is there free will? [Archive]

Beskar

03-23-2010, 00:34

As Sasaki went into, it is Semantics.

Define free will.

Is having predictable behaviour classed as free will? such as, you enjoy pepperoni pizza, therefore if I gave you pepperoni pizza, I predict you would enjoy it, and when I gave it you, you did.

As well as personalised tastes, people follow rituals. People generally do the same things all the time, we are creatures of habit. You don't suddenly randomly put on a pink dress and walk out the door just because you chose to, though given circumstances and your behaviour patterns, you might.

Hypothetically speaking, if I had all the data to how you would respond to something, I could hypothetically tell you your entire life story and how you would react in certain situations. Does this mean you process no free-will? No freedom to make a choice?

Answer is, you do have the freedom to pick up that pizza and eat it or not, however, behaviour is inherently predictable given if you know a certain about of information about a person, so I could predict what you would freely choose.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-23-2010, 01:15

a question:

if there is no rational mind which makes choices do people still have free will? and if not, when a person has no free will, are they no longer free?

Who says there is no rational mind? I need more context.

gaelic cowboy

03-23-2010, 01:20

a question:

if there is no rational mind which makes choices do people still have free will? and if not, when a person has no free will, are they no longer free?

We can still make choices when in an irrational mind so no your question is wrong

Beskar

03-23-2010, 02:07

Re-reading the OP, I think it might be more towards people with learning disabilities or mental illness. Yes, they still have free-will, if it is that.

KukriKhan

03-23-2010, 02:41

is there free will?

Of course there is. Because I will it, as do you (all). Without it, there is no randomization or chaos or anarchy, only rock-solid predictability. It is, after all, the Original SIN of Judeo-Christo-Muslo philosophy and tradition, which we are all supposed to be cured of by LAW (a subservience of our free will to a greater good), or a savior.

Centurion1

03-23-2010, 02:45

Who says there is no rational mind? I need more context.

mentally impaired, small children is what i think he is hinting at as beskar has answered.

Beskar

03-23-2010, 03:32

There may be limited conceptual and educated choices in comparison, but there is still free will.

CountArach

03-23-2010, 07:58

I follow Sartre on this one, and say that yes there is free will and that we can know this through angst and anxiety.

The Stranger

03-23-2010, 11:16

to avoid confusion, the question is hypothetical. i dont conclude there is no rational mind, but if there is none, what would be the case.

Sasaki i will come back to your question soon. and as to beskar, that is not what i meant. i mean more, do we have control over our own actions or are they determined. if you can predict my actions but not alter them than you have no control, so my will is still free if already was in the first place.

the modern definition of free will, at least in the dictionaries includes the requirement of rationality.

Free will is the purported ability of rational agents to exercise control over their actions, decisions, or choices to such an extent that they can be held responsible for their selections. (wikipedia)

“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. (stanford)

and so the list continues.

maybe i should add another question, does an animal have free will. an animal like a pig per example.

The Stranger

03-23-2010, 11:16

We can still make choices when in an irrational mind so no your question is wrong

a question cannot be wrong. :P

The Stranger

03-23-2010, 11:24

I follow Sartre on this one, and say that yes there is free will and that we can know this through angst and anxiety.

meh but sartre's idea(l) of freedom and free will is unliveable. more over its unrational. so if we would apply the modern definition of free will to it, we would still not have free will according to the definition while sartre does contribute free will to the person in such cases.

CountArach

03-23-2010, 13:16

meh but sartre's idea(l) of freedom and free will is unliveable.
Actually his branch of existential thought is far more practically applicable than any other form of philosophy. I follow it, for instance. The simple idea is "we have free will and with that comes all the responsibility in the Universe to do what is right by our standards." That is a very workable and liveable philosophy.

The Stranger

03-23-2010, 16:21

Actually his branch of existential thought is far more practically applicable than any other form of philosophy. I follow it, for instance. The simple idea is "we have free will and with that comes all the responsibility in the Universe to do what is right by our standards." That is a very workable and liveable philosophy.

oh yes it is, and i agree. but sartre puts it so radical it becomes unliveable in the pure form he intends it. that was all i meant.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-23-2010, 16:26

If you lay out five different objects that have been rated as equally appealing by test groups, they will pick one and say they picked it because they liked it the best, pointing out some feature of the object that made them pick it. But in actuality they pick the one on the far right 80% of the time.

So you have to ask: in all of our "choices" are the reasons we think we have the actual reasons?

But then, what do you call our capacity to resist our basic urges at times, and the effect our thoughts can have on our actions?

I would replace free will with "will", the urge to follow a set of beliefs rather than our "lower" (for lack of a better word) urges.

I follow Sartre on this one, and say that yes there is free will and that we can know this through angst and anxiety.

I don't understand this...

Rhyfelwyr

03-23-2010, 17:54

I would replace free will with "will"

This is always exactly what I have thought on the issue. People then say that if the path you choose is always inevitable due to your own nature, then this makes you a robot. But surely with this logic all that 'free will' would mean is that we were robots with a random element in decision making.

The Stranger

03-23-2010, 18:43

im also trying to find a definition of will or free will in which the rational element is excluded. we are free as a body i believe. i will explain more after dinner.

The Stranger

03-23-2010, 18:46

I don't understand this...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism#Angst

its sartre's philosophy based mostly on kierkegaard and heidegger's philosophy.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-23-2010, 19:31

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism#Angst

its sartre's philosophy based mostly on kierkegaard and heidegger's philosophy.

Angst, sometimes called dread, anxiety or even anguish is a term that is common to many existentialist thinkers. It is generally held to be the experience of humans' freedom and responsibility. The archetypal example is the experience one has when standing on a cliff where one not only fears falling off it, but also dreads the possibility of throwing oneself off. In this experience that "nothing is holding me back", one senses the lack of anything that predetermines one to either throw oneself off or to stand still, and one experiences one's own freedom.

There's a simple psychological mechanism for that "dread the possibility of throwing yourself off" bit though. The only way to make sure you don't do something is to have like a process running that checks to see if you are doing it. But the awareness of that check can be anxiety inducing.

That's the trouble with trying to answer psychological questions with philosophy. I don't find it to be an argument for free will anyway, because in that situation I wouldn't really be worried about my choosing to throw myself off the cliff of my own free will, but of something making me jump off the cliff against my will.

drone

03-23-2010, 19:51

Of course!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpCASVFyQoE

The Stranger

03-23-2010, 21:05

There's a simple psychological mechanism for that "dread the possibility of throwing yourself off" bit though. The only way to make sure you don't do something is to have like a process running that checks to see if you are doing it. But the awareness of that check can be anxiety inducing.

That's the trouble with trying to answer psychological questions with philosophy. I don't find it to be an argument for free will anyway, because in that situation I wouldn't really be worried about my choosing to throw myself off the cliff of my own free will, but of something making me jump off the cliff against my will.

i think the example sux... if i have time ill try to give good one.

Reenk Roink

03-24-2010, 04:20

Everything is predestined from eternity even one's choices, so they don't have free will in the commonly thought sense of being able to choose differently.

im also trying to find a definition of will or free will in which the rational element is excluded. we are free as a body i believe. i will explain more after dinner.

If you take a (naively) non deterministic view of the world, then human actions aren't caused or influenced by anything, "rational" considerations or not. So if you wish to go that way you can have it.

Beskar

03-24-2010, 04:34

Everything is predestined from eternity even one's choices, so they don't have free will in the commonly thought sense of being able to choose differently.

This has always been an interesting point of view especially with religion such as Christianity which believes in redemption. Hypothetically, if there is no free will then what is the point in redemption? As the end result, the Lord Almighty will know that we will commit sin and in the same breath the Lord Almighty would know if we will redeem ourselves or not. then the act of redemption becomes trivial as ultimately we are slaves to our destiny and we do not have the choice to redeem ourselves, as our fate has already been decided.

Reenk Roink

03-24-2010, 04:49

This has always been an interesting point of view especially with religion such as Christianity which believes in redemption. Hypothetically, if there is no free will then what is the point in redemption? As the end result, the Lord Almighty will know that we will commit sin and in the same breath the Lord Almighty would know if we will redeem ourselves or not. then the act of redemption becomes trivial as ultimately we are slaves to our destiny and we do not have the choice to redeem ourselves, as our fate has already been decided.

The problem comes because many people seem to require a sense of free will for moral responsibility (in both secular and religious contexts).

Aquinas made a really good case for double predestination (of the elect and the damned), even though I don't think it's an idea the Catholic Church endorses (correct me if I'm wrong Catholics).

The Stranger

03-24-2010, 11:09

Everything is predestined from eternity even one's choices, so they don't have free will in the commonly thought sense of being able to choose differently.

If you take a (naively) non deterministic view of the world, then human actions aren't caused or influenced by anything, "rational" considerations or not. So if you wish to go that way you can have it.

wow reenk how very constructive of you haha... who the hell is being naive thinking he has knowledge. that he knows the truth of anything?

if everything is predestined, by what is it predestined?

The Stranger

03-24-2010, 11:11

The problem comes because many people seem to require a sense of free will for moral responsibility (in both secular and religious contexts).

