James Longstreet, Bobby Lee´s old warhorse.

[Kagemusha]

I would like to hear your opinions about quite the controversial figure of Lt.Gen James Longstreet if you have any. According to some he was the best Corps commander in American civil war on both sides, while others have stumbled his name in mud with vigour.

What kind of person and military leader Mr.Longstreet really was? Its a cliche that he was the anvil of Confederate, while Stonewall Jackson the hammer. For example in second battle of Bull Run Jackson was holding the line while Longstreet conducted successfully a massive attack on Union flank. Longstreet seemed to have very large problems conducting orders he didnt like or deemed ineffective. For example he even tried to turn the command of Picket´s charge to General Alexander during the decisive third day of battle of Gettysburg.

After Gettysburg he trasferred to Tennessee and while he crushed the Union right in battle of Chickamauga. He orchestrated a mutiny amongst his fellow officers against his commanding general, Braxton Bragg whose lack of support to Longstreets right wing at Chickamauga saved the Union army under William S. Rosecrans from total rout. So what is your take on Longstreet, about whom there are several more issues yet being mentioned in this starting post of mine?

[GeneralHankerchief]

I've let my knowledge of the Civil War wane these past few years, but from what I remember reading about Longstreet, he was ahead of his time defensively, being a big proponent of trench warfare especially in the later years. However, this was counterbalanced by his often reluctance to engage in offensive attacks. In Second Bull Run, as you mentioned, he did orchestrate the flank attack at Thoroughfare Gap, but I believe that Jackson was of the opinion that Longstreet should have been quicker about it and that his men suffered unnecessarily for hours as a result of Longstreet's caution.

Once Jackson died, Lee did have to rely on Longstreet more often, but I think this was a combination of both his good generalship and the fact that Lee just didn't feel as comfortable with his two new corps commanders, Ewell and Hill. Both were ineffective at Gettysburg and it was partly because of this fact that two of the three infantry divisions involved in Pickett's Charge actually belonged to Hill, despite the attack being under Longstreet's command.

I think Longstreet definitely had his merits, but he was best in place as Jackson's counterbalance. Once the equation got toppled with Jackson's death, Longstreet had to react too much to tactics he was uncomfortable with. Had Jackson survived, no matter how the war would have gone differently I think Longstreet's name would be more pristine because he was able to stick to his role.

Also, I think, but am not certain, that Longstreet sided with the Republicans during Reconstruction, which angered a lot of the old "Glorious Cause" holdouts in the South which may have contributed to his name being somewhat tarnished.

[Kagemusha]

You have some very good points there GH but i wouldnt necessarily agree with the conclusion that he had universally problems in offensive capacities. Here are couple examples about what he could do in that department.Here is one from battle of Chickamauga, where Longstreets actions turned the situation from Confederate defense into rout of Union right including the commanding general of the whole Union army:

"The First Corps veterans arrived in the early stages of the Battle of Chickamauga. Bragg had already begun an unsuccessful attempt to interpose his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga before the arrival of Longstreet's corps. When the two met at Bragg's headquarters in the evening, Bragg placed Longstreet in command of the Left Wing of his army; Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk commanded the Right. On September 20, 1863, Longstreet lined up eight brigades in a deep column against a narrow front, an attack very similar to future German tank tactics in World War II.[50] By chance, a mistaken order from General Rosecrans caused a gap to appear in the Union line and Longstreet took additional advantage of it to increase his chances of success. The organization of the attack was well suited to the terrain and would have penetrated the Union line regardless. The Union right collapsed and Rosecrans fled the field, as units began to retreat in panic. Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas managed to rally the retreating units and solidify a defensive position on Snodgrass Hill. He held that position against repeated afternoon attacks by Longstreet, who was not adequately supported by the Confederate right wing. Once night fell, the battle was over, and Thomas was able to extricate the units under his control to Chattanooga. Bragg's failure to coordinate the right wing and cavalry to further envelope Thomas prevented a total rout of the Union Army. Bragg also neglected to pursue the retreating Federals aggressively, resulting in the futile siege of Chattanooga. Nevertheless, Chickamauga was the greatest Confederate victory in the Western Theater and Longstreet deserved a good portion of the credit."

