View Full Version : What if the 20th of July 1944 Hitler has been "terminated"
What if?
What if in the 20th of July1944, the generals had succeeded to kill Hitler?
How they would have convinced the world to stop the war? What they would have to do?
Following the debate on the Treaty of Versailles and how the Allies were determined in 1944 to show to the Germans they had lost the war, would this assassination change the German end?
Or would this been seen by the Allies as another trick to avoid a defeat then to claim few years after that Germany wasn’t defeated?
What about the extermination camps?
Would Stalin be convinced to stop his offensive?
Would Churchill and Roosevelt convinced to halt the D-Day offensive?
In the internal situation what and who to arrest? The SS are an army in the Army. What about Himmler, Goering and the hard Nazi?
More I think about it, less I give a chance of success to the generals to stop the war at this point…
So what would they have to do?
Possible reaction of the major Allies?
Price to pay?
Pannonian
05-17-2010, 19:52
They could have decided on a more rational route towards unconditional surrender, eg. hold in the east for as long as possible and yield in the west, thus allowing the western Allies to be in de facto occupation of the majority of Germany before the Soviets pushed their Germans back. What that does to post-war negotiations is anyone's guess. But unconditional surrender was the only ceasefire available.
PanzerJaeger
05-17-2010, 20:24
Peace(alliance) with the Western Allies, sensible command decisions and, dare I say, victory in the East. On the home front, the top Nazis would have to be rounded up and put on trial to show the Western Powers that they were dealing with different leadership. The Holocaust would have probably been quietly halted and covered up.
How they would have convinced the world to stop the war? What they would have to do?
Well, the Allies only agreed on unconditional surrender in 1945, but that doesn't mean they didn't think that was the only or proper way to end the war.
In the end of July, the Allies were still struggling to build a bridgehead in Normandy, while the Soviets were already pushing through the Baltic countries, Bielorussia and Ukraine. Phreaps the Allies wouldn't have pushed for a unconditional surrender, but Stalin had already smelled blood in the water and bent on bringing the entire Eastern Europe under his bootheels, I doubt he would have settled for a conditional surrender. Further, most of the conspirators and the future cabinet would have far greater sympathies for the Western Allies and make a transition to a Conservative Democracy, then they would to anything similar to Communism (Which was the archenemy of Fascism/Nazism).
Also taking into account it would take a few weeks before control was cemented by the conspirators and any counter-coups thrwarted, before the conspirators could actually press for an armistice.
Following the debate on the Treaty of Versailles and how the Allies were determined in 1944 to show to the Germans they had lost the war, would this assassination change the German end?
Or would this been seen by the Allies as another trick to avoid a defeat then to claim few years after that Germany wasn’t defeated?
It is true Roosevelt that Roosevelt and Morgenthau were by then already planning to utterly destroy any semblance of German power after the war, the coup and assassination of Hitler might have changed his minds as to how zealous would they be to persue Germany into its hinterlands. I suppose it would all depend on what measures the Conspirators would take to deal with the more radical elements of the regime as a whole.
What about the extermination camps?
That would be a tricky matter. I am not aware of how much the conspirators knew of the extent of the holocaust, but the sheer horror of such a program was the creation of Hitler and more radical elements within the Nazi Hierarchy. Without a doubt, the Conspirators would pull the plug on that as soon as they could, along with other forced labour measures occurring in Germany.
Would Stalin be convinced to stop his offensive?
As I said, that would be highly unlikely.
Stalin had placed great trust in Hitler and cherished the idea of a military alliance up until the very moment when he was attacked (Stalin's suspicions and dismissal of Allied reports that Germans were massing troops on his borders as attempts to alienate both countries apart; along with his orders not to counter-mobilize before the invasion, and not to counter-attack once the Germans began attacking), he felt betrayed, further, his country suffered a great deal from the invasion and now he was winning and on the verge of occupying large tracts of Europe, he was going to stop? I doubt it.
Would Churchill and Roosevelt convinced to halt the D-Day offensive?
They might be inclined to it, but operations would proceed. In the end, I believe Stalin's firm refusal to accept anything less than unconditional surrender would force both Western Allies to continue their operations in Europe, which also settled well with their desire to punish Germany. Regardless if the Western Allies were to accept a surrender without their Eastern Ally's approval, German forces in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy would have to surrender and be disarmed, and Germany would have to fend off for itself against the Soviets.
In the internal situation what and who to arrest? The SS are an army in the Army. What about Himmler, Goering and the hard Nazi?
In that event, all of the Nazi's high cadre who didn't join the conspirators would be put under arrest. Starting with the SS, which was part of the plot from the beginning. They were the only ones who had the capability to resist and attack the coup once it was well settled.
More I think about it, less I give a chance of success to the generals to stop the war at this point…
Yeah, pretty much. Provided they were completely successful internally, they would then petition the Allies for an Armistice, along with all the conditions of post-war transition to a Democracy, pledges to curb the Nazi regime, restoring sovereignty to the occupied countries (quite possibly including Austria), closing down the concentration camps, trialling the high Nazi elites (Though I doubt much of the military would be effected by it. The conspirators were still very much dependent on the army loyalty to assert control over the country), etc. Churchill and Roosevelt, would start having second thoughts and might have been inclined to take the deal, but only with the agreement of Stalin, who, fiercely rejecting any such agreement would insist on unconditional surrender and occupation under the victorious Allies' terms. That would end the openness by the Western Allies to accept peace.
Realizing they had no choice but to continue to fight to defend Germany from total occupation, they would do so, albeit with weaker decisiveness then Hitler. Once the Germans were pushed out of Poland and France, I believe then the Conspirators would see that all was really lost, and after making a token defence to save some face and dignity, they would fold before the facts and accept unconditional surrender.
The result would be the Soviets putting the whole lot to trial along with the already arrested German elite. They would probably get a few dozens years each with crimes against the peace or something, and the whole path would not deviate that much from our history. A good more deal of Germans would probably have survived though, especially in the Western theaters.
Strike For The South
05-18-2010, 04:12
Patton rides into Moscow and spits on the Kermlin
BLAST THOSE YELLER REDS TO HELL
Alexander the Pretty Good
05-18-2010, 05:03
Peace(alliance) with the Western Allies, sensible command decisions and, dare I say, victory in the East. On the home front, the top Nazis would have to be rounded up and put on trial to show the Western Powers that they were dealing with different leadership. The Holocaust would have probably been quietly halted and covered up.
How would victory in the East be defined?
PanzerJaeger
05-18-2010, 10:24
How would victory in the East be defined?
Realistically, much like WW1 - with Russia asking for an armistice on favorable terms to Germany. If Russia lost her Western allies, face the prospect of unhindered German industry, and suffered a major battlefield reversal, it is not inconceivable that Stalin would look for an exit, or even be replaced.
If the Allies actually joined Germany against the Soviets, which was at least considered (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unthinkable), total victory would not have been implausible.
Question is if Western Allies would allow on peace mentioned by Jaeger. Governments of GB and USA had to listen to their population. Would people accept casefire and peace. Would Churchill allow Germans on victory on east? I really doubt. Victory mentioned by Jaeger would made Germany strongest nation into Europe again. And Germany would not have problems on East. More - they have all the sources of USSR.
Churchill was not idiot and would know that in these condition fall of Britain = 10 years.
More realistic is that Allies would still fighting and Germany would surrender. Maybe on better condition but would surrender.
Too many variables. How would the German population react? Who would have taken charge, the generals or someone from the party? Would the population support the successor? Assuming the war continued (and domestic peace continued), how would the fighting be affected? How much would the German military benefit from the removal of Hitler's interference?
I do not believe that the Western Allies would have made peace with Germany in July of '44 without the Soviets. Any peace deal between the West and Germany would also have included a settlement of some kind for the Soviets. If the Germans were not prepared to agree to such terms, the war would have continued even without Hitler. I see no plausible way for Germany to make peace in the west and continue to fight in the east.
Alexander the Pretty Good
05-18-2010, 17:44
Realistically, much like WW1 - with Russia asking for an armistice on favorable terms to Germany. If Russia lost her Western allies, face the prospect of unhindered German industry, and suffered a major battlefield reversal, it is not inconceivable that Stalin would look for an exit, or even be replaced.
If the Allies actually joined Germany against the Soviets, which was at least considered (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unthinkable), total victory would not have been implausible.
Would such an armistice or total victory take into account Germany's war aims when they began the conflict?
Consider that some of the plotters against Hitler, including the guy Tom Cruise played, weren't opposed to the Holocaust or all the other nice the Nazi Party had made a priority. They were angry that Hitler was screwing up their chances of a Jew-free utopia.
Too many variables. How would the German population react? Who would have taken charge, the generals or someone from the party?
Ugh. Very few people from the Nazi party would take charge of any meaningful post.
The leader would be Ludwig Beck, which had the respect of the military and the conservative elements of society. He was by all means a respected and conciliatory person to lead Germany.
PanzerJaeger
05-18-2010, 19:35
Would such an armistice or total victory take into account Germany's war aims when they began the conflict?
An armistice would fall short of Hitler's original goal of total annexation. Also, any deal with the Western powers would obviously require the return of all the nations Germany conquered, except for Poland.
Remember, in this hypothetical situation, the removal of Nazi leadership and peace with the Allies would necessitate leadership with completely different goals, ie. not aggressive expansion, which of course changes the conditions for victory. Defeating Bagration and bringing the Soviets to the peace table on a favorable footing would be quite a victory for Germany in 1944.
Consider that some of the plotters against Hitler, including the guy Tom Cruise played, weren't opposed to the Holocaust or all the other nice the Nazi Party had made a priority. They were angry that Hitler was screwing up their chances of a Jew-free utopia.
I think you are mischaracterizing their motivations quite a bit. While it is true that the plotters were motivated by fear of losing the war and not any particularly altruistic intentions, it is incorrect to assume that they were big supporters the Holocaust or a "Jew-free utopia".
The full extent of the Holocaust and its cultural and historical significance emerged after the war. Today, WW2 has almost become a morality play about the Holocaust. It has, rightly, become a huge historical event with countless books, movies, and other media devoted to it. Some have even described a "Holocaust Industry". To be perfectly blunt, however, the treatment of the Jews was a murky and wholly insignificant issue in the minds of most Germans who were not directly involved. The vast majority of Germans had no idea about the full extent of what was happening, and, frankly, didn't care. There was a war on, cities were being bombed, and people were trying their best to survive and win. I have read quite a few diaries from German officers and soldiers at all levels, and I have yet to come across much mental masturbation over Jew-free utopian visions.
Sarmatian
05-18-2010, 19:39
At that point, I don't think it would change much. Allies would have demanded unconditional surrender anyway.
Louis VI the Fat
05-18-2010, 19:44
What if?
What if in the 20th of July1944, the generals had succeeded to kill Hitler?
How they would have convinced the world to stop the war? What they would have to do?
Following the debate on the Treaty of Versailles and how the Allies were determined in 1944 to show to the Germans they had lost the war, would this assassination change the German end?
Or would this been seen by the Allies as another trick to avoid a defeat then to claim few years after that Germany wasn’t defeated?
What about the extermination camps?
Would Stalin be convinced to stop his offensive?
Would Churchill and Roosevelt convinced to halt the D-Day offensive?
In the internal situation what and who to arrest? The SS are an army in the Army. What about Himmler, Goering and the hard Nazi?
More I think about it, less I give a chance of success to the generals to stop the war at this point…
So what would they have to do?
Possible reaction of the major Allies?
Price to pay?Lots of questions, good ones.
In short, I do not think that a succeeded attempt would've changed the course of history much. Perhaps a sad conclusion, and one that relegates the 20th of July attempt back to its rather modest place: merely a coup of continuity.
Ian Kershaw contrasted the options of Italy and Germany:
Unlike Italy, there was no alternative anymore. The Nazis had fully overtaken the state and society. Which is also telling of the extent to which German society, and especially the conservative, nationalist and military segment had embraced Hitler. They were the Nazis, instead of being governed by them. And everybody else had been eliminated.
Italy always retained a king, a society outside Mussolini, and could dispose of him when the war was lost. It was not possible for Germany to switch to the democratic camp in this manner.
And short of Germany turning democratic, I don't see how America could have struck a deal with 'Nazi' Germany, with or without Hitler, against the Soviet Union in 1944 anymore. It was too late for that. Britain, perhaps. Britain at this point was at the crossroads between independent foreign policy, and foreign policy in line with the US. The former impulse would dictate a return to the Ribbentrop-Hoare pact of 1935-1939, and indeed using Germany to contain Russia. (The UK is a promiscuous wench indeed! In twenty years, it jumped the beds of France, to Germany, to Russia and to America)
But this would require an isolationist America, which was not the case, so a deal with a non-democratic Germany was not a viable option.
There was also the irreconcilable problem of occupied states. What of France? Maybe this could've been solved with an evacuation of German troops. But France would not have fought alongside 'Nazi' Germany against the Soviet Union. It would've meant civil war in France, with the most likely outcome of a communist victory and an alliance with the Soviet Union. Poland is unsolveable too. Indeed, Poland was already unsolvable in actual history.
Peace(alliance) with the Western Allies, sensible command decisions and, dare I say, victory in the East.B...but victory in the East means the defeat of Nazism. :beam:
Also, national-militaristic Germany installed Communism in Russia, and national-socialist Germany ensured its triumph over half of Europe. Some legacy! Far from claiming to lead the fight against bolshevism, the German right is the patron saint of Bolshevism, to which it owes all.
Pannonian
05-18-2010, 20:04
B...but victory in the East means the defeat of Nazism. :beam:
There was victory in the East. At around this time, the Nazis were getting their arses kicked by Bagration and its follow ups. If that's not victory in the East, I don't know what is.
An armistice would fall short of Hitler's original goal of total annexation. Also, any deal with the Western powers would obviously require the return of all the nations Germany conquered, except for Poland.
Except for Poland? The Western Allies included the UK, and the UK had specifically gone to war to protect Poland. While the UK might have theoretically bowed out around the time of Dunkirk, leaving Poland under German occupation, there is no way they would have done so in July of 1944. After Overlord succeeded, an Allied victory was inevitable and the Allies knew it. It was just a question of time and cost. I simply do not see the UK allowing Germany to keep control of Poland in any peace agreement at that point in the war. Since the US would never have made a peace without the UK, I see no way for Germany to get out of the war in July of '44 and keep control of Poland.
As I see it, the only things a July '44 peace would have achieved for Germany would have been an improved post-war situation domestially. Germany probably would not have been divided, its infrastructure would have been far more intact, and it would have avoided another year's worth of deaths. The chance of pulling some kind of German strategic victory out of a July '44 peace is a pipedream and nothing more.
Ugh. Very few people from the Nazi party would take charge of any meaningful post.
The leader would be Ludwig Beck, which had the respect of the military and the conservative elements of society. He was by all means a respected and conciliatory person to lead Germany.
Beck was slated to take over in the plot, but this assumes that the post-hit coup was successful. Himmler was not going to go down easily.
Louis VI the Fat
05-18-2010, 20:38
There was victory in the East. At around this time, the Nazis were getting their arses kicked by Bagration and its follow ups. If that's not victory in the East, I don't know what is.There was already victory in the East indeed. I was just having fun with PJ having a different idea of who would've had to win to speak of victory.
