Afrika Korps

[The Spartan (Returns)]

I was reading in my history textbook about the German invasion of British occupied Egypt.
It seems it was like a tug of war... the UK was very successful pushing the Germans out until Hitler (from my textbook:) "sends a crack German tank force, the Afrika Korps."
Yet again another tug of war... finally ending in German victory and the renown of General Erwin Rommel being nicknamed the "Desert Fox".

What was so "crack" about this German Panzer Force? Was it the heavily armored tanks such as the Panther and Tigers? Were the crew trained exceptionally better than others?

[A Very Super Market]

Quality of the commander, veterans, up-to-date equipment, and most importantly, SO MUCH BETTER THAN THE ITALIANS.

[The Spartan (Returns)]

Quality of the commander, veterans, up-to-date equipment, and most importantly, SO MUCH BETTER THAN THE ITALIANS.Very interesting...

Could you please tell me of famous achievements that Rommel performed, what battles the veterans come from, and what kind of tanks the German use? Basically some more interesting details :eyebrows:

I know I'm being lazy, but I also know there is better information from people, than your average Google search.

[KarlXII]

The Afrika Korps were not a "special forces" unit specifically trained for the job. They were regular Whermacht soldiers who found themselves deployed in Libya. Erwin Rommel distinguished himself as the commander of Seventh Panzer during the Invasion of France, and was given the job of blocking the British forces after they had destroyed the Italian army in North Africa.

Indeed, German soldiers had were still trying to cope with desert warfare during El Alamein. Much of the dysentry and disease came from inadequate medical development compared to Commonwealth forces.

However, Rommel made due with what he could. He often demanded much from his men, but was no arrogant and elitist, he often lead from the front, in his tank or Mammut command vehicle. He captured the hearts and minds of his men, who trusted his tactical expertise.

What made the Afrika Korps "crack" was her commander and what he did with the little resources he had. Tiger tanks were not even introduced in the African Theater until the Tunisian surrender.

[Strike For The South]

+1 because they weren't Italians

[PanzerJaeger]

Despite becoming the default designation for all German forces in North Africa in popular culture, the DAK actually refers to the small initial force commanded by Rommel of the 5th Light Division and elements of the 15th Panzer division sent to block any further advance of British forces against the Italians in Libya in 1941. This force was used in Rommel's first offensive which trounced the British and resulted in the capture of General Richard O'Connor, the man who so thoroughly defeated the Italians just months earlier.

The formation was expanded throughout the Desert War to include, at least nominally, 2 more Panzer Divisions (10th and 21st) and several light and full infantry divisions. As with all German forces in North Africa, it never achieved full strength. As the war progressed, the DAK became and ever smaller component of the larger Panzer Army Afrika - among other names given to the greater Italian-German force.

There's a lot that has been said about Rommel, the DAK, and the Italians - much of it incorrect. As is true every time the Allies came up against an enemy force that performed better, the DAK was made into an amazing/elite/technologically superior force of Aryan super-soldiers. Suffice to say, there was nothing special about the Afrikakorps or its commander. In actuality, the elite divisions of the German military (Großdeutschland, Panzer Lehr, etc.) and it's best commanders were sent into Russia.

The outstanding performance of the DAK and other German forces in Africa was simply a case of professionals entering a theatre of amateurs. Rommel's greatest attribute was not his tactical sense, but his willingness to take risks and throw himself completely at an objective. The tactics and strategies he employed were standard fare in German doctrine and duplicated on a much larger scale in France and Russia.

What is truly amazing about the Afrikakorps and Rommel was the effect such a small force had on the larger campaign. Most people don't know that North Africa was always an Italian theatre. Rommel was technically subordinate to the Commando Supremo much of the time and the vast majority of Axis troops, supplies, etc. were under Italian organization, including the troops under Rommel's direct command - who performed quite well under German leadership.

It truly speaks to the competence and abilities of the German military during the first years of the war that Rommel was able to use this small, outnumbered, under strength and undersupplied force as the proverbial "tip of the spear" to lead the - inarguably terrible - Italian Army to victory for several years in the Desert against numerically superior Allied forces.




Very interesting...

Could you please tell me of famous achievements that Rommel performed, what battles the veterans come from, and what kind of tanks the German use? Basically some more interesting details :eyebrows:




There are way too many battles to get into in detail right now. Gazala (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gazala) was arguably Rommel's greatest victory of the war. It was a textbook example of German maneuver warfare. The Brit's just couldn't keep up. Kasserine Pass (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kasserine_Pass) was the first large scale encounter the Americans had with German forces. The battle was not particularly huge but had far reaching implications within the Allied command structure. Some have speculated that the American's learned and implemented more lessons from that single battle into their doctrine than the British did with all their combined experiences fighting in the Desert.

The vast majority of German tanks used in the desert were Panzer II and III models. Panzer IV models also saw action in significant numbers as well as a very, very few number of Tigers.

I've had this in my photobucket for a while and I believe it is the famous Bovington Tank Museum (http://www.tankmuseum.org/) Tiger captured in Tunisia and still running today.

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y104/panzerjaeger/800px-TigerITankTunis.jpg

Contrary to popular belief, German tanks in North Africa, excluding the Tigers, were not superior to their Allied equivalents in any particularly meaningful ways. It was the skill of the crews as well as their doctrine which resulted in the lopsided results.

[Marshal Murat]

As I understand it, the Panzer II and Panzer III models weren't superior to the British tanks they faced. They were faster, better coordinated, and some had bigger guns, but those appeared later in the war. The British Matildas had bigger guns, heavier armor, and there were frankly more Matildas.

Rommel and the Afrika Korp was so successful because Rommel could exploit his speed to outmaneuver the British troops, and punch through British piecemeal resistance. The 88s also helped Rommel defeat British counterattacks very easily.

If the British hadn't dispersed the troops, used their combined forces more effectively, and in general hadn't thought the Germans a bunch of rats who were gonna throw themselves onto minefields willy-nilly, then it wouldn't have been such a big deal.

[The Spartan (Returns)]

Sweet posts guys. Thanks a lot, I'm lovin' the info. :bounce:

[Papewaio]

Problem was for Rommel was that he won the battle not the war in North Africa. Tactically he out maneuvered and out performed against the British. But at the end of the day he came up against the same problem that the Italians did which was logistics.The supply lines means this was more down to Navy power then Army. As long as you could make your opponent run and use up their fuel and food, it become a game of stamina not firepower.

[A Very Super Market]

Oh yes, and the desert itself suited massive maneuvreing and fuel usage. It lacked much strategic importance, so any failed battle would simply mean withdrawing until you found a large rock to entrench in. The British had fuel coming directly from the Middle East, and no amount of rebels there could curtail their transportation to Egypt, while Rommel had to make do with tiny amounts from Romania, the bulk of which were sent to the Eastern Front.

[Marshal Murat]

The majority of the logistics that Rommel had to put up with was shipped from Italy around British held Malta into Tripoli. Had the Italians successfully taken Malta, then Rommel would've had more material to wage war with, which would've tipped the scales in his favor.

[Pannonian]

The majority of the logistics that Rommel had to put up with was shipped from Italy around British held Malta into Tripoli. Had the Italians successfully taken Malta, then Rommel would've had more material to wage war with, which would've tipped the scales in his favor.
A fair amount of supplies was interdicted from Malta, but most of the fuel was used up in the supply line from Tripoli and Benghazi. Even the capture of Tobruk didn't help too much, as it was too small to adequately land supplies for the Axis army. While the British commanded the eastern Mediterranean, the Axis would have inevitably run into the problem of the Alamein position sooner or later, where there would be no outflanking by sea or land, and where the British could just sit them out. The logistics and strategic situation meant the scales couldn't have tipped enough in Rommel's favour.

[Marshal Murat]

Had the supplies not been interdicted by RAF forces, Rommel would've had alot more men, tanks, and other logistical equipment that would've allowed him more depth of action. Had Rommel had more tanks and men, he could've continued assaults that stopped not only due to logistical problems but also due to the number of tanks and number of men fit for combat. Rommel himself said "Without Malta the Axis will end by losing control of North Africa".

Had Rommel received all the supplies from Italy, Rommel would've had more striking power than what he had after the Battle of Gazala, and he could've carried the war on more effectively and in my view successfully.

[CBR]

Malta was not the real problem. Although it took losses to bring supplies to North Africa, the Italians managed to send enough. The real problem was lack of transport to the front.

http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb01/MS610.htm


While the critical role of Malta as a base for British interdiction of the Axis strategic lines of communication is undeniable, the limited intratheater distribution system was the more important problem facing the Afrika Korps. The most significant weaknesses in this system were the limited capacity of the available ports and the inadequate capabilities of German and Italian overland transportation assets. These two factors alone contributed more to Rommel's final defeat at Alam El Halfa than did all other factors combined, including enemy action for much of the campaign.
CBR

[Gregoshi]

Excellent link CBR. The logistics is alway one of those things you "know" but never seem to take into consideration - something I was guilty of while following this discussion.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Rommel never got close to 100% supply at any point in the campaign. During 1941, when he did get a fairly good percentage, he made some of his greatest gains.

I agree, for the most part, with PJ's assessment. Rommel was a very good commander, and a favorite of Adolph Hitler, but not the greatest fielded by the Wermacht. Still, he had the basic audacity needed for panzers (stosstruppen leader in ww1 as well as the ghost division command in France) and he was tenacious.

His great "genius" however, was simply using mobility and the broadness of the desert -- there was always an open flank. This is good generaling, but not necessarily great. When confronted by a tougher tactical problem -- the narrow front at Alamein, the tenacious defense of Tobruk during the first assault, the defense of the Meuse in 1940 -- he was brave, energetic and usually effective, but not necessarily brilliant. History demonstrated that he was correct in his assessment of Allied airpower on Overlord and the Western Front -- but had the panzers been forward deployed, would they have been deployed near the correct beaches? In short, Runstedt's "Marshall Bubi" was too dismissive, but Churchill's "Desert Fox" was also a bit of P.R. to make the Brits look good for besting him eventually.

Still, the DAK fought well and long against adverse conditions and, for most of their campaign, superior numbers and resources. They were beaten more logistically than tactically.

The real key to their success was the same thing that made the Wermacht disproportionally effective against superior forces throughout most of the war -- solid tactics and a degree of combined arms thinking and flexibility that none of the Allies did more than approach before the end of 1944/early 1945. The Kampfgruppe concept alone is a hallmark of that thinking, and it is that body of tactics/approach that made them so deadly. Too many casual readers fixate on the "iron discipline" and "calculating" traits attributed to Germans in the movies. Die Soldaten der Wermacht were very much disciplined and trained, but the point was NOT rigidity and low cunning, but flexibility and adaptability under adverse conditions. They simply outperformed all comers.

