The Development of Democratic Institutions in Arab Culture

[PanzerJaeger]

Here we disagree. The neo-cons made a lot of big mistakes, but the belief in universal aspiration wasn't one of them. It was the belief that one nation can impose those aspirations on another for their own good.

In my opinion, the aspirations to human rights and liberty are universal, but must be earned by the people that then cherish and them. Sometimes this is through conflict, sometimes by enlightenment, but always by a great and personal struggle. It may take a shorter or longer time, and the character of the implementation may look very different in each culture.

Other - no matter how well intentioned - imposing those values by force of arms simply cause resentment and ultimately rejection for yet more generations. By far the best "imposition" is by living the values at home, and the myriad benefits that invariably arise become the driver for aspiration elsewhere.

I agree - intervention, even with the best intentions, isn't good policy. And yet we've seen human rights and liberty imposed on peoples from Europe to Asia by force of arms. It is possible if a significant percentage of the population actually wants it. I'm just not sure there are that many people in the region who really do want it. Wanting a change in leadership is not the same thing as embracing democracy.

From Iraq I to Libya today, the biggest impediment to Arab democracy hasn't been the Great Satan or even Arab dictators, but the Arab people themselves. Time after time, when their dictators have been at their weakest, ordinary Arabs have stepped up to defend them and kill other Arabs. And when the West actually did all the hard work and deposed a genocidal Arab dictator, instead of embracing democracy and human rights as the Germans did after the Second World War, individual Arabs in great numbers rose up at significant personal risk to attempt to sabotage the creation of a democratic state and return the nation to chaos and strongman oppression.



Yeah, whatever.

And what did we do when the Shi'ites rose up in resistance after listening to Radio Free Iraq, hosted and serviced by the Americans? What happened to the Kurds in North Iraq who were tortured to death? Do you think those "pockets of resistance" are fighting the Coalition forces just out of spite?

The US never promised or even suggested that it would aid such a rebellion, as it was against the UN resolution. The propagation of such myths is part of the reason why many Americans felt a special responsibility for liberating the country.

In any event, we were a little busy assessing the scale of the Iraqi Arab atrocities committed against other Arabs in Kuwait.

Here's a tougher question. Where were the Iraqis? Saddam didn't jump in a helicopter himself and quell those uprisings.

The Coalition had just obliterated a good portion of the Iraqi military and they still couldn't topple the regime? Why? The sad truth is that the uprisings were pathetically small and Saddam still enjoyed a significant level popular support throughout most of the country. Sound familiar?



Let's face it, when the Iraqis who desperately needed freedom and we were sick of seeing their families being murdered in shady prisons all over the country, when we told them to rise up against the Ba'athists and take up arms, we suddenly pulled back and instead of laying siege to Baghdad and ousting Saddam Hussein, we just slapped sanctions on the country that hurt not the government, but the kids who were dying of depleted-uranium induced cancers in Basra. What was on the list of forbidden goods to enter Iraq? Syringes not the least, but the list extens to thermometers, scientific magazines, toilet paper, tissue paper, soap, shampoo, miroscopes and much, much more.

Why was it our job to lay siege to Baghdad? We acted in defense of the rest of the Arabian Peninsula and crippled the Iraqi military - couldn't the Iraqis have carried a little bit of the weight themselves?

And we all saw what happened when they were belatedly delivered a chance for freedom and democracy on a silver platter - a rare chance peoples in dozens of third world crapholes would love to get. You'll note that the initial toppling of the regime was remarkably bloodless for the average Iraqi and the nation's infrastructure. America was ready and enthusiastic to help the Iraqis create a democratic state and rebuild their nation after years of rot under Saddam. Unlike the Japanese who faced a similar situation decades before, the Iraqis chose the path of the petulant child, and their temper tantrum led to untold levels of death and destruction. Fun stuff.



So do you honestly believe that the Iraqi insurgents have no reason at all to possibly dislike the West?

No valid reasons, yes. If you're trying to create the impression that Iraqi insurgents fought due to bitterness over sanctions, then they were fighting the wrong people (http://www.thenation.com/article/hard-look-iraq-sanctions?page=full). When the effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi people became clear, the UN, specifically prodded by the US and British, took steps to address the situation. There wasn't much that could be done to help the Iraqis under regime control except... :idea2:


The government of Iraq also bears considerable responsibility for the humanitarian crisis, however. Sanctions could have been suspended years ago if Baghdad had been more cooperative with UN weapons inspectors. The progress toward disarmament that was achieved came despite Iraq's constant falsifications and obstruction.

