What was the magic behind the success of French Napoleonic armies?

[Kagemusha]

I would like to hear your opinions what made the French Napoleonic armies so formidable? If you look at the components of those armies, there wasnt anything particularly amazing about them compared to their adversaries. British line infantry was comparable if not better to French. Austro Hungarian or Polish Cavalry maybe better then their French counterparts. I dont know of any revolutionary advantages in French artillery either. So that leaves us with Organisation, which i am not particularly familiar with other then that Napoleonic armies started using the Corps and Brigade structures,which made the organisation more felixible. Discuss.

[KrooK]

I don't remember polish cavarly fighting against Napoleon.
Some of Poles fought againt France serving into Austrian Army - but not into national units.
Much more fought together with France into army of Warsa Princedoom or as a part of French Army into national units.
Strenght of Napoleonic army was not advantage of soldiers but way how Napoleon was using them.
Napoleon was not afraid of breaking habbits. This was clue in my opinion.

[Pannonian]

According to Clausewitz, it was their sheer aggression that made them better than similarly organised enemy armies.

[BasharCaptWill]

- very good logistics,
- very capable commanders (Napoleon was not the only capable leader on the battlefield),
- Napoleon wanted that every commander knew what the plan was prior the battle and what he was supposed to achive,
- commanders had free hands to make decisions when needed,
- Napoleon knew better then others how to deploy and to use artillery and infantry to the highest effect,
- and ''fortune follows the brave'' - history records reveal that Napoleon's soldier were fully devoted to the Napoleon - like Cesar's legions to him

[Cyclops]

- very good logistics,...

I disagree, the revolutionary armies travelled light and Napoleon and his marshals did not supply their men very well. They moved so fast they avoided massive attrition losses, except when they could not catch the enemy (eg Russia, Spain). In those circumstances they met disaster.


...
- very capable commanders (Napoleon was not the only capable leader on the battlefield),
- Napoleon wanted that every commander knew what the plan was prior the battle and what he was supposed to achive,
- commanders had free hands to make decisions when needed,...

Bang on the money. The revolution killed off a generation of unfit commanders selected by birth and influence, and men who fought well and survived rose quickly. He had a cadre of geniuses to select from. Davout, Massena and Soult were army commanders of great talent, and Lannes, Ney and Murat were inspiring battlefield heroes. Basically the French had 9 or 10 of the best dozen military commanders of the age IMHO.

Napoleon kept a gaggle of decorated high ranking officers around him who could be tasked to take over critical phases/points of the battle and bring excellent leadership that short circuited the unweildy command control structures of the period.

The talented line commanders were encouraged to show aggression and initiative as well.


... Napoleon knew better then others how to deploy and to use artillery and infantry to the highest effect,...

And cavalry too.

On top of all his great talents, Napoleon was the greatest gunner there was, and mowed down fields of enemies with superb use of guns.

He built a huge artillery establishment, capable of concentrated fire. He rebuilt the french cavalry tradition that the revolution nearly extinguished and revived heavy cav charges so the three arms (cav inf and arty) played a balanced role once more in offensive warfare, and combined them superbly.


...
- and ''fortune follows the brave'' - history records reveal that Napoleon's soldier were fully devoted to the Napoleon - like Cesar's legions to him

Yes, the revolution unlocked the army to new classes of people full of passion, not press ganged mercenaries. They were instensely motivated and Napoleon built on that with the Imperial cult. He was a superstar and people worship him to this day. However his Marshals proved less loyal than his devoted soldiers.

I would add the carriere ouvert talent: the revolution opend society up and the Empire preserved the gains the middle classes had made. Educated men joined the ranks, and smart privates could become Marshals, so ability was not repressed in the interests of the social order.

This meant morale, intelligence and manpower reserves were greater than for any other nation or power.

I musty comment on this nonsense about "superior British Infantry"-in general tye were well matched but the French we superior in attack and there were no comparable mass elite formations to the Old Guard in the HM's forces.

The British never dared face the French unless they were on top of a big hill (or prefeably hiding behind it) because the French army would have walked over them in an open battle. Wellington was a brilliant general to find so many ways for a the small, brave but less capable British forces to win against a superior foe so often.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Columns. The French often attacked in columns. These were faster on the battlefield and often gave the French an edge since they didn't have to slow down to deploy in line. Also had a psychological edge in that it would appear that a couple of thousand blokes were headed right at your company and the one next to yours. Even though the front of the column would probably have no more muskets brought to bear than the two companys in line, it took steady nerves (and/or a good deal of drink) to stand there and halt the column with disciplined fire. The French rarely encountered opposition with the nerve.

Leadership -- as above.

Esprit-de-corps. This is always a key component and Bonaparte did much to inculcate/enhance it.