Aquinas made a really good case for double predestination (of the elect and the damned), even though I don't think it's an idea the Catholic Church endorses (correct me if I'm wrong Catholics).

i dont know... aquinas is one of the major authorithies for christianity and has been redeemed quit alot since the 19th century. so its much possible.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-24-2010, 16:08

Aquninine determinsim, itself essentially Augustinian in nature, was rejected as heterodox by the Catholic Church, and remains so today. Interestingly, Aquinas also proposed that beings are capable of independent agency seperate from God's direct control. From my persepctive, it seems that every attempt to remove Free Will from the Christian worldview is born of angst over relatively minor questions regarding how God's own nature and Divine Knowledge interact with the world he created.

broadly speaking, determinists usually feel the need to explain away one of two logical inconsistancies. The first is that God is all powerful, but that Free Will allows beings to rebel against God's power; the argument is easily undone by stating that God allows rebellion (Sin), but does not condone it. The second argument relates to God's constancy and his Onnicience. While this is harder to answer, it is easy to ignore because, bluntly, the Bible contains numerous instances of rebellion, so it clearly does happen.

On to the more philosophical question:

Why must the exercise of Free Will require reationality, and how do we define who is "rational"? For me, Free Will is apparent because if there were no Free Will or Random Chance the universe would be a perfectly ordered and regular place. It would also be a lot less interesting.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-24-2010, 16:47

On to the more philosophical question:

Why must the exercise of Free Will require reationality, and how do we define who is "rational"? For me, Free Will is apparent because if there were no Free Will or Random Chance the universe would be a perfectly ordered and regular place. It would also be a lot less interesting.

The problems I see with this are:

a) Who says there isn't random chance?
b) How do you know the universe isn't orderly? It could be a very complex order.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-24-2010, 16:59

The problems I see with this are:

a) Who says there isn't random chance?
b) How do you know the universe isn't orderly? It could be a very complex order.

Well, I claim there is random chance, and it therefore follows that there is random chance in our decision making. This being so, our decisions are not pre-determined, ergo Free Will is possible.

As to the Universe being orderly, Quantum Theory tells us that a situation has a variety of possible outcomes with varrying probability, not one pre-determined outcome.

The Stranger

03-24-2010, 17:00

i just am not in the mood to continue where i left of yesterday so ill just post the things i do have. sorry if its a bit fragmented or inconsistent.

Freedom in its most radical form is when one is subjected to nothing but oneself, meaning that nothing outside the individual controls his choices. This type of radical freedom would only exist in a situation when the individual is all there is, usually only Gods are attributed this type of freedom. Yet somehow this type of freedom, which is a divine freedom is also the standard to which humans are sometimes held. We must return freedom to the humans, it must become a human freedom, not an animal one, nor a divine one.

With neurosciences on the rise, more insight is being gained into the biochemical processes of our body. So while our conception of what a human is, is changing rapidly, our concepts which apply to humans are not changing at the same rate. This results in a Cartesian concept of free will, e.g. the idea that there is a rational faculty in each human being which controls it from a centralized point in the body, being pitted against a modern conception of what a human being is, e.g. we can conclude as much as that there is no such centralized rational faculty in our body. From the absence of this centralized rational faculty some people like to conclude the absence of free will. This is not a valid conclusion however. Free will may very well still exist, but instead of just one part of our body deciding for everything else, parts of our body decide for their own jurisdiction and as a body together they decide for the body as a whole. So human bodies are not a dictatorship or an autocracy but more a federal constitution. However it is still very much possible that our body as a whole has free will, because there are (many) situations thinkable in which nothing from outside this body influences the body in such way that the body has no choice left but to obey. The point I'm trying to make is that our concept of freedom must evolve alongside our conception of human beings. Since the idea the mind and body are separated is fading in our conception of human beings it should likewise fade in our conception of free will.

To say that a person has free will because he (in this case is soul or mind or any similar phrase) makes his own choices, amounts to as much as to say that, a person is free because nothing outside this person influences him so that he has no choice but to obey that external influence. So if our conception of what we are as human beings changes from the soul to the body than so must it change in our conception of free will. Thus the 'he' is no longer soul but body, yet the concept of free will applies to the body as well as it did to the soul before.

The objection can be made that we are not aware of these choices at the bodily level and thus the choices are not rational and so one is not free. Yet why is rationality a requirement for freedom? Are animals not free, or rationally impaired human beings? And if it is truly so that our current conception of human beings is the right one, than it has always been so. Why should the actions we would have labeled as an act of free will not years ago be labeled as determined only because it turns out we are not aware of them.

if this: "a decision or situation is often called rational if it is in some sense optimal, and individuals or organizations are often called rational if they tend to act somehow optimally in pursuit of their goals." is the definition of rational. i dont see why the body cant be rational. and thus when the body is rational and the body makes choices, then the body must have free will.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-24-2010, 17:39

Well, I claim there is random chance, and it therefore follows that there is random chance in our decision making. This being so, our decisions are not pre-determined, ergo Free Will is possible.

As to the Universe being orderly, Quantum Theory tells us that a situation has a variety of possible outcomes with varrying probability, not one pre-determined outcome.

I don't see the relation between random chance and free will. Imagine that you are in an ice cream shop picking your favorite ice cream. In a largely deterministic world you would probably pick your favorite, unless you have an urge to go for variety, or something else like that. Your favorite was predetermined, possibly be some combination of genetically coded taste buds, what kind of ice cream you had first, etc. Is this really a bad thing? Your choice may be predetermined, but it's based on who you are and what you want.

If there is random chance, then how is that different from you flipping a coin to decide between two flavors? It doesn't sound like a choice at all.

So human bodies are not a dictatorship or an autocracy but more a federal constitution. However it is still very much possible that our body as a whole has free will, because there are (many) situations thinkable in which nothing from outside this body influences the body in such way that the body has no choice left but to obey. The point I'm trying to make is that our concept of freedom must evolve alongside our conception of human beings. Since the idea the mind and body are separated is fading in our conception of human beings it should likewise fade in our conception of free will.

...

To say that a person has free will because he (in this case is soul or mind or any similar phrase) makes his own choices, amounts to as much as to say that, a person is free because nothing outside this person influences him so that he has no choice but to obey that external influence.

I mostly agree, but disagree with the direction you took it. Saying that the human body is not a dictatorship would lead me to the conclusion that free will doesn't apply to the body as a whole. I can't choose not to be hungry, right? If we have any sort of free will, it rests in the part of our brain that is conscious, that thinks and has urges to overcome our "basic" urges. It's not very powerful, but it's what separates us from most animals.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-24-2010, 17:51

Sasaki Kojiro

03-24-2010, 18:00

Determinism would mean that whether or not the coin landed heads or tails would be determined before you flipped it, with 100% certainty. Random chance is a prerequisite for Free Will because wihtout it the universe has no room for divergence from it's ordained course.

No, it's only a prerequisite for a certain conception of free will. And certainly not sufficient. Random chance cannot possibly equal free will, because when you flip coins to determine your actions it is the coin that decides, not you. In an extreme random chance scenario, everytime you pass someone on the street you have a chance of flipping out and killing them. All it takes is the right coin flips.

The Stranger

03-24-2010, 23:33

I don't see the relation between random chance and free will. Imagine that you are in an ice cream shop picking your favorite ice cream. In a largely deterministic world you would probably pick your favorite, unless you have an urge to go for variety, or something else like that. Your favorite was predetermined, possibly be some combination of genetically coded taste buds, what kind of ice cream you had first, etc. Is this really a bad thing? Your choice may be predetermined, but it's based on who you are and what you want.

If there is random chance, then how is that different from you flipping a coin to decide between two flavors? It doesn't sound like a choice at all.

I mostly agree, but disagree with the direction you took it. Saying that the human body is not a dictatorship would lead me to the conclusion that free will doesn't apply to the body as a whole. I can't choose not to be hungry, right? If we have any sort of free will, it rests in the part of our brain that is conscious, that thinks and has urges to overcome our "basic" urges. It's not very powerful, but it's what separates us from most animals.

no it can't choose not to be hungry. but i dont see hunger as some influence from the outside. it is part of the bodily functions. it is part of life. life needs to be sustained or otherwise it will die. no free will can alter that. the body though is free to choose not to eat, to ignore this hunger, or to eat and choose what it eats. its probably much more complicated, i have to get more into biology. i already foresee difficulties with allergies and stuff.

the brain which is conscious, or the conscious activity of the brain is very limited, i believe the entire body thinks, but just not everything is translated into the conscious part of the brain. only those actions that cannot do without.

The Stranger

03-24-2010, 23:35

Sasaki Kojiro

03-24-2010, 23:42

no it can't choose not to be hungry. but i dont see hunger as some influence from the outside. it is part of the bodily functions. it is part of life. life needs to be sustained or otherwise it will die. no free will can alter that. the body though is free to choose not to eat, to ignore this hunger, or to eat and choose what it eats. its probably much more complicated, i have to get more into biology. i already foresee difficulties with allergies and stuff.

the brain which is conscious, or the conscious activity of the brain is very limited, i believe the entire body thinks, but just not everything is translated into the conscious part of the brain. only those actions that cannot do without.

Well, it's true that people have starved themselves to death. Some monks in Japan used to practice self-mummification. You could, I suppose, see that as the ultimate expression of free will.

But it still seems like it's the one part of the brain that exercises it. If you quit smoking, then your "body" (including parts of the brain) was very strongly pushing to keep smoking. There is conflict within the body. And I don't feel that that part is really "you". It's sort of like an outside influence.

Rhyfelwyr

03-25-2010, 00:06

Sasaki Kojiro

03-25-2010, 00:18

Now, if your decision making has a random element, the above factors may lead you to lean 80% in favour of vanilla, and 20% in favour of chocolate. On average, 4 times out of 5 you will go for vanilla. But in each case, you were able to choose chocolate, and some times you did. Chocolate wasn't just a flavour that was taken into consideration and then overriden every time by vanilla - there was in each case a very real chance that you might go for chocolate.

