Treaty of Versailles - Modern Reappraisal

[Louis VI the Fat]

Few treaties are as contentious as the Treaty of Versailles. For even fewer, there is as large a discrepancy between modern, serious scholars, and the public at large.

Whereas the general public has since almost the very beginning swallowed hook, line and sinker German propaganda, serious historians have in the past two decades reached a far more balanced view. 'Versailles' is currently regarded in a much more positive light. It was a moderate, pragmatical, lenient treaty.

Unfortunately, in this instance, the losers have managed to write history.

For various reasons, many of the misconceptions and negative views of Versailles which were established fairly soon after WWI, do not seem likely to lose their hold of the public imagination any time soon.


Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, Eds., The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press and The German Historical Institute, 1998.


Years ago in a Holocaust course I co-taught, I had portrayed the Versailles Treaty as neither harsh nor conciliatory. Lucjan Dobroszycski, a survivor of Auschwitz, a great historian of Jewish history, thought the Treaty dealt harshly with Germany. I indicated the conflict between our interpretations. With a characteristic twinkle in his eyes he asked, "Might we agree that Germans perceived the Versailles Treaty to be harsh, and perceptions play crucial roles in history."



Realities, perceptions, and myths are all analyzed in The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. These twenty-six stimulating, often provocative, and always informative essays are essential reading for anyone interested in history of the twentieth century. There is surprising agreement, but disagreements endure over reparations, the severity of the treaty, and its impact.



I have been shaped by the same contemporary history and historiography that have shaped the minds of the contributors. My students have also influenced me as some of them, products of what I imagine are typical American primary and high schools, bring a stark simplification of the interwar years: The Versailles Treaty was unbearably harsh, particularly reparations, destroyed the German economy causing inflation and depression, brought Hitler to power, and caused World War II. They espouse monocausal history and cast France as the major villain. These essays help explain why more than eighty years after its creation the Versailles Treaty remains one of the most misunderstood events of the twentieth century.


Review and quick summary here: http://www.h-france.net/vol1reviews/blatt.html

The book, was the result of the the 1994 conference, by the German Historical Institute in Washington D.C (http://www.ghi-dc.org/)., and the Center for German and European Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. (http://www.berkeley.edu:5031/)
Site: http://people.virginia.edu/~sas4u/versailles.htm (http://people.virginia.edu/%7Esas4u/versailles.htm)

Apart from the 1994 conference and subsequent book, both very influential, Margareth MacMillan in 2002 wrote the highly acclaimed:

Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War



was published in 2002 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002) and is a historical narrative based on the events of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Peace_Conference_of_1919). It was written by Canadian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada) Professor Margaret MacMillan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_MacMillan) with a foreword by American (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) diplomat Richard Holbrooke (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Holbrooke). The book has also been published under the titles Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World and Peacemakers: Six Months That Changed the World.


MacMillan is a history professor at the University of Oxford (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oxford) and was also Provost of Trinity College (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Trinity_College) at the University of Toronto (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Toronto). For her work on this book, she had access to many private collections, including those of her great-grandfather, Prime Minister David Lloyd George (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lloyd_George).


Peacemakers recounts in precise detail the six months of negotiations that took place in Paris, France (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris,_France) following World War I (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I). The book focuses on the "Big Three", photographed together on its cover (left to right): Prime Minister Lloyd George (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lloyd_George) of the United Kingdom (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom), Premier Georges Clemenceau (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Clemenceau) of France (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France), and President Woodrow Wilson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson) of the United States (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States). Other participants included Vittorio Orlando (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vittorio_Orlando), premier of Italy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italy); an Arab (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab) delegation headed by Faisal ibn Husayn (later King Faisal I of Iraq (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faisal_I_of_Iraq)), T. E. Lawrence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_of_Arabia), and Gertrude Bell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gertrude_Bell), the "Uncrowned Queen of Iraq"; and Ho Chi Minh (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ho_Chi_Minh), then a kitchen helper at the Ritz Hotel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%C3%B4tel_Ritz_Paris) who submitted a petition for an independent Vietnam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam).


The acclaimed book details the conditions imposed on Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) and how three men rewrote the map of the world. The book also details other parts of the peace conference, such as Yugoslavia, China, Romania, Poland, and other major events throughout the conference. It also attempts to debunk a much-quoted theory of John Maynard Keynes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Maynard_Keynes), who propagated the idea that the conditions imposed on Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) in the Treaty of Versailles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles) led to the rise of Adolf Hitler (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Hitler).


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peacemakers:_The_Paris_Peace_Conference_of_1919_and_Its_Attempt_to_End_War


Vivid depiction of Versailles conference wins £30,000 prize for non-fiction


Peacemakers, published by John Murray, tells the story of the conference outside Paris that tried to fashion an enduring settlement for Europe and the wider world out of the ruins left by the First World War. Writing with dramatic gusto and a keen eye for character and incident, Professor MacMillan examines the intrigues of the leading players – Lloyd George from Britain, Georges Clemenceau from France, Woodrow Wilson from the US. She passes an unusually kindly judgement on them.


Previous historians have often seen the botched arrangements of Versailles as a trigger for the German resentment that culminated in the rise of Hitler and another, even deadlier, war. MacMillan spurns such hindsight as she dramatises the actions of confused politicians who had "to deal with reality, not what might have been".


In particular, she challenges the widely accepted view, first espoused by John Maynard Keynes, that the "harshness" of the Versailles Treaty towards Germany ultimately led to the Nazi takeover. Peacemakers even suggests that, if their aim was long-term peace in Europe, the Versailles negotiators were not harsh enough.


http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/vivid-depiction-of-versailles-conference-wins-pound30000-prize-for-nonfiction-646370.html
[To which I would like to add, that apart from prestigious prizes, MacMillan was rewarded with a promotion from Toronto to Oxford.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

From my point of view the placing of any punitive conditions on Germany was wrong, as was the American refusal to deal with the Kaisar.

[Beskar]

I always seen it as moderate. I believe it was EMFM (or Husar? One of the German posters anyway) were saying about 'Crippling Reperations' which totalled in real-terms to 2% GDP during that time-period, so only little skim off the cream.

The worst part of the treaty, was that the German government purposely signed the armistice before the allies over-ran Berlin, so the perception of the Germans at the time were "Why are we surrendering? They not laid a foot in Germany yet!". Perhaps allowing the allies to overrun Germany would change perception.

Also, France's idea of obliterating Germany always gets forgotten.

[HoreTore]

From my point of view the placing of any punitive conditions on Germany was wrong, as was the American refusal to deal with the Kaisar.

They lost the war, that's standard procedure.

Winner takes it all, just like ABBA says...

And Germany basically just lost what they had gained through war 50 years earlier, so they're just whiners.

[Beskar]

Well, compare the average Total:War game to the terms of the treaty. Makes the treaty look like a slap on the wrist.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

They lost the war, that's standard procedure.

Winner takes it all, just like ABBA says...

And Germany basically just lost what they had gained through war 50 years earlier, so they're just whiners.

but they weren't responsible for it, Austria was. Why was Germany singled out? Only because they fought well and France was afraid of them.

[Beskar]

but they weren't responsible for it, Austria was. Why was Germany singled out? Only because they fought well and France was afraid of them.

Austria didn't recieve any punishment? LOL The Habsburg Empire was obliterated and split up into several states. (Austria, Hungry, Yugoslavia, Czechoslavikia, etc, etc) Germany got a slapped wrist in comparison.

1914 - http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/maps/map_images/Europe1914.gif
1919 - http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/maps/map_images/Europe1918.gif

You have a very funny version of events.

Look at Austria in those two pictures.. they weren't punished?

[HoreTore]

but they weren't responsible for it, Austria was. Why was Germany singled out? Only because they fought well and France was afraid of them.

Because they lost. When you lose a war, you get punished. You don't have to start it, all you need to do is be a part of it.

And as Beskar noted, Austria-Hungary was completely dismantled...

[Husar]

Also, France's idea of obliterating Germany always gets forgotten.

I'm not sure the government would have signed that.

Now everybody is supposed to buy into this revisionist, anti-german re-writing of the thing that crippled our country and turned us into slaves of the french though, sickening. :sweatdrop:

[HoreTore]

I'm not sure the government would have signed that.

Now everybody is supposed to buy into this revisionist, anti-german re-writing of the thing that crippled our country and turned us into slaves of the french though, sickening. :sweatdrop:

Yes.... You need a strong leader, Husar!! Someone who can speak the truth about the jews who betrayed your country!

[Pannonian]

I'm not sure the government would have signed that.

Now everybody is supposed to buy into this revisionist, anti-german re-writing of the thing that crippled our country and turned us into slaves of the french though, sickening. :sweatdrop:

Are we still talking about the Treaty of Versailles, or are you talking about the Treaties of Rome (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaties_of_Rome)?

[PanzerJaeger]

The treaty and its restrictions are readily available online. I encourage anyone who hasn't read it to do so, and then come to their own judgment as to whether it was fair to impose it on a nation that was not responsible for the war, and made far more effort than the victors to end it. Further, would you and your nation accept such a treaty or support its overturning? I know that America wouldn't put up with it.

[Pannonian]

The treaty and its restrictions are readily available online. I encourage anyone who hasn't read it to do so, and then come to their own judgment as to whether it was fair to impose it on a nation that was not responsible for the war, and made far more effort than the victors to end it. Further, would you and your nation accept such a treaty or support its overturning? I know that America wouldn't put up with it.

From the British POV, you were indeed responsible for the war. If you hadn't invaded neutral Belgium, we wouldn't have entered the war.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Full text of the treaty: http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versailles.html

Other documents: http://people.virginia.edu/~sas4u/versailles.htm

[spmetla]

I've always thought it an overly harsh Peace Treaty, the Germans had done well throughout most of the war and still had a fair amount of holdings in France at the time. While they were bound to lose the war they were given much harsher terms than necessary. Nullifying the Treaty of Brest-Livtosk put Eastern and Central Europe at the mercy of the Bolsheviks which was thankfully stopped by the Poles. Taking away ALL of Germany's colonial possessions was ridiculous, especially seeing as not all of them had been captured by the Allies (German East Africa). Limiting the size of the army to 100k was again harsh because it meant a great power in Europe was at the mercy of it's two larger neighbors which in the case of the Russian Civil war made it ineffective and practically defenseless if say Poland had lost to the USSR and the Bolsheviks had continued pressing West. The 20s were a turbulent time in Europe and limiting a great power in such a way was unnecessary and destabilizing. The reparations were in order though, Germany's trying to flout it by devaluing their own currency to pay it off was just stupid and it bit them back.

Taking some colonies would be understandable, taking back Alsace-Lorraine would be natural too, as well as demilitarizing the Rhineland and making Germany pay reparations but demands that were made were far in excess of this and it is not surprising that it lead to the rise of a ultra nationalist such as Hitler.

I can understand that after the amount of blood that had been shed that they would want to get some territorial possessions or something but they went overboard. The Prussians after winning a total victory over France's Imperial armies and then defeating the various attempts by the 2nd Republic's army's to relieve Paris only demanded Alsace and part of Lorraine; they didn't limit France's Army, take a lot of territory, or even really punish France, and remember the Franco Prussian war was started by the French because Napoleon III opposed the attempt to put a Prussian on the Spanish throne.

While it is true that the losers in a war will have to bite the bullet and give in to terms, the terms given to Germany were extremely harsh and this attempt to try and say that it was a moderate kind treaty is wrong. Just because They didn't give the Rhineland to France or split Germany into the various duchies and kingdoms that it was prior to Franco Prussian war does not mean it was moderate in the slightest.

[Pannonian]

I've always thought it an overly harsh Peace Treaty, the Germans had done well throughout most of the war and still had a fair amount of holdings in France at the time. While they were bound to lose the war they were given much harsher terms than necessary. Nullifying the Treaty of Brest-Livtosk put Eastern and Central Europe at the mercy of the Bolsheviks which was thankfully stopped by the Poles. Taking away ALL of Germany's colonial possessions was ridiculous, especially seeing as not all of them had been captured by the Allies (German East Africa).

I'd have been happy if the Germans were allowed to keep those overseas possessions we hadn't yet captured, but we continued the war and kept any bits of Germany we managed to take. What say you to the British port of Kiel? Sounds good to me.

[Beskar]

I just thought of something, it just had to be said.

The Treaty was obviously not harsh enough, as you see in the next blockbuster, German Empire Strikes Back. If the treaty was all that harsh, Germany wouldn't have been able to take France out, govern the majority of Europe, and require an Alliance of British, Americans and Russians to defeat. (Though arguably, America and Britain wasn't needed as Russia would have eventually won.)

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Thanks Loius.

The military reductions were the most idiotic, aside from excluding Germany from the League; which was moronic.

[Kralizec]

I don't know enough about the actual terms to judge if they were harsh or not. There are, however, plenty of economists who disagree with the notion that the reparations were an impossible burden.

But more generally, treating Germany as a pariah state was wrong and counterproductive.

[spmetla]

I just thought of something, it just had to be said.

The Treaty was obviously not harsh enough, as you see in the next blockbuster, German Empire Strikes Back. If the treaty was all that harsh, Germany wouldn't have been able to take France out, govern the majority of Europe, and require an Alliance of British, Americans and Russians to defeat. (Though arguably, America and Britain wasn't needed as Russia would have eventually won.)

That would have more to do with the failure of France and Britain to enforce the treaty. Germany occupied the Rhineland and began rearming and nothing happened, if France had sent troops to counter the German reoccupation of the Rhineland the world would be a vastly different place.

[Louis VI the Fat]

'Versailles' remains highly contentious. I spoke in the OP of a discrepancy between modern historians, and lingering perceptions at large.

To see this in action, the history of the Wikipedia entry on 'Versailles' is very enlightening. Wikipedia keeps a mirror image of all previous versions of its pages. In the case of the entry on Versailles, one could write a fine thesis on the spread of evolving historical insight.

For example, until a few months ago, wiki followed this - by now - obsolote interpretation of Versailles:


France's aims

Further information: Revanchism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revanchism)

While both American and British leaders wanted to come to a fair and reasonable deal, France's interests were much more aggressive and demanding as many of the battles had been fought on French soil. Although they had agreed after the treaty was signed many world leaders agreed that some of France's demands were far too harsh and unsympathetic. France had lost some 1.5 million military personnel and an estimated 400,000 civilians to the war. (See World War I casualties (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_casualties)) To appease the French public, Prime Minister (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_France) Georges Clemenceau (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Clemenceau) wanted to impose policies meant to cripple Germany militarily, politically, and economically, so as never to be able to invade France again.[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] Clemenceau also particularly wished to regain the rich and industrial land of Alsace-Lorraine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alsace-Lorraine), which had been stripped from France by Germany in the 1871 War.[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] Clemenceau wanted the Rhineland to be separated from Germany as it was a key area of industry.[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] This land also acted as a buffer zone between France and Germany in case of repeated attack.[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)]Once all those '[citation needed]' were filled in with the findings of modern economic and strategical historians, a different, more balanced, picture emerged:

France's aims

Further information: Revanchism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revanchism)

France's chief interest was security. France had lost some 1.5 million military personnel and an estimated 400,000 civilians (See World War I casualties (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_casualties)) and had suffered great devastation during the war. Like Belgium, which had been similarly affected, France needed reparations to restore its prosperity and reparations also tended to be seen as a means of weakening any future German threat[7] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_versailles#cite_note-David_Thomson_1970.2C_p._605-6). Clemenceau particularly wished to regain the rich and industrial land of Alsace-Lorraine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alsace-Lorraine), which had been stripped from France by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Prussian_War) of 1871.[8] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_versailles#cite_note-7)

[Centurion1]

America and Britain wasn't needed as Russia would have eventually won.

Lol. If america hadnt flooded the market with our war goods you all would have fallen. and russia could not have won that war all on their own

[Beskar]

Lol. If america hadnt flooded the market with our war goods you all would have fallen. and russia could not have won that war all on their own

They could. That is the reason America jumped into the European front, to get the Germans from behind and to quickly take the land before the Russians get there.

[Centurion1]

Even russias vast manpower reserves were almost gone. And stalin was screaming for a two front war and stalin never ever demanded help unless he truly needed it.

If the Nazi's from the British air campaign, n. africa, and their whole u-boat fleet as well as no american aid and japans likely eventual entrance into the war on behalf of nazis would have resulted in complete destruction.

Though the japan thing is only hypothetical thinking of course.

Hey i love russian ive been there but i dont think they would have won ww2 single handedly against the german war machine.

[PanzerJaeger]

Topic derail in 3... 2... :yes:

[Centurion1]

he started it by instigating my post....... *sulk*

[Strike For The South]

From my point of view the placing of any punitive conditions on Germany was wrong, as was the American refusal to deal with the Kaisar.

Don't even try to put this on us Bond.

The thanks we get :angry:

[Aemilius Paulus]

Lol. If america hadnt flooded the market with our war goods you all would have fallen. and russia could not have won that war all on their own
Yeah, cause facts are simply gushing from from that assertion... Where did you pick that up, in your World History textbook - the one which covers all of history starting Neolithic in ~500-800 fully-illustrated pages? :laugh4::laugh4:


Read Glantz before posting on the Eastern Front. No-one in the West really cared much about representing the Soviet WWII experience accurately, save for a handful of scholars, Glantz being without a doubt the leading one, and he still retain his position as the expert on the Eastern Front. They say victors write the history, but for the most part, it was the German experience which shaped the Western understanding of the Great Patriotic War. I daresay the Cold War and the natural temptation to dismiss the enemy as incompetents or cowards was very much present as well, whether subtle or not so.

Whatever it is, your posts did not strike me as particularly indicative of knowledge on this field. Nothing above the average American teenage-young adult netizen level of comprehension of this subject. It is not that simple. I could spew such unfounded assertions as well. Here is one - about eight or nine out of ten German soldiers died on the Eastern Front. And this one is actually rather true, especially if you take the eight out of ten figure, which is actually quite accurate.

[Centurion1]

hld tht thought im in no conditin to argue........ and glantz nt only authority.

[Aemilius Paulus]

and glantz nt only authority.
Ha, that only shows you are not interested in the Eastern Front history. Let me put it this way - Turtledove is often called the king/master of alternate history. Glantz is the master of the Eastern Front. He is the foremost living scholar on this topic, and anyone already dead is too old of a source to trust anyhow, since 1:too much was de-classified/opened to the Western public after Cold War and 2:Cold War was not receptive to basically - a)any research in USSR regarding such a sensitive field or b)the tendencies of Western authors to present unbiased accounts of USSR.

Oh, and I have not heard of any other authors of his calibre, on this topic, who have already died.

[PanzerJaeger]

Read Glantz before posting on the Eastern Front. No-one in the West really cared much about representing the Soviet WWII experience accurately, save for a handful of scholars, Glantz being without a doubt the leading one, and he still retain his position as the expert on the Eastern Front. They say victors write the history, but for the most part, it was the German experience which shaped the Western understanding of the Great Patriotic War. I daresay the Cold War and the natural temptation to dismiss the enemy as incompetents or cowards was very much present, whether subtle or not so.


I completely agree with your assertion that the Eastern Front is very much misrepresented in popular culture, when it is brought up at all, and that Glantz is an excellent source. However, as Glantz himself points out in many of his books, Russian post-war propaganda was certainly not innocent in the distortion of facts.


Sorry Louis :shame:

[Centurion1]

srlsy cn we discuss ths later ima nt going put up much fight right nw.

but as for glantz, i read him one of the top american military historians blah blah blah, you wanna know bout slav he knows it, etc., wht about stephen ambrose. yeah not best example but im reallyyyyyyy not in it right now.


look russia was a huge force in ww2. but it woulda been much harder alone if nt impossible.

[Beskar]

look russia was a huge force in ww2. but it woulda been much harder alone if nt impossible.

Russia didn't need America jumping into Europe like it did. If anything, America jumping into Europe benefited American interests more in stopping an USSR advance into the West than it did than defeating Hitler. America's fight in WW2 was against the dregs of German armed forces with the Russian's fighting the vast majority. If America didn't make the big last minute assualt into Europe, then a Greater Proportion of Europe would have been under USSR control. The USSR was winning, it suffered some bloodly setbacks, but once they were in that gear, the Germans lost.

Though, Centurion1 is probably in that breed of American History books where America were the saviours of the 2nd World War, opposed to actually jumping in last second and taking all the glory. (Same with WW1, funnily enough)

[Centurion1]

Though, Centurion1 is probably in that breed of American History books where America were the saviours of the 2nd World War, opposed to actually jumping in last second and taking all the glory.

dnt take advantage of my conditin. tht was ww1. in ww2 our war materiels really were a key part. though maybe our actul war fightin wasn't really "neccassary:

[Aemilius Paulus]

but as for glantz, i read him one of the top american military historians blah blah blah, you wanna know bout slav he knows it, etc., wht about stephen ambrose. yeah not best example but im reallyyyyyyy not in it right now.
Yeah, you may want to put off the debate, because I am sorry to say you are making well, a... I do not want to say it, but I will say that mention of Ambrose could not have been more irrelevant. For one, he is not an Eastern Front historian. Second, he is not even a valid WWII historian in this discussion. I mean, I his books are a mix of personal experiences of soldiers, anecdotes, highly specialised books, some tactics, but very little overall strategy, the in-depth, large-scale analytical works of Glantz or similar historians. Sometimes, I would even say Ambrose is more of a populariser of WWII history. Yes, I have read most/much of his works on WWII - namely D-Day, Citizen Soldiers, Americans at War, The Victors: Eisenhower and his Boys, and Band of Brothers.




Just a question, are you typing from a computer? You must be on something else or really busy, huh?

[Centurion1]

wisdm teeth painkiller, no ima nt drnk.

yes i feel stupid for sayng ambrose. he did bnd of brthers for gods sakes.

geez.

[Aemilius Paulus]

Alright, rest well, Centurion :yes::kiss:

I thought you were typing from a phone or something at first... That normally impairs the spelling and grammar.

[Centurion1]

jst you weait we gnna talk bout americas manufactirning might when i get bck.

[PanzerJaeger]

Though, Centurion1 is probably in that breed of American History books where America were the saviours of the 2nd World War, opposed to actually jumping in last second and taking all the glory. (Same with WW1, funnily enough)


Downplaying America's contributions to such an extent is just as bad...

[Husar]

Well, Bismarck already said the when you beat an enemy you either make sure they can't rise again or treat them so they can still look into a mirror afterwards. Versailles was an attempt at the former but it wasn't enforced so it ended up somewhere in between. Everybody is aware of the results, case closed, Bismarck won. (oh and we sunk our fleet at scapa flow, nanana!)

WW1 was partly the result of a similar story, the new Kaiser disregarded all the treaties Bismarck established to keep the french(who had previously proven their evil imperialistic tendencies over and over again) down and in the end we had to fight WW1 with only Austria on our side, not to forget that we had to fight WW1 in the first place because that ******** of a Kaiser was only concerned about his own gloria and making every german boy look like a sailor... :wall:

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Yeah, you may want to put off the debate, because I am sorry to say you are making well, a... I do not want to say it, but I will say that mention of Ambrose could not have been more irrelevant. For one, he is not an Eastern Front historian. Second, he is not even a valid WWII historian in this discussion. I mean, I his books are a mix of personal experiences of soldiers, anecdotes, highly specialised books, some tactics, but very little overall strategy, the in-depth, large-scale analytical works of Glantz or similar historians. Sometimes, I would even say Ambrose is more of a populariser of WWII history. Yes, I have read most/much of his works on WWII - namely D-Day, Citizen Soldiers, Americans at War, The Victors: Eisenhower and his Boys, and Band of Brothers.

Just a question, are you typing from a computer? You must be on something else or really busy, huh?

Ambrose has now been totally discredited, as well. His books have been shown to be a mix of populism, bad history and outright lies. His opinion of Monty is an excellent example of this.

[Meneldil]

I can understand that after the amount of blood that had been shed that they would want to get some territorial possessions or something but they went overboard. The Prussians after winning a total victory over France's Imperial armies and then defeating the various attempts by the 2nd Republic's army's to relieve Paris only demanded Alsace and part of Lorraine; they didn't limit France's Army, take a lot of territory, or even really punish France, and remember the Franco Prussian war was started by the French because Napoleon III opposed the attempt to put a Prussian on the Spanish throne.


In 1873, France lost 20% of her industrial capacity, and 15% of her mineral resources, 1.600.000 inhabitants and 6% of her territories. Despite the quasi-state of civil war, the Paris commune, the political instability, France was requested to pay for the war, which was started by France accordingly to Bismarck's plan (who did all what possible to start the war). Germany wasn't invaded in the slightest, large parts of France were destroyed and then occupied (the Prussian army stayed in northern France until the reparations were paid). So yeah, Frankfurt treaty wasn't any less harsh than Versailles.

Then, have a look at the conditions of the Brest Litovsk treaty, which would have effectively turned Russia into a third world country. Harsh treaties were the norm, not the exception.

The Habsbourg empire was litteraly dismantled into several rival nations, and so was the Ottoman Empire (who joined the war after 1914). Germany, despite being labelled responsible for the war, wasn't the only country to face a harsh treaty.
Fact is, the two countries who suffered the most from the war were France and (far behind) Russia. Russia abandonned all claims for reparations and a seat at the negociation table when it accepted a separate peace.

In 1918, the most influencial nation within the allies was France. It took most of the hit, and lost many more men than the rest of the allies. Some parts of it had been occupied for 4 years, and a quarter of the country was in 1918 a wasteland. No governement could have opposed France's will to make Germany pay.
The reparations weren't pulled out off someone's ass either, but calculated by economists, based on the destruction that had occured in France and Belgium (actually, the money requested was lower than the estimated cost of the destructions). They weren't excessive or out of proportion, they were meant to pay for the rebuilding of these two countries. And since Germany had lost, and since - despite what's being said in this topic - she was more responsible for the war than most other countries (this has been debatted in another thread), it was requested to pay for most of it.

Now, that is all fine and dandy. "The treaty was harsh!" "No it was not!". Those are opinions, and each of us can read the treaty and compare it to other similar treaties (some enforced by Germany or Prussia) to make his own mind. What can't be rejected though is that France, the UK and the US agreed to lessen the burden of the treaty, and to give Germany a chance to rejoin the international society.

The reparations requested were lowered at least 3 times, Germany was admitted into the Society of Nations, relations were restablished on a fair basis (the unfair commercial clauses of the treaty were cancelled in the late 20's, unlike the ones that hit France in 1873 and that were still enforced in 1914), all the while Germany wasn't respecting the terms of the treaty. In France, a large part of the Radical Party (the main political party), led by Aristide Briand, sought to reevalute even further the treaty, in a attempt to establish friendly relationships with Germany. The only time the treaty was really harshely enforced was during the invasion of the Ruhr (which was indeed a retard move, but was permitted according to the treaty).

The whole diktat idea and bitterness toward the west didn't come from the Treaty itself, but from the fact that Germany surrendered while the country had more or less be spared from the war. Except for the blocus, Germany had been mostly untouched. This gave birth to various dangerous ideas, such as:
- Germany was backstabbed from the inside (by the Jews, communists, liberals)
- Germany could still fight, and victory was still within reach (which obviously meant the treaty was unfair: Germany should have been offered an honorable peace because it decided on its own to end the war)
- An international conspiracy was trying to bring down Germany

The treaty is peanut. Saying it was responsible for the rise of Nazism is by definition stupid, given that many fascist and proto-fascist movements emerged in several countries, even among the victorious ones (Italy obviously, but France too).

[Fisherking]

To say it was reasonable and moderate is ridiculous.

The loss of territory alone made it harsh.

The creation of all of the new states in eastern Europe was a recipe for war.

France was upset over 6% of her lands being taken and loosing a bunch of German speaking citizens.

Had it all been dictated by plebiscite it may have been different but it was not.

Did the treaty lead to resentment and war?

I think we have the answer...

[Pannonian]

Did the treaty lead to resentment and war?

I think we have the answer...

The biggest link between WW1 and WW2 isn't Versailles, but the fact that the war was concluded before Germany was invaded and its inevitable defeat made even clearer. Whatever the terms of the treaty, the likes of Hitler would still have found reason to resent the government for ending the war while Germany was still unbeaten in the field. Germany should have been beaten back past its borders, and its centres of government occupied, to impress on them the fact that they've been fairly and utterly beaten. The dolchstosslegende came about because the Germans were able to pretend that, because they were still on enemy territory, the German Army was victorious but for the treacherous collapse of the civilian government. The Allies did it right second time round, flattening Germany when they had the chance.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Let's dispell some persistent myths:

1) 'War Guilt Clause'

Myth: Versailles places the blame for WWI on Germany.

Reality: the treaty says no such thing. There is no war guilt clause in the ToV. This is German propaganda.

The reviled article in question, art.231, merely states that Germany is responsible for paying reparations, and seeks to provide a legal title for these reparations.


The American historian Sally Marks has pointed out that the so-called "war guilt clause" says no such thing, and all that the clause does say is “the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies”
[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles#cite_note-1) The claim that Article 231 implies “war guilt” was the work of various German politicians and apologists who misinterpreted Article 231 as saying that as a way of gaining international sympathy[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles#cite_note-2) Moreover, Marks points out that the next article, Article 232 of the Versailles treaty limits German responsibility to pay only for civilian damages, and that when a conference was called in London in 1921 to determine how much Germany should pay, the Allies calculated on the basis of Germany could pay, not on their needs[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles#cite_note-3)
Apart from "Article 231", there is no title for this article in the treaty itself. The names "Guilt Clause” and "War Guilt Clause" were assigned in later commentaries.
The Weimar government was forced to sign this in 1919. The signing of this later led them to be called the 'November Criminals (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_Criminals)'.
By blaming only Germany for causing the war, Article 231 has been cited as one of the causes that lead to the rise of national socialism in Germany[5] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles#cite_note-4). At least one historian, Margaret MacMillan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_MacMillan), has outlined that this long held notion is fundamentally erroneous [6] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles#cite_note-5).




2) Reparations.

Myth: Germany was forced to pay an exorbitant amount of reparations.
Reality: Germany only had to pay a very small sum.

Of this sum, they paid only a small bit. This small bit, they could borrow from America. In fact, America lend the Germans more money then they used for reparation payments.
Germany paid some 2% of GDP in reparations, for about a decade. This money was borrowed. Then Germany defaulted on this loan in 1932.

The astonishing conclusion of modern economic historians is: Germany profited financially from the reparations.

As has often been noted, few things are so profitable as losing a war to America. WWI was no exception. Where Germany gained financially from the treaty, Britain and France - the victors - had to bear the costs.


3) Consequences of reparation payments.

Myth: The reparations were responsible for the German hyperinflation of 1923. Responsible for the crisis of 1929. And caused hardship and poverty for Germans.

Reality: all of the above notions are false.

The hyperinflation was created by the German government itself to undermine Versailles. The crisis of 1929 and subsequent years were an international event. This crisis struck Germany harder because of German deflation, again as a result of Germany's efforts to obstruct Versailles.

What was once thought extreme and Germanophobe, is now no longer disputed by serious economic historians: both the inflation of the early 1920's and the deflation of the early 1930's - both with devasting consequences for the German economy - were not the result of Versailles, but of deliberate German sabotage.


4) Germany received a harsh treaty after WWI. And a humane treatment after WWII.

Reality: the reverse.

Versailles was a lenient treaty. Germany was asked to pay only a small percentage of the devastation of WWI. Germany was made a democracy. Germany was left a great power, with the request not to re-militarize. Only territories were stripped that were either not part of the traditional German lands, or were borderlands of mixed settlement. Most were recent aquisitions by Germany.
A peace was accepted before Germany was destructed. No war of attrition or full destruction was waged against Germany to force it into complete submission.

By contrast, after WWII Germany was divided, occupied, partly placed under a dictatorship, stripped of large chuncks of territory which had been Germanic for centuries. A relentless war was waged, peace overtures were ignored, until Germany would accept a complete defeat and subsequent harsh peace treaty.
Then Germany was plundered, required to pay reparations multiple times those after WWI, and even was Germany required to pay after all the reparations for WWI which were scrapped before 1933.

[Louis VI the Fat]

The biggest link between WW1 and WW2 isn't Versailles, but the fact that the war was concluded before Germany was invaded and its inevitable defeat made even clearer. Whatever the terms of the treaty, the likes of Hitler would still have found reason to resent the government for ending the war while Germany was still unbeaten in the field. Germany should have been beaten back past its borders, and its centres of government occupied, to impress on them the fact that they've been fairly and utterly beaten. The dolchstosslegende came about because the Germans were able to pretend that, because they were still on enemy territory, the German Army was victorious but for the treacherous collapse of the civilian government. The Allies did it right second time round, flattening Germany when they had the chance.Hear hear!

In fact, Germany was treated so harshly during and after WWII (beaten to a pulp long after it had lost the war by 1943, nor receiving a favourable peace settlement this time round) to prevent a repeat of German 'Versailles' myths.

[Fisherking]

The biggest link between WW1 and WW2 isn't Versailles, but the fact that the war was concluded before Germany was invaded and its inevitable defeat made even clearer. Whatever the terms of the treaty, the likes of Hitler would still have found reason to resent the government for ending the war while Germany was still unbeaten in the field. Germany should have been beaten back past its borders, and its centres of government occupied, to impress on them the fact that they've been fairly and utterly beaten. The dolchstosslegende came about because the Germans were able to pretend that, because they were still on enemy territory, the German Army was victorious but for the treacherous collapse of the civilian government. The Allies did it right second time round, flattening Germany when they had the chance.

That was a rather tall order. Even given that Germany was in the grip of a revolution. The Spanish Flue was already on the scene and it was more than 900 miles to Berlin.

Because of the revolution Germany was negotiating from a weak position. But the vast transfers of lands and the redrawing of borders was a formula for further war.

Dividing Germany into its older smaller states may have been a better solution so far as a German threat was concerned but leaving it as a crippled giant was a poor plan.

Post WWII was not much better. It resulted in the Cold War. Most of the eastern lands not given back to the Soviet Union just became puppet states with little or no self determination. The wisest thing they did was the resettlement of ethnic populations.