[aimlesswanderer]

His secret book: the Art of War. Without that he would have gone nowhere! :laugh4:

[CountArach]

Initially I think it was the fact that most of the European armies were fighting in a dated manner (see the Prussian army). However, once the other armies started to modernise then it became more a matter of psychology in some respects. The French were formidable foes and the more that the soldiers on both sides got in the mindset of "The French can't be beaten", the more they were inclined to believe it. Thus morale drops amongst their enemies and the French become arrogant (Arrogant Frenchmen? Say it ain't so!).

[G. Septimus]

Simple:
1. a very good Commander
2. Sheer, and Supreme Trained French Army
3. Capable Officers
4. High Morale (Except in Russia)
5. lovable Commander
6. National Heroes

[BasharCaptWill]

Originally Posted by BasharCaptWill
- very good logistics,...

Originally Posted by Cyclops
I disagree, the revolutionary armies travelled light and Napoleon and his marshals did not supply their men very well. They moved so fast they avoided massive attrition losses, except when they could not catch the enemy (eg Russia, Spain). In those circumstances they met disaster.

Overall I agree with what is said. It is a bit off topic but Caesar campaign in Gaul comes to my mind. Without good logistics his legions would not be able to fullfil their tasks. Napoleon supposed to read about great commanders and I would say that he also knew the importance of logistics. That's why regarding the records from those days, I mentioned that logistic for French army during Napoleon era was quite good.

[Cute Wolf]

I'm just finished my napoleon campaign... and if not because of darn waterloo... where is my crack veteran units??? OMIGOD!!!! I practically spam Grenadiers, Young Guards, and Curassiers, save some howitzers... but what they give with me at waterloo? some pathetic guys????? WHAAAATTTTT??????

*. But after 3 times of reloading, I finally beat it.!!!!

[Beskar]

Also, didn't Napoleon effectively re-write the rulebook? So when the generals encountered him, they were not used to fighting "dishonestably" and use set-style pieces which Napoleon just easily countered?

[Meneldil]

I'm not really familiar with the military history of the era, but from what I understood, the french armies started to appear superior to their foes even before Napoleon kicked in.

National conscription, fervor, high moral, motivated new commanders, better weapons (artillery), etc. All that existed before Napoleon became Emperor, though it certainly helped him later.

[Watchman]

From what I recall of reading it, the early Revolutionary armies were basically hordes of enthusiastic but abysmally trained conscripts around hard kernels of actual soldiers from the old royal army, and real headaches for their commanders who duly had to figure out how to work around their many limitations and make use of their few strengths. With the often overzealous Revolutionary regimes having a bad habit of poking their noses in to boot.
That said they were working off a pretty hardcore military tradition - France hadn't become the continental superpower by being bad at war...

[al Roumi]

Napoleon's armies were not created when he took or assumed power. They were seasoned by the near continual state of war in which the republic had existed since the revolution. The French revolutionary armies certainly were not instantly victorious either, suffering many severe defeats throughout the first revolutionary wars.

The very first armies the republic fielded to defend against the Austrian army were poorly supplied, trained and equipped -but benefitted from massive numbers of troops (conscripts/volunteers from the levee en masse) and l'ancien regime's artillery corps (who were more favourable to the revolutionary cause that other pre-revolutionary army units).

Their strength in numbers proved to be the main tactical advantage exploited by the early revolutionary leaders, afaik.

[DisruptorX]

From what I have read, Pre-Napoleonic Revolutionary armies were all about winning because they heavily outnumbered their opponents. In cases where they did not outnumber, they fared poorly.

[Cyclops]

I'm not really familiar with the military history of the era, but from what I understood, the french armies started to appear superior to their foes even before Napoleon kicked in.

National conscription, fervor, high moral, motivated new commanders, better weapons (artillery), etc. All that existed before Napoleon became Emperor, though it certainly helped him later.

Guys like Dumouriez did zerg the British out of Flanders, but at Valmy the excellent French arty stuck it to the Prussians and made them pause and then withdraw, so as mentioned above there was some quality in the revolutionary forces, residual from Ancien Regime reforms.

Napoleon transformed the Army of Italy from an inert rabble into a dashing plundering fiery force (all covered in glitter and baubles, if sometimes barefoot) more than a match for the ponderous Austrian forces sent against them, and he secured the Directory with the wealth of Lombardy. Napoleon was pretty much outnumbered in every battle in Italy and wiped the floor with all comers, so superior Austrian numbers and training did not win out: leadership and morale (in particular the motivation of greed, but also republican fervor) more than made up the difference here.

In the war of the second coalition Napoleon saved the situation at Marengo but the war was won at Hohenlinden by Moreau and the more austere Army of the Rhine, so there was a growing maturity and quality to all the French forces, not just those under Napoleons hand. The forces at Hohenlinden were pretty much equal so French leadership and morale once again was decisive.

