View Full Version : Were the WW1 generals idiots?
Now that we have a few things going in various threads, it's often said that the ww1 generals were poor commanders, but what started as a mobility-war ended in a stalemate and it ended up as a meat-machine, what exactly happened here.
Well, 78 British/Dominion Generals died in WWI, so although they may have been idiots, yoiu can't say they just sat behind the lines all the time.
And this guy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Emil_von_Lettow-Vorbeck) was most certainly not an idiot. Mao, eat your heart out.
Meneldil
11-12-2009, 14:46
Though several huge strategic mistakes were made, I can't see how generals were idiots.
The defensive capabilities of the era far outmatched the offensive power available to armies. In these condition, any attack easily turned into a manslaughter. But what else could have been done?
No idea but it became an exchange of life somewhere. There must be someone behind it who is absolutely clueless, we don't even have a satisfactory answer for how things came to be, let alone how it was played out, who was doing what ordering who. Charge? There are some cold people around.
Louis VI the Fat
11-12-2009, 15:07
The defensive capabilities of the era far outmatched the offensive power available to armies. In these condition, any attack easily turned into a manslaughter. But what else could have been done?What else? Perhaps not stubbornly attacking all of the time then? :idea2:
Can't really blame the commanders for the Western front turning into a long and bloody stalemate. The generals had been dealt a bad hand but still had to play the game, heck they had to learn the rules anew as the game had changed completely.
WW1 is quite a unique war with so much technological change.
Note, when I said "may have been idiots," I didn't mean that I thought that they were idiots, but I was referring to the thread title.
I've always thought that the US got a taste of the consequences of "industrial" warfare during the US Civil War. I suppose it's a lesson that did not make it across the Atlantic.
Ironside
11-12-2009, 16:56
Now that we have a few things going in various threads, it's often said that the ww1 generals were poor commanders, but what started as a mobility-war ended in a stalemate and it ended up as a meat-machine, what exactly happened here.
The defensive capabillities in form of machine guns and long range artillery completly changed the defensive nature of warfare from how it had been since the start of gunpowder. Added to that, logistics were heavily depended on your own railroad system, so basically all offensives ran out of steam while the defenders were operating through their inner lines by default.
So it basically took more than 3 years before good methods for breakthroughs were developed and offensive logistics were never really solved. How large change in the thinking needed is seen when the Americans came (vets from the US-Mexico war), who ignored the advises they got and had to go through trial by massacre before catching on.
What else? Perhaps not stubbornly attacking all of the time then? :idea2:
And letting the soldiers fraternize with eachother and rebel against the high command? The breakthrough of the idea of eqaulity of man really came through this war due to what you mentioned.
I would guess that it was simply a lot of frustration. They were as trapped as a losing compulsing gambler, they had to play (politics, simply having a stale front doesn't work there) but didn't know any method to win so instead they threw away everything simply in the vain hope of a miraculous victory.
WWI general were no more idiots than US Civil War generals. Both wars were fought at a period of time when technology resulted in a vast increase in firepower, but before there was a corresponding increase in defense technology. The result was that soldiers were faced with overcoming massed machinegun and artillery fire with nothing but their uniforms to protect them. A lot of blame is placed on nations for not realizing the potential of armored vehicles to overcome the technology advances, but I think that is distorted by hindsight. The first tanks did not reach the battlefield until the end of 1916, by which time the war had already stagnated. Even then, the first tanks were extremelly unreliable and the designs were relatively poor. Tanks did not really even become successful until the end of 1917, only a year before the war was over.
In addition, the idea that WWI was somehow more of a bloodbath than WWII is itself ridiculous. According to Wikipedia, in WWI, Germany lost 2,050,897 men in battle. In WWII they lost 5,533,000. Russia lost 1,811,000 in WWI and 8,800,000 to 10,700,000 in WWII. The UK and US cannot properly be compared, as the UK did far less ground warfare in WWII than in WWI, and the US was the opposite. When you compare deaths (both military and civilian) as a percentage of the population of the combatants, WWI resulted in the deaths of 1.75% of the population, while WWI resulted in the deaths of 3.17% to 4.00% of the population.
Essentially, WWII was far, far more of a meat grinder than WWI ever was. The only difference was that in WWI there were a larger number of casualties in a smaller area. That results in a distortion effect on the perceived bloodiness of the events. By contrast, the Battle of Towton in 1461 resulted in the death of approximately 1% of the entire population of England, and that was in a single day. Yet when we think of the bloodiness of wars, no one ever ranks the Wars of the Roses up there with WWI, despite similar impacts on the population.
al Roumi
11-12-2009, 18:13
I've always thought that the US got a taste of the consequences of "industrial" warfare during the US Civil War. I suppose it's a lesson that did not make it across the Atlantic.
Ha! If so, there's not much evidence to suggest it's a lesson they properly learned or carried accross the ocean themselves. The US expeditionary force is known to have had a "steep learning curve" in its first months on the Western front... :oops:
Ha! If so, there's not much evidence to suggest it's a lesson they properly learned or carried accross the ocean themselves. The US expeditionary force is known to have had a "steep learning curve" in its first months on the Western front... :oops:
I didn't say the US had the tactics, we just knew what full-scale industrial slaughter was like. I don't think the European WWI generals had any idea what they were getting themselves into, and many failed to adapt.
al Roumi
11-12-2009, 18:25
WWI general were no more idiots than US Civil War generals. Both wars were fought at a period of time when technology resulted in a vast increase in firepower, but before there was a corresponding increase in defense technology. The result was that soldiers were faced with overcoming massed machinegun and artillery fire with nothing but their uniforms to protect them. A lot of blame is placed on nations for not realizing the potential of armored vehicles to overcome the technology advances, but I think that is distorted by hindsight. The first tanks did not reach the battlefield until the end of 1916, by which time the war had already stagnated. Even then, the first tanks were extremelly unreliable and the designs were relatively poor. Tanks did not really even become successful until the end of 1917, only a year before the war was over.
In addition, the idea that WWI was somehow more of a bloodbath than WWII is itself ridiculous. According to Wikipedia, in WWI, Germany lost 2,050,897 men in battle. In WWII they lost 5,533,000. Russia lost 1,811,000 in WWI and 8,800,000 to 10,700,000 in WWII. The UK and US cannot properly be compared, as the UK did far less ground warfare in WWII than in WWI, and the US was the opposite. When you compare deaths (both military and civilian) as a percentage of the population of the combatants, WWI resulted in the deaths of 1.75% of the population, while WWI resulted in the deaths of 3.17% to 4.00% of the population.
Essentially, WWII was far, far more of a meat grinder than WWI ever was. The only difference was that in WWI there were a larger number of casualties in a smaller area. That results in a distortion effect on the perceived bloodiness of the events. By contrast, the Battle of Towton in 1461 resulted in the death of approximately 1% of the entire population of England, and that was in a single day. Yet when we think of the bloodiness of wars, no one ever ranks the Wars of the Roses up there with WWI, despite similar impacts on the population.
The commanders of WW1 looked stupid because they used inappropriate tactics -based on old situations: the old adage that military planners are always preparing for the last war they fought.
This raises an interesting point, as relevant today as ever before, the commanders at the end of a conflict in which a major new technological/strategic challenge was faced always have a better reputation than those who were in command at the start of it: eg Gen. Petreus enjoys a much better reputation than Tommy Franks... ok, not sure how far i can push that but...
al Roumi
11-12-2009, 18:29
I didn't say the US had the tactics, we just knew what full-scale industrial slaughter was like. I don't think the European WWI generals had any idea what they were getting themselves into, and many failed to adapt.
[sorry for double post]
I think that might still be a bit shortsighted a claim -it would make the early months of the US expeditionary force's engagement appear even more of a senseless waste.
Having awareness of an issue and ignoring it is probably worse than blundering into it unawares.
