PowerWizard
06-04-2009, 09:54
Browsing Europe's World (http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/tabid/763/Default.aspx?language=en-US), an independent an European-wide policy journal, I stumbled upon two interesting and recent articles concerning the relationship of Russia and the EU.
You can say that the first one was written by an Estonian MEP - thus biased against Russia - but he does raise an intriguing point, when he says that Europe must stop thinking of Russia as a “normal” strategic partner, and Europe can speak about common interests, certainly, but not common values, as Russia no longer aims to integrate with the West under western terms and conditions.
Read the whole article:
An EU realpolitik to unravel the riddle of unruly Russia
Spring 2009
by Tunne Kelam
http://www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/Author/TunneKelam.jpg
Russia’s behaviour is neither unfathomable nor about to change for the better, says Tunne Kelam, an Estonian MEP who is part of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. He warns that as Moscow always acts in its own national interest, it’s left to the EU to insist on the international rule of law
Europe’s view of Russia frequently reflects misconceptions. Either people hide behind Winston Churchill’s famous (but often misrepresented) comment that Russia “is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” or they betray a naïve optimism about Moscow’s understanding of democracy and the rule of law.
Neither of these views reflects the true nature of Russia and neither does the European Union any favours as it tries – and fails – to establish a working relationship with its increasingly assertive neighbour. What Europe needs is a healthy and robust realpolitik, one that is free from illusions about the giant next door. Past experience shows there is nothing mysterious about Russia’s pursuit of its national (even imperialist) interests. The trick for Europe is to counter-balance Russian self-interest, and this means the EU has to agree on – and jointly promote – Europe’s own interests, and to channel relations with Moscow into an international framework that upholds the rule of law.
---Matter of opinion---
Before the invasion, Georgia was nostalgic for Soviet times
Surprisingly, a Gallup survey showed that most
Georgians felt no hostility towards Russia in the months before last summer’s conflict. In a poll taken in Georgia last June, two-thirds (64%) of respondents agreed with the statement that the country had to have good relations with Russia “by all possible means”. Asked which country in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) they most admired,
Russia was easily the first choice with 40%, followed by Ukraine with 29%.
http://www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/GallupGraphs/EW11_CIS1.jpg
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The danger of taking Churchill’s phrase at face value has been clear enough for some 80 years, especially at times of crisis. Western leaders have used it as an excuse for making ignoble compromises which by-passed western values. Eastern, central and south-eastern Europe suffered the tragic results of these compromises after World War II. The “Russian riddle” mindset is still to be found in the confusion and hesitation of Western policymakers who often desperately try to reconcile their strategic and pragmatic interests with a democratic code of conduct – even though Russia mostly ignores such international standards.
Viewing Russian behaviour as a riddle also reinforces Moscow’s traditional standpoint that it is a country with a unique role in history that places it outside any existing political or national models. Moscow expects people to make an exception in Russia’s case, and its refusal to ratify and implement the Energy Charter (after having signed it without reservations) was just one example of this conduct. When the EU prevaricates in its condemnation of Russia’s broken promises, it just reinforces the Kremlin’s accusations about European double standards.
It would be far better if Europe rigorously applied internationally-recognised standards when judging Moscow’s actions. These standards should include reciprocity based on common democratic values and the rule of law. There was a chance to start implementing such a policy in 1991 when the West had “won” the Cold War. Instead, the West fell for the second great illusion about Russia, that provided it had the opportunity, enough freedom and plenty of Western goodwill it would almost automatically transform itself into a democratic society and respect the rule of law. This optimistic view ignored the question of whether post-Soviet Russia had sufficient good will of its own to make such a transition, even when it refused to make moral or political judgements about its totalitarian past. Such a crucial issue was not considered relevant.
Deluded by its own mistaken views of Russia, Europe has failed to find a coherent and realistic strategy on how to deal with its biggest neighbour. A 2005 European Parliament resolution summed up the problem very well: “Russia is a big neighbour with whom the European Union has every interest to further develop good relations. However, the EU strategy cannot be seen as a success. There is still lack of trust – a situation that became more pronounced after the EU enlargement. The ambiguity in the role of democracy and human rights in the development of Russia complicates the partnership.” More presciently still, in the same year the U.S. civil rights group Freedom House demoted Russia from a “semi-free” country to a “non-free” state. Events since then have shown that the alarm bells were rung with good reason.
Counter-democratic developments in Russia today make it essential to understand where in real terms we stand vis-à-vis Russia. This is all the more urgent as spin doctors are busy creating new illusions around the personality of President Dmitry Medvedev. Depending on who you listen to, Medvedev is either a new John Kennedy or he’s a technocrat with no KGB background, or again he is a more decent and softer version of Vladimir Putin, his predecessor. Western leaders who buy into such illusions and race one another to the gates of the Kremlin demonstrate a classic case of European confusion regarding Russia. They also furnish proof of their own vulnerability to Moscow’s manipulations.