I believe the US Army has come to equal that level of excellence and integrative thinking -- but I don't think it's ever been surpassed.

[KarlXII]

As already mentioned, German tanks in North Africa were often obsolete models sent to the least cared for front (North Africa never recieved much attention until Operation Torch), such as Panzer II's and III's. The real punch Rommel had with his force was his 88mm AntiAir guns that he placed in an AntiTank role. In fact, he did not invent this idea, as it was used during the Invasion of France. I am not sure how he came to the use of 88's as AntiTank weapons, but it devastated most Commonwealth armor.

[A Very Super Market]

Panzer IIs and were quite numerous in '39 and '40, and Panzer IIIs were quite mainstream until '42. Neither of them were ineffective in battle, and took down their share of Lees, Matildas, Stuarts, and Valentines. And Crusaders. Though that was more to do with combined arms than anything. The DAK also had a large amount of Panzer IVs, and even received some Tigers (In '43, no less) so I wouldn't say they were sent obsolete equipment. The only obsolete things they received were just anything the Italians armed themselves with.

[Xiahou]

I'll just chime in to agree with others in that Rommel was a good commander, but not the best. Really though, I think his biggest problem was the same as every other German commander- the meddlesome micro-managing of Hitler. :shrug:

[Oleander Ardens]

The open terrain allowed for a combination of manuever and firepower that fitted the superior tactical skill of the Germans at lower and higher rank. With so much space to manuever battles were initially very fluent and ideal for the Auftragstaktik employed by thinking skilled junior officers. The responses of the allied forces would be quite slugghish in comparison. CAS was very important in the wide open areas of operation and fuel was in the "maneuver" battles the key compontent. In "set-piece" battles the light firepower caused by relative light armament in artillery and the insufficient supply of shells proved to be a huge problem against a well dung enemy. Light on tanks most tank engagements were initiated by German tanks but won by long-ranged AT guns like the 88 which were aranged in fireboxes/bases togheter with AA guns and artillery to whjch the light german tanks retreated.

Given the circumstances it is hard to believe that the German and the attached Italian forces were so successfull in this theater of operation. With the increased war effort by the Allies and the meatgrinder called Eastern front the superiority of the Allied forces in every aspect of war expect tactical and combat skill was vast. If this huge advantages was wielded with good skill by decent commanders with good troops the outcome could only be one.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Panzer IIs and were quite numerous in '39 and '40, and Panzer IIIs were quite mainstream until '42. Neither of them were ineffective in battle, and took down their share of Lees, Matildas, Stuarts, and Valentines. And Crusaders. Though that was more to do with combined arms than anything. The DAK also had a large amount of Panzer IVs, and even received some Tigers (In '43, no less) so I wouldn't say they were sent obsolete equipment. The only obsolete things they received were just anything the Italians armed themselves with.

Good points.

The German II's were outclassed, but IIIh's would hold their own with the Stuarts, Lees and Crusaders -- only falling off in their ability to kill Matilda's and Valentines. The IIIj, with it's long barreled 50, was able to beat anything aside from a Matilda fairly readily up until the Brits started fielding the Churchills and Shermans. Of course, the Germans had begun to field IV's by that point.

The DAK also had Marder's with 75mm guns and the Italians had the Semovente SPG. Both of these were good in their roles and served well. The Italian M13/40 was a rolling coffin.

[KrooK]

Germans were not loosing into Africa before Africa Corps because there ITALIANS NOT GERMANS.

Africa Corps was not better than other German Corpses. Count from veterans of polish and probably french campaign reitrained on Błędowska Desert in Poland. They had new equipment but what is more important, good commanders.
There were no Panthers or Tigers (maybe few at the end but practically no) but earlier German tanks.
And of course Africa Coprs go some luck because their first punch was in the moment, when british commanders had to send some units to Greece.

[CountArach]

:poland:

[Agent Miles]

What exactly were the combined arms tactics where the Germans excelled? The Panzer II’s were fast scout tanks that could actually defeat the thin armor of some of the British cruiser tanks at close range and chew up infantry with High Explosive rounds from its 20 mm main gun. The Panzer III’s were the mainstay and could defeat most of the slower Allied armor by outflanking them. When the panzers were outmatched, the 88 mm flak guns could defeat any Allied tank from a considerable range. The British tanks were equipped with guns that did not fire HE rounds, so the 88’s could fire at them with impunity (until the M3 and M4 showed up). The German Panzer IV’s short 75 mm HE gun on the other hand, was able to take out Allied AT gun crews. In place of set piece artillery, the Luftwaffe provided Stukas to pummel desert fortresses. So the DAK had an answer to most tactical situations that the Allies could provide.

Rommel fought a “guerrilla blitzkrieg”, which his contemporaries in Russia did not employ. He often took his force into deep flanking maneuvers without what most generals would consider adequate logistical support on the premise that he would overrun Allied supply depots and thus use Allied fuel for his panzers and Allied food and water for his troops. Possession of the battlefield was paramount as destroyed panzers were cannibalized to repair damaged panzers and fuel and ammo was always stripped away. Rommel was also not against using captured Allied equipment. Twelve British Matildas were used by the DAK, often to the confusion of both sides. Still, the Afrika Korps often had fewer than 100 panzers operational. Never have so few done so much with so little.

[Pannonian]

What exactly were the combined arms tactics where the Germans excelled? The Panzer II’s were fast scout tanks that could actually defeat the thin armor of some of the British cruiser tanks at close range and chew up infantry with High Explosive rounds from its 20 mm main gun. The Panzer III’s were the mainstay and could defeat most of the slower Allied armor by outflanking them. When the panzers were outmatched, the 88 mm flak guns could defeat any Allied tank from a considerable range. The British tanks were equipped with guns that did not fire HE rounds, so the 88’s could fire at them with impunity (until the M3 and M4 showed up). The German Panzer IV’s short 75 mm HE gun on the other hand, was able to take out Allied AT gun crews. In place of set piece artillery, the Luftwaffe provided Stukas to pummel desert fortresses. So the DAK had an answer to most tactical situations that the Allies could provide.

Rommel fought a “guerrilla blitzkrieg”, which his contemporaries in Russia did not employ. He often took his force into deep flanking maneuvers without what most generals would consider adequate logistical support on the premise that he would overrun Allied supply depots and thus use Allied fuel for his panzers and Allied food and water for his troops. Possession of the battlefield was paramount as destroyed panzers were cannibalized to repair damaged panzers and fuel and ammo was always stripped away. Rommel was also not against using captured Allied equipment. Twelve British Matildas were used by the DAK, often to the confusion of both sides. Still, the Afrika Korps often had fewer than 100 panzers operational. Never have so few done so much with so little.
Operation Compass (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Compass). A British-Commonwealth force of around 35,000, with barely enough fuel to reach the Egyptian border, against an Italian force of around 150,000. Ended up clearing out the Italians from Cyrenaica, and would have continued into Tripolitania if the bulk of the force hadn't been transferred to Greece. A highlight of the campaign was the sending of a mobile column across open desert to cut off the retreat of the Italians, while simultaneously harassing them via the road route. I wonder if Rommel would have had the same success if O'Connor, who used Rommel's tactics before Rommel ever arrived on the scene, hadn't been captured early on.

[PanzerJaeger]

I wonder if Rommel would have had the same success if O'Connor, who used Rommel's tactics before Rommel ever arrived on the scene, hadn't been captured early on.

I'm almost sure of it.

[Husar]

O'Connor can't have been all that clever if he got captured early on. ~;)

[KrooK]

Rommels first success was mostly because Britons did not respect his skills.
British generals had to send best units to Greece.
If we are comparing O'Connor and Rommel - O'Connor was better for me. Africa Corps and Britons into Africa had equal strenght at the beginning of that stage of war. O'Connor had to attack few times stronger enemy.

Anyway someone showed polish flag. Thx - looks like you are using tactic "I have no arguments so I will tell that he is Pole and uses polish propaganda". Imagine my friend that polish brigade defended Tobruk against Rommel.
And his great africa corps lost that battle (and appeared to be lower skilled than infantry brigade).

[Agent Miles]

I don’t think that you can reasonably compare what O’Connor did to Il Duce's Italians to what Rommel did to the British Commonwealth forces. The Italians were led by incompetent officers and were poorly equipped. 7th Armoured Division had dozens of Matildas that were quite literally invulnerable to any and all Italian weapons. Rommel never had an advantage like that.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Of course you can compare them.


Rommel faced a higher quality of opposition, but not quite the disparity of numbers.

O'Connor faced lower quality opposition, but quite a disparity in numbers.

Both faced supply issues.

Everyone faced water issues.


EVERYONE, faced with a desert conflict during the era of mobility, has come up with the SAME grand tactic -- whip around wide on the desert flank. Allenby -- O'Connor -- Rommel -- Montgomery -- Schwarzkopf, have all gotten to the same solution.

[Agent Miles]

I think that one must blur a lot of facts to reasonably compare the two. The Greek garrison army defeated the Italians and drove them back into Albania. So one could argue that they accomplished what O’Connor did. The French drove back an Italian army on their southern border while they were being overrun by the Germans. I’m pretty sure that the only people who did not defeat the Italians were the spear-armed Ethiopian tribesmen. Yes, Rommel and O’Connor brilliantly out-flanked their opponent, but one has to remember who their opponents were to scale the accomplishment. House training my puppy is not reasonably comparable to lion taming.

[Pannonian]

I think that one must blur a lot of facts to reasonably compare the two. The Greek garrison army defeated the Italians and drove them back into Albania. So one could argue that they accomplished what O’Connor did. The French drove back an Italian army on their southern border while they were being overrun by the Germans. I’m pretty sure that the only people who did not defeat the Italians were the spear-armed Ethiopian tribesmen. Yes, Rommel and O’Connor brilliantly out-flanked their opponent, but one has to remember who their opponents were to scale the accomplishment. House training my puppy is not reasonably comparable to lion taming.
Well, you highlighted the tactical genius of Rommel in doing what he did, so I showed you that O'Connor did exactly the same thing, using the same tactics, even down to capturing enemy fuel and equipment and using it to further push one's offensive forward. The mobile column that crossed the desert to cut off the Italian retreat was an example of kampfgruppe tactics, as it consisted of whatever mobile elements the British could pull together from available units, given an objective, then left alone to carry it out while the slower Australians pushed the Italians back frontally. How is this different in methodology from Rommel?