But that isn't at all implied by quantum randomness (as far as I understand it). If something is random, it isn't by choice, that's part of the definition.

But in a deterministic world where there isn't a random element to decision making, every single time you will take vanilla. Sure, you want to take vanilla. You 'will' to do it, and you get what you want. But you could never have chosen the chocolate, without first changing your own tastes. Therefore, you do not have 'free will' as the term is generally used, since there was only one course of action you could take, the one which you 'willed' to do.

That's not true though. Say that you like vanilla better, but chocolate reminds you of the holidays. The song in the ice cream shop might also remind you of the holidays and then you buy chocolate. You may feel that you have to much consistency in your life and go for something different. Just because it's deterministic doesn't mean it isn't complex.

Reenk Roink

03-25-2010, 02:21

wow reenk how very constructive of you haha... who the hell is being naive thinking he has knowledge. that he knows the truth of anything?

if everything is predestined, by what is it predestined?

I think you misunderstood what I mean and it's my bad for using naive as the adjective. It still fits, but the better word would be a simple non determinism (a la Lucretius). Human actions aren't caused or influenced by anything, including "rational" considerations. I was just answering your question.

Of course, one could then argue that this kind of model doesn't allow for free will either, as their is no choice anyway (it is 'random' for lack of a better term).

--

God.

As to the Universe being orderly, Quantum Theory tells us that a situation has a variety of possible outcomes with varrying probability, not one pre-determined outcome.

First thanks for the clarification with Catholic doctrine. :bow:

The QM argument against determinism is probably the (mildly) promising one, but it does run into some problems. First the interpretations of QM by many scientists I believe is one that embraces ontological randomness and denies determinism, but their are definitely others which don't answer the determinism question or answer positively and my view is firmly that there isn't any ontological randomness.

Furthermore, you can find many arguments that while granting the particular interpretation of QM with micro-indeterminism, do not grant that it amplifies to the macro level (read neurons) thus making the discussion of QM irrelevant.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-25-2010, 12:11

No, it's only a prerequisite for a certain conception of free will. And certainly not sufficient. Random chance cannot possibly equal free will, because when you flip coins to determine your actions it is the coin that decides, not you. In an extreme random chance scenario, everytime you pass someone on the street you have a chance of flipping out and killing them. All it takes is the right coin flips.

You misunderstand, I merely meant that random chance is a pre-requisite, i.e. that without a random element in the universe that Free Will would be impossible, the idea can't even get off the ground.

I think what PVC means is that the random element is necessarily in order to make you able to pursue more than one course of action, and it is this ability that makes your will 'free'. With a random element, you have the ability to weigh up your options in any given scenario, and from this give each their own probablity for actually taking them. Without a random element, you will only ever choose the one path. You may 'will' to do it, but your will was not free - there was no random element, hence what you did was inevitable, hence your will was not 'free' in the sense that it could ever have done anything differently.

So say you can pick two flavours of ice cream, one vanilla, the other chocolate. Vanilla is your favourite. It was the first flavour you ever tried, it tastes nice and creamy, and it reminds you of your holidays. Chocolate has less going for it, but it does satisfy your sweet tooth.

Now, if your decision making has a random element, the above factors may lead you to lean 80% in favour of vanilla, and 20% in favour of chocolate. On average, 4 times out of 5 you will go for vanilla. But in each case, you were able to choose chocolate, and some times you did. Chocolate wasn't just a flavour that was taken into consideration and then overriden every time by vanilla - there was in each case a very real chance that you might go for chocolate.

But in a deterministic world where there isn't a random element to decision making, every single time you will take vanilla. Sure, you want to take vanilla. You 'will' to do it, and you get what you want. But you could never have chosen the chocolate, without first changing your own tastes. Therefore, you do not have 'free will' as the term is generally used, since there was only one course of action you could take, the one which you 'willed' to do.

I believe the latter scenario is the reality we live in, and that's why I said earlier why I believe we have a 'will', but not a 'free will'.

Clearly you and I have been arguing for too long.

The QM argument against determinism is probably the (mildly) promising one, but it does run into some problems. First the interpretations of QM by many scientists I believe is one that embraces ontological randomness and denies determinism, but their are definitely others which don't answer the determinism question or answer positively and my view is firmly that there isn't any ontological randomness.

Ok, so the weight of Scientific opinion is against determinism. Why do you dissagree.

Furthermore, you can find many arguments that while granting the particular interpretation of QM with micro-indeterminism, do not grant that it amplifies to the macro level (read neurons) thus making the discussion of QM irrelevant.

The point about Quantom Theory is that it demonstrates that Physics generally does not actually support a deterministic worldview, as was previously claimed. Ultimately we know very little about how the universe works, we just have a lot of theories that fit the (very limited) data.

The Stranger

03-25-2010, 12:35

Well, it's true that people have starved themselves to death. Some monks in Japan used to practice self-mummification. You could, I suppose, see that as the ultimate expression of free will.

But it still seems like it's the one part of the brain that exercises it. If you quit smoking, then your "body" (including parts of the brain) was very strongly pushing to keep smoking. There is conflict within the body. And I don't feel that that part is really "you". It's sort of like an outside influence.

it is free will... but there is one problem. is it rational? i doubt it is when you take rational in the optimal sense. but on the other hand it might be rational because it is thoroughly thought through. or maybe that just makes it reasonable? if it is not rational, than how can there be nonrational free will? and how can a rational body willingly wish and practice its own demise?

i dont see why those parts of the body are not you? they are certainly part of you, or do you believe we, as a rational soul or whatever, are chained within a body, which we use but not are. in the same way we use a car perhaps. the body can be in conflict, just as your desires can be in conflict. will i buy a new tv or a new playstation? will i date this girl and forsake my friends? etc

The Stranger

03-25-2010, 12:41

I think you misunderstood what I mean and it's my bad for using naive as the adjective. It still fits, but the better word would be a simple non determinism (a la Lucretius). Human actions aren't caused or influenced by anything, including "rational" considerations. I was just answering your question.

Of course, one could then argue that this kind of model doesn't allow for free will either, as their is no choice anyway (it is 'random' for lack of a better term).

--

God.
.

i already though so. no worries.

anyhow, if god determined everything, than he is the cause of human actions right?

Reenk Roink

03-25-2010, 14:15

Ok, so the weight of Scientific opinion is against determinism. Why do you dissagree.

Non-deterministic interpretations of QM don't feel right at all. As I mentioned in that post, there are other interpretations that do support determinism. (Furthermore it has yet to be shown that any kind of indeterminism is distinguishable from determinism at anything above the Quantum level).

TS: yes

The Stranger

03-25-2010, 15:28

Non-deterministic interpretations of QM don't feel right at all. As I mentioned in that post, there are other interpretations that do support determinism. (Furthermore it has yet to be shown that any kind of indeterminism is distinguishable from determinism at anything above the Quantum level).

TS: yes

meh.. im just now reading nietzsche. so im not willing to go into your answer right now. because i foresee a whole lot of blood haha :P

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-25-2010, 16:28

Non-deterministic interpretations of QM don't feel right at all. As I mentioned in that post, there are other interpretations that do support determinism.

Don't "feel" right? That sounds like just a personal opinion. You yourself admitted that the majority of Scientists support nondeterministic interpretations.

(Furthermore it has yet to be shown that any kind of indeterminism is distinguishable from determinism at anything above the Quantum level).

Irrelevant, the whole edifice is still little more than a theory, that's like me saying, "It has yet to be demonstrated that there is any form of determinism".

I would also note that The Stranger's earlier musings on a shift between body/soul in terms of our understanding of conciousness is somewhat odd, as greater understanding of the mechanical body has no bearing on the existence of a soul, nor have we yet been able to define conciousness itself.

Strike For The South

03-25-2010, 16:29

I think yall are looking at the forrest when you should be more focused on the trees

Sasaki Kojiro

03-25-2010, 17:00

You misunderstand, I merely meant that random chance is a pre-requisite, i.e. that without a random element in the universe that Free Will would be impossible, the idea can't even get off the ground.

Yes, but I don't see the point in saying that because

1) The are conceptions of free will compatible with determinism
2) randomness is not control

The point about Quantom Theory is that it demonstrates that Physics generally does not actually support a deterministic worldview, as was previously claimed. Ultimately we know very little about how the universe works, we just have a lot of theories that fit the (very limited) data.

Generally, newtonian physics works on the large scale, but not on the micro scale. It seems reasonable to say that determinism is accurate on the large scale.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-26-2010, 00:07

The are conceptions of free will compatible with determinism.

Name one.

In order for the Will to be "Free" it must be unbound, if it is fettered by fate then it is not "Free".

Sasaki Kojiro

03-26-2010, 01:11

Name one.

In order for the Will to be "Free" it must be unbound, if it is fettered by fate then it is not "Free".

It's generally called "compatibilism". Many varieties.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-26-2010, 01:26

It's generally called "compatibilism". Many varieties.

That's all you've got? I was hoping for a reasoned argument.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-26-2010, 01:38

That's all you've got? I was hoping for a reasoned argument.

All you made was an assertion :tongue3:

You are saying that free will requires regulative control, i.e. that you have to be able to choose between different alternatives. Other people would argue that you have free will if you have guidance control, i.e. you bring about your actions even if you don't have any alternative. I was talking about this in the ice cream example. Do you define freedom as the ability to do anything? I would think not, because then no one could have free will, since we are all fettered by gravity. Some might say that a freely taken action originates in a certain way from your psychological self.