What, then, are the current realities that should inform a more accurate EU analysis of Russia? First, we have to acknowledge that Russia is not a democracy. In fact the policy of building a “normal” society which respects the rule of law has been reversed. Under the guise of "sovereign democracy," Russia openly and defiantly abandons the goal of becoming an advanced open society, marked by political liberty and the rule of law. Russia is an authoritarian centralized state where Soviet-style security services play the key role in politics as well as economics. Kremlin leaders are creating their own Moscow-centred system and reasserting Russia’s status as a great power.
That does not mean that Russia today is the same as the old Soviet Union; Russian society is now based on capitalism, albeit state-controlled. But disturbing comparisons can be drawn with another regime from the past. Aggressive Russian nationalism and officially-inspired bouts of xenophobia seem reminiscent of Nazi Germany in the mid-1930s, and look to be designed to recompense Moscow for the humiliation of its Soviet empire. It also compensates for the ignominy of having the terms of its democratic reforms “dictated” by its old adversaries. Blatant harassment of selected foreign diplomats and the loyalist youth movement dubbed “Putinjugend” sometimes appear to echo Hitler's rise to power.
Europe must stop thinking of Russia as a “normal” strategic partner. While the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement declares common values as the basis of a strategic partnership, this is deceptive. We can speak about common interests, certainly, but not common values. Russia no longer aims to integrate with the West under western terms and conditions. As former EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten said three years ago, “Europe should clearly work for a comprehensive partnership with Russia, but at the moment it is nonsense to suggest that this will be based on shared values.” He described his first meetings with the Kremlin as follows: "Russian officials – President Putin, prime ministers and foreign ministers – obfuscated and lied. They ignored our letters. They denied that we had raised concerns about specific issues with them ... Naturally, they got away with that.
So the EU should forget any notion that Russia is a friend, ally or reliable partner. Russia’s strategic interests in Europe directly oppose those of the EU. Moscow wants to split the Union apart and is trying to set old and new member states against each other. It is also making systematic efforts to demonstrate that the EU’s 2004 “big bang” enlargement has been at least a partial failure. The former Soviet-occupied Baltic states are the main target and testing ground for these divisive policies. Russia combines political and economic pressure on the three Baltic states with disinformation campaigns and the exploitation of Soviet-era immigrants. Russia has also tried to turn these EU members into bargaining chips in possible future deals with the Union. Such manoeuvring was firmly rejected at the 2007 Samara Summit by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and Commission President José Manuel Barroso, so there are grounds for optimism that at least this element of the Russian strategy has failed.
Beyond Europe, Russia is eagerly seeking to deepen the rifts between the U.S. and the EU. The Kremlin concentrates on bilateral deals with the most important EU members and exploits its role as their major energy supplier. Russia is unreliable as a partner in areas of international conflict. The Kremlin supplied modern arms to Saddam Hussein of Iraq until the last moment, and now pragmatically and cynically endeavours to assert its national interests in relations with Iran, Syria and Sudan, while simultaneously weakening the positions of the U.S. and European democracies.
Energy is a sector where the EU needs to get a real grip on today’s realities. Of course Russia’s economic development has been fuelled by its hydrocarbons and the EU is increasingly dependent on Russian oil and on gas especially. The more sober economic analyses show, though, that Russia needs the EU more than the EU needs Russia. Russia’s over-dependence on its energy sector has meant that its recent economic boom was highly vulnerable to the downturn in oil prices. Despite these structural weaknesses, the Kremlin retains the psychological upper hand in EU-Russian discussions.
European companies continue, meanwhile, to do business with Russia, in spite of its flagrant disregard for Western norms, its dramatic lack of reciprocity and a general disdain for legal guarantees. They rush into Russian markets in search of short-term gain and accept the crippling moral price of having to share their profits with the ruling elite. The business practices involved cast aside most EU principles of fairness and transparency. This sort of systematic disregard for the rules of fair play undermines the credibility of our own value-based free market economy.
---Matter of opinion---
More Georgians favoured Russia than America
Russia is Georgia’s biggest market. But economics aside, a more deep-rooted reason for retaining a good relationship is offered by former presidential candidate Gia Maisashvili. “I think there’s nostalgia for the Soviet times,” he told Gallup. “We had security and we had a strong safety net.”
Nostalgia for the old days is not shared by Georgia’s Western-minded President Mikheil Saakashvili. After the conflict, he announced Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS, although the move may not turn out to be popular, especially among the older population.