Having awareness of an issue and ignoring it is probably worse than blundering into it unawares.
I don't think it was ignored, we stayed out of the abattoir for 3 years. ~;)
Pershing kept the US units separate, which led to the initial high casualties as vital experience was developed. I imagine a large part of his decision was to prevent the British and French from using the new units as fodder.
Louis VI the Fat
11-12-2009, 19:50
Pershing kept the US units separate, which led to the initial high casualties as vital experience was developed. I imagine a large part of his decision was to prevent the British and French from using the new units as fodder.Dang it, so they were onto us after all. :wall:
Just to throw a bomb in here: did the Americans use the trenches to etnically cleanse their minorities? France, Britain and Belgium did with the Bretons, Welsh and Flemings respectively...
Just to throw a bomb in here: did the Americans use the trenches to etnically cleanse their minorities?
Generally, no, as America was then so racist it didn't trust blacks with guns, as they would allegedly break ranks and rout at the mere sight of a German due to inferior nature, so they were often confined to manual labour. Total nonsense of course, and the few black regiments that did see combat fought with no less distinction then their white counterparts.
France, Britain and Belgium did with the Bretons, Welsh and Flemings respectively...
That actually happened?
Just to throw a bomb in here: did the Americans use the trenches to etnically cleanse their minorities? France, Britain and Belgium did with the Bretons, Welsh and Flemings respectively...
Even more diabolical. We gave black units to the French to do it for us.
The commanders of WW1 looked stupid because they used inappropriate tactics -based on old situations: the old adage that military planners are always preparing for the last war they fought.
They're only inappropriate if there was an alternative that was more appropriate. WWI occurred at an odd period of time when firepower had been greatly increased, but mobility had not. Cavalry were no longer useful due to their vulnerability to modern weapons, but automobile technology was still extremely primitive and was particularly poor at handling off-road terrain, which is required on the battlefield. Amphibious and air technology were equally primitive, and did not allow for rapid flanking by large-scale coastal landings (see Gallipoli) or paradrops for similar reasons. As such, it was essentially impossible to move men quickly enough to flank an enemy position before the enemy could adjust their own forces to defend the threatened spot. You need look no farther than the Race to the Sea in 1914, to see this in effect. The result was stupendously long, heavily defended infantry lines that could only be approached directly.
Under such circumstances, without a technological ability to flank the enemy on any significant scale, the only real option was frontal assault. Given the amount of firepower that the enemy could put down, this in turn required attacks with huge numbers of men just to make sure that some of them got through. The only other option I see in such a situation is just not fighting at all... which isn't a strategy that tends to win wars.
When I think of stupid commanders, I think of people like Phillip VI at Crecy or Custer at Little Big Horn. Stupid commanders are those who had plenty of legitimate options about how to deal with an enemy that had a particular known fighting style, but simply chose to ignore those options and suffered defeat as a result. In WWI, most battles had no options except a frontal assault. It seems unfair to blame the generals for those failures when they did not have the ability to achieve victory by other means.
Meneldil
11-12-2009, 20:28
There was a large number of bretons fighting, but I'm not sure there was a will to eliminate them.
AFAIK, by 1914, bretons weren't really a minority anymore.
Meneldil
11-12-2009, 20:34
Essentially, WWII was far, far more of a meat grinder than WWI ever was.
I agree in a way. For a starter, the battle of France was more deadly than the Marnes in 1914.
But there are several things that make WWI terrible, such as:
- the living conditions of the soldiers.
- the stubborn and pointless attacks launched against heavily defended lines, that resulted in the death of millions of young people who had no choice but to join their respective national army.
- the fact that the average Michel had really no reason to kill/get killed by the average Gunther.
- the shooting for the example.
All in all, if I had to live a war as a rank and file soldier, I'd take WWII over WWI anytime (except if it comes to the Eastern Front or China).
Evil_Maniac From Mars
11-12-2009, 20:48
Though several huge strategic mistakes were made, I can't see how generals were idiots.
The defensive capabilities of the era far outmatched the offensive power available to armies. In these condition, any attack easily turned into a manslaughter. But what else could have been done?
Well, 78 British/Dominion Generals died in WWI, so although they may have been idiots, yoiu can't say they just sat behind the lines all the time.
And this guy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Emil_von_Lettow-Vorbeck) was most certainly not an idiot. Mao, eat your heart out.
I agree with both of these posts.
Tristuskhan
11-12-2009, 21:31
There was a large number of bretons fighting, but I'm not sure there was a will to eliminate them.
Definitely not. Bretons are only the most ferocious people in France, something the HQ knew very well and used. Monuments to the WW1 dead in breton villages are impressive.
AFAIK, by 1914, bretons weren't really a minority anymore.
As a Breton myself, I could hear it as an insult to my kind, but nevermind... Definition of "minority", please:beam:?
Quintus.JC
11-12-2009, 22:42
Well, 78 British/Dominion Generals died in WWI, so although they may have been idiots, yoiu can't say they just sat behind the lines all the time.
And this guy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Emil_von_Lettow-Vorbeck) was most certainly not an idiot. Mao, eat your heart out.
Arthur Currie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Currie)and von Mackensen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_von_Mackensen). Two legendary commanders that enjoyed less legacy then they deserved.
Evil_Maniac From Mars
11-12-2009, 23:33
Just to throw a bomb in here: did the Americans use the trenches to etnically cleanse their minorities? France, Britain and Belgium did with the Bretons, Welsh and Flemings respectively...
I've never heard of any of these, and though the French and Belgians may be simply because I haven't studied the issue enough, I never heard of a campaign to actually eliminate the Welsh.
I've always thought that there was a sense that the colonials were second-class citizens to the British command, and therefore somewhat disposable. Hence another reason Pershing wouldn't relinquish command of American units. I have no idea is there is any truth to this though, could just be griping from the Canadians/Aussies/Kiwis/etc.
A Very Super Market
11-13-2009, 01:52
Why the Welsh? Probably the least troublesome of the Islanders, really.
In any case, it wouldn't be efficient to do so. British nationals outnumbered the Welsh, Scottish, and Irish by a fair amount, and it would be truly stupid to leave a line undermanned for the sake of getting a certain group of people killed.
In fact, the valued Scots of the British Army took the highest proportional casualties on the Allied side (Apart from the Serbians, who sunk their entire population into the war)
... it's often said that the ww1 generals were poor commanders, but what started as a mobility-war ended in a stalemate and it ended up as a meat-machine, what exactly happened here.
The view of the WW1 generals as donkeys does not quite square with their overseeing the technological change that CBR mentioned. They were looking for solutions to the stalemate, but there were none available "off the peg".
I think the military at the start of the war could be faulted for not having learnt sufficiently from previous conflicts - such as the ACW (which ended in trenchwarfare) and the Russo-Japanese war (which showed the power of machine guns and heavy artillery). There was still a fair amount of pseudo-Napoleonic claptrap about bayonet charges and closed formations etc. It's not just a failure to understand the technology, but also to anticipate the scale. Reared on professional armies, it was probably hard to envisage that mass mobilisation would permit the entire length of Western Europe to be defended in depth. It's still rather a mind-boggling fact today. Even then, the venerable Schlieffen Plan can hardly be faulted for failing to seek a solution to gridlock. But once the stalemate and trench warfare started, my impression is that the factions were rather quick to seek ways to overcome it.
Perhaps not stubbornly attacking all of the time then?
Reading about even the most bloody encounters such as the Somme and the Verdun in the past, my recollection was that casualties were more evenly divided between attackers and defenders than one might expect. So it's not that obvious that greater passivity would have substantially reduced losses. Attacking gives you the advantage of initial concentration of force and suprise, I guess. Plus the defenders have to counter-attack to stabilise the front.
