French Indian War

[Peasant Phill]

After playing the French in ETW, I brushed up on my (minimal) knowledge of their history in America. I started reading about the French Indian war and I had a really hard time getting my head around the battles.

Firstly the scale. A lot of times there were no more than 500 men fighting. Can you actually cal that a battle? Can a victory be decisive when the total casaulties are no more than a few dozen? Where there actually only so many colonists?

Secondly the duration. So you got a confrontation between 50 on one side and 50 on the other side and that confrontation lasts 2 hours.

Lastly, the forts. Some forts I read about where nothing more than a palisade around a central building. Some where even badly placed (to close to the woods, dominated by a hill where artillery could destroy the fort unopposed).

In short I have a hard time to understand it all. Maybe some of you could clarify it a bit.

[PanzerJaeger]

In my understanding, it was more of a guerilla war than one of grand set-piece battles (although there were a few). North America was so vast, it was impossible to completely dominate one party's territories, or to adequately supply large standing armies. Therefore, it was more of an attritional conflict, where victory was measured in the amount of suffering one party could impose on the other. The British, particularly, showed a marked level of cruelty to both the Indians and French who came under their control, most likely reflecting an element of embarrassment from early French and Indian victories against them.

The battles may not have been large in scale, but the implications were enormous. France essentially ceded their North American holdings to Britain and Spain (which was given Louisiana by the French for losing Florida to the British).

[Alexander the Pretty Good]

After playing the French in ETW, I brushed up on my (minimal) knowledge of their history in America. I started reading about the French Indian war and I had a really hard time getting my head around the battles.

Firstly the scale. A lot of times there were no more than 500 men fighting. Can you actually cal that a battle? Can a victory be decisive when the total casaulties are no more than a few dozen? Where there actually only so many colonists?

Secondly the duration. So you got a confrontation between 50 on one side and 50 on the other side and that confrontation lasts 2 hours.

Lastly, the forts. Some forts I read about where nothing more than a palisade around a central building. Some where even badly placed (to close to the woods, dominated by a hill where artillery could destroy the fort unopposed).

In short I have a hard time to understand it all. Maybe some of you could clarify it a bit.
I don't really know the specifics (and in fact a recommendation for a good general history of the war in book format would be welcome) but I imagine part of the nature of the war was the "unprofessionalism" of the combatants. A skirmish might take two hours if you aren't lining up nice and neatly on a European battlefield, especially if both sides are militia/natives who aren't trained to die in those battle lines. In the same vein, a lot of the British/American colonists/settlers (hedging my terms here lol) weren't experienced fortification experts.

[Meneldil]

Firstly the scale. A lot of times there were no more than 500 men fighting. Can you actually cal that a battle? Can a victory be decisive when the total casaulties are no more than a few dozen? Where there actually only so many colonists?



French colonies in America always suffered from a lack of population. The attempt to surround the English colonies (in the US east coast) from Canada to Louisiana would have been a nifty strategy, had the french kingdom decided to promote an effective immigration policy. As it was, the settlers were mostly nuns, exiled scums and adventurers.
That explains why France couldn't mobilize enough manpower to fight the Brits, and relied heavily on Natives (who weren't that numerous either), which in turns explain why - except for a few large battles - the Indian war was mostly about skirmishes, guerilla and terror tactics.

I'd disagree with the accusation of unprofessionalism. The few french professional soldiers sent to NA were the top of the cream. There was just not enough of them to be effective (+ they weren't trained for such a war, which I assume would be the same for the Brits).

The several wars between France and UK in North America are quite an interesting topic of study though. Despite the few resources and manpower diverted to them, I think it was a decisive event for the future of the world. What would have happened, had Louis XIV and XV decided to effectively colonize New-France, instead of seeing it as a vast trading post? Had France kept her territories in the new world? So many interesting what-ifs.

[Azathoth]

The several wars between France and UK in North America are quite an interesting topic of study though. Despite the few resources and manpower diverted to them, I think it was a decisive event for the future of the world. What would have happened, had Louis XIV and XV decided to effectively colonize New-France, instead of seeing it as a vast trading post? Had France kept her territories in the new world? So many interesting what-ifs.