In a June Gallup poll, only 11% of Georgians agreed that, even if it harmed relations with Russia, it was important to have close relations with the U.S.
http://www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/GallupGraphs/EW11_Georgia.jpg
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The EU’s weakness extends beyond economic and commercial relations and into the political sphere. Russia’s Council of Europe membership is a case in point. In 1996, Russia was accepted as a member only after lengthy debate and in return for a long list of democratic commitments which were to be met in the shortest possible time. The decision was purely political: the majority concluded that Russia was “better in than out.” The justification was that membership would speed up Russia’s democratic transformation. Sadly, the opposite is true. Most of Russia’s commitments have been left unrealised and Russia has exerted much more influence on the Council than vice versa. The Kremlin’s influence is increasing, and its ability to block initiatives enhanced. As a result of political pressure and economic carrots, several politicians have apparently lost their objectivity in dealing with Moscow. By playing at democracy, authoritarian Russia has won and the oldest post-war European democratic organisation has lost.
So where do we go to from here? An intriguing analysis by Mexican political scientist Fredo Arias King compares Russia to a person with the psychological condition known as borderline personality disorder. This involves a split cultural identity, unstable self image, black-and-white thinking and difficulties of perceiving one’s own responsibilities. Sufferers often have bursts of anger and aggressiveness, and attempts to appease and indulge them are counter-productive. The way to handle them, it is said, is to be stable, polite and firm, defining non-negotiable rules that are then stuck to.
Applied to Russia-EU relations, this formula could be the best remedy for unruly Russian behaviour. The EU should set clear rules which are not subject to change as a result of whim or exceptional circumstances. They must be based on the international standards for the rule of law. Europe’s working relationship with Moscow should start afresh on the basis of friendly but firm reciprocity.
The mission of a united Europe should be to speak the truth, set boundaries and underline that our principles and values are not up for negotiation. Such a common and unwavering EU policy would help Russia to differentiate between normal national interests and imperial ambitions, eventually resulting in a Russia that is less unpredictable and more cooperative. Russia is not a mystery, the full text of Churchill’s celebrated October 1939 remark is as follows: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.”
Source (http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21348/Default.aspx)
Another interesting article on the same subject:
It’s time for hard choices on EU-Russia relations
Spring 2009
by Eneko Landaburu
http://www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/Author/Landaburu_final.JPG
The Georgia crisis has been a catalyst for bringing the uneasy EU-Russia relationship into sharper focus. Eneko Landaburu outlines the shape of the updated partnership needed to prevent more conflicts in their shared neighbourhood while putting the wider issues of economic cooperation and energy supply on a much surer footing
Last August’s conflict in Georgia, irrespective of the reasons it blew up, marked a turning point in international relations, and one that the European Union will need to take carefully into account as it plans its future partnership policies with Russia.
The EU was strong, clear and unanimous in its condemnation of the Russian military invasion of Georgia last summer, and of Russia's unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. It is imperative that this degree of European unity be preserved to support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, so that a solution to the conflict between the two countries may be found.
The decisions on refugees and displaced people made at the peace deal meetings of 12 August in Moscow and 8 September in Tbilisi are now being implemented, while the international discussions on a settlement that began in Geneva on 15 October, which stemmed from the Medvedev-Sarkozy-Saakashvili peace agreement, are continuing in a constructive manner. The talks address the sensitive question of security and stability arrangements in the region, and also the longer-term aspects of the problem of internally displaced persons and refugees.
Russia's actions over Georgia have of course affected EU-Russia relations, ensuring that they are now under closer scrutiny than ever. The in-depth examination of EU-Russia relations published on 5 November last year included a substantial contribution from the Commission. It highlighted the interdependence of Europe and Russia, with Russia now the EU's third largest trading partner after the United States and China, and the EU by far Russia's number one trading partner. The investment figures are also impressive: EU member states account for 80% of foreign investment in Russia, and 80% of Russia's own investments abroad are in EU countries. To put these figures in context, though, it’s worth pointing out that EU investments in Russia are a mere 15% of what Europeans invest in the United States.
---Matter of opinion---
Germany is top of the pops
Germany is widely thought to be better led than other western countries, according to the results of a Gallup survey. Half (51%) of the EU citizens judged its leadership to be superior to that of France (41%), the UK (39%) and of the George W. Bush administration (a lowly 20%). In the Commonwealth of Independent States, composed of Russia and a number of former Soviet republics, there was 47% support for Germany – although Russia came out top with 62%.
The poll (2Q-3Q, 2008) was conducted against a background of deteriorating relations between Germany and the West: the crisis over Georgia, Russia’s worries over Ukraine’s bid to join NATO and its protests over American plans to site anti-missile installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. During this period, Chancellor Merkel did much to shape the EU’s policy towards Russia.
http://www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/GallupGraphs/EW11_Germany1.jpg
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Energy interdependence will continue to be pivotal to economic relations between the EU and Russia, with the stakes high for both parties. More than 60% of Russia's total oil and gas exports are earmarked for the EU, and, from our standpoint a quarter of all our oil imports and 40% of our gas imports come from Russia.