O'Connor can't have been all that clever if he got captured early on. ~;)
Rommel was lucky, O'Connor was unlucky. On a number of occasions, Rommel was scouting at the front when he ran into British scouts, on one occasion only getting away because he was riding in a captured British vehicle that wasn't identified. O'Connor was returning to his relocated HQ when he was caught, and his captors initially didn't realise whom they'd captured (his aides were dressed more impressively than him).


Rommels first success was mostly because Britons did not respect his skills.
British generals had to send best units to Greece.
If we are comparing O'Connor and Rommel - O'Connor was better for me. Africa Corps and Britons into Africa had equal strenght at the beginning of that stage of war. O'Connor had to attack few times stronger enemy.

Anyway someone showed polish flag. Thx - looks like you are using tactic "I have no arguments so I will tell that he is Pole and uses polish propaganda". Imagine my friend that polish brigade defended Tobruk against Rommel.
And his great africa corps lost that battle (and appeared to be lower skilled than infantry brigade).
Rommel's much vaunted genius failed him whenever he had to attack a competent enemy front-on. The Australians bloodied his nose at Tobruk, Auchinleck and Montgomery fended him off at Alamein, Montgomery was astonished at his idiocy at Medinine, and thereafter he never launched another offensive. Whatever his limitations, Montgomery was able to crumble his enemy, bulldog style, grabbing a biteful then holding on until the enemy was exhausted. The British initially failed because their commanders had outdated cavalry ideas of charges and counter charges, while the PBI were left to hold a line or bring up the rear. Once they had a commander with modern ideas of combined arms warfare, and previously, before they lost their commander with modern ideas of combined arms warfare, they were able to deal with the best the Axis could throw at them.

[Husar]

Rommel was lucky, O'Connor was unlucky.

You could use that argument for the progression of the war as well. The americans were lucky to live in america for example, the british were lucky to live on an island that's relatively hard to overrun etc. etc. :sweatdrop:

[Agent Miles]

How is this different in methodology from Rommel?

It is different because it obscures the most important factor, that of scale. If Nadal takes my six year old grandson onto a tennis court and beats him it is not comparable to Nadal beating Roddick just because he used the same “methodology”. Every nation armed with more than pointy sticks beat the Italians. Granted, O’Connor was really brilliant when he did it, but you must agree that it’s just not comparable to what Rommel did.

[PanzerJaeger]

In such a comparison, it is important to remember just how terrible the Italian army was at this time. The British were outclassed, but the Italians were simply incompetent. Some of the stunts they pulled belonged in a Monty Python skit instead of the battlefield, including top commanders deserting their armies before battles even commenced.

"Failure has had the healthy effect of once more compressing Italian claims to within the natural boundaries of Italian capabilities." -Hitler

This is not to say that O'Connor wasn't a good commander, but to hold him in the same league as Rommel due to his performance against the Italians is slightly off base.

If one were to examine Operation Compass, it is clearly evident that aside from some minor combat, it was nothing more than a series of massed surrenders. In a campaign which involved the capture or surrender of well over 100,000 Italians, the British lost around 500 men and 15 aircraft, while the Italians lost less than 3000 in non-captured or surrendered casualties. The Italian leadership was just unimaginably terrible, and the troops had very little will to put up serious resistance.*

Compare this, to say, Gazala, which involved similar troop deployments - where the British lost nearly 100,000 men and the Axis lost around 30,000 along with large numbers of tanks and planes on both sides, or 1st El Alamein where both sides lost around 15,000, or any other face off between the British and the German-led forces. These battles involved real combat on a large scale and represented a very different situation than what was prevalent during Compass. Neither side simply threw up their hands in surrender so willingly.

*The turnaround the Italians had under Rommel and German leadership is quite amazing, and demonstrates the vital importance that moral and confidence in command plays in the effectiveness of a fighting force.




Rommel's much vaunted genius failed him whenever he had to attack a competent enemy front-on. The Australians bloodied his nose at Tobruk, Auchinleck and Montgomery fended him off at Alamein, Montgomery was astonished at his idiocy at Medinine, and thereafter he never launched another offensive. Whatever his limitations, Montgomery was able to crumble his enemy, bulldog style, grabbing a biteful then holding on until the enemy was exhausted. The British initially failed because their commanders had outdated cavalry ideas of charges and counter charges, while the PBI were left to hold a line or bring up the rear. Once they had a commander with modern ideas of combined arms warfare, and previously, before they lost their commander with modern ideas of combined arms warfare, they were able to deal with the best the Axis could throw at them.

Really? :inquisitive:

Much is made of Tobruk, but in reality it was a fully supplied and reinforced fortress, with both heavily reinforced man-made defenses and natural barriers. The Axis forces only slightly outnumbered those of the Allies, and more importantly, were almost all Italian. The few German units available had to be used to defend against relieving actions such as Brevity and Battleaxe. One must also remember that the siege did not take place in a vacuum. There was a whole Allied Army just beyond the horizon that had to be kept in check.

There is little room for tactical genius in siege warfare. You either have the blunt force to knock down the proverbial walls or you don't. What is more telling is how Tobruk came under siege to begin with and O'Conner captured. Therein lies Rommel's command abilities.

Also, which Alamein are you referring to? In both battles the Axis were completely outnumbered in every respect. Take the Italians out of the equation and the German men and material were but a small fraction of the British forces. And again, there was not really much that could have been done tactically given the geographical circumstances.

You're also way off on Medinine. Rommel had very little if anything to do with the planning or command of that operation. I'm also not sure what you are trying to emphasize by stating he never launched another offensive - as this was in March of 1943 and there was nothing even remotely close to parity between the two forces numerically, not to mention the American's on the other side. :shrug:

Now then, you seem to discount all of Rommel's victories as battles won against incompetents. Wouldn't that make O'Connor, who hesitated in taking command of the situation the first time the British collapsed and then got himself captured, an incompetent as well?

[Oleander Ardens]

Mostly good posts here.

Sadly PJ is quite right that the Italian army seemed to be partly something out of Monty Python sketch. The greates fault lies on officer corps and generals and their staff. Partly Italian soliders fought valiantly, but there is only so much you can do without supply. Given the terrible and poor performances of the Italian forces in France (alpine theater, IIRC the field artillery magazine had in 1941 a nice article about it), Albania, Abessinia and Somalia the Italian army can be rated as third-class. More so in this Operation where the excellent spirit and vigor of the Allies and inspired command hammered them. I guess that all this wars by waged by the Italians with mixed results against the poor and heavily outgunned African nations had a bad influence on the Italian army.


Note that under Rommel many of them performed quite well, which just shows how incompetent their leaders were.



There is little room for tactical genius in siege warfare. You either have the blunt force to knock down the proverbial walls or you don't. What is more telling is how Tobruk came under siege to begin with and O'Conner captured. There in lies Rommel's command abilities.

Most people have sadly little understanding of warfare. As PJ rightly points out a siege is a bloody affair for the attacker unless he has overwhelming firepower. Clausewitz dictum that defense is the stronger form has been proven again and again. Thus the need to concentrate large amounts of manpower and firepower with good mobility to achieve a breakthrough. With as little as 5000 tons a day of supply there was no way to reduce the fortress-city with the little artillery they had. With only a slight superiority in numbers - most of them Italians - chances of a victory would be slim against isolated city. But Tobruq had due to it's position a very short frontline and could be supplied well by the Royal Navy. Take a look on the map.

P.S: Just compare the siege to other hard-fought sieges in WWII (Monte Cassino for example) to see how laughable the firepower of the Axis was. Note they the weight and amount of gun wasn't even that terrible - the tiny number of shells was. This battlefield series helps the less educated a good starter - here the siege of Sevastopol (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rw6gCSnT6J8&feature=PlayList&p=6EA8BF7424D4FBBA&index=5). Note the focus on heavy firepower - the "annihilation princip" of Napoleon, codified by Clauswitz.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Rommel understood the difficulty of assaulting built-up positions. His service in Italy in 1918 would have been instructive. Still, it is obvious that such situations do limit tactical options. The 'stormtrooper' tactics used by Imperial Germany in 1918 were as good as it gets for taking built up positions by storm -- and they require high-quality motivated troops who will take significant casualties. Even knowing those tactics, Rommel may simply not have had the ability to absorb that kind of loss without the whole exercise being rather Pyrhhic.

Of all of the modern "desert" generals named, I'd probably give the nod to Rommel, but I don't think his leadership was orders of magnitude better than O'Connor or Schwartzkopf -- just a few notches.

[Oleander Ardens]

Rommel understood the difficulty of assaulting built-up positions. His service in Italy in 1918 would have been instructive. Still, it is obvious that such situations do limit tactical options. The 'stormtrooper' tactics used by Imperial Germany in 1918 were as good as it gets for taking built up positions by storm -- and they require high-quality motivated troops who will take significant casualties. Even knowing those tactics, Rommel may simply not have had the ability to absorb that kind of loss without the whole exercise being rather Pyrhhic.

True enough, even if he actually did attack initially the fortress, taking rather heavy casualities in the process. The infiltration tactics of WWI were of course the tactical (becoming also partly the operational) mold for every intelligent offensive operation. However the concept ever called for heavy firepower directed ala' Bruchmueller. It was impossible to achieve against Tobruk given the small weight of the artillery and the even smaller of the available ammunition. Heavy mobile direct firepower in the form of well-armored assault guns and self-propelled artillery who proved to be of so great importance later in the war lacked completely. Airpower was also not available in even remotely sufficient numbers, nor to support the siege, nor to cut off the supplies. Seapower was not present.

All in all the defenders of Tobruk were brave but all but successfull defense under this circumstances would have cast a deep shadow on the capabilities of allied forces in a "conventional" setting.

[Pannonian]

True enough, even if he actually did attack initially the fortress, taking rather heavy casualities in the process. The infiltration tactics of WWI were of course the tactical (becoming also partly the operational) mold for every intelligent offensive operation. However the concept ever called for heavy firepower directed ala' Bruchmueller. It was impossible to achieve against Tobruk given the small weight of the artillery and the even smaller of the available ammunition. Heavy mobile direct firepower in the form of well-armored assault guns and self-propelled artillery who proved to be of so great importance later in the war lacked completely. Airpower was also not available in even remotely sufficient numbers, nor to support the siege, nor to cut off the supplies. Seapower was not present.

