganda encouraging them to make sacrifices and pitch in to kill the Japanese invaders.

Last but certainly not least you are also forgetting that the US was not quite as ill prepared for war as you think. US industry was already churning out tons of weapons and equipment and rearming its military in 1941, all thanks to the Lend/Lease program and the US government's concerns over Japan's designs on her Asian neighbors. With a Japanese invasion you can bet the overwhelming majority of supplies, weapons, planes, tanks, etc. heading to the UK and Soviet Union would suddenly be diverted towards the arming of a west coast liberation army.

CBR

02-13-2009, 04:12

http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/japan/administrativearmy1941.html
Order of Battle (notice the truck brigades that moved supplies around)
Yes several truck regiments but nonetheless:

"Please keep in mind that Japanese divisions could be between 14,000 and 32,000 troops and were commanded by lieutenant generals. One reason for their size was a 4,000 man transport regiment which included mules, horses, and carts."

Also:

"Despite their size, Japanese divisions were light compared to the British division, and even more so compared to the American"

And please take a note of the divisional artillery in your next two links. Maybe not all US divisions were fully equipped but in general the Japanese would have been outgunned. Their performance in Guadalcanal did not seem that convincing. But maybe the USMC division was special?

CBR’s link kindly reports that the Japanese had earmarked 4 million tons of shipping to the war effort in their plan, which would more than suffice to move and supply twelve divisions in my scenario.
If you care to notice the Navy takes up a substantial part of the tonnage and that is not used for the Army. The around 1.4 million tons of Army shipping would not be enough for all 12 divisions. The axis history link provides a breakdown of shipping for the various historical operations.

Also note the shipping requirements might have 2 months of food for the soldiers but not that much ammunition. It won't hold for long with 2000 rounds per artillery tube. Also food would be consumed during the journey across the Pacific. Extra shipping would be needed.

There are also the added requirements from extra artillery and tank regiments.

Only two USN carriers would be available to stop this attack in January ’42.
At the time of Pearl Harbor there were 3 carriers in the Pacific: Lexington and Enterprise was at sea and Saratoga was at San Diego. And as already described in my other post Yorktown arrived at San Diego on Dec 30. So historically there were 4 carriers in the Pacific by early Jan 1942. We should add perhaps a max 2 weeks for extra carriers coming from the Atlantic if USA felt a need for them.

Admiral Halsey knew that his pilots could barely hit training targets, let alone combat ships
And yet they managed to hit targets in May and June 1942, even in Dec 1941 as Wildcats managed to sink a destroyer at Wake Island.

...with 600+ ground based Zeros for use, the Japanese would be poised for an attack on the west coast by Feb./Mach ‘42
Wait what ground based Zeros?
.

Of course, the U.S. would simply sink those four million tons of cargo ships.
http://www.historynet.com/us-torpedo-troubles-during-world-war-ii.htm
The Torpedo problem
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-4.html
Actual Japanese Merchant Shipping losses
Yeah Japan lost around 8+ million tons and about half of that were from submarines but what does that have to with the threat from US carriers and land based aircraft off the coast of California? And dive bombers did not have a problem with defective torpedoes anyway.

Failing this, 1.4 million draftees that could barely march together and had never fired a shot in anger, would defend 1200 miles of coastline that led to 25% of the U.S. aircraft production.
The US army had around 1.5 million by June 1941 in 34 divisions and various support units. On Sept 16 1940 the Selective Training and Service Act was signed by FDR and the actual draft began in Oct. A max of 900,000 men could be in training and service was set to 1 year (extended in Aug 12 1941) FDR had already declared a limited national emergency on Sept 8 1939 and the Army and National Guard had been increased to 227,000 and 235,000.

I have no idea how fast all these man were gathered but even if we assume it was spread out from October to June then it would put the average training time to about a year (from 8 to 16 months in Feb/Mar 1942) plus the divisions that already were active before the draft. A majority of these divisions had been involved in large multi divisional maneuvers. There were still equipment shortages by December 1 as only 7 divisions was considered fully equipped but the invasion is still maybe 3 months away so more divisions would be 100% ready.