Reenk Roink

03-26-2010, 02:05

Don't "feel" right? That sounds like just a personal opinion. You yourself admitted that the majority of Scientists support nondeterministic interpretations.

Well yeah it's a personal opinion. Anyway, I frequently disregard the opinions of many people with the scientific mindset especially on metaphysical issues (such as scientific realism). Many scientists today are scientific realists, but there's a very good argument that constructive empiricists stand on firmer ground, for example.

The interpretation of QM that I support for example (or other interpretations that others support), is as consistent with the results of QM as the main one. Just because many scientists today don't like it is as irrelevent as the fact as Einstien did like it. :shrug:

Irrelevant, the whole edifice is still little more than a theory, that's like me saying, "It has yet to be demonstrated that there is any form of determinism".

But it's absolutely relevant. It shows that invoking QM and interpreting the results as proof of ontological indeterminism does not do anything to the argument for determinism that is made in respect to free will.

Determinism certainly has some extremely strong arguments for it however. Cause-effect relations abound. Determinism above the Quantum level has a much stronger argument for it than any kind of indeterminism.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-26-2010, 14:54

All you made was an assertion :tongue3:

You are saying that free will requires regulative control, i.e. that you have to be able to choose between different alternatives. Other people would argue that you have free will if you have guidance control, i.e. you bring about your actions even if you don't have any alternative. I was talking about this in the ice cream example. Do you define freedom as the ability to do anything? I would think not, because then no one could have free will, since we are all fettered by gravity. Some might say that a freely taken action originates in a certain way from your psychological self.

Free Will requires options, if you have only one option then your "Will" is being externally directed and is totally unfree. Since it certainly appears we have Free Will (otherwise we would not have started this agument) I tend to think the burden of proof must lie on determinism.

Andres

03-26-2010, 15:12

I tend to think the burden of proof must lie on determinism.

Me too.

I decided to post in this thread today. Prove to me that I did not post out of my own free will but that I did it because I was determined to do so. And even if you can prove that everything is determined: does it matter? I certainly don't feel like everything I do is determined. If my free will is but an illusion, then it's a damn good one. Maybe it's so good because it's not an illusion?

Filosophy is nice and fun and it offers good thinking exercises, but it often occupies itself with fruitless questions, "do we have a free will?" being one of them. Who cares if what I'm doing has always been determined or not?

Of course, there are some things we can't control. Some call it "luck" or "bad luck", others "coincidence" and others "destiny", but the fact that there are some things beyond our control doesn' mean that we don't have free will. I have a free will.

Feel free to convince me otherwise.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-26-2010, 15:26

Quite, but why bother to try and prove us wrong if the world is deterministic. Then it doesn't matter either way.

Andres

03-26-2010, 15:29

Quite, but why bother to try and prove us wrong if the world is deterministic. Then it doesn't matter either way.

Determinism is just an excuse for hippies and communists to be lazy :mean:

"It's not my fault that I'm lazy! I was determined to be so!"

Bah.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-26-2010, 15:46

Free Will requires options, if you have only one option then your "Will" is being externally directed and is totally unfree. Since it certainly appears we have Free Will (otherwise we would not have started this agument) I tend to think the burden of proof must lie on determinism.

:inquisitive:

I agree that the fact that we started this argument is evidence that we have free will, a certain kind of free will. But I disagree with your definition. It is entirely possible for the world to be deterministic and for us to have started this argument.

With determinism, your actions are merely predictable, not "externally directed". And why would you want to live in a world where your actions weren't predictable? Would you want to be unpredictable? Would you want "I'm perfectly normal now, but could go crazy at any moment if a certain random event occurs"?

Essentially it seems like your concluding determinism to be false based on the assumption that it's incompatible with free will. But why do you assume that?

"It's not my fault that I'm lazy! I was determined to be so!"

That's fatalism.

Andres

03-26-2010, 15:50

With determinism, your actions are merely predictable, not "externally directed".

Then the word determism is poorly chosen. Our actions are predictable (only to a certain extent, certainly if you look at the individual level), not determined.

That's fatalism.

Semantics.

The difference is not that big.

Determinism:

"I'm lazy, but so what, everything is determined anyway, so I can just as well be lazy."

Sasaki Kojiro

03-26-2010, 16:13

Then the word determism is poorly chosen. Our actions are predictable (to a certain extent, certainly if you look at the individual level), not determined.

They are predictable to the extent that they are determined. The idea being, that if there was some demon who understood perfectly the laws of nature, and had exact information about the world, he could predict exactly what choice you would make. If it was up to you entirely, then your actions wouldn't be predictable. If there is an element of randomness, then it isn't predictable either, but since randomness isn't choice it's generally best to just leave the complicated physics out of the discussion.

There would be no predictability without some level of determinism. Now we as people can't predict very well, but that's because we have a limited capacity. You can't predict where all the balls will go when you break on a pool table, but do you think that some thing that had more capability couldn't predict where each ball would end up, based on information about the cue ball?

Semantics.

The difference is not that big.

Determinism:

"I'm lazy, but so what, everything is determined anyway, so I can just as well be lazy."

That's fatalism, a nice definition of it by the way. Determinism is the "idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature".

Why don't you think there is a significant difference? Fatalism is a kind of "it doesn't matter if I wear my seatbelt, my date of death is predetermined". But of course, it does matter if you wear your seatbelt.

Rhyfelwyr

03-26-2010, 18:04

Determinism:

"I'm lazy, but so what, everything is determined anyway, so I can just as well be lazy."

And yet, we had the Calvinist work ethic.

I decided to post in this thread today. Prove to me that I did not post out of my own free will but that I did it because I was determined to do so. And even if you can prove that everything is determined: does it matter? I certainly don't feel like everything I do is determined. If my free will is but an illusion, then it's a damn good one. Maybe it's so good because it's not an illusion?

Why should the burden of proof lie on determinism as opposed to the free wil argument? Determinism is the simplest explanation of why things are the way they are today. Free will requires all sorts of abstract reasoning for alternative timelines, allowing different paths through time for different choices.

With determinism, you chose to post in this thread because given the conditions which you took into consideration when deciding whether or not to do so, you went with the option that appeared best to you. With free will, you need something that goes beyond the way science sees our brains as being sorts of computers that run by generating electric signals, and you have to add it some sort of spiritual/metaphysical element that we have no proof of whatsoever.

You say that your participation in this thread is proof of your free will. But surely all you can know is that you wanted to participate in the thread. Can you provide any evidence to suggest that you might ever have not participated in this thread?

The Stranger

03-26-2010, 18:37

science is not as a whole in favor of determinism. or free will for that matter. what science says about the brain or sees it etc is not a valid argument in this discussion untill more is known.

The Stranger

03-26-2010, 18:44

Well yeah it's a personal opinion. Anyway, I frequently disregard the opinions of many people with the scientific mindset especially on metaphysical issues (such as scientific realism). Many scientists today are scientific realists, but there's a very good argument that constructive empiricists stand on firmer ground, for example.

The interpretation of QM that I support for example (or other interpretations that others support), is as consistent with the results of QM as the main one. Just because many scientists today don't like it is as irrelevent as the fact as Einstien did like it. :shrug:

But it's absolutely relevant. It shows that invoking QM and interpreting the results as proof of ontological indeterminism does not do anything to the argument for determinism that is made in respect to free will.

Determinism certainly has some extremely strong arguments for it however. Cause-effect relations abound. Determinism above the Quantum level has a much stronger argument for it than any kind of indeterminism.

if there is free will cause and effect will only situate your freedom, not determine it. e.g. the effect will cause your scala of choises, but which choice you make is still yours. wether the choices available are all rational is something different.

All you made was an assertion :tongue3:

You are saying that free will requires regulative control, i.e. that you have to be able to choose between different alternatives. Other people would argue that you have free will if you have guidance control, i.e. you bring about your actions even if you don't have any alternative. I was talking about this in the ice cream example. Do you define freedom as the ability to do anything? I would think not, because then no one could have free will, since we are all fettered by gravity. Some might say that a freely taken action originates in a certain way from your psychological self.

you should google the deciscion inducer thought experiment.

Name one.

In order for the Will to be "Free" it must be unbound, if it is fettered by fate then it is not "Free".

thats actually not true. Human Freedom is always bound. unless you believe there is a radical schism between body and mind or soul, and such mind or soul is pure active intellect. but then it is still bound, if not in the body. because as pure intellect it is not possible to touch the material world. or you would argue that all is pure energy but then we get into another discussion entirely.

The Stranger

03-26-2010, 18:46

Quite, but why bother to try and prove us wrong if the world is deterministic. Then it doesn't matter either way.

u make a mistake here. if the world really was determined they have no choice. they just do it and why they do it is something we and they dont understand. i agree with you that if it was divinely determined there would be no sense in this argument, why would a god let his subjects talk possible heresy etc. but if its more bodily determined than there are no reasons only causes for what we do.

:inquisitive:

With determinism, your actions are merely predictable, not "externally directed"

what kind of determinism is that? they are not merely predictable, they are predictable because everything is cause and effect, so if you know that cause and of everything you can logically determine its effect and so on. so its indeed not neccesarily externally directed... hmm...

The Stranger

03-26-2010, 18:51

double post sorry.

Subotan

03-26-2010, 19:31

Surely if we are able to say that we have free will, then we have free will?

Sasaki Kojiro

03-26-2010, 19:32

you should google the deciscion inducer thought experiment.