All in all the defenders of Tobruk were brave but all but successfull defense under this circumstances would have cast a deep shadow on the capabilities of allied forces in a "conventional" setting.
How would you assess the original Australian assault on Tobruk?

[Oleander Ardens]

How would you assess the original Australian assault on Tobruk?

Pretty much as Wikipedia:


Following the fall of Bardia, 7th Armoured Division with Australian 19th Brigade advanced to Tobruk which was isolated by the 7th Armoured Division on the 6 January. By 9 January it was surrounded.[34] After a twelve day period building up forces around Tobruk, O'Connor attacked on 21 January and Tobruk was captured 22 January, yielding over 25,000 prisoners along with 236 field and medium guns[6], 23 medium tanks and more than 200 other vehicles. The Australian losses were 49 dead and 306 wounded

A truly fierce siege against determined defenders which made a crushing amount of firepower an absolute necessity. Still kudos to the Aussies.

P.S: The article CBR posted shows just how terrible the intratheater supply situation of the Axis forces was. No fuel - no mobility, no ammunition - no firepower.

[Pannonian]

How would you?
The Australians lacked overwhelming firepower, numbers, and time, needing to take it quickly with whatever was at hand so their pursuit wouldn't be delayed.

[Oleander Ardens]

I edited my post without seeing your reply :book:



How would you assess the original Australian assault on Tobruk?

Pretty much as Wikipedia:


Following the fall of Bardia, 7th Armoured Division with Australian 19th Brigade advanced to Tobruk which was isolated by the 7th Armoured Division on the 6 January. By 9 January it was surrounded.[34] After a twelve day period building up forces around Tobruk, O'Connor attacked on 21 January and Tobruk was captured 22 January, yielding over 25,000 prisoners along with 236 field and medium guns[6], 23 medium tanks and more than 200 other vehicles. The Australian losses were 49 dead and 306 wounded

A truly fierce siege against determined defenders which made a crushing amount of firepower an absolute necessity. Still kudos to the Aussies. See also that they had in their infantry tanks (Matilda) an excellent "assault gun" for the specific METT-T.


Next day, the capture of the remaining outposts from R1 to S11 was completed and assisted strongly by Infantry tanks of the Support Group and the 2nd Rifle Brigade and 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps which had arrived as reinforcements that morning. Meanwhile, the 7th Armoured Division which had also entered the perimeter from the Derna road that morning stood by to advance into the town if required.

P.S: The article CBR posted shows just how terrible the intratheater supply situation of the Axis forces was. No fuel - no mobility, no ammunition - no firepower.

[Mount Suribachi]

Contrary to popular belief, German tanks in North Africa, excluding the Tigers, were not superior to their Allied equivalents in any particularly meaningful ways. It was the skill of the crews as well as their doctrine which resulted in the lopsided results

I'm sorry. but you're taking the michael here. The PzIII & PzIV not superior to the Crusader, A13 and Matlida? British tanks were without exception, underpowered, underarmed, unreliable and (Matilda excepted) underarmoured. Not only was the 2pdr a pop-gun, it was also unable to fire HE ammunition. Then throw in the German 88m AT gun (which to be fair probably destroyed more British tanks than the Panzers) and the British were totally outclassed until the arrival of the Sherman put them back on a level playing field.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I'm sorry. but you're taking the michael here. The PzIII & PzIV not superior to the Crusader, A13 and Matlida? British tanks were without exception, underpowered, underarmed, unreliable and (Matilda excepted) underarmoured. Not only was the 2pdr a pop-gun, it was also unable to fire HE ammunition. Then throw in the German 88m AT gun (which to be fair probably destroyed more British tanks than the Panzers) and the British were totally outclassed until the arrival of the Sherman put them back on a level playing field.

The panzers WERE superior -- but not by large margins.

The most common marks fielded by Axis forces: M13/40, Pzkw-II, Pzkw-IIIh were, respectively, a fully-tracked assisted suicide device, an undergunned lightweight, and a mediocre performer. Only the relatively few up-gunned types (such as the less-than-two dozen IIj's and infrequent Marders) really outclassed the Allied armor. Moroever, while the 2-pounder was very much past its prime by the Gazala battles, the 37mm mounted by the Stuarts and Lees fought all but the best gunned German armor at par. The key to German success was their excellent tactical coordination. THAT is what got the 88's in place for the armor to fall back through them and let them brew up Crusaders and the like. In short, the playing field was a good bit more "level" than some would like to admit.

[Husar]

a fully-tracked assisted suicide device

:laugh4: :2thumbsup:

Also I tend to agree, the Panzer II to me always looked more like an armored machinegun position than anything else, if it can crack your armor with that tiny gun, then your armor must be pretty weak. I'm by no means an expert but I think the british tanks had bigger guns than 20mm.
I don't know much about the Panzer III, except that there must have been a reason to introduce a Panzer IV. :sweatdrop:

Interesting topic by the way but I don't know a lot about it, obviously.

[Oleander Ardens]

I think not all people are able to appreciate the great advantages of the strategic defense which the British enjoyed after having been beaten quite badly be the Axis. The political and economical situation made time and space commodities on the Allied side and so the good tactical defense in depth against forces inferior in ressources made it able to lay the foundations of a new offensive operations.

[PanzerJaeger]

I'm sorry. but you're taking the michael here. The PzIII & PzIV not superior to the Crusader, A13 and Matlida? British tanks were without exception, underpowered, underarmed, unreliable and (Matilda excepted) underarmoured. Not only was the 2pdr a pop-gun, it was also unable to fire HE ammunition. Then throw in the German 88m AT gun (which to be fair probably destroyed more British tanks than the Panzers) and the British were totally outclassed until the arrival of the Sherman put them back on a level playing field.



First of all, British tanks were clearly superior to the Pz.II (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_early_World_War_II_tanks). That much is not debatable, I would think. As to the pz.III, the Matilda had a significant armor advantage and the Crusader was faster. The early pz.IV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzer_IV#Western_Front_and_North_Africa_.281939.E2.80.931942.29) is also often misjudged. It was actually meant to be an infantry support tank much like the British models and performed worse than the pz.III in tank versus tank combat:


Although the Panzer IV was deployed to North Africa with the German Afrika Korps, until the longer gun variant began production the tank was outperformed in penetrating armour by the Panzer III.[64] Both the Panzer III and IV had difficulty in penetrating the British Matilda II's thick armor, while the Matilda's 40 mm QF 2 pdr gun could knock out either German tank; its major disadvantage was its low speed.[65] By August 1942, Rommel had only received 27 Panzer IV Ausf. F2s, armed with the L/43 gun, which he deployed to spearhead his armored offensives.[65] The longer gun could penetrate all American and British tanks in theater at ranges of up to 1,500 metres (4,900 ft).[66] Although more of these tanks arrived in North Africa between August and October 1942, their numbers were insignificant compared to the amount of matériel shipped to British forces.[67]

What really kills your assertion, though, is Lend-Lease. By the time the more powerful variants of the pz.III and the pz.IV mentioned in the above quote arrived in Africa in significant numbers, the US M3 and later Sherman were in abundance - in time for Gazala and El Alamein respectively.

M3 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M3_Lee):


The Medium Tank M3 first saw action in 1942 during the North African Campaign. British Lees and Grants were in action against Rommel's forces at the disastrous Battle of Gazala on May 27 that year. They continued to serve in North Africa until the end of that campaign. A regiment of M3 Mediums was also used by the U.S. 1st Armored Division in North Africa. In the North African campaign, the M3 was generally appreciated for its mechanical reliability, good armor, and heavy firepower. In all three areas it outclassed the available British tanks, and were able to fight German tanks and towed anti-tank guns.

Overall, the M3 was able to cope with the battlefield of 1942. Its armor and firepower were the equal or superior to most of the threats it faced. Long-range, high velocity guns were not yet common on German tanks.

M4 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_tank#U.S._service_history):


When the Sherman first saw combat in 1942, its 75 mm M3 gun could defeat the armor of the German Pzkw III and Pzkw IV tanks it faced in North Africa at normal combat ranges.


So, yes, I am confident in my original statement. Niether the British nor the American armored forces ever suffered from a significant inferiority to their German counterparts. Its simply a myth created to excuse poor performance. Even at their worst (the time directly before receiving American armor), the British tanks still enjoyed advantages over their German rivals. By the time the few long barreled pz.IVs reached Africa, the Sherman was already in service - which held significant advantages of its own. Your comment about the 88s had nothing to do with tank versus tank comparability, and is thus irrelevant. Do I get to mention how many more tanks the Allies had? :book:

The British armored forces, and the Americans to a lesser extent, performed in the manner that they did not because of technical inferiority but of doctrinal. Despite those huge numerical advantages mentioned above, they allowed themselves to be outmaneuvered, tricked into tank traps, and generally outfought. This was an issue of skill, not equipment.

[Papewaio]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Tobruk

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leslie_Morshead

The Battle of the Salient


Rommel's troops had captured fifteen posts on an arc of three-and-a-half miles of the perimeter, including its highest fort. But the Australians had largely contained this Italo-German thrust. One German POW said: "I cannot understand you Australians. In Poland, France, and Belgium, once the tanks got through the soldiers took it for granted that they were beaten. But you are like demons. The tanks break through and your infantry still keep fighting."[28] Rommel wrote of seeing "a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prisoners [largely from C Company of the 2/24th Battalion that had been taken prisoner by the Italians]... marched off close behind us—immensely big and powerful men, who without question represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a fact that was also evident in battle."


Rommel placed the blame for the failure to capture Tobruk squarely on the Italians.[citation needed] However, it was the 19th and 20th Infantry Regiments of the 27th "Brescia" Division along with the 5th and 12th Bersaglieri Battalions of the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment, the 3rd Company, 32nd Combat Sappers Battalion and "Ariete" Armoured Division who after much hard fighting, had possession of most of the positions which the Australians had lost[30] The 7th Bersaglieri Regiment soldiers bunkered along the newly captured concrete bunkers. The Australians fought hard to win back their positions. Much fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place from 1 May till the end of August 1941 when finally the weary soldiers of the 7th Bersaglieri were ordered move to Ain Gazala to rest and refit.[31] According to an Australian soldier, "In Tobruk we became part of the 9th Division with the 28th and 16th Battalions. Each Platoon had to do two or three weeks in the Salient, which was a section of ‘no man’s land’ where the enemy had driven us back from fortifications that skirted Tobruk from sea to sea. Time up there wasn’t exactly pleasurable. We were in dugouts with interconnecting trenches about a foot or so deep (hence becoming known as the ‘rats of Tobruk’). The Germans pummelled us with trench mortar bombs and also had fixed machine guns firing on us."[32]

[PanzerJaeger]

Heh, Pap, that Wiki on ol Ming was obviously written by someone who admired him as much as you do. :yes:

[Papewaio]

My two quotes showed that Rommel's word had to be taken with a grain of salt. Even though he compliments the Aussies, he shows inaccuracy in summing up how the Italians performed. As such his compliment has to be taken into context too.