However, more generally, I think the logic of war demands generals who are fighters. The public, the politicians and perhaps even the soldiers require it. Like with the ACW, when Lincoln kept sacking generals until he could find a brawler like Grant who was prepared to accept terrible losses and keep attacking aggressively. There's a pressure for victory, particularly given that losses are already so horrific, so there were always schemes for a key breakthrough. I guess on the Western Front during the middle part of the war, the French and British were in the position similar to that of the Union in the ACW - they had to go on the offensive. After 1914, the Germans switched to fighting defensively in the West, looking to get a knockout blow in the East. Then the boot was on the other foot, with the Germans desperate for victory in the West before millions of Americans arrived to swing the balance. Given the Russian revolution and the logic of American entry, it is hard to fault either side for their alternating aggressive stances.
I suspect that a proper answer to the question would identify some WW1 generals who were plain bloody minded and lacking in imagination (I'd look at the Italians for some culprits here) while others who adapted rather successfully (Ludendorf comes to mind at a strategic level; Rommel at a tactical one).
Megas Methuselah
11-13-2009, 03:39
I've always thought that there was a sense that the colonials were second-class citizens to the British command, and therefore somewhat disposable. Hence another reason Pershing wouldn't relinquish command of American units. I have no idea is there is any truth to this though, could just be griping from the Canadians/Aussies/Kiwis/etc.
It's been hammered into my head by the Canadian education system that the Canadian Expeditionary Force in WW1 developed a deserved reputation as an elite unit, and was thus frequently used in heavy fighting.
:shrug:
A Very Super Market
11-13-2009, 04:09
I thought you meant colonials as in "Africans". The Commonwealth was more or less seen as a proper fighting force, probably because they were equipped to the same standard, and not given pointed sticks to fight the enmy with.
al Roumi
11-13-2009, 11:55
I've always thought that there was a sense that the colonials were second-class citizens to the British command, and therefore somewhat disposable. Hence another reason Pershing wouldn't relinquish command of American units. I have no idea is there is any truth to this though, could just be griping from the Canadians/Aussies/Kiwis/etc.
Not really, in both WW1 and WW2 the Anzac forces (Australians & New Zealanders) as well as Canadians were a vital part of the British army. If anything, the Anzac's were considered much better soldiers than British Tommys -who tended to be physicaly smaller (apparently).
The contribution of non-white soldiers in both wars is not at all well recognised in Britain. Only now is it starting to be properly considered.
AFAIK, in both WW1 and WW2, the main body of British troops deployed to fight in Egypt/North Africa/middle east were colonial/commonwealth: from Aus, NZ and India.
As to killing off British/colonial minorities, I'd say that was unsubstantiated hogwash -certainly when it comes to white ethnic groups. Sikhs were also a well renowned part of the British Army AFAIK. Can't vouch for where and how units were used though -Ghurkas already enjoyed a great reputation in WW2.
I didn't say the US had the tactics, we just knew what full-scale industrial slaughter was like. I don't think the European WWI generals had any idea what they were getting themselves into, and many failed to adapt.
I just don't see much "full-scale industrial slaughter" in the ACW. It was really no different than earlier or contemporary wars in Europe.
I'm sure one can look at statistics in all kinds of ways but the Union army had a total of 388,000 battle related casualties. France in WW1 with a population nearly twice of the Union states and with a war of same length had about 14 times the casualties. USA had in just 6 months of combat about 260,000 casualties in WW1.
Some WW1 generals might have entered the war with a highly optimistic view of how quickly it could be decided, some, like Moltke a few decades earlier, had a rather pessimistic view though. One could argue that the use of field fortifications in the later part of the ACW was similar to WW1 and yet the circumstances were very different.
Afterall the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 was de facto finished in just 4 weeks of heavy fighting even though the armies had more lethal weaponry than seen in the ACW. There the French did dig in and yet lost to outflanking and especially German artillery that shelled the French out of their positions.
Even when the stalemate appeared in WW1 it technically did not even stay the same as the defense also changed to make it more difficult to attack: more machineguns, longer range artillery, the effect of numerous craters turning everything into mud, the concept of deep defense and local counter attacks to repel exhausted attackers etc.
So yes they did not know what they were getting themselves into but IMO they did try to adapt, but new technologies, and more of it, and tactics had to be developed while they were still trying to fight a war and defeat an opponent that also changed his ways to defend.
CBR
Meneldil
11-13-2009, 13:43
As a Breton myself, I could hear it as an insult to my kind, but nevermind... Definition of "minority", please:beam:?
From what I understood by reading Eugen Weber, the assimilation process of various minorities in France was mostly completed by 1910. Britanny was probably one of the less assimilated place (notably because Corsica wasn't nearly as independantist back then as it is nowadays), but I don't think there were any strong movement advocating independance or separation, despite the local church's attempts.
Sure, some people didn't speak french correctly yet (I read something about a Breton soldier who was shot after a trial because he didn't speak the language and likely didn't understand the orders), but that's about as far as it goes according to Weber.
As for Bretons being the most ferocious people in France, well, if that's what you think, good for you :inquisitive:
Edit: Though I'm not quite sure there was a will to get rid of Bretons and other supposedly bothersome minorities, Eugen Weber advocates that the national service was one of the main tools of assimilations for said minorities.
Throughout their three years in the army, Bretons, Catalans, Corsicans and Basques would have had to learn a proper french, cut their ties with the homeland and meet people from other regions, which supposedly created bonds with the nation as a whole, rather than with the local community.
Louis VI the Fat
11-13-2009, 15:10
Was there a deliberate policy to send minority soldiers to the frontlines? Nah, probably not. However, many 'minorities' had disproportionally large casualty rates.
There are several mechanisms at work:
- Working class, lower education, rural died at a higher rate.
- These characteristics applied to many of Europe's minorities
- WWI was not just a matter of nation-state vs nation-state. Nationalism was rampant - but which nationalism? WWI was also the spring of regions. Many of which gained independence after WWI, often after having sought it through sacrifice on the battlefield. Or the other way round, a feeling of having made sacrifices in battle bolstered regionalism, and was used to claim independence.
What I really need is some sources analysing the proportion of casualties in different countries, broken down into region, class, education. Alas, my google-fu is distinctly abandoning me today.
Some effects of WWI on regions:
1)
Definitely not. Bretons are only the most ferocious people in France, something the HQ knew very well and used. Monuments to the WW1 dead in breton villages are impressive.Impressive indeed. Impressively large too. WWI has been a crucial, pivotal event for Breton awakening:
La Grande Guerre
A million Bretons answered the French call to arms in World War I. A quarter of them never returned. Bretons were killed and wounded at a rate twice the national average.
The wartime experiences of Breton soldiers and sailors had a contradictory affect on Franco-Breton relations. For many Bretons service in the trenches of Verdun or on the Marne was their first exposure to the France and French of other regions. Most of the veterans found the bounds of their patriotism now extended beyond the borders of their native province. Contact with the broader French society also accelerated a decline in the use of Breton and Gallo dialects. Others saw Brittany’s disproportionate share of the national sacrifice as proof that in the eyes of Paris, they were ignorant peasants fit only for service as cannon fodder.
http://worldatwar.net/article/brittany/index.html
2) Flanders. I do not know whether Flemings died at a disproportionate rate. I seem to remember they did. However, as with the Bretons, when correcting for 'rural, education and social class', the difference with Walloons is accounted for.