Except for Poland?But, Poland was given up in the end. France and Britain did not win the guarantee of Poland over which they started the war in the first place. Poland was in the end the prize for one of the two countries that had invaded it in September 1939. One of the three countries that had divided Poland for the century and a half before Poland was freed at the great Treaty of Versailles.
But, Poland was given up in the end. France and Britain did not win the guarantee of Poland over which they started the war in the first place. Poland was in the end the prize for one of the two countries that had invaded it in September 1939. One of the three countries that had divided Poland for the century and a half before Poland was freed at the great Treaty of Versailles.
As far as I am aware, the UK never declared war on the USSR to protect Poland. If I am wrong about that, please correct me.
Louis VI the Fat
05-18-2010, 21:08
As far as I am aware, the UK never declared war on the USSR to protect Poland. No, but we did declare war on Germany to protect Poland. Rightfully or wrongfully, or forced by circumstance, in the end, we picked one of the two 1939 invaders of Poland for an ally, and sold out Poland to him.
The 'what if' here, is there a possibility that we would've sided with Germany against those who occupied Poland? It is, after all, what we did do after, say, 1949. What was the earliest date possible? Could it have been done in 1944, at the possible prize of giving Poland to Germany instead of to Russia?
No, but we did declare war on Germany to protect Poland. Rightfully or wrongfully, or forced by circumstance, in the end, we picked one of the two 1939 invaders of Poland for an ally, and sold out Poland to him.
The 'what if' here, is there a possibility that we would've sided with Germany against those who occupied Poland? It is, after all, what we did do after, say, 1949. What was the earliest date possible? Could it have been done in 1944, at the possible prize of giving Poland to Germany instead of to Russia?
No, the UK had no interest in fighting the Soviets over Poland at any point that is relevant to this discussion. The UK-Poland military alliance was specifically targetted at Germany, not the USSR. In reality, the UK didn't care a whole lot about Poland's independence, they just cared about limiting Germany's expansion. The exact same was true of the Franco-Polish treaty. If you want to see how the UK/France would have responded to a unilateral Soviet attack on Poland, it's probably more accurate to look at their response to the Soviet invasion of Finland. In that situation, the UK/France made a big diplomatic scene, but didn't have any intention of opposing the Soviets militarily. The Cold War situation is not remotely comparable to WW2, and is more in-line with the UK/France reaction to the Finnish invasion. They were certainly not willing to risk war with the USSR in 1949 (or at any other subsequent date) over Polish independence.
PanzerJaeger
05-18-2010, 21:22
Except for Poland? The Western Allies included the UK, and the UK had specifically gone to war to protect Poland. While the UK might have theoretically bowed out around the time of Dunkirk, leaving Poland under German occupation, there is no way they would have done so in July of 1944. After Overlord succeeded, an Allied victory was inevitable and the Allies knew it. It was just a question of time and cost. I simply do not see the UK allowing Germany to keep control of Poland in any peace agreement at that point in the war. Since the US would never have made a peace without the UK, I see no way for Germany to get out of the war in July of '44 and keep control of Poland.
The UK's brave stand for Poland was of course before the absolute humiliation of Dunkirk, the Blitz, and being kicked around the desert for years. Louis pretty much made the point that I would have. After 5 years, the British were more than happy to cede Poland to the Russians - one of the original invaders back in '39. I don't think they would have had a problem doing the same with Germany, especially if the nation was under new leadership.
Oh, and Overlord was far from decided in July of '44.
The chance of pulling some kind of German strategic victory out of a July '44 peace is a pipedream and nothing more.
Stranger things have happened. We shouldn't forget how strong the fear of communism was among the Western leadership, especially with Churchill. It is conceivable that if the Germans assassinated Hitler themselves, the emerging leadership could have been seen as a wholly different political animal by the West. And if the West threw their support behind Germany in its new found role as a defender instead of an aggressor, things would get very interesting indeed.
The UK's brave stand for Poland was of course before the absolute humiliation of Dunkirk, the Blitz, and being kicked around the desert for years. Louis pretty much made the point that I would have. After 5 years, the British were more than happy to cede Poland to the Russians - one of the original invaders back in '39. I don't think they would have had a problem doing the same with Germany, especially if the nation was under new leadership.
The UK ceded Poland to the Russians because they had no choice. The same applied to the US. Neither was willing to risk a war with the Soviets over Poland, or for that matter any other Eastern bloc country. That's irrelevant to the discussion though because the UK, US, and France WERE willing to fight Germany over Poland. That's the entire point.
Oh, and Overlord was far from decided in July of '44.
Caen had already fallen by July 20th. There was no longer any way for Germany to eject the Allies from France at that point. The US breakout along the coast started less than a week later. No change in leadership was going to prevent that from happening.
PanzerJaeger
05-18-2010, 21:46
The UK ceded Poland to the Russians because they had no choice. The same applied to the US. Neither was willing to risk a war with the Soviets over Poland, or for that matter any other Eastern bloc country. That's irrelevant to the discussion though because the UK, US, and France WERE willing to fight Germany over Poland. That's the entire point.
Well, the UK and France were willing to fight Germany for Poland in 1939. The US was only willing to fight Germany after Hitler declared war. Anyway, after 5 years, France was beaten and the UK had suffered severely. As you stated, the British did not really care about the Poles, they only wanted to contain German expansion. I think that with the Nazis out of power, Britain would have been more than willing to cede Poland for a "victorious" exit from the war, especially if it helped contain the second, now first, most dangerous threat to Western security - communism.
Caen had already fallen by July 20th. There was no longer any way for Germany to eject the Allies from France at that point. The US breakout along the coast started less than a week later. No change in leadership was going to prevent that from happening.
It wouldn't? The Normandy campaign was decisively won a month later in late August with the Falaise disaster, which was directly attributable to Hitler.
“As far as I am aware, the UK never declared war on the USSR to protect Poland. If I am wrong about that, please correct me.”
France and UK declare war on Germany after the attack by Germany of Poland. That was the step too far and this time the 2 Allies decided to go for it.
Unfortunately their armies and Air Forces were not up to the job, nor their generals and strategies…
“The Holocaust would have probably been quietly halted and covered up.”
Yeap, but what to do? To stop the convoys (which would be use much better for reinforcing the Eastern lines) would be easy, but what with the millions of deportees? A lot of war industries were using the forced labour…
What about the survivors of the Death Camps? To finish them off wouldn't be possible without the Allies to know, to release them wouldn’t help in gaining sympathy to Germany, even not in not any more Hitlerian one.
Just trying to resolve this would be a logistical nightmare, just to stop the deportees to stop dying of typhus or Cholera, or hunger. How to increase their daily rations in a besieged Germany? What to do with them? And if the Generals were not aware of this, it would make their task even harder...
“Peace (alliance) with the Western Allies”
Why the Allies would accept a Peace that would save Germany, and under which conditions?
As the debate on Versailles showed, a too lenient and soft Treaty just fuelled the next war…
So even in a will to save what left of Europe out of Communism, would Churchill and Roosevelt (as De Gaulle was still not in full control of France at this moment) would have accepted the risk of a confrontation with Stalin (which Roosevelt trusted) in order to save a Germany they were fighting with the help of the Soviets?
Even if the 2 leaders had no real idea of the scale of the holocaust, they knew what the Nazis were doing.
As the German population, they couldn’t imagine the reality of it. To know and to accept the reality of it is different. I am one of think the Germans knew of the deportation, I ma not sure they were aware of the physical reality…
More, as we know, Roosevelt always distrust De Gaulle as he was a general and he wasn’t elected… How and why he would have trust putchist German Generals?
As mentioned, there is no more a political credible German opposition thanks to the efficient Gestapo.
Now, if we look at the maps in July 1944, the Russian are deep in Europe.
They can decide to halt THEIR offensive in the East, giving the Germans time to regroup and to stop the Allies offensive.
They have in their ranks a political alternative to Nazism as they have a “German Communist Government” in Exile.
In case of a successful coup, they could claim the throne…
And considering the difficult logistic faced by the Allies in 1944, I am far to believe that the Allies would have been victorious in front of the Russians…
And I don’t want to start again a comparison between Sherman and T 34 or JS, Patton against Zukov, Koniev or Vatutine.
Defeating Bagration would have been indeed a difficult task but I am not sure that the British soldiers would have been so happy to fight the Russian even if they would be able to reach this front…
As for the French Army fighting during Anvil operation, I quite sure that they wouldn’t.
“The full extent of the Holocaust and its cultural and historical significance emerged after the war.” Agree, but only for the civilian population. I interviewed during my research a Leclerc 2DB veteran and he was still horrified by what he saw in some trains in an abandoned railways station…
So, the Allied soldiers who would have to see this kind of things would not fight to save Germany from Communism, as the horrors of communism became apparent even latter in history than the ones from Nazism…
Well, the UK and France were willing to fight Germany for Poland in 1939. The US was only willing to fight Germany after Hitler declared war. Anyway, after 5 years, France was beaten and the UK had suffered severely. As you stated, the British did not really care about the Poles, they only wanted to contain German expansion. I think that with the Nazis out of power, Britain would have been more than willing to cede Poland for a "victorious" exit from the war, especially if it helped contain the second, now first, most dangerous threat to Western security - communism.
You seem to be assuming that the USSR/West split had already occurred in July of 1944. That's simply not true. The Western Allies didn't begin to re-align themselves against the Soviets until early 1945, and even then the Cold War didn't really start until 1947. Despite the 'what-if' posturing a lot of people like to make, with numerous cites to Patton, there was essentially no chance whatsoever that the US and UK were going to turn on the USSR, even in 1945. The US, UK, and USSR were all extremelly committed to supporting each other against Germany in July of 1944. Unconditional surrender was first discussed at Casablanca in January of 1943, and it was all but accepted by Tehran in November of 1943. That's long, long before the events of Overlord and July 20th. Unconditional surrender was a near-certainty by that point. The Soviets had also demanded that Poland's borders be redrawn at Tehran... they would not have accepted an end to the war that left Poland in Germany's hands.
PanzerJaeger
05-18-2010, 22:49
“The Holocaust would have probably been quietly halted and covered up.”
Yeap, but what to do? To stop the convoys (which would be use much better for reinforcing the Eastern lines) would be easy, but what with the millions of deportees? A lot of war industries were using the forced labour…
What about the survivors of the Death Camps? To finish them off wouldn't be possible without the Allies to know, to release them wouldn’t help in gaining sympathy to Germany, even not in not any more Hitlerian one.
Just trying to resolve this would be a logistical nightmare, just to stop the deportees to stop dying of typhus or Cholera, or hunger. How to increase their daily rations in a besieged Germany? What to do with them? And if the Generals were not aware of this, it would make their task even harder...
“Peace (alliance) with the Western Allies”
Why the Allies would accept a Peace that would save Germany, and under which conditions?
As the debate on Versailles showed, a too lenient and soft Treaty just fuelled the next war…
So even in a will to save what left of Europe out of Communism, would Churchill and Roosevelt (as De Gaulle was still not in full control of France at this moment) would have accepted the risk of a confrontation with Stalin (which Roosevelt trusted) in order to save a Germany they were fighting with the help of the Soviets?
Even if the 2 leaders had no real idea of the scale of the holocaust, they knew what the Nazis were doing.
As the German population, they couldn’t imagine the reality of it. To know and to accept the reality of it is different. I am one of think the Germans knew of the deportation, I ma not sure they were aware of the physical reality…
More, as we know, Roosevelt always distrust De Gaulle as he was a general and he wasn’t elected… How and why he would have trust putchist German Generals?
As mentioned, there is no more a political credible German opposition thanks to the efficient Gestapo.
Now, if we look at the maps in July 1944, the Russian are deep in Europe.
They can decide to halt THEIR offensive in the East, giving the Germans time to regroup and to stop the Allies offensive.
They have in their ranks a political alternative to Nazism as they have a “German Communist Government” in Exile.
In case of a successful coup, they could claim the throne…
And considering the difficult logistic faced by the Allies in 1944, I am far to believe that the Allies would have been victorious in front of the Russians…
And I don’t want to start again a comparison between Sherman and T 34 or JS, Patton against Zukov, Koniev or Vatutine.
Defeating Bagration would have been indeed a difficult task but I am not sure that the British soldiers would have been so happy to fight the Russian even if they would be able to reach this front…
As for the French Army fighting during Anvil operation, I quite sure that they wouldn’t.
“The full extent of the Holocaust and its cultural and historical significance emerged after the war.” Agree, but only for the civilian population. I interviewed during my research a Leclerc 2DB veteran and he was still horrified by what he saw in some trains in an abandoned railways station…
So, the Allied soldiers who would have to see this kind of things would not fight to save Germany from Communism, as the horrors of communism became apparent even latter in history than the ones from Nazism…
All good points, especially about the difficulty in figuring out how to repatriate a population you were previously systematically killing.
Essentially, my whole scenario hinges on the Allies viewing the assassination of Hitler as a dramatic change in German leadership and intentions and swallowing their moral and historical issues with Germany in the preservation of their own self interest, as they did when allying with the Soviet Union.
You seem to be assuming that the USSR/West split had already occurred in July of 1944. That's simply not true. The Western Allies didn't begin to re-align themselves against the Soviets until early 1945, and even then the Cold War didn't really start until 1947. Despite the 'what-if' posturing a lot of people like to make, with numerous cites to Patton, there was essentially no chance whatsoever that the US and UK were going to turn on the USSR, even in 1945. The US, UK, and USSR were all extremelly committed to supporting each other against Germany in July of 1944. Unconditional surrender was first discussed at Casablanca in January of 1943, and it was all but accepted by Tehran in November of 1943. That's long, long before the events of Overlord and July 20th. Unconditional surrender was a near-certainty by that point. The Soviets had also demanded that Poland's borders be redrawn at Tehran... they would not have accepted an end to the war that left Poland in Germany's hands.
Even at their most congenial, the West and the Russians were extremely suspicious of each other. Read Churchill's opinions on Stalin and communism as a good example. Their alliance was one of necessity, and while I agree with you wholeheartedly that there was no way the two would turn on each other as long as their common enemy, Nazi Germany, existed, the proposed scenario changes everything. With Hitler dead and the Nazis (presumably) out of power, Germany suddenly becomes the lesser of two evils/threats
Even at their most congenial, the West and the Russians were extremely suspicious of each other. Read Churchill's opinions on Stalin and communism as a good example. Their alliance was one of necessity, and while I agree with you wholeheartedly that there was no way the two would turn on each other as long as their common enemy, Nazi Germany, existed, the proposed scenario changes everything. With Hitler dead and the Nazis (presumably) out of power, Germany suddenly becomes the lesser of two evils/threats
I see what you're getting at, but I have difficulty believing that the US or UK would truly believe that Germany had been de-Nazified while it continued fighting and particularly while it continued to occupy foreign nations, such as Poland. Just look at the reaction Patton got when he tried to keep the civil servants around. If Patton, of all people, could be politically tarred and feathered over retaining that relatively minor amount of 'Nazism,' I cannot see the US or UK accepting a simple leadership purge as a good enough reason to completely cease hostilities. Perhaps if the Germans had engaged in massive, open, and public de-Nazification there might have been something to build upon, but such a drastic purge of Germany would have so seriously damanged their ability to wage the war that Germany would have been defeated even more quickly in the East.