When lands are taken nationalists tend to see it as theft. Mexicans still remember that Texas and California were theirs and had they the power I am sure they would try and take them. It took the Irish 800 years to gain nationhood. When you divide a nation you have to replace its loyalties not just grab its lands, or you are only delaying the conflict.

The breakup of the Soviet Union into regional powers is a bit more stable. It gives the people a new loyalty and patriotism, though there are still those who would like to see the Union reunited.

If you are going to dismantle a state you need to give the people a new identity, if not then they will want their land back.

[Pannonian]

That was a rather tall order. Even given that Germany was in the grip of a revolution. The Spanish Flue was already on the scene and it was more than 900 miles to Berlin.

On the upside, there was no war fatigue among the soldiers in the field. The then survivors of WW1 were interviewed a few years back, to get their stories while they were still around, and they were all disappointed the war ended just as they were getting going. Germany may have been on the verge of collapse, but the Allies could keep it up for a few years yet.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Ho hum...

More on the subject of 'the notions of serious modern scholarship replacing crude notions based on German myths'.

I was just browsing the entry history on Wikipedia about the reviled 'War Guild Clause'. Until recently, it was commonly taken for granted by the public at large that the Treaty of Versailles sought to place all the blame for WWI on Germany.

Slowly, the insights of modern scholarship that this is not the case, at any rate a far too simplistic point of view, are trickling down. It is very interesting to read Wiki's entry history:


Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles was the “Guilt Clause”, in which Germany was forced to take complete responsibility for the war or face renewed warfare. This simply served to anger the Germans and ensure that they would seek revenge.


http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles&oldid=10721136




Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles) was the “Guilt Clause” or the "War Guilt Clause", in which Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) was forced to take complete responsibility (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility) for starting World War I (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I) or face renewed warfare. This simply served to anger the Germans and ensure that they would seek revenge. Created as a result of much animosity between Germany and France as well as Germany and England. The United States did not play as active a role, mostly due to President Woodrow Wilson's principle of "peace without victory". It involved a number of provisions. The German Army was limited to no more than 100,000 men with limited firepower. The German Navy was limited to six warships, and a corresponding number of other specific ships. Germany was also not allowed to possess any submarines or aircraft. The fortifications thto pay only for civilian damages, and that when a conference was called in London in 1921 to determine how much Germany should pay, the Allies calculated on the basis of what Germany could pay, not on at Germany possessed in Heligoland were to be dissolved. The 30-mile wide demilitarized zone known as the "Rhineland" was created. The German rivers were to be nationalized and allow all ships to pass through. The former German emperor and other "offenders" were to be tried and convicted. Germany was to pay both civilian damage and occupation costs, which would total up to $33 billion that were to be paid over the following 30 years. In addition, all German merchant vessels over 1600 tons, half of the vessels between 800 and 1600 tons, and 25% of the German fishing fleet was to be seized. They were to build over 200,000 tons of shipping to be delivered to the victors for five years annually. Coal was to be shipped to France, Belgium, and Italy for ten years. Finally, Germany was required to consent the sale of its land.

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles&oldid=26320549
Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles_%281919%29) reads in full:
"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles_%281919%29) is commonly known as the “Guilt Clause” or the "War Guilt Clause", in which Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) was forced to take complete responsibility for starting World War I (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I). The United Kingdom (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom) and France (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France) played the primary role in the article, while the United States (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) did not play as active a role, mostly due to President Woodrow Wilson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson)'s principle of "peace without victory"[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)].
Article 231 is the first article in Part VIII, "Reparations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reparations)", and serves as a justification for the obligations put upon Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) in the remainder (Articles 233 through 247) of Part VIII.
Apart from "Article 231", there is no title for this article in the treaty itself. The names "Guilt Clause” and "War Guilt Clause" were assigned in later commentaries.


http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles&oldid=85297448



Commonly known as the “Guilt Clause” or the "War Guilt Clause", Article 231 is the first article in Part VIII, "Reparations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_reparations)" of the Treaty of Versailles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles). Apart from "Article 231", there is no title for this article in the treaty itself. The names "Guilt Clause” and "War Guilt Clause" were assigned in later commentaries. The American historian Sally Marks argues that the clause says no such thing, and all that the clause does say is “the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies” [1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles&oldid=342317581#cite_note-0).

Article 231
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

The article, in which Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) was assigned the responsibility for damages caused by World War I (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I), serves as a justification for the obligations put upon Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) in the remainder (Articles 233 through 247) of Part VIII.
The United Kingdom (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom) and France (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France) played the primary role in the inclusion and writing of the article, while the United States (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) played a lesser role, mostly due to President Woodrow Wilson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson)'s principle of "peace without victory"[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles&oldid=342317581#cite_note-1).
The claim that Article 231 implies “war guilt” was the work of various German politicians and apologists who misinterpreted Article 231 as saying that as a way of gaining international sympathy[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles&oldid=342317581#cite_note-Marks_pages_231-255-2).
Moreover, Marks points out that the next article, Article 232 of the Versailles treaty limits German responsibility their needs[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles&oldid=342317581#cite_note-Marks_pages_231-255-2).
By blaming only Germany for causing the war, Article 231 has been cited as one of the causes that led to the rise of national socialism in Germany[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles&oldid=342317581#cite_note-3). At least one historian, Margaret MacMillan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_MacMillan), has outlined that this long held notion is fundamentally erroneous I predict that, apart from the still commonly held notions about the 'War Guilt clause', many other widespread ideas about 'Versailles' will come to be understood as fundamentally erroneous, as more insights of modern scholarschip take hold.

[Louis VI the Fat]

On the upside, there was no war fatigue among the soldiers in the field. The then survivors of WW1 were interviewed a few years back, to get their stories while they were still around, and they were all disappointed the war ended just as they were getting going. Germany may have been on the verge of collapse, but the Allies could keep it up for a few years yet.We could've kept it up forever. (If the Americans could be persuaded)

Germany by contrast, by November 1918 was driven out of France, faced communist uprisings at home, saw its emperor flee, was out of ammo, food and supplies, faced mass starvation over the coming winter, and was completely disintegrating.

At this point, the German military, which had taken over the German state, returned power to civilians - that they might take the blame. Prussian military for ya - arrogant and merciless in victory, docile and cowardly in defeat.

[gaelic cowboy]

Ho hum the twice a decade row over WW1 it would not matter one wit if Versaillse or the previous treaty of Frankfurt happened at all.
Every single event in major political event in twentieth century Europe can be traced to a question on the position of Germany in Europe.
Since Germany was bound to try to shift the balance in its favour eventually the treaty was and is irrelevant the mistake was by the Allies in not realising that early enough.

[Brenus]

“France was upset over 6% of her lands being taken and loosing a bunch of German speaking citizens.” Not German, Germanic. Alsatian is not German… And Alsatian speak French, by the way. Most of them still speak Alsatian as well…
“Had it all been dictated by plebiscite it may have been different but it was not.” In 1871?

“Germany was still unbeaten in the field”: German was beaten on all the front line, from Belguim to the Swiss borders.
The fact that against the opinion of general as per say Pershing, the war was ended before the Allies in pursuit crossed the boders on the heel of a reteating German Army was indeed a mistake.

This mistake was not repeated in 1945, thanks to the US demand of unconditional surrender…

“On the upside, there was no war fatigue among the soldiers in the field.” Right…

[Fisherking]

One can argue the point of that article (231). How ever it may have been meant it assigns guilt to Germany. It was the first thing the Germans said after viewing the thing.

After the Armistice the German army withdrew the allies continued the blockade resulting in the further deaths of another 750,000 civilians from starvation. They were told they could import food at a later point, provided they used their own ships and paid for it themselves. The fact that it was a new Government with no assets was immaterial to them. Germany was refused a lone for the food by the United States.

There was no German input to the treaty and it was repudiated by all. However, there was really no choice. Germany has no means to resist by that point so they were forced to sign. Of course they blamed the politicians, and the Socialists, Communists, & Jews bore the brunt of the blame.

If you don't think it was punitive then you have your eyes closed.

I suppose that if you think it was fair and reasonable then it would have been equally fair and reasonable for the British to have received those parts of France they once held after the defeat of Napoleon...

[Pannonian]

I suppose that if you think it was fair and reasonable then it would have been equally fair and reasonable for the British to have received those parts of France they once held after the defeat of Napoleon...

We imposed our choice of government on the French, so it wouldn't have been prudent to carve off chunks of France. We were fighting against Napoleon, and the deposed and later reinstated French royals were our friends.

[Kralizec]

Article 231
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

I don't know...I don't think that calling this a "war guilt" clause is a misrepresentation. Yes, so it was mainly a pretext for imposing war reparations. But it doesn't make sense to impose war reparations without claiming that the loser is responsible...or you'd have to come out and explicitly say that they're the spoils of victory.


The biggest link between WW1 and WW2 isn't Versailles, but the fact that the war was concluded before Germany was invaded and its inevitable defeat made even clearer. Whatever the terms of the treaty, the likes of Hitler would still have found reason to resent the government for ending the war while Germany was still unbeaten in the field. Germany should have been beaten back past its borders, and its centres of government occupied, to impress on them the fact that they've been fairly and utterly beaten. The dolchstosslegende came about because the Germans were able to pretend that, because they were still on enemy territory, the German Army was victorious but for the treacherous collapse of the civilian government. The Allies did it right second time round, flattening Germany when they had the chance.

Very true...
On a different note, I'm a little surprised that nobody in Russia post-1990 has blamed their loss in WW1 on the Bolshewiks. Something very similar to the dolchstochlegende actually happened there: the provisional government under Kerensky wanted to continue fighting in order to sue for a more beneficial treaty; the Bolshewiks then proceeded to grab power in order to accept the German's rather humiliating terms. Of course, the Bolshewiks then ruled the country for over 80 years afterwards...


Russia didn't need America jumping into Europe like it did. If anything, America jumping into Europe benefited American interests more in stopping an USSR advance into the West than it did than defeating Hitler. America's fight in WW2 was against the dregs of German armed forces with the Russian's fighting the vast majority. If America didn't make the big last minute assualt into Europe, then a Greater Proportion of Europe would have been under USSR control. The USSR was winning, it suffered some bloodly setbacks, but once they were in that gear, the Germans lost.

Though, Centurion1 is probably in that breed of American History books where America were the saviours of the 2nd World War, opposed to actually jumping in last second and taking all the glory. (Same with WW1, funnily enough)

America was simultaniously fighting a war in the Pacific.

And something else: it's obvious that the Soviets did most of the ground fighting against the Germans, and the lend-lease program was probably only slightly helpful (as Sarmation has repeatedly pointed out on this forum). But the western allies had to fight and resupply from off shore. The Soviets wouldn't have been able to pull a logistal stunt like Operation Overlord. Furthermore I think that strategic bombing in WW2 (not specifically Dresden or city bombing, but also infrastructure) has been extremely undervalued afterwards.

Saying that the Soviets brought the Germans down single handedly or that the Brits and Americans only did a last-minute landgrab is a gross misrepresentation.

[Brenus]

“Saying that the Soviets brought the Germans down single handedly or that the Brits and Americans only did a last-minute land grab is a gross misrepresentation.” Agree, with some comments;
War was forced on USA… The choice of Germany first was made by Roosevelt by in December 1941, the German were experimenting their first defeat in Russia…

This saying is a kind of answer about the lonely Germany against the rest of the World. Germany had Allies, Hungary, Austria, Italy, Romania, Croatia, and a lot of suppletives troops as the Vlasov Army, some Cossacks, Foreign SS troops, auxiliaries etc, and of course some Collaborationist States, as France or Norway…

Both claim (we alone won against Germany, and Germany alone against the Rest) are baseless and only born thanks to the Cold War…

[Louis VI the Fat]

I don't know...I don't think that calling this a "war guilt" clause is a misrepresentation. Yes, so it was mainly a pretext for imposing war reparations. But it doesn't make sense to impose war reparations without claiming that the loser is responsible...or you'd have to come out and explicitly say that they're the spoils of victory.I knew you'd be interested in this contentious article. :jumping:
To further understand this article, one should look at:

- The place of the article in the Treaty.
If it is an article that seeks to place guilt for the war on Germany, then it is oddly misplaced. It appears only as article number 231, in the chapter 'reparations'. Not as an overarching article near the beginning of the Treaty that seeks to establish a moral or political framework for the entire treaty. Telling is that the preceding chapter deals with German war crimes. This chapter does not have a 'war guilt clause'. If there would've been an intention to place a political or moral blame for the war on Germany, a 'war guilt clause' would surely have been more appropriately inserted here, or even nearer the beginning of the Treaty.

- The origin of the article.
During negotiations, reparations were already decided upon. This article was an afterthought. It is not the product of statesmen, never mind of hardliners. Nor even of the repicients of the reparations, Britain and France. Article 231 is the product of two American representatives on the Reparation Commission, a courtly Southern gentleman and a lawyer, Davis and Dulles. With article 231 and the accompanying and inseparable article 232, they sought to create the legal liability and justification for reparations, and the protection of Germany against unwarranted claims.


The political reasons for the articles 231 and 232 seem to have been to appease British and French hardliners, by stating that Germany is liable for all war damages, while simultaneously protecting Germany by affirming that Germany neither can nor should be expected to actually pay these damages. It is, and was meant to be, an artful work of pragmatism and compromise by the Americans, who thought (with Wilson, and me too) they had produced two clever articles.


'Blaming Germany' had nothing to do with it all, even if the text of the article - especially when lifted out of context - would seem to indicate such.

Reparations

PART VIII
SECTION I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 231

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Article 232

The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.

[Etc.]


The amount of reparations had yet to be established when these articles were written. The remainder of Part VIII, article 233 and beyond, deal with this.
ARTICLE 233.
The amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, [etc]


I shall repeat the modern finding that Germany ended up making a net profit from reparations. Which means that the victor - France, plus a little bit the US - paid for all the destruction the loser - Germany - caused on the victor. Talk about 'history being written by the loser', since Germany has cried bloody murder so hard and intermittently that the public image is one of French plunder of Germany after 1918.

[The Wizard]

Germany making a net profit out of reparations ...? Tell that to the people who suffered through the 1929 crisis, which was an (unintended) consequence of the capital flows set up under the auspices of Versailles reparations (German reparations to France -> France uses these to pay its debt with the U.S. -> U.S. loans Germany money to pay its reparations (Dawes plan) -> rinse and repeat)...


'Versailles' remains highly contentious. I spoke in the OP of a discrepancy between modern historians, and lingering perceptions at large.

To see this in action, the history of the Wikipedia entry on 'Versailles' is very enlightening. Wikipedia keeps a mirror image of all previous versions of its pages. In the case of the entry on Versailles, one could write a fine thesis on the spread of evolving historical insight.

For example, until a few months ago, wiki followed this - by now - obsolote interpretation of Versailles:


France's aims

Further information: Revanchism

While both American and British leaders wanted to come to a fair and reasonable deal, France's interests were much more aggressive and demanding as many of the battles had been fought on French soil. Although they had agreed after the treaty was signed many world leaders agreed that some of France's demands were far too harsh and unsympathetic. France had lost some 1.5 million military personnel and an estimated 400,000 civilians to the war. (See World War I casualties) To appease the French public, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau wanted to impose policies meant to cripple Germany militarily, politically, and economically, so as never to be able to invade France again.[citation needed] Clemenceau also particularly wished to regain the rich and industrial land of Alsace-Lorraine, which had been stripped from France by Germany in the 1871 War.[citation needed] Clemenceau wanted the Rhineland to be separated from Germany as it was a key area of industry.[citation needed] This land also acted as a buffer zone between France and Germany in case of repeated attack.[citation needed]

Once all those '[citation needed]' were filled in with the findings of modern economic and strategical historians, a different, more balanced, picture emerged:


France's aims

Further information: Revanchism

France's chief interest was security. France had lost some 1.5 million military personnel and an estimated 400,000 civilians (See World War I casualties) and had suffered great devastation during the war. Like Belgium, which had been similarly affected, France needed reparations to restore its prosperity and reparations also tended to be seen as a means of weakening any future German threat[7]. Clemenceau particularly wished to regain the rich and industrial land of Alsace-Lorraine, which had been stripped from France by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871.[8]

The change is relatively minor, actually, seeing as the only thing removed is French revanchism as a major driving force behind the Treaty. What remains is still the core of the analysis, namely that France wished to recoup all its (vast) losses on Germany.

The case here, the historical appraisal of Versailles, is very simply, really. It's basically an argument between realism and liberalism. France and (something that the old Wiki version omitted) the UK took a realist stance on peace, demanding reparations and harsh terms of peace. The USA under the famous liberal Wilson took the liberal line, operating according to Wilson's Fourteen Points and wishing to be lenient towards the British while also agreeing that France should get Alsace-Lorraine back and Belgium's sovereignty restored.

Realism won, and liberalism lost, in Germany's case. Wilson did get the League of Nations, freedom for the Central and Eastern European nations, and obviously agreed with France getting Alsace-Lorraine back. Yet no more than that. What followed was twenty years of hostility, instability and enmity in the international field, and a treatment of Germany which fostered hostility and hatred in German public opinion, aimed at the Allies. I think it's very obvious that this proved to be a gold mine for Nazi propaganda.

Liberals have always held that this policy proved disastrously counterproductive and made the Interbellum into nothing more than a twenty-year armistice of what was essentially one and the same conflict, but what has gone down in history as the two World Wars. I am sorely tempted to agree with them.

Meneldil's argument basically underwrites this view, you see. Prussia did the same to France in 1871 as the Entente later did to Germany. Look at the reaction in France and amongst the French people. See how counterproductive the policy ultimately proved, especially once Bismarck's moderating influence was removed from German foreign policy.

Now, the blame does not rest solely on French shoulders, according to this view. Lloyd George was just as eager to punish Germany for its ambitions as Clemenceau was (ambitions not very dissimilar to any other nation's at the time, but that's beside the point). Secondly, Versailles ultimately was only a factor in the rise of the Nazis, not the driving force. That is also not part of historical consensus as I have been taught. Versailles as a treaty was, like Locarno, basically dead by 1935. Despite this, it was still a major factor in preparing the way for the radical right in Germany. Just like the immense dissatisfaction with the spoils of war in Italy paved the way for the fascist coup d'état in Italy.

Of course, the realism vs. liberalism debate is (very) old and has largely been abandoned amongst most scholars of international relations today, and for good reason. Still, I find the liberal argument more convincing than the realist one, considering realism has only policy failures to show for it.

Now, I don't, as of now, have any literature of my own to support my view, while Louis has two sources (well... summaries of sources, to be precise). I find it slightly disappointing, though, that the OP mentions historians with another opinion yet does not show any arguments from the other side. This is incomplete, in my opinion, and misrepresents it as a one-sided debate. I also found it disappointing that the arguments made in the two books cited in the OP were not shown in synopses. Sure I can accept eminent historians argued against the negative view of Versailles. But it's kind of hard when all I have is a summary's word for it. I'd rather see some arguments.

Of coure, I accept that I might be wrong, mostly because of the aforementioned lack of sources. However, this is what I have been taught by my professors, and to be honest, I don't take their opinion lightly.

[Captain Blackadder]

The treaty was a fair one and overall Germany had nothing to complain about compare that treaty to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk look at that treaty and tell me that Versailles was unfair

[Aemilius Paulus]

The treaty was a fair one and overall Germany had nothing to complain about compare that treaty to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk look at that treaty and tell me that Versailles was unfair
Hah, good one. I have not thought of this, even if I should have, being a Russian myself.

[Prince Cobra]

I'm not sure the government would have signed that.

Now everybody is supposed to buy into this revisionist, anti-german re-writing of the thing that crippled our country and turned us into slaves of the french though, sickening. :sweatdrop:

Long live the Central Powers! Long live the Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria!

Joking aside, the treaty was harsh indeed compared with say, the Vienna treaty of 1815.

The military clauses, the reparations, the way the treaty was concluded...

The military clauses: the destruction of all the military force of Germany was an extremely severe clause. On the top of this, it hits a traditional value of the Prussian society: the army. There could have been slight restrictions in the first years but what the victorors did was insane.

The reparations. Indeed, if we sum up, Germany paid little (bu the original sum was huuuge). The treatment was really harsh in the beginning (the occupation of parts of Germany by the French in the 20s, for example) which led to a full collapse of the German economy. WHen Germany started to recover, the crisis of 1929 hit the state. Then the country sank and something had to be done. The reparations were (finally!) gradually obliterated and Germany received aid (that amounts more than the paid reparations; in fact, this is a good example why the reparations are ineffective). However, the fruits of this aid to one of the pillars of the European economy were exploited by the wrong person (Hitler) because the other Europeans started to care about Germany when it was too late.

Perhaps slicing Eastern Prussia was also unnecessary cruel, they could have granted an economic access of Poland to the Baltic seas.

The Peace Conference. If we compare the Veinna treaty of 1815 and the Versailles: France was active on the conference whilst the delegations of Germany was denied any role in the treaties. They simply have to sign the treaty that put Germany on their knees.


I won't comment the cases of the treaties with Hungary and the Ottoman Empire that were also extremely harsh (Hungary lost about 2/3 of its territory, the Ottomans about 80 per cent; the reason why Turkey is nowadays big is in the denial of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to recognise the treaty).

[Prince Cobra]

The hyperinflation was created by the German government itself to undermine Versailles. The crisis of 1929 and subsequent years were an international event. This crisis struck Germany harder because of German deflation, again as a result of Germany's efforts to obstruct Versailles.

What was once thought extreme and Germanophobe, is now no longer disputed by serious economic historians: both the inflation of the early 1920's and the deflation of the early 1930's - both with devasting consequences for the German economy - were not the result of Versailles, but of deliberate German sabotage.

In the 20's the reason lied in the occupation of part of the German territory by France. I've always had the feeling the deflation in the 30's was due to the fact that the German economy was one of the most industrialised in the world and it's logical that we will have a heavy deflation there as a result of the World Crisis felt everywhere. I only agree with the fact that reparations were not working and were no factor aside from psycholical one (but this really matters and if you add it to the military restructions and to the exclusion from the Great Powers club, this matters, this really matters).But you should not blame the Germans for the crisis in Germany, it was a world process that severaly hit the most developed countries, Louis.

[Fisherking]

This is basically revisionist pap anyway. Didn’t anyone else notice that the author was the Great Granddaughter of Lloyd George? Is this supposed to add to her creditability? I don’t think so.:inquisitive:

What else would you expect?

It is a bit like the decedents of Attila the Hun saying that he was a pussycat in person...

[Louis VI the Fat]

In the 20's the reason lied in the occupation of part of the German territory by France. I've always had the feeling the deflation in the 30's was due to the fact that the German economy was one of the most industrialised in the world and it's logical that we will have a heavy deflation there as a result of the World Crisis felt everywhere. I only agree with the fact that reparations were not working and were no factor aside from psycholical one (but this really matters and if you add it to the military restructions and to the exclusion from the Great Powers club, this matters, this really matters).But you should not blame the Germans for the crisis in Germany, it was a world process that severaly hit the most developed countries, Louis.I do not blame Germany for the crisis of 1929. I do blame German nationalist agitation of the period for blaming Versailles for the economical woes in Germany that were caused by what was clearly an international crisis.


Equally as important, I blame Germany for using this crisis (as well as any other event) to undermine the peace and the Treaty of Versailles. From 1919 all the way to 1945, German nationalism played the perfidious, dangerous game of sacrificing German stability for its goal of revenge:



When in 1930 Heinrich Brüning became chancellor of Germany he told his friends in the unions that his chief aim was to liberate Germany from paying war reparations and foreign debt. He felt that if he diverted all Germany’s efforts into exports it would weaken the ability of America and the Allies to force Germany to pay her ious if she chose not to. The German unions therefore agreed to Brüning reducing wages, raising taxes and diverting all industrial activity into exports so as to bring pressure on the Western powers, not realizing to what extent this would mean misery, unemployment and a diminution of power for the workers. Brüning’s initiative was successful. Millions of people abroad were fooled into believing that Germany herself was really poor, not just her hapless citizens, even though Germany was the greatest exporter in the world, with a mountain of cash in the bank



This was bought hook, line and sinker by most people, both at home in Germany and abroad. Not until the archives were opened later, did it fully sink in to what extent Germany sacrificed her economic well-being between 1918-1933 to undermine Versailles.
Not Versailles, but deliberate German policy to sabotage the German economy was responsible for both the crisis in 1923, and for the extent of the misery the crisis of 1929 and subsequent years caused.

Both notions, that the hyperinflation of the 1920's, and the deflation of the 1930's, were caused by Germany itself in a deliberate bid to sabotage the German economy, to create widespread poverty to its people, in an attempt to gain domestic unrest and foreign sympathy, with the stated goal of discrediting and obstructing the peace, were considered extreme and Germanophobe back then. Nowadays, they are in little dispute anymore amongst economic historians.

[The Wizard]

Would you discount the influence of rampant protectionism in all major world economies, as a reaction to the 1929 crisis, in being a major influence on the scale and extent of the Great Depression, then? Would you say Germany is to blame more than anything else? Because AFAIK there is no doubt that the massive tariff hike and extensive protectionist measures in the two years following the Wall Street crash, in which the U.S. and major European economies tried to shield themselves from each other, killed off international trade and the hope for a swift recovery.

[Brenus]

“The Peace Conference. If we compare the Veinna treaty of 1815 and the Versailles: France was active on the conference whilst the delegations of Germany was denied any role in the treaties.” 100 years before…
Compare with contemporary treaties e.g. Brest Litovsk and you will find it was quite lenient…

[Prince Cobra]

The Brest Litovsk treaty was more or less equal to the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, that legalised the partition of the Austrian Empire (i.e creation of national states since it was the nationalism that leads from the end of XIX century). In the same way, the Brest Litovsk treaty legalised the Polish Kingdom (that was planned to be created by the Central powers as well) and the Ukrainians that at that time also started to review their existence in the Russian Empire, as well as Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.

I still think the comparison between the Vienna treaty and the Versailles treaty is possible despite the changes that occurred in a century.

[Prince Cobra]

In fact, a brief check shows that the reparations from Russia were 6 billion whilst those from Germany 226 billion. In addition the Saint-Germain treaty and the Treaty of Trianon were heavier since apart from the insanely large reparations they costed really much to the countries of Austria and Hungary (in territorial terms). Of course, one may say that Germany was eager to finish the war in the East, so it's hard to say how lenient the treaty would have been in case of German victory. But this does not justify the actions of the Entente, either.

[Fisherking]

It is foolish of any serious historian to view this from only the winning side’s perspective.

If you hand someone a treaty in which they were denied any input and word things in such a way as to insult their nationhood you are not going to receive a positive reaction.

Whether you fault the treaty or the reaction to the treaty it makes no difference. It was still a disaster that ultimately lead to another war. Since it was billed at the time as ‘The War To End All War’ you can see what a colossal mess the allies made of the process.

I suppose they were doing them a favor by taking the German Colonies also?

The fact that Germany was willing to take such drastic measures, harming its own interest to escape the treaty only point up how much it was hated.

This argument is the equivalent of having a bandit’s daughter trying to convince his victims that the bandit let them off easy.

[Brenus]

“It is foolish of any serious historian to view this from only the winning side’s perspective.” Actually all the point is that the loosers point was only heard and according to what I read from Louis, blaming the French for something wich existed only on their imagination…
And this story was not made up by the Nazi, but by the German Society…

[Prince Cobra]

“It is foolish of any serious historian to view this from only the winning side’s perspective.” Actually all the point is that the loosers point was only heard and according to what I read from Louis, blaming the French for something wich existed only on their imagination…
And this story was not made up by the Nazi, but by the German Society…

Which story? Could you make your point more clear? What is the role of the Nazi in making the story?

P.S. I think I must agree with Fisherking.

[Fisherking]

“It is foolish of any serious historian to view this from only the winning side’s perspective.” Actually all the point is that the loosers point was only heard and according to what I read from Louis, blaming the French for something wich existed only on their imagination…
And this story was not made up by the Nazi, but by the German Society…

So we are expected to drop everything. Forget what history shows as a result, and except the views of the British Prime Minister’s great granddaughter because that is the real story?

I think you should read your own signature...

[Louis VI the Fat]

In fact, a brief check shows that the reparations from Russia were 6 billion whilst those from Germany 226 billion.And how much of that 226 billion was ever collected, or intended to be collected? *

Keynes, for very unrelated reasons, quite soon after the treaty started the whole 'Crippling reparations!!' craze. No serious historian believes Keynes was right anymore. Unfortunately, once a point of view becomes dominat, it is near impossible to overcome it.

Part of the problem is, that Versailles had two consequences which are difficult to disentangle from the assesment of its merits:
- The Versailles system failed in its foremost goal: to preserve the peace. (as an aside - because the paricipants refused to uphold the treaty, not because the treaty itself was unworkable)
- Versailles, whatever its nature, was perceived to be harsh and unjust. This perception, ungrounded or not, is real.

Combine this with a third problem, namely that fairly soon the German view of Versailles became dominant, and it is clear why later historical reassesments of Versailles - most far more positive, cetainly far more subtle - find it difficult to take hold.

The loser has written history.

* The figure of 226 billionj is highly misleading. Only fifty billion was ever meant to be paid. Of this, only twenty billion was ever requested to be paid. This twenty billion was paid not by Germany, but by the US:
Marks calculates that between 1921 and 1931, Germany paid a total of 20 billion marks in reparations, most of which came from American loans that the Germans repudiated in 1932[/URL]. In this way, the Germans largely escaped paying for World War I, and instead shifted the costs onto American investors (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_reparations#cite_note-Marks_pages_231-255-10).

The American historian Gerhard Weinberg commented about the way the Germans used reparations to avoid paying the costs of World War I that "The shifting of the burden of reparations from her shoulders to those of her enemies served to accentuate this disparity" in the economic strength of the Allies, which struggled to pay their heavy World War I debts and the other costs of the war and Germany, which paid neither reparations nor its World War I debts[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_reparations#cite_note-Marks_pages_231-255-10"]That's right. The above are the conclusions of modern historians: Germany barely paid any reparations or war debts. What little it did pay, it borrowed from the US. Then it defaulted on these loans. Thus making a nice profit.

Britain, France and the US payed Germany's costs of WWI. Plus their own debts and costs in the case of the UK. Plus the costs of the damage WWI inflicted on their homelands in the case of France and Belgium.

That's what you get for a lenient peace treaty, and for trying to incorporate Germany peacefully within the circle of industrial democracies.

[Beskar]

Louis again, is unfortunately right. Also, Versailles was not responsible for World War 2 in anycase, during the high-times of the German economy, the National Socialists enjoyed a share of less than 3%. It was actually the great depression that ended up causing a situation where the National Socialists got any real support.

[Louis VI the Fat]

So we are expected to drop everything. Forget what history shows as a result, and except the views of the British Prime Minister’s great granddaughter because that is the real story?
This is basically revisionist pap anyway. Didn’t anyone else notice that the author was the Great Granddaughter of Lloyd George? Is this supposed to add to her creditability? I don’t think so.:inquisitive:

What else would you expect?

It is a bit like the decedents of Attila the Hun saying that he was a pussycat in person... Sorry, but I am not sure one can write off with the stroke of a pen the very highly acclaimed work of a leading expert in her field, who was named professor of history at Oxford based on the merits of this study, simply because of some conspiracist thought about her ancestry.
MacMillan is the current warden of St Anthony's College in Oxford. Academic posts in the field of international relations and history don't come much more prestigious (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St_Antony%27s_College,_Oxford) than that.
Today's brightest minds in the history of international relations are scholed in an understanding of the Treaty that I've broadly outlined here. :smug:

The other link in my first post is about a conference of the world's leading historians on the subject - British, American, German, others. Plus on the subsequent collection of articles by these leading experts by Cambridge University press.

Again, I am merely presenting commonly held views of serious modern scholars. I am not presenting fringe opinion.


What's funny, is that the very scholars of this period, of this Treaty, ask themselves the same question that has been brought uphere: how come there persists such a huge difference between crude popular notions of 'Versailles', and modern academic assesment? Why is the view of the Treaty so resistant against any change from its original negative reception, a reception based on notions that mostly do not hold up against modern scholarly scrutiny?


The Treaty of Versailles has had a bad press. From the time that it was signed and John Maynard Keynes penned his all-too-well-known polemic, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) until a recent book by that aging realpolitiker, Henry Kissinger, commentators have had little good to say about the Treaty. ‘We came to Paris confident that the new order was about to be established’, Harold Nicolson wrote in Peacemaking, 1919, ‘we left it convinced that the new order had merely fouled the old’. 1 (http://www.questia.com/read/101708628)
Scholarly opinion, if one can use such a collective term, though divided, has moved in a different direction. A massive compilation of contributions from almost all the leading historians of the Versailles settlement opens with the observation that scholars ‘tend to view the treaty as the best compromise that the negotiators could have reached in the existing circumstances’ and ends with a question. Why has the original indictment of the Treaty seen off almost every attempt at revision and not just in the popular view? 2 (http://www.questia.com/read/101708628)
If what has emerged from recent multi-archival research is ‘a much more nuanced portrait of statesmen and diplomats striving, with a remarkable degree of flexibility, pragmatism and moderation to promote their nation's vital interests as they interpreted them’, why do even our more learned statesmen continue to repeat the shibboleths of the past?

Would you discount the influence of rampant protectionism in all major world economies, as a reaction to the 1929 crisis, in being a major influence on the scale and extent of the Great Depression, then? Would you say Germany is to blame more than anything else? Because AFAIK there is no doubt that the massive tariff hike and extensive protectionist measures in the two years following the Wall Street crash, in which the U.S. and major European economies tried to shield themselves from each other, killed off international trade and the hope for a swift recovery. No. Neither do I give cause to assume I do. Nor is the rehash of basic highschool knowledge of the depression, however correct in itself, very relevant.
I also do not deny that Berlin is the capital of Germany and that they drink beer in Oktober.

I blame German nationalist agitation of the period for blaming Versailles for the economical woes in Germany that were caused by what was clearly an international crisis.