No one would ever contemplate to defend such a lengthy coast line. Put a few divisions near the main cities and the rest as an operational reserve ready to focus on the landing area. Sounds like a better plan to me.

During an invasion, they would have to learn to shoot, move and communicate while being bombed and strafed.
The 6 Japanese carriers had a total load of 387 ready planes and 54 reserve planes (as at Pearl Harbor) Luftwaffe had like 3-4 times that just in bombers for the Polish and French campaigns. 108 plus 18 reserves would be Zero's. Just how long do you think they could maintain any type of air superiority and how much damage could so few aircrafts really do?

Let’s look at Midway...
If you look at all the carrier battles fought in 1942 you will notice how luck/randomness played a big role: who was discovered first, unreliable info on sighted enemy fleets, weather, course changes etc etc. We can only expect the same thing for the big showdown off California.

The US Navy can afford to wait. With the loss of Pearl Harbor they are on the defensive for now. For every day that passes the army is digging in and getting more equipment. For every day that passes the Japanese Army is eating its food and is one day further away from grabbing the SE objectives.

The Japanese Navy will have to cover the transports while still seeking out a battle with the US carriers. At a landing it will have to cover the beachhead and later on try to provide air support to the army while still worrying about the US navy. That is not gonna be easy.

CBR

Agent Miles

02-13-2009, 17:30

CBR

02-13-2009, 17:48

The Zero was at its best in a classic lower speed dogfight. If inexperienced enemy pilots allowed themselves to get involved in that then the Japanese pilot had an advantage against the Spitfire. The best way to deal with a Zero would be the so called boom and zoom.

http://www.acepilots.com/discussions/spitfire_zero.html

http://www.simhq.com/_air/air_024a.html

CBR

Agent Miles

02-13-2009, 18:49

CBR, most of the armies of the world in 1942 used horses and mules to move supplies. That doesn’t make the Japanese less effective. You act like they were a third world banana republic. Airpower would reduce the artillery, along with everything else, in U.S. divisions. Attacking at one point with over whelming force, they would win through. Also, your graphic shows over 354,000 cubic feet of ammunition or the equivalent of over 10,000 tons being shipped with the division. So they take the Catalina islands with six divisions, go back to PH and then bring the other 6 ashore.

BnZ is basically the tactic I already discribed, except that its 1942 not 2009 and the U.S. mostly had inexperienced pilots and most of the experienced ones didn't know to do this. The Zero swept away all challengers. Read "Zero Fighter" by Martin Caidin, an American who apologizes several times in the book at the astonishing performance story that he knew would not be well received by western readers. The Japanese had learned in China that you cannot operate without control of the air. The Zero gave them this. The incredible range advantage of the Zero would give them the drop on USN carriers that would have to fight. Unless you want to say that a miracle like what happened at Midway would prevent this. The Japanese could trade their light carriers for our only carriers, as during the Coral Sea Battle and then wipe out land based fighters from a safe distance. What could be done in March 1942 to prevent a catastrophe?

CBR

02-13-2009, 20:42

I don't think they were third class military but neither do I make them into something invincible that somehow could crush a US army while being outnumbered and out gunned. Having horses means a disadvantage, both for shipping, general food requirements as well as transport capacity. From the numbers I have seen a US division had heavier artillery, more machineguns and better rifles of course.

And yet you want a Japanese army mainly consisting of infantry with light artillery and little tank support to roll over the US forces that only grow stronger for every day. US forces that have had 2+ months to prepare and dig in near the major cities. Although being green troops, they should have had enough training to perform at a reasonable level especially with advantages in numbers. I just don't see where that Japanese uber fighting skill is that can overcome such odds.

Now they are supposed to take an island and move the transports back (taking maybe 20 days total back and forth) for the remaining force. You want them to build an airbase, ok maybe the airport on Catalina Island is fine assuming the island can be taken which is also assuming a lot, and have escort carriers to ship more planes forward. Not only are you increasing the logistical needs but you are also making this less and less a blitzkrieg offensive. It has become more a war of attrition or rather a siege and I'm wondering who is under siege at that point.