I've spent many years studying WW2 history, particularly the very entertaining 'what if' scenarios. While they are fun, there are honestly very few scenarios in which Germany could have won WW2 without deviating so signficantly from reality that the scenario becomes more fantasy than history. IMHO, Germany's only serious, realistic chance of victory was at Dunkirk. Had things occurred differently, and had the diplomacy been handled properly, peace with the UK could have been had then and there. That would have prevented the US from entering the war and would have let Germany fight the Soviets without one hand tied behind its back. After Dunkirk, the odds of a UK withdrawal from the war was negligible and the US entry was inevitable, even without Japan.
Beck was slated to take over in the plot, but this assumes that the post-hit coup was successful. Himmler was not going to go down easily.
As far as I'm aware, even with all the delays, the major operation behind the coup was running under rails until the Commander of the Reserve Army was called by Goebels, which was surrounded by the German reserve army in his ministry of propaganda, and Goebels put the Commander to speak with Hitler, which changed his alliegance immediatly. Other high military commanders were being ordered by the conspirators to arrest key SS members and commanders stationed in the same area of operations as themselves. Without Hitler being alive, the reserve army would continue doing it's job, and Himmler resisting would only lend credibility to the conspirators. It would be a case of "Damned if you do, damned if you don't."; I'm not sure what a chance Himmler would have at directing any resistance efforts if the whole SS and Nazi leaders were arrested in a couple of days.
Seamus Fermanagh
05-20-2010, 04:42
1. Hitler's death was not enough. To succeed the coup had to kill or neutralize Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Borman, and Goebbels.
Assume that they did.
2. Germany is now headed by a half-military/half-civilian junta. The Holocaust is happening on autopilot until countermanded. The Soviets are attacking. The Western Allies have taken Rome and are established in a bridgehead in Normandy. Germany sues for peace.
The Russians say no and continue -- which they will do regardless. They have no interest in stopping short of the Elbe and probably would have preferred to get to the Rhine. The Western Allies honor their alliance with the Soviets -- however grudgingly. The War continues and we end up with the same partition (though the Holocaust is quickly curtailed and some of the stupider "hold and die" orders are never given.
But suppose the West did make a separate peace (however unlikely).
3. The Russians get to the Rhine. Sorry PJ, but der Wermacht is a shell of what it was by this point. It is the Soviets who are punching holes with armored spearheads while the Germans use hastily trained conscripts and kampfgruppe "fire brigades" to stop them as best they can. German industry, revamped by Speer, is up to the task (especially if the Western Allies are not involved anymore) but the Germans simply do not have the time to train people or enough experienced cadre to use all the new wonders that had been cooked up. Moreover, the remaining elite formations are very likely being broken up by the new German government which cannot afford groups of SS troops or Luftwaffe troops of dubious loyalty to the new government. So maybe JV-44 sets an all time record for kills and we see that in competent hands the Jadgtiger really could knock out a JS-III, but it is still too little too late. The Soviets bleed a lot more, but they still get to the Rhine (or to the split line between them and the West).
Louis VI the Fat
05-20-2010, 11:56
German industry, revamped by Speer, is up to the task (especially if the Western Allies are not involved anymore) With the west out, German industry will collapse immediately. The millions of slaves must be released. There can be no more plunder either. The wholesale transfer of money, resources, products will come to a halt.
Nazi Germany economically had come to fully rely on a pyramid schemes of conquest, plunder, and bills being pushed ahead.
One must not forget the depths of depravity of Nazi Germany. How would a seperate Western peace work anyway? Would they check German factories to ensure Western slaves have been released, and just leave those of its former allies? Only leave the Russians?
Would there be Western inspectors to check the rape camps the Germans had set up for their troops, leave the Czech girls and liberate the Belgian ones?
What of Western reparations (or 'greedy and duplicitous punitive measures' for those who think reparations are not precisley that when it concerns Germany)? Would the West make a peace that leaves the plundered goods and money in Germany, only for the Russians to destroy and collect it to satisfy their claims? Or would the West prevent that and rapidly collect their restitutions themselves, with the immediate collapse of Nazi Germany's plunder economy?
What of the looted art, antiques, valuables, much in the hands of millions of ordinary Germans? For banal plunder, mere thuggery, from the lowest to the highest rank, was the largest economical sector of Germany behind the military. The Nazis had the morality of a street corner gang of thugs, including their little 'cool' gestures, identification marks, uniforms, honour codes and utter disregard for their victims.
With the west out, German industry will collapse immediately. The millions of slaves must be released.
I fully agree with you. However, Speer would simply begin using German women ask a workforce for the industry. It was his original plan anyway. The other plan was use foreign forced labour (If I'm not mistaken, proposed by Himmler). The adopted plan was the second one.
Part of the problem for any July 20th scenario is simply that the Germans had already been broken by that point, on both fronts. In the west, the entire defense of Normandy collapsed within two weeks and Paris was liberated only a month later. On the eastern front, Germany was in full-scale retreat and had essentially been completely kicked out of the USSR:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/96/Eastern_Front_1943-08_to_1944-12.png/782px-Eastern_Front_1943-08_to_1944-12.png
I honestly think that by that point it was too late for Germany to recover, no matter what happened domestically. Hypothetical German victory scenarios need to be based upon changes in the war that occurred much, much earlier.
Pannonian
05-20-2010, 15:44
Part of the problem for any July 20th scenario is simply that the Germans had already been broken by that point, on both fronts. In the west, the entire defense of Normandy collapsed within two weeks and Paris was liberated only a month later. On the eastern front, Germany was in full-scale retreat and had essentially been completely kicked out of the USSR:
I honestly think that by that point it was too late for Germany to recover, no matter what happened domestically. Hypothetical German victory scenarios need to be based upon changes in the war that occurred much, much earlier.
There was still a window of opportunity for Germany to achieve a comparatively satisfactory peace. The Soviet offensives had run out of steam by around mid-August, and they would customarily have to wait until winter before building up supplies for another push. This gave the Germans around 4 months in which to completely collapse in the west, and let the Allies know this to be so, so that the Anglo-Americans would be in occupation of as much of Germany as possible while the Russians were still preparing for their winter offensive.
There was still a window of opportunity for Germany to achieve a comparatively satisfactory peace. The Soviet offensives had run out of steam by around mid-August, and they would customarily have to wait until winter before building up supplies for another push. This gave the Germans around 4 months in which to completely collapse in the west, and let the Allies know this to be so, so that the Anglo-Americans would be in occupation of as much of Germany as possible while the Russians were still preparing for their winter offensive.
Yes, this I agree with. Germany could certainly have had a more favorable peace. The partition of Germany was not agreed upon until Quebec in September 1944. If the war had ended in summer 1944, perhaps the partition would not have happened. That alone would have drastically improved Germany's post-war situation.
Gah and you are all into mistake. GB and France entered World War 2 not to protect Poland (I assume that we are looking for real reasons not casus belli). People from GB and France - sorry but you have to face the truth.
And thats why Jaeger was right talking that no one cares about Poland. Ok maybe Churchill a bit but into 1945 he lost leadership.
But you Jaeger are making another mistake. Don't you remember that France fallen into 1940 and GB was close to fall. Do you really believe that they would stop war when they were clearly winning. And give Germany time to get stronger? They knew that victory of Germany would made them strongest country into Europe. Empire stronger than France and GB. Thats why they would not stop after Hitler's death. They simply knew that winner of this war will be ruling Europe and probably world.
Anyway jaeger - battle of Falaise was not disaster. It was great victory that let Allies finish with Germany faster.
Louis VI the Fat
05-21-2010, 00:10
Gah and you are all into mistake. GB and France entered World War 2 not to protect Poland (I assume that we are looking for real reasons not casus belli). People from GB and France - sorry but you have to face the truth.
And thats why Jaeger was right talking that no one cares about Poland. Ok maybe Churchill a bit but into 1945 he lost leadership.
But you Jaeger are making another mistake. Don't you remember that France fallen into 1940 and GB was close to fall. Do you really believe that they would stop war when they were clearly winning. And give Germany time to get stronger? They knew that victory of Germany would made them strongest country into Europe. Empire stronger than France and GB. Thats why they would not stop after Hitler's death. They simply knew that winner of this war will be ruling Europe and probably world.As to the first, few, if any, think WWII was fought to guarantee Poland. Even back then, the Polish border was presented as the line in the sand, not the reason for war. Although some sentimental attachment to the history of French patronage over Polish independence was present - it was not France that sold out Poland to gain Russia, even if that would have been the obvious strategic course of action prior to 1939.
As to the second, I am not sure at what point it dawmed on France and Britain that the new superpowers would be the US and SU. Fairly soon, I'd wager.
France was rather pre-occupied with simply being restored, and at any rate had since decades earlier resigned herself that Germany was structurally larger. For decades prior to WWII France's entire policy had been based on this acceptance of Germany's position as the greatest power in Europe. Prior to WWI, alliance against Germany was the defence against it, after WWI the dual policy of alliance against and tentative co-operation with Germany, after WWII, co-operation.
PanzerJaeger
05-21-2010, 19:03
3. The Russians get to the Rhine. Sorry PJ, but der Wermacht is a shell of what it was by this point. It is the Soviets who are punching holes with armored spearheads while the Germans use hastily trained conscripts and kampfgruppe "fire brigades" to stop them as best they can. German industry, revamped by Speer, is up to the task (especially if the Western Allies are not involved anymore) but the Germans simply do not have the time to train people or enough experienced cadre to use all the new wonders that had been cooked up. Moreover, the remaining elite formations are very likely being broken up by the new German government which cannot afford groups of SS troops or Luftwaffe troops of dubious loyalty to the new government. So maybe JV-44 sets an all time record for kills and we see that in competent hands the Jadgtiger really could knock out a JS-III, but it is still too little too late. The Soviets bleed a lot more, but they still get to the Rhine (or to the split line between them and the West).
While that is certainly a valid opinion, I give the Wehrmacht a bit more credit. With independence of command, I think they could have stopped the Russians and even delivered some serious battlefield reversals. Of course, they wouldn't be marching triumphally into Moscow any time soon, but they could cause the Russians to question their commitment to total victory.
The German forces in '44 were battered, but still largley intact. Certain training programs were curtailed, but the major cut backs had not yet begun. The quality of the average German soldier and the specialists coming out of training was still better than that of the Soviets. Further they still had a large cadre of experienced veterans to help fill in the gaps. The main deficiency, at least from a defensive standpoint, were tanks and/or anti-tank guns. Production was actually up, though, as Germany was finishing the transition to a total war economy.
Whilst Hitler's blunders at Stalingrad and Kursk and the resulting Russian counteroffensives cost the Germans serious casualties, their real cost was in battlefield momentum. They actually only limited the Wehrmacht's offensive capabilities (especially in tanks) for their respective years ('42 & '43). The true final nail in the coffin was Bagration in the summer of ‘44. That was where great swathes of German troops were simply encircled and captured/destroyed, where entire divisions and even armies were swallowed up in the most perfect example of Soviet deep operations theory until the invasion of Manchuria.
The Soviets must be given credit for excellent planning and coordination, but Bagration’s biggest benefactor was arguably Hitler himself. By this point, Hitler had wrested almost complete strategic and even tactical control over the battlefield from his generals. He insisted on a form of static warfare that was diametrically opposed to the reality of the battlefield.
Every decision had to be approved by Hitler, who refused to allow his generals to give ground, denying them the fluidity that characterized conflict in the East. The biggest losses occurred during the liberation of Minsk, which Hitler had declared a Fester Platz, where the 4th and 9th Armies were not allowed to withdraw and were summarily encircled and destroyed.
However, with operational freedom, I think much of the damage could have been mitigated. Bagration was no surprise; it had been anticipated well in advance by the German commanders. They understood deep operations and how to defeat it – or at least how to avoid the massed encirclements. The Russians were somewhat successful in attempting to convince the Germans that the attack would be against Army Group North instead of Army Group Center, but by the time of the offensive the breakthrough points were well known. Had they been allowed to withdraw and let the Russians exhaust themselves, they would have been in decent shape. Manstein would almost certainly have been reinstated, and the addition of the freed up forces from the West and Italy would have put him in a perfect position to execute a “Backhand Blow” type operation that he had been arguing for since Kursk.
After such a victory, the Germans would have had a lot working in their favor. Unharrassed industry (at least until the Russians got around to building a strategic bombing force), one front to focus on, excellent leadership unhindered by constant interference, and many advanced new weapons coming online. The 262 would have decimated the Russian Air Force alone.
That’s all just speculation on my part, of course.
With the west out, German industry will collapse immediately. The millions of slaves must be released. There can be no more plunder either. The wholesale transfer of money, resources, products will come to a halt.
The biggest economic benefits Germany recieved from the occupied territories were favorable exchange rates and forced labor. The loss of either of those would not have collapsed the German economy. Normal exchange rates could have been sustained in the short and medium terms without much impact, and women were a vast untapped resource throughout the war.
But you Jaeger are making another mistake. Don't you remember that France fallen into 1940 and GB was close to fall. Do you really believe that they would stop war when they were clearly winning. And give Germany time to get stronger? They knew that victory of Germany would made them strongest country into Europe. Empire stronger than France and GB. Thats why they would not stop after Hitler's death. They simply knew that winner of this war will be ruling Europe and probably world.
I think removing the Nazis from power would have had a big impact on the Allies. We'll never know.
Anyway jaeger - battle of Falaise was not disaster. It was great victory that let Allies finish with Germany faster.
For the Germans, it was a monumental disaster, and one of Hitler's greatest blunders. That is what I was saying.
In order to shift the Alliances, and to keep Germany (and Eastern Europe) out of the communist hands, the new German government would need time.
I, and nobody will never know, if without the Western Allies push and the Strategic Bombing the Russians would have been able to win.
I tend to say yes, but…
How much time the German Government would need to negotiate, not only a separate peace but also a change in alliance?
I base the idea of a successful killing on the 20th of July.
So, what decision to take?
In term of military you can’t just withdraw all the troops inside Germany then deployed them just in front of the Russian without a Western Allies guaranty they won’t take advantage of this to invade the national territory…
You can try to negotiate a separate peace with France, Belgium, Holland and all the others governments in exiles, but how much chances you have too persuade the French Army which is soon to land in Provence to stop here and not pursuit…
The massacres of Oradour sur Glane and Tulles by the 2nd SS are from June. It would be difficult to the new German Government to convince the new French Government (as by now Petain’s Government is completely discredited) not only to cease-fire but to help against the Russian, which they help in their war thanks to the Groupe de Chasse 3 (Fighter Squadron) Normandy, at this date Normandy-Niemen (21st of July 1944) and Soviet Union Hero (Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union, Red Star Order, Red Flag Order and Lenin Order, plus some others)…
I agree with PJ, the biggest mistakes would be avoid, however I am not sure it would avoid the Eastern defeat…
“The loss of either of those would not have collapsed the German economy. Normal exchange rates could have been sustained in the short and medium terms without much impact, and women were a vast untapped resource throughout the war.”
On other matters, the release of the prisoners and the immediate cut in raw material, which would need to be compensate, would create a vacuum that Germany can’t easily fill.
To replace the Slave labour by the German Women labour would need more than just a shift in personnel. Most of the war factories were linked with the Labours Camps, and the logistic chains adapted (and work conditions) to the first kind of labour.