Equally as important, I blame Germany for using this crisis (as well as any other event) to undermine the peace and the Treaty of Versailles. From 1919 German nationalism played the perfidious, dangerous game of sacrificing German stability for its goal of undermining Versailles.
Not only were the reparations not the cause of any economic hardship for Germany. What's more, this very hardship was the result of deliberate acts by the German governments to bolster its foreign policy goal of undermining Versailles.
In the case of the crisis after 1929, the deliberate policy of the German government created runaway deflation and mass unemployment, deepening the impact of the criris on Germany. This the government did in a deliberate attempt to undermine the treaty. (See Sally Marks, "The Myths of Reparations")



Now, I don't, as of now, have any literature of my own to support my view, while Louis has two sources (well... summaries of sources, to be precise).Then I suggest you find yourself some literature to support your view, or read some of mine.

[Husar]

From 1919 all the way to 1945, German nationalism played the perfidious, dangerous game of sacrificing German stability for its goal of revenge:

Pff, from 1789 all the way up to 1940 France played the perfidious, dangerous game of sacrificing european stability for it's goal of european hegemony.

[Fisherking]

Lewis, the premise that it was moderate does not real encompass a realistic view. No matter who the scholars are.

Blaming German Nationalism is the easy way out.

The facts are that it was a dictate, a judgment without appeal.

In not allowing the Germans to negotiate it was predestined to failure.

Germany had not offered unconditional surrender when they negotiated an armistices.

Had the German delegation been seated and negotiated such a treaty then the blame would go to them, however it is a fantastic stretch of the imagination to call this fair and moderate.

Any nation forced to partition their homeland and allow foreign occupation of some of its provinces and be restricted to such an extent in forming a military is not going to see it as fair.

[Pannonian]

Lewis, the premise that it was moderate does not real encompass a realistic view. No matter who the scholars are.

Blaming German Nationalism is the easy way out.

The facts are that it was a dictate, a judgment without appeal.

In not allowing the Germans to negotiate it was predestined to failure.

Germany had not offered unconditional surrender when they negotiated an armistices.

Had the German delegation been seated and negotiated such a treaty then the blame would go to them, however it is a fantastic stretch of the imagination to call this fair and moderate.

Any nation forced to partition their homeland and allow foreign occupation of some of its provinces and be restricted to such an extent in forming a military is not going to see it as fair.

Call it unfair for Austria-Hungary then, but hardly for Germany. Here's (http://www.johndclare.net/peace_treaties4.htm) a map of Germany pre- and post-Versailles. Other than returning Alsace-Lorraine to France, which hardly counts as losing territory, they lose a chunk of land in Prussia, mainly to provide sea access for Poland. Then compare with what Germany forced on Russia in Brest-Litovsk (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Brest-Litovsk). The two treaties were overseen by the same generation of German statesmen, perhaps even the same statesmen. One dictated by Germany, the other dictated to Germany, one year apart. The only possible argument for Versailles being less fair is tha fact that the German army was still on enemy soil when the ceasefire was agreed. Hence the dolchstosslegende, and why the Allies should have beaten the Germans back into their homeland, and rubbed in the reality of their defeat.

[Fragony]

The german emperor actually called for restraint, and the Austro-Hungarian government waited for two weeks, don't think they really wanted war. It's normal generals make plans, prusian generals had a tradition of making one every year, as did Conrad of the Austria-Hungarian monarchy. It doesn't say all that much.

I am pretty familiar with the subject, now this is all cool conspiracy stuff, especially the black hand, but also the Serbian government, and the Russian government, are being a little bit closer then they want to admit.

[The Wizard]

[...]

First off, I was merely asking you a question, not trying to make a point, when I asked you about your view on Germany's role in the Great Depression. Just to get that out of the way. As an aside, the fact that protectionism played a large role in worsening the crisis into a depression is hardly "basic high school" knowledge.

Second, in my first post in this thread, I commented on how I wished that some of the arguments the authors you cite were actually named in this thread. You can try and browbeat us all you like with the eminency and respect of these scholars, which are fine and all, but without arguments, you won't convince many people. All we know now is that they oppose the traditional view of Versailles. We don't know any of their reasons to do so, however, which makes it kind of difficult to accept your conclusions.

Furthermore, I also noted how no (current, not old) opposing views (if there are any, mind) were mentioned in the OP. You cite two sources yet don't put them in the context of an academic debate (you do say they are "influential", but without elaborating). Not that this isn't understandable, since it obviously adds to the strength of the point you're trying to make, but it kinda looks bad to me when I get the impression that this MacMillan woman is just about the only person saying what she does. Revisionism is fun and all, but when it doesn't get any agreement from anyone else it quickly becomes suspect.

Of course, if I'm wrong about the above musings, please tell me so. It's not that I can't accept your views, it's just that right now I still have a hard time believing them. For the above reasons.

[Fragony]

Are you really interested

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Call it unfair for Austria-Hungary then, but hardly for Germany. Here's (http://www.johndclare.net/peace_treaties4.htm) a map of Germany pre- and post-Versailles. Other than returning Alsace-Lorraine to France, which hardly counts as losing territory, they lose a chunk of land in Prussia, mainly to provide sea access for Poland. Then compare with what Germany forced on Russia in Brest-Litovsk (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Brest-Litovsk). The two treaties were overseen by the same generation of German statesmen, perhaps even the same statesmen. One dictated by Germany, the other dictated to Germany, one year apart. The only possible argument for Versailles being less fair is tha fact that the German army was still on enemy soil when the ceasefire was agreed. Hence the dolchstosslegende, and why the Allies should have beaten the Germans back into their homeland, and rubbed in the reality of their defeat.

And what happened in Russia? The rise of 70 years of Communism.

[Fisherking]

Germany was required to abrogate treaties dating to 1843, surrender all colonies, give up provinces in the east in addition to the north and west. Give up mineral rights to France, submit to the military occupation of its most industrialized region in the Ruhr and for the most part hand the Saar over to the French to administer.

It was shot sighted. It strongly favored the two reaming powers. It was vengeful.

But don’t take my word for it. Read it! Surly you don’t need scholars and lawyers to reach your own conclusions.

Imagine for a moment that you are on the receiving end of that document and try to think how you would feel if you were forced into signing it.

It is easy to see why the Germans felt as they did and that is why the loosing side got their point across as excepted history up to this point.

[spmetla]

Call it unfair for Austria-Hungary then, but hardly for Germany. Here's (http://www.johndclare.net/peace_treaties4.htm) a map of Germany pre- and post-Versailles. Other than returning Alsace-Lorraine to France, which hardly counts as losing territory, they lose a chunk of land in Prussia, mainly to provide sea access for Poland. Then compare with what Germany forced on Russia in Brest-Litovsk (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Brest-Litovsk). The two treaties were overseen by the same generation of German statesmen, perhaps even the same statesmen. One dictated by Germany, the other dictated to Germany, one year apart. The only possible argument for Versailles being less fair is tha fact that the German army was still on enemy soil when the ceasefire was agreed. Hence the dolchstosslegende, and why the Allies should have beaten the Germans back into their homeland, and rubbed in the reality of their defeat.

Just because Germany wasn't completely broken up into small little states does not mean that it did not have large territorial losses. It's overseas colonies were large and important, in Germany's eyes colonies gave it it's place under the sun. Once again, just because it wasn't the most unfair does make make it moderate or fair, as pointed out earlier the Germans agreed to an armistice and then were left out of the creation of a peace treaty, if the Germans had submitted to unconditional surrender as the Axis powers did in WWII it would not be the same but because they were in a position of weakness they had sign the peace treaty.

[KukriKhan]

Pff, from 1789 all the way up to 1940 France played the perfidious, dangerous game of sacrificing european stability for it's goal of european hegemony.

From the outside looking in, one could make a case that Europeans, since the Golden Bull of 1356, have sought some way to

1. prevent the slaughter of its inhabitants, and

2. prevent rule by a dictator

by thinking up rules and Conventions and Treaties and other agreements. All of which "worked" for awhile, only to be tossed eventually in the name of some emergency, or tribal need for revenge for oppression. Versailles (and the League of Nations) was merely the early 20th Century version of that effort.

[Pannonian]

Just because Germany wasn't completely broken up into small little states does not mean that it did not have large territorial losses. It's overseas colonies were large and important, in Germany's eyes colonies gave it it's place under the sun. Once again, just because it wasn't the most unfair does make make it moderate or fair, as pointed out earlier the Germans agreed to an armistice and then were left out of the creation of a peace treaty, if the Germans had submitted to unconditional surrender as the Axis powers did in WWII it would not be the same but because they were in a position of weakness they had sign the peace treaty.

I don't really find this to be a persuasive argument for harshness considering that Britain, as a victorious power, and the victorious power which had been continuously actively fighting for the longest, lost most of our overseas territories after WW2, and the trading base that was the basis of our power. Germany were in no shape to significantly continue resistance by the time the armistice was agreed, and the subsequent treaty reflected their lack of power, just as Brest-Litovsk reflected Russia's lack of power to resist anything Germany might wish to impose on them. Such is war. The later rise of the Nazis was due to two factors. Firstly, the worldwide depression, whose cause had little to do with Versailles. Secondly, the myth that the German Army hadn't been beaten, but was sold out by the civilian government. This second point would have been argued whatever the terms of the treaty, simply because the Allies treated the Germans as the defeated (which they were), while the Germans deluded themselves that they hadn't been beaten.

From all the accounts I've read, the Germans in WW2 had a similar attitude, and if peace had been concluded while they were still in Belgium and Poland, they would have kept a grudge against the Allies, and looked to avenge their so-called defeat in the next war. This arrogance was only knocked out of them by taking the fight into Germany, and showing them they were indisputably the losers of the war.

[Fisherking]

There is also the matter of the Allies treating Germany as though it were still the old Imperial state and not a new Republic.

Had they actually negotiated with the freely elected government the likelihood of future conflict could possibly have been avoided.

Had France been treated this way after the fall of Napoleon there would have been several of the older states reformed from what is today French territory.

The study is correct in it assessment of the German reaction. They were treated the same as the old Imperial Germans.

It makes not difference whether the so call war guilt clause was written by two Americans, or the French, or even by a Martian Council of Elders it was a trigger phrase and any fool can see that.

The guilt for the failure should be sheared out among the Allied Governments, and not least to the United States who should have, better than the European Powers, seen what this would mean to the people of the new Republic of Germany.

In American History it is taught that had Wilson succeeded in placing the US in the League of Nations there would never have been a Second World War, which is patently farcical with the role they played in the treaty.

The handling after the Second World War was little better. It ended Germany as a threat but brought us the Cold War and only the dread of Nuclear Annihilation kept us from a third.

[King Henry V]

Oh goodie, I do enjoy talking about Versailles.

A couple of points I should like to make:

Firstly, I think some posters over-estimate the Allies capabilities in November 1918. Though it is true the German army was in full retreat, morale was not completely broken, hence the incomprehension on the part of many soldiers concerning Germany's effective surrender. Furthermore, to project the snapshot of the last stage of the war over a hypothetical continuation is grossly erroneous. Remember, the German army was steaming towards Paris until the Battle of the Marne. In effect, had the war continued in 1918, the Allies would still have had to fought through the Ardennes and the hilly terrain north of Lorraine, ideal for defence and useless for tanks. I also highly doubt the political will of America and much of Great Britain to continue a war which had clearly become offensive rather than defensive. War exhaustion was high amongst all the nations, though now Germany would have had the fillip of defending the Heimat against foreign invaders.
I need to only point to the Greco-Turkish war to show how even ill-equipped and trained troops with enough resolve can decisively an invader.

Secondly, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was quite different to Versailles. Though German territorial gains were huge, it was a negotiated settlement: the Bolsheviks wanted a truce at any price in order to eliminate their opponents in the civil war. They were under no illusion that the treaty was a lasting peace; it was merely a stop-gap until the inevitable world revolution had made it null and void.

[spmetla]

I don't really find this to be a persuasive argument for harshness considering that Britain, as a victorious power, and the victorious power which had been continuously actively fighting for the longest, lost most of our overseas territories after WW2, and the trading base that was the basis of our power. Germany were in no shape to significantly continue resistance by the time the armistice was agreed, and the subsequent treaty reflected their lack of power, just as Brest-Litovsk reflected Russia's lack of power to resist anything Germany might wish to impose on them. Such is war. The later rise of the Nazis was due to two factors. Firstly, the worldwide depression, whose cause had little to do with Versailles. Secondly, the myth that the German Army hadn't been beaten, but was sold out by the civilian government. This second point would have been argued whatever the terms of the treaty, simply because the Allies treated the Germans as the defeated (which they were), while the Germans deluded themselves that they hadn't been beaten.

From all the accounts I've read, the Germans in WW2 had a similar attitude, and if peace had been concluded while they were still in Belgium and Poland, they would have kept a grudge against the Allies, and looked to avenge their so-called defeat in the next war. This arrogance was only knocked out of them by taking the fight into Germany, and showing them they were indisputably the losers of the war.

But Britain didn't have to lose it's colonies it simply gave up most of them due to the various independence movements and its war exhaustion. If Britian or France or really any of the colonial powers had wanted to maintain their colonies they could have at the cost of another colonial war. This is not comparable to stripping Germany of its colonies, Britain gave up its empire due to cost, public opinion, and war exhaustion, not because it had to.

I don't despute that Germany would have lost WW1 after 1918 but it would have been at the cost of many more allied lives, the armistice was welcomed by both sides as an end to the fighting but don't imagine that there was no will left to fight in Germany. I'd rather not do "what ifs" but I think it wouldn't be too hard to accept that the german military extablishment would not have agreed to an armistice if they knew what the terms of Versailles would have been.

A respectable peace treaty that didn't try to turn a great power into a weak one would probably have been more effective for peace than Versailles. The Nazies were able to make use of the stab in the back myth because Germany was treated so harshly after the armistice and the German populace obviously thought they were given an undeservedly bad deal.

As for the German attitude in WW2, I think that many Germans probably accepted that the war was lost by the end of 1943, with it's tremendous defeats by the USSR as well as the vast increase in bombing from the Allied powers. The various German memoirs I've read seem to show rather a surprise that they weren't able to conclude a peace with Britain after the fall of France and would have liked to conclude a peace with the western powers if it allowed them to concentrate their effort against the soviets. The assassination attempt against hitler (I refer to the one in 1944) was an attempt to bring about a German government with which the allies would have been satisfied to conclude peace with.
The rise of the German idea of military superiority seems to only have occured during and after the Franco-Prussian war. By all accounts the Germans expected the French to invade Germany in that war which it didn't due primarily to the inefficiecy within the French mobilization system which gave the German nations a numerical superiority which detered the French invasion of Germany and allowed a German invasion of France. Only after the German victory in 1871 did they seem to think that the military solution would always result favorabley to them. Once again I think that a peace treaty that didn't seek to punish Germany so harshly would have allowed Germans to accept that they were defeated instead of being led to believe that their state of affairs was a result of a stab in the back.

Also, shouldn't this thread be in the monastery?

[Aemilius Paulus]

Also, shouldn't this thread be in the monastery?
These topics heat up too much and get locked, so Louis posted it here, where there are less restrictions :shrug:

[Louis VI the Fat]

Imagine for a moment that you are on the receiving end of that document and try to think how you would feel if you were forced into signing it.How would I feel? Me, I'd feel very sad about having lost the war.

But I wouldn't tell myself bedtime stories how I did not lose the war, nor how losing a war does not come at a price, nor that the Jews/Bolshevist/liberal-capitalist were behind it all.

I'd accept it and move on. You win some, you lose some. No point in being an idiot about it.



All countries have lost wars, and all have understood this comes at a price - territorial loss, dynastic change, loss of influence or resources etc. Yet for some unexplained reason, the thought that Germany in 1918 should've been excempted from this is considered an article of faith.



if the Germans had submitted to unconditional surrender as the Axis powers did in WWII it would not be the same but because they were in a position of weakness they had sign the peace treaty.Germany was defeated. Germany pleaded for an end to military hostilities. This was granted, to avoid further bloodshed. Bloodshed which would've been entirely unecessary, since Germany accepted defeat. The terms of the armistice were quite clear.
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Allies%27_Armistice_Demands

Germany was not 'in a position of weakness', a position that was subsequently 'exploited'. Germany was defeated and accepted this defeat. Since there is no point in continuing the fight only to wait for the politicians to have settled on all the little details of the defeat, the armistice was accepted by the allies to prevent more deaths and the destruction of Germany.

The notion that Germany only agreed to a 'ceasefire', and that this was subsequently abused by the allies is erroneous.
(Imagine the following scenario: Germany is completely defeated, Germany pleads for an end of hostilities, and the allies continue fighting. Surely, this is outrageous? If one takes this into deliberation, it becomes clear why the armistice and treaty are regarded as 'lenient'. In 1918, events such as Dresden were avoided, that is, continuing the fight long after the war has been won.
If the allies can be considered harsh, it must be that it took them two months to agree to Germany's desperate pleas for an end to hostilities.)

The allies suspended military operations to prevent further casualties. Why needlessly waste more lives when Germany is defeated and has accepted defeat already? Why spend months more fighting simply because no definitive peace treaty has been agreed upon? Why needlessly continue the fight to an unconditional surrender, when this will only have more bloodshed on both sides, and a very likely breakdown of Germany - which the allies sought to avoid. The allies wanted Germany left intact, a bulwark against bolshevism, and with its economy left functioning.


The term 'armistice' might be misleading. It was not a ceasefire, not a temporary cessation of hostilities. It is an acceptance of defeat. For example, in Juny 1940, France and Germany signed an armistice, instead of a surrender treaty.
Yet, unlike the armistice of 1918, nobody will be so naive as to mistake this for anything but an acceptence of defeat. Nobody will claim that the French army was not defeated and merely asked for a ceasefire. Nobody in his right mind will descibe this armistice as 'France only asked for an armistice, this armistice was then exploited by Germany because France was now in a position of weakness'.
The mythology that surrounds 1918-1919 beggars belief.

Oh well. In 1945, the allies were neither as naive nor as lenient as they were in 1918/1919. To prevent renewed myths and nonsense from taking hold, this time they made sure that nobody could mistake a German defeat for anything else. Sad and tragic indeed. But such is the consequence of mythology. It is not just rhetorics to state that the myths and erroneous assumptions surrounding the treaty of Versailles caused sixty million deaths.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Pff, from 1789 all the way up to 1940 France played the perfidious, dangerous game of sacrificing european stability for it's goal of european hegemony. Lies! Filthy lies!

France did not play a dangerous game of sacrificing Europe to her own aims from 1789 to 1940. :no:

France has done so from 843 all the way up to now.

It's not our fault that the Gaul is manly and strong, and the German weak and easily distracted by his romantic pursuits of poetry and philosophy. :smash:

[Sarmatian]

Oh goodie, I do enjoy talking about Versailles.

A couple of points I should like to make:

Firstly, I think some posters over-estimate the Allies capabilities in November 1918. Though it is true the German army was in full retreat, morale was not completely broken, hence the incomprehension on the part of many soldiers concerning Germany's effective surrender. Furthermore, to project the snapshot of the last stage of the war over a hypothetical continuation is grossly erroneous. Remember, the German army was steaming towards Paris until the Battle of the Marne. In effect, had the war continued in 1918, the Allies would still have had to fought through the Ardennes and the hilly terrain north of Lorraine, ideal for defence and useless for tanks. I also highly doubt the political will of America and much of Great Britain to continue a war which had clearly become offensive rather than defensive. War exhaustion was high amongst all the nations, though now Germany would have had the fillip of defending the Heimat against foreign invaders.
I need to only point to the Greco-Turkish war to show how even ill-equipped and trained troops with enough resolve can decisively an invader.

Secondly, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was quite different to Versailles. Though German territorial gains were huge, it was a negotiated settlement: the Bolsheviks wanted a truce at any price in order to eliminate their opponents in the civil war. They were under no illusion that the treaty was a lasting peace; it was merely a stop-gap until the inevitable world revolution had made it null and void.

I'm always away when people start interesting threads.

It seems to me that you're ignoring the south. Macedonian front collapsed completely, Bulgaria was out of the war, and there was no significant German force between French and Serbian divisions and Germany. They were in Hungary when armistice was declared. Hindenburg cited collapse of the Macedonian front as the last straw, saying that after that there is no hope of victory. Even without that, German economy was on the verge of total collapse. Not saying that everything was fine and dandy within the Entente but they could have gone on for much longer.

Germany was defeated, no doubt about that.

About the treaty, I'm with Louis, Meneldil, Pannonian... that it indeed wasn't that harsh. It is also a matter of defining "harsh". Arguably, all peace treaties are harsh on the losers but compared to treaties of the era (Brest-Litovsk) or the treaty Germany intended to put before the allies had it won, it wasn't that harsh. Certainly not harsh enough to warrant an entire generation of people who felt they have been victimised by the rest of the world.

Pannonian said it best with this:

The biggest link between WW1 and WW2 isn't Versailles, but the fact that the war was concluded before Germany was invaded and its inevitable defeat made even clearer. Whatever the terms of the treaty, the likes of Hitler would still have found reason to resent the government for ending the war while Germany was still unbeaten in the field. Germany should have been beaten back past its borders, and its centres of government occupied, to impress on them the fact that they've been fairly and utterly beaten. The dolchstosslegende came about because the Germans were able to pretend that, because they were still on enemy territory, the German Army was victorious but for the treacherous collapse of the civilian government. The Allies did it right second time round, flattening Germany when they had the chance.

I'd also say that German backing was the main reason Austria dared to risk war with Russia. Germany wasn't drawn in the war in support of an ally, Berlin actively encouraged Vienna to pursue military action. It was in a way natural, like France and Britain, Germany was highly industrialized country but with twice the population and GDP of those countries. Even so, Brits and French had all those nice colonies, getting cheap everything they need, from diamonds to oil and were generally acting all important around the world. At the same time Germany had the poorest colonies and was stuck between France and Britian on one side and Russia on the other. As Germany was the strongest military and economic power on the continent, it was bound to act on it eventually.

[Louis VI the Fat]

I'm always away when people start interesting threads.

It seems to me that you're ignoring the south. Macedonian front collapsed completely, Bulgaria was out of the war, and there was no significant German force between French and Serbian divisions and Germany. They were in Hungary when armistice was declared. Hindenburg cited collapse of the Macedonian front as the last straw, saying that after that there is no hope of victory. Even without that, German economy was on the verge of total collapse. Not saying that everything was fine and dandy within the Entente but they could have gone on for much longer.

Germany was defeated, no doubt about that. To think that we granted an armistice, thereby preventing a nice Serbian-French march into Vienna, only to hear perennial nonsense about how they were not defeated at all. (And it had been all too long since French troops had their traditional march right through Austria too!).

Tell us more about the South Eastern front. Do the Turks, Bulgarians and Austrians too deny they lost?

How is the creation of Yugoslavia viewed in its succesor states? The Treaty of Versailles was, after all, only one of a number of treaties to end this war and create a new order.

[Fisherking]

This book still doesn't change the events.

It is just allied apologists saying that Germany shouldn't have reacted so badly.

It is just more blame and blaming someone never solves the problem.

We should learn from mistakes of the past and find remedies and not say that a total failure was someone else's fault. What good does that do?

The Allies overstepped the bounds of good sense and dictated the terms of peace rather than negotiating them.

The German reaction may have been unreasoning, in blaming the people forced to sign it, but it was foreseeable.

It wasn’t just a failure, it was a colossal failure and pointing fingers as to who was the most at fault is of very limited value.

[Meneldil]

Meneldil's argument basically underwrites this view, you see. Prussia did the same to France in 1871 as the Entente later did to Germany. Look at the reaction in France and amongst the French people. See how counterproductive the policy ultimately proved, especially once Bismarck's moderating influence was removed from German foreign policy.

Now, the blame does not rest solely on French shoulders, according to this view. Lloyd George was just as eager to punish Germany for its ambitions as Clemenceau was (ambitions not very dissimilar to any other nation's at the time, but that's beside the point). Secondly, Versailles ultimately was only a factor in the rise of the Nazis, not the driving force. That is also not part of historical consensus as I have been taught. Versailles as a treaty was, like Locarno, basically dead by 1935. Despite this, it was still a major factor in preparing the way for the radical right in Germany. Just like the immense dissatisfaction with the spoils of war in Italy paved the way for the fascist coup d'état in Italy.

Not entirely. Just as it was the case for Germany, France bitterness and will for "la revanche" wasn't really based upon the terms of the treaty. By 1890, France was back in the top 3 of European superpowers, the economy was going fine (despite being less industrialized than in Germany or UK), etc. etc. I think in 1870 most Alsacians barely spoke French, and a large part of them agreed to be annexed by Germany. Yet, people were still ressentful about the war of 1870, still thought Germany had to pay.

Except for the unfair commercial clauses that France was still submitted to, the effects of 1873 were pretty much nonexistant by 1900. Fact is, it was an era of rampant nationalism, a time when nation building was heavily based on sending young men to war against a supposed eternal rival, and imposing your will on the international scene.

While it is true that the defeat of 1870 caused a deep impact in the french national mythos (and also gave birth to the whole "Jews betrayed us" and "collectivist are going to destroy or country conspiracy theories, as the punishment of the Paris Commune and the whole Dreyfus Affair underlined), it was mostly because France still considered herself and her 'people's army' to be the top military power of the world, and got her ass beaten to oblivion by what was she considered to be the underdog of Europe, in a few weeks. Not because of the terms of the treaty.

[Furunculus]

great thread people, very insightful.

my reading of Dreadnought causes me to side with Louis et-al, given that Versailles was no harsher than the treaty imposed on France at the end of the previous Franco-German war some few decades earlier.

[Kralizec]

It is just allied apologists saying that Germany shouldn't have reacted so badly.

Well duh, they shouldn't have. The only issue is wether the Versailles treaty was such a humiliating and heavy burden on the Germans that it all becomes more understandable.

To me, the idea that Germany was somehow compelled to invade Poland and annex Chzechoslovakia because they were forced to pay to England and France is a bit odd.
Regardless of wether the Versailles treaty was harsh in either its wording or execution (I think it was, even if it was not unusual for the time)...it's not sufficient to explain why the Germans embraced the nazis and caused WW2.

[Sarmatian]

To think that we granted an armistice, thereby preventing a nice Serbian-French march into Vienna, only to hear perennial nonsense about how they were not defeated at all. (And it had been all too long since French troops had their traditional march right through Austria too!).

Tell us more about the South Eastern front. Do the Turks, Bulgarians and Austrians too deny they lost?

How is the creation of Yugoslavia viewed in its succesor states? The Treaty of Versailles was, after all, only one of a number of treaties to end this war and create a new order.

Serbian army, naturally after so much suffering and spilled blood, wanted to push on to Vienna, but allies sent a clear signal to stop and get out of Hungary. Balkan countries tended to be as pigheaded then as they are now and would loathe to abandon territory the army had control of :laugh4:, although a nice, in-style entry in Vienna would have definitely painted a clearer picture about who lost the war to the general population.

I believe it was pretty clear to everyone except Germany that the war was lost, that it wasn't "we're offering armistice since we don't want to fight" but "we're offering armistice since we're defeated".

Unfortunately, it is difficult to apply western European standards to Balkans. As one, I believe American, history professor said:"For Britain, France, Germany, even Russia and the United States, the World War I years of 1914 to 1918 are powerful dates around which we can organize our thinking. World War I stands as a watershed event that fundamentally changed these nations' historic progress.
Such a view of World War I is less attractive and useful for thinking about Balkan affairs. Halting a discussion of Greek or Serbian nationalism in 1914 or 1918 leaves the story unfinished. It makes more sense to trace Serbian nationalist thought from the 1840s all the way up to 1929, perhaps even to the history of Serbia during World War II and during the 1980s. In the same way, it makes sense to look at Greece from 1821 up to 1923 and beyond: events as recent as the Cyprus crisis of the 1970s are extensions of nineteenth century issues. In Western Europe, 1914 ended a century of relative peace, but for the Balkan countries, World War I was only the latest war in a string of crises and confrontations. For Serbia, 1914 was an extension of the fighting of 1912 and 1913, and it has been called the "Third Balkan War" by some writers. For Greece, the period 1914-1918 was a middle period in a decade of fighting that began in 1912 and ended in 1923."

In Yugoslavia, there were many different pan-slavic movements and often they had contradicting ideas about how post-war Yugoslavia should be organized and even what should become part of it. Serbian prime minister, Pasic was originally opposed to the idea of Yugoslavia, but he caved in to the pressure of the King and other politicians. His contribution was try to organize Yugoslavia relatively similar to Prussia-Germany model, a large state encompassing all or most south Slavs but ruled by Serbian king and effectively dominated by Serbia politically.

Now, in retrospect, some in Serbia think we shouldn't have pursued Yugoslavian idea but instead should have accepted the extremely large territorial extension offered by the Allies under the treaty of London. That would have made a huge Serbian state that would have encompassed around 3/4 quarters of Yugoslavia.

https://img85.imageshack.us/img85/746/732pxlandsforserbia.png

Croatians were pressuring for a Yugoslavia and national councils pledged support of unification with Serbia as that was the only way they could have a say during the peace conference and they were afraid that what doesn't become part of Yugoslavia would be claimed by Italy, or even Hungary and Austria.. Slovenians were thinking along similar lines. Allies actually opposed the idea of Yugoslavia at first, primarily because of the complicated situation it would create with another ally, Italy. Without informing Serbia, Istria and Dalmatia were promised to Italy. Creation of Yugoslavia meant contesting claims between two allies. At first, allies refused to acknowledge that the delegation at the peace conference represented Serbs, Croats and Slovenes but addressed the delegation as "the delegation of the Kingdom of Serbia". So immediately after the war the creation of Yugoslavia was seen in very positive light. It changed after the war, as we've seen.

An interesting article: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/versailles-and-yugoslavia-ninety-years-on

This text (http://www.serbianna.com/features/25/25.pdf) provides and nice background of the history of the Balkans and naturally deals with the causes and the effects of the WW1 in the Balkans. It is relatively short (for its scope) and broad and paints a good "bigger picture" about Balkan history in general for people interested in it. The WW1 part starts about 2/3 through it.

[King Henry V]

I'm always away when people start interesting threads.

It seems to me that you're ignoring the south. Macedonian front collapsed completely, Bulgaria was out of the war, and there was no significant German force between French and Serbian divisions and Germany. They were in Hungary when armistice was declared. Hindenburg cited collapse of the Macedonian front as the last straw, saying that after that there is no hope of victory. Even without that, German economy was on the verge of total collapse. Not saying that everything was fine and dandy within the Entente but they could have gone on for much longer.

Germany was defeated, no doubt about that.


Oh come now, sir, you're not seriously suggesting that the Serbian Army, even with the help of a few French divisions, having fought against the combined armies of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany for the past four years was in a fit state to advance all the way across Austria-Hungary to Germany?

I don't deny that Germany was defeated by November 1918, however there are many varying degrees of defeat, and Germany's was not a total one, nor do I think it would have been had the war continued. The problem therefore was the gap between the severity of the treaty and the degree of defeat.

[TinCow]

I majored in European History with a concerntration in the inter-war years, with a particular emphasis on Germany. I'm also a Jew and about as far from a German sympathizer as you can get. However, you can chalk me up in the anti-Versailles camp. Versailles was not remotely balanced given the realities of the origins of the war and the state at the time of the Armistace. Versailles absolutely gutted Germany economically and politically, and opened up rifts within German society which were easily exploited by both the Fascists and the Communists.

It is wrong to say that Versailles caused WW2. It most certainly did not. However, it is equally wrong to say that it had nothing to do with WW2. Versailles was one of several major factors which contributed to the Nazi rise to power. The others are the Great Depression, the Bolshevik Revolution, the US refusal to join the League of Nations, and the complicity of the Centre Party. I do not consider Versailles to be more or less important than any of those other factors; they all hold equal responsibility and the absense of any single one of them may have been enough to prevent WW2.

[Sarmatian]

Oh come now, sir, you're not seriously suggesting that the Serbian Army, even with the help of a few French divisions, having fought against the combined armies of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany for the past four years was in a fit state to advance all the way across Austria-Hungary to Germany?

I don't deny that Germany was defeated by November 1918, however there are many varying degrees of defeat, and Germany's was not a total one, nor do I think it would have been had the war continued. The problem therefore was the gap between the severity of the treaty and the degree of defeat.

Actually, Serbian army spent more than 6 months resting and refitting on Corfu prior to the breakthrough. That breakthrough threw 300,000 Bulgarian soldiers out of the war and left central powers with no significant forces in the south. It was a major defeat for the Central Powers. Ludendorf, when informed of it, had a fit with foam coming out of his mouth and his adjutant thought that he would die of shock. I've already cited Hindenburg's assessment. Given that allies had complete control of the seas, that force could have been infinitely resupplied and even reinforced with more British and French division if there had been need for it. Stopping it would require establishing a front along a very long border, which means digging trenches, building field fortifications, barbed wire etc... and, more importantly, manning it. Germany didn't have the manpower or time to do it. Budapest would have been taken in matter of days, Vienna probably in the matter of weeks. Ottoman Empire was also near the end of its endurance which would free up a lot of British divisions. I don't believe Germany alone had enough manpower to establish a completely new front that would have needed to be hundreds of kilometers in length. Even if it did, it would have severely weakened German position in the west.

I'm not saying it wouldn't have been bloody, but German defeat was a done deal. By suing for peace, Germany saved itself from destruction. One could argue that Germany should have felt grateful allies didn't finish the job. Instead they tried it once more 20 years later after which they finally learned the lesson that they could get more by selling us their cars than trying military conquest.

Oh, and Romanian army could have joined the party in the south were it needed

[Fisherking]

I majored in European History with a concerntration in the inter-war years, with a particular emphasis on Germany. I'm also a Jew and about as far from a German sympathizer as you can get. However, you can chalk me up in the anti-Versailles camp. Versailles was not remotely balanced given the realities of the origins of the war and the state at the time of the Armistace. Versailles absolutely gutted Germany economically and politically, and opened up rifts within German society which were easily exploited by both the Fascists and the Communists.

It is wrong to say that Versailles caused WW2. It most certainly did not. However, it is equally wrong to say that it had nothing to do with WW2. Versailles was one of several major factors which contributed to the Nazi rise to power. The others are the Great Depression, the Bolshevik Revolution, the US refusal to join the League of Nations, and the complicity of the Centre Party. I do not consider Versailles to be more or less important than any of those other factors; they all hold equal responsibility and the absense of any single one of them may have been enough to prevent WW2.