Morshead tactics did work to counter Rommel. But they are not new by any means as they were used by the Australian's in the second Boer War. Aggressive patrolling was also seen later on in the likes of Vietnam. End of the day patrols reduce the fog of war.

I don't like Ming... far too right wing and no were as good as Monash (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Monash). Also while Monash is on the $100 note, I don't think you'll find Morshead on any currency.


The true role of infantry is not to expend itself upon heroic physical effort, not to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire, not to impale itself on hostile bayonets, but on the contrary, to advance under the maximum possible protection of the maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine-guns, tanks, mortars and aeroplanes; to advance with as little impediment as possible; to be relieved as far as possible of the obligation to fight their way forward.

Combined Arms...

[Oleander Ardens]

I think we should not divert our focus on Monash. A great tactician to be sure, but not certainly the first and most brilliant mind to come up with "combined arms". The concept is as old as war, while its form in WWI was mostly driven by the Germans - with important contribuitions of the French and Russians, and less so of the British.

The Dynamics of Doctrine:
The Change in German
Tactical Doctrine During the
First World War (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lupfer/lupfer.asp)


The Germans did not win the First World War and their strategic conduct of the war was often flawed. Yet, much value can be derived from their development of tactical doctrine, for the Germans developed and applied new tactical doctrine impressively in 1917 and 1918. Their tactical changes were systematic and thorough, for these changes in doctrine directly effected subsequent battlefield success. The analysis of the doctrinal changes cannot be restricted to examining changes to regulations because doctrine that influences nothing beyond the printing press is stillborn.

German successes in World War I demonstrated a thorough process:

* Perception of a need for change
* Solicitation of ideas, especially from the battlefield units
* Definition of the change
* Dissemination of the change
* Enforcement throughout the army
* Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate
the change
* Thorough training
* Evaluation of effectiveness
* Subsequent refinement

This outline describes the manner by which the German Army succeeded in changing and implementing tactical doctrine during war. The process is not rigidly sequential; it is a dynamic process that requires great intellectual ability and strong character from tacticians who desire to make successful changes.

Many characteristics ascribed to the German military have too often sufficed for explanations of German military success. Glib expressions such as "great organization" or "a knack for war" do little justice to the men who brought success to German arms and, more importantly, offer little guidance for anyone who desires to achieve similar success.

In the examination of the German process of tactical change, several important personalities emerge. Their memoirs certainly must be used with caution, but I have quoted extensively from participants in this paper, in part to convey the essential interest in tactics among the participants. Their interest in tactics is instructive, for not all military leaders possess a continuing interest in tactics.

I do not intend to portray all German tactical efforts as inherently brilliant. The Germans usually achieved a relative advantage over the Allies with respect to tactical change. Tentative generalizations about the reasons for this German success and about the limitations of doctrine itself in wartime are described in chapter 3. These conclusions can only be tentative, for the uncertainties of war extend to its analysis.



So let us go back the theater of Northern Africa. So far I have seen little evidence that the overall tactical skill of the German soldiers and their leadership wasn't superior to the allies. Did the Australians put up a dogged resistence? Did the Allies show great morale? Sure enough.

However the siege of Tobruk was a defensive battle, and the Australians enjoyed rather well built strongholds and defensive works in depth. They had:

a) superior amounts of artillery (72 + additional captured Italian heavy guns vs 12 + unknow Italian)
b) superior amounts of AT-guns (113 vs 33 + few Italians + several 88 Flak ) - mostly 2-pounders.
c) anti-aircraft guns (68 (40 captured Italians) vs ?)
d) inferior number of tanks (60:250 - the number of operational axis tanks is unknown)
e) superior numbers of men: 30500 soldiers plus 3000 Lybians against an overall 25000 Germans and Italians (not well documented)
f) Inferior numbers of aircraft: (250 operational vs ~20). It is unknow how many were used against Tobruk)

All in all the Allies enjoyed:

a) Greatly superior terrain - the dominating features were in allied hand, the terrain of the defenseline was mostly unsuited for tank operations yet offered the attackers no cover and no chance to dig in.
b) Relative short lines and protected by large fluid maneuvers by the sea.
b) Good to very good defenses - far better chances to camo and hide positions. Lot of mines and wire, and a AT ditch.
c) Greatly superior supply, especially ammunition
d) The ability to negate almost completely deny surprise by the German due to the terrain
e) The ability to use their greatly superior firepower far more effectively thanks to far better possibilities of observation
f) Far superior firepower thanks to the number and weight of the guns and even more to the clearly better supply of ammunition

The Germans enjoyed

a) Greatly superior numbers of tanks, the majority being light and suscitable by even the 2-pounders at long ranges. The Mark IV was mostly used as mobile artillery due to the lack of guns, but was restriced due to meager supplies in this role. All in all 80 of the 240 tanks were Mark III and Mark IV, the rest light MkII and italian M-13 tanks - good scouts but terrible in a direct assault with dug-in AT-guns.
b) Greatly superior numbers of aircraft, with a lot of dive-bombers. The dismal supply situation greatly restriced flighttimes and bombing runs. When the logistics allowed they were able to mass 30-40 Stukas with fighter support against the 14 Hurricanes.

So they had little relative firepower added to the non-existent room to manuever. Under such condition a shadow would be fallen on the performance of the Allies if the Axis would have taken Tobruk. Amusing that the Wiki states that "it was the first time the Blitzkrieg was stopped". The author had seemingly no idea what "Blitzkrieg" was.

A study written from an Allied Point of View is here (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/9thaustr/9th_part1.pdf). Very interesting work, but note the almost total reliance on allied sources. It is sometimes surprising too, for it comes up now with 30500 allied soldiers and 3000 Lybians on one side and 25000 Germans and Italians on the other in the first operations - combat and support troops (not all documented he says). Does this mean that the well-supplied defenders outnumbered the badly-supplied attackers by a quit an margin?

Some interesting pieces:


An Infantry Division Against
Tanks-Tobruk, Libya, 1941


During both engagements, the Australians fought from a
static defense in depth. Australian infantrymen occupying the
first line of defense allowed the German tanks to pass through
their initial perimeter into extensive minefields. British and Australian
artillery and antitank gunners, deployed well to the rear
of the infantry and supported by British tanks, then engaged
the German tanks with devastating direct fire. As the German
infantrymen, artillerymen, and machine gunners following the
tanks passed through the perimeter, the Australian infantry,
lying in wait on the flanks, moved in behind them with rifle
fire and bayonets. At the same time, British fighter planes
overhead, supported by antiaircraft artillery, attempted to fight
off the attacking German dive-bombers and fighter aircraft.

Good to see that the infantry division had also quite some tank support (60 serviceable out of 86), mostly cruiser and light.
The Germans had roughly 25 armoured cars, 70 Mark II and 80 Mark III and IV tanks. How many were serviceable is seemingly not known). The Italians fielded around 80 M-13 (light tanks with a good gun, the operational numbers is seemingly unknown). The author also points out just how inferior the common 2-pounder was in comperision with the large AT-guns of the Germans, but seems to forget that the German 37mm AT-gun was by far the most comon on the Axis side. They had just "several" 88 guns. At least he concedes that the Australians enjoyed a marked superiority in artillery - by far the most important support weapon in such conditions.

Part 2 (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/9thaustr/9th_part2.pdf) is also available.

[Pannonian]

I think we should not divert our focus on Monash. A great tactician to be sure, but not certainly the first and most brilliant mind to come up with "combined arms". The concept is as old as war, while its form in WWI was mostly driven by the Germans - with important contribuitions of the French and Russians, and less so of the British.

It was the British who went furthest in coordinating technology with infantry tactics, with whole departments dedicated to proving that their idea of technological advance was the war-winning way, and a huge bureaucracy gathering data on the success or otherwise of the latest experiment, in an effort to turn war into a science rather than an art. We all know about tanks, but far more immediately successful advances were the perfection of artillery use, and the proliferation of light machine guns among the spearhead, and squad tactics thereby derived. Artillery-wise, the British perfected the counter-battery system, and worked out just what weight and type of barrage was necessary to suppress defences, thus enabling infiltration tactics. Machine gun-wise, the British went wholeheartedly with the Lewis gun, which carried firepower with the advancing infantry, and developed squad tactics that both utilised said firepower and allowed fluid exploitation of changing situations.

There was a reality TV mini-series on BBC a few years ago, called "The Trench", which looked at the everyday reality of trench warfare, based on the experiences of a Hull battalion in the war. In addition to the tedium, there were occasional highlights such as patrols, and there was a bit where one of the men certified for a Lewis gun qualification, having spent x hours training in said weapon. On a larger scale and over a longer time period, there were qualifications for other weapons as well, training in the latest tactical ideas, working with other branches, and other, less feasible and more hairbrained theories. All with meticulous documentation, so as to better control and disseminate ideas.

[Oleander Ardens]

There was a reality TV mini-series on BBC a few years ago, called "The Trench", which looked at the everyday reality of trench warfare, based on the experiences of a Hull battalion in the war. In addition to the tedium, there were occasional highlights such as patrols, and there was a bit where one of the men certified for a Lewis gun qualification, having spent x hours training in said weapon. On a larger scale and over a longer time period, there were qualifications for other weapons as well, training in the latest tactical ideas, working with other branches, and other, less feasible and more hairbrained theories. All with meticulous documentation, so as to better control and disseminate ideas.


Interesting, thanks. Perhaps I will find the time to watch it.


It was the British who went furthest in coordinating technology with infantry tactics, with whole departments dedicated to proving that their idea of technological advance was the war-winning way, and a huge bureaucracy gathering data on the success or otherwise of the latest experiment, in an effort to turn war into a science rather than an art. We all know about tanks, but far more immediately successful advances were the perfection of artillery use, and the proliferation of light machine guns among the spearhead, and squad tactics thereby derived. Artillery-wise, the British perfected the counter-battery system, and worked out just what weight and type of barrage was necessary to suppress defences, thus enabling infiltration tactics. Machine gun-wise, the British went wholeheartedly with the Lewis gun, which carried firepower with the advancing infantry, and developed squad tactics that both utilised said firepower and allowed fluid exploitation of changing situations.