It is impossible to say with certainty the results of a carrier battle(s) as luck could have produced dramatic results for either side. Just remember that US carriers could have support from landbased planes a lot easier than the Japanese navy. Sure at Coral Sea the US lost a fleet carrier while Japan only lost an escort carrier but Shokaku was heavily damaged and forced to limp back to Japan for repairs and was out for a few months. Santa Cruz was even worse with two Japanese carriers being out of action for at least 3 and 5 months.

I'd say there was a higher chance of several actions of high attrition for both sides than some Midway scenario. The problem for the Japanese carriers would be the need to cover their supply line, beachhead as well as themselves while the US navy has more freedom.

If Japan could indeed take and hold Catalina Island, that could cause a lot of trouble for the use of San Diego as naval base for USA. But I just think it would be extremely risky to go for that. It is just too close to US naval and air bases and there is little chance of surprise. Then we are back to the idea that Japan could do whatever they wanted when the historical carrier battles show it was not so, better ranged Zero's or not.

CBR

Spino

02-13-2009, 21:01

Well Spino, I think that the patriots would be standing in those lines at the Draft office and wouldn’t be soldiers for many months. The other partisan armies you mention took many months to get organized. As my other posts, which I guess you didn’t read explained, my scenario dealt with a DoW on only the U.S., followed by all the available forces of the Japanese Empire focused on taking Midway, Hawaii and then invading the west coast, thus forcing a truce before a true disaster occurred.

You conveniently and consistently overlook the fact that Japan foolishly gambled on the US not caring about its losses at Pearl Harbor and suing for peace in the aftermath rather than choosing to fight a full scale war. And yet look how Pearl Harbor galvanized the government and the population. And why would America be so quick to write off the west coast? More than 600 thousand Americans died fighting the Civil War and more than 100 thousand died fighting WW1, clearly we were not nearly as sensitive to casualties and privations back then as we are now. And how do you arrive at millions of Americans dying in such a short period of time? Again, if you have Japanese invaders killing American civilians by the thousands, tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands you're looking at a racially tinged crusade mentality taking root in the population. After Pearl Harbor the US government sought nothing but an unconditional surrender from the Japanese. After a US invasion the average American would probably settle for nothing less than doing to Japan what the Romans did to Carthage... total destruction with NO rebuilding & rejuvenation program.

You are commiting the same exact mistake as the Japanese High Command in your gross misunderstanding of the mentality prevalent in the US during the early part of the 20th century. Prior to Pearl Harbor the US population did not want to fight another major war not because it was timid or felt it couldn't but because it simply did not care about the affairs of Europe and Asia. Isolationism is not to be confused with timidness. Most Americans simply felt that no foreign war warranted expending American lives as it did in WW1 where we came away with nothing to show for it except for 100,000+ dead. In 1942 the US was hardly the politically correct haven it is now and it certainly was not 1930's East & Southeast Asia with an impoverished, poorly armed population barely able to defend itself. With Pearl Harbor Japan turned a seemingly irrelevant foreign war into a personal one, once that happened we were in it for the long haul.

You are spending too much time obsessing over the small details and are completely missing the big picture. The shortcomings of Japan's military, industry and merchant fleet were simply too great to overcome in lieu of the demands of such a large invasion. Also, what do you think the US government would be doing from the time the Hawaiian islands were invaded to the moment the first Japanese amphibious assault craft lands on a California beach? If the Japanese invade Hawaii on December 7th it would take at least a month or two to secure the main islands. Add another three to six months needed to build up an invasion force large enough to carry out an invasion of California. During that time do you not think the US would be fortifying the west coast and moblizing its military in anticipation of an invasion? When the Japanese actually invaded they would have been mauled on the beaches as they were in their initial attempts to take Wake Island from a handful of Marines.