What he said!

:bow:

[Louis VI the Fat]

Oh come now, sir, you're not seriously suggesting that the Serbian Army, even with the help of a few French divisions, having fought against the combined armies of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany for the past four years was in a fit state to advance all the way across Austria-Hungary to Germany?.Not only had the French-Serbian-Greek troops been doing just that, what's more, there not even was an Austria-Hungary anymore when we were done with them. It had collapsed. The Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes had broken away. Hungary and Austria had split.

As the British marched on virtually undefended Constantinople, d'Espèrey and his army had crossed the Danube, and stood deep into Hungary. Bulgaria, Hungary and the Ottoman Empire had been defeated one by one. To the west, the Italians had knocked out Austria.

All of Austria-Hungary had surrendered and had ceased to exist. And for a punchline: part of the armistice was...that the Entente armies were to be given free passage through Austria-Hungary to Germany!
http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19181103-1.pdf :yes: :italy:


Germany faced imminent invasion.

We had it for the picking: crossing into Germany in the West, where the Germans had been fully driven out of France, or crossing into Germany from the south or southeast, where nothing stood in the way anymore. The outcome on either fronts was certain.

No country suffered more than Serbia in WWI. If ever a country snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, it was Serbia in 1917/18. I'm not going to take away their ultimate victory from them.

[Pannonian]

great thread people, very insightful.

my reading of Dreadnought causes me to side with Louis et-al, given that Versailles was no harsher than the treaty imposed on France at the end of the previous Franco-German war some few decades earlier.

More immediately relevantly, compare Versailles with Brest-Litovsk, which the Germans had imposed on the Russians but a year earlier. Having dictated such a treaty, Germany are in no position to complain about the harshness of any terms dictated to them in turn.

[Meneldil]

I majored in European History with a concerntration in the inter-war years, with a particular emphasis on Germany. I'm also a Jew and about as far from a German sympathizer as you can get. However, you can chalk me up in the anti-Versailles camp. Versailles was not remotely balanced given the realities of the origins of the war and the state at the time of the Armistace. Versailles absolutely gutted Germany economically and politically, and opened up rifts within German society which were easily exploited by both the Fascists and the Communists.

It is wrong to say that Versailles caused WW2. It most certainly did not. However, it is equally wrong to say that it had nothing to do with WW2. Versailles was one of several major factors which contributed to the Nazi rise to power. The others are the Great Depression, the Bolshevik Revolution, the US refusal to join the League of Nations, and the complicity of the Centre Party. I do not consider Versailles to be more or less important than any of those other factors; they all hold equal responsibility and the absense of any single one of them may have been enough to prevent WW2.

The idea that Versailles paved the way to the fascists and to the communists doesn't hold much water does it? Very similar movements appeared among the victorious nations (namely France and Italy), before nazism even had any meaningful weight within Germany (and even the economical crisis, might I add). Similarly, much like France, Germany never was a monolithic nation. The disparity between conservative prussia and the more liberal areas (and former states) was quite similar to the opposition between die-hard republicans and monarchists in France. The rifts opened up by Versailles had actually been there since Germany became a country.

That being said, I agree that Versailles was an important event for the German national myth. Yet, my opinion is that, had the treaty requested 20 billions marks instead of ~130 (which never were paid, mind you), Germany would still have claimed the treaty was too harsh, simply because the country couldn't swallow defeat (once again, much like France in 1870).

Edit: My point about nazism and communism appearing in the interwar period is that these ideologies didn't simply pop out off nowhere because of the treaty. They've had roots in Germany (and much of western Europe) since the mid-19th and probably since the french Revolution. The volkisch movement, romantism, new racial and religious theories, the appeal and the hatred for the french Revolution, nationalism... All this have been at work for a long time. Versailles (and WWI) only revealed what was already present.

[TinCow]

The idea that Versailles paved the way to the fascists and to the communists doesn't hold much water does it? Very similar movements appeared among the victorious nations (namely France and Italy), before nazism even had any meaningful weight within Germany (and even the economical crisis, might I add). Similarly, much like France, Germany never was a monolithic nation. The disparity between conservative prussia and the more liberal areas (and former states) was quite similar to the opposition between die-hard republicans and monarchists in France. The rifts opened up by Versailles had actually been there since Germany became a country.

That being said, I agree that Versailles was an important event for the German national myth. Yet, my opinion is that, had the treaty requested 20 billions marks instead of ~130 (which never were paid, mind you), Germany would still have claimed the treaty was too harsh, simply because the country couldn't swallow defeat (once again, much like France in 1870).

I did not say that Versailles "paved the way" for fascists or communists, only that it created additional rifts in German society which were exploited by both parties. The German political revolution began before WWI was even over, so that was a given in any post-war scenario. However, Versailles caused additional economic problems over and above those that would have been felt with the oncoming of the Great Depression. Keep in mind that German hyperinflation was the direct result of war reparations and the government's response to the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. This made it easier for the communist movement to grow much faster in Germany than it would have if the nation had been more economically stable. In addition to normal strength all opposition parties gain during times of economic instability, the fascists also grew as a direct counter to the communists; reduce communist growth and the fascist response would have been similarly stunted. Reduce economic instability, and both groups would have been smaller. The war guilt clause, and the public perception of the Armistice/Versailles swindle, also provided excellent propaganda for the fascists to exploit.

What it all boils down to is that there was too much instability and too little national cohesion for the Weimar Republic to hold together. People seem to forget that Germany had already undergone a revolution before WWI was even over. The Weimar Republic had a lot of potential to produce a modern, democratic nation but it was simply too new to withstand the constant battering it got from so many different sources. The blame thus lies directly with the factors that undermined Weimar, all of them.

If you want to see a direct contrast of how this situation was better handled, you need look no further than WW2. The same nations were involved, with the same result in the war, but Germany emerged from it as a prosperous and democratic nation. The reason for this was that a great deal of effort was made by the western allies, particularly the US, to ensure that Germany was stabilized and returned to economic solvency as quickly as possible. After WWI, the Allies stripped Germany bare and gave its new government no support. After WWII, the Allies (mainly the US) invested heavily in the German economy and backed the new government with military and diplomatic support. The different outcomes were heavily influenced by this.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Versailles caused additional economic problems over and above those that would have been felt with the oncoming of the Great Depression. Keep in mind that German hyperinflation was the direct result of war reparations and the government's response to the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. I say this is based on obsolete, at least rearguard, conceptions. The reparations were only indirectly responsible for the hyperinflation - because it was the German government, not reparations, that created runaway inflation in a bid to avoid reparations.

Niall Ferguson and Gerald Feldman disagree with Marks but agree that German leaders played domestic politics with reparations. Ferguson concludes that in 1921 reparations placed an "intolerable strain on the state's finances." Therefore, reparations were "'ultimately responsible for the inflation' (Barry Eichengreen's phrase), meaning that no Weimar government could have raised taxes or cut spending sufficiently to pay reparations and balance the budget" ( Ferguson, p.425). Ferguson, though, only estimates a "total value of unrequited transfers from Germany to the Allies" of approximately 19 billion gold marks from 1919-1932 (p. 424). And Ferguson shows German governments utilizing budget deficits and currency depreciation to avoid paying reparations and, a decade later during the Great Depression, turning to deflation in order to end reparations, achieving "diplomatic success" at the price of domestic political catastrophe (pp. 438-439).
Gerald Feldman castigates the Versailles Treaty as a "horrendous failure." He appears to agree with what he regards as the prevailing view that the Treaty was too hard given the means of enforcement and too soft to block "a second German grasp for world power" (p. 441). Feldman disputes Marks' linkage of reparations to the balance of power and denies any "scholarly consensus" that Germany could have paid the reparations. Feldman believes that the appropriate time for German stabilization would have been November 1922 while Ferguson cites 1920. Feldman concludes that reparations "undermined German democracy and were instrumentalized to romote inflation in the beginning of the Republic and deflation at its end" (p. 447).
Reassertions by Ferguson and Feldman of the decisive role of reparations in disrupting the German economy, focusing on a specific moment in 1921, appear to be a rear-guard historiographical action. Marks' and Ferguson's figures are strikingly modest. They are comparable to those regarded in 1919-1920 as feasible by one of the Treaty's harshest critics, John Maynard Keynes. To assert that German attempts to avoid reparations contributed to inflation and depression is very different than to claim that reparations themselves caused these economic catastrophes. To be sure, reparations did not help the German economy, but they did not destroy it either. The figures, a far cry from 132 billion gold marks or 100 billion or 50 billion, do not bear the weight placed on them.
Several authors reinforce Marks' critique. Diane Kunz observes, "The German government's decision not only to sabotage the Versailles Treaty but to manipulate its economy for short-term political gain triggered the financial chaos of this period" (p. 528).





If you want to see a direct contrast of how this situation was better handled, you need look no further than WW2. The same nations were involved, with the same result in the war, but Germany emerged from it as a prosperous and democratic nation. The reason for this was that a great deal of effort was made by the western allies, particularly the US, to ensure that Germany was stabilized and returned to economic solvency as quickly as possible. After WWI, the Allies stripped Germany bare and gave its new government no support. After WWII, the Allies (mainly the US) invested heavily in the German economyIs it? Or is this a myth and was Germany severly plundered after WWII, whereas it was not nearly plundered to the same extent after WWI?



Contrary to common myth the U.S. did in fact take "reparations", parts of it by John Gimbel called "plunder and exploitation", directly from Germany. The U.S. for instance took a 8.9% share of dismantled Western German industry [1] (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,854422,00.html) The Allies also confiscated large amounts of German intellectual property.[27] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-26) Beginning immediately after the German surrender and continuing for the next two years the U.S. pursued a vigorous program to harvest all technological and scientific know-how as well as all patents in Germany. John Gimbel comes to the conclusion, in his book "Science Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany", that the "intellectual reparations" taken by the U.S. (and the UK) amounted to close to $10 billion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1000000000_%28number%29).[28] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-27)[29] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-28)[30] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-29) The U.S. competitors of German firms were encouraged by the occupation authorities to access all records and facilities.[31] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-ReferenceA-30) In 1947 the director of The U.S. Commerce Department's Office of Technical Services stated before congress: "The fundamental justification of this activity is that we won the war and the Germans did not. If the Germans had won the war, they would be over here in Schenectady and Chicago and Detroit and Pittsburgh, doing the same things.[31] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-ReferenceA-30) A German report from May 1, 1949 stated that many entrepreneurs preferred not to do research under the current regulations (Allied Control Council Law No. 25) for fear of the research directly profiting their competitors. The law required detailed reporting to the Allies of all research results.[31] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-ReferenceA-30) The British took commercial secrets too, by abducting German scientists and technicians, or simply by interning German businessmen if they refused to reveal trade secrets.[32] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-31).
[edit (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Industrial_plans_for_Germany&action=edit&section=6)] Occupation costs

The costs of the occupation were charged to the German people, about $2.4 billion per year.[33] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-32) One estimate for the year 1948 placed this cost to the German economy, through requisitions of goods, materials and direct payments, to be 46 percent of local tax receipts.[34] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-James_L._Payne_2006._p.213-33) The Germans were charged for such costs as "one ton of water bugs to feed a U.S. general’s pet fish, a bedspread of Korean goatskin, thirty thousand bras (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brassiere)".[34] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-James_L._Payne_2006._p.213-33)


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany

[/URL]
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-James_L._Payne_2006._p.213-33)


[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-James_L._Payne_2006._p.213-33"]
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_plans_for_Germany#cite_note-James_L._Payne_2006._p.213-33)
To which list of plunder after WWII one can add:
- massive forced labour of Germans. (five million men)
- infinitely larger reparations payments
- much larger territories annexed. (Not to mention, ancient German lands, whereas in 1918 the annexed territoried were mostly recent aquisitions, notably since 1870)
- prevention of food supplies or foreign aid to Germany for longer than the period after the armistice of 1918. Also, in 1918, the starvation of Germany was a solely pressure means to force Germany to accept the peace treaty. In 1945 Germany had already unconditionally surrendered. Deliberate blockage of food and aid lasted until 1947. Mass starvation ensued, more intense than in 1919, and for far longer. Even in 1948, German child mortality rate was twice that of its neighbours.

[spmetla]

Here's a Dutch journalist's opinion on Versailles shortly after its signing:


Dutch Algemeen Handelsblad Editorial on the Treaty of Versailles, June 1919

The peace conditions imposed upon Germany are so hard, so humiliating, that even those who have the smallest expectation of a "peace of justice" are bound to be deeply disappointed.

Has Germany actually deserved such a "peace"? Everybody knows how we condemned the crimes committed against humanity by Germany. Everybody knows what we thought of the invasion of Belgium, the submarine war, the Zeppelin raids.

Our opinion on the lust of power and conquest of Germany is well known. But a condemnation of wartime actions must not amount to a lasting condemnation of a people. In spite of all they have done, the German people is a great and noble nation.

The question is not whether the Germans have been led by an intellectual group to their destruction, or whether they are accomplices in the misdeeds of their leaders - the question is, whether it is to the interest of mankind, whether there is any sense in punishing a people in such a way as the Entente governments wish to chastise Germany.

The Entente evidently desires the complete annihilation of Germany. Not only will the whole commercial fleet be confiscated, but the shipbuilding yards will be obliged to work for the foreigner for some time to come.

Whole tracts of Germany will be entirely deprived of their liberty; they will be under a committee of foreign domination, without adequate representation.

The financial burden is so heavy that it is no exaggeration to say that Germany is reduced to economic bondage. The Germans will have to work hard and incessantly for foreign masters, without any chance of personal gain, or any prospect of regaining liberty or economic independence.

This "peace" offered to Germany may differ in form from the one imposed upon conquered nations by the old Romans, but certainly not in essence. This peace is a mockery of President Wilson's principles. Trusting to these, Germany accepted peace. That confidence has been betrayed in such a manner that we regard the present happenings as a deep humiliation, not only to all governments and nations concerned in this peace offer, but to all humanity.

These conditions will never give peace. All Germans must feel that they wish to shake off the heavy yoke imposed by the cajoling Entente, and we fear very much that that opportunity will soon present itself. For has not the Entente recognized in the proposed so-called "League of Nations" the evident right to conquer and possess countries for economic and imperialistic purposes? Fettered and enslaved, Germany will always remain a menace to Europe.

The voice and opinion of neutrals have carried very little weight in this war. But, however small their influence and however dangerous the rancorous caprice of the Entente powers may be to neutrals, it is our conviction and our duty to protest as forcibly as possible against these peace conditions.

We understand the bitter feelings of the Entente countries. But that does not make these peace conditions less wrong, less dangerous to world civilization, or any less an outrage against Germany and against mankind.

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VII, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923

http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/parispeaceconf_dutcheditorial.htm

[Prince Cobra]

I did not really have the time to read everything so perhaps I will comment later some things. Now I see Bulgaria has been much debated. Bulgarians had the best army on the Balkan peninsula ( for example, the Bulgarian army encircled and threatened with destruction the Greek army led by Prince Constantine in 1913, despite it was fighting both Greece and Serbia simultaneously; for this Bulgaria was often referred as "Prussia of the East"). It was exhausted in two subsequent wars (in 1912 with Greece and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire, resulting in a victory; and in 1913 it quarrelled with its allies Serbia and Greece for the division of the territories, Romania and the Ottoman Empire used its occupation and attacked Bulgaria thus Bulgaria lost the war for the Ottoman heritage; this naturally made the Central powers an ally). The WW1 arrived too early for Bulgaria and when Bulgaria joined in 1915 it was not entirely recovered from the wars. Neverhteless, the Bulgarian army had its share in the defeat of Serbia and Romania. The Bulgarian army slowly grew with the progress of the war and finally in 1918 the Bulgarian army reached between 700 000-900 000 mobilised men. This for population of 5 million people is a huge burden (20 per cent of all the population, which basically means that almost all the male population were mobilised). Like all the soldiers of the Central powers it was badly supplied. The Bolshevik revolution also influenced the demoralised army. And on the top of this, Bulgarians were badly outnumbered on the Balkan frontier and forced to defend alone the most of the front (there were a few German divisions but these were definately not a significant reifnorcement compared with the huge enemy army; I think there were some divisions from Austria-Hungary as well). Eventually, after 3 years of fighting, the Bulgarian army was forced to retreat. This had a tremendous impact on the Bulgarian morale and eventually, some regiments rebelled and the frontier collapsed completely. Before that, as a last signal of what was once a powerful army, General Vladimir Vazov (brother of a famous Bulgarian poet and national hero) managed to prevent a second breaking in the frontline and pushed the Allies in a famous victory at Doyran. This minor victory helped to save from captivity significant part of the Bulgarian army and secured slightly better conditions for capitulation (Bulgaria was not occupied by any of its neighbours).

On a different matter. Bulgaria was the only defeated country that preserved its royal line (Tzar Ferdinand I abdicated in favour of his son). I would say that the next monarch (Boris III (1918-1943))was a stabilisng factor in the society since it prevented from establishing either left or right wing dictatorship. He ruled as a dictator in the last years of his reign but there was not really anything from the madness of the totalitarian ideology (for example, Bulgaria even maneaged to save its Jews, despite being an Axis ally in the WW2). I've always wondered what would have happened if the Kaiserreich was preserved (even reinstalled by the Allies) and Kaiser Wilhelm II was replaced by the next in line... One can say an Italy case was possible but I think that the Savoy King was remarkably incompetent. In addition, one can easily notice that the Mussolini regime was far less oppressive than Hitler's. Just a material for reflection.

Btw, somebody mentioned why did not the Allies pushed into German territory? This would have prolonged the war and everybody feared of Red revolution. It would also cost more lives and total destruction of Europe. It would be really a madness. I also think that the capitulation of Germany was forced by internal factors, not only by the dropping of Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Ludendorf's offensive failed and there was no hope the nightmare will end with victory. Eventually, the Navy (ironic isn't it having in mind the love of the Kaiser for the ships) rebelled and the Kaiser was forced to flee.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Doiran

[TinCow]

I say this is based on obsolete, at least rearguard, conceptions. The reparations were only indirectly responsible for the hyperinflation - because it was the German government, not reparations, that created runaway inflation in a bid to avoid reparations.

I completely agree that the German government caused the hyperinflation, but the fact remains that they did it because of (1) war reparations that they were either unwilling or unable to pay, and (2) the costs of supporting the striking Ruhr workers in 1923. Blame the Germans all you want, but the fact remains that without the reparations and the French occupation of the Ruhr, hyperinflation would not have occurred. Under these circumstances, blaming Germany exclusively for hyperinflation is simply passing the buck. France, Britain, and Belgium share the blame with Germany.


Is it? Or is this a myth and was Germany severly plundered after WWII, whereas it was not nearly plundered to the same extent after WWI?

It was not so much the plundering that was the impact, it was the failure to rejuvenate the nation afterwards. First, in WWI reparation were made in financial means which Germany could not afford, resulting in a collapse of the entire financial system. In WWII, reparations were made in movable and intellectual property, something which caused decreased output but did not fundamentally destroy the financial system. Second, after the WWII plundering, the US re-invested a huge amount of money in rebuilding the German economy. As a result of this Britain and France actively fell behind Germany, because their economies were heavily based on plundered German equipment and technology which was old and obsolete by the standards of the late 1940s. With American investment income, Germany was re-outfitted with the most modern machinery for industrial and technical production, which laid the ground work for the German economic revolution which has continued to this day. It is not coincidental that after WW2 Germany and Japan both became leading economic powers, while Britain and France lost much of their economic influence.

[Sarmatian]

It was not so much the plundering that was the impact, it was the failure to rejuvenate the nation afterwards. First, in WWI reparation were made in financial means which Germany could not afford, resulting in a collapse of the entire financial system. In WWII, reparations were made in movable and intellectual property, something which caused decreased output but did not fundamentally destroy the financial system. Second, after the WWII plundering, the US re-invested a huge amount of money in rebuilding the German economy. As a result of this Britain and France actively fell behind Germany, because their economies were heavily based on plundered German equipment and technology which was old and obsolete by the standards of the late 1940s. With American investment income, Germany was re-outfitted with the most modern machinery for industrial and technical production, which laid the ground work for the German economic revolution which has continued to this day. It is not coincidental that after WW2 Germany and Japan both became leading economic powers, while Britain and France lost much of their economic influence.

It's not really the same. After WW2 Germany laid in ruins, no political system, no institutions with industry and infrastructure in appaling state. Everything had to be rebuilt. The problems Germany had after WW1 were political and economic, and both were their fault. Part of reparations for WW1 was also taken in intellectual property. The reduction of the army was beneficial economically as it reduced expenses in the long term.

Reparations didn't help German economy but they didn't bring it to collapse. More important reasons for its collapse were severe strain placed on it by war and delibarate actions of German government.

What treaty of Versailles hurt the most was German pride. They didn't demand the same train car to be pulled out of museum for armistice to be signed in 1940 just for kicks.

[The Wizard]

I would like to point out that the book cited in the OP rejects the opinion, held by some of the pro-Versailles posters in this thread, that it should have been much harsher (this, at least, as stated by the summaries and reviews I have read so far). The traditional view of Versailles from an economic point of view is also maintained in said book (as seen in Louis's latest post: Feldman and Ferguson agree Germany was unable to pay, and the reparations structurally weakened the Weimar Republic).


Well duh, they shouldn't have. The only issue is wether the Versailles treaty was such a humiliating and heavy burden on the Germans that it all becomes more understandable.

To me, the idea that Germany was somehow compelled to invade Poland and annex Chzechoslovakia because they were forced to pay to England and France is a bit odd.
Regardless of wether the Versailles treaty was harsh in either its wording or execution (I think it was, even if it was not unusual for the time)...it's not sufficient to explain why the Germans embraced the nazis and caused WW2.

It would be a sufficient condition, not a necessary one. As TinCow states.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Wonderful discussion so far, but I begin to believe it is in the wrong forum....

[Louis VI the Fat]

Wonderful discussion so far, but I begin to believe it is in the wrong forum....I know, I agree.

But Lemur wanted to hear none of it.

[Brenus]

“Versailles was not remotely balanced given the realities of the origins of the war”: That is the part Louis is constesting, and I agree with him after reading his comments: Versailles was not a Guilty Verdict. The fact that Austria started a war she wouldn’t if Germany hadn’t agreed has nothing to do with the Treaty.

The perception of the Treaty by Germany after the WW1 is just as a construction for:
The Militaries: To rewrite history in their favours, pretending they could have won, which became we would have won if…
The Politicians, to blame every thing going wrong on a very easy scapegoat. You have no electricity: Versailles
You have no jobs: Versailles
You have a parking Ticket: Versailles.

“I don't deny that Germany was defeated by November 1918, however there are many varying degrees of defeat, and Germany's was not a total one, nor do I think it would have been had the war continued.”
It was a total collapse!!!!
After the last July 1918 German offensive and its failure, Germany lost the gains done in 4 years in 3 months.
The heavily fortifided lines fall in the Anglo-French-Canadians-US troops on the East/West –for the Germans, their Allies were routing on the South, South East… Internal up-raising and revolt were brewing inside…
Contrary to the French in 1914-15, the Germans were not able to regroup and counter-offensive…
If the war would have continued, the blood shed would have been worst for Germany and the conditions of surrender harsher…

“The problem therefore was the gap between the severity of the treaty and the degree of defeat.” The problem was Germany built a non-guilty conscience and refuse to aknowledge the defeat on the battlefiled…
This drove the Germans in a self inflicted humiliation and their ressentemt was skillfully exploited by all politicians untill they found their master in manipulation in the name of Adolf Hitler…

In term of humiliation, I do not remember a Victory Parade in Berlin in 1918.

“Blame the Germans all you want, but the fact remains that without the reparations and the French occupation of the Ruhr”
Funny enough, I do not remember hyper inflation starting in France during the German Occupation after 1871.
As Menedil pointed out, France went as well with civil war (Commune de Paris), political changes (III Empire to III Republic), foreign occupation, humiliation and amputation of territories.
The condition of the defeat were worst for France in 1871 than for Germany in 1918.
And the conditions for another war were in the Peace Treaty.

But French Revenchism is blamed. Not harsh peace treaty.
Without German Unification proclaimed in Versailles, without German Parade in Paris in 1870, without the HUGE war reparation (under the pretext France started the war… remind you something?), without annexing French Territories, WW1 wouldn’t have happened…
The fact is in 1871, the French blamed themselves and Louis Napoleon Bonaparte for the defeat.
And they prepared for the Revenge, eyes fixed on the blue lines of the Vosges. En parler, jamais, y penser, toujours: To speak about, never, to think about, always…
The Germans were aware of this and knew at the first opportunity offered the French would go for it. The 2nd French Colonial Empire was built and developed for this goal… The French Foreign Policy was aimed at this, so big was the humiliation and the desire of the revenge…

The German attack on the neutral Belgium and France gave the opportunity and the good conscience the French were waiting for…

So, Versailles treaty was the combinations of these factors, but, as such, was not so harsh, especially when, as it was showed in this debate, Germany never paid it.

“This peace is a mockery of President Wilson's principles. Trusting to these, Germany accepted peace.” These 14 points were proposed on Januaru 1918. The German answer was in July 1918 Offensive.
Germany couldn’t in good faith hoping that the Anglo-French would, after having defeating their armies, go for it…
The German envoys came hoping it would be the bases of the talks, but it wasn’t not up to the USA of 1918 to negotiate, but the French and the English.
I can understand the 1918 Germans’ hopes…
But Germany had no choice in November 1918.
Luddendorff’s failure followed by Allies counterattacks forced in 100 days the exhausted and battered German Armies toward theirs own borders…
The demand to the German fleet to go at see and to die is another clue on how much the German defeat was deep and irreversible…

[Prince Cobra]

Since it seems most of the arguments are being repeated again and again, I may afford to make a slight comment before I go to sleep...


The condition of the defeat were worst for France in 1871 than for Germany in 1918.

I think you want to bury your thesis alive with this sentence. Better think over this statement carefully.

[Louis VI the Fat]

I completely agree that the German government caused the hyperinflation, but the fact remains that they did it because of (1) war reparations that they were either unwilling or unable to payIt is this exact link that is the crucial point.

Not the reparations, but the German government created the hyperinflation. This they did to undermine the reparation payments. This is the pattern of behaviour of the German governments throughout the period, before and after 1933. Not the Treaty itself was the problem, but German obstruction, German refusal to accept concilliation efforts.


Sally Marks regards the reparations controversy as a battle over the postwar balance of power that Germany won. She declares the total figure of German reparations over many years as approximately 21.5 milliard gold marks (p.367--a milliard is the American billion; with approximately four gold marks to the dollar, her figure is somewhat more than $5 billion). As a reparations non-specialist, it appears to me that Sally Marks has largely won her thirty year war over reparations (She was not alone as scholars such as Marc Trachtenberg, Stephen Schuker, and others joined her on the same historiographical playing field). A significant caveat though: Marks and Gerald Feldman, who do not agree on much concerning reparations, are in accord that the reparations conundrum was a huge, costly mess that might have been avoided.

Sally Marks characterizes reparations as the "primary battlefield" of the postwar "continuation of war by other means" (pp. 338, 370; her first two forays into reparations are in Central European History, 1969 and 1978). Northeastern France had been destroyed, Germany had taken French factories and cattle into Germany, and retreating German Armies had flooded French coal mines. If France confronted domestic war debts, interallied debts, and reconstruction while Germany only faced the former, Germany would "reverse" its defeat. Reparations was a tug-of-war over the postwar balance of power. "For political reasons," the London Schedule of Payments of 1921 established an ostensible 132 billion gold marks figure for reparations but then deposited all but 50 billion gold marks in "never-never land" (p. 346). "Comparative moderation" was hidden "in apparent rigor" (p. 367). From 1919 until 1932, Germany only paid approximately 21.5 milliard marks (somewhat more than 5 billion dollars) (p. 367). Marks states, "A substantial degree of scholarly consensus now suggests that paying what was actually asked of it was within Germany's financial capacity" (p. 357).

It was not so much the plundering that was the impact, it was the failure to rejuvenate the nation afterwards. First, in WWI reparation were made in financial means which Germany could not afford, resulting in a collapse of the entire financial system. In WWII, reparations were made in movable and intellectual property, something which caused decreased output but did not fundamentally destroy the financial system. Second, after the WWII plundering, the US re-invested a huge amount of money in rebuilding the German economy. As a result of this Britain and France actively fell behind Germany, because their economies were heavily based on plundered German equipment and technology which was old and obsolete by the standards of the late 1940s. With American investment income, Germany was re-outfitted with the most modern machinery for industrial and technical production, which laid the ground work for the German economic revolution which has continued to this day. It is not coincidental that after WW2 Germany and Japan both became leading economic powers, while Britain and France lost much of their economic influence. Whilst I agree that it is more profitable to fight against America than with America, I disagree this was much different in the 1920's.

The UK and France had to pay vast sums to America. Additionaly, France's north - her industrial and mining heartland - lay in ruins still. Both countries economies were in shambles. France never asked nor received reparations remotely sufficient to undo the ravages of WWI. Germany, by contrast, received more loans than it needed to pay for reparations. Despite Germany's sabotage of its economy, Gemany witnessed a period of massive growth in the second half of the twenties. Alas, it was all too shortlived. 1929 ended all of that.



I would like to point out that the [...] traditional view of Versailles from an economic point of view is also maintained in said book (as seen in Louis's latest post: Feldman and Ferguson agree Germany was unable to pay, and the reparations structurally weakened the Weimar Republic) Feldman and Ferguson are shredded to pieces in the book by the other authors. (See spoiler above)They are rearguard, representing mostly obsolote views.

Ferguson in particular has the problem he agrees with the modern findings that Germany only ever had to pay 19 billion - a very modest sum. He has the additional problem that he maintains the (modest) reparations caused economical woes, while simultaneously stating that deliberate German policy was the cause for the hyperinflation of the 20's and the deflation of the 30's.


A kind of TinCow then. :tongue:
Educated in older conceptions of Versailles, accepting of the newer findings, but not quite mentally ready to accept the full staggering consequences of it.

[Louis VI the Fat]

In term of humiliation, I do not remember a Victory Parade in Berlin in 1918.I do. I remember a victory parade in Berlin in 1918.

By the German troops.

Yes, really.

[The Wizard]

Now I haven't read the book, but as far as I know Feldman and Ferguson are the only authors to write on the subject of economics in that work, being the experts employed to write on that subject in the book. They represent another voice in the debate that you have not mentioned (for which I do not blame you, I'd do it too if it were me).

As far as I have read in peer reviews so far (and I recognize this is inferior to reading the book itself), the general consensus of the book's authors is that the Treaty of Versailles was the best achievable document given the circumstances (i.e. the clashing interests of the U.S. v. the UK and France, and the ability and will towards enforcement), which is what I was taught. Of course, this is a general consensus distilled from the varying opinions expressed by the various authors, but still.

Also, about the reparations and hyperinflation. The point is not who is to blame (at least, not mine). The point is the demand for reparations put the German government before a choice it could not fulfill, while the opposing side (France) was unwilling to budge. In other words, the Treaty was a failure (at least in the field of economic reparations) from the outset because it set unrealistic demands that fostered conflict and undermined its effectivity, damaging peace in the process and inflaming German public opinion needlessly through heavy-handed policies directly derived from the Treaty's clauses. It was this hostile international environment, which is partly to blame on Versailles, that led to economic stagnation throughout the Interbellum (and not just after '29) and also prepared the ground for the rise of radically right-wing movements like the Nazis.

[Pannonian]

“I don't deny that Germany was defeated by November 1918, however there are many varying degrees of defeat, and Germany's was not a total one, nor do I think it would have been had the war continued.”
It was a total collapse!!!!
After the last July 1918 German offensive and its failure, Germany lost the gains done in 4 years in 3 months.
The heavily fortifided lines fall in the Anglo-French-Canadians-US troops on the East/West –for the Germans, their Allies were routing on the South, South East… Internal up-raising and revolt were brewing inside…
Contrary to the French in 1914-15, the Germans were not able to regroup and counter-offensive…
If the war would have continued, the blood shed would have been worst for Germany and the conditions of surrender harsher…

According to the old Tommies who were interviewed for posterity a few years ago before they died off, they were advancing several km a day (on average), advancing as far as they could before meeting resistance, then calling in the heavies, or doing the job themselves if they felt inclined. What surprised me was that they were happy with the war, and were disappointed when it ended. Unlike WW2, and unlike the Germans in both wars, the Allies had plenty of logistical and human resources, and the casualties they suffered during an advance were felt to be justified by the advances they made. The Allied soldiers were trained for a job, they did their job well, and they could see the tangible results of their work, so they were satisfied, and could have kept this up for longer if necessary.

[Louis VI the Fat]

They represent another voice in the debate that you have not mentioned (for which I do not blame you, I'd do it too if it were me). Thus far, I have twice quoted them, and once went over them in my own words. :book:

[King Henry V]

I think Sarmatian, Louis and Brenus heavily over-estimate the military capabilities of the Entente in 1918. Austria-Hungary might have been broken, but you speak as though the Allies had unlimited reserves of manpower. There would still have been an awful lot of territory to occupy before reaching the German border, too much for the Allies to achieve anyway considering their resources. Similarly I very much doubt that they would have been able to push very far into Germany without severe losses that would have had much of public opinion calling for peace.

[Centurion1]

Well being able to sue for peace and actually getting peace are two different hings. I assume we are saying that Germany didnt agree to versaille. Then the people of the entente didnt really have a "choice" if neither side was willing to yield right?

[TinCow]

“Blame the Germans all you want, but the fact remains that without the reparations and the French occupation of the Ruhr”
Funny enough, I do not remember hyper inflation starting in France during the German Occupation after 1871.

...

The condition of the defeat were worst for France in 1871 than for Germany in 1918.

On the first point, I do not see how that comparison is remotely relevant to the situation. Are you actually arguing that hyperinflation was not caused by the German government's reaction to war reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr?

On the second point, I believe that is one of the most inaccurate statements made in this thread.