The Flemish Movement became more socially oriented through the Frontbeweging (Front Movement), an organization of Flemish soldiers who complained about the lack of consideration for their language in the army, and Belgium in general, and harbored pacifistic feelings. The Frontbeweging became a political movement, dedicated to peace, tolerance and autonomy (Nooit Meer Oorlog, Godsvrede, Zelfbestuur). Yearly pilgrimages to the IJzertoren (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IJzertoren) are still held to this day. The poet Anton van Wilderode (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anton_van_Wilderode) wrote many texts for this occasion. Many rumours arose regarding the treatment of Flemish soldiers in World War I (though mostly debunked by research of Flemish historians) live on and are part of the Flemish martyr syndrome. For instance, one such legend is that many Dutch-speaking soldiers were slaughtered because they could not understand orders given to them in French by French speaking officers.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flemish_Movement#World_War_I
In Flanders, remembrance of WWI and the expression of national sentiment overlap:
The IJzerbedevaart (Pilgrimage of the Yser) is a yearly gathering of Flemings (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flemings), at the IJzertoren (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IJzertoren) in Diksmuide (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diksmuide). This pilgrimage remembers the Flemish (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flanders) soldiers who died during the First World War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_World_War) and was first organised in 1920. It is at the same time a political meeting striving for Flemish political autonomy. The aims of the annual meeting are No more War, Autonomy and Truce of God.
3) The Anzacs. There is - to this very day - a strong feeling that NZ and OZ forged and deserved their independence and national identity on the European battlefields of WWI.
4) In the East, the empires that went into the war, fully disintegrated during and after the war. Russia, Austro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire.
Arguably, regionalism is both cause and result of WWI in this part of Europe.
In Turkey, the Armenian genocide was part of WWI. Here is a clear example of deliberate use of the war to etnically cleanse a minority.
Not really, in both WW1 and WW2 the Anzac forces (Australians & New Zealanders) as well as Canadians were a vital part of the British army. If anything, the Anzac's were considered much better soldiers than British Tommys -who tended to be physicaly smaller (apparently).
I agree that they were vital. By "second-class", I mean were they used/misused in place of British units when high casualties were expected? I don't know if this was the case, it's just a sense that I get.
A Very Super Market
11-13-2009, 17:19
Absolutely not. The British army was simply too small to undergo an offensive independent of commonwealth support. At Gallipoli, the Brits outnumbered and took heavier casualties than the Anzacs and French, same as the Somme, and only smaller operations (Like Vimy Ridge) were given separately to the commonwealth.
WWI was a strange war in that not only the lower class were recruited. In fact, the British had to turn down some of the labourers that flocked to the recruiting office, since their loss would severely impact Britain's war economy. The rampant nationalism was instead directed to a more middle-class recruitment pool.
WWI was a strange war in that not only the lower class were recruited. In fact, the British had to turn down some of the labourers that flocked to the recruiting office, since their loss would severely impact Britain's war economy. The rampant nationalism was instead directed to a more middle-class recruitment pool.
What you touch on here is the final death-knell of chivalric warfare and the introduction of total war. Even after the Napoleonic wars, the 19th Century conflicts retained an air of honorable respect between combatants. This was mainly noticeable amongst the noble classes. Prior to WWI, it was not uncommon for captured enemy officers to be wined and dined by their captors and treated extraordinarily well. That was a hold-over from the ancient traditions of warfare where the nobility commanded and the commoners fought. In such a situation, often enemy commanders would have more in common with each other than they would with their own soldiers. Thus, there was a camaraderie amongst the leadership even when they were on opposite sides of a battle.
Despite it being largely focused on the elite of society, it also bled over into general society. War was considered a noble and civil enterprise with proper rules and actions to be followed. It was a contest between selected adversaries with limited combatants who would meet on a field of battle and resolve the dispute with arms. While this notion never (even during the Age of Chivalry) accurately reflected warfare, it was a romantic notion that was strongly held by many peoples. This is why many Americans rode out with picnic baskets to watch First Manassas in 1861.
In WWI, the idea of honorable warfare continued to exist right up through the early hostilities. Many Brits went over to the continent in 1914 expecting to watch the battles as spectators. This kind of sentimentality amongst the troops is also what led to the Christmas Truce. After 1914, though, these things largely disappeared in ground combat and amongst the civilians. They were heavily discouraged by military leadership, and they were also the result of the brutality of the new weapons that were being used.
Interestingly, chivalric warfare did hang on in one odd area during WWI: air combat. Pilots in WWI behaved very much as knights of old, and would honor and celebrate their enemies, both in life, capture, and death. von Richthofen was buried will full military honors by the Australian squadron that found his body, including 6 men of Captain rank as pallbearers, a honor-guard salute, and the presentation of memorials from other nearby squadrons.
There were even hints of this kind of attitude towards warfare in WW2, particularly amongst the officer class. The old Prussian officer corps of the German Army and large sections of the British military were particularly notable for their respectful behavior towards captured adversaries, even in the midst of horrendous warfare. It is essentially the last vestiges of a notion that are perhaps best known through the Combat of the Thirty (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_of_the_Thirty).
aimlesswanderer
11-14-2009, 04:23
I remember my history teacher (who didn't know very much, since he was mostly a physical ed teacher) say that the British generals were a bunch of upper class incompetents who failed to learn and therefore got vast numbers of people killed needlessly charging machine guns. He also said that the official British war history was mostly a work of creative writing, and was "discredited", unlike ours of course. And if you talk to some Aussies they think that we nearly won the war by ourselves, and it was only the silly Brits who stuffed up at Gallipoli (wrong beach!), or else we would have conquered the whole of Turkey! Umm, yeah, right.
Disturbingly, many Australians don't know much at all about WWI, mostly just Gallipoli thanks to ANZAC day and the accompanying media hoopla.
Pannonian
11-14-2009, 05:30
I remember my history teacher (who didn't know very much, since he was mostly a physical ed teacher) say that the British generals were a bunch of upper class incompetents who failed to learn and therefore got vast numbers of people killed needlessly charging machine guns. He also said that the official British war history was mostly a work of creative writing, and was "discredited", unlike ours of course. And if you talk to some Aussies they think that we nearly won the war by ourselves, and it was only the silly Brits who stuffed up at Gallipoli (wrong beach!), or else we would have conquered the whole of Turkey! Umm, yeah, right.
Disturbingly, many Australians don't know much at all about WWI, mostly just Gallipoli thanks to ANZAC day and the accompanying media hoopla.
Doctrine developed as the war went on. The original BEP was capable of sophisticated tactics, but was almost completely gone by the end of 1914. In place of the experienced professionals, the British Army expanded, for the first time in its history, into a massed conscript army, that saw its first campaign at the Somme in 1916. The tactics that were used were necessarily constrained by the use of recruits who weren't experienced in war, but had to follow prescribed doctrine rather than be given the freedom to follow the feel of any particular action. Before the collapse in the Michael Offensive, the only thing the British High Command did on the Western Front that follows the accepted history was their continuation of the Passchendaele campaign for far too long.
Generals from WW1 - you are all making mistake. At the beginning. You are puting all of them into same level. As on most of wars there were some idiots and some intelligent guys (like Petain). Sadly highest commanders were generally weak - which (connected with mentioned into earliers post technical changes on battlefield) causes massive loses.
Centurion1
11-17-2009, 01:59
No they did what they could with the technology at hand..... there was no way to have a totally mobile war and you have to attack to win..... so thats WW1 in a nutshell
A Very Super Market
11-17-2009, 03:23
You seem to forget about the Eastern Front. Of course, the situation there lended itself well to sweeping attacks reminiscent of Belgium in 1914. Large tracts of flat meaningless land, excessive manpower reserves, even by WWI standards, it was a clear contrast between Easter Europe and the Western front. Cramped, with Paris a mere skip away, and the Ruhr in the other direction, there was nothing to give up.
Peasant Phill
11-17-2009, 21:29
2) Flanders. I do not know whether Flemings died at a disproportionate rate. I seem to remember they did. However, as with the Bretons, when correcting for 'rural, education and social class', the difference with Walloons is accounted for.