STFS would be Louis the Fat and vice versa. Wait, what?

[The Lurker Below]

Firstly the scale. A lot of times there were no more than 500 men fighting. Can you actually cal that a battle? Can a victory be decisive when the total casaulties are no more than a few dozen? Where there actually only so many colonists?

Secondly the duration. So you got a confrontation between 50 on one side and 50 on the other side and that confrontation lasts 2 hours.

Lastly, the forts. Some forts I read about where nothing more than a palisade around a central building.

most of europes conflicts during the early medieval years were on a smaller scale. their defensive structures frequently even more primitive. further, the consequences of those conflicts weren't nearly as far reaching. the current skirmishes in the middle east seldom result in more than a few casualties. had i actually been in any of the above actions i'm certain i'd say it was a battle.

having said that the french and indian war is overlooked as just a sideshow of the seven year's war, and it's lack of scale is probably the biggest reason why.

[Peasant Phill]

OK, now I can somewhat understand the small scale but I still find calling a raid on an undefended settlement or a indecisive encounter between scouting parties a battle still a bit laughable.

Can someone clarify the tactics used in such skirmishes? The only thing I can base myself on ATM is 'the last of the Mohicans' and that didn't really have hour long skirmishes.

[Kagemusha]

OK, now I can somewhat understand the small scale but I still find calling a raid on an undefended settlement or a indecisive encounter between scouting parties a battle still a bit laughable.

Can someone clarify the tactics used in such skirmishes? The only thing I can base myself on ATM is 'the last of the Mohicans' and that didn't really have hour long skirmishes.

It could be because movies tend to intensify engagements. In covered terrain most of the time "battles" were just shootouts from behind a cover.

[Meneldil]

STFS would be Louis the Fat and vice versa. Wait, what?

The world would be doomed.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

While you can argue whether the appropriate appellation would be "skirmish," "engagement," "battle," or whatever, the number of combatants does not necessarily have any influence as to the decisive nature of the result. The Plains of Abraham featured total force committments that wouldn't have been classed as much above a "rear guard" for a contintental army, yet the impact was decisive. Clive commanded only 500 or so at the siege of Arcot, but when the dust finally settled, Clive had put a new nawab on the throne.

[Meneldil]

While you can argue whether the appropriate appellation would be "skirmish," "engagement," "battle," or whatever, the number of combatants does not necessarily have any influence as to the decisive nature of the result. The Plains of Abraham featured total force committments that wouldn't have been classed as much above a "rear guard" for a contintental army, yet the impact was decisive. Clive commanded only 500 or so at the siege of Arcot, but when the dust finally settled, Clive had put a new nawab on the throne.

Yep. If a country can only commit 100 men to a war and you kill/injure 50 of them, you've pretty much won anyway. I'm not quite sure about that, but IIRC, Abraham Plains was like 5000 Brits vs 4500 French, which would have been laughable anywhere in Europe at the time.

[Brenus]

Like the battle of Ticonderoga (8th of July 1758) where 6,000 Regulars & 9,000 Militias British went in battle against 3,000 French (mainly Colonials).

[Hosakawa Tito]

Here's an interesting book on Robert Rogers, War on the Run (http://www.historynet.com/book-review-war-on-the-run.htm), that I enjoyed reading and gave some insight into your questions about the French & Indian War.

[A Nerd]

I apologize if this is off-topic or such, but wasn't George Washington a colonel for the British during the French and Indian War? Wasn't he almost killed (bullet passing thru his jacket) during an ambush when General Braddock fell? I seem to recall that and in facinated me as a youth.

[Hosakawa Tito]

I apologize if this is off-topic or such, but wasn't George Washington a colonel for the British during the French and Indian War? Wasn't he almost killed (bullet passing thru his jacket) during an ambush when General Braddock fell? I seem to recall that and in facinated me as a youth.