A kind of TinCow then. :tongue:
Educated in older conceptions of Versailles, accepting of the newer findings, but not quite mentally ready to accept the full staggering consequences of it.

I am very confused by your reaction. Are you actually saying that Versailles had NO impact whatsoever on causing WW2? If you re-read my first post, I very clearly stated that Versailles was only one of several factors that caused the war. I fully believe that had any of those other factors been different, that WW2 would never have happened even with Versailles. I feel like you are having some intense allergic reaction to the very concept of Versailles having any influence on anything.


Also, about the reparations and hyperinflation. The point is not who is to blame (at least, not mine). The point is the demand for reparations put the German government before a choice it could not fulfill, while the opposing side (France) was unwilling to budge. In other words, the Treaty was a failure (at least in the field of economic reparations) from the outset because it set unrealistic demands that fostered conflict and undermined its effectivity, damaging peace in the process and inflaming German public opinion needlessly through heavy-handed policies directly derived from the Treaty's clauses. It was this hostile international environment, which is partly to blame on Versailles, that led to economic stagnation throughout the Interbellum (and not just after '29) and also prepared the ground for the rise of radically right-wing movements like the Nazis.

:yes:

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

You know, I don't understand what drives the current WW1 revisionism. A couple of years ago some academic was quated as saying something like, "most people now accept that the Germans in WW1 represented just as much of a threat to liberty and human rights as in in WW2".

What idocy is this, to make all Germans into monsters; and all their governments into Nazis?

[Pannonian]

I think Sarmatian, Louis and Brenus heavily over-estimate the military capabilities of the Entente in 1918. Austria-Hungary might have been broken, but you speak as though the Allies had unlimited reserves of manpower. There would still have been an awful lot of territory to occupy before reaching the German border, too much for the Allies to achieve anyway considering their resources. Similarly I very much doubt that they would have been able to push very far into Germany without severe losses that would have had much of public opinion calling for peace.

That's a modern day perspective. The Allies had already sustained heavy casualties without calling off the war, and with the advances of 1918, which would have been even more marked with the maturation of the original 1919 plans and the continued starvation of Germany, the soldiers were happy that they were tangibly winning and moving. Forget the war poets, who were unrepresentative of the majority of soldiers, and read the accounts of the campaigns of 1918. The Allies were plentifully equipped with whatever equipment and supplies they felt were needed, they were conversant in the language of combined arms, and they still had plenty of manpower in reserve (remember there were no commitments in the far east, so both Britain and France could concentrate the resources of their empires on the western front).

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

That's a modern day perspective. The Allies had already sustained heavy casualties without calling off the war, and with the advances of 1918, which would have been even more marked with the maturation of the original 1919 plans and the continued starvation of Germany, the soldiers were happy that they were tangibly winning and moving. Forget the war poets, who were unrepresentative of the majority of soldiers, and read the accounts of the campaigns of 1918. The Allies were plentifully equipped with whatever equipment and supplies they felt were needed, they were conversant in the language of combined arms, and they still had plenty of manpower in reserve (remember there were no commitments in the far east, so both Britain and France could concentrate the resources of their empires on the western front).

None of which reflects the bottom line, which is what was really beginning to worry Paris and London.

[Centurion1]

As they say PVC the winners write the history books. WW1 was one of the last wars in which there were not really defined lines of "good or evil". which are of course very subjective terms to hold. Not to say that the residents weren't filled with propaganda hating on everything about the enemy. Like sauerkraut=the devil and pastries=evil. (well not really but propaganda gets pretty ridiculous). The English and French had to rewrite history so as to favor them and therefore excuse the massive loss of life they just incurred upon their respective people. In essence they created a bogeyman.

I am not sure how you can say Versaille was not a cause for WW2. To be sure it was not the single defining cause but it most definitely had an impact. The German people were most certainly not favored in the treaty which led to resentment which at the very least allowed a man like Adolf Hitler to come to power with his promises. The Treaty was very unfair and in my mind ironically was very similar to a typical congressional budget bill in the US. When Wilson came over on his triumphant entrance to bring world peace he left after making revision after revision and simply making everyone associated with the Treaty angry.

and then the French and English as well as America's somewhat immature fascination with isolationism resulted in a reluctance to call Hitler on any of his bluffs caused many more problems after imposing such harsh repatriations and territorial grabs.

Which to some extent is understandable after the meat grinder that was WW1

[Brenus]

“On the second point, I believe that is one of the most inaccurate statements made in this thread.” Really? You mean France still had Armies to oppose to the Germans in 1870? Paris wasn’t starve to death and didn’t surrender? The German Troops didn’t Parade in Paris? Didn’t occupying the Country untill full payment was done?
The conditions of the Peace Treaty imposed by Germany, the lost of territory, the War Reperations, the Civil War, Regime Change, all these were better than the condition imposed to Germany in 1918?
Think twice.

[Brenus]

"the Allies had unlimited reserves of manpower": They had. That is what the USA entrance in the war meant. A endless reinforcement...

[Husar]

Anyone else noticed how it's mostly the french arguing for this, the americans mostly against it and the british are split?
I'm against it, too, of course, can't let the frenchies get away with this. :smash:

So basically the french paid all their unfair reparations and we were clever enough to evade our very fair reparations and that is why we're the bad guys and deserved to be punished? Maybe it was dumb not to punish us then because when Hitler stopped paying anything, France and Britain did nothing, waiting for Hitler to build up his army, is that our fault as well now?
Maybe the Allies should have tried winning hearts and minds after WW1. :eyebrows:
Ignoring that, it seems like you frenchies are still angry because of 1871, and if you still are today then sure as heck the treaty of Versailles was your revenge for 1871, you even wanted the war to get your revenge, when Germany inquired what France would do in the case of a war between Germany and Russia, France more or less indicated that it would attack, no, not Russia... it's why there was the triple entente in the first place.
And let's not forget the whole situation only arose because Germany tried to be more like France and Britain but the two had already enslaved most of the world so the conflict was carried out here in Europe.
It's a bit like that new brutal mafia clan challenging the old familias, you're lying to yourself when you think the old powers were somehow gentle, tame and more adorable.(except in 'Carlito's way' but that does not apply here)

[Louis VI the Fat]

I am very confused by your reaction. Are you actually saying that Versailles had NO impact whatsoever on causing WW2? If you re-read my first post, I very clearly stated that Versailles was only one of several factors that caused the war. I fully believe that had any of those other factors been different, that WW2 would never have happened even with Versailles. I feel like you are having some intense allergic reaction to the very concept of Versailles having any influence on anything.I was enticing you into debate.

My point of view is perhaps best, and most briefly, summed up with:



Years ago in a Holocaust course I co-taught, I had portrayed the Versailles Treaty as neither harsh nor conciliatory. Lucjan Dobroszycski, a survivor of Auschwitz, a great historian of Jewish history, thought the Treaty dealt harshly with Germany. I indicated the conflict between our interpretations. With a characteristic twinkle in his eyes he asked, "Might we agree that Germans perceived the Versailles Treaty to be harsh, and perceptions play crucial roles in history.

That is the crucial bit.
Of course Versailles was central to the events in the 20's and 30's. But...Versailles was workable. It was not conciliatory, but it wasn't harsh either. It didn't work out because people perceived the treaty to be punitive and unworkable.


What idocy is this, to make all Germans into monsters; and all their governments into Nazis? Who says any such thing?


As they say PVC the winners write the history books.

The English and French had to rewrite history so as to favor themStrangely, the Germans have written history. The view of German nationalist agitation has become dominant.
Most of their points are factually incorrect, or fundamentally erroneous.



Anyone else noticed how it's mostly the french arguing for this, the americans mostly against it and the british are split?Yes, I knew this would be the impression. I have therefore taken specific and explicit care in avoiding naming French historians*. My sources are German, Canadian and American. :book:

*who, incidentally, usually have a more negative view of Versailles than German, British or American historians. For an excellent read though, try Georges-Henri Soutou. He shows remarkable continuity between French policy after WWI and WWII. France after 1918 sought accomodation with Germany, co-operation. French policy was mostly realistic and rational, aimed at accomodating Germany and striving towards fixing Germany's place as the peaceful, largest power in Europe.

[TinCow]

“On the second point, I believe that is one of the most inaccurate statements made in this thread.” Really? You mean France still had Armies to oppose to the Germans in 1870? Paris wasn’t starve to death and didn’t surrender? The German Troops didn’t Parade in Paris? Didn’t occupying the Country untill full payment was done?
The conditions of the Peace Treaty imposed by Germany, the lost of territory, the War Reperations, the Civil War, Regime Change, all these were better than the condition imposed to Germany in 1918?
Think twice.

If you'd like to debate this, start a second thread. Any response I make will derail this thread.


That is the crucial bit.
Of course Versailles was central to the events in the 20's and 30's. But...Versailles was workable. It was not conciliatory, but it wasn't harsh either. It didn't work out because people perceived the treaty to be punitive and unworkable.

I strongly agree that perception was the single strongest factor in Versailles' contribution to WW2. That isn't just German perception though, it was also strongly British as well. Appeasement as a policy was founded in the idea that Germany had a right to regain what had been stripped from her. Even many French, Americans, etc. perceived Versailles as too harsh as well.

Beyond perception, I do believe Versailles did have a real impact that was significant enough to be contributory, while at the same time nowhere near as significant as was proclaimed by the various German nationalists groups in the interwar period. I think the point at which we draw the line on this impact is where you and I are disagreeing. I believe that Weimar was significantly undermined by German economic weakness in the 20s and early 30s, and Versailles contributed a moderate amount to that economic weakness. I do agree with you that had other events unfolded differently, Weimar could have met the terms of Versailles without falling to Nazism. That in itself is proof that Versailles was 'workable' as you like to say. Yes, I agree that Versailles could have been followed to the letter without a second war, if other factors had been different.

As for your terms 'harsh' and 'punitive'... harsh feels like a moral judgment which I am not trying to make. Versailles certainly wasn't 'easy,' but it feels like most perceptions of its severity are rather amorphous and based on emotion rather than actual balancing of the impact. As for punitive, Versailles was certainly punitive. Versailles punished Germany for losing WWI. Therefore, by definition, it was punitive.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Who says any such thing?

Such things have been said in the popular press these last few years. Germany has no heroes from either War, to hear it told in Britian. As far as the German historiographical reaction; don't ignore the German crisis of confidence, and the crisis of their history, that has lead to such idiocy as retiring the Iron Cross as a medal for valour and has left the German army demoralised and reluctant to do any actual fighting.

[Fisherking]

The modern claim is that the guilt clause wasn't a guilt clause at all simply because it was crafted by two Americans.

Yet this was seen as outrageous from the very first reading of the treaty.

There are many more onerous parts that don't seem to have been addressed here.

Additionally, the fact that it is not the Kiser's Government that is forced to make these concessions but a new German Republic seems of little importance to those who drew up the thing.

We have also seen what Dutch and Neutral sentiments were to the treaty from the outset, and most likely those opinions were not the second hand opinions voiced by the Germans, but rather from their own reading of the document.

The German reaction was plainly foreseeable and if not it was certainly plane from their first reading. To pretend that the Allies were being moderate is a fantasy, even if they tried to convince themselves of it.

The fact that Germany may have sabotaged its self to avoid payment is not very surprising either. They were forced to view the French and British as enemies from the very inception of their government.

Germany behaved much as a fox caught in a trap, chewing off its foot to escape.

It fostered German Nationalism and galvanized it in a way to recoup its injured pride.

Despite the founding of the League of Nations a reading of the treaty makes those who drafted it look like small and petty men with base motives.

Placing a new “spin” on it is like dressing a donkey in a tuxedo.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Such things have been said in the popular press these last few years. Germany has no heroes from either War, to hear it told in Britian. As far as the German historiographical reaction; don't ignore the German crisis of confidence, and the crisis of their history, that has lead to such idiocy as retiring the Iron Cross as a medal for valour and has left the German army demoralised and reluctant to do any actual fighting.One of the tragedies is that I am a Germanophile. I grew up on Arte, speak German and have a great love for its culture. I can recite Schiller backwards and draw all of Cologne's romanesque churches with my eyes closed.

I have no moral qualms about Germany in 1914-1918. I do resent Germany's unwillingness to accept defeat, certainly in light of what this eventually led to.
The nazis I consider a disaster. They were just too much, they went a level beyond anything seen before in modern Europe. Uncouth, unsophisticated. Nowhere near as fascinating as they are sometimes thought to be. Banal. An excersize in pointlessness and futility.

Germany is a culture nation. It is also Prussian militarism.
If only German liberalism could've united Germany in 1848, instead of Prussia! Even so, I have little resentment against the period 1866-1918.
1918-1945, on the other hand, was an exersice in lunacy.


Of course, the very reason of the contention, is: what was behind 1918-1945: legitimate injustice, or perceived injustice? This is the question. This will decide a person's anger, at either the treaty or at German nationalist agitation, either of which is consequently held to no small degree responsible for WWII.
Me, I grew up naive about the period: 'Poor Germany, so hardly done by. Even if I regret the extent of German aggression in WWII, obviously Germany received a bad deal. Versailles was too stern. Etc.'

But the more I've learned, the more I've read, the clearer it has become that Versailles was not at all harsh, never mind tried to punish or destroy Germany. On the contrary. It was, certainly taking realistic limits into account, a lenient, workable treaty. The policy was to incorporate Germany peacefully as Europe's biggest power, within a peaceful Europe.



The modern claim is that the guilt clause wasn't a guilt clause at all simply because it was crafted by two Americans.No. Nobody would make such a ridiculous claim.

[Husar]

Strangely, the Germans have written history. The view of German nationalist agitation has become dominant.
Well, looks like the nation of poets beat the brutish gauls there. ~;)


My sources are German, [...]

[French authors] who, incidentally, usually have a more negative view of Versailles than German, [...]
Well, look, all this proves is that Fragony was right all along and the modern liberal hippie commie left like to apologize for everything, cane themselves and generally feel like their own people are the worst anyway. :mellow:


One of the tragedies is that I am a Germanophile. I grew up on Arte, speak German, [...]
Ist das so? :inquisitive:

[Sarmatian]

I think were at impasse because of our definition of "harsh". As I've already said, arguably all peace treaties are harsh on the losers, but the general conception of the Versailles Treaty is that 1) it was incredible harsh and restricting, unlike any other 2) that it caused hyper-inflation and 3) that it was responsible for bringing Nazi party to power.

1) Comparing it to treaties of the same era show this to be false. Peace treaty of 1871, Brest-Litovsk, WW2... show that it wasn't harsher than any of those treaties.

2) German economy was heavily hit by the war and hyper inflation was deliberately caused by the German government. Reparations strained the economy even more, surely but they weren't sole reason for hyper inflation or even the most important reason.

3) Arguably this might be considered true, but I would choose different wording - it wasn't Versailles treaty that was responsible but German perception of the Versailles treaty. They didn't believe they had been defeated and they had felt humiliated.

All this nonsense how Versailles treaty crippled German economy was proven false when just 20 years later (including four years of the Great Depression) Germany emerged as the principal economic and industrial power of Europe once again, with the strongest or second strongest army after Soviet Union (it's a matter of debate I would rather avoid at the moment). If it was so harsh, so crippling, so restricting how is it possible that only 2 decades after Germany had not just recovered, but regained its position of the dominant power in Europe in every way...

[TinCow]

Of course, the very reason of the contention, is: what was behind 1918-1945: legitimate injustice, or perceived injustice? This is the question. This will decide a person's anger, at either the treaty or at German nationalist agitation, either of which is consequently held to no small degree responsible for WWII.
Me, I grew up naive about the period: 'Poor Germany, so hardly done by. Even if I regret the extent of German aggression in WWII, obviously Germany received a bad deal. Versailles was too stern. Etc.'

But the more I've learned, the more I've read, the clearer it has become that Versailles was not at all harsh, never mind tried to punish or destroy Germany. On the contrary. It was, certainly taking realistic limits into account, a lenient, workable treaty. The policy was to incorporate Germany peacefully as Europe's biggest power, within a peaceful Europe.

I think one of the greatest tragedies with the continuing emphasis on whether Versailles was the cause of WW2 is that it ignores other major factors which need a lot more public attention: (1) American isolationism and (2) Communism.

IMHO, the US has as much blame for starting WW2 as Germany, France, and Britain. The US was the only nation that emerged unscathed from WWI. It's refusal to join the League of Nations and its total disengagement from European diplomacy removed the only option for a neutral (at the time) arbitrator in European politics. Had the US remained actively engaged in Europe after 1918, I believe war with Germany could have been avoided.

At the same time, the growth of Communism itself propelled the Nazis to power. There were very strong pro-German movements in Britain and France in the 1930s, even after 1933, which specifically saw Germany in general (and Hitler in specific) as bulwarks against the USSR. In the 1920s, Communism was growing very, very quickly in much of Europe. It was a realistic possibility that Germany, France, and Spain could have gone communist at various points in time. Without the Communist threat in Russia, I believe that Britain and France would have taken a far harder line with Germany from 1933-1939. In addition, without the Communist agitation in Germany, the Nazis themselves would have gained far less support and would not likely have earned the Chancellorship in 1933. Without control of the Reichstag, the Nazis would have been just another strong right wing political party as are present in so many nations even today.

I also believe that war itself was inevitable due to Communism. The conflict between Communism and Capitalism was going to occur even if Weimar had never fallen and Hitler remained nothing more than a forgotten painter. Remove the German WW2, and you instead replace it with a Soviet WW2, but that's another topic.

[Fisherking]

Lewis, that was one of the things that struck me when reading the paper. Perhaps I got it wrong some how but it was there assertion.



With the rest please bare with me.

The revolutionary government took power on November 9 and the Armistice was signed on November 11th taking Germany out of the war.

I think that the German People were proud of that. They were forming a new republic and putting an end to a very nasty war. They didn't feel defeated, the Kiser was defeated. I think they may have felt a little surprised that the Allies didn't share in their joy and kept up the blockade.

On the other hand France, Britain, et. all expected contrition and they didn't see near enough. Not that it would have made much difference in the treaty terms, but this made them unhappy.

Not allowing Germany to negotiate was not a slap just to the German Government but to the German People.

Had the Allies recognized this and negotiated in good faith they may well have gotten reparations, most of what was in the treaty, and a friendly State in Central Europe. In handling it in the way they did they continued the enmity of the war and the resentment and hostility that followed.

That was the mistake.

[The Wizard]

French policy was most certainly not conciliatory towards Germany following 1918. France (and its little ally Belgium) took the hardest line when it came to Germany, Versailles and reparations, often clashing with Britain (and of course Germany) in the process. It is as I said: it's not just about perceptions. The Treaty of Versailles demanded things that could not be provided and therefore created conflict that would otherwise not have been there. When Briand partially reversed that policy with Locarno, things were looking up, till everything was messed up again by the Great Depression (which was made so bad partly due to the financial currents set up to pay the Versailles reparations, as well as the hostile international environment the Treaty fostered). Locarno and Versailles were basically dead by 1932, at the latest by '36.

However, TinCow in his latest post is very correct. The U.S. was arguably already the new hegemon in 1918, yet refused to take on the responsibilities that came with the role. This left the declining powers of Europe to squabble amongst themselves for twenty years until they :daisy:ed up so hard even American isolationist opinion couldn't ignore the implications. And the same goes for the effect of the perception of a communist takeover, which was what drove many leaders to view the Soviet Union and the Comintern as a greater threat than Hitler and Mussolini, disastrously underestimating them until it was too late.

This doesn't take away the importance of Versailles, though. The perceptions it created, the policies it dictated and the unrealistic expectations it had were all important factors in undermining the Weimar Republic's integrity and creating an atmosphere of hostility that pervaded Europe throughout the Interbellum and led almost directly to WW2. Versailles may not be the most important factor, but it would be foolishness to discount it as one altogether.


Thus far, I have twice quoted them, and once went over them in my own words. :book:

Perhaps, but you de-emphasized (they weren't bolded, only the reviewer disagreeing with them) their articles because they don't fit into the point you're trying to make :book:

[Beskar]

Why are people blaming Britain? It was Britain that made sure the treay was as moderate as it was, with a few concessions to the French. Britain wanted to keep a strong Germany, France for example wanted to see Germany broken up into smaller states like the Habsburg Empire. Either way, when Germany wrote that blank cheque to the Habsburg Empire, it began the war. Russia declared war on the Habsburg Empire, Germany declared war on Russia and France (not the otherway round), Germany then declared war on Belguim, etc, which made Britain come in Belguims aid.

In short, Germany is very responsible for the war. Also, German reprerations were no where near the level that France had to spend, rebuilding half of its nation. Also, the amount of loans Germany recieved from the United States more and covered the cost of the reperations, so any problems were down to the German Government, and the Great Depression.

[The Wizard]

My personal opinion that the question of who to blame for WW1 is a question of propaganda, with Entente propaganda (the evil Huns did it!) facing off against Triple Alliance propaganda (we were attacked!).

As far as I'm concerned, this was a conflict a long time coming, and that any perceptive mind could have seen coming from far, far away (as Friedrich Engels did as early as 1878, as I recall). Every single major power on the European continent was ready to pull the trigger, and had been sharpening knives to settle some old grudges for decades. Everyone, consequently, is partially to blame. Though I am sympathetic to the viewpoint that it was the horrible Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in the month separating the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the ultimatum to Serbia, a month in which all sympathy for the Habsburgs in the world had drained away, which sealed the deal.

I'm going to derail this discussion horribly, aren't I? I couldn't help myself, though... :embarassed:

[Louis VI the Fat]

Perhaps, but you de-emphasized (they weren't bolded, only the reviewer disagreeing with them) their articles because they don't fit into the point you're trying to make :book:But then why would I have quoted the part in the first place, twice no less, if I wanted it de-emphasized?

I bold the most relevant part as a courtesy to the reader, who may not want to read the entire bit but does want to be able to quickly follow the conversation. I quote the entire bit for those more interested, that they can understand the larger context. I give links, for those who want to follow up on that, plus for those who want to check my sources.

The bit shows contuining historical debate, yes. disagreement. It also shows that Ferguson and in particular Feldman are an increasing minority, and that Ferguson's midway position is not without incongruities.




With the rest please bare with me.I do hear you.

One could argue that the allies should have taken the moral high ground. Even disregarding modern morality ('we don't do that stuff anymore'), by the standards of their time it was possible to understand that industrial scale warfare was a dead end. That realpolitik, power politics, if those are the words, were a dead end.

One should be noble in victory, respectful to the loser. One wins some, one loses some. It could be the other way round next time, it has been the other way round in the past. Events could've unfolded differently.

And noble, no, this Versailles was not.

But noble is the exception, not the rule. One does not hold the absence of nobleness against someone, one admires it when it is present.



Even so, Versailles was full of idealism. It did not seek to supress Germany, never mind suck it dry or humiliate it. Versailles was not even a mixture of realpolitik and humilation. Versailles was a mixture of realpolitik and idealism.

Versailles was not harsh. It was perhaps not directly conciliatory either. However, where it was not conciliatory, it left open the possibility of concilliation. Germany was not crippled. Germany was left Europe's most powerful state. Many provisions were conditional in the first place, or could easily be revised at a later date.
Versailles was not meant as a system to keep Germany down forever. It was meant as a system that would eventually incorporate, once passions had settled down, Germany as a peaceful state, as the largest power in Europe, in a system that sought to overcome differences in a peaceful manner.

In the execution of this Versailles failed. Why? Because Germany cried bloody murder from the start, never reconcilling itself with defeat. Because the allies - who had too much, not too little, sympathy for Germany - bought into this from the start, because the allies lost track of what they set out to do and let Germany play them against each other. The atmosphere became one of overthrowing the peace system, rather than preserving the peace. With the powers trying to maintain the peace becoming the agressor in public opinion, and the power trying to destroy the peace the victim.
Twenty years of allied concilliatory efforts were only ever met with a reprisal of the entire war.

Germany did not want re-concilliation. Germany wanted not to undo the peace treaty. Germany wanted to undo the war itself.

[Louis VI the Fat]

My personal opinion that the question of who to blame for WW1 is a question of propaganda, with Entente propaganda (the evil Huns did it!) facing off against Triple Alliance propaganda (we were attacked!).

As far as I'm concerned, this was a conflict a long time coming, and that any perceptive mind could have seen coming from far, far away (as Friedrich Engels did as early as 1878, as I recall). Every single major power on the European continent was ready to pull the trigger, and had been sharpening knives to settle some old grudges for decades. Everyone, consequently, is partially to blame. Though I am sympathetic to the viewpoint that it was the horrible Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in the month separating the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the ultimatum to Serbia, a month in which all sympathy for the Habsburgs in the world had drained away, which sealed the deal.

I'm going to derail this discussion horribly, aren't I? I couldn't help myself, though... :embarassed:No, these are good points. You've made several, even if I can't possibly respond to every point raised in this thread.

To me, blackadder said it best, and most succinctly:

Baldrick: 'Why are we at war?'
George: The war started because of the vile Hun and his villainous empire-building.
Edmund: George, the British Empire at present covers a quarter of the globe, while the German Empire consists of a small sausage factory in Tanganyika. I hardly think that we can be entirely absolved of blame on the imperialistic front.


Even if Germany is most directly responsible for the war - which I think it is - this loses much of its political relevance in light of the eagerness of the other powers, and its moral significance in light of the imperialism of all.

[TinCow]

To me, blackadder said it best, and most succinctly:

Baldrick: 'Why are we at war?'
George: The war started because of the vile Hun and his villainous empire-building.
Edmund: George, the British Empire at present covers a quarter of the globe, while the German Empire consists of a small sausage factory in Tanganyika. I hardly think that we can be entirely absolved of blame on the imperialistic front.

:laugh:

That reminds me of a letter A. A. Milne wrote in 1937:

A statesmanship which can still think of the final catastrophe of another European war in terms of key positions and strategical risks is a matter for tears, but the tears can only turn into hysterical laughter when we are told what the key position is. We imagine the German General Staff, on the eve of invading France through Belgium, reassuring the Kaiser by saying: “Don’t forget, Sire, that we hold the key position of Tanganyika.” We imagine Lord Haig, when warned of the danger of a German break-through in 1918 saying: “Ridiculous! Think of the strategical risks they would be taking; we hold Tanganyika now.” And no doubt the British Cabinet, during the darkest days of the submarine campaign, often unrolled its map of Africa and renewed its confidence with the thought that Tanganyika was still there…

It should still be possible for [the British] to understand how the British Empire appears to the “other fellow.” Not only do we own, as it were, property all over the world, but we insist that there shall be an “all-red route” to that property; and on no account must the all-red route be “threatened.” Luckily for the comparative peace of the world our trade is still borne in ships, and we are content with a selection of ports and islands along its waterways; but in 50 years’ time our “vital need” will be for all-red airways, and the Amery [referring to Leopold Amery whose original letter generated this response by Milne] of the future will contemplate with horror the restoration to Greece of the key position of Athens…

We who announced a little while ago that we would not risk “one single ship” for the greatest ideal of the age, the ideal of collective security, have since announced that we will fight “to the last man” in the defense of any “British interest.” Wherever the foreigner looks, he sees a British interest, wherever he moves, he is reminded that in one step he will be endangering a British interest. Barred from Australia, he enters China: the massacre of women and children begins: and our Ambassador voices the Cabinet’s indignation that on the sacred British Embassy “22 splinters of bombs” were allowed to fall. So peace-loving are we.

There would be more hope, then of what Lord Allen calls “an all-round peace settlement” if we began by realizing that to the rest of the world the British Empire is not a guarantee of peace but a guarantee of trouble; and will continue so to be until for our present motto, “What we have we hold,” we substitute the more gracious one, “Noblesse oblige.” It would also be an advantage if just occasionally we could discard that hypocrisy which, to the foreigner, is so infuriatingly characteristic of England. We announce complacently that we have done all we can for peace: we offered to disarm; we set the example… and so on. Just so might the great landowner offer to reduce the number of his man-traps if the starving villagers threw away their guns and stopped poaching the preserves which he had appropriated from the common land…

Above all, Sir, let us remember, when we talk of strategic risks and key positions, that the tragedy of the next world war will not lie in the result of it but in the happening of it. Compared with the war itself, victory or defeat will be a triviality. To endanger, in however small a degree, the chance of a peace settlement by an intransigent insistence on the key positions in the ensuing war would be criminal folly. To endanger it for a key position in the middle of Africa – O God! O Tanganyika! – there is nothing left to say.

A. A. Milne, The London Times, 21 October 1937, p. 10.

[spmetla]

No, these are good points. You've made several, even if I can't possibly respond to every point raised in this thread.

To me, blackadder said it best, and most succinctly:

Baldrick: 'Why are we at war?'
George: The war started because of the vile Hun and his villainous empire-building.
Edmund: George, the British Empire at present covers a quarter of the globe, while the German Empire consists of a small sausage factory in Tanganyika. I hardly think that we can be entirely absolved of blame on the imperialistic front.


Even if Germany is most directly responsible for the war - which I think it is - this loses much of its political relevance in light of the eagerness of the other powers, and its moral significance in light of the imperialism of all.


Excellent quote from an excellent show! I have to say the fine arguments put forth by most of you make me very jealous of your abilities to convey a point so well. So far this has been five pages of fine reading!

[Meneldil]

You know, I don't understand what drives the current WW1 revisionism. A couple of years ago some academic was quated as saying something like, "most people now accept that the Germans in WW1 represented just as much of a threat to liberty and human rights as in in WW2".

What idocy is this, to make all Germans into monsters; and all their governments into Nazis?

Well, my understanding is that yes, Germany was seen as an autoritarian and agressive country, even in 1914, while UK and France were respectively seen as the good old pal and the country of the human rights (TM). Which explains why volunteers flocked from the US way before the country joined the Allies. Now, comparing 1914 Germany to the IIIrd Reich and calling Germans nazis is obviously overkill, but I've always thought that France and the UK were seen as the good guys by other democratic countries.

@Husar: to answer your point, I don't think Versailles should have been harsher. I don't think countries should impose reparations treaties over their defeated foes, but I understand that it was a common practice back then, and that everybody would more or less have done the same.
As pointed out several times, Germany had France sign a harsh treaty (I wouldn't call it harsher than Versailles though), and intended to turn Russia into a 3rd word country by dismantling the Empire and taking away all of its industrial power. That's how things went back then.

My point is that no matter how harsh Versailles was/n't, should/n't have or could/n't have been, it would still have been a national trauma for Germany, a taint that had to be fixed somehow. From the moment it begged for an armistice to the rise of Hitler, the country developped this whole "jewish communists backstabbed us, we could still have won" conspiracy theory. Versailles is important because of how it was perceived, not because of the terms of the treaty.
Invading the country and showing the population that Germany was utterly and completely defeated could have prevented that, though that's merely a "what-if".

[Centurion1]

Strangely, the Germans have written history. The view of German nationalist agitation has become dominant.
Most of their points are factually incorrect, or fundamentally erroneous.

I blame All the nations of the entente as well as Germany and Austria-Hungary for WW1. I blame American Isolationism for helping the war last as long as it did. What i am saying is the British and French gloss over their help in starting the war. The GREAT war was caused by extreme nationalism, a web of conflicting alliances, old european politics mated with modern technology, and a convenient serbian with a gun.

[Pannonian]

I blame All the nations of the entente as well as Germany and Austria-Hungary for WW1. I blame American Isolationism for helping the war last as long as it did. What i am saying is the British and French gloss over their help in starting the war. The GREAT war was caused by extreme nationalism, a web of conflicting alliances, old european politics mated with modern technology, and a convenient serbian with a gun.

In what way did Britain help start the war, except by being a Great Power whom Germany wished to surpass? Britain entered the war under a specific condition - the violation of Belgium's neutrality. Given how important Belgium is to the balance of power in Britain's vicinity, were we supposed to ignore Germany's invasion?

[The Wizard]

That was no more than a pretext, Britain was a part of the European alliance system as much as any other country was.

[Centurion1]

In what way did Britain help start the war, except by being a Great Power whom Germany wished to surpass? Britain entered the war under a specific condition - the violation of Belgium's neutrality. Given how important Belgium is to the balance of power in Britain's vicinity, were we supposed to ignore Germany's invasion?

Do you really believe that sort of thinly veiled bull. Britain entered the war because britian saw they could gain something. They did too as german influence in the colonies was diminished. well pretty much destroyed

[Pannonian]

Do you really believe that sort of thinly veiled bull. Britain entered the war because britian saw they could gain something. They did too as german influence in the colonies was diminished. well pretty much destroyed
Which German colonies did Britain covet? Also, please explain your dismissal of a balance of power policy in the Belgium-Holland area that goes back to Georgian times, arguably even Elizabethan times. England has demanded a neutral Belgium for centuries, long before Germany existed.

[Centurion1]

Which German colonies did Britain covet? Also, please explain your dismissal of a balance of power policy in the Belgium-Holland area that goes back to Georgian times, arguably even Elizabethan times. England has demanded a neutral Belgium for centuries, long before Germany existed.

not any specific colonies but i am sure in the far east and africa they enjoyed when Gemrany lost her colonies. And the balance of power is exactly why they entered. They didnt want either france or germany to become too powerful. Belgium most definitely was not the singular motivation between entering the war maybe for the common man but not for the higher ups.

[Pannonian]

not any specific colonies but i am sure in the far east and africa they enjoyed when Gemrany lost her colonies. And the balance of power is exactly why they entered. They didnt want either france or germany to become too powerful. Belgium most definitely was not the singular motivation between entering the war maybe for the common man but not for the higher ups.
The far east colonies were given to Japan. The main ones which Britain took over were those in Africa, which were the leftovers after Britain and France had already taken their pick. Show me some colonies which Britain could have conceivably gone to war for, rather than picked up after fighting German forces there.

Once England had accepted that France was no longer disputed territory, Belgium and Holland was the key to maintaining a balance of power on the continent. It's not an excuse, but a concrete reason for war. British forces fought against Napoleonic forces there, most notably at Waterloo, and before that, had fought against the Revolutionary French. Before that, we fought against the Spanish. That's centuries of English/British interventions in Belgium/Holland, not for direct benefits, but to maintain a smallish but neutral state there, somewhere where we can land, but also a barrier to any power wishing to dominate the mainland, and potentially threaten England. Why do you dismiss this historic policy, but point to some worthless colonies instead as our reason for war?