We in Europe will continue to share common interests with Russia in the face of international security challenges that range from peace in the Middle East to relations with Iran, cooperation at the United Nations and global climate change, not to mention such challenges as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the propagation of contagious diseases.
The EU, needless to say, is prepared to pursue constructive dialogue with Russia on all these topics. But in the light of this brief synopsis of the importance of good relations between the EU and Russia, we now need to identify those areas that demand more attention.
The EU should work with Russia on a pragmatic and sober basis, taking the country as it is rather than wishing to see it transformed. At the same time, we must be clearer on the commitments we expect Russia to make.
It is important that the negotiations that resumed last November on a new version of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia should significantly change the relationship. Strong and effective institutional arrangements that will ensure good governance are fundamental to the new agreement as EU-Russian relations are too often clouded by emotions stemming from a common history that is both rich and painful. This could yet jeopardise our future strategic partnership by preventing us from resolving problems on a day-to-day basis. A distinction should therefore be made between the historical debate that needs to be conducted at an academic level, and the pursuit of our mutual political interests. As Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev said in Berlin last June, "an honest academic debate" is needed on the events of the 20th century, even though it must be said that the openness of this debate was somewhat compromised last December when the authorities in St Petersburg seizing the archives of Memorial, the human rights organisation holding details of the victims of the Gulag.
Which brings me to the question that is so often raised of whether we have "shared values". We certainly share commitments in the areas of human rights and democracy; Russia is a member of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and of the Council of Europe, and is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights and by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Which means that we in the EU see no room for compromise on Russia’s adherence to the rule of law or its respect for the principle of territorial integrity.
Two things are key to cooperation in the EU’s common neighbourhood with Russia: bi-lateral relations of both with the countries of Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region and central Asia should be furthered, and any new initiatives should be in the context of the "Eastern Partnership". These must offer real advantages such as those envisaged in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy. The Georgia crisis sent shockwaves through the EU, prompting it to step up its efforts to find long-term solutions to the frozen conflicts that are acting as a brake on political, economic and social progress.
The Eastern Partnership is intended to signal the EU’s commitment to working with all its neighbours. But that in no way means it should therefore be interpreted as a sign of hostility towards Russia. However, Russia's new foreign policy recommends a return to the concept of spheres of influence – something that is unacceptable to the EU. We need to be clear on the principles that maintain peace and stability on our continent, such as respect for independence, the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. Theories of zones of influence or zero-sum games are derived from the outdated diplomatic approach that underpinned so many of the conflicts that wracked Europe in the past. President Medvedev's proposal on a new security architecture in Europe highlights the need for a debate on this subject, although first there needs to be agreement over how this debate would be set up.
In the area of economics, the EU and its partners must continue to work together to integrate Russia into the global economy, and into organisations of multilateral economic cooperation like the WTO and the OECD. The obstacles to Russia’s WTO membership are no longer technical but political. Russia must make up its mind on whether it wants to join the WTO, because that holds the key to its future economic diversification and to creating a more welcoming environment for foreign investors in Russia.
On energy, we need to monitor energy security conditions in Eastern Partnership countries. Last August’s events in Georgia heightened awareness of the EU’s need to revise its energy policies; although security of supply was not affected, we have seen how vital it is to secure energy transit through the Caucasus and the trans-Caspian corridor, and to seek new suppliers in Central Asia and the Middle East. The EU Strategic Energy Review presented last November, and the Commission’s communication in December on developing an eastern European partnership, contained a number of proposals on these issues.
Fundamentally, Europe and Russia must tackle these issues together. In the long term, the EU hopes to establish a strategic partnership whereby it will work with Russia to diversify and modernise its economy and increase its energy efficiency and innovation. The EU will remain Russia's natural partner in these areas.
For Russia to continue with the process of international engagement the only way is to address its deeply-rooted structural problems, which include the need to create a genuinely independent judiciary. Russia will therefore have to define itself politically with greater clarity, coherence and above all credibility. The financial and economic crisis now engulfing us brings this need right to the fore.
But Russia cannot aspire to a greater role on the international scene while failing to ratify the conventions or protocols of the major multilateral institutions to which it is a party. Various conventions of the Council of Europe and UNESCO as well as the European Energy Charter offer examples of this state of affairs. By the same token, Russia's accession to the WTO will be critical to showing its commitment to international compliance, including its bi-lateral relations with the EU.
In sum, it would be futile to think that Russia can aspire to being a strategic partner of the EU, while continuing with policies that maintain the status quo. Both sides want a strategic partnership, but for the EU this implies that technical and trade matters must be settled without becoming political issues, so that attention can be paid to the bigger picture. It would be desirable for the EU and Russia to implement this shared vision in their new partnership agreement, so the time for making choices about the future direction of EU-Russia relations appears to have arrived.