Also significant has been Iraq's denial and disruption of the oil-for-food humanitarian program. UN officials proposed the relief effort in 1991 when evidence was first reported of rising disease and malnutrition. The idea was to permit limited oil sales, with the revenues deposited in a UN-controlled account, for the purchase of approved food and medical supplies. Baghdad flatly rejected the proposal as a violation of sovereignty. Concern about worsening humanitarian conditions led the Security Council to develop a new oil-for-food plan in 1995. It increased the level of permitted oil sales and gave responsibility for relief distribution in the south-central part of the country to the Iraqi government. Again Iraq rejected the program, but after further negotiations, Baghdad finally consented in 1996, and the first deliveries of food and medicine arrived in 1997.

The oil-for-food program was never intended to be, and did not provide, the needed economic stimulus that alone could end the crisis in Iraq. But it was a bona fide effort by the Security Council to relieve humanitarian suffering. If the government of Iraq had accepted the program when it was first proposed, much of the suffering that occurred in the intervening years could have been avoided.

The Security Council has steadily expanded the oil-for-food program. In 1998 it raised the limits on permitted oil sales, and in 1999 it removed the ceiling altogether. Production has risen to approximately 2.6 million barrels per day, levels approaching those before the Gulf War. Oil revenues during the last six months of 2000 reached nearly $10 billion. This is hardly what one would call an oil embargo. Oil exports are regulated, not prohibited. Funds are still controlled through the UN escrow account, with a nearly 30 percent deduction for war reparations and UN costs, but Baghdad has more than sufficient money to address continuing humanitarian needs. Said Secretary General Kofi Annan in his latest report, "With the improved funding level for the programme, the Government of Iraq is indeed in a position to address the nutritional and health concerns of the Iraqi people."

Not only are additional revenues available, but the categories for which funds can be expended have been broadened to include oil production, power generation, water and sanitation, agriculture, transportation and telecommunications. The program is no longer simply an oil-for-food effort. The emphasis has shifted from simple humanitarian relief to broader economic assistance and the rebuilding of infrastructure.

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Despite these improvements, Baghdad has continued to obstruct and undermine the aid program. Iraq has periodically halted oil sales as a way of protesting sanctions. During the first half of 2001, oil sales were approximately $4 billion less than in the previous 180-day period. According to Annan, the oil-for-food program "suffered considerably because...oil exports...[have] been reduced or totally suspended by the government of Iraq." In June and July 2001, as the Security Council considered a new "smart sanctions" plan, Iraq again withheld oil exports to register its disapproval of the proposal. The result was a further loss of oil revenues and a reduction of the funds available for humanitarian needs.

The differential between child mortality rates in northern Iraq, where the UN manages the relief program, and in the south-center, where Saddam Hussein is in charge, says a great deal about relative responsibility for the continued crisis. As noted, child mortality rates have declined in the north but have more than doubled in the south-center. The difference is especially significant given the historical pattern prior to the Gulf War. In the 1970s child mortality rates in the northern Kurdish region were more than double those in the rest of the country. Today the situation is reversed, with child mortality rates in the south-center nearly double those in the north. The Kurdish zone has enjoyed a favored status in the relief program, with per capita allocations 22 percent higher than in the south-center. The region contains most of the country's rain-fed agriculture. Local authorities have welcomed the continuing efforts of private relief agencies, and have permitted a lively cross-border trade with surrounding countries. But these differences alone do not explain the stark contrast in mortality rates. The tens of thousands of excess deaths in the south-center, compared to the similarly sanctioned but UN-administered north, are also the result of Baghdad's failure to accept and properly manage the UN humanitarian relief effort.



Saying that the First Gulf War was an accessory to the attacks of 9/11? Did you just try to link Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden? Excuse me, but you make no sense whatsoever. The only way you might suggest the two are linked was that when Saddam Hussein invaded Iraq that Bin Laden offered to fight for Saudi-Arabia but was rebuked. Okay, big deal.

9/11 had everything to do with the First Gulf War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_laden#Formation_and_structuring_of_Al-Qaeda) and nothing to do with Saddam. It seems if you act in defense of some Arabs, you get blown up by other Arabs.



Oh yeah? Where were the beloved Geneva Conventions when the Iranians were gassed by the thousands during the Iran-Iraq war? When it was convenient to not talk about human rights, we didn't. Where was universal freedom when Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down, supposedly "accidental"? Only when Hussein paraded captured British pilots in Baghdad did we feel it necessary to cling onto the Conventions. Only then.