I spoke with one French Woman (refugee from Croatia in Serbia as she was married with a Yugoslav she met during the WW2 in Germany) who was in Forced Labour.
She worked for Siemens and all the work force was specialised and couldn’t protest against working conditions.
It wouldn’t be easy for a new Government to let these people to go (and de facto to provide the means of transportation) and to create more suitable premises for the German Labour to take their places… It would need time.
Would Germany have the skilled man/woman power to produce the ME 262 without the Slave Labour? I doubt.
It would need time to reshuffle the war industry, and this even if the Western Allies agree with the plan…
Time it wouldn’t have.
Because the Western Allies can decide to use the moment to push their advantage.
And the Russian as well.
Would the SS fight to hard in the boccage if Hitler would be dead?
Even the regular Heer would be in disarray…
How to avoid what happen to the Menshevik in 1917 when the Russian soldiers decided they had enough and “voted with their feet”…
Some the best German Generals were Nazi as e.g. Model. Kesselring and Sepp Dietrich for the best known. Would these Generals gave-up and agree to this, especially after an assassination and Coup?
Some the best German Generals were Nazi as e.g. Model. Kesselring and Sepp Dietrich for the best known. Would these Generals gave-up and agree to this, especially after an assassination and Coup?
No doubt, by July 1944, discerning German Generals could quite well see that Germany was on the verge of defeat, and Hitler's lunacies and mad resistance until the end would change little. In the end, I'm sure they would be quite content in serving Germany to try and "lessen" the weight of defeat then madly follow Hitler to lead the country to total occupation.
Sarmatian
05-22-2010, 09:25
There are several issues here to discuss:
1) Western allies would have accepted a separate peace with Germany
That is highly, highly unlikely. Even though some people high up thought that Soviet Union is now greater threat than Germany, most of the leadership didn't think that way. Even if the political leadership managed to reach a consensus about it, there still remained a question of how would the population and the military react. At the time Nazis were "scum of the earth" and the Russians were "our gallant Soviet allies". Sure, in theory, with propaganda it could have been reversed but such things take time. There is very little chance that a coup would have totally changed the opinion of western allies, without the total denazification. By that point, nazis infiltrated practically everything, from education and politics to military structure. Again, it would take time and probably a a decent chunk of the military to enforce it. Time was something that Germans didn't have.
2) Germany would have been able to outproduce Russia.
This is even more improbable than the first one. There is little chance that half destroyed German industry and infrastructure would have been able to properly resupply the army. Women were an untapped resource, true, but moving them to factories and retraining them takes time. Even with that, it is questionable if German industry could have outproduced the Russian industry. Russian effort to do this showed how difficult it is, as their industry produced less equipment and of lesser quality for a long time until women were trained enough to perform those tasks well. Of course, the chaos of industry transfer was to blame for much of it but still we are talking about months.
3) Wehrmacht would have been able to defeat the Red Army without Hitler in 1944
This is the most improbable of all. Red Army of '44 wasn't the Red Army of '41. Even the Wehrmacht of '41, when it was at peak efficiency and pinnacle of military might would have trouble with it. Stalin, even though he was involved in strategic decision, largely left the planning and execution of military operations to the professionals. By that time, Soviet commanders were experienced and mature enough to conduct Deep Operations properly. Soviet soldiers (most of them) made up in experience what they lacked in training. A peasant who spent three years fighting in a huge conflict is a better soldier than a professional fresh out of the academy, no matter how good his training was. Huge Soviet advantage in equipment meant that it would take Germany a long time to catch up. By that time, surrender of Finland and Romania was a done deal, meaning Soviets could have easily put a stop to German iron ore supply from Sweden and oil from Romania, the only natural source of oil for the German army and industry. The most dangerous assumption is that Russian thinking was static and that because Manstein was able to counter attack at Kharkov, he would have been able to do so again at will. Quite the opposite, Red Army showed constant improvement throughout the war. Russians were quite aware that their winter offensives were halted by over-extension, just like German over-extension allowed them to perform counter offensives. Indeed, a huge problem for both armies in the first years of the war was to decide when to halt the offensives and to stop, rest and resupply. Precisely for that reason, Russian commanders were given fixed operational range for the offensive (100-120 km, iirc, may have to look it up) after the battle of Kursk, with the option to continue the offensive if the situation on the field allowed it. Their success was bigger than they expected so Stavka allowed continuation of the offensive beyond that original range in most cases. So, simply thinking that if Manstein was allowed to perform his "Backhand Slap" would have changed to course of the war is a huge mistake. Prolong it - probably, reverse it - unlikely.
Ibn-Khaldun
05-22-2010, 10:21
I think that WW2 would've ended much much sooner if Georg Elser (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Elser) would've succeeded on 8 November, 1939. Since the war had just started then with Hitler's death Western Allies would've accepted the peace more likely, I guess.
PanzerJaeger
05-23-2010, 16:31
2) Germany would have been able to outproduce Russia.
This is even more improbable than the first one. There is little chance that half destroyed German industry and infrastructure would have been able to properly resupply the army. Women were an untapped resource, true, but moving them to factories and retraining them takes time. Even with that, it is questionable if German industry could have outproduced the Russian industry. Russian effort to do this showed how difficult it is, as their industry produced less equipment and of lesser quality for a long time until women were trained enough to perform those tasks well. Of course, the chaos of industry transfer was to blame for much of it but still we are talking about months.
I don't know if this was directed at me, but if so, I just wanted to clarify. I don't think German industry could have ever outproduced that of the Soviets in raw output, but I do think it could have produced enough high quality weaponry to keep Germany in the war. Germany was well ahead of the Soviet Union in many key technologies (sometimes several generations), which then become combat multipliers.
3) Wehrmacht would have been able to defeat the Red Army without Hitler in 1944
This is the most improbable of all. Red Army of '44 wasn't the Red Army of '41. Even the Wehrmacht of '41, when it was at peak efficiency and pinnacle of military might would have trouble with it. Stalin, even though he was involved in strategic decision, largely left the planning and execution of military operations to the professionals. By that time, Soviet commanders were experienced and mature enough to conduct Deep Operations properly. Soviet soldiers (most of them) made up in experience what they lacked in training. A peasant who spent three years fighting in a huge conflict is a better soldier than a professional fresh out of the academy, no matter how good his training was. Huge Soviet advantage in equipment meant that it would take Germany a long time to catch up.
I don’t want to take anything away from the Russians as Deep Operations was an excellent doctrine, and far better than anything the Allies came up with, but it must be noted that the big victories under its name were scored with vast numerical majorities and against a hierarchally paralyzed enemy. For example, Wikipedia’s strength tables for Bagration, based mostly on Frieser and Glantz, have the opposing sides at:
Germany:
486,493 men
118 tanks
377 assault guns
2,589 guns
Russia:
1,254,300 men
2,715 tanks
1,355 assault guns
24,363 guns
Now, my point is that if either of those variables were altered – either the freedom of operation or the ratios of opposing forces – the situation would indeed be different. See the battle of Targul Frumos in May of '44 where Deep Operations fell flat:
Some of the blitzkrieg principles apply equally well to armor in the defense, and where they do not an understanding of them points the way to countering them. We spoke of moment and momentum as strengths of the armored offensive. The attacker loses both these when he is unable to move forwards or sideways - in other words when he is contained. The counter is thus simply: first contain, encircling if possible; then destroy.
Unfortunately the Wehrmacht's operations feature rather few instances of well-conducted defense and these are mainly at divisional or at most corps level. Hitler's (and Goering's) repeated interventions, mostly featuring refusals to give ground laced with accusations of cowardice and treachery, prevented the field and air commanders on the Eastern Front from conducting the kind of defense which they wanted and which would surely have influenced the duration of World War II in Europe and the situation at its end.
Manteuffel's handling of the Pz.Gr.Div. Grossdeutschland at Targul Frumos (northeast of the Ploesti oilfield region) on 2 May, 1944, is one of the best examples. This battle is also of interest as the Germans' first encounter with the Soviet heavy tanks in the shape of KV85. Schematically the ground is a horseshoe ridge with the opening facing roughly northeast and the left (west) side higher and longer than the right. There is rolling to hilly ground north of the horseshoe's opening. At the apex.of the horseshoe, above and to the south of the town of Targul Frumos, is a dominating hill on which Manteuffel set up his battle headquarters. He established both his infantry regiments, stiffened with jagdpanzers in depth and all other antitank weapons including a battery of 88mm guns, along the base of the horseshoe, with his tank reserve in depth. He deployed his reconnaissance and some tanks in the rolling ground about 8km to the north of the main position.
The Soviets advanced in strength with massive artillery support, mainly with tanks and evidently with the base of the horseshoe as their initial objective. Manteuffel's forward tanks fell back and to their left with fire and movement, drawing the enemy into the killing ground enclosed by the horseshoe and towards the southwest corner. The infantry were in concealed positions, which they had had several weeks to prepare. They lay low and allowed the Soviet tanks to pass through them, then took on the supporting infantry. The first crisis seems to have been caused by the Soviet heavy tanks thrusting down the west ridge just as the pressure on the southwest corner began to build up. Manteuffel used his tank reserve under his personal command.
Meanwhile the panzerfüsilier regiment on the right had deliberately been left entirely without tank support for over 2 hours. They were badly overrun and broken through, and the regimental headquarters had itself become involved in driving off a Soviet tank attack. Nevertheless they had held firm and succeeded in pinning down the enemy infantry. Then the Soviets, exploiting success, put in another tank attack on them.
After about 2 hours of intensive fighting, Manteuffel sensed a weakening of resolve on the part of the Soviets facing his left. Rather than counterattack at that stage, he took personal command of a company of Pzkw IVs and led his tank regiment, by now replenished, across to the right and straight into the attack off the line of march. His account says he appeared on that sector at 11.55 hrs - 5 minutes before the time he had promised the regimental commander. The tank regiment drove the Soviets right back with heavy losses.
That night he passed two companies each of Tigers and Panthers through the infantry into forward positions. These together with air support sufficed to beat off subsequent Soviet attacks. No ground had been lost; an estimated 350 Soviet tanks and SU guns were destroyed at an exchange rate better than 20:1; and Manteulfel's force remained capable of operating effectively at its previous level.
I have dwelt on this battle because it well represents the defensive side of the blitzkrieg coin and is a model of great relevance today. The hammer-and-anvil principle was of course used to excellent effect by Montgomery in the battle of Alem Halfa though his hammer blow consisted - typically perhaps - mainly of tank fire rather than tank maneuver. Manteuffel combined this tactic with two others. One had been much employed by the Afrika Korps at lower levels - the use of an actually or apparently weak force of tanks as a bait to draw the enemy onto a screen of (in those days) antitank guns. The other was to separate the enemy tanks and infantry by allowing the enemy tanks to overrun the defending infantry in the anvil, and then to destroy both in detail.
"Easy come, easy go", runs the saying. Armored forces properly handled can gain vast areas of territory rapidly and achieve strategic success by disruption of the enemy forces. Conversely the defense against an armored offensive calls for great speed and scope of maneuver. Real estate has to be traded off for time and - paradoxically enough - space if disruption is to be avoided and containment achieved. This is the dilemma that currently faces NATO's land forces -and most of all the FRG.
-- Brig. Gen. Richard Simpkin, Tank Warfare: An Analysis of Soviet and NATO Tank Philosophy (London: Brassey's Publisher's Ltd., 1979), pp. 44-48.
IIRC, the Germans had around 3500 AFVs in Normandy (equivalent to the total amount covering the entirety of the Eastern Front) and a further 400 AFVs in Italy. Those vehicles, not even mentioning the infantry, guns, and air forces focused on defeating the Allies and the removal of Hitler’s interference and stand fast orders would certainly have changed the equation considerably.
The most dangerous assumption is that Russian thinking was static and that because Manstein was able to counter attack at Kharkov, he would have been able to do so again at will. Quite the opposite, Red Army showed constant improvement throughout the war. Russians were quite aware that their winter offensives were halted by over-extension, just like German over-extension allowed them to perform counter offensives. Indeed, a huge problem for both armies in the first years of the war was to decide when to halt the offensives and to stop, rest and resupply. Precisely for that reason, Russian commanders were given fixed operational range for the offensive (100-120 km, iirc, may have to look it up) after the battle of Kursk, with the option to continue the offensive if the situation on the field allowed it. Their success was bigger than they expected so Stavka allowed continuation of the offensive beyond that original range in most cases. So, simply thinking that if Manstein was allowed to perform his "Backhand Slap" would have changed to course of the war is a huge mistake. Prolong it - probably, reverse it - unlikely.
Kharkov was largely a reactive operation. Manstein accurately judged that the Russians were strung out and vulnerable and used his smaller force more effectively to defeat them. From what I’ve read about his plans for Backhand Blow, it was to be a far more deliberate operation involving ruse to draw the Russians in. It never made it off the drawing board, of course, so we’ll never know. I do know that even in Bagration the Germans recognized several vulnerable Russian overextensions that they were not able to take advantage of due to the reasons discussed earlier.
Louis VI the Fat
05-24-2010, 00:29
I don't think German industry could have ever outproduced that of the Soviets in raw output, but I do think it could have produced enough high quality weaponry to keep Germany in the war. Germany was well ahead of the Soviet Union in many key technologies (sometimes several generations), which then become combat multipliers. I don't think this is correct.
Germany had a raw industrial output larger than the Soviet Union and Britain combined. Germany also had an industrial labour force twice the size of the SU.
The Nazis refused to change to a war economy until it was all but over - spoiled Germans wouldn't have it otherwise. The war was not supposed to cost anything, to lower living standards. This wasn't specific to the Nazis. For decades, Berlin policy had been that the population should not have to make any sacrifice in living standard for Germany's foreign agression - the bills are for the others: occupied territories, Jews, Americans, French and Belgians for WWI, future generations.
The Nazis were simply not all that good in making smart decisions, in using their favourable position.
For example, they made high-tech equipment that was useless in the extreme circumstances in Russia. Russians knew better - one must rely on cheap, simple and therefore sturdy equipment. These work, these are low maintanance, and these can be mass produced in great numbers. On top of this, Germany also managed to rely in crucial aspects on low-tech equipment, which rendered much of their fancier equipment useless. For example, a reliance on horses to tow this fancy equipment around, against mobile mechanised Russians.
Stalin was smart. Half his country occupied from the get go, and half of Europe fighting against him, and he still managed to win against the odds. Germany, the largest and most advanced economy in Europe, couldn't have fared worse if its decisions were made by chimpansees throwing darts.
PanzerJaeger
05-24-2010, 10:28
\
I don't think this is correct.
Germany had a raw industrial output larger than the Soviet Union and Britain combined. Germany also had an industrial labour force twice the size of the SU.
I was referring to armaments production, in which Germany could not have attained parity with Russia even with a total war economy for a number of reasons.
The Nazis were simply not all that good in making smart decisions, in using their favourable position.