Source (http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21349/Default.aspx)
You can say that the first one was written by an Estonian MEP - thus biased against Russia - but he does raise an intriguing point, when he says that Europe must stop thinking of Russia as a “normal” strategic partner, and Europe can speak about common interests, certainly, but not common values, as Russia no longer aims to integrate with the West under western terms and conditions.
Read the whole article:
An EU realpolitik to unravel the riddle of unruly Russia
Spring 2009
by Tunne Kelam
http://www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/Author/TunneKelam.jpg
Russia’s behaviour is neither unfathomable nor about to change for the better, says Tunne Kelam, an Estonian MEP who is part of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. He warns that as Moscow always acts in its own national interest, it’s left to the EU to insist on the international rule of law
Europe’s view of Russia frequently reflects misconceptions. Either people hide behind Winston Churchill’s famous (but often misrepresented) comment that Russia “is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” or they betray a naïve optimism about Moscow’s understanding of democracy and the rule of law.
Neither of these views reflects the true nature of Russia and neither does the European Union any favours as it tries – and fails – to establish a working relationship with its increasingly assertive neighbour. What Europe needs is a healthy and robust realpolitik, one that is free from illusions about the giant next door. Past experience shows there is nothing mysterious about Russia’s pursuit of its national (even imperialist) interests. The trick for Europe is to counter-balance Russian self-interest, and this means the EU has to agree on – and jointly promote – Europe’s own interests, and to channel relations with Moscow into an international framework that upholds the rule of law.
---Matter of opinion---
Before the invasion, Georgia was nostalgic for Soviet times
Surprisingly, a Gallup survey showed that most
Georgians felt no hostility towards Russia in the months before last summer’s conflict. In a poll taken in Georgia last June, two-thirds (64%) of respondents agreed with the statement that the country had to have good relations with Russia “by all possible means”. Asked which country in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) they most admired,
Russia was easily the first choice with 40%, followed by Ukraine with 29%.
http://www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/GallupGraphs/EW11_CIS1.jpg
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The danger of taking Churchill’s phrase at face value has been clear enough for some 80 years, especially at times of crisis. Western leaders have used it as an excuse for making ignoble compromises which by-passed western values. Eastern, central and south-eastern Europe suffered the tragic results of these compromises after World War II. The “Russian riddle” mindset is still to be found in the confusion and hesitation of Western policymakers who often desperately try to reconcile their strategic and pragmatic interests with a democratic code of conduct – even though Russia mostly ignores such international standards.
Viewing Russian behaviour as a riddle also reinforces Moscow’s traditional standpoint that it is a country with a unique role in history that places it outside any existing political or national models. Moscow expects people to make an exception in Russia’s case, and its refusal to ratify and implement the Energy Charter (after having signed it without reservations) was just one example of this conduct. When the EU prevaricates in its condemnation of Russia’s broken promises, it just reinforces the Kremlin’s accusations about European double standards.
It would be far better if Europe rigorously applied internationally-recognised standards when judging Moscow’s actions. These standards should include reciprocity based on common democratic values and the rule of law. There was a chance to start implementing such a policy in 1991 when the West had “won” the Cold War. Instead, the West fell for the second great illusion about Russia, that provided it had the opportunity, enough freedom and plenty of Western goodwill it would almost automatically transform itself into a democratic society and respect the rule of law. This optimistic view ignored the question of whether post-Soviet Russia had sufficient good will of its own to make such a transition, even when it refused to make moral or political judgements about its totalitarian past. Such a crucial issue was not considered relevant.
Deluded by its own mistaken views of Russia, Europe has failed to find a coherent and realistic strategy on how to deal with its biggest neighbour. A 2005 European Parliament resolution summed up the problem very well: “Russia is a big neighbour with whom the European Union has every interest to further develop good relations. However, the EU strategy cannot be seen as a success. There is still lack of trust – a situation that became more pronounced after the EU enlargement. The ambiguity in the role of democracy and human rights in the development of Russia complicates the partnership.” More presciently still, in the same year the U.S. civil rights group Freedom House demoted Russia from a “semi-free” country to a “non-free” state. Events since then have shown that the alarm bells were rung with good reason.
Counter-democratic developments in Russia today make it essential to understand where in real terms we stand vis-à-vis Russia. This is all the more urgent as spin doctors are busy creating new illusions around the personality of President Dmitry Medvedev. Depending on who you listen to, Medvedev is either a new John Kennedy or he’s a technocrat with no KGB background, or again he is a more decent and softer version of Vladimir Putin, his predecessor. Western leaders who buy into such illusions and race one another to the gates of the Kremlin demonstrate a classic case of European confusion regarding Russia. They also furnish proof of their own vulnerability to Moscow’s manipulations.