Hehehe, the year before that Washington was in charge of building a fort near Pittsburg PA. Some of his troops & Indian allies ambushed a French scouting party
and killed the French leader. You could kinda say Washington helped started the French & Indian War.:oops:

[A Nerd]

Hehehe, the year before that Washington was in charge of building a fort near Pittsburg PA. Some of his troops & Indian allies ambushed a French scouting party
and killed the French leader. You could kinda say Washington helped started the French & Indian War

Very interesting indeed. Sorry if I sounded dumb.

[Hosakawa Tito]

Very interesting indeed. Sorry if I sounded dumb.

There are no dumb questions. ~:pat:

[Louis VI the Fat]

There are no dumb questions. ~:pat:If there are no dumb questions, then do dumb people suddenly become smart when they ask questions? :balloon:



Edit: uh...dumb people in general, not a specific poster. :sweatdrop:

[Pannonian]

I apologize if this is off-topic or such, but wasn't George Washington a colonel for the British during the French and Indian War? Wasn't he almost killed (bullet passing thru his jacket) during an ambush when General Braddock fell? I seem to recall that and in facinated me as a youth.

How much did he charge for replacing that jacket? $10,000?

[Hosakawa Tito]

If there are no dumb questions, then do dumb people suddenly become smart when they ask questions? :balloon:



Edit: uh...dumb people in general, not a specific poster. :sweatdrop:

I hate it when I answer my own question too. So what wine is best served with crow?:laugh4:

[drone]

Here's an interesting book on Robert Rogers, War on the Run (http://www.historynet.com/book-review-war-on-the-run.htm), that I enjoyed reading and gave some insight into your questions about the French & Indian War.
Ah, Roger's Rangers. Old school special forces.

[Incongruous]

Actually, the French-Canadians were masters of war in the wilderness of North America, they seem to have had an almost unmatched ability to learn from the Indians and their surroundings. The British army on the other hand was a late comer to the idea that one must adapt to win in such an enviroment, even by the end of the war, little had really been learnt properly IMHO.

As to the cruelty, I disagree with PJ on this point, at leat in the early years of the war it was the French who were condemned (even back in Europe) for their dishonourable conduct, particularly that great warrior Montcalm, but indeed the British were also brutal, scalping was a popular act of post-batytle barbarism favoured by everyone. Prisoners were rarely taken in the backwoods actions between groups of irregulars, though it was particular facet of Indian culture to sometimes burn alive the few that were taken, more often than not they adopted their white prisoners, some of the greates Indian warrior (particularly those whom fought for Canada) were white men.

However as noted, it was a losing battle for Canada simply due the numbers facing her and once the Champlain had been given up I believe it was only a matter of time, regardless of Wolfe's attack upon Quebec. It was very much a war of warriors, abiding my ancient codes of warrior honour, almost medieval in its character.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I apologize if this is off-topic or such, but wasn't George Washington a colonel for the British during the French and Indian War? Wasn't he almost killed (bullet passing thru his jacket) during an ambush when General Braddock fell? I seem to recall that and in facinated me as a youth.

Washington had attacked the French the year before and had been forced to capitulate at Fort Necessity. This was indeed one of the incidents that helped bring about the war. NOT his finest hour.

As a colonel of Virginia's forces, he volunteered to serve as an aide to Braddock during that campaign.

Washington's personal bravery was never questioned by any of his contemporaries (whatever they may have said about the ego, the expense accounting, and the tactical miscues). He was often in the line of fire and came close to being shot on many occasions.

After the British regulars broke, Washington himself led a rear-guard of colonials who staged a fighting withdrawal and covered Braddock's troops.

I've always wondered at the odd mix of tactical qualities Washington had. In a set-piece battle or standard attack he was no better than average, not particularly prone to mistakes but also not proof against being out manuevered or out-generaled. Yet at the same time he was a virtuoso in extracting an army from a debacle. He could retreat effectively under fire with a routing or half-broken force and pull it off time and again -- even though many of the professionals out there assert that this is the most difficult thing to do in all of warfare.