[Centurion1]

T
he far east colonies were given to Japan. The main ones which Britain took over were those in Africa, which were the leftovers after Britain and France had already taken their pick. Show me some colonies which Britain could have conceivably gone to war for, rather than picked up after fighting German forces there.

Once England had accepted that France was no longer disputed territory, Belgium and Holland was the key to maintaining a balance of power on the continent. It's not an excuse, but a concrete reason for war. British forces fought against Napoleonic forces there, most notably at Waterloo, and before that, had fought against the Revolutionary French. Before that, we fought against the Spanish. That's centuries of English/British interventions in Belgium/Holland, not for direct benefits, but to maintain a smallish but neutral state there, somewhere where we can land, but also a barrier to any power wishing to dominate the mainland, and potentially threaten England. Why do you dismiss this historic policy, but point to some worthless colonies instead as our reason for war?

Britians view since the beginning of the Imperialist movement has always been less Euro centralized than any other nation, which is why they were so successful. As to the colonies they simply wanted German influenced removed completely so as to have one less competitor in those regions.

Edit: your direct benefit was to not allow any one power not all the power in Europe and ground so close to your shores. It was not for the benefit of Belgium/Holland it was for the benefit of Britian. Which is just as selfish as any other nations reasons to go to war. They wanted to be number 1.

[Pannonian]

T

Britians view since the beginning of the Imperialist movement has always been less Euro centralized than any other nation, which is why they were so successful. As to the colonies they simply wanted German influenced removed completely so as to have one less competitor in those regions.

Edit: your direct benefit was to not allow any one power not all the power in Europe and ground so close to your shores. It was not for the benefit of Belgium/Holland it was for the benefit of Britian. Which is just as selfish as any other nations reasons to go to war. They wanted to be number 1.
Once again, why the heck would we care about the colonies Germany had? We already held all the strategically important points we could want, and then some. Both ends of the Mediterranean were controlled by us, plus strategic points in between. Plenty of coaling stations dotted around the oceans without ever needing to stop in German territories. We controlled all points of access into the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic and Pacific. Just about the only strategic point we could have coveted, and didn't already have, was the Panama canal, which was American. You generalise Britain's imperialism by saying it's less Euro-centric than other European countries, but then fail to grasp what that imperial vision was.

Also, you've failed to make a case for us helping to start the war, which was your original claim. We demanded that Belgium should have its neutrality respected. How the heck is this helping to start the war? If Germany wanted to get at France, they could have done so through Alsace-Lorraine.

[Prince Cobra]

JUst a remark. Great Britain would have entered the war with or without the invasion of Belgium. I doubt anybody will reject that. Indeed, I think that whilst the head of states have some responsibility, the whole military machine started to work. Perhaps, the mobilisation decision was what triggered the war. They Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia and perhaps even France had gone too far. All the government wanted the war (there was a hectic preparation for war during the past years), the Central Powers (unlike the Marrocan crisis in 1912 when the Kaiser stepped back) just made the first step being the strongest and the best prepared and the others gladly accepted it. Perhaps Russia was not happy to start the war because it had many internal problems.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Following the Tangier affair in 1905, England did begin -- haltingly and never full-heartedly -- to develop a plan for coordinated action with France operating on the basic premise that Germany would attept a large flanking attack through Belgium so as to avoid assaulting the heavily fortified zone between Verdun and the Swiss border. To the extent that this contributed to the "entangling alliances" that helped create conflict, England does bear some culpability. However, the UK did not jump in whole-heartedly and Belgium was critical to their decision.

The violation of Belgian neutrality was the real reason for war and it is possible that Grey could not have procured a Declaration of War without Germany's violation of that neutrality, despite the growing anti-German sentiment of the British populace and the efforts of Britain's G-1 team. Belgium became THE issue that would bring the British in fully as an ally of France. The need to insure that Germany was the one to make such a violation was so important to the French government that they ordered the French Army to back up 10km along the ENTIRE frontier so as to make certain that no accidental violation of Belgian or Lux neutrality was made by some patrol or some commander who got confused. This order was made DESPITE the fact that France's primary strategy was an attack immediately South of the Ardennes -- backing up is rarely the best means of building momentum.

[Husar]

One should be noble in victory, respectful to the loser. One wins some, one loses some. It could be the other way round next time, it has been the other way round in the past. Events could've unfolded differently.

And noble, no, this Versailles was not.

But noble is the exception, not the rule. One does not hold the absence of nobleness against someone, one admires it when it is present.

Now it all makes sense to me, after all France abandoned nobility in 1789. ~;)
Ok, ok, I'll stop. :sweatdrop:

The blackadder quote was very good, and I also wanted to add that this was partly a result of the interests of big business, it were the businessmen in germany who wanted all the colonies and the Kaiser used it to acquire more glory, more money, more army, the people loved him, some even wished him back many years later, after WW2 even.
From today's perspective I cannot understand this at all, to me he seems completely inept, apparently he improved the life of Germans and made them feel more important but the former as well as the latter came though silly, unnecessary and aggressive foreign politics, giving in to the demands of big business(acquiring colonies that is) and a hybris almost similar to his successor("Germany needs a place under the sun" etc.). Unlike Bismarck he gambled and he failed miserably, I don't have a lot of sympathy for him.
I do however see that everybody else was just as eager to show how glorious they were, show me a great nation that actually tried to prevent a war, France even provocated Germany by hinting that they would fall into our backs in case we went to war with Russia, I know they had a treaty that they didn't have before Wilhelm II., drives me mad, I often wonder what might have happened had Wilhelm II. continued Bismarck's politics. Also keep in mind that Bismarck was a chancellor under Kaiser Wilhelm I. and got replaced under Wilhelm II., a point from which the Kaiser took more and more control apparently, leading me to believe that he was a power hungry fool...

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Following the Tangier affair in 1905, England did begin -- haltingly and never full-heartedly -- to develop a plan for coordinated action with France operating on the basic premise that Germany would attept a large flanking attack through Belgium so as to avoid assaulting the heavily fortified zone between Verdun and the Swiss border. To the extent that this contributed to the "entangling alliances" that helped create conflict, England does bear some culpability. However, the UK did not jump in whole-heartedly and Belgium was critical to their decision.

The violation of Belgian neutrality was the real reason for war and it is possible that Grey could not have procured a Declaration of War without Germany's violation of that neutrality, despite the growing anti-German sentiment of the British populace and the efforts of Britain's G-1 team. Belgium became THE issue that would bring the British in fully as an ally of France. The need to insure that Germany was the one to make such a violation was so important to the French government that they ordered the French Army to back up 10km along the ENTIRE frontier so as to make certain that no accidental violation of Belgian or Lux neutrality was made by some patrol or some commander who got confused. This order was made DESPITE the fact that France's primary strategy was an attack immediately South of the Ardennes -- backing up is rarely the best means of building momentum.

Ah hem, "Britain" not "England" please. It may seem like a petty point of order, I know, but the Prime Minsiter who signed the treaties was Welsh after all.

[Beskar]

Ah hem, "Britain" not "England" please. It may seem like a petty point of order, I know, but the Prime Minsiter who signed the treaties was Welsh after all.

Think of the good side, PVC. We can blame Scotland for Gordon Brown.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Think of the good side, PVC. We can blame Scotland for Gordon Brown.

Of course, but we can do that anyway.

[Louis VI the Fat]

I am struggling with the brutality and severity of the treaty now. Perhaps a noble treaty should’ve been made. I have given it some thought, and made a quick draft.




What do you guys think, would this be more acceptable:







Peace without Victory, Louis' 21 Points:



Preamble






1 The French original of this Treaty is the only authoritative one. English, German and other translations to be without legal consequence.


2 Germany requests, and the allies confirm, that Germany shall retain its place as Europe’s largest power.








Reconstruction Costs







1 – There shall be no demands of reparations.


2- Germany does not have to pay costs of any kind for the allied military expenditures, or any costs of the war effort.


3 - There shall be only financial claims for reconstructing civil damages


3a- An exception shall be made for the UK. Britain, having sustained no direct civil damges, but facing large pension and disability costs as a result of the war, shall receive a large share of the costs for reconstruction meant for France and Belgium


4 – The costs for reconstruction shall take into account civil damages on all sides, on both sides of the border, including Germany


5 – These reconstruction costs, for both sides of the border, shall be split between the allies and Germany.


6 – These costs must be limited to a small sum


7 – These costs must not be based on actual damage, but on what any of the parties can pay, so as not to obstruct economic recovery. We must look forward, not backward




8 – To prop up Germany, these reconstruction costs shall be divided thus: allies to pay 95%, Germany to pay 5%


9 – To help Germany pay for reconstruction costs, it shall receive aid amounting to 150% of what it will pay towards reconstruction of war damages. That is, for every DM Germany pays, it will receive 1.5DM.






War Guild





7 – There shall be no War Guilt clause, only a legal-technical framework setting and limiting legal liability for reconstruction costs.





Colonial Possessions





8 – Only foreign possesions that have been colonised in the three decades before WWI shall be taken away from Germany.


9 – No foreign possessions with meaningful German settlement shall be taken


10 – The entire amount of German nationals affected by territorial transfer must be limited to no more than 20.000, worldwide.






Territorial Changes





10 – German territorial integrity shall be respected. There shall be no split up of Germany.


12 – Annexetion of German territory to the victorious states must be based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, in particular points six to fourteen


13 – In the west, transfer of territory must be striclty limited those territories which have been annexed by Germany since 1864. Traditional German lands must remain unaffected


14 – These territorial transfers must be in accordance with the wishes of the population affected.


15 - An exception to article 13 and 14 shall be made for Belgium. Belgium, whose neutrality was violated and suffered severly, shall be compensated territorially. This compensation will be limited to the two tiny rural villages of Eupen and Malmedy.


16 – In the east, with few exceptions, annexations must be limited to territories of overwhelming and traditional Polish majority






To Make and Retain the Peace





17 – The provisions in this treaty bear a temporary, comditional character. In due time, Germany shall be relieved of its obligations


18 – A United Nations shall be established. This institution shall deal with any disputes arising from this treaty in a peaceful manner.


19 This UN shall be empowered to deal with future conflicts. Reason and the rule of law, not the might of the victors of WWI, shall govern international relations.


20 – This United Nations shall be based in Geneva, Switzerland, and not in the territory of any of the victorious states


21 – Germany shall be made a full member of this UN no later than seven years after this treaty, to ensure Germany’s interests as a restored Great Power will be looked after.

[Beskar]

It is League of Nations, not United Nations. However, that treaty is a complete joke and even then, the German members might stil cry foul at it, even though it butters their bread for them.

[Pannonian]

It is League of Nations, not United Nations. However, that treaty is a complete joke and even then, the German members might stil cry foul at it, even though it butters their bread for them.
Louis's revised treaty is unfairly weighted against Germany. The text mentions France/French twice, Britain/British 3 times, and Germany/German no fewer than 21 times. I don't see why Germany should have to endure this unfair treaty, which the craven civilian government signed, even though the German Army was victorious in the field. The Army will not stand for this betrayal, and will avenge this wrong in the next war.

[Brenus]

Agree. What about the expenses of the German Army? Who will pay for the shoes? What about the PTSD (Post Trauma Sydrom Desorder) for having breach the Belguim Neutrality and the Guilt it imposed on the poor soldiers?

And what about the unfortunate war veterans like Mr Hitler who suffered of a wind change and was poisoneed by Gaz? Do the Unfair treaty speak about it?
Noooo... All is done for France and, just because the French were attacked and won, they got it all...

Justice has to be restored...

[Fisherking]

In fairness, the Armistice was based on Wilson’s 14 Points. Germany Agreed to them all.

They would also imply a negotiated settlement rather than a dictate.

Who would have thought that agreeing to them would have lead to a take it or leave it settlement stripping Germany of its colonies and the additional territorial concessions imposed by Versailles.

I would much rather hear how the Entente reconciled the one with the other.

[Beskar]

In fairness, the Armistice was based on Wilson’s 14 Points. Germany Agreed to them all.

They would also imply a negotiated settlement rather than a dictate.

Who would have thought that agreeing to them would have lead to a take it or leave it settlement stripping Germany of its colonies and the additional territorial concessions imposed by Versailles.

I would much rather hear how the Entente reconciled the one with the other.

It was a ploy to move in American troops, so the Germans had no other choice when it came to the signing, other than get anniliated if they didn't accept. The allies would say they tried to do peace, but the Germans wouldn't allow it, which gives them a better justification for a far harsher treaty once they been totalled.

"Argh! zee allies outswichzetted us!"

[Fisherking]

It was a ploy to move in American troops, so the Germans had no other choice when it came to the signing, other than get anniliated if they didn't accept. The allies would say they tried to do peace, but the Germans wouldn't allow it, which gives them a better justification for a far harsher treaty once they been totalled.

"Argh! zee allies outswichzetted us!"

Sure! That is certainly the best way to promote peace and understanding between nations.

I am sure most would see nothing wrong with such an agreement.

These stupid Germans should have been fawning all over us after receiving such a favorable agreement!


In all seriousness, how was this justified, and how was it that the Allied nations retained any international credibility.

Wasn’t it a breech of trust that should have been condemned by the international community at large?

[Beskar]

Wasn’t it a breech of trust that should have been condemned by the international community at large?

You forget, the Allies and Germany were the International Community... There was no one else... (Japan was on the Allies side, all the colonies under control of Britain, France, Belguim, etc...)

This is another problem, you are not going through the world due to the time-period. Now-a-days, Germany would be slapped on the wrist and told it is a naughty boy, back then, it was the ending of the period of when you defeat a nation, you annex it as part of your Empire.

There has been major advances in diplomacy and ideology since that time.

[Brenus]

"In fairness, the Armistice was based on Wilson’s 14 Points. Germany Agreed to them all." Who told you this? When did France and UK agree that any Peace Treaty should be based on Wilson's 14 Points? And why the US proposal should bind France and UK as when it was proposed, Germany didn't show any intention to start peace talk, but 6 months after, launched one of the biggest offensive of the war...

[Fisherking]

You forget, the Allies and Germany were the International Community... There was no one else... (Japan was on the Allies side, all the colonies under control of Britain, France, Belguim, etc...)

This is another problem, you are not going through the world due to the time-period. Now-a-days, Germany would be slapped on the wrist and told it is a naughty boy, back then, it was the ending of the period of when you defeat a nation, you annex it as part of your Empire.

There has been major advances in diplomacy and ideology since that time.


It may very well be so that it was a stab in the back as Germany said, but still, there has to be further justification for their actions, no matter how feeble.

International Diplomacy has to be based on trust otherwise there is no point. It can not be that the strong make the rules and the weak surrender to it.

[Fisherking]

"In fairness, the Armistice was based on Wilson’s 14 Points. Germany Agreed to them all." Who told you this? When did France and UK agree that any Peace Treaty should be based on Wilson's 14 Points? And why the US proposal should bind France and UK as when it was proposed, Germany didn't show any intention to start peace talk, but 6 months after, launched one of the biggest offensive of the war...

That was what the Germans were negotiation on when they signed the Armistice. Plus another three points Wilson tossed in at the end.

However, the Allies found they were unacceptable, after the fact.

The fact that the so called good guys were a pack of liars seems to have escaped everyone’s notice, with Woodrow Wilson being the biggest hypocrite of the lot, or so it would seem.

[Brenus]

"That was what the Germans were negotiation on when they signed the Armistice":
No. What was the Germans were negotiating was an Armistice as they lost on battle. They were asking to the winners the terms in order to save what can be, social order in Germany.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

"That was what the Germans were negotiation on when they signed the Armistice":
No. What was the Germans were negotiating was an Armistice as they lost on battle. They were asking to the winners the terms in order to save what can be, social order in Germany.

Then they had a treaty imposed on them at gunpoint.

[Beskar]

Hey, losers can't be choosers.

(For some-reason, that came to mind.)

[Fisherking]

"That was what the Germans were negotiation on when they signed the Armistice":
No. What was the Germans were negotiating was an Armistice as they lost on battle. They were asking to the winners the terms in order to save what can be, social order in Germany.

Have you read on the negotiations for the Armistice?

It was not “Hay! We give up. What will you do to us?

It was a negotiated process.

It began on 5 October with a German telegram to Wilson. There were several more exchanges and on 23 October Wilson added three more points to the agreement.

As one of these points seemed to imply that the Kiser had to abdicate the Germans delayed and even considered further resistance.

Once the Kiser abdicated the way was clear and they signed the peace on November 11th.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Have you read on the negotiations for the Armistice?

It was not “Hay! We give up. What will you do to us?

It was a negotiated process.

It began on 5 October with a German telegram to Wilson. There were several more exchanges and on 23 October Wilson added three more points to the agreement.

As one of these points seemed to imply that the Kiser had to abdicate the Germans delayed and even considered further resistance.

Once the Kiser abdicated the way was clear and they signed the peace on November 11th.

Oh, yes, now let us consider that.

Was is wise, or remotely reasonable, for Wilson to demand the Kaisar's abdication, and was the Allied call for him to be tried as a War Criminal justified?

[Sarmatian]

Then they had a treaty imposed on them at gunpoint.

Which is kinda what happens when you lose the war...

[Louis VI the Fat]

Then they had a treaty imposed on them at gunpoint.I think you'll find this has been the case ever since Knut the Cavemen waved his large club around and told Ugh-Ugh that no, he can not have the impala.

Or, just about every war is ended at gunpoint. Of course Germany had a surrender imposed on them at gunpoint. 'Pointing guns' at each other, sometimes even actually pulling the trigger and shooting at the other, is exactly what war is.
It is part of the bizarre Versailles lore that Germany was terribly injusticed simply by being subjected to the most basic principles of war.


~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~



In fairness, the Armistice was based on Wilson’s 14 Points. Germany Agreed to them all.No, this is simply not true.

Germany's surrender was not based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. Consequently, Germany neither agreed to them, nor had any reason to expect them.

Incidentally, tentative peace offers based on the fourteen points were offered in early 1918, which Germany did not accept, because it still hoped to win the war.


~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~



I am still curious - would these 21 points be at all aceptable as a Treaty, as conduct to make a workable peace?






Preamble






1 The French original of this Treaty is the only authoritative one. English, German and other translations to be without legal consequence.


2 Germany requests, and the allies confirm, that Germany shall retain its place as Europe’s largest power.








Reconstruction Costs







1 – There shall be no demands of reparations.


2- Germany does not have to pay costs of any kind for the allied military expenditures, or any costs of the war effort.


3 - There shall be only financial claims for reconstructing civil damages


3a- An exception shall be made for the UK. Britain, having sustained no direct civil damges, but facing large pension and disability costs as a result of the war, shall receive a large share of the costs for reconstruction meant for France and Belgium


4 – The costs for reconstruction shall take into account civil damages on all sides, on both sides of the border, including Germany


5 – These reconstruction costs, for both sides of the border, shall be split between the allies and Germany.


6 – These costs must be limited to a small sum


7 – These costs must not be based on actual damage, but on what any of the parties can pay, so as not to obstruct economic recovery. We must look forward, not backward




8 – To prop up Germany, these reconstruction costs shall be divided thus: allies to pay 95%, Germany to pay 5%


9 – To help Germany pay for reconstruction costs, it shall receive aid amounting to 150% of what it will pay towards reconstruction of war damages. That is, for every DM Germany pays, it will receive 1.5DM.






War Guild





7 – There shall be no War Guilt clause, only a legal-technical framework setting and limiting legal liability for reconstruction costs.





Colonial Possessions





8 – Only foreign possesions that have been colonised in the three decades before WWI shall be taken away from Germany.


9 – No foreign possessions with meaningful German settlement shall be taken


10 – The entire amount of German nationals affected by territorial transfer must be limited to no more than 20.000, worldwide.






Territorial Changes





10 – German territorial integrity shall be respected. There shall be no split up of Germany.


12 – Annexetion of German territory to the victorious states must be based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, in particular points six to fourteen


13 – In the west, transfer of territory must be striclty limited those territories which have been annexed by Germany since 1864. Traditional German lands must remain unaffected


14 – These territorial transfers must be in accordance with the wishes of the population affected.


15 - An exception to article 13 and 14 shall be made for Belgium. Belgium, whose neutrality was violated and suffered severly, shall be compensated territorially. This compensation will be limited to the two tiny rural villages of Eupen and Malmedy.


16 – In the east, with few exceptions, annexations must be limited to territories of overwhelming and traditional Polish majority






To Make and Retain the Peace





17 – The provisions in this treaty bear a temporary, comditional character. In due time, Germany shall be relieved of its obligations


18 – A United Nations shall be established. This institution shall deal with any disputes arising from this treaty in a peaceful manner.


19 This UN shall be empowered to deal with future conflicts. Reason and the rule of law, not the might of the victors of WWI, shall govern international relations.


20 – This United Nations shall be based in Geneva, Switzerland, and not in the territory of any of the victorious states


21 – Germany shall be made a full member of this UN no later than seven years after this treaty, to ensure Germany’s interests as a restored Great Power will be looked after.

[Fisherking]

Which is kinda what happens when you lose the war...

No, that is not it.

If you decide to buy a house and you sign an earnest money agreement based on a cost you expect the agreement to go through.

If the terms are changed and they say we are keeping your money and you are liable for the balance, don’t you think you might get angry? Especially if you find out you can’t take it to court.

That just might be why they got a little upset and why the Neutrals were asking what ever happened to the 14 Points of Mr. Wilson.

[Fisherking]

~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~


No, this is simply not true.

Germany's surrender was not based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. Consequently, Germany neither agreed to them, nor had any reason to expect them.

Incidentally, tentative peace offers based on the fourteen points were offered in early 1918, which Germany did not accept, because it still hoped to win the war.


~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~





If not, then why the additional three points?

What were they haggling over, play dates for the children?

[Pannonian]

No, that is not it.

If you decide to buy a house and you sign an earnest money agreement based on a cost you expect the agreement to go through.

If the terms are changed and they say we are keeping your money and you are liable for the balance, don’t you think you might get angry? Especially if you find out you can’t take it to court.

That just might be why they got a little upset and why the Neutrals were asking what ever happened to the 14 Points of Mr. Wilson.
If the terms were so extravagantly unfair, the Germans could have resumed war. After all, that's what happened to the Russians. Once again, why is there such outrage over Versailles, but none over Brest-Litovsk? The treaty with the Russians was signed after the Fourteen Points was laid out. What did the Allies do that the Germans did not?

[Prince Cobra]

Louis, Sarmatian... The most basic principles of war, perhaps. The most basic principle of diplomacy, no. The problem with winner/loser is that sometimes situation changes and enemies of a certain war are expected to work together. Then this could create certain problems. Making peace is an art that is often underestimated. In addition, too much pieces of the mosaic were absent. Where was Russia (the reason can be obvious but you should always have it in mind) and you have Germany taken out of the Great Powers list (in the very same League of Nations). It is not a random thing somebody (can't remeber his name) called Eastern Europe "no man's land". Btw, this perception (for the perception rule the politics, not facts) led to the treachery to Czechoslovakia in Munich. Anyway, my point was that Great Britain and France as single pillars of the Versailles put it on a sand foundation.

[Prince Cobra]

The treaties of Versailles and Brest Litovsk are on a different presumption, the way I see it. By Brest Litovsk Germany granted a freedom a potential satelite of Poland and Ukraine (national states). Germany was one national state, there is difference. Once again, I think Saint Germain treaty for Austria can be a better source for comparing.

[Louis VI the Fat]

If not, then why the additional three points?

What were they haggling over, play dates for the children?Meh, I'll let you do the work.

Can you show us the treaty / ceasefire / surrender where Germany agrees to the Fourteen / Seventeen points? Or show us any part of any treaty which left any room to expect it was based on these 14/17 points?

I can't prove a negative. You shall have to show us the positive truth of your assertion.

[Pannonian]

The treaties of Versailles and Brest Litovsk are on a different presumption. By Brest Litovsk Germany granted a freedom a potential satelite of Poland and Ukraine (national states). Germany was one national state, there is difference. Once again, I think Saint Germain treaty for Austria can be a better source for comparing.
With Brest-Litovsk, the territories west of a certain line were to be disposed of as Germany and Austria-Hungary saw fit, with the rider "with the agreement of their people", which is effectively worthless. That's the Baltics, Poland, Belorus and Ukraine ceded by Russia, to be split up between Germany and Austria-Hungary. And people are arguing that Versailles was harsh and unfair on the Germans.

[TinCow]

Was is wise, or remotely reasonable, for Wilson to demand the Kaisar's abdication, and was the Allied call for him to be tried as a War Criminal justified?

I won't address the War Criminal part, but the abdication part seems to be a totally moot point. If the Kaisar had not abdicated, he would have been overthrown. The German Revolution had already begun before he stepped down, and it became clear very quickly that it had great popular support. That was not temporary support either, as Weimar survived the Kapp Putsch in 1920 purely on the basis of popular support. By late 1918, Germany was done with Kaisars, and nothing could change that.

[Husar]

Hey, losers can't be choosers.

(For some-reason, that came to mind.)

I'll say that the next time Auschwitz, Palestine, 9/11 or slavery comes up and I'm sure everybody will find it funny. :inquisitive:

It's funny how we went from "Versailles was not a harsh treaty" to "well, fine, it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana"...

[Beskar]

I'll say that the next time Auschwitz, Palestine, 9/11 or slavery comes up and I'm sure everybody will find it funny. :inquisitive:

It's funny how we went from "Versailles was not a harsh treaty" to "well, fine, it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana"...

Though if you did that, you are taking it out of context. Unless as a German, you are advocating your nations historical treatment of the jewish population... as the Winners stopped the said Germans from doing those acts, thus they couldn't choose to continue. So arguably in that context, the losers couldn't choose to continue those acts.

Also, Versailles is not a harsh treaty and it never went to "well, fine it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana", it went to "You lost the war, the treaty was fair, there is nothing you could have done, unless you want to continue but lose even more..."

[Pannonian]

I'll say that the next time Auschwitz, Palestine, 9/11 or slavery comes up and I'm sure everybody will find it funny. :inquisitive:

It's funny how we went from "Versailles was not a harsh treaty" to "well, fine, it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana"...
Versailles was not harsh by the standards of its time, such as the treaty dictated by Germany the year before. If the Germans disliked it that much, they should have returned to arms, and come back to the table after they'd been beaten back another couple of hundred km. Maybe a peace treaty with a line stretching longitudally from Munich, and all German territory west of this to be disposed of by Britain and France, "with the agreement of its people".

[Louis VI the Fat]

I'll say that the next time Auschwitz, Palestine, 9/11 or slavery comes up and I'm sure everybody will find it funny. :inquisitive:

It's funny how we went from "Versailles was not a harsh treaty" to "well, fine, it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana"...No we haven't gone from 'not harsh', to 'we had guns'.

We are disputing both 'Versailles was harsh', and 'Versailles was unjust because forced at gunpoint'.
'Versailles was unjust because Germany was forced at gunpoint' - this is saying that Versailles was harsh simply by virtue of Germany losing the war. This is one of the many fundamentally erroneous views about the Treaty. Of course it is harsh to lose a war. But it is preposterous to say that a treaty was unjust simply because it came about based on one side's surrender. By that reasoning, all wars that have been lost and had a treaty based on that circumstance should be considered unjust.


I am not sure Auschwitz and 9-11 are comparable to states waging war. You are getting uncomfortably close to reasoning that took hold 25 years after Versailles. That Auschwitz was merely justified revenge, a tit-for-tat, doing unto 'them' what they did to us. Then again, I said it before: it is not merely rhetoric to say that Versailles lore caused sixty million deaths.
This is part of the Versailles lore that no serious scholarship can overcome: Germany as the persecuted victim A state that simply loses a war - as states so often do, is not the same as inflicting terrible injustice upon it, never mind mass murder.

[Pannonian]

No we haven't gone from 'not harsh', to 'we had guns'.

We are disputing both 'Versailles was harsh', and 'Versailles was unjust because forced at gunpoint'.
'Versailles was unjust because Germany was forced at gunpoint' - this is saying that Versailles was harsh simply by virtue of Germany losing the war. This is one of the many fundamentally erroneous views about the Treaty. Of course it is harsh to lose a war. But it is preposterous to say that a treaty was unjust simply because it came about based on one side's surrender. By that reasoning, all wars that have been lost and had a treaty based on that circumstance should be considered unjust.


I am not sure Auschwitz and 9-11 are comparable to states waging war. You are getting uncomfortably close to reasoning that took hold 25 years after Versailles. That Auschwitz was merely justified revenge, a tit-for-tat, doing unto 'them' what they did to us. Then again, I said it before: it is not merely rhetoric to say that Versailles lore caused sixty million deaths.
This is part of the Versailles lore that no serious scholarship can overcome: Germany as the persecuted victim A state that simply loses a war - as states so often do, is not the same as inflicting terrible injustice upon it, never mind mass murder.
In the run up to Brest-Litovsk, the Russians considered peace, but were dissuaded by the terms demanded by Germany. As they resumed fighting and were pushed back, so the terms became more severe, until they finally agreed peace with worse terms than before.

[TinCow]

We are disputing both 'Versailles was harsh', and 'Versailles was unjust because forced at gunpoint'.
'Versailles was unjust because Germany was forced at gunpoint' - this is saying that Versailles was harsh simply by virtue of Germany losing the war. This is one of the many fundamentally erroneous views about the Treaty. Of course it is harsh to lose a war. But it is preposterous to say that a treaty was unjust simply because it came about based on one side's surrender. By that reasoning, all wars that have been lost and had a treaty based on that circumstance should be considered unjust.

I would say Versailles is best described, not as 'harsh' or 'unjust' but rather as 'duplicitous.' 'Harsh' and 'unjust' are subjective terms, and they are difficult to properly analyze due to changes in international law and diplomacy since 1918. To put it into historical context, the terms of Versailles were certainly far better than were offered to many heavily defeated nations in ancient and medieval times (i.e. Third Punic War), but they were far worse than would be expected today. So, it seems improper to try and impose our own judgment on whether it was right or wrong. The best analysis is simply what happened and why.

I think the key is that, if Germany had been presented with the final terms of Versailles on November 11, I do not believe they would have agreed to them. Germany signed the Armistice on the assumption that they would receive better terms than they eventually did. On that assumption, they began massive demobilization, with the result that they were no longer in a position to refuse any agreement whatsoever when they were presented with Versailles. Thus, Versailles was 'duplicitous' as it was a diplomatic exploitation of the altered German situation in 1919 as compared to 1918. I will not argue that such a maneuver was good or bad, only that it occurred. Indeed, such post-war but pre-treaty shifts in power are very common throughout all of human history and it was and is the normal course of business for nations to negotiate on the basis of present strength, not strength as it stood at some point of time in the past. One side may regard the changed situation as unfair, while the other says it is fair; it is possible that both sides are correct at the same time.

[Pannonian]

I would say Versailles is best described, not as 'harsh' or 'unjust' but rather as 'duplicitous.' 'Harsh' and 'unjust' are subjective terms, and they are difficult to properly analyze due to changes in international law and diplomacy since 1918. To put it into historical context, the terms of Versailles were certainly far better than were offered to many heavily defeated nations in ancient and medieval times (i.e. Third Punic War), but they were far worse than would be expected today. So, it seems improper to try and impose our own judgment on whether it was right or wrong. The best analysis is simply what happened and why.

I think the key is that, if Germany had been presented with the final terms of Versailles on November 11, I do not believe they would have agreed to them. Germany signed the Armistice on the assumption that they would receive better terms than they eventually did. On that assumption, they began massive demobilization, with the result that they were no longer in a position to refuse any agreement whatsoever when they were presented with Versailles. Thus, Versailles was 'duplicitous' as it was a diplomatic exploitation of the altered German situation in 1919 as compared to 1918. I will not argue that such a maneuver was good or bad, only that it occurred. Indeed, such post-war but pre-treaty shifts in power are very common throughout all of human history and it was and is the normal course of business for nations to negotiate on the basis of present strength, not strength as it stood at some point of time in the past. One side may regard the changed situation as unfair, while the other says it is fair; it is possible that both sides are correct at the same time.
How is that different from Germany exploiting the disintegrating Russia and imposing more severe terms than the 1917 Russia might have expected? It's not the Allies' fault if Germany demobbed to avoid furthering the economic strain it already couldn't stand. If Germany didn't like the terms, they could have taken up arms again as the Russians did, and get beaten again as the Russians did, and get presented with even more severe terms as the Russians did. Nothing the Allies did to Germany was in any way worse than what the Germans did to Russia.

[Prince Cobra]

With Brest-Litovsk, the territories west of a certain line were to be disposed of as Germany and Austria-Hungary saw fit, with the rider "with the agreement of their people", which is effectively worthless. That's the Baltics, Poland, Belorus and Ukraine ceded by Russia, to be split up between Germany and Austria-Hungary. And people are arguing that Versailles was harsh and unfair on the Germans.

No, I am almost 100 per cent sure the Central Powers planned to restore the Polish Kingdom, though ruled under a German prince (German dynasties ruled Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, so nothing unusual here).

[TinCow]

How is that different from Germany exploiting the disintegrating Russia and imposing more severe terms than the 1917 Russia might have expected? It's not the Allies' fault if Germany demobbed to avoid furthering the economic strain it already couldn't stand. If Germany didn't like the terms, they could have taken up arms again as the Russians did, and get beaten again as the Russians did, and get presented with even more severe terms as the Russians did. Nothing the Allies did to Germany was in any way worse than what the Germans did to Russia.

I do not claim that it is different.

[spmetla]

Meh, I'll let you do the work.

Can you show us the treaty / ceasefire / surrender where Germany agrees to the Fourteen / Seventeen points? Or show us any part of any treaty which left any room to expect it was based on these 14/17 points?

I can't prove a negative. You shall have to show us the positive truth of your assertion.

Below is the German protest to the peace terms:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/parispeaceconf_germanprotest1.htm

Leader of the German Peace Delegation Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau's Letter to Paris Peace Conference President Georges Clemenceau on the Subject of Peace Terms, May 1919

Mr. President:

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the observations of the German delegation on the draft treaty of peace.