This one?

Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened.

Well, I agree that not having the ability to do otherwise is not a threat to free will. I don't think you need the thought experiment though, although I guess it helps.

what kind of determinism is that? they are not merely predictable, they are predictable because everything is cause and effect, so if you know that cause and of everything you can logically determine its effect and so on. so its indeed not neccesarily externally directed... hmm...

I say "merely" because it's simply not bad thing if our actions are completely predictable by some sort of omniscient thing, even though people present as if it is a bad thing. The fact that you can predict what I'm going to choose, that I was always going to choose it, simply isn't that relevant. It doesn't change the fact that I'm the kind of person who would choose it in that circumstance, just as it doesn't make Jones not a murderer.

The Stranger

03-26-2010, 20:19

This one?

Well, I agree that not having the ability to do otherwise is not a threat to free will. I don't think you need the thought experiment though, although I guess it helps.

I say "merely" because it's simply not bad thing if our actions are completely predictable by some sort of omniscient thing, even though people present as if it is a bad thing. The fact that you can predict what I'm going to choose, that I was always going to choose it, simply isn't that relevant. It doesn't change the fact that I'm the kind of person who would choose it in that circumstance, just as it doesn't make Jones not a murderer.

yes that is an example of the experiment. i like it, though its a bit ethically related.

just a note, free will applies to the will of humans so far this discussion is concerned and indeed does allow for other parts of the world to be determined. such as when you drop a stone or when somethning happens on cellular level. there is a difference between that determinism and a determined will, ergo no free will at all.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-27-2010, 01:48

u make a mistake here. if the world really was determined they have no choice. they just do it and why they do it is something we and they dont understand. i agree with you that if it was divinely determined there would be no sense in this argument, why would a god let his subjects talk possible heresy etc. but if its more bodily determined than there are no reasons only causes for what we do.

Actually, I made a naughty rhetorical flounce and you caught me :bow:. However, if one admits that everyone here actually believes they have free will (otherwise why are the determinists arguing with me, regardless of whether their belief is determined they clearly believe they can argue with me.) then that begs the question of why we should think the world is deterministic. Cause and Effect does work, broadly speaking, but it's not reliable.

Increasingly we find that answers beget more questions, formulae end in curves rather than finite results.....

there's clearly something fishy going on.

The Stranger

03-27-2010, 12:55

I think i found a way to say what i want about free will and irrationality. i had to read sartre for it so if things sound familiar thats why. its still unpolished, so spill your thoughts about it.

Rationality is not prerequisite for free will. Because it is the capability of humans to be irrational which is also part of our free will. Animals cannot be rational, but they cannot be irrational either. Their nature coincides entirely with their being, thus they always act optimally for their cause, which is the survival of their being. No animal will starve himself for a noble cause other than its own survival. Human nature however does not entirely coincide with their being, they have the ability or the choice so to speak, to be of another nature. Humans have the possibility, the choice, to be irrational. To not act optimally in regard of their cause, to play games while they should study, or to starve while the body demands food. This is because human nature allows for more causes than the survival of its being. However the survival of its being is the cause from which all other causes derive, so it is the primal cause. If one would (knowingly?) something which would harm this cause, like smoking cigarettes, this would be irrational, even though it is optimally in pursuit of a secondary cause, pleasure.

i also have a whole part about being conscious of these cause and desires but that part needs some more work. it all was very clear untill i started to right it down and got lost in the words...

Sasaki Kojiro

03-27-2010, 23:38

Actually, I made a naughty rhetorical flounce and you caught me :bow:. However, if one admits that everyone here actually believes they have free will (otherwise why are the determinists arguing with me, regardless of whether their belief is determined they clearly believe they can argue with me.) then that begs the question of why we should think the world is deterministic. Cause and Effect does work, broadly speaking, but it's not reliable.

Increasingly we find that answers beget more questions, formulae end in curves rather than finite results.....

there's clearly something fishy going on.

You keep starting with the assumption that having free will must mean that determinism is false...

Consider:

1) Unless there are special circumstances, people should be held morally responsible for their actions
2) If you can't reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, that would be one such special circumstance (e.g. if I pat you on the back and you die, I should not be called a murderer)
3) In order for you to be able to reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, the world can't be random, it needs to be causally determined

Therefore: Moral responsibility requires causal determinism.

I just don't get why you are intent on dismissing determinism :juggle2:

The more random the world is, the less you can hold people responsible for their actions. If my choices are random, I'm not choosing them.

*****

Our actions being causally determined is no reason to say we don't have free will. Generally the argument goes something like

1) determinism means that under circumstances X, you must do A
2) if you must do A, you have no choice in doing A

Therefore: if determinism is true we have no free will

When really it should go

1) determinism says that under circumstances X, what will happen is that you will do A
2) if you must do A, you have no choice in doing A

Therefore: under circumstances X, you will do A (premise 2 is irrelevant)

So cause and effect doesn't force us to make the choices we will make, it simply describes the choices we will make. For comparison take Greshem's law:

[Gresham's Law is] the theory holding that if two kinds of money in circulation have the same denominational value but different intrinsic values, the money with higher intrinsic value will be hoarded and eventually driven out of circulation by the money with lesser intrinsic value.

So when a government starts printing money like bad, people will hoard gold. Do they do so because of Greshem's law? No. Greshem's law simply describes what people do in that situation.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-28-2010, 01:09

1) determinism says that under circumstances X, what will happen is that you will do A
2) if you must do A, you have no choice in doing A

Therefore: under circumstances X, you will do A (premise 2 is irrelevant)

So cause and effect doesn't force us to make the choices we will make, it simply describes the choices we will make. For comparison take Greshem's law:

So when a government starts printing money like bad, people will hoard gold. Do they do so because of Greshem's law? No. Greshem's law simply describes what people do in that situation.

I know, which is why people cannot be held responsible for their actions in a deterministic system. No one ever acts, or chooses they merely react. Further, it goes against what we percieve to be true, that we make choices. To borrow a Calvinistic principle, and thereby undercut Rhy, Free Will should be accepted against determinism because of utility. If we truly believe our choices are pre-determined by our environment we have no reason to act morally, or act at all.

Under a genuinely dterministic philosophy a human being would be unable to make choices and would simply grind to a halt.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-28-2010, 02:33

I know, which is why people cannot be held responsible for their actions in a deterministic system.

I just explained why determinism is required to hold people responsible for their actions :stare:

No one ever acts, or chooses they merely react. Further, it goes against what we percieve to be true, that we make choices. To borrow a Calvinistic principle, and thereby undercut Rhy, Free Will should be accepted against determinism because of utility.

They can both be accepted because they are compatible with one another. :stare:

If we truly believe our choices are pre-determined by our environment we have no reason to act morally, or act at all.

Under a genuinely dterministic philosophy a human being would be unable to make choices and would simply grind to a halt.

That's fatalism, not determinism. They aren't the same thing :stare:

The Stranger

03-28-2010, 03:38

You keep starting with the assumption that having free will must mean that determinism is false...

Consider:

1) Unless there are special circumstances, people should be held morally responsible for their actions
2) If you can't reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, that would be one such special circumstance (e.g. if I pat you on the back and you die, I should not be called a murderer)
3) In order for you to be able to reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, the world can't be random, it needs to be causally determined

Therefore: Moral responsibility requires causal determinism.
.

actually that is why that kind of moral responsibility requires causal determinism. because that kind of moral responsibility is based on its consequenses and not on its intentions. moral responsibility based on intentions doesnt require causal determinism.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-28-2010, 03:46

actually that is why that kind of moral responsibility requires causal determinism. because that kind of moral responsibility is based on its consequenses and not on its intentions. moral responsibility based on intentions doesnt require causal determinism.

But is having "good intentions" enough? I don't think so. You have to have good reason to back it up. And without causal determinism, you can't be reasonably expected to know what your actions will do.

And even your intentions would change randomly without causal determinism...

The free will you would have without determinism is the type no one would really want.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-28-2010, 08:37

Well, if you are going to use smileys to be rude I could just leave, you know.

I just explained why determinism is required to hold people responsible for their actions.

Causation is required to reasonably determine the outcome of a proposed course of action, but in order for someone to be held responsible they must have a choice, i.e. at least two options.

They can both be accepted because they are compatible with one another.

No.

That's fatalism, not determinism. They aren't the same thing :stare:

Fatalism is the directing of events by an outside force, i.e. God. Determinism assumes the system directs itself. Your "causal determinism" is absolute and its results are therefore the saem as a fatalistic system.

In the UK there is a defence against murder called "autonomy" where the accused's faculties and decision making are deemed to have been bypassed by an outside agent. In your system:

"determinism says that under circumstances X, what will happen is that you will do A"

So, under the correct circumstance Harry will murder his wife, and under those exact circumstances Harry would always muder his wife. Therefore he cannot be held responsible because he is subject to the external circumstance.

So Free Will in your system merely appears to exist because you cannot accurately measure all the variables and therefore accurately predict the outcome of a situation.

actually that is why that kind of moral responsibility requires causal determinism. because that kind of moral responsibility is based on its consequenses and not on its intentions. moral responsibility based on intentions doesnt require causal determinism.

Generally morality accounts for both, so you would need a regular mbut not wholly deterministic system.

Rhyfelwyr

03-28-2010, 13:58

To borrow a Calvinistic principle, and thereby undercut Rhy, Free Will should be accepted against determinism because of utility. If we truly believe our choices are pre-determined by our environment we have no reason to act morally, or act at all.