[Peasant Phill]

I've always wondered at the odd mix of tactical qualities Washington had. In a set-piece battle or standard attack he was no better than average, not particularly prone to mistakes but also not proof against being out manuevered or out-generaled. Yet at the same time he was a virtuoso in extracting an army from a debacle. He could retreat effectively under fire with a routing or half-broken force and pull it off time and again -- even though many of the professionals out there assert that this is the most difficult thing to do in all of warfare.

On the other hand, I got the impression that being at least average or not particularly prone to mistakes went quite far in the French and Indian war. In larger encounters usually both sides made their part of mistakes or had their disadvantages.

[A Nerd]

Would it be foolish to say that some of the fighting expertise/tactic for the Americans that was used later in the Revolution came from skirmish and the like during the French and Indian War? Or am I just generalizing?

[Incongruous]

Would it be foolish to say that some of the fighting expertise/tactic for the Americans that was used later in the Revolution came from skirmish and the like during the French and Indian War? Or am I just generalizing?

In terms of large field battles, no, the Rebel's were increadibly poor field generals for the most part, men like Clinton were given absurdly high commands for their increadibly poor military skills, whereas men like Stark received almost nothing and Benedict Arnold ended up forsaking what he concieved of a Congress enthralled to Washington. Himself a poor field commander but a surprisingly good organiser.

Both sides made good use of irregulars and "rangers", the battle of King's mountain is perhaps the best example of this type of warfare, worth a read up on (as long as you discount the usual Franklin drivel about it), and it also the most increadibly spooky battle site I have ever been to.

[TinCow]

One aspect of this war that is often neglected is the American Indian conflict. Many Indian groups were willing to aid one side or the other specifically because they were interested in expanding their own influence over rival groups. The Indians were fighting for themselves, and were allies with the various Europeans only as a means to their own gains. This inter-Indian warfare was spurred on by arms and munitions given by the French and British, and helped to exacerbate the heavily 'guerrilla' nature of the conflict. Remove the Indian allies from the war, and it would have been a much smaller and more conventional conflict.

[Peasant Phill]

Perhaps. I did notice that the Indians were very pragmatic in their alliances. Sitting on the fence as long as possible, supporting the winner of the moment, ...

I also found another thing striking. Correct me if I'm wrong but the American theater of the Seven Years war was rather uninspiring in the sense of strategies or tactics in comparison to the European theater while the terrain and the smaller scale could have made it a great testing ground.

[Louis VI the Fat]

It's all a matter of luck, really. If the English didn't have the good fortune of having more men, better weapons, smarter leaders, more money and better strategy than the French we would've easily driven them out. :book:

[TinCow]

I also found another thing striking. Correct me if I'm wrong but the American theater of the Seven Years war was rather uninspiring in the sense of strategies or tactics in comparison to the European theater while the terrain and the smaller scale could have made it a great testing ground.

I'm hesitant to criticize the British and French for failing to understand the strategy and tactics of the Americas at that time. The wars being fought in Europe at that point simply required very large armies engaged in decisive battles at critical points. Guerrilla warfare is mainly a long-term defensive strategy that requires the support of the native population, it's not something that was well suited to the pre-Napoleonic era, when wars of occupation were almost unheard of. European wars prior to the 18th century generally involved a large, direct assault by a massed army to capture the major cities of the enemy and force a peace by the defeated government. At that point, the attacker would remove their military forces and the terms of the defeat were enforced by threat of another invasion, not soldiers on the spot.

The number of true wars of occupation that occurred prior to the 19th century were relatively few in number and involved nations conquering small areas over lengthy periods of time to gradually form the current state of European nations. Examples include English attacks on Wales, Scotland, and Ireland; Castile's wars with Aragon, Portugal, and the Almohads; the warring Italian city-states; etc. That said, there IS one interesting 'aberration' in guerrilla warfare that is uniquely European: the Hundred Years War. The campaigns of the Free Companies/Routiers in the 1350s and 1360s were essentially offensive guerrilla warfare and I've yet to encounter anything similar to them in military history. A very odd situation, that, where small groups of men scattered here and there could paralyze an entire nation.