Yes and no. Which Nazis are you talking about? Which time period are you talking about? The Nazis certainly made many more intelligent decisions than the French and British leadership both diplomatically and militarily in the prelude to the war and the first two years. The invasion of the USSR was, of course, a fiasco fueled by arrogance from previous campaigns. The proper planning and foresight that allowed for the decimation of the French and British forces in the West was not carried out, despite warnings from some in the military hierarchy. However, in spite of the sloppiness and haste that went into its preparation, Barbarossa almost succeeded. Some have speculated that a few more armored divisions would have tipped the scale. The failure led to a drawn out war, for which Germany was definitely not prepared. This was by far the Nazi... Hitler's biggest mistake, and slowly drained the lifeblood out of Germany. As the war progressed, both Hitler and Goering, the two most important men to the military situation, became strung out on narcotics and made many more poor decisions.
While it can certainly be said that the invasion of Russia was a monumental mistake, it was one miscalculation that had a not insignificant chance of success. Had that happened, Germany would have won WW2.
For the record, I'm not defending the Nazi political leadership. When they got involved in military decision making, their meddling was devastating. I just don't think such blanket statements paint the most accurate picture possible.
Ignoring moral issues and simply focusing on goal attainment (and assuming Hitler's goals were the military domination of Europe), the Nazis made a lot of intelligent decisions up front and made one critical mistake from which they could not extricate themselves. The French and British made highly ignorant decisions and were lucky to be bailed out by the US and Russia, who both made the wisest decisions of the war and propelled themselves into world domination after the fact.
For example, they made high-tech equipment that was useless in the extreme circumstances in Russia. Russians knew better - one must rely on cheap, simple and therefore sturdy equipment. These work, these are low maintanance, and these can be mass produced in great numbers. On top of this, Germany also managed to rely in crucial aspects on low-tech equipment, which rendered much of their fancier equipment useless. For example, a reliance on horses to tow this fancy equipment around, against mobile mechanised Russians.
Can you elaborate? Which "fancy" equipment was towed around by horses? How was it then rendered useless? It is well known that the majority of German forces relied on horses (as sufficient numbers of trucks were unavailible), but off the top of my head I cannot think of any fancy equipment that was towed by horses. I can only think of run-of-the-mill type stuff like artillery, wagons, etc.
Stalin was smart. Half his country occupied from the get go, and half of Europe fighting against him, and he still managed to win against the odds. Germany, the largest and most advanced economy in Europe, couldn't have fared worse if its decisions were made by chimpansees throwing darts.
Stalin had the largest army in Europe. He had far greater quantities of armor, artillery and airplanes than Germany. He had brilliant military minds and a sound doctrine. Despite Western historiography, the Soviet military was second only to the Wehrmacht in quality, even in 1941. Due to his intelligent decisions, his brilliant officer corps was systematically murdered by their own leader directly before the war and the vast majority of this force was destroyed by the Germans in the first year of the war, having to be rebuilt from scratch. Stalin's best decision was when he decided to stop making decisions and leave it to the professionals.
This all seems to be based more in narrative than history, Louis. Obviously the Nazis made poor decisions that lost the war, but writing them off as little more than chimps is perilously simple. Hitler in his prime was a personally courageous and politically brilliant leader that managed to bring a fringe ideology to power in Germany through the sheer force of his personality and then went on to almost conquer Europe. That is why he was so dangerous. :nice:
“Yes and no. Which Nazis are you talking about? Which time period are you talking about? The Nazis certainly made many more intelligent decisions than the French and British leadership both diplomatically and militarily in the prelude to the war and the first two years.”
As you say, depend of the time period. When Hitler came to power it was thanks to German mistakes from the Conservative party (E.G. Von Papen) who though they can out manoeuvre the Nazi after they’re crushed the Communist, except of course that the Spartakists were crushed by Noske and the Weimar Republic. Hitler benefited of this, but in fact he wasn’t involved in this process.
As he inherited a new Army coming from the Reichwerh, a tank doctrine developed in cooperation with the Soviets and a trained Luftwaffe, still thanks to Weimar.
Hitler smartly took the glory and the aura for these achievements and capitalised on things he didn’t.
So when he came on power he was able to bluff the Western Powers finally aware of their weaknesses.
In France you will have to wait for the Front Populaire, which will nationalise the Weapons Industries, to start to build a new army.
It was too late.
Germany had a constant policy from 1919 to 1933 for rearming and to avoid all obligations from the Treaty of Versailles.
So, in these terms, yes, the Germans outsmarted their (future) opponents.
I give (because I am a nice person) credit to the French and UK leaders they couldn’t believe somebody wanted to start again a new war after the blood bath of 1914-1918...
However, the Nazis were never able to prioritise their production. Hitler was ruling by dividing and eliminating all opponents (as Reom will discovered at his costs), SS against Heer, Gestapo against Abwehr, Himmeler against Goering, etc.
Focke Wuff airplanes, Junkers, Me, Gotha, and others for airplanes.
Same for tanks and equipment.
Seamus Fermanagh
05-25-2010, 06:25
PJ:
I think you overstate the operational ability of the 262. Along with the 163, they were devastating interceptors -- probably the first to excell at that role -- but were much less reliable in a dogfight where they had a lousy turn radius, were prone to more engine problems, and where the lower velocity of the MK108 created far more shooting problems. This would have been especially true at low level where the IL-2s went out to play.
I think the mystique of the 262 was built on two things: speed and experience. Being 100 mph faster, the 262 could literally attack a bomber formation and break away before the fighters could react. The 51s and 47s had the briefest of firing windows. Galland is quite possibly correct that he could have stopped daylight bombing if he'd had 500 262s and an equal number of decent pilots.
And that's the second qualifier. A lot of the mystique of the 262 was created by those who flew them. They were given to the best of the best (especially JV-44) and almost all of those blokes had what the Germans called "the shooting eye." Had JV-44 been re-equipped with Fokker D7s from war one, they would STILL have gotten a positive kill ratio.
So, against the Russians, the 262 would have piled up quite a few kills -- almost certainly wiping the IL-4s and TB-3s from the sky -- but would have had a lot more trouble "low and slow" against the Russian tacair folks.
IIRC, the Germans had around 3500 AFVs in Normandy (equivalent to the total amount covering the entirety of the Eastern Front) and a further 400 AFVs in Italy. Those vehicles, not even mentioning the infantry, guns, and air forces focused on defeating the Allies and the removal of Hitler’s interference and stand fast orders would certainly have changed the equation considerably.
For the purposes of hypothetical discussion, I will agree with this. If we assume some kind of scenario in which ALL hostilities (ground, air, and naval) against Germany cease in western, southern, and northern Europe and Germany is able to shift ALL of their forces in those theaters to the Eastern Front, then there would be a situation in which a Soviet victory would be uncertain. I'm not prepared to say that Germany would win or even obtain a stalemate, but I'll give Germany enough credit to state that if they were able to focus all of their forces against the Soviet Union they did have a realistic chance of turning around the situation, even as late as summer 1944. However, I still find the assumptions required for that scenario to be complete fantasy.
Louis VI the Fat
05-25-2010, 14:06
This all seems to be based more in narrative than history, Louis. I shall have to get back to you about those horses.
As for the rest, there is a narrative indeed. Like you, my interest is in dispelling myths based in ancient contemporary propaganda.
Europe's most advanced country and largest power twice suffered disastrous defeat in war, despite not unfavourable circumstances. Regardless, this Germany has become synonymous with fantastic overachievement.
Something doesn't add up about that.
Adrian summed up one of the myths I'm up against with his statement: 'Germany took on half the world and nearly won'. Me, I'd say that by the time half the world indeed started fighting, Germany was effortlessly defeated.
I'd rather say that Germany could pick off a handful of smaller opponents one by one, and the very first time it took on somebody roughly its own size it suffered devastating defeat in a period measured not in years, but months. Some achievement for a Reich as large as France and Britain combined.
The scale of the staggeringly poor performance becomes even more clear when one considers that Germany was supported by half of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union was a second world newly industrialising agragrian country run by a madman who had killed his officer corps, had decimated its restless population with mass starvation the decade before, and had let himself be taken by complete surprise. Far from military overachievement, Nazi Germany deserves the title of 'worst military performance in modern history'.
Meneldil
05-25-2010, 19:16
I'd rather say that Germany could pick off a handful of smaller opponents one by one, and the very first time it took on somebody roughly its own size it suffered devastating defeat in a period measured not in years, but months. Some achievement for a Reich as large as France and Britain combined.
The scale of the staggeringly poor performance becomes even more clear when one considers that Germany was supported by half of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union was a second world newly industrialising agragrian country run by a madman who had killed his officer corps, had decimated its restless population with mass starvation the decade before, and had let himself be taken by complete surprise. Far from military overachievement, Nazi Germany deserves the title of 'worst military performance in modern history'.
While I'm not too found of the "Germany was sooo badass" mindset, I don't think saying they outrightly sucked is correct. In 1939, France was widely regarded as having the most impressive military in the western world, and USSR wasn't far behind (if only thanks to the available manpower). On that respect alone, Germany did well: France and her 'mighty' (but outdated) army was trampled in a few months, and the SU would have suffered an even more crushing defeat if it weren't for the sheer size of the country.
A two front war when the west was still rather volitile didn't help either. Instigation of war with a neutral US and a passive USSR were very foolish decisions indeed. Though circumstance may have made them inevitable before the west was realatively stabilized.
PanzerJaeger
05-26-2010, 01:19
So, against the Russians, the 262 would have piled up quite a few kills -- almost certainly wiping the IL-4s and TB-3s from the sky -- but would have had a lot more trouble "low and slow" against the Russian tacair folks.
I largely agree with your specific criticisms of the 262, however, many of them, such as engine reliability and armament, had already been improved or corrected in later variants of the plane that did not see action. I also think you give the IL-2's, and Russian fighters, too much credit. Sturmoviks were very vulnerable to fighters, so I'm not sure how a faster, more advanced fighter would fare worse; and Russian fighters and pilots were on average worse than their Allied equivalents. 262s put down P-51s with relative ease, so I don't think it would have too much trouble with Russian fighters. Yes, much of their success can be attributed to pilot skill, as with every fighter, but even with the poor turning radius, the plane was very capable - especially when new tactics were developed to maximize it's strengths and minimize its limitations. Further design enhancements would have only helped.
As for the rest, there is a narrative indeed. Like you, my interest is in dispelling myths based in ancient contemporary propaganda.
Far from military overachievement, Nazi Germany deserves the title of 'worst military performance in modern history'.
I agree that the conventional wisdom surrounding WW2 and what actually happened are often not even close to matching up. However, in correcting the historical record, one should be mindful of not creating new myths.
I also agree with the limited economic point you made. Had Germany transitioned to a total war economy in 1939 instead of 1943, her production of armaments would have been far greater. (Not anywhere close to Allied production, but higher.) You seem to attribute that failure to base stupidity of Nazi leadership and a spoiled German populace. I think a more accurate analysis would reveal that the German plan for war was based on quick victories, and that that strategy was largely supported by results, except for the one fundamental miscalculation I discussed earlier (Russia). Once it was determined that the war would be prolonged, Germany responded accordingly. Further, Russia's early adoption of a total war type economy wasn't some brilliant decision that they chose correctly and the Germans didn't, they simply had no choice. Now, if one wants to find support for the notion that Germany was terrible in WW2, one could retroactively assert that Germany should have known that it could not knock out Russia during Barbarossa. However, that ignores all the information Germany had available and how close that it came to victory. I believe Hitler told Mannerheim that if he knew the Soviets could produce so many tanks, he never would have invaded. Again, every nation made such miscalcutlations during the war.
However, to conflate that economic point with German military performance is misguided at best and dubious at worst. The facts you use to support your assertion are simply incorrect.
I'd rather say that Germany could pick off a handful of smaller opponents one by one,
You seem to completely ignore your own nation's effort. The battle for France can hardly be described as Germany picking off a handful of smaller opponents. French and British forces were not outnumbered, and even enjoyed vast numerical superiority in artillery and tanks, many of which were technically superior to Germany's. Further, it was not a slow attritional battle where Germany's economy out produced France and Britain, but a quick campaign where military superiority won the day.
and the very first time it took on somebody roughly its own size it suffered devastating defeat in a period measured not in years, but months
I can only assume you are referring to Russia, although your assertion that it was roughly the same size really threw me off. 35,400,000 men served in the Red Army during WW2, comprising roughly 500 divisions. Germany committed 3,200,000 troops to Barbarossa and the number of German troops serving on the Eastern Front never grew above that number. Their divisional strength never grew beyond 150. Further, Russia far out produced Germany in every quantifiable armaments measure, not to mention the benefits Russia inherited from the actual geographic size of the country. At the time of our scenario - around Bagration in '44 - Germany had 2.5 million troops in the East, while Russia had 11 million - in addition to huge numerical superiorities in artillery, tanks, and airplanes. You seem to be trying to substitute industrial capacity with all other measures of size, which besides being fundamentally flawed, has little to do with the combat performance of comparative militaries.
This highlights one of the flaws in your estimation of German production capacity. Manpower, in itself, is a critical production constraint. Let's say Germany pulled off your economic miracle and produced 106, 334 brand new, shiny Panther tanks - exactly the number of tanks the Soviet Union produced throughout the war. Where are the 531, 670 crew going to come from to operate them, to say nothing of the maintenance and support personnel and or the people needed to train the crews? I refer you to the tens of thousands of brand new fighters the Luftwaffe had in storage when the war ended, as there were no pilots to fly them.
one considers that Germany was supported by half of Europe,
More cleverly deceptive language. Would you care to discuss the number of German allied troops committed to Russia and their effectiveness?
Soviet Union was a second world newly industrialising agragrian country run by a madman who had killed his officer corps, had decimated its restless population with mass starvation the decade before, and had let himself be taken by complete surprise.
He had also kept the population's living standards at such a base level that his country could focus nearly 95% of its industrial capacity towards military production without destroying its economy. Your spoiled Germans don't represent the full picture.
Overall, you could make the point that Germany should not have produced 15 million spools of wallpaper in 1945, and I would agree with you. However, you cannot then transfer that questionable economic performance onto the performance of the German military. The German forces are widely regarded as the best of the war, and various statistical analyses support those findings.
I'll go with Anthony Evans from World War II : An Illustrated Miscellany who has the most accurate and concise description of the Germans during WW2 I've read:
The German soldier was very professional and well trained, aggressive in attack and stubborn in defense. He was always adaptable, particularly in the later years when shortages of equipment were being felt.
I feel like you're trying to fight the war all over again, to deny the Germans even the recognition of being effective at much of anything at all. While your intentions are admirable, I think such statements do a disservice to history. It begs the question: If the German's were so stupid, spoiled, lazy, and militarily ineffective, what the hell was wrong with the Allies!? :grin:
Jaeger and you still don't see something. Into our discussion we started from termination of Hitler into 1944 not 1941. Red Army into 1944 was not the same thing like into 1941. Its absolutely true that into 1941 they had no good officers and their soldiers were bad trained. But during 3 years of war situation changed a lot. Russian officers learnt much - they were still worse but not that bad like into 1941. Russian soldiers were always harder that german - Wermacht was winning due to organisation, training and leadership. But 3 years of war changed it. Russian soldiers were as experienced as Germans and still had something that let them hold first years of war. They were simply brave - really brave. And they knew how to cope with russian winter.
I do not believe that Wermacht in the 2nd part of 1944 would win with Russia. Too late. And even if Western Allies would agree on casefire (I doubt but lets think about it) - Germany still had no oil. Even 100.000 of panthers could do nothing without fuel.