As this battle took place right after Gettysburg. It would seem that Longstreet had really taken a lesson from the peacemeal attacks of the said battle. While the concensus during the time was to attack in lines. Longstreet deployed his Corps in deep attack column that was somewhat historical type of attack.

Another late war good example of Longstreets ability to attack was at Battle of Wilderness:

"Longstreet and the 12,000-man First Corps finally arrived at around noon, with perfect timing: Hancock's men were tired and disorganized from six hours of fighting. Lee was exuberant that the reinforcements had arrived and attempted to lead the 800-man Texas Brigade in a charge against the Union line. The brigade refused to advance as their line was not yet formed and they knew the South could not afford Lee being killed or wounded. Longstreet and the Texas Brigade launched their attack once Lee agreed to withdraw to a safer distance.

When Longstreet attacked the Union forces they withdrew, and within two hours the situation was totally reversed: Longstreet had regained all the ground lost and advanced 1 mi (1.6 km) further, forcing Hancock to regroup along the Brock Road. At a crucial moment in the fighting Longstreet attacked through a cutting of an unfinished railroad that had split the Union forces, increasing the confusion. However, Longstreet did not have enough men to complete his victory, and the fighting soon petered out near the Brock Road. As the fighting wound down on this part of the battlefield, Longstreet was badly wounded by friendly fire and did not return to the Army of Northern Virginia for several months. (By coincidence, Longstreet was accidentally shot by his own men only about 4 miles (6.4 km) away from the place where Stonewall Jackson suffered the same fate a year earlier."

After the war, the Union II Corps commander that day, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, said to Longstreet of this flanking maneuver: "You rolled me up like a wet blanket." And Hancock was maybe one of the best Corps commanders in the whole Union army.

So in the end it would seem that Longstreet knew how to attack, but maybe he was somewhat stubborn and even borderline mutinous when it came down executing orders he didnt seem fit. The best examples come from the Battle of Gettysburg from days two and three:

"Postbellum criticism of Longstreet claims that he was ordered by Lee to attack in the early morning and that his delays were a significant contributor to the loss of the battle.[38] However, Lee agreed to the delays for arriving troops and did not issue his formal order for the attack until 11 a.m. Although Longstreet's motivations have long been clouded by the vitriol of the Lost Cause partisans (see Legacy), many historians agree that Longstreet did not aggressively pursue Lee's orders to launch an attack as early as possible. Biographer Jeffry D. Wert wrote, "Longstreet deserves censure for his performance on the morning of July 2. He allowed his disagreement with Lee's decision to affect his conduct. Once the commanding general determined to assail the enemy, duty required Longstreet to comply with the vigor and thoroughness that had previously characterized his generalship. The concern for detail, the regard for timely information, and the need for preparation were absent."[39] Military historians Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones wrote, "Unenthusiastic about the attack, Longstreet consumed so much time in properly assembling and aligning the corps that the assault did not commence until 4 p.m. During all the time that passed, Meade continued to move in troops to bring about a more and more complete concentration; by 6 p.m. he had achieve numerical superiority and had his left well covered."[40] Campaign historian Edwin Coddington presents a lengthy description of the approach march, which he described as "a comedy of errors such as one might expect of inexperienced commanders and raw militia, but not of Lee's "War Horse" and his veteran troops." He called the episode "a dark moment in Longstreet's career as a general."[41] Gettysburg historian Harry Pfanz concluded that "Longstreet's angry dissidence had resulted in further wasted time and delay."[42] David L. Callihan, in a 2002 reassessment of Longstreet's legacy, wrote, "It is appalling that a field commander of Longstreet's experience and caliber would so cavalierly and ineptly march and prepare his men for battle."[43] An alternative view has been expressed by John Lott, "General Longstreet did all that could be expected on the 2nd day and any allegations of failing to exercise his duty by ordering a morning can be repudiated. It would have been impossible to have commenced an attack much earlier than it occurred, and it is doubtful that the Confederacy could have placed the attack in any more secure hands than General Longstreet."[44] Regardless of the controversy regarding the preparations, however, once the assault began around 4 p.m., Longstreet pressed the assault by McLaws and Hood (Pickett's division had not yet arrived) competently against fierce Union resistance, but it was largely unsuccessful, with significant casualties.[45]"