I would also invite you to read the "The Dynamics of Doctrine", as it is a good summary of tactics IMHO. The creation of doctrines and tactics is a highly dynamic process and it is often hard to determine its exact evolution. The British drive to integrate technology was certainly impressive, however I would not call it war-winning. The stark difference in manpower and ressources was war-winning, the evolution in tactics was a helping component. After the debacle at the Somme a change was certainly needed. Even with large manpower pool loosing roughly (http://books.google.de/books?id=6XYXWDGF9JIC&pg=RA1-PA301&dq=casualties+Somme&lr=#PRA1-PA301,M1) 432000 men (killed, wounded and captured) against ~230000 (killed, wounded and captured) for some miles of ground is hardly a "victory".

The German army was certainly behind the curve when it came to tanks, but once again it is mostly a question of ressources. Although the pioneered the use of heavy artillery the suffered also greatly in the numbers of guns and the amount of ammunition. Keep in mind that the Allies had access to all the ressources they wanted and the USA first as supplier and later as ally. The Axis had a smaller industrial base and the naval isolation was far more harmful than the submarine campaign.

The wide use of the Lewis gun showed beside the capability to supply many the willigness to do so and tactical understanding. The MP 18 Bergmann was however arguably a greater step forward and was the first practical submachine gun.

The preceived impressions of the War

Google book

Battle Tactics of the Western Front (1996)
Von Paddy Griffith



Historians have portrayed British participation in the Great War as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, untried new military technology and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book Paddy Griffith, a renowned military historian, examines the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies persistently failed during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology and, eventually, its self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the autumn of 1918, he argues, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during the Second World War. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties; but that the breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. By the end of 1916 the British were already masters of 'storm-troop tactics' and, in several important respects, further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, 'commando-style' trench raiding, the use of light machine guns or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, the book maintains they should at least be credited with having effectively invented much of thetwentieth century's art of war.

The myth of the Great War, 2003
Von John Mosier


Based on previously unused French and German sources, this challenging and controversial new analysis of the war on the Western front from 1914 to 1918 reveals how and why the Germans won the major battles with one-half to one-third fewer casualties than the Allies, and how American troops in 1918 saved the Allies from defeat and a negotiated peace with the Germans

Draw an amazing amount of Flak by British readers at Amazon

The Somme, 2006
Von Robin Prior, Trevor Wilson

Despite superior air and artillery power, British soldiers died in catastrophic numbers at the Battle of Somme in 1916. What went wrong, and who was responsible? This book meticulously reconstructs the battle, assigns responsibility to military and political leaders.

This shows just how controversial the whole topic is. Amazing is the differing account of casualites in major battles, especially on the German side when consulting Anglo-american literature. From war-time 600.000 plus to German-backed numbers as low as 165000. To sum it up i would not say that the british ability to integrate technology into tactics was unmatched (see the MP18 and storm troopers, to name one example) and that the tactical superiority of the German forces was very large. Anyway I would think it would be best to read the paper I posted.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Excellent points on the development of squad tactics, 1916-1918. I am loving this discussion.

I was well aware of the Brit development of better timing with artillery and the use of light machine-guns. I was not aware of their shift in squad tactics. Tanks are, of course, the quintessential innovation and the tactics for their use were better developed than the tanks themselves were reliable enough to make it happen. But you can't fault the Brits for that -- the tank went a very long way from nowhere to Cambrai.

However, I think it is fairly obvious that the British were trying to improve tactics throughout their force and never really developed the "assault group" concept as far as the Germans did. By grouping their assault troops and lavishly equipping them for their work, the Germans had a better cutting edge (though the depth of English cross-the-board skills certainly allowed them to weather it well enough).


Regarding Rommel's dismissive characterizations of the Italians under his command:

Since his comments were contemporaneous, I wonder how much of his criticism was simply an effort to "lobby" OKW for more troops? Would Rommel have been equally critical of the Italians had he been writing his memoirs in 1955 or would more of the blame have shifted toward the failure to neutralize Malta as a base for interdicting supplies and OKW's treatment of the campaign as a sideshow?

[Pannonian]

Excellent points on the development of squad tactics, 1916-1918. I am loving this discussion.

I was well aware of the Brit development of better timing with artillery and the use of light machine-guns. I was not aware of their shift in squad tactics. Tanks are, of course, the quintessential innovation and the tactics for their use were better developed than the tanks themselves were reliable enough to make it happen. But you can't fault the Brits for that -- the tank went a very long way from nowhere to Cambrai.

However, I think it is fairly obvious that the British were trying to improve tactics throughout their force and never really developed the "assault group" concept as far as the Germans did. By grouping their assault troops and lavishly equipping them for their work, the Germans had a better cutting edge (though the depth of English cross-the-board skills certainly allowed them to weather it well enough).

Griffith goes into some detail about the adoption of diamond formations, with one squad taking the lead, one on each flank, and another in the rear, all armed with a mixture of rifles, Lewis guns and bombs, where they would advance until they meet resistance, then one pins down the enemy strongpoint while the others would feel their way around the flanks until they found sufficient give, the idea being that the formation would be fluid, self-sufficient and yet mutually supporting. Once the breakthrough had been made with artillery support, this kind of squad tactics, along with mobile mini artillery in the form of plentiful mortars, and the encouragement to bypass the more intractible strongpoints, allowed the British to continually advance through the German defences. There was a project a few years back to get as much testimony as they could from WW1 survivors while they were still around, and I remember one of them remarking on how disappointed he was that the war ended when it did, as they were advancing around 2 miles per day at that point.


Regarding Rommel's dismissive characterizations of the Italians under his command:

Since his comments were contemporaneous, I wonder how much of his criticism was simply an effort to "lobby" OKW for more troops? Would Rommel have been equally critical of the Italians had he been writing his memoirs in 1955 or would more of the blame have shifted toward the failure to neutralize Malta as a base for interdicting supplies and OKW's treatment of the campaign as a sideshow?
Phoebus over at TWC talks a lot about how well some Italian units performed, even with inferior equipment, with the Ariete probably the equal of the more famous (British) 7th Armoured Division.

[Agent Miles]

Here’s a really good analysis of the first Battle of Tobruk.
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/miller/miller.asp
Basically, Rommel tried all the wrong things by attacking the fortress’ strong points with tanks. Mobile combined arms tactics aren’t a magic wand that automatically wipes away a determined defender. Barbed wire and bayonets will still spoil the party if you let them get you in a bear hug. The Italians proved to be better at building the defenses of Tobruk than at taking them back. Rommel finally overran the fortress with a blitz from the flat, open terrain of the southeast sector in the second battle for Tobruk.

Here's another good reference:
http://www.wwiivehicles.com/default.asp

[PanzerJaeger]

Excellent analysis Orleander.


So they had little relative firepower added to the non-existent room to manuever. Under such condition a shadow would be fallen on the performance of the Allies if the Axis would have taken Tobruk. Amusing that the Wiki states that "it was the first time the Blitzkrieg was stopped". The author had seemingly no idea what "Blitzkrieg" was.


Heh, I have been referencing Wiki quite a bit lately as I haven't been in a position to consult my books on the subject to ensure what I remembered was at least vaguely correct, and I have to say the Wiki's on the Commonwealth troops in North Africa border on ridiculous in their inaccuracies and the dramatic license taken. I had to look twice when I saw on one of them that the DAK was "crushingly defeated", when in fact it was an Italian division that was eventually ground down, ran out of ammunition and supplies, and made an orderly withdrawal. :laugh4:

Overall the Eastern front battles seem to be covered in a much more neutral manner.



Regarding Rommel's dismissive characterizations of the Italians under his command:

That Wiki is not entirely accurate - or it is at least misleading. (Notice it is without citation.) We're led to believe that Rommel attempted to blame the Italian troops to cover for his own failure, when in actuality it is based on a quarrel about the plans for the defenses not being forthcoming by Italian leadership, not the capabilities of their troops. He felt that if he had the plans faster, he could have taken the fortress before the defenders were able to set up their defenses properly. Later, he simply gave an accurate assessment of the siege, which included the fact that the Italians made up most of the besieging force.

Rommel was actually pretty honest with Hitler and OKW about such things as combat performance, as at this point he did not fear replacement and as you said, he wanted them to know how badly he required reinforcements. During the siege, he had far more criticism for his direct superior, Halder, than the Italians.

As to the Italians in general, his statements generally reflected their performance.

When he arrived in Africa and was questioned about the Italian capabilities at making war, he responded along the lines of "They're certainly not good at it."

However, under German leadership the Italian performance greatly improved and he was never shy to praise them - when they deserved it. He is quoted many times praising his Italians, probably culminating in his feelings during 2nd El Alamein about a particularly fierce Italian AT defense.

"The German soldier has impressed the world. However the Italian Bersagliere has impressed the German soldier."

[Papewaio]

I think we should not divert our focus on Monash. A great tactician to be sure, but not certainly the first and most brilliant mind to come up with "combined arms". The concept is as old as war, while its form in WWI was mostly driven by the Germans - with important contribuitions of the French and Russians, and less so of the British.


OT

I was called out as liking Morshead (too right wing for me). Monash's brilliance wasn't just combined arms, it was in the details and use of it. Everything from food supplies to artillery bombardment combined with an element of surprise.

The Battle of Hamel, then the Battle of Amiens certainly showed what he and his Corps was capable of.

Both these Battles gained more ground and lost less troops then other major operations.

Amiens was the beginning of the end of WWI. It is relatively easy to compare the German combined arms doctrine to that of the allies at the time. The British at the battle of Amien had a very hard time as they had relatively few tanks. The Australians and Canadians Infantry had considerably more armor (British). The Australian and Canadian advance stopped once they ran out of tanks and where getting beyond artillery support.


There was some concern among the Allies on 6 August when the German 27th Division actually attacked north of the Somme on part of the front on which the Allies planned to attack two days later. The German division (a specially selected and trained Stosstruppen formation) penetrated roughly 800 yards (730 m) into the one-and-a-half mile front. This attack was made in retaliation for the repeated Australian trench raids south of the Somme which had gained many prisoners and affected the morale of the "Trench" divisions the Germans had stationed there.[12] The German division moved somewhat back to its original position on the morning of 7 August, but the movement still required changes to the Allied plan.

vs


In the first phase, seven divisions attacked: the British 18th (Eastern) and 58th (2/1st London), the Australian 2nd and 3rd, and the Canadian 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The Canadian and Australian attackers were supported by eight battalions of the Royal Tank Corps, with a paper strength of 216 Mark V and 72 Mark V* tanks, with 48 unarmed tanks used as supply-carrying tractors. Parts of the American 33rd Division supported the British attackers north of the Somme.