Under a genuinely dterministic philosophy a human being would be unable to make choices and would simply grind to a halt.

I object to the idea that the inevitability of our actions removes personal responsibility. Maybe you could not have done things differently, but that does not change the fact that you are what you are. If you are a sinner, you sin. If regenerated, good works should follow. The notion that in order to be responsible for something, we must make a rational choice to do it, is a very modern one based on the idea of all people being rational agents with free will. If someone gets drunk and kills a guy in a bar fight, he is still held responsible, even if he was unable to use his rational faculties, and acted purely on his animalistic instincts. If a dog bred for fighting mauls a baby, you put it down. It didn't make a reasoned decision, it was just being what it is.

To put a more theological perspective on things, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" (Romans 9:20)

@Sasaki: I think maybe part of the confusion we are all having is due to what we mean by free will. When PVC and myself debate the issue, we always tend to refer to the idea of 'libertarian free will', where freedom is defined as the ability to take more than one path. I get where you are coming from in your arguments, but the issue is that with compatabilitist views, they don't tend to make allowance for the possibility of alternative time lines, or different paths through our lives.

In the reality you describe, everything is inevitable. I was always going to be here typing this post, not one detail of it could be different. This is freedom insofar as we can act according to our nature and our will, but it is not freedom in the sense that the term 'free will' has always been used in philosophical circles, since that suggests a choice. With your view of freedom, everything is inevitable. With libertarian free will, there are countless possible outcomes for the future.

The Stranger

03-28-2010, 14:58

But is having "good intentions" enough? I don't think so. You have to have good reason to back it up. And without causal determinism, you can't be reasonably expected to know what your actions will do.

And even your intentions would change randomly without causal determinism...

The free will you would have without determinism is the type no one would really want.

i agree with you. i believe free will is causally determined in this way. you get born into a situation, one you dont pick, you get thrown into it. and the descisions that are made for you and you will make later will determine the course of your life. you cannot choose the situation you get into, but you can choose freely from the options your situation presents you. so to speak with sartre, the enviroment (taken very broadly) never limits your freedom, it only situates it. but you never wholly reasonably foresee the outcome of your actions, so even though you can somewhat guide the course of your life you cannot entirely direct it, and its not determined from the moment you are born. i simply dont believe that you can foresee the future (you can definitly not predict it in this system) because time is not constant.

The Stranger

03-28-2010, 15:10

I object to the idea that the inevitability of our actions removes personal responsibility. Maybe you could not have done things differently, but that does not change the fact that you are what you are. If you are a sinner, you sin. If regenerated, good works should follow. The notion that in order to be responsible for something, we must make a rational choice to do it, is a very modern one based on the idea of all people being rational agents with free will.

how can you be responsible for something you have no power over? you are not responsible for being a human, nor being a man or a woman, even though that is who you are, in the sense that that is your being. you have responsibility for being born in a certain place and time. and only if you have a choice to change your nature, (eg how you are) than you can be held accountable for that. but you have no choice about how you are, than how you are is similar to who you are. and you cannot ever be held accountable for who you are.

If someone gets drunk and kills a guy in a bar fight, he is still held responsible, even if he was unable to use his rational faculties, and acted purely on his animalistic instincts. If a dog bred for fighting mauls a baby, you put it down. It didn't make a reasoned decision, it was just being what it is.
we hold him accountable for drinking too much in the first place and therefor he knowingly put himself in a situation he could no longer hold himself in check. no one holds a lion accountable for killing a gazelle. we only put down the dog because we reasonably foresee that the dog, who is not rational might kill again because he is not capable of controlling or changing his nature.

im not sure whether that the possibilty or the illusion of free will might be enough to account for responsibility. such a situation as the descision inducer are difficult, and i have to think more about it. in a logically ordered universe with a rational omniscient and omnipotent deity i think the possibility is enough, but in a causal determined system without a rational reason but only cause and effect, i doubt that is enough. however, if that illusion or even the possibility cease to exist than there is no reason to hold people responsible for their actions.

Rhyfelwyr

03-28-2010, 15:38

how can you be responsible for something you have no power over? you are not responsible for being a human, nor being a man or a woman, even though that is who you are, in the sense that that is your being. you have responsibility for being born in a certain place and time. and only if you have a choice to change your nature, (eg how you are) than you can be held accountable for that. but you have no choice about how you are, than how you are is similar to who you are. and you cannot ever be held accountable for who you are.

How so? If someone is evil then they are evil, the fact they can't choose to do good doesn't make them any better. In the world of the Gnostic sects where there is one good god and one bad god, is the bad god any less evil simply because it is purely a matter of his nature, rather than him being rational and able to choose between good and evil?

we hold him accountable for drinking too much in the first place and therefor he knowingly put himself in a situation he could no longer hold himself in check.

If that was the case, shoudln't there just be a blanket legal punishment for being drunk, regardless of what the person does afterwards? If being drunk is the only thing we are held accountable for when a crime follows, why should someone who drink drives and kills someone get a longer sentence than someone who smashes a window on a night out or whatever?

Sasaki Kojiro

03-28-2010, 16:48

Well, if you are going to use smileys to be rude I could just leave, you know.

I just felt like I was repeating myself.

Causation is required to reasonably determine the outcome of a proposed course of action, but in order for someone to be held responsible they must have a choice, i.e. at least two options.

But this depends on how you define choice and options. If I leave the bar drunk, I do have the option of calling a cab instead of driving home. That's very easy and very doable--I am capable of it, and in fact with a minor change (say, having been told recently about the legal penalties) I might have made the right choice. Doing that is an option for my personality. It may be that, given my personality, I was always going to choose to drive home. But that doesn't mean I didn't have the option not to. I only didn't have the option if you see the laws that "govern" human behavior as proscriptive rather than descriptive.

No.

Do you see why I think they are compatible?

Fatalism is the directing of events by an outside force, i.e. God. Determinism assumes the system directs itself. Your "causal determinism" is absolute and its results are therefore the saem as a fatalistic system.

Fatalism assumes that that, for example, I don't need to wear my seatbelt because the date of my death is already set in stone. But of course, not wearing a seatbelt might be what kills you. Determinism says "I'll wear my seatbelt out of habit".

In the UK there is a defence against murder called "autonomy" where the accused's faculties and decision making are deemed to have been bypassed by an outside agent. In your system:

"determinism says that under circumstances X, what will happen is that you will do A"

So, under the correct circumstance Harry will murder his wife, and under those exact circumstances Harry would always muder his wife. Therefore he cannot be held responsible because he is subject to the external circumstance.

So Free Will in your system merely appears to exist because you cannot accurately measure all the variables and therefore accurately predict the outcome of a situation.

But what I was disputing is that he was "subject" to anything. The laws don't govern us, they describe us. In the Greshem's law example, people aren't forced to hoard gold because of greshem's law, remember?

You can hold him responsible for his character by the way. Someone who has the character to murder someone in an argument or for money etc can be deemed immoral, even with determism, don't you think?

I object to the idea that the inevitability of our actions removes personal responsibility. Maybe you could not have done things differently, but that does not change the fact that you are what you are. If you are a sinner, you sin. If regenerated, good works should follow. The notion that in order to be responsible for something, we must make a rational choice to do it, is a very modern one based on the idea of all people being rational agents with free will. If someone gets drunk and kills a guy in a bar fight, he is still held responsible, even if he was unable to use his rational faculties, and acted purely on his animalistic instincts. If a dog bred for fighting mauls a baby, you put it down. It didn't make a reasoned decision, it was just being what it is.

I agree :yes:

That's what I was trying to get at with "holding people responsible for their character".

@Sasaki: I think maybe part of the confusion we are all having is due to what we mean by free will. When PVC and myself debate the issue, we always tend to refer to the idea of 'libertarian free will', where freedom is defined as the ability to take more than one path. I get where you are coming from in your arguments, but the issue is that with compatabilitist views, they don't tend to make allowance for the possibility of alternative time lines, or different paths through our lives.

In the reality you describe, everything is inevitable. I was always going to be here typing this post, not one detail of it could be different. This is freedom insofar as we can act according to our nature and our will, but it is not freedom in the sense that the term 'free will' has always been used in philosophical circles, since that suggests a choice. With your view of freedom, everything is inevitable. With libertarian free will, there are countless possible outcomes for the future.

Thanks, that does indeed seem to be the argument. But, the libertarian view and the compatibilist view can't both be correct, yes? I think the libertarian view has a lot to answer, and that if you can get your head around the compatibilist view you can see that determinism is no threat at all to free will.

In other words, I have my definition of free will, but I can't just claim that it is the correct one. Whether the definition is correct is a viable (and essential) source for argument.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-28-2010, 18:38

I just felt like I was repeating myself.

That's no need to get personal. If you feel that way you can either conclude I am stupid, that I am being deliberately obstructive, or that you are not explainging yourself so that I can understand you. In option 1 and 2 I should be ignored, option 3 behoves you to either explain better or concede the point as unsupportabe.

But this depends on how you define choice and options. If I leave the bar drunk, I do have the option of calling a cab instead of driving home. That's very easy and very doable--I am capable of it, and in fact with a minor change (say, having been told recently about the legal penalties) I might have made the right choice. Doing that is an option for my personality. It may be that, given my personality, I was always going to choose to drive home. But that doesn't mean I didn't have the option not to. I only didn't have the option if you see the laws that "govern" human behavior as proscriptive rather than descriptive.