[Ibrahim]

may late night (and rambly), addition (which itself is late)

while its true that much of the fighting was "petite guerre", the more important encounters were the european style ones (formal sieges and set piece battles), fought by europeans, with some Indian help if possible. for example: Louisebourg, Plains of Abraham, St.Foy, Ft. Oswego, Ft. William Henry, Ft. carillon (Ft. Ticonderoga). the list goes on.

and many of them involved at least 3-4000 men. the battle of Carillon involved ~15,000 british, and 3,000 French soldiers (French won this). St. Foy involved 4-5 thousand men, while the plains of abraham involved ~8-9000 men. the only large scale "petite guerre" engagement was at the battles of Monongahela, and that one ambush towards the end of the war, and neither involved more than 3,000 men

also: its a myth (of sorts), that the british did not learn from that war; they didn't learn as perfectly as one would expect after nine years of fighting (1754-1763), but the influence of that war did linger. for starters, light infantry companies were formed, for specifically the purpose of fighting in skirmishes, in that war, and were by 1770-71 officially part of the makeup of each regiment. also, many items of gear one seas in the revolution were, oddly enough, first used in the fighting in America: the backpack comes to mind, and the bayonet drill used in the revolution was first used on the plains of Abraham in 1759 (later adopted by a militia drill manual, later incorporated into the manual of arms of 1764). there was also a tendancy in that war to remove lace from uniforms, and to cut coats down to jackets, or even scrap it altogether in favor of a waistcoat, ot waistcoat with sleeves stitched on it.. overall though, its still a pretty minor influence: the British IIRC prussified their uniform in 1768-the last thing you want when fighting in the woods (seriously? extra tight uniforms?).

now why didn't they learn as well as one would expect? well, it boils down to what I mentioned before: the more important engagements didn't necessarily depend on guerilla tactics, but on the European style of warfare. and the British did have a concerted strategy for capturing Canada (consistently a pincer movement); the first was in 1755, with one column to Ft.Duquesne, the other towards Ft. beausejour and lake George. then another in 1758, with one towards Carillon (Ticonderoga) and one towards Louisebourg. then another in 1759, with one to Quebec and another from Albany to IIRC Montreal (which didn't even get far). and finally in 1760, with the attack on Montreal. had all of thses been planned perfectly, and were well led and supplied, the war could very well have ended sooner. and for anyone who is aware of the results of these engagements, one might notice that usually one half of the pincer would fail (Ft.Duquesne, Carillon, Montreal).

so in the end, the "petit guerre", which is the french title at the time for what was happening in regards to guerrilla warfare, was comparatively minor in the war when looked a from a strategic sense. they did help delay, or aggravate the difficulty of, British attempts at winning the war, but in the end, failed to give the french the decisive edge.

this last part was due to a combination of poor leadership (truely evident at the battle of carillon), and/or proper french/Indian preparation (Duquesne), and an element to bad luck (Montreal 1759).
sources:
www.kronoskaf.com (that's where I make uniform plate for)
Paul Revere's ride, david hackett-Fisher (there is a part that discusses Gen. Thomas Gage's involvement in the war-he was at monongahela, Carillon, and led the 1759 expidition that failed. he also raised a light infatry regiment (the 80th))
Duffy, Military experience in the age of reason.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_jumonville_glen
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Necessity
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fort_Necessity (warning: severe fail in this article; not on the part of the writers of it, but in the description of the "fort", which is actually pretty accurate)


and to everyone: washington didn't help start the war. no-he himself did so-almost single-handed. what's even funnier is that he:
1-surrendered Ft.Necessity on the 4th of July, 1754. no, seriously, 4th of July.
2-had built that fort in a clearing, the wood itself was green, and easily punctured by the muskets of the day.
3-the french made him sign a paper, essentially admitting o murdering the diplomat himself (whose name was Joumonville, and he was acually killed by a guy name half-king, who was nominally under Washington). Washington, not knowing french (and not asking for an honest interpreter), didn't know until it was too late.

and to whoever it was: necessity and Joumonville glenn were in the same year.

[Louis VI the Fat]

I still don't get what the fuzz is about. As Voltaire said: Canada? Just a few acres of snow...