Just an info. According to the program I watch yesterday, the Foreign Labour (not including the Slave one), forced or voluntary, represented 7,000,000 people.
It won't easy to shift to women forces.
So, the only way to "save" Germany would be not only a sepearte peace with the main Powers, but a at least neutrality from the 1939-40 invaded countries, but an alliance with them, in order to get minerals, food, supplies and petrol for the war machine...
Louis VI the Fat
05-29-2010, 14:18
What great timing!
A Russian general revealed two days ago that Stalin twice cancelled advanced plans to assasinate Hitler. Stalin feared a separate peace, and thought Germany was weaker with Hitler than without Hitler.
Soviet dictator Josef Stalin (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mt_profile/Josef_Stalin/) blocked two attempts to kill Adolf Hitler (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mt_profile/Adolf_Hitler/) during World War II, fearing that his replacement as Nazi leader would make peace with the Western Allies, a top Russian general said.
A plan to attack Hitler's bunker in 1943 and a 1944 plot involving an assassin who had gained the trust of the Nazi leadership were both canceled on Stalin's orders, General Anatoly Kulikov (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mt_profile/Anatoly_Kulikov/) said at a conference in Moscow.
"A plan to assassinate Hitler in his bunker was developed, but Stalin suddenly canceled it in 1943 over fears that after Hitler's death his associates would conclude a separate peace treaty with Britain and the United States," Kulikov said Tuesday, RIA-Novosti reported.
In 1944, the Soviets again plotted to kill Hitler after a potential assassin managed to gain the trust of the Nazi leadership. "A detailed assassination plan was prepared, but Stalin canceled it again," Kulikov said.
Hitler killed himself on April 30, 1945, as Soviet forces closed in on Berlin, effectively ending the war in Europe and setting the stage for the Cold War standoff between Russia and the West.
An estimated 27 million Soviet citizens died in the 1941-45 war with Nazi Germany.
Kulikov was interior minister from 1995 to 1998 under President Boris Yeltsin. He said the Club of Military Leaders, which he heads, would include details of the assassination attempts in a forthcoming book on World War II.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/general-stalin-blocked-attempts-to-kill-hitler/406889.html
PanzerJaeger
05-29-2010, 21:30
Jaeger and you still don't see something. Into our discussion we started from termination of Hitler into 1944 not 1941. Red Army into 1944 was not the same thing like into 1941. Its absolutely true that into 1941 they had no good officers and their soldiers were bad trained. But during 3 years of war situation changed a lot. Russian officers learnt much - they were still worse but not that bad like into 1941. Russian soldiers were always harder that german - Wermacht was winning due to organisation, training and leadership. But 3 years of war changed it. Russian soldiers were as experienced as Germans and still had something that let them hold first years of war. They were simply brave - really brave. And they knew how to cope with russian winter.
I've agreed and acknowledged as much. However, the German forces were not the same as they were in 1941 either. In some ways they were worse, but in others they were much better. I think with the combined forces of the Western and Italian forces, they could have stopped and even possibly reversed the Russian advance.
A Russian general revealed two days ago that Stalin twice cancelled advanced plans to assasinate Hitler. Stalin feared a separate peace, and thought Germany was weaker with Hitler than without Hitler.
Hah! Amazing! Never would have thought that I would be in complete agreement with the big man himself. I cannot wait for further Russian declassifications and releases in the future. There's so much we don't know.
I didn't know:
In January 1941, Stalin organised 2 “Kriegspiel” focused on defence and the other on counter-offensive. The German Forces are under Zhukov command who defeated he Soviet under Pavlov.
Zhukov will take Mereskov’s chair as Chief of the STAVKA and informed Stalin he will need 2 years to reorganise the Soviet Forces. Stalin gave him one.
Find this in a French What If: What If France didn't surrender in May 1940...
RabidGibbon
06-16-2010, 23:35
I just want to make a point that I think is important. On the 22nd of July the warsaw uprising hadn't happened yet, and that was an event that brought home to the west just how cynical Stalin could be. Admittedly they decided to let Stalin have his way, but one poster said that the british "Were happy to abandon Poland". This was simply not true - the situation was that certain elements of british government were rabid stalinists, but the warsaw uprising brought home to churchill (and perhaps alanbrooke) how ruthless Stalin was, and how he would ignore protesters who could not affect him (summed up by his quote "How many divisions does the pope have?").
But the point I'm trying to say is that by 22nd July the Red army was not deep into eastern europe, and the split that caused the Iron curtain speech had not happened yet. An assaination of Hitler on that date might have ended the war sooner, but the brits wouldn't have teamed up with the Germans against the Russians (And neither would the americans).
Just a short answer:
Stalin wasn't cynical. I used to think like this before.
However, Stalin was more "political" than his allies. Why should he help future ennemies. The Polish in the Warswa upraising were nationalist and openly anti-communist.
In term of politic, Stalin did act in concordence with his own interests.
And don't forget that Roosevelt (and Churchill) prohibided the only French Armored Division available (2nd DB) as the others French Units were fighting in Italy to land ihe 6th of June 1944 to stop de Gaulle of Propaganda Material. Roosevelt wanted to treat France as a Occupied Country and was not keen to see a French Administration put in place.
And the same story when Paris took arms and revolted. It will be thanks to Patton who released Leclerc 2nd DB to rush to Paris that the French liberated their own Capital.
We can as well see how the Communist French Fighters Groups didn't received so much weapons from the British and US as thees were not really keen to arm potential ennemies...
RabidGibbon
06-18-2010, 22:41
To answer you point by point Brenus,
Stalin acting in concordence with his own interests is to my mind cynical when it involves leaving the polish Home Army to bleed to death over two months because of post war considerations. You say the Polish in Warsaw were anti-communist, but this is only true to the extent that anyone who did not completly accept Soviet policy was anti-communist, and Stalin (and the Lublin commitee) had already made it clear that they foresaw the future boundaries of the USSR as being the 'Peace Line' agreed with Hitler in 1939. Its hard to see how a Polish resistance (aware of the NKVD's activites during the 1939-41 period in occupied eastern Poland and of course the Katyn forest) could be pro-soviet. However Stalin deliberately passed up an opportunity to end the war earlier by halting Rossokovsky on the Vistula (I'm refering to the september actions, not the earlier August offensive, which admittedly was halted by a German counterattack).
Of course everyone acted in their own self interest at the expense of their allies, but I dont think everyone took it to the level that Stalin did. Were Free French Communist Groups arrested, disarmed and placed in detention by the Western allies, as the Polish Home Army were? (Serious, not rhetorical question - I dont know anything about this subject).
I dont know anything either about the 2nd Armoured Div not being allowed to land on D-Day, but I believe that the plan didn't call for the commitment of an armoured division. Monty wanted tank brigades to push out of the british zone towards Falaise, and 2nd French armoured was a US formation (In the sense that the Canadians were a 'British' Formation - I'm refering purely to organisational details). Of course these are operational rather than political considerations, but French troops did land at Ouistreham on the 6th of June.
Did Roosevelt really plan to occupy France? Its not something I've ever heard anything about before - It theirs any good onlie sources I'd appreciate you pointing me towards them.
The point I'm trying to make is that Stalin, whilst perhaps his appreciation of the situation was identical to Churchill and Roosevelt, the actions he took on the basis of this appreciation were certainly more ruthless than anything the Western allies would have considered.
Edit: It just occurs to me that a great counter point to everything I just wrote would be Mers - El - Kebir, a superb example of allies acting against the interest of their erstwhile ally. The only defence I could make is that the French Fleet was not actively fighting the Germans, (as the Home Army abandoned by Stalin was) and could potentially prove an asset to them, although this is a pretty weak argument considering what eventually happened at Toulon.
Well, you put a moral judgement on a political decision.
Was Stalin cynical? Most probably, however the decision to halt (if it was a decision as the Russian claim they were at their logistical chain end so they couldn’t push forward –this wouldn’t explain the lack of support in ammunition and weapons/air support) was a pure political –perhaps immoral- decision.
From the Russian point of view, Poland was always an enemy.
From the Communist point of view, same: The Polish Dictator in charge prior 1939 was openly anti-communist and even supported Germany policy during the Spanish Civil War.
So Poland was anti-Stalin before Katyn (reason why Katyn happened, somewhere).
In term of politic and post war politic, and Stalin knew the war was won just didn’t know how much lands he would be able to do.
So resolving the Polish political future in letting the Germans to eradicate part of the Polish elite and in the same time denying to the anti-communist Partisan a propaganda victory in liberating their Capital was a typical communist decision.
What I learned in studying another Communist war (Indochina) is the Communists always favour the political (long term) effect even in a war. If a defeat gave them upper hand in the propaganda/media war, they will scarify men in order to achieve it.
If you judge Stalin’s decision from this, this decision makes sense.
Not a cynical decision but a plain battle field full of sense decision.
As the second point you can’t compare Democracy and Dictatorship. Of course no French Communist was deported or executed by the French Nationalist forces (even if some questions were raised on who betrayed Jean Moulin).
However, the idea to contain communism in France (and Italy) was always there.
And can I remind you what happened in Greece?
It took long time for Churchill to give weapons to Communist Tito instead of Mihailovic’s Cetniks (royalist) when it appear that the second one was more incline to wait in order to save civilian lives.
A I said Tito being a communist did scarify lives in order to gain political goals so he gave to Churchill was he wanted, at the price 100 civilians for one German soldiers killed (50 for one injured). It was implemented in October 1941 in Kragujevac.
The Kieffer Commando (Navy) was part of the British Commando No 10 was 174 men strong… It can hardly be seen as a French participation in the national territory liberation.
If you compare with Operation Anvil/Dragoon in August 1944, you understand that the decision to exclude French troops from the D-Day was indeed political.
About France treated as Occupied Territory, I’ve got this information in an interview I had with a French veteran when I was studying Indochina war. He was an officer in the French Corps Leger d’Intervention and met some US colleagues who show him their news shoulder insignia. It was the French Occupation Administration patch.
“Roosevelt’s feelings towards the French, at least regarding post-war talks, were chilly. While he’d harbored some distrust towards Great Britain, it was stronger with the French. When the American forces advanced into France, Roosevelt was sucked into the quagmire of French, wartime politics. Roosevelt and the US government had given backing to Vichy’s regime and refused to recognise the de Gaulle Free French movement. He saw him as someone who could raise the potential for a dictatorship in France. This strong dislike caused problems for the post-war planning talks. Without fully recognizing one of the main actors in the anti-Nazi movement, reaching a mutually agreed solution would be difficult to say the least. Indeed, Roosevelt would have preferred to keep de Gaulle from planning both the war and post-war plans. Requiring the French to disarm, in that case being treated similar to the Germans, made clear their place in the new world order that Roosevelt hoped to achieve; they would not be on the same level as the US, Great Britain, the Soviets, or China. France was to become another state in Europe that needed to be watched over by the stronger powers.”
In Tatiana McArthur, What Was Roosevelt’s “Vision of Europe”, November 30, 2009.
Sarmatian
06-21-2010, 21:03
I wouldn't say Stalin was cynical. In fact, that would be more applicable to Churchill and Roosevelt. When Italy surrendered, Soviets argued for a joint occupation. Italy was one of the countries that attacked the Soviet Union and was in war with both allies and the Soviets. They were flatly refused, more than once. So, after bitching about it, they decided to act according to the precedent set by the Allies - whoever occupies a territory decides what happens to it.
Lets not forget that there was a strong communist movement in Italy at the time and given the 100% free elections, it is not unthinkable that communists would have been placed in power.
So basically, what Stalin did in Poland was not different to what Allies did in Italy, and according to Glantz, Red Army was indeed at the end of their logistical supply and was unable to mount a huge operation of capturing a huge city such as Warsaw at such short notice...
Louis VI the Fat
06-22-2010, 00:07
The things one finds in archives...
Franco gave Nazis list of Jews in Spain
El País publishes order signed by Spanish dictator in 1941 instructing provincial governors to provide names of Jews to be handed over to 'final solution' architect Heinrich Himmler Ynet Published: 06.21.10, 08:45 / Israel Jewish Scene (http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3443,00.html)
P{margin:0;} UL{margin-bottom:0;margin-top:0;margin-right: 16; padding-right:0;} OL{margin-bottom:0;margin-top:0;margin-right: 32; padding-right:0;} H3.pHeader {margin-bottom:3px;COLOR: #192862;font-size: 16px;font-weight: bold;margin-top:0px;} P.pHeader {margin-bottom:3px;COLOR: #192862;font-size: 16px;font-weight: bold;} When former Prime Minister Golda Meir (http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3551447,00.html%20) thanked Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco for his "humanitarian attitude" and for protecting the Jews in his country during the Holocaust, she was not aware that he had ordered his officials to draw up a list of thousands of Jews living in Spain to be handed over to the Nazis.
The list, which was published in the El País newspaper on Sunday, would have sent thousands more Jews to their deaths in the Nazi extermination camps.
Franco, whose apologists and supporters claim he gave protection to the Jews of Spain, ordered his officials during the Second World War to compose a list of some 6,000 Jews, both Spanish and foreign, living in his country.
The list was handed over to the Nazi architect of the "final solution", German SS chief Heinrich Himmler, at a time when the two countries were discussing Spain's possible incorporation into the axis powers that included Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan.
The Spanish newspaper published the original order, which was recently unearthed in the Spanish government's archives and instructed provincial governors to provide detailed lists of "all the national and foreign Jews living in the province… showing their personal and political leanings, means of living, commercial activities, degree of danger and security category."
The governors were ordered to keep a close eye on Sephardic Jews, as their language and appearance enabled them to blend in with Spanish society.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3908170,00.html Another find to rewrite history.
Put here for its 'what if' value.
Pannonian
06-22-2010, 00:21
So basically, what Stalin did in Poland was not different to what Allies did in Italy, and according to Glantz, Red Army was indeed at the end of their logistical supply and was unable to mount a huge operation of capturing a huge city such as Warsaw at such short notice...
According to Montefiore, Stalin was worried about the reaction of his allies, and pressed his generals (ie. Rokossovsky) to make that extra push, but was told it wasn't possible. Stopping short of Warsaw was a military decision, not a politically-based one.
Interesting hypothetical.
I suggest Germany would've collapsed immediately if Hitler had been killed in any of the mid-late war attempts (ie post Stalingrad).
The power lines in the German hierarchy all ran to Hitler's desk. By 1944 his principle heir Goering was in disgrace and high on drugs and the next in line Himmler was less able and more disliked by the generals than Hitler himself. I don't think there was a coherent power structure much beyond "obey the Fuhrer".
I think the Wehrmacht, SS and Luftwaffe forces would've been at one another's throats in the ensuing power struggle. The winner (the Wehrmacht surely) would have the honour of surrendering the reich to the first comer.
The notion of Germans killing Hitler was a suicidal one once the war was on. The punchline is Manhattan: if a seperate peace was just a pause on one front to finish the other before sweeping west again, then its nuclear winter on the Oder. Should Stalin prevail, make that nuclear winter in Moscow.
A seperate peace post-Stalingrad is pretty much unbelievable for any of the Allies. There were large portions of the German machine simply unable to surrender or make peace with anyone. The commitment ot race extermination, slave labour and total conquest meant total victory or total defeat was the only way to stop the fighting. If one part of the German machine made peace there were other parts that would simply break off and keep fighting.