"Choice" implies options and the ability to choose between them, "options" implies multiple available paths. If one says "you have no choice" that indicates only one option. Ergo, it is fair for me to say, "In a truly detministic system you have no choice". Even if theoretically there are multiple possible outcomes, or multiple decisions, the total causality inherrent in the system dictates that the same choice will always be made under the same circumstances.

So there is no actual choice, only a theoretical system. In this I think your philosophy shows a flaw, it imagines a system for its morality that it claims does no factually exist.

Do you see why I think they are compatible?

No, not in a pruely deterministic system, which is why I replied with a flat rejection last time. You claim appears non-sensical to me.

Fatalism assumes that that, for example, I don't need to wear my seatbelt because the date of my death is already set in stone. But of course, not wearing a seatbelt might be what kills you. Determinism says "I'll wear my seatbelt out of habit".

No, actually fatalism says, "I will wear my seatbelt until the day I decide not to and it kills me", while determinism says, "I will wear my seatbelt unless X conditions are met". The reason that determinism produces the same result as fatalism is that in a purely deterministic system whether or not X conditions would ever be met was predetermined long before you were born by the causality of the universe; whether X condictions would ultimately lead to your death was ultimately also already predetmined.

If you want to see how fatalism works, I suggest you look at Greek Myths, they are the best education in the subject; Oedipus is an excellent example.

Crucially, mortals cannot detect either Fate or Predeterminism.

But what I was disputing is that he was "subject" to anything. The laws don't govern us, they describe us. In the Greshem's law example, people aren't forced to hoard gold because of greshem's law, remember?

Well Greshem's Law demonstrates the problem, because not everyone hoards Gold. So, either the universe is not truly deterministic, or your laws refuse to take account of its interlocking complexity. In any case, it is not a question of being "subject" to these Laws, but to the system they seek to explain. If we are subject to a deterministic universe which (pre)determines our actions then we have no choice, and thence to Free Will.

You can hold him responsible for his character by the way. Someone who has the character to murder someone in an argument or for money etc can be deemed immoral, even with determism, don't you think?

No, because in your system his character is determined by his genetics and environment, he can be no more blamed for it than for his gender. This raises another problem with your system; why the system dictates that some beings punish others to begin with. This is where Calvinism picks up Augustinianism and argues that some beings are ordained to punish others for their Sins in the name of God.

Still, I digress.

Thanks, that does indeed seem to be the argument. But, the libertarian view and the compatibilist view can't both be correct, yes? I think the libertarian view has a lot to answer, and that if you can get your head around the compatibilist view you can see that determinism is no threat at all to free will.

In other words, I have my definition of free will, but I can't just claim that it is the correct one. Whether the definition is correct is a viable (and essential) source for argument.

the only way for Determinism to be compatable with Free Will is if the two are held in constant opposition, i.e. they oppose each other like the poles of a magnet. Even so, determinism is THE threat to Free Will, and to personal choice.

The Stranger

03-28-2010, 19:06

How so? If someone is evil then they are evil, the fact they can't choose to do good doesn't make them any better. it does not make them any better. you mistake good and evil for free and unfree. im not talking about that. if he is evil he is evil, but he is NOT RESPONSIBLE for being evil. and thus cannot be held ACCOUNTABLE for what he does in the way that we do now.

In the world of the Gnostic sects where there is one good god and one bad god, is the bad god any less evil simply because it is purely a matter of his nature, rather than him being rational and able to choose between good and evil? you cannot treat gods in the way you treat men and you cannot treat men in the way you treat god. but again if the god has no ability to change his nature than he cannot be responsible for how he is. and if how is is the same as what he does than in that sense he is also not responsible for what he does. but even so it is irrelevent because there is no one to hold him responsible or anyone he has to account his deeds to.

If that was the case, shoudln't there just be a blanket legal punishment for being drunk, regardless of what the person does afterwards? If being drunk is the only thing we are held accountable for when a crime follows, why should someone who drink drives and kills someone get a longer sentence than someone who smashes a window on a night out or whatever?

that is a very good question. and i think being drunk irresponsible is always a "crime". its just very hard to determine those boundaries.

Rhyfelwyr

03-28-2010, 19:44

Thanks, that does indeed seem to be the argument. But, the libertarian view and the compatibilist view can't both be correct, yes? I think the libertarian view has a lot to answer, and that if you can get your head around the compatibilist view you can see that determinism is no threat at all to free will.

Indeed, they both can't be correct, the libertarian view is grounded on the idea that compatiblism is impossible. As for the libertarian view, I agree there are issues with the mechanics of it. For choice to exist in the libertarian sense, we must have a soul, or something that allows for decision making to take place above the purely scientific/biological view of how our brains work (well I'm pretty ignorant of the biological side, but I would guess it supports determinism with our brains working by signals with one inevitably determining the next, I could of course be completely, embrassingly wrong).

But I think PVC's argument here in defense of the libertarian view is more on the grounds of its necessity from a philosophical perspective with its relation to morality and responsibility etc, as opposed to laying out the actual mechanics of how it works.

In other words, I have my definition of free will, but I can't just claim that it is the correct one. Whether the definition is correct is a viable (and essential) source for argument.

I agree, that this dispute is best resolved now, since otherwise it's going to be impossible for people to understand each other. I agree that your definition of free will is the sum of the freedom which our will's possess in reality btw, but I see this as supporting purely determinsim and not free will (since I hold to the libertarian defintion of the term, which is how it has been traditionally used). I think we have the same ideas, but are just using different words for them.

it does not make them any better. you mistake good and evil for free and unfree. im not talking about that. if he is evil he is evil, but he is NOT RESPONSIBLE for being evil. and thus cannot be held ACCOUNTABLE for what he does in the way that we do now.

you cannot treat gods in the way you treat men and you cannot treat men in the way you treat god. but again if the god has no ability to change his nature than he cannot be responsible for how he is. and if how is is the same as what he does than in that sense he is also not responsible for what he does. but even so it is irrelevent because there is no one to hold him responsible or anyone he has to account his deeds to.

But does responsbility require the subjection of lesser beings to greater realities? Can only a follower of evil be responsible for his actions, as opposed to the source of the evil itself?

This is why I think your response to the Gnostic god issue is quite unusual. If one god is the source of all evil, the self-evident, self-perpetuating root of all evil - why should it be looked upon more kindly than one of its followers?

Sasaki Kojiro

03-28-2010, 19:55

That's no need to get personal. If you feel that way you can either conclude I am stupid, that I am being deliberately obstructive, or that you are not explainging yourself so that I can understand you. In option 1 and 2 I should be ignored, option 3 behoves you to either explain better or concede the point as unsupportabe.

I think you are drawing too much from some :stare: smileys :/

"Choice" implies options and the ability to choose between them, "options" implies multiple available paths. If one says "you have no choice" that indicates only one option. Ergo, it is fair for me to say, "In a truly detministic system you have no choice". Even if theoretically there are multiple possible outcomes, or multiple decisions, the total causality inherrent in the system dictates that the same choice will always be made under the same circumstances.

So there is no actual choice, only a theoretical system. In this I think your philosophy shows a flaw, it imagines a system for its morality that it claims does no factually exist.

I think you are viewing the mind abstractly here, which is very counter-intuitive*. If you present options to me, and I go over them in my mind, consider things, think about it etc and pick one because of my thoughts and feelings, I have made a choice. That's what making a choice is. The fact that I was always going to make that choice doesn't mean that I didn't have a choice.

It seems like partly a language problem. Look at the following argument:

If Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has to have at least two children.
Paul has two sons and a daughter.

Therefore: Paul has to have at least two children.

This conclusion is a false statement. He does not have to have any amount of children. He just happens to in this case. A better way to phrase it would be:

"It has to be that (if Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has at least two children)."
Paul has two sons and a daughter

Therefore: Paul has at least two children

And that's what determinism is saying. And the conclusion now allows for free will. The conclusion is no longer that Paul had to have two children, and thus had no choice. For human choices it would go:

It must be that (if certain conditions are met, then you will do A).
not:
If certain conditions are met, then you must do A.

*And I think in your own beliefs you don't view it that way (since you reject determinism)

No, actually fatalism says, "I will wear my seatbelt until the day I decide not to and it kills me", while determinism says, "I will wear my seatbelt unless X conditions are met". The reason that determinism produces the same result as fatalism is that in a purely deterministic system whether or not X conditions would ever be met was predetermined long before you were born by the causality of the universe; whether X condictions would ultimately lead to your death was ultimately also already predetmined.

But you are leaving out the key difference. Fatalism assumes that it doesn't matter what we do--that is patently false. What I do does effect when I will die. Fatalism says that determinism is a reason to act a certain way.

Well Greshem's Law demonstrates the problem, because not everyone hoards Gold. So, either the universe is not truly deterministic, or your laws refuse to take account of its interlocking complexity. In any case, it is not a question of being "subject" to these Laws, but to the system they seek to explain.

I don't understand what you mean with this bit. Not everyone hoards gold because Greshem's law describes a tendency on a certain scale. It's a different level of description than cause and effect on the atomic level.

No, because in your system his character is determined by his genetics and environment, he can be no more blamed for it than for his gender.

Well, I agree this is a digression from the free will argument. It has more to do with what morality is for.

I agree, that this dispute is best resolved now, since otherwise it's going to be impossible for people to understand each other. I agree that your definition of free will is the sum of the freedom which our will's possess in reality btw, but I see this as supporting purely determinsim and not free will (since I hold to the libertarian defintion of the term, which is how it has been traditionally used). I think we have the same ideas, but are just using different words for them.