What's the point of a thread that discusses trivialities such as losing an inconsequential continent only triple the size of Europe. Ah well, I suppose it makes the English feel all warm and fuzzy inside. They are a funny people like that. Needless to say, there's not the least bit of resentment or regret at the failure to understand what the America's could look like if properly settled. What the world would be like if North America were a French speaking continent, with perhaps, just as a daily reminder, maybe six million English speakers tucked away in some cold and distant corner, just to rub it in.

[Ibrahim]

I still don't get what the fuzz is about. As Voltaire said: Canada? Just a few acres of snow...


What's the point of a thread that discusses trivialities such as losing an inconsequential continent only triple the size of Europe. Ah well, I suppose it makes the English feel all warm and fuzzy inside. They are a funny people like that. Needless to say, there's not the least bit of resentment or regret at the failure to understand what the America's could look like if properly settled. What the world would be like if North America were a French speaking continent, with perhaps, just as a daily reminder, maybe six million English speakers tucked away in some cold and distant corner, just to rub it in.

:laugh4:

problem is, you are thinking like a 21st century person (not that that's wrong; I do too :clown:)*, but to understand why this war mattered (then as now) to many, you have to think like an 18th century person:

France, while its loss of Canada was not, on the surface, that bad (and financially, yes, it wasn't), was still humiliated over it; colonies, no matter the triviality, were still items of prestige. understandibally, the French were ****** at the British. Didn't help that the British had also siezed 90-99% of all French possessions in India as well, and had in fact destroyed their navy, ruined their merchantile fleet, and caused a severe credit crunch in 1759. thus, they all too naturally wanted revenge for all that-Canada included. understand that Europe was still, to an extent, dominated by relics of the code of chivalry. Honor was everything to the ruling class.

also, this war was hardly unimportant: the war practically made the US. after all. think about it: the UK had just humiliated France, Spain, and Holland (in a Bengal expedition in 1758), and had taken a crud load of land, especially in North America, by 1763. naturally, the humiliated party wanted to get back at the UK. the UK govt, being wise to this, had decided that a large army (70 infantry regiments, 20-30 cavalry reg., and almost 900 ships), would be needed to police all the new land.

problem was: where do they get the money? they're mired in debt from the SYW, the people in Ireland and Britain were already overtaxed, and there were surprisingly few military installations in Norh America. the solution? tax the colonies, and use their houses as impromptu Barracks: they were hardly taxed compraed to the mother country, and they were certainly wealthier, then as now. and, the Govt thought, the colonists would be grateful that there are soldiers who can cover their rears. why complain?

I leave it to you to figure out where that led instead. also, bear in mind that with the removal of the French threat to the 13 colonies, and the pacification of the native tribes in wake of Pontiac's rebellion (plus the royal proclamation line of 1763), removed a good deal of need on British forces. the proclamation line, and the Quebec Act of 1774, also didn't help with the result.


*that, and Voltaire was, based on what I have read, not exactly an authority on warfare or politics.

[al Roumi]

also, this war was hardly unimportant: the war practically made the US. after all. think about it: the UK had just humiliated France, Spain, and Holland (in a Bengal expedition in 1758), and had taken a crud load of land, especially in North America, by 1763. naturally, the humiliated party wanted to get back at the UK. the UK govt, being wise to this, had decided that a large army (70 infantry regiments, 20-30 cavalry reg., and almost 900 ships), would be needed to police all the new land.

problem was: where do they get the money? they're mired in debt from the SYW, the people in Ireland and Britain were already overtaxed, and there were surprisingly few military installations in Norh America. the solution? tax the colonies, and use their houses as impromptu Barracks: they were hardly taxed compraed to the mother country, and they were certainly wealthier, then as now. and, the Govt thought, the colonists would be grateful that there are soldiers who can cover their rears. why complain?

I leave it to you to figure out where that led instead.