The Flemish Movement became more socially oriented through the Frontbeweging (Front Movement), an organization of Flemish soldiers who complained about the lack of consideration for their language in the army, and Belgium in general, and harbored pacifistic feelings. The Frontbeweging became a political movement, dedicated to peace, tolerance and autonomy (Nooit Meer Oorlog, Godsvrede, Zelfbestuur). Yearly pilgrimages to the IJzertoren (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IJzertoren) are still held to this day. The poet Anton van Wilderode (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anton_van_Wilderode) wrote many texts for this occasion. Many rumours arose regarding the treatment of Flemish soldiers in World War I (though mostly debunked by research of Flemish historians) live on and are part of the Flemish martyr syndrome. For instance, one such legend is that many Dutch-speaking soldiers were slaughtered because they could not understand orders given to them in French by French speaking officers.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flemish_Movement#World_War_I
In Flanders, remembrance of WWI and the expression of national sentiment overlap:
The IJzerbedevaart (Pilgrimage of the Yser) is a yearly gathering of Flemings (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flemings), at the IJzertoren (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IJzertoren) in Diksmuide (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diksmuide). This pilgrimage remembers the Flemish (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flanders) soldiers who died during the First World War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_World_War) and was first organised in 1920. It is at the same time a political meeting striving for Flemish political autonomy. The aims of the annual meeting are No more War, Autonomy and Truce of God.
Firstly I wouldn't call the Flemings a minority in Belgium in the 20th century. There wasn't even a Flemish-Waloon' conflict as such. The real breakline in at that time was socio-economic rather than regional or cultural. The great divide between upperclass and lowerclass was the language. If you wanted to succeed in those days (in Flanders) you had to learn French.
The cohesion/cameraderie between the Flemish speaking front soldiers developed in a cultural movement that would later result in the emancipation of the Flemish speaking lower class, not only cultural but later also economical and political. This can be seen in the same light as the expansion of the right to vote.
Secondly, I doubt that Flemish casualties were disproportional. If it is the case than it's because of secundary factors rather than a deliberate act of the Belgian government at that time.
Thirdly, many rumours about the treatment of the Flemish soldiers may have been debunked, it stands without a doubt that the Flemish speaking lower class was surpressed by French speaking upper class:
- trials were held entirely in French, meaning a Flemish speaking party was unable to follow
- The Ijzertoren (symbol of the Flemish movement) has been dinamited twice
- Gravestones made for Flemish soldiers from WWI were removed and grinded up to make roads.
- ...
(I don't want to sound like a radical, and all this from wanting to point out that the 'Flemish minority' was actually socio-cultural)
This guy This guy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Ludendorff) came up with these guys (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stormtroopers). And though it was too late to change the tide of war, it certainly prolonged it past when it would have ended had he not done so. He also made it official policy and doctrine for even the lowest corporal to exercise tactical initiative on the battlefield leading to a much more effective German effort, but again, it was too late to change the inevitable outcome.
Evil_Maniac From Mars
11-21-2009, 19:23
Not really, in both WW1 and WW2 the Anzac forces (Australians & New Zealanders) as well as Canadians were a vital part of the British army. If anything, the Anzac's were considered much better soldiers than British Tommys -who tended to be physicaly smaller (apparently).
The Canadians tend to say that about themselves too, so either it's a national myth or the British were the worst soldiers in the Commonwealth.
G. Septimus
11-24-2009, 14:42
The Canadians tend to say that about themselves too, so either it's a national myth or the British were the worst soldiers in the Commonwealth.
Even the Special Air Service (SAS) were made of Australians, Irish, New Zealenders, and even French!!!
The Commandos to, so The best-soldiers were either the Germans, Americans , or French, the Brits only have talented Comanders (not that talented in WWI), and Those commanders mostly command ANZACs, Gurkhas, Indians, and some West Africans. so the Brits maybe the worst
The Brits:
http://www.worldwar1gallery.com/wartimexmas.jpgthey only get their Asses in the media, and they don't kick-ass like the Americans
:smg: :skull:
:smg: :rifle:
Quintus.JC
11-24-2009, 15:23
Not really, in both WW1 and WW2 the Anzac forces (Australians & New Zealanders) as well as Canadians were a vital part of the British army. If anything, the Anzac's were considered much better soldiers than British Tommys -who tended to be physicaly smaller (apparently).
Even the Special Air Service (SAS) were made of Australians, Irish, New Zealenders, and even French!!!
The Commandos to, so The best-soldiers were either the Germans, Americans , or French, the Brits only have talented Comanders (not that talented in WWI), and Those commanders mostly command ANZACs, Gurkhas, Indians, and some West Africans. so the Brits maybe the worst
The Brits:
http://www.worldwar1gallery.com/wartimexmas.jpgthey only get their Asses in the media, and they don't kick-ass like the Americans
:smg: :skull:
:smg: :rifle:
Let's not forget that the vast majority of Tommies in WWI were made of volunteers and other conscripts. Most had trashy day jobs and had little trainning when put to the trenches. The Anzac and the Canadians travelled across the globe to fight in Europe - they weren't about to sent milkmen and shopkeepers to the battlefields. The properly trained British Expeditionary Force did well in their actions. While for the vast majority of the Tommies, it was really a case of lions led by donkeys. Comparing the ordinary British field army against the Stoomtroopers and Gurkhas seem hardly fair to me.
A Very Super Market
11-25-2009, 00:43
Err, these Canadians and ANZACs were not professional soldiers, or particularily well trained for that matter. If they were, that would mean that a tremendous portion of their respective nations had been in the regular army (The figure for Canada would have been .8 million out of 7.2 million) in the years prior to the Great War.
This shouldn't even be considered. There were simply more Brits fighting, and thus, they get little recognition.
While for the vast majority of the Tommies, it was really a case of lions led by donkeys.
That is pretty much how he german generals thought about the brits, even worded it like that, english troops were highly respected by the german high-command, their leaders not so much.
Alexander the Pretty Good
11-25-2009, 17:52
The properly trained British Expeditionary Force did well in their actions.
If "well" is "better than the French" perhaps. Or at least the BEF on the Western Front...
Quintus.JC
11-25-2009, 18:17
That is pretty much how he german generals thought about the brits, even worded it like that, english troops were highly respected by the german high-command, their leaders not so much.
Ludendorff: "The English soldiers fight like lions."
Hoffmann: "True. But don't we know that they are lions led by donkeys."
True that, The British commander Douglas Haig was a massive disappointment; his medieval approach to 20th century warfare really shouldn't have made him Field Marshall. The English soldiers certainly didn't lack courage, but unfortunately courage don't win you battles. They were still massively inferior when compared to their German counterpart.
If "well" is "better than the French" perhaps. Or at least the BEF on the Western Front...
The original 'Old Contemptibles' were truely fit for recognition. At the battle of Mons they inflicted heavy casualities on the Germans despite being heavily out-numbered. They also played a vital role in slowing down the German advance through Belgium and France. Later on the BEF contributed considerably at the First Battle of Ypres - during which the majority of the old contemptibles were wiped out. And had to be replaced by a batch of new recruites. The BEF generally faded into the background when trench warfare was introduced, but their original contributions cannot be forgotten.
and only smaller operations (Like Vimy Ridge) were given separately to the commonwealth.
You mean Canadians. :canada:
Byng and Currie handled that battle well, but that lump of dirt still cost us 3000 dead. Mind you, out of all of the battle of Arras and the Nivelle Offensive that went along with it (or the other way around), I think Vimy would count as the best fought and the best won.
As for the generals; some were out of touch, some were out of their element, and some, like Haig, were out of their mind. What Haig did at Passchendaele was nothing less than a crime.
al Roumi
11-26-2009, 11:40
What about Verdun... I'm surprised it hasn't been mentioned yet. There are some arguments around for it being a calculated strategy to bleed France into submission, but also stuff questioning that as an original objective. Is this where the discussion might move from the idiocy to the immorality of commanders and their decisions?
There are some arguments around for it being a calculated strategy to bleed France into submission, but also stuff questioning that as an original objective.
Isn't it always? Frontline warfare is a transaction of casualties. The german generals were certainly more cautious, the French were rather eager to run at heavily fortified positions.