I don't mind using different words if the ideas are the same :yes:

The Stranger

03-29-2010, 10:51

But does responsbility require the subjection of lesser beings to greater realities? Can only a follower of evil be responsible for his actions, as opposed to the source of the evil itself?

This is why I think your response to the Gnostic god issue is quite unusual. If one god is the source of all evil, the self-evident, self-perpetuating root of all evil - why should it be looked upon more kindly than one of its followers?

he should not be looked more kindly upon. if one chooses freely for evil, whatever that may be, (i dont believe in objective evil or good, but that is besides the matter) he is responsible for that evil and the evil he does. if he has the ability to change than also the actions that come forth from his nature are his responsibility. this makes him not more or less "evil" than that evil god, would he exist, who is the root of all evil in the world. he is only more responsible for his actions. because the evil god is not responsible at all. you cannot apply the same cause and effect, names etc to gods as you do to men.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-29-2010, 11:36

I think you are viewing the mind abstractly here, which is very counter-intuitive*. If you present options to me, and I go over them in my mind, consider things, think about it etc and pick one because of my thoughts and feelings, I have made a choice. That's what making a choice is. The fact that I was always going to make that choice doesn't mean that I didn't have a choice.

No, if you only have one choice, there is NO choice. You only have the illusion of choice, the outcome was always inevitable. I don't see anything abstract about that.

It seems like partly a language problem. Look at the following argument:

If Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has to have at least two children.
Paul has two sons and a daughter.

Therefore: Paul has to have at least two children.

This conclusion is a false statement. He does not have to have any amount of children. He just happens to in this case. A better way to phrase it would be:

"It has to be that (if Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has at least two children)."
Paul has two sons and a daughter

Therefore: Paul has at least two children

And that's what determinism is saying. And the conclusion now allows for free will. The conclusion is no longer that Paul had to have two children, and thus had no choice. For human choices it would go:

It must be that (if certain conditions are met, then you will do A).
not:
If certain conditions are met, then you must do A.

*And I think in your own beliefs you don't view it that way (since you reject determinism)

I fail to see the point, you are using the concrete to try to describe the conceptual. Paul's children were born to him, three were born to him, that is more than two. Paul's children are already born when you say "he has at least two." However, that bears not at all on the question of determinism because it describes the present, not the future.

But you are leaving out the key difference. Fatalism assumes that it doesn't matter what we do--that is patently false. What I do does effect when I will die. Fatalism says that determinism is a reason to act a certain way.

I think you're confusing fatalism and prophecy, which is the expression of fatalism. To borrow you example, "Paul will have two children" is a prophetic statement, when he then has three the prophecy was fulfilled, even though he has an extra child. Fatalism is not detectable from within the system.

I don't understand what you mean with this bit. Not everyone hoards gold because Greshem's law describes a tendency on a certain scale. It's a different level of description than cause and effect on the atomic level.

Not everyone reacts in a given way to a given situation, this is either because A: they are different parts of the deterministic system and therefore function differently or B: because they have Free Will and make different choices.

The crucial point is this, a "Free" Will is unbound, it is not subject to any outside force, though it may take such forces into account. What you are describing is a "Will" which is merely an intellectual expression of a predetermined desire for a predetermined outcome.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-29-2010, 15:36

No, if you only have one choice, there is NO choice. You only have the illusion of choice, the outcome was always inevitable. I don't see anything abstract about that.

But the word "choice" has always referred to what I described and what you call the illusion of choice. It seems abstract to me because it doesn't acknowledge the complexity of the mind. Would you admire a van gogh, or say that he didn't really paint it, his arm was forced to?

It's essentially a semantic disagreement, but I don't get your insistence that free will must be unbound. That would require omnipotence, yes? And presumably no sense of right and wrong, else our will would be bound by our conscience. It seems to me like you add up all the external forces that push us around, and say that despite them, we have free will. But that if our brain has a definite process by which it decides things, we don't. The freedom in my free will comes from our ability to do what our psychological selves want--and your description of that as unfree boils down to "we have to do what we want, so we don't choose it".

I think you're confusing fatalism and prophecy, which is the expression of fatalism.

Isn't that how it was described originally? "I don't need to work because it's all determined anyway" is an expression of fatalism right? Because it can matter if you work.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-29-2010, 16:19

But the word "choice" has always referred to what I described and what you call the illusion of choice. It seems abstract to me because it doesn't acknowledge the complexity of the mind. Would you admire a van gogh, or say that he didn't really paint it, his arm was forced to?

I don't think so.... Generally the mind has been considered a discerning faculty which performs a decision making process, choosing between multiple options.

It's essentially a semantic disagreement, but I don't get your insistence that free will must be unbound. That would require omnipotence, yes? And presumably no sense of right and wrong, else our will would be bound by our conscience. It seems to me like you add up all the external forces that push us around, and say that despite them, we have free will. But that if our brain has a definite process by which it decides things, we don't. The freedom in my free will comes from our ability to do what our psychological selves want--and your description of that as unfree boils down to "we have to do what we want, so we don't choose it".

I think you are mistaking the ability to express our Will, and its Freedom. Let us be clear, "Freedom" in any context means "to be unfettered" To be free is to be unconstrained. Now, the Will if it is truly Free must be uncontrained and able to make choices in spite of external pressure. Now, the expression of the Will is something else, I can exercise my Free Will and decide I want to fly, but I can't carry through that Will because I don't have wings. Of course, man continued to Will this, wholly against his nature, and thence built himself wings.

So the Will is Free but the Action isn't. Freedom of Action is a preserve of the Divine, whether man has Free Will within himself is a seperate question. Is the distinction I am making clear, now?

Now, the Will can allow itself to be bound by, for example, morality and be held accountable for such a decision. However, because the Will is Free such notionally binding, or rather submission, is voluntary.

Now, if the decisions the Will makes are actually bound by the environment, rather than influenced by it, then the Will is un-Free because its choices are make independent of it. Essentially, the Will is commanded by the system to want a certain thing. With Free Will the Will merely aquiences, it is never commanded.

My complaint with your system is that it boils down to, "We have to want what we want" rather than, "we choose what we want".

Isn't that how it was described originally? "I don't need to work because it's all determined anyway" is an expression of fatalism right? Because it can matter if you work.

Not really, its more like, "whether I work or not has been determined, so I don't have to think about it". Such a situation as you describe happens when someone who actually has Free Will gives up and becomes fatalistic. Remember, all my objections to the way Determinism impacts society come from a Free Will perspective.

Sasaki Kojiro

03-29-2010, 16:36

My complaint with your system is that it boils down to, "We have to want what we want" rather than, "we choose what we want".

Ah, but it is in the moment so to speak that we have to want what we want. Although it is true that we don't choose many of our wants (you in no way chose to like food over non-food, or music over screeching sounds, etc) we can want to choose/change certain wants of ours. You can point one step back on the chain and say that we can't choose to want to choose our wants, but for what purpose? We are still fettered at some point, because we exist.

I think you are mistaking the ability to express our Will, and its Freedom. Let us be clear, "Freedom" in any context means "to be unfettered" To be free is to be unconstrained. Now, the Will if it is truly Free must be uncontrained and able to make choices in spite of external pressure. Now, the expression of the Will is something else, I can exercise my Free Will and decide I want to fly, but I can't carry through that Will because I don't have wings. Of course, man continued to Will this, wholly against his nature, and thence built himself wings.

So the Will is Free but the Action isn't. Freedom of Action is a preserve of the Divine, whether man has Free Will within himself is a seperate question. Is the distinction I am making clear, now?

I see. But intuitively it feels like the will has constraints on it. You mentioned that we can't fly because we don't have wings, but aren't their many things that we want to do but can't that are more internal? I may want to stay awake, but not be able to. There are many internal forces.

I don't think your freedom of will is inherently different from mine. You are still supposing an individual with a self and everything that comes with that. That has inherent constraints.

Now, the Will can allow itself to be bound by, for example, morality and be held accountable for such a decision. However, because the Will is Free such notionally binding, or rather submission, is voluntary.

But we have innate moral instincts that we don't choose. And as a child there is much we don't choose.

Philippus Flavius Homovallumus

03-30-2010, 13:39

Ah, but it is in the moment so to speak that we have to want what we want. Although it is true that we don't choose many of our wants (you in no way chose to like food over non-food, or music over screeching sounds, etc) we can want to choose/change certain wants of ours. You can point one step back on the chain and say that we can't choose to want to choose our wants, but for what purpose? We are still fettered at some point, because we exist.

I see what you are saying, but I think you are trying to reduce the argument back through time to create an ad absurdiam effect. Also, your examples are defective I'm afraid, some people choose not to like food and therefore starve themselves to death, others listen to sounds that I defy anyone to actually call "music" for pleasure.

I see. But intuitively it feels like the will has constraints on it. You mentioned that we can't fly because we don't have wings, but aren't their many things that we want to do but can't that are more internal? I may want to stay awake, but not be able to. There are many internal forces.

I don't think your freedom of will is inherently different from mine. You are still supposing an individual with a self and everything that comes with that. That has inherent constraints.

These are all [i]physical]/i] examples and threfore belong to the realm of Action, not Will. What you are essentially saying is that we cannot control our physical beings in every sense, but that is irrelevant when our Will is not itself physical. I know you are going to say that it is, because it is contained in our brain, but I would point out here that the brain is merely the organ which houses the electrical impulses that make up our conciousness.

But we have innate moral instincts that we don't choose. And as a child there is much we don't choose.

actually, I agree with you, though I believe they originate outside ourselves. However, many people disregard these, so they clearly aren't binding either.