The attackers captured the first German position, advancing about 4,000 yards (3,700 m) by about 7:30 a.m.[16] In the centre, supporting units following the leading divisions attacked the second objective a further two miles (3 km) distant. Australian units reached their first objectives by 7:10 a.m., and by 8:20 a.m., the Australian 4th and 5th and the Canadian 4th divisions passed through the initial hole in the German line.[16] The third phase of the attack was assigned to infantry-carrying Mark V* tanks. However, the infantry was able to carry out this final step unaided.[16] The Allies penetrated well to the rear of the German defences and cavalry now continued the advance, one brigade in the Australian sector and two cavalry divisions in the Canadian sector. RAF and armoured car fire kept the retreating Germans from rallying.[16]

So a larger scale combined arms formation, with tighter scheduling of the artillery and a more effective use of surprise then that of the German Stosstruppen formation. Resulting in by the end of the day:


The Canadian and Australian forces in the center advanced quickly, pushing the line 3 miles (4.8 km) forward from its starting point by 11:00 a.m. The speed of their advance was such that a party of German officers and some divisional staff that were eating breakfast were captured.[18] A gap 15 miles (24 km) long was punched in the German line south of the Somme by the end of the day.

I think the larger scale and the greater results 800m vs 4.8kms achieved at the same territory 2 days apart shows who had successfully integrated combined arms at a formation level more successfully. Also as the attacking force vs the defending one the Allies lost 22,000 to 74,000 of the Germans. Quite remarkable in comparison with the Somme.

I think the results speak for themselves.

[PanzerJaeger]

I was called out as liking Morshead (too right wing for me).

Understood. I'm having a bit of difficulty understanding the point you're trying to make in the above comparison though. Could you straighten me out on it?



I think the larger scale and the greater results 800m vs 4.8kms achieved at the same territory 2 days apart shows who had successfully integrated combined arms at a formation level more successfully.

You seem to be comparing a limited divisional Stosstruppen attack to a full scale Allied armored offensive involving hundreds of tanks - in August of 1918 no less.

I'm not sure what can be gleaned from such a comparison. Wouldn't it be better to examine Stosstruppen actions during, say, Operation Michael or some of the other full scale offensives they had a major impact on? I would say they forced a much greater change in the battlefield dynamics. Or maybe I'm just completely missing your point. :inquisitive:

[Papewaio]

The German Assault troops are a very good (elite) and well equipped style of units that showed how combined arms, artillery barrage, surprise and infiltration work.

I was countering the other posters suggestion that the Brits didn't understand that. The counter example showing that the British also had a firm grip of the same concepts and actually could put together larger formations of combined arms which in turn had much larger gains then smaller ones.

The Stosstrupen were fine and if they had 12 divisions in their attack the battle of Amiens would have been the German victory on the 6th. Not the Allies one on the 8th.

Amiens is a very good example in showing how combined arms worked. The small Stosstrupen did better on the 6th then the British did on the 8th. Whilst the divisions that had tanks did better again.

It is interesting that the very reason for the Stosstrupen engagement on the 6th was the infiltration tactics being done by the Allies side. I think both sides adapted to use the best of tactics from each side.

One of the most interesting battles is when both the Stosstrupen and the first British tanks were used. I often wonder what it would have been like if had been both Stosstrupen and tanks on the German side vs the static Haig defence... the war would have been over before the Americans had got involved.

[Oleander Ardens]

Just a quick look:

I have to study the battle of Hamel a bit more. While it certainly was a great victory once again the casualities of the german side are a wartime estimate (Bean). The number of the captured are almost always correct, but experience has told me that sometimes warpropaganda on both sides exagerated the inflicted losses up by a factor of four (British at the Somme). The difference is that the "allied" numbers are on Wiki, the axis numbers are not.

Sadly I can not find the total strenghts on both sides and the once in the decisive sectors. However once again I'm a bit surprised that the Wiki shows things in a rather deceptive way and compares quite fresh allied divisions - with a huge difference in structure and manpower - with seemingly often depleted German divisions. The sources are all anglo-american, no French and German sources have been used. I really wonder why the english wiki seems to be so biased in many regards.

Ok now I finally found a better description of the Battle in The Great War (http://books.google.de/books?id=Fw7Owo0USCwC&pg=PA154&dq=Battle+of+Amiens+casualties&lr=#PPA155,M1). It seems that in the way of the main trust of Rawlinson were 6 skeleton divisions with 3000 men each (18000 men). The assinged army of the Allies had 15 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. A conservative estimate with 6000-8000 men each gives between 108000 and 144000 men. They were supported by 2000 guns and 17 air squadrons with 414 vehicles (aka Tanks), and over 100 tracked support vehicles (tanks) and troop carriers.

I will continue later.

[rotorgun]

I apologize to all for not getting in on this thread sooner; my work and social schedule have been rather heavy lately. I have read all of the posts and found the discussion intriguing. The posts about the development of tactics during the first world war are fascinating indeed. In an effort to steer the discussion back towards its original beginning I should like to add that I agree with some that the Afirka Korps was a indeed a regular collection of regular Wheremacht units, given a modified organization to accommodate a special mission. That it was considered a crack outfit is probably part truth and part myth based on its overall performance and the reputation of Erwin Rommel.

As for its superiority during some battles, this was due to the better use of a combined arms approach on the tactical level, and a general superiority of equipment at various times during the many battles it fought. If one considers how much more flexible an organization the average Panzer division was at the time, compared to how the average British or Commonwealth Armored unit was arranged, than it is easy to see how it could respond more rapidly to contingencies. British armored formations lacked infantry support until much later in the war, and indeed many of their AFVs armed with the 2 Pndr had no HE ammunition to deal with enemy infantry. This often lead to the attaching of infantry brigades to the armored brigades to provide this capability, but as they might not have trained with each other prior to this, it was an ad-hoc solution at best.

The dreaded 88mm gun aside, most of the German main battle tanks were Panzer III H or G models, armed with the 50mm KwK 38 L/42. At the time of the battle of Gazala, there were only 19 Panzer III J models available. They had the much improved 50mm KwK 39 L/60. These later became the mainstay of the Afrika Korps during the Tunisian campaign. The British had the Crusader MK II as its main AFV, which despite its good speed, had weaker frontal armor than the German Pz III. There were separate brigades for of Matilda and Valentine tanks that had superior armor than the German tanks, but they were slow and sometimes unreliable. All of these were equipped with QF 2-pounder gun. There were also brigades made up of lend lease equipment. The M3 Stuart or Honey as the British called it, and 167 M3 Grant Tanks. It was these that surprised Rommel along with 112 of the new 6 Pndr anti-tank guns available to the infantry.

Although the new 6 Pndrs and M2 75mm guns of the Grants gave the Afrika Korps serious trouble during parts of the battle, the way in which the German formations dealt with them by the use of better tactics and maneuver neutralized their impact. Whenever possible, they would attempt to lure the heavier armored Matildas, Valentines, and Grants into kill boxes of anti-tank guns, dominated by the 88mm Flak 36 guns aided by the lighter 28/20 and 50 mm PAK. If these were unavailable, the way that Panzer Divisions were able to mass all of its armor rapidly against the often piecemeal deployment of the British Armored Brigades allowed them to defeat them in detail. This was a result of a better doctrine and a more flexible command climate.

Here is an interesting sight about the Afrika Korps that has a wealth of information:

http://www.afrikakorps.org/

I hope it will foster more discussion from this group of Org Members. :beam:

[PanzerJaeger]

That is a good analysis, rotorgun. It pretty much falls in line with everything I've read.

It is funny to log on and see this thread up again as I've been watching a lot of the "Military Channel" lately. They're obviously lacking in original content as quite a bit of the late night and off-hours programming is composed of British imports. As such, I've seen the Afrika Korps referred two at least twice as an "elite" or "crack" force. Further, you would think that the Germans outnumbered the British in the desert! And you don't hear much about superior tactics and certainly nothing about British losses to the Italians.

I understand issues of pride and such, but the inaccuracies in those BBC "documentaries" were quite astounding. I mean, they did win after all. There is nothing wrong with acknowledging reality.

[rotorgun]

Panzer...

As you seem to be interested often in tanks, here is a great link for comparisons between Tanks and Anti-tank weapons from WWII:

http://gva.freeweb.hu/index.html

Just click on the weapons data link and it will take you to a section where you can select each country in other links. There is a wealth of data on the various AFVs and Anti-tank guns available. You'll see that with the Cruiser tanks, for instance that their armor could be penetrated at a further distance by the Panzer III 50mm weapons, but the 2 Pounder was had to be closer to do the same to the German vehicles. That is really critical in the open desert where an inferior armed opponent cannot use ruses and concealment to allow his enemy into his kill range. In my opinion, the British would have been wiser to dig in some of their tanks to provide a smaller target and give the lower hulls protection. This sacrifices mobility, but would have allowed them to lay in ambush while mobile elements lured the Germans with feigned withdrawals. A tactic that Monty learned from Rommel himself.

[PanzerJaeger]

Thanks for the link. Haven't seen that one. :bow:

[rotorgun]

Thanks for the link. Haven't seen that one. :bow:

You're welcome indeed.

Your thread has got me digging out my old war games and books about the subject, and I came across an old jewel. Rommel's War in Africa(Wolf Heckmann)-Doubleday & Co. 1981, Garden City, New York. It has an excellent foreword by General Sir John Hackett who was a Major in charge of the 8th Hussars' Honeys (M-3 Stuarts) of the famed 7th Armored Division (The Desert Rats) at the Battle of Gazala. Herr Heckmann writes a book which brings us the point of view of many combatants on both sides as a way of telling the history of the fighting. It's a compelling read.

One of the things he mentions is that a strongpoint called Blenheim that was located just south east of the Bir Hachiem defenses. (The southernmost part of the British defense line.) Blenheim was a series of fortifications and natural defenses where the British high command had originally planned to meet the expected (yes they were expected) thrust by the Afrika Korps. Rommel's plans were known to the British high command through Ultra intercepts as well as reconnaissance on the day that the Germans opened their offensive. The plan was to move into these prepared defenses prior to the attack and thereby await the oncoming panzer divisions as they turned northwards. For some reason, despite such foreknowledge, the British didn't begin moving until the 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions had already passed Blenheim by.