A Very Super Market
11-26-2009, 17:22
Verdun caused just as many casualties to the Germans as it did the French. Not the best battle of attrition. The Somme was the British answer to Verdun, and it did end rather badly for them...
G. Septimus
11-26-2009, 17:41
well,
Verdun, and the Somme, were, WWI's most bloody Battles (the others were Gallipoli, and Ypers-3 of them)
http://rb3091.k12.sd.us/Event/ypres.jpg
Oleander Ardens
11-26-2009, 20:37
I think that the war of 1870 already showed that frontal attacks against prepared attackers were even with heavy artillery support a mostly futil and very bloody affair. This led especially in the German army to a strong doctrinal support for rapid flanking maneuvers at a small and grand scale. Heck already Clausewitz noticed the increasing defensive strenght of skirmishing infantry. However only very few could have imagined the staying power of the trenchsystem combined with an increasingly flexible defensive concept in the face of such shattering firepower and immense manpower as in WWI.
OA
al Roumi
11-27-2009, 12:03
Isn't it always? Frontline warfare is a transaction of casualties. The german generals were certainly more cautious, the French were rather eager to run at heavily fortified positions.
Um, not exactly. Traditionaly battles are for fought for control of an area, an asset or something. Not with the express desire of killing everyone who might be able to oppose you.
Um, not exactly. Traditionaly battles are for fought for control of an area, an asset or something. Not with the express desire of killing everyone who might be able to oppose you.
How does that coexist with your theory of bleeding the french dry? I didn't say kill everyone, I mean kill everyone until you won, hence a transaction of casualties. That isn't something I just decided it to be, you even kinda touched it however briefly as it may have been.
Since WW1 did not allow for "battles of annihilation" there was really only attrition warfare left. Part of the package meant large battles that, even though they involves heavy losses, were merely small steps towards exhausting the enemy and forcing him to the negotiating table. There is no immorality in that.
CBR
al Roumi
11-27-2009, 17:00
How does that coexist with your theory of bleeding the french dry? I didn't say kill everyone, I mean kill everyone until you won, hence a transaction of casualties. That isn't something I just decided it to be, you even kinda touched it however briefly as it may have been.
My question, and the debate i was hoping to see was related to the morality of the kind of warfare where you are simply trying to bleed a nation dry through attritive warfare. Yes the technology of WW1 didn't really allow for much of a different strategy, but it evidently became "normal" or acceptable for the "transaction of casualties" to be the de-facto method of war.
I'd like to think I'm not being strategically naive but what I do find so appaling about WW1 is that life became so horrendously cheap to the strategists of both sides. They basically drew a blank when looking for an answer to their contemporary tactical equations but decided to carry on with the "meat-grinder" regardless.
I recognise that there weren't any readily available solutions on the western front (exploitation of this fact is what drove the German plans for the Verdun offensive -backing France against an effective wall), so I won't call the generalls and startegists "stupid", but I cannot think of them without shuddering at the lives they ultimately had responsability for condemning.
The German strategy for Verdun fully embraced the attritive nature of the war and sought to exploit it. Basically by laying the French nation over an anvil (Verdun) and breaking it remorselessly.
bah, you can tell me the generals were just following political orders but IMO that doesn't wash the blood off their hands.
Whether those in charge of the Somme offensive were any different I don't really know, but afaik the plan there was more traditional -to overwhelm and capture ground rather than to specifically create the battlefield equivalent of a mass slaughterhouse (as at Verdun).
al Roumi
11-27-2009, 17:02
Since WW1 did not allow for "battles of annihilation" there was really only attrition warfare left. Part of the package meant large battles that, even though they involves heavy losses, were merely small steps towards exhausting the enemy and forcing him to the negotiating table. There is no immorality in that.
CBR
I understand that, but purposefully setting up the equivalent of an abatoir is not moral.
All is not fair in war IMO.
I will now go and pick some flowers, or something, man.
A Very Super Market
11-27-2009, 17:08
How can one form of generalship be more immoral than another? You are still leading men to their deaths. A battlefield is a mass slaughterhouse. Does it really matter if the objective is expressively to kill them, or to kill them in order to achieve something? Death is death, and the only thing that distinguishes it is a death at peace or a death in fight.
al Roumi
11-27-2009, 18:31
How can one form of generalship be more immoral than another? You are still leading men to their deaths. A battlefield is a mass slaughterhouse. Does it really matter if the objective is expressively to kill them, or to kill them in order to achieve something? Death is death, and the only thing that distinguishes it is a death at peace or a death in fight.
When death and destruction itself is the sole aim, I do find that immoral. In that light I see the Verdun "mill" strategy as immoral, even though it was ultimately intended to achieve an eventual strategic "manpower" victory and peace.
In a purely hypothetical case, I could not plan and see through a strategy which was solely based on exterminating enough people that there would not be enough left to oppose me.
Hindsight is a luxury, but I would hope to be less cynical and more merciful than those who planned Verdun.
Sorry for derailing the post!
Alexander the Pretty Good
11-27-2009, 18:57
At least before 1918, the Allies on the Western Front were focusing on trying to create a breakthrough as a means of driving the Germans out of France. Most of their commanders didn't realize just how big of a breakthrough needed to be made for anything to be accomplished. To compound that mistake, they failed to grasp the new weapons, logistics, and tactics the Germans had developed, their choices for locations of potential breakthroughs were worthless unless a breakthrough developed (and one never did), and in lying to themselves about how poorly the war was going for themselves they were continually overoptimistic about the likelihood of a breakthrough happening. So you had your Vauquois and Somme and Passchendaele.
The idea of bleeding out the Central Powers was based on the idea that Germany was running out of men (they weren't) and as spin for the horrific casualties the Allies suffered in pointless assaults. If you could pretend that the Germans lost double the men you lost on the Somme then it made sense to continue fighting there no matter the cost. But it was largely fiction.
Oleander Ardens
11-27-2009, 22:18
The idea of bleeding out the Central Powers was based on the idea that Germany was running out of men (they weren't) and as spin for the horrific casualties the Allies suffered in pointless assaults. If you could pretend that the Germans lost double the men you lost on the Somme then it made sense to continue fighting there no matter the cost. But it was largely fiction.
The myth of a the favorable "exchange" in casualities at the Somme was created to justify the unjustifiable. To quote Wikipedia:
The original Allied estimate of casualties on the Somme, made at the Chantilly conference on 15 November, was 485,000 British and French casualties versus 630,000 German.[61] These figures were used to support the argument that the Somme was a successful battle of attrition for the Allies. However, there was considerable scepticism at the time of the accuracy of the counts. After the war a final tally showed that 419,654 British and 204,253 French were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner; of the 623,907 total casualties, 146,431 were either killed or missing.[61]
The British official historian Sir James Edmonds maintained that German losses were 680,000, but this figure has been discredited.[61] A separate statistical report by the British War Office concluded that German casualties on the British sector could be as low as 180,000 during the battle. In compiling his biography of General Rawlinson, Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice was supplied by the Reichsarchiv with a figure of 164,055 for the German killed or missing.[62]
It is quite striking that most English literature still gives more credit to estimates founded on the necessary myth than on hard facts.
But I would not rate the efforts of Allies in the realm of tactics as low as you did. Their integration of recon and surveillance with the combined arms were indeed sophisticated.
OA
How can one form of generalship be more immoral than another? You are still leading men to their deaths. A battlefield is a mass slaughterhouse. Does it really matter if the objective is expressively to kill them, or to kill them in order to achieve something? Death is death, and the only thing that distinguishes it is a death at peace or a death in fight.
Death for country, life sacrificed for country is biggest gift that could be given.
A Very Super Market
11-28-2009, 01:18
Depends on what you believe in. KrooK, your reputation as a Polish nationalist preceeds you, so it is no doubt that you believe so. But my post is in reference tp alh_p's, who argues that attritional warfare is more immoral than manuevre warfare. Not, a one-off on the pointlessness of death and war, that would be profoundly off-topic.