We came to Versailles in the expectation of receiving a peace proposal based on the agreed principles. We were firmly resolved to do everything in our power with a view of fulfilling the grave obligations which we had undertaken. We hoped for the peace of justice which had been promised to us.

We were aghast when we read in documents the demands made upon us, the victorious violence of our enemies. The more deeply we penetrate into the spirit of this treaty, the more convinced we become of the impossibility of carrying it out. The exactions of this treaty are more than the German people can bear.

With a view to the re-establishment of the Polish State we must renounce indisputably German territory - nearly the whole of the Province of West Prussia, which is preponderantly German; of Pomerania; Danzig, which is German to the core; we must let that ancient Hanse town be transformed into a free State under Polish suzerainty.

We must agree that East Prussia shall be amputated from the body of the State, condemned to a lingering death, and robbed of its northern portion, including Memel, which is purely German.

We must renounce Upper Silesia for the benefit of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, although it has been in close political connection with Germany for more than 750 years, is instinct with German life, and forms the very foundation of industrial life throughout East Germany.

Preponderantly German circles (Kreise) must be ceded to Belgium, without sufficient guarantees that the plebiscite, which is only to take place afterward, will be independent. The purely German district of the Saar must be detached from our empire, and the way must be paved for its subsequent annexation to France, although we owe her debts in coal only, not in men.

For fifteen years Rhenish territory must be occupied, and after those fifteen years the Allies have power to refuse the restoration of the country; in the interval the Allies can take every measure to sever the economic and moral links with the mother country, and finally to misrepresent the wishes of the indigenous population.

Although the exaction of the cost of the war has been expressly renounced, yet Germany, thus cut in pieces and weakened, must declare herself ready in principle to bear all the war expenses of her enemies, which would exceed many times over the total amount of German State and private assets.

Meanwhile her enemies demand, in excess of the agreed conditions, reparation for damage suffered by their civil population, and in this connection Germany must also go bail for her allies. The sum to be paid is to be fixed by our enemies unilaterally, and to admit of subsequent modification and increase. No limit is fixed, save the capacity of the German people for payment, determined not by their standard of life, but solely by their capacity to meet the demands of their enemies by their labour. The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour.

In spite of the exorbitant demands, the reconstruction of our economic life is at the same time rendered impossible. We must surrender our merchant fleet. We are to renounce all foreign securities. We are to hand over to our enemies our property in all German enterprises abroad, even in the countries of our allies.

Even after the conclusion of peace the enemy States are to have the right of confiscating all German property. No German trader in their countries will be protected from these war measures. We must completely renounce our colonies, and not even German missionaries shall have the right to follow their calling therein.

We most thus renounce the realization of all our aims in the spheres of politics, economics, and ideas.

Even in internal affairs we are to give up the right to self-determination. The international Reparation Commission receives dictatorial powers over the whole life of our people in economic and cultural matters. Its authority extends far beyond that which the empire, the German Federal Council, and the Reichstag combined ever possessed within the territory of the empire.

This commission has unlimited control over the economic life of the State, of communities, and of individuals. Further, the entire educational and sanitary system depends on it. It can keep the whole German people in mental thraldom. In order to increase the payments due, by the thrall, the commission can hamper measures for the social protection of the German worker.

In other spheres also Germany's sovereignty is abolished. Her chief waterways are subjected to international administration; she must construct in her territory such canals and such railways as her enemies wish; she must agree to treaties the contents of which are unknown to her, to be concluded by her enemies with the new States on the east, even when they concern her own functions. The German people are excluded from the League of Nations, to which is entrusted all work of common interest to the world.

Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence.

Germany knows that she must make sacrifices in order to attain peace. Germany knows that she has, by agreement, undertaken to make these sacrifices, and will go in this matter to the utmost limits of her capacity.

Counter-proposals

1. Germany offers to proceed with her own disarmament in advance of all other peoples, in order to show that she will help to usher in the new era of the peace of justice. She gives up universal compulsory service and reduces her army to 100,000 men, except as regards temporary measures. She even renounces the warships which her enemies are still willing to leave in her hands. She stipulates, however, that she shall be admitted forthwith as a State with equal rights into the League of Nations. She stipulates that a genuine League of Nations shall come into being, embracing all peoples of goodwill, even her enemies of today. The League must be inspired by a feeling of responsibility toward mankind and have at its disposal a power to enforce its will sufficiently strong and trusty to protect the frontiers of its members.

2. In territorial questions Germany takes up her position unreservedly on the ground of the Wilson program. She renounces her sovereign right in Alsace-Lorraine, but wishes a free plebiscite to take place there. She gives up the greater part of the province of Posen, the district incontestably Polish in population, together with the capital. She is prepared to grant to Poland, under international guarantees, free and secure access to the sea by ceding free ports at Danzig, Konigsberg, and Memel, by an agreement regulating the navigation of the Vistula and by special railway conventions. Germany is prepared to insure the supply of coal for the economic needs of France, especially from the Saar region, until such time as the French mines are once more in working order. The preponderantly Danish districts of Schleswig will be given up to Denmark on the basis of a plebiscite. Germany demands that the right of self-determination shall also be respected where the interests of the Germans in Austria and Bohemia are concerned. She is ready to subject all her colonies to administration by the community of the League of Nations, if she is recognized as its mandatory.

3. Germany is prepared to make payments incumbent on her in accordance with the agreed program of peace up to a maximum sum of 100,000,000,000 gold marks, 20,000,000,000 by May 1, 1926, and the balance (80,000,000,000) in annual payments, without interest. These payments shall in principle be equal to a fixed percentage of the German Imperial and State revenues. The annual payment shall approximate to the former peace budget. For the first ten years the annual payments shall not exceed 1,000,000,000 gold marks a year. The German taxpayer shall not be less heavily burdened than the taxpayer of the most heavily burdened State among those represented on the Reparation Commission. Germany presumes in this connection that she will not have to make any territorial sacrifices beyond those mentioned above and that she will recover her freedom of economic movement at home and abroad.

4. Germany is prepared to devote her entire economic strength to the service of the reconstruction. She wishes to cooperate effectively in the reconstruction of the devastated regions of Belgium and Northern France. To make good the loss in production of the destroyed mines of Northern France, up to 20,000,000 tons of coal will be delivered annually for the first five years, and up to 80,000,000 tons for the next five years. Germany will facilitate further deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg. Germany is, moreover, prepared to make considerable deliveries of benzol, coal tar, and sulphate of ammonia, as well as dyestuffs and medicines.

5. Finally, Germany offers to put her entire merchant tonnage into a pool of the world's shipping, to place at the disposal of her enemies a part of her freight space as part payment of reparation and to build for them for a series of years in German yards an amount of tonnage exceeding their demands.

6. In order to replace the river boats destroyed in Belgium and Northern France, Germany offers river craft from her own resources.

7. Germany thinks that she sees an appropriate method for the prompt fulfilment of her obligation to make reparations conceding participation in coal mines to insure deliveries of coal.

8. Germany, in accordance with the desires of the workers of the whole world, wishes to insure to them free and equal rights. She wishes to insure to them in the Treaty of Peace the right to take their own decisive part in the settlement of social policy and social protection.

9. The German delegation again makes its demand for a neutral inquiry into the responsibility for the war and culpable acts in conduct. An impartial commission should have the right to investigate on its own responsibility the archives of all the belligerent countries and all the persons who took an important part in the war. Nothing short of confidence that the question of guilt will be examined dispassionately can leave the peoples lately at war with each other in the proper frame of mind for the formation of the League of Nations.

These are only the most important among the proposals which we have to make. As regards other great sacrifices, and also as regards the details, the delegation refers to the accompanying memorandum and the annex thereto.

The time allowed us for the preparation of this memorandum was so short that it was impossible to treat all the questions exhaustively. A fruitful and illuminating negotiation could only take place by means of oral discussion.

This treaty of peace is to be the greatest achievement of its kind in all history. There is no precedent for the conduct of such comprehensive negotiations by an exchange of written notes only.

The feeling of the peoples who have made such immense sacrifices makes them demand that their fate should be decided by an open, unreserved exchange of ideas on the principle: "Quite open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly in the public view."

Germany is to put her signature to the treaty laid before her and to carry it out. Even in her need, justice for her is too sacred a thing to allow her to stoop to achieve conditions which she cannot undertake to carry out.

Treaties of peace signed by the great powers have, it is true, in the history of the last decades, again and again proclaimed the right of the stronger. But each of these treaties of peace has been a factor in originating and prolonging the world war. Whenever in this war the victor has spoken to the vanquished, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, his words were but the seeds of future discord.

The lofty aims which our adversaries first set before themselves in their conduct of the war, the new era of an assured peace of justice, demand a treaty instinct with a different spirit.

Only the cooperation of all nations, a cooperation of hands and spirits, can build up a durable peace. We are under no delusions regarding the strength of the hatred and bitterness which this war has engendered, and yet the forces which are at work for a union of mankind are stronger now than ever they were before.

The historic task of the Peace Conference of Versailles is to bring about this union.

Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my distinguished consideration.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VII, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923

[Louis VI the Fat]

I would say Versailles is best described, not as 'harsh' or 'unjust' but rather as 'duplicitous.' I myself do not think the German leadership was this extraordinarily naive.

The eventual treaty was not going to be nothing but a temporary breathing space for Germany. No German could've expected this. In fact, I think the German leadership expected a far, far harsher* treaty than they received. Something along the lines of, indeed, Brest-Litovsk, if slightly mpore civilized since not even the Germans expected the West to be as brutal as Germany. Yet for the most part, Germany expected that would be done onto it, as it did unto others. This did not come about, not in the slightest. As for what did come about, any German knew that Alsace-Lorraine was going to be returned, that there would have to be compensation paid for the ravaged territories, that Poland woulod be restored (all of which were incidentally part of the 14 points), that Germany would have to return looted art and equipment.

* 'Harsh', while indeed a troubled and subjective term, is important here. Because I think your verdict of the 'harshness' is very different from mine. Me, I see Versailles as very lenient, which left Germany fully intact as Europe's greatest power.

[Sarmatian]

The treaties of Versailles and Brest Litovsk are on a different presumption, the way I see it. By Brest Litovsk Germany granted a freedom a potential satelite of Poland and Ukraine (national states). Germany was one national state, there is difference. Once again, I think Saint Germain treaty for Austria can be a better source for comparing.

No. Those territores were forcefully taken from Russia, there were no plebiscites, nobody asked the population anything. Nobody asked Ukranians and Belorussians whether they want to live in Poland or Russia or want to have their own respective countries. It was simply a matter of the loser being forced to relinquish control of territory because the winner demanded it. There was no liberation there.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Below is the German protest to the peace terms:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/parispeaceconf_germanprotest1.htm

Leader of the German Peace Delegation Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau's Letter to Paris Peace Conference President Georges Clemenceau on the Subject of Peace Terms, May 1919

Mr. President:

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the observations of the German delegation on the draft treaty of peace.

We came to Versailles in the expectation of receiving a peace proposal based on the agreed principles. We were firmly resolved to do everything in our power with a view of fulfilling the grave obligations which we had undertaken. We hoped for the peace of justice which had been promised to us.

We were aghast when we read in documents the demands made upon us, the victorious violence of our enemies. The more deeply we penetrate into the spirit of this treaty, the more convinced we become of the impossibility of carrying it out. The exactions of this treaty are more than the German people can bear.

With a view to the re-establishment of the Polish State we must renounce indisputably German territory - nearly the whole of the Province of West Prussia, which is preponderantly German; of Pomerania; Danzig, which is German to the core; we must let that ancient Hanse town be transformed into a free State under Polish suzerainty.

We must agree that East Prussia shall be amputated from the body of the State, condemned to a lingering death, and robbed of its northern portion, including Memel, which is purely German.

We must renounce Upper Silesia for the benefit of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, although it has been in close political connection with Germany for more than 750 years, is instinct with German life, and forms the very foundation of industrial life throughout East Germany.

Preponderantly German circles (Kreise) must be ceded to Belgium, without sufficient guarantees that the plebiscite, which is only to take place afterward, will be independent. The purely German district of the Saar must be detached from our empire, and the way must be paved for its subsequent annexation to France, although we owe her debts in coal only, not in men.

For fifteen years Rhenish territory must be occupied, and after those fifteen years the Allies have power to refuse the restoration of the country; in the interval the Allies can take every measure to sever the economic and moral links with the mother country, and finally to misrepresent the wishes of the indigenous population.

Although the exaction of the cost of the war has been expressly renounced, yet Germany, thus cut in pieces and weakened, must declare herself ready in principle to bear all the war expenses of her enemies, which would exceed many times over the total amount of German State and private assets.

Meanwhile her enemies demand, in excess of the agreed conditions, reparation for damage suffered by their civil population, and in this connection Germany must also go bail for her allies. The sum to be paid is to be fixed by our enemies unilaterally, and to admit of subsequent modification and increase. No limit is fixed, save the capacity of the German people for payment, determined not by their standard of life, but solely by their capacity to meet the demands of their enemies by their labour. The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour.

In spite of the exorbitant demands, the reconstruction of our economic life is at the same time rendered impossible. We must surrender our merchant fleet. We are to renounce all foreign securities. We are to hand over to our enemies our property in all German enterprises abroad, even in the countries of our allies.

Even after the conclusion of peace the enemy States are to have the right of confiscating all German property. No German trader in their countries will be protected from these war measures. We must completely renounce our colonies, and not even German missionaries shall have the right to follow their calling therein.

We most thus renounce the realization of all our aims in the spheres of politics, economics, and ideas.

Even in internal affairs we are to give up the right to self-determination. The international Reparation Commission receives dictatorial powers over the whole life of our people in economic and cultural matters. Its authority extends far beyond that which the empire, the German Federal Council, and the Reichstag combined ever possessed within the territory of the empire.

This commission has unlimited control over the economic life of the State, of communities, and of individuals. Further, the entire educational and sanitary system depends on it. It can keep the whole German people in mental thraldom. In order to increase the payments due, by the thrall, the commission can hamper measures for the social protection of the German worker.

In other spheres also Germany's sovereignty is abolished. Her chief waterways are subjected to international administration; she must construct in her territory such canals and such railways as her enemies wish; she must agree to treaties the contents of which are unknown to her, to be concluded by her enemies with the new States on the east, even when they concern her own functions. The German people are excluded from the League of Nations, to which is entrusted all work of common interest to the world.

Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence.

Germany knows that she must make sacrifices in order to attain peace. Germany knows that she has, by agreement, undertaken to make these sacrifices, and will go in this matter to the utmost limits of her capacity.

Counter-proposals

1. Germany offers to proceed with her own disarmament in advance of all other peoples, in order to show that she will help to usher in the new era of the peace of justice. She gives up universal compulsory service and reduces her army to 100,000 men, except as regards temporary measures. She even renounces the warships which her enemies are still willing to leave in her hands. She stipulates, however, that she shall be admitted forthwith as a State with equal rights into the League of Nations. She stipulates that a genuine League of Nations shall come into being, embracing all peoples of goodwill, even her enemies of today. The League must be inspired by a feeling of responsibility toward mankind and have at its disposal a power to enforce its will sufficiently strong and trusty to protect the frontiers of its members.

2. In territorial questions Germany takes up her position unreservedly on the ground of the Wilson program. She renounces her sovereign right in Alsace-Lorraine, but wishes a free plebiscite to take place there. She gives up the greater part of the province of Posen, the district incontestably Polish in population, together with the capital. She is prepared to grant to Poland, under international guarantees, free and secure access to the sea by ceding free ports at Danzig, Konigsberg, and Memel, by an agreement regulating the navigation of the Vistula and by special railway conventions. Germany is prepared to insure the supply of coal for the economic needs of France, especially from the Saar region, until such time as the French mines are once more in working order. The preponderantly Danish districts of Schleswig will be given up to Denmark on the basis of a plebiscite. Germany demands that the right of self-determination shall also be respected where the interests of the Germans in Austria and Bohemia are concerned. She is ready to subject all her colonies to administration by the community of the League of Nations, if she is recognized as its mandatory.

3. Germany is prepared to make payments incumbent on her in accordance with the agreed program of peace up to a maximum sum of 100,000,000,000 gold marks, 20,000,000,000 by May 1, 1926, and the balance (80,000,000,000) in annual payments, without interest. These payments shall in principle be equal to a fixed percentage of the German Imperial and State revenues. The annual payment shall approximate to the former peace budget. For the first ten years the annual payments shall not exceed 1,000,000,000 gold marks a year. The German taxpayer shall not be less heavily burdened than the taxpayer of the most heavily burdened State among those represented on the Reparation Commission. Germany presumes in this connection that she will not have to make any territorial sacrifices beyond those mentioned above and that she will recover her freedom of economic movement at home and abroad.

4. Germany is prepared to devote her entire economic strength to the service of the reconstruction. She wishes to cooperate effectively in the reconstruction of the devastated regions of Belgium and Northern France. To make good the loss in production of the destroyed mines of Northern France, up to 20,000,000 tons of coal will be delivered annually for the first five years, and up to 80,000,000 tons for the next five years. Germany will facilitate further deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg. Germany is, moreover, prepared to make considerable deliveries of benzol, coal tar, and sulphate of ammonia, as well as dyestuffs and medicines.

5. Finally, Germany offers to put her entire merchant tonnage into a pool of the world's shipping, to place at the disposal of her enemies a part of her freight space as part payment of reparation and to build for them for a series of years in German yards an amount of tonnage exceeding their demands.

6. In order to replace the river boats destroyed in Belgium and Northern France, Germany offers river craft from her own resources.

7. Germany thinks that she sees an appropriate method for the prompt fulfilment of her obligation to make reparations conceding participation in coal mines to insure deliveries of coal.

8. Germany, in accordance with the desires of the workers of the whole world, wishes to insure to them free and equal rights. She wishes to insure to them in the Treaty of Peace the right to take their own decisive part in the settlement of social policy and social protection.

9. The German delegation again makes its demand for a neutral inquiry into the responsibility for the war and culpable acts in conduct. An impartial commission should have the right to investigate on its own responsibility the archives of all the belligerent countries and all the persons who took an important part in the war. Nothing short of confidence that the question of guilt will be examined dispassionately can leave the peoples lately at war with each other in the proper frame of mind for the formation of the League of Nations.

These are only the most important among the proposals which we have to make. As regards other great sacrifices, and also as regards the details, the delegation refers to the accompanying memorandum and the annex thereto.

The time allowed us for the preparation of this memorandum was so short that it was impossible to treat all the questions exhaustively. A fruitful and illuminating negotiation could only take place by means of oral discussion.

This treaty of peace is to be the greatest achievement of its kind in all history. There is no precedent for the conduct of such comprehensive negotiations by an exchange of written notes only.

The feeling of the peoples who have made such immense sacrifices makes them demand that their fate should be decided by an open, unreserved exchange of ideas on the principle: "Quite open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly in the public view."

Germany is to put her signature to the treaty laid before her and to carry it out. Even in her need, justice for her is too sacred a thing to allow her to stoop to achieve conditions which she cannot undertake to carry out.

Treaties of peace signed by the great powers have, it is true, in the history of the last decades, again and again proclaimed the right of the stronger. But each of these treaties of peace has been a factor in originating and prolonging the world war. Whenever in this war the victor has spoken to the vanquished, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, his words were but the seeds of future discord.

The lofty aims which our adversaries first set before themselves in their conduct of the war, the new era of an assured peace of justice, demand a treaty instinct with a different spirit.

Only the cooperation of all nations, a cooperation of hands and spirits, can build up a durable peace. We are under no delusions regarding the strength of the hatred and bitterness which this war has engendered, and yet the forces which are at work for a union of mankind are stronger now than ever they were before.

The historic task of the Peace Conference of Versailles is to bring about this union.

Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my distinguished consideration.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VII, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 19231) Yes, but - I am going to be a pest here - can you show us the treaty / ceasefire / surrender where Germany agrees to the Fourteen / Seventeen points? Or show us any part of any treaty which left any room to expect it was based on these 14/17 points?


2) "The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour
Germany's sovereignty is abolished.
Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence."
[/I]
These are the conclusions of the protest. Hysteria, I have no other word for it. Yet this hysteria was the first, and final, verdict of Germany about the Treaty and formed the basis of Germany's ceaseless obstruction of the peace, no matter how ungrounded, nor what concilliatory measures the allies took. Here is the culprit. Not the Treaty, but nationalist agitation and hysteria.

[Beskar]

* 'Harsh', while indeed a troubled and subjective term, is important here. Because I think your verdict of the 'harshness' is very different from mine. Me, I see Versailles as very lenient, which left Germany fully intact as Europe's greatest power.

As TinCow says, go back a hundred years or so, and Germany would have become "North France". World War 1 was the beginning of the liberation process, where there are no longer big Empires, but coalitions of nation states. Germany had to surrender the land it gained from Russia, and West Prussia and return land to France from the Franco-prussian war. Compared to what happened to the Habsburg Empire, this was nothing in comparison. On top of this, they have to pay reperations at the sum of 2% GDP per year. Oh and Germany had to disarm, which is good news economically, as it reduces state-spending.

In return, Germany was left basically in one piece.

A pretty low price, considering the *the long list I could be put here quite easily*.

[TinCow]

I myself do not think the German leadership was this extraordinarily naive.

The eventual treaty was not going to be nothing but a temporary breathing space for Germany. No German could've expected this. In fact, I think the German leadership expected a far, far harsher* treaty than they received. Something along the lines of, indeed, Brest-Litovsk. The Germans expected that would be done onto them, as they did unto others. This did not come about, not in the slightest. As for what did come about, any German knew that Alsace-Lorraine was going to be returned, that there would have to be compensation paid for the ravaged territories, that Poland woulod be restored (all of which were incidentally part of the 14 points), that Germany would have to return looted art and equipment.

* 'Harsh', while indeed a troubled and subjective term, is important here. Because I think your verdict of the 'harshness' is very different from mine. Me, I see Versailles as very lenient, which left Germany fully intact as Europe's greatest power.

No, the German leadership were not that naive, but that is part of the reason why I do not believe they would have signed the agreement. To sign such a treaty when German soil had not even been occupied would have spelled political (and possibly physical) death for those leaders. The question for the German leaders was not whether the treaty was realistic, but whether it would be accepted at home. I do not believe that the German people would have been content with the reparations levels set in Versailles, nor with the War Guilt clause. They had not experienced sufficient suffering yet to support such a treaty.

The important factor in all of this is not the German leadership, it is the German people. 1918-1939 is not Feudal Europe where the national leaders made all the decisions. Public support was required for the Nazis to gain power, and thus it was public perception that was most important. In this case, the public perceived Versailles as being a 'cheat' by the French which exploited German 'good will.' The Stab-in-the-back Myth worked because sufficient people believed it, not because it was true.

In fact, I would say that had Germany been presented with the Versailles terms on November 11 and continued to fight, the final treaty would have been harsher (agreed on its use here) than even Versailles was, for the same reasons cited by others for Brest-Litovsk. However, if the Germany population had been forced to personally experience the horrors of war on their own territory, they likely would have been far less willing to believe the propaganda that led them to WW2. In the long run, it might actually have saved more lives if WWI had continued into 1919.

[spmetla]

1) Yes, but - I am going to be a pest here - can you show us the treaty / ceasefire / surrender where Germany agrees to the Fourteen / Seventeen points? Or show us any part of any treaty which left any room to expect it was based on these 14/17 points?


2) "The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour
Germany's sovereignty is abolished.
Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence."
[/I]
These are the conclusions of the protest. Hysteria, I have no other word for it. Yet this hysteria was the first, and final, verdict of Germany about the Treaty and formed the basis of Germany's ceaseless obstruction of the peace, no matter how ungrounded, nor what concilliatory measures the allies took. Here is the culprit. Not the Treaty, but nationalist agitation and hysteria.

While I can't find a document that explicity says that the Germans signed the armistice based on the fourteen points just about every source I've read points or alludes to it. Here, I'll try to post some.

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3401800255.html

German military leaders acknowledged in October 1918 that their country had been defeated and, seeking more favorable terms than they were likely to obtain from Britain or France, appealed to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson for an armistice based on the Fourteen Points.

http://www.answers.com/topic/1918-armistice

In October the Austro-Hungarian and German governments separately proposed an armistice to US Pres Wilson, preliminary to a peace conference based on his ‘Fourteen Points’.

I do understand though that Wilson's 14 points ammounted to no more than propaganda and that he did not have the authority to decide peace terms for the British Empire and France. I'll try and find a souce for it but from what i understand is that Prince von Baden proposed the 1918 offensive because he actually found the 14 points unacceptable and was hoping that by grabbing more French territory that he could negotiate from a position of strenght, though this of course failed utterly and caused a tremendous reversal.

[Beskar]

In fact, I would say that had Germany been presented with the Versailles terms on November 11 and continued to fight, the final treaty would have been harsher (agreed on its use here) than even Versailles was, for the same reasons cited by others for Brest-Litovsk. However, if the Germany population had been forced to personally experience the horrors of war on their own territory, they likely would have been far less willing to believe the propaganda that led them to WW2. In the long run, it might actually have saved more lives if WWI had continued into 1919.

You could argue that the government had the foresight to know that continuing was simply futile. All in all, you are completely outgunned, surrounded, and only one left in your alliance still able to fight and America just joined the war on your enemies side. Isn't going "hey, we surrender." Leaving your country pretty much intact and lesser terms the best thing to do?

Otherwise, you are simply saying the allies would have been justified in destroying half the nation and imposing significantly tougher terms on Germany and allowing far more causalities and deaths in an already bloody war.

[Louis VI the Fat]

No, the German leadership were not that naive, but that is part of the reason why I do not believe they would have signed the agreement. To sign such a treaty when German soil had not even been occupied would have spelled political (and possibly physical) death for those leaders. The question for the German leaders was not whether the treaty was realistic, but whether it would be accepted at home. But...the treaty did spell political suicide and that is why the then German leadership did not sign it indeed. That's why the emperor abdicated, and that is why the Prusiian military caste - this state within a state, this state over the state which had assumed control over Germany - who realised perfectly well what was coming, quickly retreated politically and left the handling of the treaty to the civil government. Which therefore became forever tainted. And who thus sought to regain and maintain legitimacy by undermining the treaty and the peace.

The rest of the post I think I agree with. Certainly with the part that even a few more months of war - two, three - would've sufficed. Alternatively - rather than waste a million German lives in this manner - the German government and especially the military caste could've made clear to their people that indeed Germany had been fully defeated. Instead of trying to pass the buck and encourage dangerous fairy tales.



While I can't find a document that explicity says that the Germans signed the armistice based on the fourteen points just about every source I've read points or alludes to it.To be fair: you won't find any such document. It is a fable. One of many that keeps being repeated in spite of cold, hard fact.
Germany did seek, at several instances, 'peace without victory'. This it did after it was defeated, hence obviously was an illusion.

We all dream of 'wage aggressive war with plenty of spoils in victory, but no consequences in defeat'. But it takes a Prussian Junker to mewl like a piglet about it when it is not granted.



Edit: good points, Beskar.

[TinCow]

You could argue that the government had the foresight to know that continuing was simply futile. All in all, you are completely outgunned, surrounded, and only one left in your alliance still able to fight and America just joined the war on your enemies side. Isn't going "hey, we surrender." Leaving your country pretty much intact and lesser terms the best thing to do?

Otherwise, you are simply saying the allies would have been justified in destroying half the nation and imposing significantly tougher terms on Germany and allowing far more causalities and deaths in an already bloody war.

You ascribe to those that made the decision the ability to have absolute foresight of the result. That ability has never been blessed on any human, particularly not on diplomats or politicians. All that would be required would be the belief in the leaders that if they continued to fight, they could get better terms that would outweight the costs of that fighting. That is a reasonable response, and many nations at war have improved their final circumstances by holding out and inflicting horrible casualties on the enemy, even when their own defeat was inevitable. It is even possible that it could have happened in this case. Like I said above, I believe that Germany would have ended up in an even worse situation had they continued fighting, but there is sufficient doubt in war to allow for the possibility that the Germans could have bled the Allies sufficiently in 1919 to make them relax their demands somewhat. It is that possibility that would have factored into the cost-benefit analysis that the German leaders would have to have considered.

It was clear in 1919 that the German public strongly believed that it would have been better to continue fighting than to agree to Versailles, except that they no longer had the military strength to continue the fight. Had they had that strength, as they did on November 11, they would almost certainly have rejected the peace and gambled on the improvement in 1919.

[Fisherking]

Okay Lewis, here goes. I will stand corrected.

The whole thing is a bag of worms worthy of the condemnation of everyone involved...

Germany opened negotiations based upon the 14 points. In having to democratize the government the German Army cynically contrived to place the blame on the political parties.

The Entente on the other hand had no intentions of agreeing to the 14 points because they were only a propaganda instrument. They didn’t come out and say that to the Germans however, they just imposed more conditions.

The Army was left to negotiate the ceasefire and they panicked and agreed to just about anything.

After the Armistice the civilian government expected to negotiate dealing with the 14 points. (the additional 3 were all military).

They got a surprise when they showed up at the peace conference and were told they were not permitted to negotiate, the terms were what ever the Allies said they were, take it or leave it.

You can say that the Germans were stupid or that the Entente was duplicitous and both would be correct.

I would say it is a low point for international relations and there is more than enough shame to go around for all the principals.

You have a choice. You can condemn the German reaction, because they were actually not promised anything. Or you can say it was a stab in the back because the Germans were duped.

There was no small amount of dissention on the allied side either, over what had been done. Diplomats resigned during the drafting of the treaty. Books were written telling how Germany was being betrayed.

It was not Germanys views that they had been betrayed that took root in allied nations, it was the view of many in the diplomatic service of the allied countries.

So duplicitous is not a bad term in describing the allied position.

So, who was in the right? Nobody! Or maybe the victims were the German People, but in a Nationalistic Rage they brought more suffering to themselves.

I would have imported much of the text but for some reason it won’t let me...so if you really, really want to know...never mind...you don’t actually want to go through this disgusting crap.

[Brenus]

“Germany opened negotiations based upon the 14 points”: Again!!!! Germany opened negotiation hoping it would be based on the 14 points perhaps.
From where, if they did, did they get this? Especially after the rejection by Germany of US mediation in 1916.
On the quantity of Peace talks, not at one moment, Germany showed the will to give-up its war goals…
In Spring 1918, Germany refused the US conditions in The Hague.

Did at one moment Clemenceau or David Lloyd George or Vittorio Orlando, gave the hint these 14 Points were the base for Peace Talks?

“You can say that the Germans were stupid or that the Entente was duplicitous and both would be correct.”: The German had no choice, the Entente was not prepared to give to Germany any choice.
I still don’t see where the Entente was duplicitous as Wilson represented only at best, USA…

“You have a choice. You can condemn the German reaction, because they were actually not promised anything. Or you can say it was a stab in the back because the Germans were duped.”
Sorry, I don’t follow you there.
Fact: Germany and Allies were defeated.
Fact: When winner, Germany imposed Diktat and Occupation Troops on the looser.
Fact: All previous Peace Talks were rejected by Germany when not favorable to Germany. At no moment, Imperial Germany showed a hint of regret for the aggression.
Fact: Facing a military collapse, a succession of Allies surrenders, a mutiny in the fleet, famines and unrest in the society, the German Hight Command and the Junkers decided to pass the buck to somebody else.
Fact: The somebody else had nothing left to negotiate excepted to play the Red Containment Card.

Yes, the German hoped that they could avoid to face the consequences of the Kaiser’s choices to back-up Austrian’s Aggression against Serbia.
Yes, the Entente could have adopted Louis’ Plan and Germany wouldn’t had to face the consequences a lost war.
The stab in the back came from the Junkers and the Political-Militaro Elite which lead Germany in the WW1 and were defeated.
To get invaded countries (having this toll of casualties –1,600.000 young men dead, 5,000,000 injured for France alone) to be as lenient as the Treaty was and then complain about it, even now, is beyond me.
Yes, the German should have expected far worst than what happened. They should have expected what happened in 1945. Or what Germany imposed to France in 1870 (for no damage to German territory and far less casualties) or Russia. Or what Germany intended to impose if winner to the Entente…
The only “stab in the back” was in the German mind. This was for political motives played on German hurt pride.
It back fired badly.
So instead to recognise it, better to blame Versailles than the gloomy, dark, nauseous but entirely German post WW1 political blaming game.

“Or maybe the victims were the German People”: They were. But not of the Entente.

In France, some complained that Versailles was to lenient, that it will open the doors to the renewal of German Imperialism…
So books written at the Period are not the good bench marks.

The reality is:
Germany didn’t paid the compensation
Germany was not under permanent occupation.
Germany was not enslaved.

In fact, Versailles was not implemented…

[Beskar]

Versailles was implemented, just that Germany didn't want to accept it. It didn't even fully disarm. They hid their armies in Russia, in return, training the Russians, etc.

Only time the allies only made a case in enforcing Versailles was during the Franco-Belgium occuptation of the Ruhr, since Germany refused to pay.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

I think you'll find this has been the case ever since Knut the Cavemen waved his large club around and told Ugh-Ugh that no, he can not have the impala.

Or, just about every war is ended at gunpoint. Of course Germany had a surrender imposed on them at gunpoint. 'Pointing guns' at each other, sometimes even actually pulling the trigger and shooting at the other, is exactly what war is.
It is part of the bizarre Versailles lore that Germany was terribly injusticed simply by being subjected to the most basic principles of war.


~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~


No, this is simply not true.

Germany's surrender was not based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. Consequently, Germany neither agreed to them, nor had any reason to expect them.

Incidentally, tentative peace offers based on the fourteen points were offered in early 1918, which Germany did not accept, because it still hoped to win the war.


~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~



I am still curious - would these 21 points be at all aceptable as a Treaty, as conduct to make a workable peace?




Germany negotiated an armistice, then was forced to accept a treaty at gunpoint. That is stupid. Germany was losing the war, but she was not defeated, in order to be so she would need to be in rout; she was not. Retreat is not defeat, sueing for peace is not surrendur.

Germany was treated as though the Allies had marched through Berlin when they had not; this was stupid.