What, then, are the current realities that should inform a more accurate EU analysis of Russia? First, we have to acknowledge that Russia is not a democracy. In fact the policy of building a “normal” society which respects the rule of law has been reversed. Under the guise of "sovereign democracy," Russia openly and defiantly abandons the goal of becoming an advanced open society, marked by political liberty and the rule of law. Russia is an authoritarian centralized state where Soviet-style security services play the key role in politics as well as economics. Kremlin leaders are creating their own Moscow-centred system and reasserting Russia’s status as a great power.
That does not mean that Russia today is the same as the old Soviet Union; Russian society is now based on capitalism, albeit state-controlled. But disturbing comparisons can be drawn with another regime from the past. Aggressive Russian nationalism and officially-inspired bouts of xenophobia seem reminiscent of Nazi Germany in the mid-1930s, and look to be designed to recompense Moscow for the humiliation of its Soviet empire. It also compensates for the ignominy of having the terms of its democratic reforms “dictated” by its old adversaries. Blatant harassment of selected foreign diplomats and the loyalist youth movement dubbed “Putinjugend” sometimes appear to echo Hitler's rise to power.
Europe must stop thinking of Russia as a “normal” strategic partner. While the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement declares common values as the basis of a strategic partnership, this is deceptive. We can speak about common interests, certainly, but not common values. Russia no longer aims to integrate with the West under western terms and conditions. As former EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten said three years ago, “Europe should clearly work for a comprehensive partnership with Russia, but at the moment it is nonsense to suggest that this will be based on shared values.” He described his first meetings with the Kremlin as follows: "Russian officials – President Putin, prime ministers and foreign ministers – obfuscated and lied. They ignored our letters. They denied that we had raised concerns about specific issues with them ... Naturally, they got away with that.
So the EU should forget any notion that Russia is a friend, ally or reliable partner. Russia’s strategic interests in Europe directly oppose those of the EU. Moscow wants to split the Union apart and is trying to set old and new member states against each other. It is also making systematic efforts to demonstrate that the EU’s 2004 “big bang” enlargement has been at least a partial failure. The former Soviet-occupied Baltic states are the main target and testing ground for these divisive policies. Russia combines political and economic pressure on the three Baltic states with disinformation campaigns and the exploitation of Soviet-era immigrants. Russia has also tried to turn these EU members into bargaining chips in possible future deals with the Union. Such manoeuvring was firmly rejected at the 2007 Samara Summit by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and Commission President José Manuel Barroso, so there are grounds for optimism that at least this element of the Russian strategy has failed.
Beyond Europe, Russia is eagerly seeking to deepen the rifts between the U.S. and the EU. The Kremlin concentrates on bilateral deals with the most important EU members and exploits its role as their major energy supplier. Russia is unreliable as a partner in areas of international conflict. The Kremlin supplied modern arms to Saddam Hussein of Iraq until the last moment, and now pragmatically and cynically endeavours to assert its national interests in relations with Iran, Syria and Sudan, while simultaneously weakening the positions of the U.S. and European democracies.
Energy is a sector where the EU needs to get a real grip on today’s realities. Of course Russia’s economic development has been fuelled by its hydrocarbons and the EU is increasingly dependent on Russian oil and on gas especially. The more sober economic analyses show, though, that Russia needs the EU more than the EU needs Russia. Russia’s over-dependence on its energy sector has meant that its recent economic boom was highly vulnerable to the downturn in oil prices. Despite these structural weaknesses, the Kremlin retains the psychological upper hand in EU-Russian discussions.
European companies continue, meanwhile, to do business with Russia, in spite of its flagrant disregard for Western norms, its dramatic lack of reciprocity and a general disdain for legal guarantees. They rush into Russian markets in search of short-term gain and accept the crippling moral price of having to share their profits with the ruling elite. The business practices involved cast aside most EU principles of fairness and transparency. This sort of systematic disregard for the rules of fair play undermines the credibility of our own value-based free market economy.
---Matter of opinion---
More Georgians favoured Russia than America
Russia is Georgia’s biggest market. But economics aside, a more deep-rooted reason for retaining a good relationship is offered by former presidential candidate Gia Maisashvili. “I think there’s nostalgia for the Soviet times,” he told Gallup. “We had security and we had a strong safety net.”
Nostalgia for the old days is not shared by Georgia’s Western-minded President Mikheil Saakashvili. After the conflict, he announced Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS, although the move may not turn out to be popular, especially among the older population.