And you have not sufficiently answered as to how a merchant fleet critical to Japanese trade and industry is going to suddenly put off such operations and supply a massive invasion fleet. How will mainland Japan fare without those critical supplies and materials necessary to feed its population and run its industry? The whole point to Japanese expansionism was to increase imports of critical materials, not risk everything on an invasion of the US mainland.

Spino, you point out what I have said is the goal of this plan. The war supplies that were needed in Europe would have to be diverted. The west coast would be ruined. Millions of Americans would have died. Hitler might prevail and build an Atomic bomb. That is what would drive FDR to a truce.

I maintain that you hold the Japanese empire and its means of waging war in much too high a regard. Does the fact that many of its own leaders and commanders viewed the war with the US as being a huge mistake to begin with mean nothing to you? Yamamoto himself knew full well what would happen when Japan chose to declare war on the US, he even stated he would 'run wild for six months' before the US war effort caught up with the Japanese. Yamamoto had difficulty coming to terms with the decision to hit Pearl Harbor, I daresay he would have treated any order from Japan's High Command to invade the US mainland with contempt and complete disbelief. Even a best case scenario of a US invasion still turns out badly for the Japanese, they had no chance in hell of succeeding.

PanzerJaeger

02-14-2009, 01:31

Fascinating back and forth guys. :2thumbsup:

rotorgun

02-18-2009, 00:34

Here is an excerpt from an article published in the Advanced Squad Leader (ASL) Annual '92. The anecdote is enlightening in the modern version of Bushido practiced by the Imerial Japenese Army (IJA).

Moreover, Japanese military law demanded death from any commander fleeing in the face of the enemy, failing to exhaust all possible means of continuing the fight or allowing himself to be captured. A good example of this obsession with "face" occured in Burma when a senior Japanese officer on horseback, brandishing his trusty sword, attempted to board a British tank. Knocked off by hammer blows to the head, he fell under the tracks but, despite his agony, then drew his pistol and fired back at the tank to save "face".-ASL Annual '92, page 6.

This is indicative of the spirit within the entire Japanese military, both Army and Navy, despite their early tactical and technical prowess. The problem with the Japanese military of WWII, was that they were extremely conservative once a plan was adopted. Almost any change in plan would throw off its timetable, and this was often disasterous to the sucess of the plans. The Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway are perfect examples of this weakness. A Japanese commander would almost never question the plans of his superior, even in the face of defeat due to the loss of "face" that he might cause.

The breaking of the Japanese codes, while imperfect, provided the US with an means of getting inside the timing of Japanese operational timetables. This led to two very stunning defeats for the IJN. This was explained in great detail in three books I've recently read, the first is The Combined Fleet Decoded, a good history of the development and use of the Navy's intelligence against Japan; I Was There, a fascinating account of the efforts of the US naval intelligence by the late Rear Admiral Layton, who was the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer for both Admirals Kimmel and Nimitz; and finally, Shattered Sword, the Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, the story told through using primary Japanese sources for the first time.

In both of the first two I mentioned, it was the opinion of the authors that there was no feasible way for the Japanese to sucessfully capture the Hawiian Islands due to a lack of logistics, and the distances involved. Even if they had taken Midway, its use as a forward base of operations was very limited, and its air capacity was minimal. All of the fuel required would have had to come by ship, with the amount delivered doubtful considering our submarines ability to prevent this (even with those faulty torpedoes). The fact that naval intelligence was on the lookout for such a move is sufficient reason to believe that we could have interfered with any attempt. Pearl Harbor was greatly reinforced by the time any such operation could have been mounted, with something like 100,000 Army, Marine, and Naval personnel assigned. One must also face the fact that the 11 Divisions available for such an invasion, the rest of the IJA tied up in China, were just simply too busy consolidating the Dutch East Indies, Borneo, Sumatra, the Plillipines, the Marianas, The Marshalls, etc.
The Oil, Rubber, Tin, and Other rescourses needed by the IJA and IJN were a mostly located in the the Dutch East Indies. The Phillipines had to be secured to secure the flank of the Eastern flank of the oil shipping lanes in the China Sea. Without those rescourses, there was no way that an invasion of Pearl or the West Coast of America could have ever taken place even if they had wanted to do so. 80% of the Japanese oil needed to conduct the war in China came from the United States until the embargo. This forced the militarists to adopt a "Southern" strategy as opposed to taking on the Soviets.