And for the infamous Pickets charge on the third day:

"On July 3, Lee ordered Longstreet to coordinate a massive assault on the center of the Union line, employing the division of George Pickett and brigades from A.P. Hill's corps. Longstreet knew this assault had little chance of success. The Union Army was in a position reminiscent of the one Longstreet had harnessed at Fredericksburg to defeat Burnside's assault. The Confederates would have to cover almost a mile of open ground and spend time negotiating sturdy fences under fire. The lessons of Fredericksburg and Malvern Hill were lost to Lee on this day. In his book, Longstreet claims to have told Lee:

General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.[46]

During the artillery barrage that preceded the infantry assault, Longstreet began to agonize over an assault that was going to cost dearly. He attempted to pass the responsibility for launching Pickett's division to his artillery chief, Col. Edward Porter Alexander. When the time came to actually order Pickett forward, Longstreet could only nod in assent, unable to verbalize the order. The assault, known as Pickett's Charge, suffered the heavy casualties that Longstreet anticipated. It was the decisive point in the Confederate loss at Gettysburg and Lee ordered a retreat back to Virginia the following day.[47]"

Criticism of Longstreet after the war was based not only on his reputed conduct at the Battle of Gettysburg, but also intemperate remarks he made about Robert E. Lee and his strategies, such as:

"That he [Lee] was excited and off his balance was evident on the afternoon of the 1st, and he labored under that oppression until enough blood was shed to appease him."

Quite the text from the eldest in rank of army of Northern Virginia after Lee, some might say.:wink2:

[Ibrahim]

Also, I think, but am not certain, that Longstreet sided with the Republicans during Reconstruction, which angered a lot of the old "Glorious Cause" holdouts in the South which may have contributed to his name being somewhat tarnished.

he did. and yes, that did contribute to the dissing he got from his peers after the war.

I myself tend to fall in between your and Kage's conclusions: he was indeed capeable of some very well orchestrated attacks/offensives on the Union army (as Kege cited), but also, that he preferred to be on the defensive, and did indeed advocate a form of trench/defensive style of warfare. I also find him to be on the cautious and level end of things, quite the opposite of Jackson and Lee, who were aggressive in nature.

as to the "mutiny" on Bragg: he had it coming. everything I have heard or read about Bragg speaks to me of an idiot of a commander. either that or one unlucky person. didn't Forrest threaten the guy at one point? correct me if I'm mistaken.

in the end, I find him, as most of you do, to be a capeable and able leader.

[Fisherking]

Longstreet seemed to have very large problems conducting orders he didnt like or deemed ineffective. For example he even tried to turn the command of Picket´s charge to General Alexander during the decisive third day of battle of Gettysburg.


Wasn’t Longstreet opposed to that attack?

The battle was finished when they failed to take little round top anyway. Union reinforcements kept arriving and it should have been obvious by the end of the second day that the opportunity was lost.

Blaming the man for the failure of a foolish attack over open ground directed at a strong defensive position with superior artillery is rather foolish its self.

It is an old debate, but the blame should go to Lee and not Longstreet.

As to disagreement over planning or orders, what commander was ever happy with every order he was to execute. In most cases he was proved right.

As to the switch though, it dose show favoritism. He and Picket were friends and I am sure he wished to save the life and command of his friend. Or was it a judgment on his part as to save the better commander for another day?

Either way it still smacks of sentiment and that is too much of a luxury for a solider.

[Kagemusha]

Wasn’t Longstreet opposed to that attack?

The battle was finished when they failed to take little round top anyway. Union reinforcements kept arriving and it should have been obvious by the end of the second day that the opportunity was lost.

Blaming the man for the failure of a foolish attack over open ground directed at a strong defensive position with superior artillery is rather foolish its self.

It is an old debate, but the blame should go to Lee and not Longstreet.

As to disagreement over planning or orders, what commander was ever happy with every order he was to execute. In most cases he was proved right.