In the unlikely event that a seperate peace occured in the West (leaving Germany in a fit state to fight that is) then Stalin is in massive trouble. A half dead Werhmacht is a match for the 3/4 dead Red Army.
I believe even in the worst months of Bagration the Germans still outfought the Russians "man-for-man": IIRC there were only 4 months in WW2 when German losses on the Ostfront exceeded Soviet: Feb 1942 (last collapse of the Stalingrad Kessel) and then Jan or Feb-Mar 1945. 70 extra divisions including a lot of armour would stop the Soviet advance I'd guess.
The economic cost of a seperate peace for Germany would be prohibitively high but if lend-lease ended I suppose there would be significant pain for Stalin too...
Whoever prevailed after a seperate peace then surely it would mean more war. The Soviets stumbled to the line in 1945 with manpower bled out and desperate for resources. A rested Allied bloc would find the challenge and provocation of Soviets in Mittel Europe irresistable, and a victorious German regime (either Nazi or Military junta) more so.
Patton might've got to spit on the Kremlin...the USAAF would've got him there.
“A half dead Werhmacht is a match for the 3/4 dead Red Army.” Err, never. Germany succeeded some in some defensive battle, but in 1944, the Red Army had definitively the upper hand both in men and material.
The battle of Budapest would show your assertion a little bit exaggerated (24 hours to re-take what took 10 days for the German to take).
“lend-lease ended I suppose there would be significant pain for Stalin too...”, Not any more, as the help in logistic was not as vital in 1944 than in 1941-1942.
“The Soviets stumbled to the line in 1945 with manpower bled out and desperate for resources”
?. Did you read about the Siege of Berlin? What the Soviets were able to deploy in order to take Berlin before the 1st of May?
“A rested Allied bloc would find the challenge and provocation of Soviets in Mittel Europe irresistable, and a victorious German regime (either Nazi or Military junta) more so.”
Do you means that the Allies who had difficulties to win against mostly 2nd Rank German Division in France would have won in engaging the Red Army who defeated the most successful and most dangerous German Troops at the pick of the German Power, helped by numerous allies and well supplied?
I doubt that the Sherman would have many chances against the T 34/85, a JSU or KV 85. I have no doubt about the Allies soldiers’ courage, but I do think they were no match for the Red Army soldiers.
Then, in case of war between USSR and others Allies (and which ones?) what about the inevitable sabotage on the rear by the Communist Parties in France or Italy…
Would Tito’s Yugoslavia allowed the Red Army to cross then to attack Italy? And provide naval bases and Airfields?
“Patton might've got to spit on the Kremlin...the USAAF would've got him there.”: Oh. How? What the German didn’t succeeded to do in attacking by surprise a completely demoralised army (thanks to Stalin’s purges) with a mostly obsolete material and no capable Generals the Western Allies, some really fresh in the fight, speaking different languages and with less man power and lesser material would do? Yeah, right.
The Allies had one Patton. The Russian have Zhukov, Rokosovsky, Koniev, Vatutine, etc. What was a general under supervision in the Western Allies was what was at the Head of the Red Army.
The Allies would have been crushed (Red Army: 41.600 artillery pieces just for Berlin!!!!).
Facing this kind of fire power, the US and Allies would have difficulties to sustain the front. Then they would have to face not 2nd hand formations, by the elite of the Red Army, Red Guards and their superior material…
The Allies tanks out-numbered the German on the Western Front but this wouldn't be possible on the new eastern front. So, the only tanks able to face the KV, T 34 or JS would be the German tanks, which can’t be produced in mass. Even if the US decided to change their production chain from Sherman to Tiger or Panther, time would run out fast.
I suspect that Patton would have been thrown in the Atlantic and Europe would have been all under Communism rule for quite a long time…
You over-estimated the Air Power...
PanzerJaeger
06-26-2010, 05:31
You over-estimated the Air Power...
Agreed. It was not at all what some make it out to be.
Tsar Alexsandr
06-27-2010, 04:03
I think the war would have ended sooner. But it would leave a lot of problems. The allies would want terms from Germany, and Germany might not be willing to meet them. So the war could have carried on even without the psychopath. But I do believe a peace could be agreed upon. Russia under Stalin would be un-predictable. Maybe a whole new war would have sparked due to Germany's change of government?
The Lurker Below
06-27-2010, 15:26
was it ever known what the would be assassins intent was? were they hoping to attempt some diplomacy? did they simply want to conduct the war on their own terms? killing the chief is just a step, is their ultimate goal known?
I take the point that there's a pro Patton myth that he was the best and Shermans were invincible, whereas in fact he was possibly a merely competent commander (and insane) and Shermans were inferior and disliked by their own crews.
“A half dead Werhmacht is a match for the 3/4 dead Red Army.” Err, never. Germany succeeded some in some defensive battle, but in 1944, the Red Army had definitively the upper hand both in men and material.
The battle of Budapest would show your assertion a little bit exaggerated (24 hours to re-take what took 10 days for the German to take)....
I believe Soviet manpower was at an end in 1945 and factory capacity was being closed just to keep the increasingly mechanised Red Army up to scratch.
I believe the Red Army was smaller in 1945 than in 1939. Stalin could not keep his army at its great size and keep his war machine going.
I believe the brilliant advances in late 1943-1944 against army group centre and then the Balkans were mostly punching into thin air: the Soviet leaders sensibly "hit them where they weren't" and avoided concentrations like Warsaw and Courland.
Even then the Soviets were bleeding massively. Even when they decisively held the upper hand they bled like stuck pigs, and I believe the bood was almost all gone.
In the highly unlikely scenario that 70 divisions from France and more from Italy and the Balkans could be switched East I think the Russians might've been stopped before they reached Germany, or even before they cleared the pre 1939 Soviet frontiers completely.
Just a guess.
“lend-lease ended I suppose there would be significant pain for Stalin too...”, Not any more, as the help in logistic was not as vital in 1944 than in 1941-1942....
Fair enough, I guess all the trucks etc helped in the "dark days" pre-Stalingrad. I think allied strategic bombing might cause enormous problems for supply chain over a thousand mile long stretching back to the Moscow basin. Bear in mind it paralysed the Werhmacht less than 500 miles from the Ruhr.
“The Soviets stumbled to the line in 1945 with manpower bled out and desperate for resources”
?. Did you read about the Siege of Berlin? What the Soviets were able to deploy in order to take Berlin before the 1st of May?...
Yes. I also read they were shutting factories to do that. The extraordinary scrifices of the Soviets cannot be overstated, they lost nearly a whole generation of men.
“A rested Allied bloc would find the challenge and provocation of Soviets in Mittel Europe irresistable, and a victorious German regime (either Nazi or Military junta) more so.”
Do you means that the Allies who had difficulties to win against mostly 2nd Rank German Division in France would have won in engaging the Red Army who defeated the most successful and most dangerous German Troops at the pick of the German Power, helped by numerous allies and well supplied?
I doubt that the Sherman would have many chances against the T 34/85, a JSU or KV 85. I have no doubt about the Allies soldiers’ courage, but I do think they were no match for the Red Army soldiers.
Then, in case of war between USSR and others Allies (and which ones?) what about the inevitable sabotage on the rear by the Communist Parties in France or Italy…
Would Tito’s Yugoslavia allowed the Red Army to cross then to attack Italy? And provide naval bases and Airfields?...
All good points. In particular I agree that the Soviet army was a deadly, well lead and experienced force with excellent equipment by 1945. if the "second round" had happened in 1945-46 then Europe would've been reduced to ashes.
I think the Western Allies made up for a multude of tactical and tanknical (the "zippo" Sherman) sins with superb airsupport and massive supply capacity.
I think Great Britian was committed to war against a single power in Europe, whoever that was. I think the USA had 2 nukes and a strong willingness to use them.
“Patton might've got to spit on the Kremlin...the USAAF would've got him there.”: Oh. How? What the German didn’t succeeded to do in attacking by surprise a completely demoralised army (thanks to Stalin’s purges) with a mostly obsolete material and no capable Generals the Western Allies, some really fresh in the fight, speaking different languages and with less man power and lesser material would do? Yeah, right.
The Allies had one Patton. The Russian have Zhukov, Rokosovsky, Koniev, Vatutine, etc. What was a general under supervision in the Western Allies was what was at the Head of the Red Army.
The Allies would have been crushed (Red Army: 41.600 artillery pieces just for Berlin!!!!).
Facing this kind of fire power, the US and Allies would have difficulties to sustain the front. Then they would have to face not 2nd hand formations, by the elite of the Red Army, Red Guards and their superior material…
The Allies tanks out-numbered the German on the Western Front but this wouldn't be possible on the new eastern front. So, the only tanks able to face the KV, T 34 or JS would be the German tanks, which can’t be produced in mass. Even if the US decided to change their production chain from Sherman to Tiger or Panther, time would run out fast....
I agree the allies would probably have had to forgo war crimes trials to fill tank division ranks, and if they wanted to win tank battles then they'd need better tanks than Shermans.
I doubt they could win if they were fighting on open plains where vastly superior Soviet numbers and experience would destroy them.
Ib think if the Soviets were to win though they would have to do it extremely quickly.
USA went into the war with a "small" 80 division army. They had production capacity and manpower to spare. Britain was wrung out by the war but in no way was it as damaged as the Soviet Union.
If this unlikely scenario played out I imagine there'd be really savage hard fought wins along the line to the Soviets but their supply situation would be untenable in the face of Allied air superiority. Their forces would have the same options as the Germans 1943-1945 had in the west: few or no replacements, unable to attack except in short "no fly" periods and run out of fuel, or withdraw painfully, or sit in place and be slowly surrounded.
I suspect that Patton would have been thrown in the Atlantic and Europe would have been all under Communism rule for quite a long time…...
2 nukes in the hand and more in the pipeline (albeit a year or more away) says Stalin would not live to see that happen.
I quite agree the Soviet army was way too strong for the allies, but so was the German army.
Air superiority allowed D-Day, a ludicrous amphibious operation to succeed and prevented any meaningful response (bar a slow painful retreat).
You over-estimated the Air Power...
Every successful advance in WW2 was predicated on air superiority, from Barbarossa to Little Saturn to Bagration to Overlord. Zitadelle failed without air superiority, Typhoon cost Stalin far more than it cost Hitler without air superiority, Big Saturn was cut up when it out ran air-support. There are many other factors but air was a non-negotiable pre-condition to success.
The pacific war was essentially an air war conducted over the sea.
Another aspect is this: WW2 was ultimately a materielschlacht. The Nazis succeeded through loony surprise attacks with superbly organised but slightly under-resourced forces. The Soviets and allies ground them down.
I think the Allies had more grind left in them by 1945, but I think it would be a horror story whoever won.
Tsar Alexsandr
06-28-2010, 06:55
was it ever known what the would be assassins intent was? were they hoping to attempt some diplomacy? did they simply want to conduct the war on their own terms? killing the chief is just a step, is their ultimate goal known?
Hitler was called a criminal by the conspirators and by Erwin Rommel. They sought to end his criminal regime, and take control of Germany themselves. Or, that's what it seems like. Either way it'd be better than Hitler in charge.
cegorach
06-28-2010, 20:05
Elections in Poland occupy vast part of my spare time, but since I am already here (didn't log in for two weeks - I think) I will quickly refute some ideas which emerged in this thread.
cegorach
06-28-2010, 21:58
About the subject.
Hitler's termination would create shockwaves in Eastern Europe provided that no replacement was quickly found - which frankly was impossible.
I'd say a sort of I WW scenario could be replayed, but with whole nations quickly changing sides.
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria are prime suspects in this case - I highly dout that it would be possible to occupy Hungary as it historically happened.
That would leave entire armies stranded in the south-east.
In Poland I am quite certain that the Uprising in 1944 would be successful.
It is nice that some people learnt there was any, but should be aware of the size of the entire movement - in addition to Warsaw Home Army launched over 20 similar actions in other places and majority was successful from military point of view e.g. Wilno (Vilnius), Lublin, Lwów (L'viv) were controlled by the Home Army for some time - and red Army launched no actions against those forces, NKVD did.
Anyway that was eastern half of Poland so what about western? Home Army numbered over 200 000 soldiers in this area and with Germany out of action in a way it would be a force with some combat value, especially considering it would be supported by civilian administration which was quickly recreated in 'our' history so it would be in this timeline.
I am talking about legal government taking power> Legal, recognised, supported by ALL political parties in Poland from right-wing nationalists to socialists and Jewish Bund and by the people of Poland.
So called 'Lublin commitee' was a rough collection of spooks, exiled comunists who survived Stalins liquidation of the communist party (small already) and various opportunists and ordinary traitors.
Really - I made extensive research recently from about 50 high commanders in Soviet controlled Polish Army only 3-4 were Poles from Poland with no incriminating past unlike for example future marschal of Poland Michał Rola-Żymierski who was discharged from the Polish Army after a corruption scandal and in 1932 became a NKVD agent attempting to provide information about Poland's defensive plans against the SU.
In other words - government supported by the people vs. bunch of guys noone knows or recognises transported in suitcases and ready to sign anything - just like they didn't protest in 1939 in any way.
The key moves would be political. Soviet offensive strenght was mostly spent in July in Poland after they suffered defeat close to Rembertów (to the east of Warsaw) and if the Allies acted quickly area to the west of the Vistula would be easily secured.
Frankly there were three divisions already there in a form of Hungarian corps including elite 1st Hussar Division who historically attempted to prepare an agreement with the Allies to join the Poles in 1944 as so called 'Legion of st. Stephen' and who for many reasons would be a great asset in the area.
If Polish government in exile would show its presence in Poland quickly - in a form of some notable character travelling through German airspace for example, this together with strong presence of the Home Army and united smaller organisations, Hungarians, and civilian administration should be enough to secure this area.
I strongly doubt that Stalin would dare to advance more than to the great natural obstacle which is the Vistula river. In any case from logistical reasons it would be possible only in a limited manner and rather not worth not trying to go for something else instead - e.g. Romanian oil.
After that?
Eastern Prussia would be divided since destruction of Prussia was one of goals which would be easy to achive, wouldn't hurt Germany so much, would be perceived as important to secure future peace and because the Soviets would be able to advance out there.
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia - occupied and annexed. Finland - not sure, maybe would be annexed to save some wounded pride.
Norway - maybe northern part would be annexed as well - after all if you can create Moldavians in a month, so much you can do with 'Soviet Norwegians' - why not?
Romania - tricky, but Stalin would like it and there was alread an army concentrating and ready to attack.
Bulgaria - probably sovietised because the British would be busy in Greece, but maybe they could count on a form of 'finlandisation' - after all they were not even at war with the Soviet Union.
Hungary - most likely saved.
Yugoslavia - Tito in power, but most likely more moderate. Albania - maybe as a part of Yugoslavia or a UN protectorate for a time - if the UN would be formed.
Czechoslovakia - probably spared sovietisation, but certainly would lose Ruthenia. In worst case scenario part of Slovakia might be grabbed and made a 'socialist' state as well.
Poland - two state solution.
One Poland with the capital in Warsaw with Upper Silesia, Greater Poland and (obviously) Danzig + maybe something else Poles could grab quickly e.g. coastal towns such as Słupsk and silesian Opole - Breslau was too large and too far away, and noone really wanted it.