G. Septimus
11-28-2009, 03:55
The myth of a the favorable "exchange" in casualities at the Somme was created to justify the unjustifiable. To quote Wikipedia:
It is quite striking that most English literature still gives more credit to estimates founded on the necessary myth than on hard facts.
But I would not rate the efforts of Allies in the realm of tactics as low as you did. Their integration of recon and surveillance with the combined arms were indeed sophisticated.
OA
485.000 is not a small number!!!!!!!!:dizzy2:
that's a bunch of guys there.
War is sweet to those who never tasted it, and those guys tasted it.
they really got they're asses kicked.
this is a small part in the Somme, http://www.freeinfosociety.com/media/images/3654.jpg
KukriKhan
11-28-2009, 15:01
Um, not exactly. Traditionaly battles are for fought for control of an area, an asset or something. Not with the express desire of killing everyone who might be able to oppose you.
The above is an important shift in thinking that I believe gets overlooked too easily.
1972. The first "sit down in a chair"-type indoctrination class I attended in the US Army. A Major took the stage, and asked us (a platoon-sized audience) "What is the mission of the army?" Answers from the floor included "seize and hold land", "defend the country", "achieve political objectives", etc.
The Major shrieked: "KILLLLLL THE ENEMY!!!", that's what we do. That other stuff: 'hold land' and so on, is just a means to the end of KILLLLL THE ENEMY!!!".
It took a little while for the simplicity of that idea to sink in, and replace any old ideas I had about battlefield honour or chivalry, and removed any doubts I had about the brutality of this outfit I'd been forced into.
If one looks at classic Napoleonic campaigns, or even Moltke's campaigns in Austria or France, then the asset was the enemy army. Taking certain objectives might be equal to victory, a capitol maybe, but the threat of taking objectives were sometimes merely to force the enemy to accept battle.
Killing, wounding, capturing or routing was all fine but when it is no longer possible to take out a majority of the enemy army, nor make a great breakthrough to exploit, then one is left with the killing and wounding part.
WW2 had the Atlantic or the bombing raids as examples of attrition. That was more of a focus on materiel losses than killing people but not because of higher morals but because commanders has better/different cards to play. Both were indeed used in WW1 too but never had the same impact as in WW2.
CBR
Ramses II CP
11-28-2009, 17:42
My question, and the debate i was hoping to see was related to the morality of the kind of warfare where you are simply trying to bleed a nation dry through attritive warfare. Yes the technology of WW1 didn't really allow for much of a different strategy, but it evidently became "normal" or acceptable for the "transaction of casualties" to be the de-facto method of war.
I'd like to think I'm not being strategically naive but what I do find so appaling about WW1 is that life became so horrendously cheap to the strategists of both sides. They basically drew a blank when looking for an answer to their contemporary tactical equations but decided to carry on with the "meat-grinder" regardless.
I recognise that there weren't any readily available solutions on the western front (exploitation of this fact is what drove the German plans for the Verdun offensive -backing France against an effective wall), so I won't call the generalls and startegists "stupid", but I cannot think of them without shuddering at the lives they ultimately had responsability for condemning.
The German strategy for Verdun fully embraced the attritive nature of the war and sought to exploit it. Basically by laying the French nation over an anvil (Verdun) and breaking it remorselessly.
bah, you can tell me the generals were just following political orders but IMO that doesn't wash the blood off their hands.
Whether those in charge of the Somme offensive were any different I don't really know, but afaik the plan there was more traditional -to overwhelm and capture ground rather than to specifically create the battlefield equivalent of a mass slaughterhouse (as at Verdun).
I find this kind of retrospective moral judgement substantially more distasteful than a similarly framed strategic judgement. The fact is that the value of life is different for societies as they develop. Recreating the circumstances of WWI in the modern world would cause us to fight it differently, but that has more to do with sociological changes than with some imaginary objective moral superiority. It is, in my opinion, equally unseemly to judge on purely moral grounds Europe's expenditure of soldiers in WWI as for us to judge Fredrick the Great's treatment of his soldiery, or Alexander's use of native levies. In no case was consideration of right the primary driving force, it was what they believed was necessary that drove them to these acts.
And in judgement of necessity hindsight has an inherent superiority which destroys all proper perspective. It's the same situation as questioning the necessity of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan; our knowledge of the postwar era and the true situation in Japan distorts our ability to properly parse the situation as the commanders at the time saw it. Personally I find questions of right and wrong are nearly irrelevant when it comes to war; it is never going to be right in any logically consistent system to perpetrate mass slaughter, but it may at times be necessary all the same.
I am considerably more comfortable giving my opinion on the quality of the strategic decisions made at the time because, absent all those moral values that cannot be eliminated from a discussion of right and wrong, it is possible to assess what choices could have been made to improve results at the front. On that topic I think the average WWI commander was operating as intelligently as could be expected under the circumstances, though there was a failure of innovation at the higher levels of command. There simply were very few good choices that could be made at the tactical level aside from the politically and economically unacceptable decision to halt all offensives, and the fact that commanders of sufficient strategic influence failed to invent new methods at that level is mostly an indication that they were of merely normal intelligence and operating under constrictive and authoritarian systems of command.
Let us not forget that WWI was won, after all, and if it was done so in a particularly uninspired and staid manner it is no less a victory for that. We can speculate that it could've been won more cheaply, more completely, more quickly, or more brilliantly, but I can certainly imagine it being conducted more foolishly, destructively, and wastefully as well. Anyone else read L. Ron Hubbard's Final Blackout? Purely speculative, but entertaining and closer to the source (In time and perspective) on strategic grounds than any of us as well.
:egypt:
Anyone else read L. Ron Hubbard's Final Blackout?
*Overwhelmed by sheer terror, Subotan recoiled in the face of such monstrous horror, his face contorted into an expression of pure pain and disgust*
Ramses II CP
11-29-2009, 05:47
*Overwhelmed by sheer terror, Subotan recoiled in the face of such monstrous horror, his face contorted into an expression of pure pain and disgust*
While your post is amusing I'm sure you're aware it is also entirely content free. Hubbard's more well known nonsense was still well in his future when he wrote this book, and delusions of grandeur are at least as often an aid to writing as an impediment.
:egypt:
Everytime I shoot an insurgent my only intent is to kill the mother:daisy:. Is that immoral? Some would say so, but it's war and in war you kill people to further the aims of your own nation. So is war immoral? Yes and no. I, like many others, believe in context. The war the insurgents wage against American soldiers and even their own people is immoral. Since it is stated explicitly in our Rules of Engagement that we are to protect Iraqi/Afghani citizens from these insurgents, I would say that our war is not.
Oh and the official purpose of the Army: "To deter war. Should deterrence fail, to achieve peace through victory in combat."
The Mahdi Militia in Baghdad is a lame duck these days. When I was there 8 months ago they had been attritted to 1/3 of their former strength and were no longer capable of posing a real threat. Bleeding the enemy dry is a legitimate strategy. Kill them. Just kill them.
Bleeding the enemy dry is a legitimate strategy. Kill them. Just kill them.
A very Sherman-esque viewpoint.
al Roumi
11-30-2009, 16:48
I find this kind of retrospective moral judgement substantially more distasteful than a similarly framed strategic judgement. The fact is that the value of life is different for societies as they develop. Recreating the circumstances of WWI in the modern world would cause us to fight it differently, but that has more to do with sociological changes than with some imaginary objective moral superiority. It is, in my opinion, equally unseemly to judge on purely moral grounds Europe's expenditure of soldiers in WWI as for us to judge Fredrick the Great's treatment of his soldiery, or Alexander's use of native levies. In no case was consideration of right the primary driving force, it was what they believed was necessary that drove them to these acts.