As to the switch though, it dose show favoritism. He and Picket were friends and I am sure he wished to save the life and command of his friend. Or was it a judgment on his part as to save the better commander for another day?

Either way it still smacks of sentiment and that is too much of a luxury for a solider.

You must have misunderstood my words. Im not blaming Longstreet from Picket´s charge or the attack against little round top. Im discussing his tardiness to conduct orders given to him by his superiors during situations he would have done otherwise.Just one aspect of a civil war general i rank among the best commanders of the war.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I think "Old Pete" had caught a lot of flack for a) assisting in the Reconstruction and b) not being T.J. Jackson.

Strategically, Longstreet was correct.

When McClellan found just enough advantages to make him actually fight at Sharpsburg -- and he preferred chess only when he could remove your rooks before playing -- the AotP fought Lee's troops to a very bloody draw, which the Union labeled a victory. While undefeated tactically, Lee's boys headed home because they simply didn't have enough resources left to continue an offensive campaign. I suspect that Longstreet knew then that the South could not win some great victory on the battlefield or capture Philadelphia and end the war with a new nation. I believe that he grasped that their only remaining hope was to assume the tactical defense whenever and wherever possible so as to inflict grossly disproportionate casualties on the North and wear down their resolve. He wanted the rest of the South's war to be a repeat of Marye's Heights....not Gettysburg or even Chancellorsville. The former ended in defeat and the latter in victory, but the South could not afford the casualties it took in either.

He had grasped that with the new killing depth presented by the rifled musket -- a beaten zone of 300-400 yards as opposed to 100-150 -- that attacks against an enemy with any kind of reasonable shelter were going to produce ghastly casualties. When Napoleon's troops closed the enemy, they would come under meaningful fire only 100 yards away from their enemy. Unless that enemy was a machine-like regiment capable of 5 rounds a minute, the charging troops faced only one or two volleys before it came to the steel. In the ACW, a typical unit could get off about 3 rounds a minute while attacking troops could cover roughly 100-150 yards a minute and had 2 or more minutes to engage the closing enemy. Until the development of LMGs and Light mortars, the defense had a crucial advantage.

I think Pete wanted to fight with what would come to be known as the Von Moltke approach (not that he was the first to use it). Move rapidly to a good defensive position that for logistic or political reasons your enemy cannot let you keep. Then let them pay the blood price. This combines the strategic offensive (choosing where and when) with the tactical defensive in a best of both worlds.

Longstreet never did have Jackson's knack for making infantry go ridiculous distances quickly though. I don't know of many commanders who did aside from the young Bonaparte. Longstreet was pretty good at getting troops moving, but it was a slow era. Move 'em too fast and too few of them would arrive able to fight. Move 'em a bit slow and you take all morning to get going after Little Round Top. No really good answers.

As to Gettysburg, I have long thought that the slowness at Culp's Hill on the Union Right may have been every bit as problematic -- or more -- than was the delayed effort to go around the Union left. Buford won the battle on day one by giving the Union the better ground and by getting Lee's blood up enough for him to want to take it anyway.

[The Lurker Below]

for several generations the lost cause had nearly religious status in the south. today their are courses taught specifically about the lost cause. in the south after the war monuments were put up everywhere to commemorate the events, statues all over the place. the most common statue was Lee, followed by Lincoln, then Grant, then Jackson. the south celebrated what they precieved to be winners despite being real sore about their own loss. in the religion of the lost cause Longstreet is more or less Satan, fallen from grace, simply evil, whereas the host of Grant is an honorable foe.

was he an exceptional commander? no doubt. his legacy however, will never live down his betrayal of the southerners.

[Vuk]

hmmm...funny you should have made this thread, because I was just logging on to make a very similar one. lol As for Longstreet, I do not like him as a person, and think that he was way too limited to be a good commander.
(A. the political and logistical situation of the South was such that if they chose to defend and out wait the North they would have lost. The North would have just choked them out. The Confederacy needed a quick victory, and defensive warfare would not have given it that.
(B. the Confederate army was better suited for attack than defense, as Stuart said, and the Union army the opposite. A defensive war would have been using their weakness against the Union's advantage.
(C. Longstreet wasn't just cautious, he was sometimes indecisive.