Many of the commanding officers of the 7th Armored tank and infantry regiments were quite angered by the failure of 8th Army to order them to move until it was too late. Some felt that even though they might have still take a beating by those "tough panzer boys", they might have at least doled out a considerable amount of punishment in return. It was a either a colossal blunder, a deliberate omission for the sake of Ultra, or just plain bad luck. What a price was paid though. Many of the Honey tanks and new Grants were overwhelmed by the more numerous and generally superior German machines. Employed instead in a series of piecemeal brigade sized meeting engagements, they suffered severe losses all out of proportion to the losses of the Germans.

[PanzerJaeger]

You're welcome indeed.

Your thread has got me digging out my old war games and books about the subject, and I came across an old jewel. Rommel's War in Africa(Wolf Heckmann)-Doubleday & Co. 1981, Garden City, New York. It has an excellent foreword by General Sir John Hackett who was a Major in charge of the 8th Hussars' Honeys (M-3 Stuarts) of the famed 7th Armored Division (The Desert Rats) at the Battle of Gazala. Herr Heckmann writes a book which brings us the point of view of many combatants on both sides as a way of telling the history of the fighting. It's a compelling read.

One of the things he mentions is that a strongpoint called Blenheim that was located just south east of the Bir Hachiem defenses. (The southernmost part of the British defense line.) Blenheim was a series of fortifications and natural defenses where the British high command had originally planned to meet the expected (yes they were expected) thrust by the Afrika Korps. Rommel's plans were known to the British high command through Ultra intercepts as well as reconnaissance on the day that the Germans opened their offensive. The plan was to move into these prepared defenses prior to the attack and thereby await the oncoming panzer divisions as they turned northwards. For some reason, despite such foreknowledge, the British didn't begin moving until the 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions had already passed Blenheim by.

Many of the commanding officers of the 7th Armored tank and infantry regiments were quite angered by the failure of 8th Army to order them to move until it was too late. Some felt that even though they might have still take a beating by those "tough panzer boys", they might have at least doled out a considerable amount of punishment in return. It was a either a colossal blunder, a deliberate omission for the sake of Ultra, or just plain bad luck. What a price was paid though. Many of the Honey tanks and new Grants were overwhelmed by the more numerous and generally superior German machines. Employed instead in a series of piecemeal brigade sized meeting engagements, they suffered severe losses all out of proportion to the losses of the Germans.

Yes that was one of many poor moves made by the British at Gazala. It was very much their low point in the war.

It seems as though someone would be able to say definitively what the cause of the particular failure to move you mentioned was, although I've never seen anyone involved cited as giving one. If it were an attempt to keep Ultra secret, then I would think someone would have said something to that effect. This leads me to believe it was most likely just a slow response to the intelligence, which would not be surprising.

[rotorgun]

Yes that was one of many poor moves made by the British at Gazala. It was very much their low point in the war.

It seems as though someone would be able to say definitively what the cause of the particular failure to move you mentioned was, although I've never seen anyone involved cited as giving one. If it were an attempt to keep Ultra secret, then I would think someone would have said something to that effect. This leads me to believe it was most likely just a slow response to the intelligence, which would not be surprising.

Not only that, but the British suffered throughout the North African campaign form poor radio discipline, something we refer to today as OPSEC. Many times British officers would transmit their plans and orders in the clear, which the excellent German intelligence staff took advantage of. This was a factor in increasing the reputation of Rommel's ability to out guess his opponents, which no doubt added to the idea of the elite stature of the Afrikakorps. Not until general Montgomery instituted better discipline in his officer corps, did the 8th army finally overcome this deficiency. Check out the wiki article on Operation Battle Axe.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Battleaxe

Wolf Heckmann also mentions incidences of lapses of communication discipline in his book as well. He even claims there was a German officer on Rommel's staff that could mimic the accent of the British so well, that he was able to issue false situation reports and even issue actual orders to several British units during the Gazala affair. Not quite cricket, what?

:oops:

[The Spartan (Returns)]

Really interesting discussions guys! It's great to see you guys still go at it.

This may be off-topic but... who do you think is a better general? General George S. Patton? Or British General Montgomery?

I'm curious, because my friend wrote an eight-page essay for our IB History class, and he wrote it on Patton. His paper talked about Patton in Sicily, and how he was faster than Montgomery. It's interesting, because discussion about Montgomery here seems like he would have been a formidable opponent for Rommel, if he wasn't captured so early on. Any thoughts?

[PanzerJaeger]

This may be off-topic but... who do you think is a better general? General George S. Patton? Or British General Montgomery?

Well, imo, Monty is often over criticized and Patton is often exalted beyond his true abilities. There is so much politics, nationalism, and ego surrounding both of them it is really hard to find honest assessments of their battlefield capabilities. Quite frankly, neither of them ever faced a full strength German army group - or anything even resembling it - and imo, neither would have been made it on the Russian front. They both screwed up in Sicily, and while Monty floundered around Caen and completely mucked things up during Market Garden, Patton didn't really have the opportunity to show he could do better much better. His drive through France was largely uncontested and his offensive to close the Bulge was competent at best. (The US lost more troops trying to close the Bulge than in the initial German offensive.) It was pretty much just attrition, not much in the way of tactics.

All that being said, I think Patton was the better leader. From everything I've read, he had a better grasp of combined arms and armored warfare. Beyond that, he had a better sense of the battlefield in general.


I'm curious, because my friend wrote an eight-page essay for our IB History class, and he wrote it on Patton. His paper talked about Patton in Sicily, and how he was faster than Montgomery. It's interesting, because discussion about Montgomery here seems like he would have been a formidable opponent for Rommel, if he wasn't captured so early on. Any thoughts?

Do you mean O'Conner? Monty was never captured. I think he was probably a better commander than Monty, though we'll never know.

As for Monty, its kind of a mixed bag. Monty was in general a more competent battlefield commander than his predecessors and did institute some very important changes, including the radio discipline that Rotorgun mentioned. However, he was also able to take advantage of the massive numerical superiority of supplies, arms, and manpower that his direct predecessor had built up, not to mention the Torch landings. It would have been fairly difficult to fail in his position.

[anweRU]

As already mentioned, German tanks in North Africa were often obsolete models sent to the least cared for front (North Africa never recieved much attention until Operation Torch), such as Panzer II's and III's. The real punch Rommel had with his force was his 88mm AntiAir guns that he placed in an AntiTank role. In fact, he did not invent this idea, as it was used during the Invasion of France. I am not sure how he came to the use of 88's as AntiTank weapons, but it devastated most Commonwealth armor.

Actually, if I remember my French campaign history, it was Rommel who unleashed the AA weapons on British armor in France. The AA weapons had high muzzle velocity (to reach altitude) and were therefore ideal anti-armor weapons as well.

In fact, AA guns were even mounted on tanks later in the war: 75 mm of the Panthers & 88 mm of the Tigers (both versions), the 3" replacement for the original 75 mm gun on the Shermans, the 90 mm gun on the Pershings, and 85 mm guns on the T34/85s were all originally AA guns that were redesigned to fit a tank turret. IIRC, the 3" gun the British put on the Shermans to make the Firefly conversion was also an AA gun. Prior to WW2, tanks were viewed as infantry support platforms, and used low muzzle velocity guns with HE shells. Only during WW2 did everyone realize that the best tank killer is another tank...

Also, the DAK didn't solely rely on German equipment - they used captured weapons, even tanks, often, due to the afore-mentioned logistics problems. For that matter the British did the same thing...

[The Spartan (Returns)]

Do you mean O'Conner? Monty was never captured. I think he was probably a better commander than Monty, though we'll never know. Correct I meant O'Conner ~:doh:

[Samurai Waki]

Wavell was pretty much a disaster on every front he served. After O'Conner was captured, (and the Siege of Tobruk situation) Churchill transferred Wavell to India Command, and Auchinleck was put in Charge of Eastern Command (where he appointed Monty). But even in Burma, Wavell was pretty awful, and only thanks to Slim did they manage to trounce the Japanese so thoroughly.

[rotorgun]

As for Monty, its kind of a mixed bag. Monty was in general a more competent battlefield commander than his predecessors and did institute some very important changes, including the radio discipline that Rotorgun mentioned. However, he was also able to take advantage of the massive numerical superiority of supplies, arms, and manpower that his direct predecessor had built up, not to mention the Torch landings. It would have been fairly difficult to fail in his position.

Very true Panzer...also, as I have discovered in my readings, it was Rommel's success after his capture of Tobruk, and subsequent pursuit of Auchinleck's ragged 8th army, that led to his demise in some ways. OKH, OKW, and General Kesselring personally all advised him to not advance beyond the Egyptian border. This he ignored after a stormy meeting during the pursuit. The plan to take Malta required the use of the Luftwaffe, the German paratroops, and the supplies built up for the operation. Hitler, was so enraptured by Rommel's success, that he immediately got behind it, even imploring Mussolini to not miss his chance of ultimate victory; the Italian senior commanders had advised him against any move into Egypt as well. Subsequent to Hitler's interference, the troops and supplies for Malta went to Rommel instead. Many of his supplies never reached him due to the increase British naval presence after Malta's successful defense.

Seeing that Auchinleck was able to conduct a successful delaying strategy, albeit a desperate one, it allowed him to fall back on his supply bases. As a result, he was able to scrape together enough reinforcements to prevent the German/Italian force from breaking through at the Battle of Alam Halfa. This, as we know, led to his ultimate defeat at El Alamein.

[PanzerJaeger]

Here's a fairly good documentary on tank warfare in the desert. Its titled Tigers in the Desert, but only the first part deals with the Tiger. The rest examines the other Axis and Allied tanks in the theatre and how they fought.

Part 1 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fuujb9k57Mc&feature=related)

Part 2 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE838HuZ-m0&feature=related)

Part 3 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FaLZh9euGiA&feature=related)

Part 4 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4q_fp7T-BA&feature=related)

Part 5 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IhGrnmXCkXM&feature=related)

Part 6 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqXcgn80FxE&feature=related)

Its a pretty good channel if you haven't stumbled upon it. Lots of old documentaries in their entirety. :2thumbsup:

[KarlXII]

Actually, if I remember my French campaign history, it was Rommel who unleashed the AA weapons on British armor in France. The AA weapons had high muzzle velocity (to reach altitude) and were therefore ideal anti-armor weapons as well.

Kondor Legion used them in the Spanish Civil War against armor. Rommel used it at Arras to break a counter attack though.