However the formation of the Grande Armee combined the best of both these famous forces: fancy show-offs like Murat, superb geniuses like Soult and Davout (the best of the Italian crew) merged with the nerveless courage of Ney (from Moreau's disciplined Rhine army). The glitter and drive of the victors of Lodi and the stern guardians of the Rhine were combined into the most dominant force in centuries.

With this concentration Napoleon acheived superior numbers in many battles, often by amazing forced marches (eg the under-rated victory of Ulm), but his great victories at Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstadt were fought against superior numbers.

Austerlitz was a true thundeclap of a victory: put himself on a platter to ensure his enemies would strike at him, conjured reinforcements out of the air, and counter-attacked into the hilly centre against the formidable Russians. I mean FFS.

Jena Auerstadt was comprehensive: his destruction of the Prussian vanguard was surgical, the result of tactical research (eg the new diamond pattern inf squares) as well as high morale, skilled leadeship and the finest equipment.

In hindsight the Prussians are thought to have been doomed from the outset but at the time Europe was like "oh hes beaten the Austrians again so wot, and well Austerlitz was sort of a fluke but the big dawg is here to sort them out now". Even more amazing is the other half of the equation at Aurstadt where Davout with one corps slammed into the main Prussian army, stood like a wall at odds of about 3-1, and when they had finished wrecking the most feared army of the 18th century drove them from the field like smoke before the wind. The cav pursuit lasted about 500 miles after that battle, the Prussinas were so demoralised they surrended fortresses to foraging hussars. It cannot be over-stated: the Prussian field army was destroyed.

Swift movement and ruthless pillaging generally made up for poor logistics. Superb intelligence (aided by brilliant map making and complete cav superiority off the battlefield) meant the enemy could be found and fought quickly, and the high morale, superb leadership and well equiped troops of all arms made victory likely once battle was joined.

The way they brought Nappy down was to not fight him, and to advance on Paris regardless. Bonaparte was never removed by the allies, it was the French themsleves and in particular the Marshals who removed him when their positions at home were threatened.

[Meneldil]

From what I recall of reading it, the early Revolutionary armies were basically hordes of enthusiastic but abysmally trained conscripts around hard kernels of actual soldiers from the old royal army, and real headaches for their commanders who duly had to figure out how to work around their many limitations and make use of their few strengths. With the often overzealous Revolutionary regimes having a bad habit of poking their noses in to boot.
That said they were working off a pretty hardcore military tradition - France hadn't become the continental superpower by being bad at war...

That was certainly right in the first years that immediately followed the Revolution. Many officers had fled the country, the army was disorganized and poorly equiped. I would even doubt that the levies were enthusiastic at the time, as most people had little clue about what was happening in Paris.
I was rather talking about the second part of the Revolutionnary era. By then, the french armies were led by competent generals, well supplied and equiped (while the civilian population was more or less starving), and made up of motivated soldiers who didn't fare any worse than their opponents. The Revolution was militarily successful on all borders before Napoléon took the power.

[rotorgun]

One of the keys to the success of Napoleon's armies was not just the corps structures he created, for other nations had also emulated this, but in the way he deployed his corps. The Grande Armee kept it's corps within a day's march from each other while on the move. This allowed for more efficient foraging than keeping the entire army together on the march. If one corps made contact with an enemy army, it had the job, and the strength in general to hold the enemy in position until the other corps could assemble to counterattack. In addition, Napoleon usually deployed his cavalry, which was organized into corps as well, as a screen forward of the main body. This, along with the use of spies, sent in advance provided Napoleon and his commanders with good intelligence of the enemy dispositions. It did not always work as well as Napoleon desired, but generally gave him a truer picture of the enemy than they had of his army. Thus he was often able to out march, and out plan his opponents.

As I mentioned, the other armies of the period adopted the corps idea, but never seemed to have as many talented corps commanders available to make it work as well. Many of them lacked the initiative and daring of Napoleons marshals. Napoleon also had a brilliant Chief of Staff, Louis Alexandre Berthier, 1st Duc de Wagram, 1st Duc de Valengin, 1st Sovereign Prince de Neuchâtel . The operational efficiency of the Grande Armée owed much to his considerable abilities of administration and organization. Some historians feel that his absence at the Battle of Waterloo was one of the reasons for Napoleon's defeat, because it was he who was able to transmit the genius of Napoleon's tactics into orders for the the Army.

Another factor in the success of Napoleon's armies was his use of artillery. It's not so much that the French weapons were of better quality, but rather Napoleon's use of it in concentrated form, such as the Grand Battery. To quote the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo " He moves his artillery like a pistol." French artillerymen were very efficient, by and large, throughout the period. The one exception where they met their match was at Borodino. The Russians proved that they could use artillery well, on the defense at least.