So if you think that the Arab population has no reason to hate the US, go ask the parents of the thousands of children that died of leukemia after touching pieces of shrapnel who died in Baghdad and Basra and all over Iraq. Imagine me and my family being tortured. You walk in with a gun, shoot my father, sister and mother. Then you talk a bit with the torturer about how evil those practices are, take some of his torturing equipment as well as my toilet and my bed, then leave, then come back some ten years later, decide to then shoot the torturer, imagine how I'd feel. How'd you feel?

Cause and effect, my friend, cause and effect. The German who has an argument with his wife and storms out of the room, slamming the door and triggering an American bomb lodged under the floor to blow her up doesn't hate the US - he hates Hitler. Iraq invaded and ruthlessly pillaged (http://www.indict.org.uk/crimedetails.php?crime=Kuwait) an Arab neighbor and was bombed accordingly. The deaths of teh childrenz sucks, but they lie at the feet of Saddam and the ordinary Iraqis who gleefully raped and killed the people of Kuwait.

A little more than a decade later, America took the extraordinary step of removing the regime and instead of thinking "wow, I'm grateful the Americans finally removed this horrible person who has caused us so much grief and want to help us establish a free state", the average Iraqi thought to himself "let's blow some :daisy: up!"

I've become more and more convinced that the Arab Street just isn't ready for democracy. They may want a change in leadership, but their culture is structured in such a way that they are not capable of establishing a modern civil society. :shrug:



Another reply to this. In Iraq, nobody requested outside help at the time. Take a look at this video from Benghazi today, and take a look at the flags in the background

Oh but they did. There were constant calls by Iraqis to liberate the country. It was, after all, our duty after mercilessly betraying them in 1991 and imposing a child-killing humantarian crisis on them thereafter. Freeing Iraq became our responsibility, and a moral imperative that could not be ignored any longer. :rolleyes:

That's another element of the Iraq saga that gets conveniently left out of the current narrative. Look up Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress. I would suggest Aram Roston's The Man Who Pushed America to War; The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, And Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi.

[Hax]

And I'd suggest Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civilisation.


The US never promised or even suggested that it would aid such a rebellion, as it was against the UN resolution. The propagation of such myths is part of the reason why many Americans felt a special responsibility for liberating the country.

In any event, we were a little busy assessing the scale of the Iraqi Arab atrocities committed against other Arabs in Kuwait.

Here's a tougher question. Where were the Iraqis? Saddam didn't jump in a helicopter himself and quell those uprisings.

The Coalition had just obliterated a good portion of the Iraqi military and they still couldn't topple the regime? Why? The sad truth is that the uprisings were pathetically small and Saddam still enjoyed a significant level popular support throughout most of the country. Sound familiar?

Then don't instigate a rebellion. Whether or not it was intended, the Shi'ites in the south-east of the country and the Kurds up north were under the impression that the United States would offer military assistance when they'd rise up in rebellion.

Interesting to note is that UNSCR 687 was adopted the 3rd of April. Radio Voice for Free Iraq called for a revolution against the Ba'ath party on the evening of February the 24th. Whether or not they had promised military assistance, it had been expected by the revolutionaries. This was not a fight they could win on their own. This was the message coming from Al-Ali of Radio Voice Free Iraq:

"...you have no option in order to survive and to defend the homeland but to put an end to the dictator and his criminal gang"

Apparently, it was either liberty or death. No middle ground. Perhaps we should've been more fair to the Iraqis who suffered daily under the Ba'athist oppression.


Why was it our job to lay siege to Baghdad? We acted in defense of the rest of the Arabian Peninsula and crippled the Iraqi military - couldn't the Iraqis have carried a little bit of the weight themselves?

And we all saw what happened when they were belatedly delivered a chance for freedom and democracy on a silver platter - a rare chance peoples in dozens of third world crapholes would love to get. You'll note that the initial toppling of the regime was remarkably bloodless for the average Iraqi and the nation's infrastructure. America was ready and enthusiastic to help the Iraqis create a democratic state and rebuild their nation after years of rot under Saddam. Unlike the Japanese who faced a similar situation decades before, the Iraqis chose the path of the petulant child, and their temper tantrum led to untold levels of death and destruction. Fun stuff.

It may not have been the job of the West to free Iraq and lay siege to Baghdad, but that was the idea everyone listening to the clandestine CIA-operated radio expected. The Iraqi rebels were first told to rise up, but when the moment was at its most critical, we decided to pull back. Basically we told them "go and get 'em, we'll be right behind you". Only we really weren't.