I must agree with Admiral Layton and his naval intelligence estimate; while attractive as a strategy it could have been, there was no real possibility an invasion of the mainland to be supported logistically. Admiral Layton did claim that had Kido Butai struck the oil tanks and repair facilities at Pearl in a third raid, it would have rendered the harbor unusable as a base for the Navy for at least a year to eighteen months. It would have also driven the Pacific Fleet back to San Diego as its main base. This, more than anything, may have led the Japanese into succeeding in their strategy to drive us to the negotiating table. Failing that, it would have definately extended the war and made it much more costly to the US.

Oleander Ardens

03-15-2009, 12:28

Excellent thread so far.

I would also invite you to read about the Operation August Storm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_August_Storm), expecially the fine paper by Glantz. He is focused (as usual) much more on the soviet side, but I think it shows how the Japanese troops performed against a the deep battle of the soviets. Using the operational experience won, a vast superiority in material and men and the lessons learned in almost four hard years of war the Soviets achieved a brilliant success The Japanese in question were lightly armed, unexperienced in "modern" mobile and mechanized warfare and outclassed in almost every aspect of the operation. There is also a Battlefield called Manchuria:The forgotten battle IIRC about it.

A truly brilliant operation, here the conclusion of Glantz:

The Soviet High Command projected that operations in Manchuria would last about one month and prepared accordingly. Preparations for a short, victorious campaign involved massive redeployments of forces in lim ited time under conditions of secrecy. Carefully selected commanders manned a unified command structure to control the massive forces operating on such a wide front. Commanders at all levels selected strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and tailored their forces to secure them in the shortest possible time. A vast array of support units of all types prepared to support the combat forces. As planned, operations exploited terrain and dynamically used all elements of combat power, especially armor. Flexibility and audacity characterized the operation. Commanders at all levels displayed initiative to achieve success.

Challenging the Soviets in Manchuria were stringent time requirements, terrain obstacles, and Japanese resistance. The Soviet Army met the first two challenges itself, while Japanese dispositions and plans helped it meet the third. Essentially, the Soviets completed the operation in seven days (by 16 August). Subsequent engagements and movements were pro forma. The Soviets exceeded their timetable by three weeks, suffered light casualties, and overwhelmed the Kwantung Army.1

Why the Soviet victory? In essence, ultimate Soviet victory was inevitable. The preponderance of Soviet forces, the crumbling Japanese strategic posture in the western Pacific, the devastating bombing offensive against Japan (including the atomic bomb), and the weakened condition of the Kwantung Army all spelled inevitable defeat for Japan. So the real question then becomes why did the Soviet victory come so quickly? Although it is convenient to use the oversimplifications cited above, they mask other reasons for quick Japanese defeat.

The Soviets expected a difficult campaign when they entered Manchuria, so they prepared accordingly. The result was a bold plan of operations. The Soviets respected the prowess, at least in name, of the Kwantung Army; they had, after all, battled the Japanese forces before and knew the individual strength and bravery of the Japanese soldier. Even the knowledge that the Kwantung Army of 1945 was not the same as the one of 1941 did not measurably lessen that respect. The Soviets apparently had a fairly good knowledge of Japanese defensive plans and adjusted forces accordingly. Nevertheless, they probably overassessed the strength of Japanese covering units on the border, hence the massiveness of initial Soviet attacks. The Soviets also expected greater Japanese resistance in the redoubt area of southern Manchuria. Soviet planning reflected this overestimation in several decisions: to gain the central Manchurian plain, to inflict piecemeal defeat on Japanese forces, and to divide them before they could consolidate. Thus, the attack occurred on many axes, including the thrusts into Korea. But even Soviet commanders were surprised at the scope and speed of their own successes.