What's equally fascinating, as a corollary to the above, is how France's involvement in the US war of independance caused the Ancien regime's bankrupcy and ultimate collapse into the revolution. Is there better evidence that an eye for an eye leaves both parties blind? (although it does seem Britain managed rather well as it was, and perhaps better in some ways, without the 13 colonies)

[Ibrahim]

What's equally fascinating, as a corollary to the above, is how France's involvement in the US war of independance caused the Ancien regime's bankrupcy and ultimate collapse into the revolution. Is there better evidence that an eye for an eye leaves both parties blind? (although it does seem Britain managed rather well as it was, and perhaps better in some ways, without the 13 colonies)

well, the American revolution only sped up the arrival of the French one (by, as you say, putting furthur strain on the French economy). if anything, the Seven years war was the main reason: the economic trouble began as a result of the spending in that war. having had the pleasure of researching the disaster area known as the French "treasury", here is what happened:

when the war started, France's largest part of the budget was on, unsrupringly, the military (both army and navy). and the "treasury" were operating at a 20% deficit per year, for up to a decade prior to the war (i.e, the end of the war of Austrian succession). the SYW caused that figure to quadruple, leading to a massive accumulation of debt; in fact, by 1763, France had incurred a national debt of 2,000,000,000 livres (remember, maony in 1763 cost more than money today), and had defaulted on that debt as early as 1759, in the aftermath of the defeat at Quiberon Bay (which left the sea as a playground to British ships). this was due to the aformentioned credit crunch, which had in fact been caused by investors pulling out of stocks, for fear that their investments would be ruined by risking their merchant fleet's destruction a british hands.

mind you, the credit crunch's effects reverberated for the next 40 years or more, causing the french military to (prior ro the US revolution) cut down on military spending: several units of the maison du roi were disbanded, and there was an attempt to transfer ownership of regiments from the Colonels to the Govt- Since regiments cost more when sold by the Colonal and not the regiment.

the revolution in the US only exacerbated the problem, by furthur added to the debt, and forcing the french to increase the sie of the army. this meant hat credit sank to an alltime low, and from there, the rest is history.

[Vladimir]

I still don't get what the fuzz is about. As Voltaire said: Canada? Just a few acres of snow...


What's the point of a thread that discusses trivialities such as losing an inconsequential continent only triple the size of Europe. Ah well, I suppose it makes the English feel all warm and fuzzy inside. They are a funny people like that. Needless to say, there's not the least bit of resentment or regret at the failure to understand what the America's could look like if properly settled. What the world would be like if North America were a French speaking continent, with perhaps, just as a daily reminder, maybe six million English speakers tucked away in some cold and distant corner, just to rub it in.

I want to know where he was educated; or maybe it's just natural tallent. :thumbsup:

[Megas Methuselah]

...wake of Pontiac's rebellion...

Wasn't a rebellion.

[Ibrahim]

Wasn't a rebellion.

I know it wasn't-but I grew up with that name, so it kinda stuck. if you have a better idea for a name, I'd be grateful. :bow:

I think part of the problem is that most of the histories of that event were written by the English (i.e the winners); as a result, even the names of certain events have an english spin to them ("French and Indian" war itself is an example; even though technically the English started it). and I grew up in a combination of Arab (which didn't care), and English cultures-that sure didn't help either.

EDIT: say, do you know about the military customs of the tribes of that region? what dress the warriors had for battle, etc? I'm making a mod for the SYW era, and would be grateful for that. that, and I work at www.kronoskaf.com , and figured someone with knowledge of tribal customs could come in handy.

[Meneldil]

What's equally fascinating, as a corollary to the above, is how France's involvement in the US war of independance caused the Ancien regime's bankrupcy and ultimate collapse into the revolution. Is there better evidence that an eye for an eye leaves both parties blind? (although it does seem Britain managed rather well as it was, and perhaps better in some ways, without the 13 colonies)

You got it all wrong, the French Revolution was caused by Loki, oups, meantLaki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laki).

[Seamus Fermanagh]

All of the World Wars have resulted in the deaths of empires either directly or as a result of the "fallout."

The Seven Years War, The War for American Independence, and the Napoleonic conflicts have never properly been recognized as what they were -- global conflicts every bit as widespread and influential as WW1 or WW2.