Eastern with capital in Lublin or Lwów (L'viv) - Stalin really didn't care much about the nonsense with the Curzon line and he would need something to give this annoying creation - Lwów and Grodno would be perfect. Przemyśl would be cleansed from Ukrainians, so would Volhynia and Wilno (Vilnius) from Poles which would be 'given' Ukraine and Lithuania.
Borders - really similar to R-M Pact according to the agreement in August 1939 (so along the river), maybe 'eastern Poland' would get some ex-German port e.g. Elbig because Koenigsberg would be too important for any suprisses such as III WW.
Would be eastern Poland 'independent' or annexed? I'd say the first after all it was still in theory only allied country unlike 'aggressors' such Romania or Finland. besides we have the entire German case as an example we can use.
Unification? Maybe in 1989 after the fall of border wall dividing western and eastern Warsaw? :laugh4:
@Brenus
Well, you put a moral judgement on a political decision.
Was Stalin cynical? Most probably, however the decision to halt (if it was a decision as the Russian claim they were at their logistical chain end so they couldn’t push forward –this wouldn’t explain the lack of support in ammunition and weapons/air support) was a pure political –perhaps immoral- decision.
I'd leave the entire moral/immoral thing to a different discussion or at all because there is no morality which allowed something like this. After all trucks were used, but to transport arrested AK soldiers in eastern Warsaw while western fought.
Even Soviet fighters didn't show up untill late September.
In general - leave it because it is impossible to defend Stalins actions on any rational and moral grounds.
From the Russian point of view, Poland was always an enemy.
Soviet in this case - Russia is not the Soviet Union which included also Georgia, Ukraine, Belorus etc.
From the Communist point of view, same: The Polish Dictator in charge prior 1939 was openly anti-communist and even supported Germany policy during the Spanish Civil War.
Eeeee.... Not really.
First of all there was noone you could even call a dictator. Piłsudski died in 1935 so BEFORE the war started, besides calling him a dictator is problematic a bit.
Second - not anti-communist but not communist. That the communist tend to treat everyone else as enemy is really noone fault.
Communist party hovewer posed some danger to the security of the state and its existence - politically it was the ONLY entity which opposed independence of Poland, fought on Soviet side in 1919-20 and even managed to organise a series of terrorist attacks in later years such as the campaign of bombings in 1923.
It really is difficult to have a conversation with people who are attempting to ruin everything.
Nevertheless the party was allowed to exist and in fact was liquidated by Stalin himself, with a vast majority of their members (those high ranking characters who survived were usually in prisons in Poland such as Gomułka).
Third.
Not the authorites, but also a vast majority of population supported Franco which considering the big blob in the east is no suprise, BUT here is a suprise for you - Poland was the second largest arms supplier to the Republic after the Soviet Union!
I can give you numbers if you need them e.g. majority of hand granades used in the war on this side was from Poland, overall there was enough equipment for 10 full divisions.
Of course no political support and no volunteers - but to neither side while 90% of sold equipment exported by Poland was sold to the Republic.
For profit of course which greatly helped in modernization of the Polish Army, but a fact is still something which counts.
Poles in International Brigades mainly came from Polish community - mainly coal miners in France who BTW later joined the Podhalan Brigade fighting in Norway in 1940 whch was supposed to fight the Soviets in Finland.
Those guys actually learnt a thing or two about Soviet commisars and NKVD in Spain so were quite keeon on kicking Soviet asses in Finland.
So Poland was anti-Stalin before Katyn (reason why Katyn happened, somewhere).
That is true, but so was Finland and everyone else for that matter. Stalin simply chose one option which was not rational anyway.
I know that he knew who Poles are - he actaully had some reasonable (completelly immoral and inhuman, but still) ideas in 1920 which were overruled.
There are several examples that he was capable of rational desicions in this matter e.g. didn't decide to place a red star over the white eagle, change the anthem or similar opposing various ideas presented by his lapdogs so he had to understand that his inaction and actions during the Uprising would backfire.
In term of politic and post war politic, and Stalin knew the war was won just didn’t know how much lands he would be able to do.
There is no single approach Stalin followed during the war. First he openly refused Hitler to establish any form of 'rump state' under the name of Poland.
Next he annexes the eastern territories of Poland (sorry no bullshit about 'former Russian territories would hold here). Later he orders the Katyn 'solution'.
And after that he suddenly moves to create a rifle division from Poles to be sent to occupied territories of Poland - in early 1941.
I'd call his approach flexible with no obvious long term goal, even despite he openly hated Poles (several example in 'the Court of the red Tzar') and knew history well.
About territories - he actually opposed ideas to move Ukrainian SRR's border to the San river (so including mainly Ukrainian Przemyśl he got in 1939) or annexing Białystok with its sizable Belorussian minority claimed Russian by Lenin in 1918
So resolving the Polish political future in letting the Germans to eradicate part of the Polish elite and in the same time denying to the anti-communist Partisan a propaganda victory in liberating their Capital was a typical communist decision.
That is definetely true, but also typically stupid.
For later 45 years it was another recent minefield which required considerable resources and would backfire if Poland was not sandwitched in some way.
No danger of German revanchism + Katyn and the failure of the Uprising = anger directed at Moscow and 'saddling the cow' was as Uncle Joe already said impossible.
More clever would be to use Czechoslovakian scenario - after all German occupation was not a sunny day in a park so there would be some ground to built some support for the Soviets in the future.
That would be more clever and from my point of view more dangerous.
I guess he either overestimated Poles or underestimated them.
Recently I've read interesting interview with a Russian historian from Memorial organisation who explained Katyn as extermination of elite which in Stalin's eyes would be a seed of Poland whenever they came so whatever it would be - Siberia, Poland or Venus.
In this light not supporting Warsaw was a bit a gamble - he might think that let's say 1/4 was eliminated in Katyn, 1/4 is in London (more in Scotland actually) and Italy with Anders, 1/4 removed Germans and 1/4 is there in Warsaw.
Maybe together with loyal reports about 'thousands' of communist fighters ready to strike (indeed there were thousands - 300 in Warsaw, c. 6-18 000 overall compared to 600 000+ in the Underground) he thought it is almost there and everything is done...
But allowing a million large capital to be literally completely destroyed is something people tend to remember.
What I learned in studying another Communist war (Indochina) is the Communists always favour the political (long term) effect even in a war. If a defeat gave them upper hand in the propaganda/media war, they will scarify men in order to achieve it.
If you judge Stalin’s decision from this, this decision makes sense.
Not a cynical decision but a plain battle field full of sense decision.
Only if we take into account the world they were living in.
The world where everyone is conspiring against you, where multilayered paranoia supports certain decision and the state aparatus provides proofs that Switzerland is imparialist power trying to overthrow Soviet government.
Why? Because some 'duce' somewhere said so and any agent's report, any confession which didn't support it could end up badly for the agent or the persecutor.
So according to this world view it is indeed clever, but fails in reality which doesn't realise it should behave as some guy wrote in his report.
And now - really guys, this view is already obsolate. August can be explained, but September cannot - while complete lack of any other support or allowing such is just impossible to defend.
@Sarmatian
So basically, what Stalin did in Poland was not different to what Allies did in Italy, and according to Glantz, Red Army was indeed at the end of their logistical supply and was unable to mount a huge operation of capturing a huge city such as Warsaw at such short notice...
Capture from whom?
I wish I could imagine German troops defending Warsaw in August-September 1944, but I cannot.
@Pannonian
According to Montefiore, Stalin was worried about the reaction of his allies, and pressed his generals (ie. Rokossovsky) to make that extra push, but was told it wasn't possible. Stopping short of Warsaw was a military decision, not a politically-based one.
In July and August.
Not in September when eastern Warsaw was occupied quickly.
In any case even in August it was still possible because similar operations were launched later during the war in Slovakia and Hungary because political decisions were different.
Hard, but possible to link with the capital or endanger German positions out there with later success in mind.
@Panzerjeager
Stalin had the largest army in Europe. He had far greater quantities of armor, artillery and airplanes than Germany. He had brilliant military minds and a sound doctrine. Despite Western historiography, the Soviet military was second only to the Wehrmacht in quality, even in 1941. Due to his intelligent decisions, his brilliant officer corps was systematically murdered by their own leader directly before the war and the vast majority of this force was destroyed by the Germans in the first year of the war, having to be rebuilt from scratch. Stalin's best decision was when he decided to stop making decisions and leave it to the professionals.
My sources aren't Western and they portrait a different picture using Russian data I am afraid.
The Red Army was simply created large too quickly (so for example 80% of tanks would have to be replaced in 1942-43) and never came over numerous problems such as terrible technical support of fast divisions,
In short:
- Soviet paratroopers were numerous, but lacked proper transports, support to continue fighting for longer time and were poorly trained,
- Soviet armor had poor technical support resulting in numerous technical breakdowns in a matter of 24 hours,
- its logistic were very poor, especially fuel was running short very quickly because it was not delievered in time,
- Soviet soldiers were afraid to fight at night resulting in numerous incidents between different divisions camped close to each other identifying their neighbours as enemies with predictable results,
- poor recon of all branches of the military,
- poor training of important personell such as drivers or pilots,
- design flaws of equipment and poor reliability of mass produced weapons especially the tanks which suffered from very poor visibility,
And finally egomaniacs in power. How can you comment Tukhachevsky's plan to invade Poland with 150 000 tanks and 80 000 airplanes presented by him around 1932?
No, the numbers are all ok - he thought it is all all right and reasonable and there were similar 'great minds' everywhere making Stalin rather positively sensible.
And so on and so forth...
Definetely one of top three, but frankly speaking competition isn't too hard... because who else could compete?
Top 8 in 1939 would include Germany, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Poland, United States (because of the navy) probably in that order.
Top 12 in 1938 would also include Czechoslovakia (after Poland), Romania, Yugoslavia, Nationalist China - in no particular order.
“I'd say a sort of I WW scenario could be replayed, but with whole nations quickly changing sides.”
Would have been so easy? Possibility of civil wars existed.
The Eastern countries are now denying it was even one communist at that time (as “nema comunista” from a song in which Serbia Group Riblja Corba just joke about this new reality in the Serbian Society).
And I have to say your description of the Polish Communists is not encouraging, as it seems that all of them was a real “believer” but just bench of opportunist. I met in Yugoslavia some of them (not Polish, of course) and they seem to be more sincere than what you describe.
And even if, in my view, it would have made the conquest by the Red Army of theses territories even faster. Without Germany support and the stubborn defence from the SS and the Heer, the national armies would have collapse even faster…
“Soviet in this case”. Yes, but same point of view for this one.
“Piłsudski died in 1935 so BEFORE the war started, besides calling him a dictator is problematic a bit.” He did take power by a Coup, didn’t he? So it feats in what I call a dictator. The fact that his system survived is just underlining he was a successful one.
“That the communist tend to treat everyone else as enemy is really noone fault.” Well, was not the truth that all the European Countries saw Communism as an enemy? The Allies intervention in the Russian Civil War against the Communist is hardly a proof a good neighbourhood…
And even the rhetoric used at the time… So, yes the Soviets were paranoid. Indeed, but they had good reason to be.
“That is definitely true, but also typically stupid.” How stupid? To use one enemy to kill another enemy is far from to be stupid. So can you explain you point?
“But allowing a million large capital to be literally completely destroyed is something people tend to remember.” Err, yeah, but it was what Gal. Eisenhower was ready to do for Paris being not Patton releasing the Free French 2nd DB to rescue the Parisians Insurgents as most of them were communist…
“Capture from whom?” Well, he avoided having to answer this question, did he?
One question: You don’t stop, with reasons, to tell Communists were enemies but you, in the same breath, reproach them to act as such.
So, in your view, the communists were at least a bench of traitors and USSR was the ultimate enemy BUT they should have helped the Nationalist Polish to fight the Germans. The ones who when in power put them in jail when they could…
Is there something I missed here?
So, in your view, the communists were at least a bench of traitors and USSR was the ultimate enemy BUT they should have helped the Nationalist Polish to fight the Germans. The ones who when in power put them in jail when they could…
Sorry Brenus but you are not listenting or don't want to listen.
You are mixind nationalism and patriotism.
Every citizen of Poland, no matter if he likes government or not, is obligated to defend country.
Especially when enemy is sending people to death camps. If citizen does nothing - he is traitor.
Country Army were not polish nationalists - they were polish patriots. Many of them did not agree with
government before ww2 but they were fighting with common enemy.
“Sorry Brenus but you are not listenting or don't want to listen.
You are mixind nationalism and patriotism”:
No I don’t. You do.
First observation: Cegorah is the one who deny to the Polish communist patriotism, as in his view (as much I understand what he wrote) Communist and Polish can’t do together…
Second observation: What is your point on the German fighting in the rank of the anti-Hitler armies? Or should they fight for Germany? What would be your definition during the WW2 of a Patriotic German?
You can’t in one hand claim that Russians/Communists are enemies of Poland and then reproach to a Russian/Communist not to take advantage of your defeat.
Let face it: The uprising of Warsaw was to deny the Russians/Communist to liberate the town and to establish a pro-Western Government that would be anti-communist as pre-war situation.
So it was logic in Stalin point of view to suspend the offensive and let the German do the dirty job.
I will remind you that in Viet man, the pro-US government cancelled the free elections when it appeared the Communists would have won them. That is politic. You don’t help your enemies….
Certainly there was a lot of pressure on Poland from Germany and the Soviets, and choices there were hard ones.
I thnk most communists (Polish and others) were very genuine in their beliefs and opposed Hitler for the good of humanity. Even in Australia (a very wealthy and safe place) we had and have communists who see the evils in our system and strive to fix them: Communism offers an alternative and Stalin seemed to be the agency to achieve this alternative. Australian communists (and I have meet some, young and old) really believe this, and see Stalin's evils as a mixture of "well nobodies perfect" and "he's been disparaged by propagandists".
Stalin's deal with Hitler would've been devastating to many Polish Communists: partition was almost every Pole's nightmare. The difficulty in accepting help or direct rule from Moscow would have taxed many hearts, but the real alternatives were few: Hitler and his camps, Stalin and his camps and what? Independence hadn't worked out too well in 1939.
The thing is Communism seemed to offer real internationalism, as opposed to the really viral nationalism which was sending armies to war in the name iof bood and race. I think Communists saw themselves not as traitors but as the acolytes of the new faith bringing the new peace.
I think it was close to a "no-win" situation for all Poles. They went down swinging at least: if there is a Polish national trait (and i know such characterisations are dodgy) its a willingness to stubbornly fight for their beliefs.
I believe Stalin was a cynical murderer and Communism was a cloak for his dictatorship to the same extent Hitler's insane beliefs served his dictatorship. I think Stalin came to rely on Great Russian Nationalism as a principle element in his rule, so the Soviet system was not free of a "Nationalist" element.
I think Stalin's brutal purges in 1937 were the reason there were less attempts on his life from within his military (we hear of none but how would we know?). Hitler purged very few generals and they kept their competence but also some degree of rebelliousness.
If Stalin had not purged the Red Army would they have folded so quickly in 1941? I think they would have held up much better, losing far less ground although still losing millions of dead. it might have shortened the war by a year.
And would there have been more attempts on his life if things went badly? I think so, especially if there was a "Kiev encirclement" type disaster.
vBulletin® v3.7.1, Copyright ©2000-2025, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.