In terms of leadership, equipment, and manpower, the Kwantung Army of 1945 certainly was not the same army as it was in 1941, but it was also not so ineffective as some analysts have claimed. In many instances, the marginal replacements of 1945 performed well on the battlefield, whenever they were permitted to fight. Even in reduced state, Japanese divisions outmanned their Soviet equivalents and fought well. Thus, the Japanese 80th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 119th Infantry Division did a remarkable job at Hailar and on the road through the Grand Khingan Mountains to Pokotu. The 135th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 123d Infantry Division acquitted themselves well at Aihun and Sunwu. Many border garrisons, holed up in fortified regions against overwhelming numbers, performed heroic defenses and earned the respect of their adversaries, who perhaps thought of similar Soviet sacrifices at Brest and Sevastopol. The Soviets viewed with awe the Japanese "death units," which threw their explosive-laden bodies at Soviet tanks.2 In fact, where Japanese forces stood and fought under competent leadership, they did a credible job and gave the Soviets the opposition they had expected. In reality, it was the higher echelon leadership of the Kwantung Army who engineered the army's overall mediocre performance.

Unquestionably, the cease-fire rumors and the ultimate surrender decision disrupted Japanese operations and forestalled possibly greater Japanese resistance in southern Manchuria. Yet much of the damage had already been done and could not be undone. Setting aside Soviet actions, the Japanese High Command reacted sloppily and indecisively, whether because of overconfidence, complacency, confusion, or pessimism. Japanese overconfidence and complacency regarding the Soviets had persisted for years, if not decades, before the Manchurian campaign. The Khalkhin-Gol defeat at the hands of the Soviets was surprising to Japanese commanders in 1939, but even more surprising was how little they had learned from it. Perhaps the Soviet defeats of 1939 and 1940 in Finland and in 1941 at the hands of the Germans gave rebirth to that Japanese complacency and overconfidence. Yet, five years later, by 1945, little had been done to modernize the Japanese infantry division to make it capable of engaging a modern Soviet rifle division, much less a tank or mechanized unit. Antitank weapons were lacking, and although the division was heavy in manpower, it was lighter in firepower than the Soviet equivalent. In mechanized and tank forces, the Japanese also compared badly: they had no tank comparable to the Soviet medium T-34. The Kwantung Army was scarcely better equipped to conduct mobile war in 1945 than it had been in 1939. At least in part, this deficiency was a measure of complacency and overconfidence. Japanese plans forgot or ignored another lesson from 1939: the Soviets had a penchant for doing the seemingly impossible, such as using the arid wastes of eastern Mongolia as a launching pad for a major invasion of Manchuria. Whether through complacency or overconfidence, the Japanese demonstrated a traditional tendency to underestimate the Soviets. That underestimation spelled doom for the Kwantung Army. For whatever reasons, Japanese commanders failed their army. Confusion reigned at the top, and area army and army orders conflicted. Thus, many units withdrew from combat, while others were swallowed up by it.

Compounding the Japanese difficulties was the nature of the Soviet offensive. Japanese plans might have succeeded to a greater degree against a lesser foe. Unfortunately, the Japanese High Command faced a highly professional force led by the cream of the Soviet officer corps, blooded and educated in four years of war. Far East Command units were among the best in the Soviet Army, and their equipment had been tested against the best weaponry European arsenals could produce. For the Soviet Army, this was the last campaign in a long war, quite literally one last opportunity to excel. And excel it did. The Manchurian operation qualified as a postgraduate exercise for Soviet forces, the culmination of a rigorous quality education in combat begun in western Russia in June 1941.

Historians must exercise care when projecting lessons from the study of any military campaign, for the value of such a study derives from viewing that campaign against the concrete conditions that affected its conduct. The Manchurian campaign may hold tactical lessons to be learned and applied in similar contemporary situations, basic techniques that transcend the technological changes that have occurred since 1945. If in fact such constants, or tactical techniques derived from battle that apply to any period, do exist, then Manchuria is worthy of study.