And in judgement of necessity hindsight has an inherent superiority which destroys all proper perspective. It's the same situation as questioning the necessity of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan; our knowledge of the postwar era and the true situation in Japan distorts our ability to properly parse the situation as the commanders at the time saw it. Personally I find questions of right and wrong are nearly irrelevant when it comes to war; it is never going to be right in any logically consistent system to perpetrate mass slaughter, but it may at times be necessary all the same.
I am considerably more comfortable giving my opinion on the quality of the strategic decisions made at the time because, absent all those moral values that cannot be eliminated from a discussion of right and wrong, it is possible to assess what choices could have been made to improve results at the front. On that topic I think the average WWI commander was operating as intelligently as could be expected under the circumstances, though there was a failure of innovation at the higher levels of command. There simply were very few good choices that could be made at the tactical level aside from the politically and economically unacceptable decision to halt all offensives, and the fact that commanders of sufficient strategic influence failed to invent new methods at that level is mostly an indication that they were of merely normal intelligence and operating under constrictive and authoritarian systems of command.
Let us not forget that WWI was won, after all, and if it was done so in a particularly uninspired and staid manner it is no less a victory for that. We can speculate that it could've been won more cheaply, more completely, more quickly, or more brilliantly, but I can certainly imagine it being conducted more foolishly, destructively, and wastefully as well. Anyone else read L. Ron Hubbard's Final Blackout? Purely speculative, but entertaining and closer to the source (In time and perspective) on strategic grounds than any of us as well.
:egypt:
You make a good point, as does Snite, on what hindsight does to a perspective even slightly removed from the time when the decision was taken. I'd like to think I was kind of aware of this whilst writing what I did, I concede it is all a bit moralistic though.
And i'm afraid i share Subotan's horror at the mention of Mr Hubbard -I trust you are not the type of person to be trying to type using the power of thought alone?
As to CBR's, Snite's and Kukri's more strategic point on "killing is [the way to] the objective", I guess that is true in the mechanistic sense of an army -it literaly is what it does. And there really was a paucity of strategic options in WW1.
A very Sherman-esque viewpoint.
I think you mean Grant, cuz Sherman waged a war agains the people by destroying farms and infastructure. Or Forrest. Forrest actually since he refused to take prisoners in every battle he fought in, though I should state I'm all for taking prisoners; they give good intel.
Meneldil
11-30-2009, 21:37
I, like many others, believe in context. The war the insurgents wage against American soldiers and even their own people is immoral. Since it is stated explicitly in our Rules of Engagement that we are to protect Iraqi/Afghani citizens from these insurgents, I would say that our war is not.
In memory of Tribesman:
:laugh4::laugh4::laugh4::laugh 4::laugh4::laugh4::laugh4:
Alexander the Pretty Good
11-30-2009, 23:14
tribesy bought a ban?
In memory of Tribesman:
:laugh4::laugh4::laugh4::laugh 4::laugh4::laugh4::laugh4:
I don't know Tribesman so I don't understand your post.
I think you mean Grant, cuz Sherman waged a war agains the people by destroying farms and infastructure. Or Forrest. Forrest actually since he refused to take prisoners in every battle he fought in.
Perhaps. But Sherman was definitely of the same mindset.
cegorach
12-02-2009, 21:39
I WW is hardly my thing, but I'd like to add one thing.
I am just after reading the Galizian War about Austro-Hungarian battles with the Russians (Germant activities were less important than usually believed).
My opinion is that in the east initially neither side could commit forces able to cover the entire frontline and later the size of the front was still an extremely important factor.
The facts meant the first years of conflict were full of higly mobile offensives and counter-offensives - if there were enough troops to create a stable position in the center, there were always the Carpatian Mountains to outflank them, if the mountains were blocked there was central Poland where only the Russians could commit massive forces attempting to steamroll the Central States'' armies.
However there were still moments where both sides were stuck in combat unable to outfalnk the enemy or simply fighting for some important transport route e.g. just like during the battle at Kraków. In those cases the clashes quickly became rather similar to great attrition battles of the west.
Because the Russians were usually the side which was unable to provide enough firepower they were suffering more which stopped more than one of their offensive actions, but the same could apply to the Austrians for example during later attempts to de-block Przemyśl.
Quite often generals who seemed rather capable and competent were simply helpless facing entrentched enemies and superior artillery sometimes in difficult terrain.
Russian armies suffered horrendous losses at Kraków or when storming Przemyśl, not to mention the Austrian-German breakthrough at Gorlice, but the Austo-Hungarian army paid their price during the winter offensives in the mountains.
Compared to these battles such as the one at Kraśnik
a nice looking map - http://www.taktykaistrategia.pl/?topic=wydanegry&content=krasnik1914
allowed more even if circumstances could be less forgiving than during the attrition battles.
But of course I no expert when it comes to the subject.
Megas Methuselah
12-04-2009, 00:17
I don't know Tribesman so I don't understand your post.
He's laughing at what he sees as being ridiculous in your post.
I got that he thinks it's funny that I don't view killing Mahdi Militia as immoral, but I don't want to respond to him until I know who Tribesman is and fully understand his post.
I got that he thinks it's funny that I don't view killing Mahdi Militia as immoral, but I don't want to respond to him until I know who Tribesman is and fully understand his post.
Tribesman is a backroom member, hasn't been here for a while sadly even if we don't exactly get along, he has his own way when it comes to communicating his views, usually looks like this; :laugh4::laugh4::laugh4::laugh4::laugh4:
And it's a big loss not to know him, have you never wondered where that black hole in your soul comes from? :sweatdrop:
It's not from never meeting Tribesman.
It's not from never meeting Tribesman.
Oh God it is, it really is. You just don't know it yet.
It's not from never meeting Tribesman.
You will probably hate his guts which comes pretty naturally. I miss the guy weird as that may be, the backroom simply needs him it isn't the same place without him, his departure is messing with the balance and I don't like it.
I don't hate his guts(surprise, surprise! :laugh4:), he has a somewhat aggressive way to express himself but once you realize that he often actually does have a relatively good point, you can get to appreciate his posts. Once in a while he also posts a link for us mere mortals to get a glimpse of his wisdom.
I don't hate his guts(surprise, surprise! :laugh4:), he has a somewhat aggressive way to express himself but once you realize that he often actually does have a relatively good point, you can get to appreciate his posts. Once in a while he also posts a link for us mere mortals to get a glimpse of his wisdom.
Well he hates mine, he hasn't behaved in the nicest of ways towards me, often somewhat unfair and sometimes just downright hostile, that is fine with me I am not build out of sugar but I don't like him. But most do and I don't want to ruin anyones fun.
Samurai Waki
12-05-2009, 12:59
What started that whole thing between you two anyways?
Anyway, I think when it comes down to it, Tribes generally always had good points to make, but was an abysmal salesman. He was the Hannibal of the Backroom, he knew how to be victorious, but didn't know what to do with it.
What started that whole thing between you two anyways?
Made a stupid post after van Gogh was murdered, meant it at the time so that's on me. But that was 5 years ago I have changed I am no longer like that, was, but not anymore. So at the time he was right.
edit, you cannot understand how angry I have been, still am, this is never going to heal it's not possible.
Made a stupid post after van Gogh was murdered, meant it at the time so that's on me. But that was 5 years ago I have changed I am no longer like that, was, but not anymore. So at the time he was right.
Tribesman changed your life.
[insert picture of Tribes and Fragony hugging]
I've usually thought that he and some others take you as a bit more xenophobic than you really are, but sometimes people form an opinion and keep it even if the person changes. It becomes a prejudice. :yes:
What started that whole thing between you two anyways?
Anyway, I think when it comes down to it, Tribes generally always had good points to make, but was an abysmal salesman. He was the Hannibal of the Backroom, he knew how to be victorious, but didn't know what to do with it.
He doesn't care about being victorious.
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