It is well known, and reported, that the Treaty was designed to impress upon the Germans that they had been deafeated, workable or not, it was designed to be humiliating.

[Pannonian]

Germany negotiated an armistice, then was forced to accept a treaty at gunpoint. That is stupid. Germany was losing the war, but she was not defeated, in order to be so she would need to be in rout; she was not. Retreat is not defeat, sueing for peace is not surrendur.

Germany was treated as though the Allies had marched through Berlin when they had not; this was stupid.

It is well known, and reported, that the Treaty was designed to impress upon the Germans that they had been deafeated, workable or not, it was designed to be humiliating.
The Germans had the option to resume arms if they didn't like the terms. That's what the Russians did, when they didn't like the terms Germany gave them. They got beaten even further back, and when they asked for terms again, they were given harsher ones that effectively ceded their most valuable lands. If the Germans didn't like the Versailles terms, they could have restarted the war. Since they didn't, it means the terms they got approximated to their military situation. When the Germans were in the ascendancy, they didn't hesitate to take advantage of Russian weakness to strip them of all they could hold. Why these complaints about taking advantage of Germany in turn, but a year after their party trick at Brest-Litovsk?

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

The Germans had the option to resume arms if they didn't like the terms. That's what the Russians did, when they didn't like the terms Germany gave them. They got beaten even further back, and when they asked for terms again, they were given harsher ones that effectively ceded their most valuable lands. If the Germans didn't like the Versailles terms, they could have restarted the war. Since they didn't, it means the terms they got approximated to their military situation. When the Germans were in the ascendancy, they didn't hesitate to take advantage of Russian weakness to strip them of all they could hold. Why these complaints about taking advantage of Germany in turn, but a year after their party trick at Brest-Litovsk?

Change of Goverment? Or the reverse, that a Communist government was an inherrent threat to everyone and needed to be de-fanged.

[The Wizard]

Versailles was implemented, just that Germany didn't want to accept it. It didn't even fully disarm. They hid their armies in Russia, in return, training the Russians, etc.

Only time the allies only made a case in enforcing Versailles was during the Franco-Belgium occuptation of the Ruhr, since Germany refused to pay.

You make it seem like this was unexpectedly low coming from them, like a soccer mom outraged over the ref missing a foul by the other team while her kid's playing.

I mean, what did you really expect? Limit a country with an army that big to an army that small overnight and this becomes pretty predictable.

That's a thing I don't see in this debate, at least, not since page 5 or so. It really shouldn't be about if Versailles was "harsh" or "just", because these are subjective values which might mean very different things to you and me than they did to Helmut and Pierre in 1920.

My problem with the Treaty stems not primarily from what it did to Germany. You see, Germany didn't exist in a vacuum. No, my problem with Versailles is that this document basically inaugurated two decades of conflict and hostility in Europe that really made that time an armistice in what we regard as two distinct wars, but what was really one and the same. In setting unrealistic demands and creating a foreign policy (in the case of France and Belgium mainly) that was intrinsically hostile to Germany, that inflamed German public opinion, maintained and widened the yawning canyon between France and Germany (Europe's scarred and ugly pit fighters), and more or less forced Germany into a financial policy that remains a German national trauma to this day, it did damage that was nearly irreparable. In Locarno they basically had to sacrifice Central Europe to Germany in order to start the mending process.

My problem with Versailles, in short, is that it intrinsically formed a major bone of contention in Europe that was a major factor in not preventing WW2. Not the most important, probably (certainly by the '30s), but major nevertheless. It was only the beginning of a story of counterproductive foreign policies, maybe even only the prologue, but that doesn't make it any less so.

Its creators may not have been able to achieve anything better, true. That much I concede to Louis and his sources. But I refuse to believe they could not have seen the short-term results of what was in the Treaty.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Yes, the Entente could have adopted Louis’ Plan Seeing as how nobody is biting....the rub is, Germany was granted the Louis Plan. :beam:

Yes, my 21 points plan sounds like silly mockery, like a preposterous plan that reverses victor and vanquished, but these 21 points below is the Versailles Treaty, re-paraphrased.

Perception and reality, and all that. :balloon2:


Peace without Victory, Louis' 21 Points:




Preamble






1 The French original of this Treaty is the only authoritative one. English, German and other translations to be without legal consequence.


2 Germany requests, and the allies confirm, that Germany shall retain its place as Europe’s largest power.








Reconstruction Costs







1 – There shall be no demands of reparations.


2- Germany does not have to pay costs of any kind for the allied military expenditures, or any costs of the war effort.


3 - There shall be only financial claims for reconstructing civil damages


3a- An exception shall be made for the UK. Britain, having sustained no direct civil damges, but facing large pension and disability costs as a result of the war, shall receive a large share of the costs for reconstruction meant for France and Belgium


4 – The costs for reconstruction shall take into account civil damages on all sides, on both sides of the border, including Germany


5 – These reconstruction costs, for both sides of the border, shall be split between the allies and Germany.


6 – These costs must be limited to a small sum


7 – These costs must not be based on actual damage, but on what any of the parties can pay, so as not to obstruct economic recovery. We must look forward, not backward




8 – To prop up Germany, these reconstruction costs shall be divided thus: allies to pay 95%, Germany to pay 5%


9 – To help Germany pay for reconstruction costs, it shall receive aid amounting to 150% of what it will pay towards reconstruction of war damages. That is, for every DM Germany pays, it will receive 1.5DM.






War Guild





7 – There shall be no War Guilt clause, only a legal-technical framework setting and limiting legal liability for reconstruction costs.





Colonial Possessions





8 – Only foreign possesions that have been colonised in the three decades before WWI shall be taken away from Germany.


9 – No foreign possessions with meaningful German settlement shall be taken


10 – The entire amount of German nationals affected by territorial transfer must be limited to no more than 20.000, worldwide.






Territorial Changes





10 – German territorial integrity shall be respected. There shall be no split up of Germany.


12 – Annexetion of German territory to the victorious states must be based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, in particular points six to fourteen


13 – In the west, transfer of territory must be striclty limited those territories which have been annexed by Germany since 1864. Traditional German lands must remain unaffected


14 – These territorial transfers must be in accordance with the wishes of the population affected.


15 - An exception to article 13 and 14 shall be made for Belgium. Belgium, whose neutrality was violated and suffered severly, shall be compensated territorially. This compensation will be limited to the two tiny rural villages of Eupen and Malmedy.


16 – In the east, with few exceptions, annexations must be limited to territories of overwhelming and traditional Polish majority






To Make and Retain the Peace





17 – The provisions in this treaty bear a temporary, comditional character. In due time, Germany shall be relieved of its obligations


18 – A United Nations shall be established. This institution shall deal with any disputes arising from this treaty in a peaceful manner.


19 This UN shall be empowered to deal with future conflicts. Reason and the rule of law, not the might of the victors of WWI, shall govern international relations.


20 – This United Nations shall be based in Geneva, Switzerland, and not in the territory of any of the victorious states


21 – Germany shall be made a full member of this UN no later than seven years after this treaty, to ensure Germany’s interests as a restored Great Power will be looked after.

[Beskar]

Seeing as how nobody is biting....the rub is, Germany was granted the Louis Plan. :beam:
Yes, my 21 points plan sounds like silly mockery, like a preposterous plan that reverses victor and vanquished, but these 21 points below is the Versailles Treaty, re-paraphrased.
Perception and reality, and all that. :balloon2:
Peace without Victory, Louis' 21 Points:

:wall: If you are correct. I am walking out of this topic, because to be Frankish, anyone who is arguing saying how harsh Versallias is, really needs to get a reality check.

[Louis VI the Fat]

:wall: If you are correct. I am walking out of this topic, because to be Frankish, anyone who is arguing saying how harsh Versallias is, really needs to get a reality check.To be fair, these 21 points are the conclusions of modern scholars (See first post in thread), and a slight mix of the treaty itself mixed with its implementation. But one will find many articles in almost the same format in the actual treaty, paraphrased and shortened by me.

These points are the actual points that caused so much 'humiliation' and 'eternal slavery'. For example, 20.000 was indeed the total number of Germans affected by colonial transfers. Germany did end up receiving 150% in loans of what it paid in reparations. Etcetera.
I have replaced 'reparations' - that maligned term - with 'reconstruction costs'. Because that was what they were, what they were intended to be. Which s now more clear. The 'League of Nations', instituted by the Versailles Treaty, I gave the name of 'United Nations' - because that name has not received the same bad press, but left the actual fact that Germany was already allowed entry in 1926 intact.

And so on and so forth.

[Beskar]

To be fair, these 21 points are the conclusions of modern scholars (See first post in thread), and a slight mix of the treaty itself mixed with its implememtation.

But yes, these points are the actual points that caused so much 'humiliation' and 'eternal slavery'. For example, 20.000 was indeed the total number of Germans affected by colonial transfers, Germany ended up receiving 150% in loans of what it paid in reparations, etcetera.

Ah, so it is the actual result of the treaty and not the treaty itself. That is understandable. But the conclusions are quite disturbing as in, what really occured.

[TinCow]

No, my problem with Versailles is that this document basically inaugurated two decades of conflict and hostility in Europe that really made that time an armistice in what we regard as two distinct wars, but what was really one and the same.

I agree, I personally consider WWI and WWII to be one conflicted divided by a long truce. It's worth noting that the period between WWI and WWII was 21 years long. The second truce of the Hundred Years war lasted 26 years (1389-1415). So, if that's considered one conflict, it's entirely reasonable to call WWI and WWII the same war.

[Centurion1]

I agree, I personally consider WWI and WWII to be one conflicted divided by a long truce. It's worth noting that the period between WWI and WWII was 21 years long. The second truce of the Hundred Years war lasted 26 years (1389-1415). So, if that's considered one conflict, it's entirely reasonable to call WWI and WWII the same war.

Yep good point and it just grew and mutated into something even uglier by the second round.

[Beskar]

I would argue they are different and not just a case of the "Empire Strikes back" as there are some very different models in place. Hypothetically, if there wasn't the Great Depression, Hitler would have never got into power in the first place and be the marginal loony fringe party, as it was always the case during the 1920's.

The Hundred Years war was basically the same two powers fighting each-other with the same types and form of governance.

[Centurion1]

I would argue they are different and not just a case of the "Empire Strikes back" as there are some very different models in place. Hypothetically, if there wasn't the Great Depression, Hitler would have never got into power in the first place and be the marginal loony fringe party, as it was always the case during the 1920's.

The Hundred Years war was basically the same two powers fighting each-other with the same types and form of governance.

I would also argue as what you said is all true one of the major reasons that hitler seized power was because of a lack of national pride which he instilled and a resentment because of Versailles. It could even be argued that Hitler was a product of the trenches.

[Pannonian]

I would also argue as what you said is all true one of the major reasons that hitler seized power was because of a lack of national pride which he instilled and a resentment because of Versailles. It could even be argued that Hitler was a product of the trenches.
How many times does this need to be repeated. It wasn't Versailles itself that caused the resentment. It was what Versailles represented, which was the defeat of the German Army. They didn't accept this because the Army was still on foreign soil when hostilities ended. For Versailles not to be resented by the Germans, it would have had to recognise Germany as a victor. Once Versailles recognised Germany as the defeated, the dolchstosslegende was already taking form. For any sane peace treaty to have worked, the young Germans, ie. those who would be making policy in a generation's time, needed to be convinced that they weren't in fact the victors. The only real failing of Versailles was that the war ended before German soldiers were dying in their thousands in Germany.

[Centurion1]

How many times does this need to be repeated. It wasn't Versailles itself that caused the resentment. It was what Versailles represented, which was the defeat of the German Army. They didn't accept this because the Army was still on foreign soil when hostilities ended. For Versailles not to be resented by the Germans, it would have had to recognise Germany as a victor. Once Versailles recognised Germany as the defeated, the dolchstosslegende was already taking form. For any sane peace treaty to have worked, the young Germans, ie. those who would be making policy in a generation's time, needed to be convinced that they weren't in fact the victors. The only real failing of Versailles was that the war ended before German soldiers were dying in their thousands in Germany.

And more deaths would really have decreased the resentment level. Versailles was harsh and unnecessarily so because everyone wanted their chunk of the Germans. Versailles was most definetly used as increased feul for german resentment leading up to WW2 that is pretty obvious

[Pannonian]

And more deaths would really have decreased the resentment level. Versailles was harsh and unnecessarily so because everyone wanted their chunk of the Germans. Versailles was most definetly used as increased feul for german resentment leading up to WW2 that is pretty obvious
Do you know what the dolchstosslegende is? Look it up before you next post on this.

[TinCow]

The Hundred Years war was basically the same two powers fighting each-other with the same types and form of governance.

I disagree with this. The situation in 1337 was vastly different from the situation in 1360, which was vastly different from the situation in 1389, which was vastly different from the situation in 1422, which was vastly different from the situation in 1453. In addition, while the conflicts between England and France were constant, there were numerous other nations that came into and left the war at various points in time, including Scotland, Portugal, Castile, Aragon, Navarre, Brittany, Flanders, Provence, Naples, and the Holy Roman Empire. Halfway through the war, the Western Schism occurred and fueled a whole new round of warfare for entirely different reasons. In addition, there were essentially separate wars between England and Castile, Castile and Aragon, Castile and Portugal, France and Flanders, France and Brittany, and England and Scotland. Add in full-fledged Civil Wars in England, Castile, France (multiple times), Brittany, and Flanders, and finally add in peasant revolutions in England, France, Flanders, and Castile.

It is simply not true that the Hundred Years War was just England v. France the entire time over the same issue. If anything, it was far more complex and far less static than WWI and WWII. I think a proper comparison of WWI and WWII to the Hundred Years War would require that the Cold War be added into the same war with WWI and WWII, including the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and every minor military action fueled by the US and Soviet conflicts.

[Husar]

I am not sure Auschwitz and 9-11 are comparable to states waging war. You are getting uncomfortably close to reasoning that took hold 25 years after Versailles. That Auschwitz was merely justified revenge, a tit-for-tat, doing unto 'them' what they did to us. Then again, I said it before: it is not merely rhetoric to say that Versailles lore caused sixty million deaths.
This is part of the Versailles lore that no serious scholarship can overcome: Germany as the persecuted victim A state that simply loses a war - as states so often do, is not the same as inflicting terrible injustice upon it, never mind mass murder.

I simply don't like blanket statements like "Losers can't be choosers." It's rather comparable to "Jews are bad."* so there you go.
WW1 was probably started because the Kaiser told Austria "We're with you whatever you do."
Of course the Versailles treaty was a valve for french revenge for 1871, while 1871 was the noble fight for german unification against the evil French who tried to prevent it. That Versailles was not really bad for us was certainly not because of french modesty.

Now that the Germans at the time found it unfair is hardly surprising, I'm sure the French found 1871 unfair as well, Bismarck's whole aim for the years afterwards was to try and prevent France from doing what Germany did after WW1, start another war to get revenge. Now obviously the allies were less successful than Bismarck.

* Note: Author is intending this as an exemplar and NOT expressing an opinion. ALL posters should use care in doing so in order to convey their point without accidentally casting aspersions. Please argue with care. --SF

[PanzerJaeger]

WW1 was probably started because the Kaiser told Austria "We're with you whatever you do."


The Kaiser did not want war and did the most of any of the world leaders to avoid it, unlike French leaders who were fueled by Revanchism - an extreme over reaction to the loss of the war they started and lost in 1871. :juggle2:

[Strike For The South]

re·vanche
n. 1. The act of retaliating; revenge.
2. A usually political policy, as of a nation or an ethnic group, intended to regain lost territory or standing.

[Aemilius Paulus]

re·vanche
n. 1. The act of retaliating; revenge.
2. A usually political policy, as of a nation or an ethnic group, intended to regain lost territory or standing.
What's up with the new definition trend? Are you aiming to be the definition version of the statistics person CountArach? If so, keep in mind one of my nicknames is 'walking dictionary' IRL... :tongue:

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Alsace and Lorraine were not taken into German control as a result of some plebescite. They were not returned to French control by one either. Caesers dictum about the winners getting to do pretty much what they want held true then, and now. This isn't a particularly cheery aspect of human interaction in conflict, but it has a long history.


Germany, after three years of war and the horror that was Verdun, took advantage of Russia's internal weakness and problems and won in the East, imposing the Treaty of Brest Litovsk to try and secure resources without frittering away troops. The British attempted to counter this unilateral treaty by intervening in North Russia to engender a collapse of the Bolshevik forces and a return of the pro-war Whites. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk was grossly one-sided. Russia's internal troubles, however, were so great that the Bolsheviks felt compelled to accept them in order to maintain their hold on the rest of Russia.

Despite finally hitting on the correct tactics to break the deadlock on the Western Front, Germany lacked the deep reserves it once had. Even with the reduced troop requirements in the East, they had too few troops to make it work. Their offensive worked very well at first, but eventally stalled. Ludendorff ran the numbers and realized that Germany could no longer attack, would be progressively more and more out-numbered while on the defense, and would not get enough resources out of Poland, Belorussia, and the Ukraine fast enough to compensate for the massive shortages they had begun to face. Rather than continuing to a full conclusion involving the invasion of Germany and the smashing of its cities, he called it quits. This was communicated to the Kaiser as early as August of 1918.

The Versailles Treaty was signed by a Germany that had gone through two revolutions, two changes of government, and the abdication of the Kaiser between October 28th 1918 and June 1st 1919. As had the Bolsheviks at Brest Litovsk, they had gotten to a point where they HAD TO sign any treaty to end the threat of foreign invasion.

Apparently the "stab in the back" Ludendorff so trumpeted was largely a fabrication. There was a "peace now" opposition, but they never really had any say in things until the government broke down after the armistice. The naval revolt was a bit parallel to the one in Russia, but really only got triggered when the sailors thought their officers would order them to attack Jellicoe and company in large-scale viking funeral effort. They didn't like that. However, this hardly counts as a "stab in the back" by the home front -- this was a naval mutiny. Ludendorff claimed he wanted to renew the war in October of 1918, but the government had already changed and was moving towards armistice and refused....the same government that Ludendorff himself had engendered so as to have the civilians rather than the military do the surrendering. He was lining them up to scapegoat them with the Armistice from the get-go as near as I can figure it. The "stab in the back" was compelling politics, but about as substantive as basing an entire campaign on hope and change.

[Beskar]

I simply don't like blanket statements like "Losers can't be choosers." It's rather comparable to "Jews are bad." so there you go.

No it isn't. It is comparable to beggars cannot be choosers, as in, they got nothing and cannot get anything, so when they are given something to eat, they take it. They can't really turn it down and ask for Marks and Spencers. Germany was in no position to get better terms, and it would have ended up in a far worse situation, with far harsher terms if it rejected, so if they wanted a lenient peace treaty, which Louis has kindly pointed out in his 21 points, they would have to accept it, or face worse.

In comparison to the example you gave, Jews aren't bad, therefore it is not comparable in the slightest as your example is fundamentally flawed, unless you are again, trying to make a statement which would warrant warning/infraction points. So I would highly recommend at least attempting to try using other examples. :inquisitive:

[Husar]

The Kaiser did not want war and did the most of any of the world leaders to avoid it, unlike French leaders who were fueled by Revanchism - an extreme over reaction to the loss of the war they started and lost in 1871. :juggle2:
Are you kidding? He didn't want a two-front war all that much but he had been trying to surpass the british fleet for years, gave the Austrians that blanket support I mentioned and didn't care about any alliances other than with Austria for reasons I cannot understand, he wanted Germany to have "a place under the sun", started aggressive politics, insulted several leaders of other countries and happily participated in gunboat diplomacy. Had he not wanted a war or aggression, he would have kept Bismarck instead of throwing him out.


No it isn't. It is comparable to beggars cannot be choosers, as in, they got nothing and cannot get anything, so when they are given something to eat, they take it. They can't really turn it down and ask for Marks and Spencers. Germany was in no position to get better terms, and it would have ended up in a far worse situation, with far harsher terms if it rejected, so if they wanted a lenient peace treaty, which Louis has kindly pointed out in his 21 points, they would have to accept it, or face worse.

In comparison to the example you gave, Jews aren't bad, therefore it is not comparable in the slightest as your example is fundamentally flawed, unless you are again, trying to make a statement which would warrant warning/infraction points. So I would highly recommend at least attempting to try using other examples. :inquisitive:

So you're perfectly fine with the way the SS ended the Warsaw uprising because the Jews lost the fight and losers can't be choosers? The jews also lost the elections to Hitler(not like there was a jewish party but they could have voted and campaigned for someone else) so they had it all coming as losers can't be choosers, yanno, I can go on and justify anything with that little sentence.
And you also think that there are beggars in the streets is perfectly fine?
Of course "Losers can't be choosers" is a reality, as I said before, but using the sentence to justify anything is opening Pandora's box, the guys in Gitmo also lost a fistfight to some CIA agents, so guess we shouldn't complain about them being there "Losers can't be choosers" after all...

[Pannonian]

So you're perfectly fine with the way the SS ended the Warsaw uprising because the Jews lost the fight and losers can't be choosers? The jews also lost the elections to Hitler(not like there was a jewish party but they could have voted and campaigned for someone else) so they had it all coming as losers can't be choosers, yanno, I can go on and justify anything with that little sentence.
And you also think that there are beggars in the streets is perfectly fine?
Of course "Losers can't be choosers" is a reality, as I said before, but using the sentence to justify anything is opening Pandora's box, the guys in Gitmo also lost a fistfight to some CIA agents, so guess we shouldn't complain about them being there "Losers can't be choosers" after all...

To the victor the spoils has been a fact of war forever. If you want to throw ethics into the question, have a look at a treaty imposed by Germany but a year before. Going by the standards set by the Germans themselves in the very recent past, there was absolutely nothing unfair about the Versailles treaty.

[Beskar]

So you're perfectly fine with the way the SS ended the Warsaw uprising because the Jews lost the fight and losers can't be choosers? The jews also lost the elections to Hitler(not like there was a jewish party but they could have voted and campaigned for someone else) so they had it all coming as losers can't be choosers, yanno, I can go on and justify anything with that little sentence.
And you also think that there are beggars in the streets is perfectly fine?

Do you hate people from a Jewish background or something? You keep making comments like "Jews are bad", the holocaust, Jewish people getting beaten by the SS, Jews fault Hitler was elected, etc.

While I am not from a Jewish background myself, I am getting disturbed. You either renamed yourself Godwin or a relic from Germany's past.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Do you hate people from a Jewish background or something? You keep making comments like "Jews are bad", the holocaust, Jewish people getting beaten by the SS, Jews fault Hitler was elected, etc.

While I am not from a Jewish background myself, I am getting disturbed. You either renamed yourself Godwin or a relic from Germany's past.

No, he's making the point that, "losers can't be chooses" can be used to justify every atrocity.

[Centurion1]

Do you know what the dolchstosslegende is? Look it up before you next post on this.

Actually i do know what it is as it was used in a editorial i read recently in the times. The Germans blamed the left for losing the war. Hitler was an economic socialist on paper. dolchstosslegende was used to foster resentment against people like jews and communists.

The germans were pissy because they lost the war had an economic collapse and disliked the terms of Versailles it is as simple as that.

[Beskar]

No, he's making the point that, "losers can't be chooses" can be used to justify every atrocity.

Though it wasn't justifying anything, it was the reality of the situation, the German's lost, Then they got a very lenient treaty anyway, so Versailles wasn't an atrocity in the fiirst place.

[Husar]

To the victor the spoils has been a fact of war forever. If you want to throw ethics into the question, have a look at a treaty imposed by Germany but a year before. Going by the standards set by the Germans themselves in the very recent past, there was absolutely nothing unfair about the Versailles treaty.
Well, that may well be right, but then the Germans getting worked up over it and electing Hitler was not anything special either, the French were still angry about 1871 in 1914, that's 43 years later, so why does this whole topic reek of "the Germans were whiners for not liking Versailles"? So were the french for not liking the Versailles of 1871 because obviously both treaties were the same level of harshness, how does that make us special? The French would have gladly fallen into out backs had we only invaded Russia and not them in 1914. They were very fortunate that our leaders were apparently quite a bit more idiotic when it came to diplomacy than theirs.


No, he's making the point that, "losers can't be chooses" can be used to justify every atrocity.
Exactly, I didn't think it was that hard to understand.

[PanzerJaeger]

Are you kidding? He didn't want a two-front war all that much but he had been trying to surpass the british fleet for years, gave the Austrians that blanket support I mentioned and didn't care about any alliances other than with Austria for reasons I cannot understand, he wanted Germany to have "a place under the sun", started aggressive politics, insulted several leaders of other countries and happily participated in gunboat diplomacy. Had he not wanted a war or aggression, he would have kept Bismarck instead of throwing him out.

With all due respect, you've got some reading to do. Wilhelm II indeed wanted a German empire comparable to those of the British and French, but he most certainly did not want it through a European war. Engaging in militarism and challenging the British fleet were about projecting power, not provoking war. Also, Bismarck was dismissed over social policy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_ii#Break_with_Bismarck). It had nothing to do with a shift in foreign policy.

Wiki offers a concise summary...


It is difficult to argue that Wilhelm actively sought to unleash the First World War. Though he had ambitions for the German Empire to be a world power, it was never Wilhelm's intention to conjure a large-scale conflict to achieve such ends. As soon as his better judgment dictated that a world war was imminent, he made strenuous efforts to preserve the peace—such as The Willy-Nicky Correspondence mentioned earlier, and his optimistic interpretation of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum that Austro-Hungarian troops should go no further than Belgrade, thus limiting the conflict. But by then it was far too late, for the eager military officials of Germany and the German Foreign Office were successful in persuading him to sign the mobilisation order and initiate the Schlieffen Plan that envisioned the occupation of Paris within 40 days.

Now, I am no fan of Wilhelm. He was a weak, immature, and poor leader. However, it is important to point out his efforts to stop the war, as it draws an important distinction between WW1 and the Franco-Prussian war - that the French initiated. It also highlights how eager the French were to engage in WW1, knowing that they had trapped Germany.

[Brenus]

“So were the French for not liking the Versailles of 1871 because obviously both treaties were the same level of harshness, how does that make us special?” It doesn’t. The only German “specialty” in this is only the German blame a Treaty for their own mistake following the treaty…

“The French would have gladly fallen into out backs had we only invaded Russia and not them in 1914.” Except to do this would have just respect a Defensive Treaty signed by France and Russia…
And, er, Germany invaded France in 1914. And Belgium. So, the only one to blame is the German Government.

“They were very fortunate that our leaders were apparently quite a bit more idiotic when it came to diplomacy than theirs”: In this matter, I think the French leaders were quite smart.
The Kaiser and the Junkers’ arrogance played in the French hands…

“he most certainly did not want it through a European war” He certainly did not… He was a little shock probably when France and UK, respecting signed defensive Treaties, said they will respected them. So he decided to declare war on France, to attack Belgium (as it was part of the plan!!!) and was surprise by UK reaction…
But at any moment the Kaiser was willing to go to war…

“It also highlights how eager the French were to engage in WW1”: Certainly they were… But, important but, they didn’t start it.
The Prussian was eager to start the 1870 war as well, as you probably know, as a tool of unification for Germany… It make Napoleon III stupid, not Bismark.
The fact that the Germans, knowing the French were decided to take back what was stolen few years ago, intention the French never hind, make the Germans even more stupid…

“that they had trapped Germany”: Germany trapped itself. Nobody obliged the Kaiser to back-up Austria on an offensive war.
The problem with the Kaiser and his optimistic view on the Austrian Ultimatum is it was absolutely baseless.
Serbia did accept almost every thing but Austria, with Germany blessing, wanted a war. They got it, lost it.
And didn’t stop to whine about it… How was it possible the French peasants were able to defeat the mighty German Army? It can only be possible because a fifth column (I know, too early…). The German were betrayed by, er, not completely German (Communist, Jews, Francs Masons, Homosexual, etc). That was the only rational reason.
All was ready to crush the French, the attack on a neutral country, the machine guns, artillery, mobilization, declaration of war, offensive, attack on Paris, we do this, they do this, parade in Paris, and all this good plan just failed. Hold one, can’t be.
It has to be something else. A back stab, that is it. The German Army never lost the Hindenburg Line, never lost at Verdun, in Champagne, at Ypres. It was a stab in the back by filthy politicians…

[PanzerJaeger]

Germany trapped itself.

This, I will agree with. Failing to renew the Reinsurance Treaty was perhaps Wilhelm's most damaging mistake.

[Kralizec]

The Versailles Treaty was signed by a Germany that had gone through two revolutions, two changes of government, and the abdication of the Kaiser between October 28th 1918 and June 1st 1919. As had the Bolsheviks at Brest Litovsk, they had gotten to a point where they HAD TO sign any treaty to end the threat of foreign invasion.

Hmmm. Someone correct me if I'm wrong, but the way I recall this episode is that Kerensky's interim government wanted to continue the war because it wasn't prepared to accept Germany's terms. The Bolshewiks then executed a well-coordinated coup d'etat and immediately accepted Germany's terms, so that they had their hands free to consolidate power...

[The Wizard]

AFAIK that is true, but the Bolsheviks left the negotiations due to what they viewed as excessive demands, following up with a failed policy of "no peace, no war" while huge tracts of lands fell into German hands before accepting even worse terms than offered at first. Which makes it pretty logical that Brest-Litovsk was so harsh, because the initial armistice was essentially repudiated by Russia's Bolshevik government giving Germany every right and opportunity (according to then-prevalent views) to simply march on and put Russia at an even bigger disadvantage. The blame for its extensive demands on Russia then, does not lie solely with Germany at all.


How many times does this need to be repeated. It wasn't Versailles itself that caused the resentment. It was what Versailles represented, which was the defeat of the German Army. They didn't accept this because the Army was still on foreign soil when hostilities ended. For Versailles not to be resented by the Germans, it would have had to recognise Germany as a victor. Once Versailles recognised Germany as the defeated, the dolchstosslegende was already taking form. For any sane peace treaty to have worked, the young Germans, ie. those who would be making policy in a generation's time, needed to be convinced that they weren't in fact the victors. The only real failing of Versailles was that the war ended before German soldiers were dying in their thousands in Germany.

Perhaps it wasn't Versailles itself that caused the resentment, but it was Versailles itself that caused the conflict. Which is part of why it was a bad peace treaty.

[Husar]

With all due respect, you've got some reading to do. Wilhelm II indeed wanted a German empire comparable to those of the British and French, but he most certainly did not want it through a European war. Engaging in militarism and challenging the British fleet were about projecting power, not provoking war. Also, Bismarck was dismissed over social policy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_ii#Break_with_Bismarck). It had nothing to do with a shift in foreign policy.

So why was no effort made to renew all those treaties Bismarck had made with other countries then? Maybe he didn't want this two-front large-scale european war, but he certainly worked hard to get there even if he didn't know that himself.
Bismarck's foreign policy was based around isolating France to prevent them from taking revenge, this wasn't continued at all, IIRC the only treaty renewed was the one with Austria as that probably suited his pipe dream of a germano-prussian power block or whatever.
I'm not going to defend Bismarck's internal policies as I'm not a fan of them, but his foreign policy was working quite well and it's disconuity (someone would have had to continue it after Bismarck's death anyway) was probably a major factor leading to WW1.
As Brenus says, it was Germany's own fault that it was trapped, but once trapped the only options to attacking France were either a defensive war in the west which would have risked France taking the industrial centers there or just giving up.


It doesn’t. The only German “specialty” in this is only the German blame a Treaty for their own mistake following the treaty…
That's not entirely correct, because in this thread the French are blaming a treaty for making a mistake that lead to a german mistake that they blame on the french mistake. I'm not going to accept that the unification of Germany was a mistake.

[Brenus]

“In this thread the French are blaming a treaty for making a mistake that lead to a German mistake that they blame on the French mistake.”
Err, no. The French, in this thread, remind the Germans that the 1870 Peace Treaty was not a model of Balance and Justice, and was harsher in some aspects than Versailles.
1870 Prussian War led to political unrest in France, Regime change and a plan was openly designed to hamper France to rise again from it.
As you mentioned, Bismarck’s policy was to isolate France and to prevent the revenge, as he knew the Treaty of Frankfurt he imposed to France had the seeds of a new war.
Then France went to built a new Colonial Empire to have access to coal, iron and raw material Iin order to regain the lost territories.

So, the complain about the allege harshness of Versailles (and more I read about it, more I am convince it was made up to avoid to pay the bills) are not really accurate.

Now, the perception of it, which I am now more and more convince it was built by Germany Political/Financial/Military Elites, was in fact more important.
When they succeeded to impose it to the German People mind (to explain and justify the mutinies, the unrests and the crack down on them), they find themselves out-maneuvered by an extreme-right nationalist movement they thought they could control, and made a deadly mistake.

“I'm not going to accept that the unification of Germany was a mistake.” No, it was not. The mistake was to do it in Versailles.
I perhaps make a mistake, but I think this is the only exemplar of a unification ceremony done after a victorious war on a foreign soil.
I do understand however the attraction of the Palace of Versailles. However, the Hegemonic Imperialist Political Message sent in doing this was perfectly understood by others European Countries…

[Husar]

Well, you see, Bismarck said when you beat an enemy you have two choices, you either make sure he can still look into a mirror afterwards or you make sure he won't rise again, he used the second tactic in 1871 and it worked until his successors completely neglected it. the treaty of Versailles was somewhere in between, first it was a "don't let them rise again", then it wasn't really enforced all that much, the german perception wouldn't have mattered had you not let Hitler and others circumvent it left and right.
Maybe 1871 was a bit harsher but in that case you should have learned from it that the loser would hate the guts of the winner for the next at least 43 years.

[Fisherking]

All this new look at the treaty has done is try to blame the Germans again.

The treaty was a failure for several reasons. Picking one and blaming the Germans dose not make it successful.

It didn’t keep Germany from rising again. It left the French feeling as though Germany got off too easy. It left the British feeling guilty and it allowed the US to slip back into isolationism.

It didn’t make Europe more stable. It didn’t make anyone happy with the outcome. Even Italy, who benefited the most was unhappy.

It cost a lot of lives and treasure but left Europe in a worse position than it started from.

Pointing fingers only causes old arguments to surface. I would say that the new look is not better than the old one.