The concrete conditions Soviet forces faced in Manchuria presented Soviet planners a unique set of problems associated with how to attack and win quickly in the beginning period of war. The Soviets adopted tech niques formulated to solve those precise problems. For example, speedy advance would preempt initial or subsequent Japanese establishment of a solid defense and would secure strategically critical territory before the Japanese could decide to abandon the war effort. Speedy advance, of course, required the Soviets to crush any opposition that might threaten their ability to adhere to that timetable.

Thus, the Soviets structured their forces to squelch the opposition and to generate the requisite speed. They also adopted tactical methods to maintain that momentum. Using cover and deception, they assembled and de ployed their forces in secret. These precautions bolstered the effectiveness of other combat techniques. Soviet forces attacked on multiple axes-in fact along every possible axis-with a majority of forces well forward in the first echelon as a means of bringing maximum pressure to bear on an already overextended foe. On each axis, the Soviets massed at the critical point and artfully maneuvered those massed forces over terrain considered impassable, much less suitable for maneuver.

In order to generate initial success and to maintain offensive momentum, the Soviets carefully timed application of their offensive power by attacking with assault units, advanced units, and then main force elements. Consequently, from the very beginning, Japanese forces were off balance, and they remained off balance throughout the short campaign. These creative Soviet methods sowed confusion in the Japanese command structure, and that, in turn, ruled out effective Japanese response.

In order to exploit these initial efforts and to preempt Japanese plans, the Soviets used armor-heavy forward detachments of every size to drive deep into Japanese positions. With limited combat power forward, Soviet main force units could advance almost unhindered. Each detachment worked in a manner similar to an awl, boring a hole into hard wood and preparing the wood for subsequent penetration by a screw. Punctured in numerous sectors, the Japanese defense lost all coherence and never regained it. Soviet main force units and the forward detachments were tailored combined arms entities suited to the terrain over which they operated. They tore into the disrupted defense, fragmented it, left it paralyzed, and raced on to their next objective. Soviet success in the campaign underscored the effectiveness of their strategic, operational, and tactical techniques.

Recent Soviet studies on the beginning period of war and the concrete nature of combat have emphasized certain of these techniques. Deception has never lost its attractiveness and currency, nor has the necessity for creating self-sustaining balanced combined arms entities at all levels. Three other techniques the Soviets used in Manchuria are still relevant on today's battlefield:

Echelon forces imaginatively, especially against a defense that may take time to gel.

In Manchuria, single echelon formation at theater, front, and army level operating on multiple axes across a broad front col lapsed and fragmented the Japanese defense before that defense could effectively establish itself. Today, applying pressure all along a broad front could rupture a partially formed defense.

Commit forces to battle in timed phases.

In Manchuria, steady, relentless hammering destroyed Japanese equilibrium and accelerated Japanese collapse. In a contemporary context, multiple penetrations and the resultant intermingling of forces would also make it difficult for defenders to use tactical nuclear weapons discriminately.

Lead with forward detachments at every command level.

In 1945, probing forward detachments perpetuated confusion in the defense and carried the battle to tactical and operational depths, thus preempting effec tive defense. Besides producing similar offensive successes, forward detachments today could also attack a defense's tactical nuclear weapons delivery systems.

A concrete legacy of the Manchurian campaign, these three techniques offer prospects for success against even a relatively prepared enemy defense. Against an unprepared or partially prepared opponent, the use of these tech niques could be devastating. The techniques worked in 1945, when mobility was in its infancy (or adolescence). So they certainly apply today, when mobility extends to virtually every aspect of a force. And they may even prohibit any rational use of tactical nuclear weapons. What is certain is that these techniques are of more than simple historical interest to Soviet tactical writers. They should be of more than historical interest to U.S. tacticians as well.

BTW the Japanese force put up heavy resistances, very often fighting to the death. But most strongpoints were made futile by punctures in other areas and the lightning fast advances on most axis of attack. Surrounded they would be reduced with heavy firepower.