In a June Gallup poll, only 11% of Georgians agreed that, even if it harmed relations with Russia, it was important to have close relations with the U.S.
http://www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/GallupGraphs/EW11_Georgia.jpg
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The EU’s weakness extends beyond economic and commercial relations and into the political sphere. Russia’s Council of Europe membership is a case in point. In 1996, Russia was accepted as a member only after lengthy debate and in return for a long list of democratic commitments which were to be met in the shortest possible time. The decision was purely political: the majority concluded that Russia was “better in than out.” The justification was that membership would speed up Russia’s democratic transformation. Sadly, the opposite is true. Most of Russia’s commitments have been left unrealised and Russia has exerted much more influence on the Council than vice versa. The Kremlin’s influence is increasing, and its ability to block initiatives enhanced. As a result of political pressure and economic carrots, several politicians have apparently lost their objectivity in dealing with Moscow. By playing at democracy, authoritarian Russia has won and the oldest post-war European democratic organisation has lost.
So where do we go to from here? An intriguing analysis by Mexican political scientist Fredo Arias King compares Russia to a person with the psychological condition known as borderline personality disorder. This involves a split cultural identity, unstable self image, black-and-white thinking and difficulties of perceiving one’s own responsibilities. Sufferers often have bursts of anger and aggressiveness, and attempts to appease and indulge them are counter-productive. The way to handle them, it is said, is to be stable, polite and firm, defining non-negotiable rules that are then stuck to.
Applied to Russia-EU relations, this formula could be the best remedy for unruly Russian behaviour. The EU should set clear rules which are not subject to change as a result of whim or exceptional circumstances. They must be based on the international standards for the rule of law. Europe’s working relationship with Moscow should start afresh on the basis of friendly but firm reciprocity.
The mission of a united Europe should be to speak the truth, set boundaries and underline that our principles and values are not up for negotiation. Such a common and unwavering EU policy would help Russia to differentiate between normal national interests and imperial ambitions, eventually resulting in a Russia that is less unpredictable and more cooperative. Russia is not a mystery, the full text of Churchill’s celebrated October 1939 remark is as follows: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.”
Source (http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21348/Default.aspx)
Another interesting article on the same subject:
It’s time for hard choices on EU-Russia relations
Spring 2009
by Eneko Landaburu
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The Georgia crisis has been a catalyst for bringing the uneasy EU-Russia relationship into sharper focus. Eneko Landaburu outlines the shape of the updated partnership needed to prevent more conflicts in their shared neighbourhood while putting the wider issues of economic cooperation and energy supply on a much surer footing
Last August’s conflict in Georgia, irrespective of the reasons it blew up, marked a turning point in international relations, and one that the European Union will need to take carefully into account as it plans its future partnership policies with Russia.
The EU was strong, clear and unanimous in its condemnation of the Russian military invasion of Georgia last summer, and of Russia's unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. It is imperative that this degree of European unity be preserved to support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, so that a solution to the conflict between the two countries may be found.
The decisions on refugees and displaced people made at the peace deal meetings of 12 August in Moscow and 8 September in Tbilisi are now being implemented, while the international discussions on a settlement that began in Geneva on 15 October, which stemmed from the Medvedev-Sarkozy-Saakashvili peace agreement, are continuing in a constructive manner. The talks address the sensitive question of security and stability arrangements in the region, and also the longer-term aspects of the problem of internally displaced persons and refugees.
Russia's actions over Georgia have of course affected EU-Russia relations, ensuring that they are now under closer scrutiny than ever. The in-depth examination of EU-Russia relations published on 5 November last year included a substantial contribution from the Commission. It highlighted the interdependence of Europe and Russia, with Russia now the EU's third largest trading partner after the United States and China, and the EU by far Russia's number one trading partner. The investment figures are also impressive: EU member states account for 80% of foreign investment in Russia, and 80% of Russia's own investments abroad are in EU countries. To put these figures in context, though, it’s worth pointing out that EU investments in Russia are a mere 15% of what Europeans invest in the United States.
---Matter of opinion---
Germany is top of the pops
Germany is widely thought to be better led than other western countries, according to the results of a Gallup survey. Half (51%) of the EU citizens judged its leadership to be superior to that of France (41%), the UK (39%) and of the George W. Bush administration (a lowly 20%). In the Commonwealth of Independent States, composed of Russia and a number of former Soviet republics, there was 47% support for Germany – although Russia came out top with 62%.
The poll (2Q-3Q, 2008) was conducted against a background of deteriorating relations between Germany and the West: the crisis over Georgia, Russia’s worries over Ukraine’s bid to join NATO and its protests over American plans to site anti-missile installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. During this period, Chancellor Merkel did much to shape the EU’s policy towards Russia.
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Energy interdependence will continue to be pivotal to economic relations between the EU and Russia, with the stakes high for both parties. More than 60% of Russia's total oil and gas exports are earmarked for the EU, and, from our standpoint a quarter of all our oil imports and 40% of our gas imports come from Russia.
We in Europe will continue to share common interests with Russia in the face of international security challenges that range from peace in the Middle East to relations with Iran, cooperation at the United Nations and global climate change, not to mention such challenges as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the propagation of contagious diseases.
The EU, needless to say, is prepared to pursue constructive dialogue with Russia on all these topics. But in the light of this brief synopsis of the importance of good relations between the EU and Russia, we now need to identify those areas that demand more attention.
The EU should work with Russia on a pragmatic and sober basis, taking the country as it is rather than wishing to see it transformed. At the same time, we must be clearer on the commitments we expect Russia to make.
It is important that the negotiations that resumed last November on a new version of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia should significantly change the relationship. Strong and effective institutional arrangements that will ensure good governance are fundamental to the new agreement as EU-Russian relations are too often clouded by emotions stemming from a common history that is both rich and painful. This could yet jeopardise our future strategic partnership by preventing us from resolving problems on a day-to-day basis. A distinction should therefore be made between the historical debate that needs to be conducted at an academic level, and the pursuit of our mutual political interests. As Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev said in Berlin last June, "an honest academic debate" is needed on the events of the 20th century, even though it must be said that the openness of this debate was somewhat compromised last December when the authorities in St Petersburg seizing the archives of Memorial, the human rights organisation holding details of the victims of the Gulag.
Which brings me to the question that is so often raised of whether we have "shared values". We certainly share commitments in the areas of human rights and democracy; Russia is a member of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and of the Council of Europe, and is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights and by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Which means that we in the EU see no room for compromise on Russia’s adherence to the rule of law or its respect for the principle of territorial integrity.
Two things are key to cooperation in the EU’s common neighbourhood with Russia: bi-lateral relations of both with the countries of Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region and central Asia should be furthered, and any new initiatives should be in the context of the "Eastern Partnership". These must offer real advantages such as those envisaged in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy. The Georgia crisis sent shockwaves through the EU, prompting it to step up its efforts to find long-term solutions to the frozen conflicts that are acting as a brake on political, economic and social progress.
The Eastern Partnership is intended to signal the EU’s commitment to working with all its neighbours. But that in no way means it should therefore be interpreted as a sign of hostility towards Russia. However, Russia's new foreign policy recommends a return to the concept of spheres of influence – something that is unacceptable to the EU. We need to be clear on the principles that maintain peace and stability on our continent, such as respect for independence, the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. Theories of zones of influence or zero-sum games are derived from the outdated diplomatic approach that underpinned so many of the conflicts that wracked Europe in the past. President Medvedev's proposal on a new security architecture in Europe highlights the need for a debate on this subject, although first there needs to be agreement over how this debate would be set up.
In the area of economics, the EU and its partners must continue to work together to integrate Russia into the global economy, and into organisations of multilateral economic cooperation like the WTO and the OECD. The obstacles to Russia’s WTO membership are no longer technical but political. Russia must make up its mind on whether it wants to join the WTO, because that holds the key to its future economic diversification and to creating a more welcoming environment for foreign investors in Russia.
On energy, we need to monitor energy security conditions in Eastern Partnership countries. Last August’s events in Georgia heightened awareness of the EU’s need to revise its energy policies; although security of supply was not affected, we have seen how vital it is to secure energy transit through the Caucasus and the trans-Caspian corridor, and to seek new suppliers in Central Asia and the Middle East. The EU Strategic Energy Review presented last November, and the Commission’s communication in December on developing an eastern European partnership, contained a number of proposals on these issues.
Fundamentally, Europe and Russia must tackle these issues together. In the long term, the EU hopes to establish a strategic partnership whereby it will work with Russia to diversify and modernise its economy and increase its energy efficiency and innovation. The EU will remain Russia's natural partner in these areas.
For Russia to continue with the process of international engagement the only way is to address its deeply-rooted structural problems, which include the need to create a genuinely independent judiciary. Russia will therefore have to define itself politically with greater clarity, coherence and above all credibility. The financial and economic crisis now engulfing us brings this need right to the fore.
But Russia cannot aspire to a greater role on the international scene while failing to ratify the conventions or protocols of the major multilateral institutions to which it is a party. Various conventions of the Council of Europe and UNESCO as well as the European Energy Charter offer examples of this state of affairs. By the same token, Russia's accession to the WTO will be critical to showing its commitment to international compliance, including its bi-lateral relations with the EU.
In sum, it would be futile to think that Russia can aspire to being a strategic partner of the EU, while continuing with policies that maintain the status quo. Both sides want a strategic partnership, but for the EU this implies that technical and trade matters must be settled without becoming political issues, so that attention can be paid to the bigger picture. It would be desirable for the EU and Russia to implement this shared vision in their new partnership agreement, so the time for making choices about the future direction of EU-Russia relations appears to have arrived.
Source (http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21349/Default.aspx)