No valid reasons, yes. If you're trying to create the impression that Iraqi insurgents fought due to bitterness over sanctions, then they were fighting the wrong people (http://www.thenation.com/article/hard-look-iraq-sanctions?page=full). When the effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi people became clear, the UN, specifically prodded by the US and British, took steps to address the situation. There wasn't much that could be done to help the Iraqis under regime control except...

Yeah, but did you know to what lengths the West went to deny what was happening in Iraq. When the aforementioned Robert Fisk first reported on the detrimental effects of depleted uranium to the public health, especially in the cases of child cancer, Lord Gilbert from the ministry of Defence wrote: "coming from anyone other than Robert Fisk, this would be regarded as a wilful perversion of reality". Nice.

In 1991, Paddy Bartholomew of the UK Atomic Energy Agency wrote: "[Depleted Uranium] can become a long-term problem if not dealt with in peacetime and are a risk to both the military and civilian population[...] if the tank category of DU was inhaled, the latest Internatioanl Committee of Radiological Protection risk factor . . . calculates 500,000 potential deaths.". Of course, the AEA made a deal with the Kuwaiti government (and rightly so) to clean up the mess of DU in Kuwait, but not in Iraq, where many, many people were dying. Infant mortality rate went up from 47 per 1,000 pre-invasion to 108 per 1,000 post-invasion]. Child mortality rate was even worse.

I will have to be fair here, though, the UN did not ban medicine imports, that was one of Saddam's own doings.

As for UN support, let's get serious here. The British newspaper The Independent launched an appeal, raising $250,000 to buy cancer drugs and medical equipment. The British government was quite lethargic in its handling of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. It called for eh "peer-reviewed epidemiological research data" to confirm the abysmal state of living in Iraq, which of course, never happened.


9/11 had everything to do with the [URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_laden#Formation_and_structuring_of_Al-Qaeda"]First Gulf War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_sanctions#Infant_and_child_death_rates) and nothing to do with Saddam. It seems if you act in defense of some Arabs, you get blown up by other Arabs.

Okay, maybe Bin Laden was bitter over the fact that the Saudi government didn't want him to fight in Iraq. But now you're sweeping over a whole different discussion and suggest that the primary reason for 9/11 was the Gulf War. That's plain denial.


Iraq invaded and ruthlessly pillaged (http://www.indict.org.uk/crimedetails.php?crime=Kuwait) an Arab neighbor and was bombed accordingly. The deaths of teh childrenz sucks, but they lie at the feet of Saddam and the ordinary Iraqis who gleefully raped and killed the people of Kuwait.

Ah yes, the gleeful rape of Kuwaitis by vile ordinary Iraqis. Those same vile ordinary Iraqis who were dumped in mass graves by American soldiers whose general couldn't be bothered to hold on the Geneva Conventions that were oh-so-very-important to count the exact amount of bodies. American deaths were tragedies. Iraqi deaths were statistics. Intriguing issue.

Thos same vile Iraqis who were threatened with execution if they tried to desert. Those ordinary Iraqis? Those who suffered perhaps even more under Saddam than the Kuwaitis? Just to make sure we're on the same line here, those Iraqis whose children were shot to death if they were supposedly working against Saddam?

Not to justify that what the Iraqis did in Kuwait was okay, of course it wasn't. But now you're pretending that there was some sort of general pro-Ba'athist consensus of the Iraqi people, so much that any mistreatment of the Kuwaitis was jusitified. That's scornful. And if the Iraqis think that all Americans think like you do, maybe, just maybe they've got some reason to dislike Americans.



A little more than a decade later, America took the extraordinary step of removing the regime and instead of thinking "wow, I'm grateful the Americans finally removed this horrible person who has caused us so much grief and want to help us establish a free state", the average Iraqi thought to himself "let's blow some :daisy: up!"

Again, those were the same Iraqis whose families were raped to death in the subterranean prisons of the Ba'ath party. Those Iraqis whose suffering was ignored by the West, probably even extended by (indirect) western support for Saddam's government. Only when it started to get inconvenient for us that we decided to stop Saddam, with some pathetic excuse about weapons of mass destruction or something like that.



I've become more and more convinced that the Arab Street just isn't ready for democracy. They may want a change in leadership, but their culture is structured in such a way that they are not capable of establishing a modern civil society.

Okay, good for you. But lets leave this to the Arabs okay? Because when Iran, a non-Arab country, was ready for democracy, we decided to interrupt. Your argument of culture reeks of 19th century colonialist filth. Don't forget that we kept Bouteflika, Ben Ali, Gaddafi, Mubarak, Assad and Saleh in power. So don't give me this "not ready for democracy" nonsense. We never wanted them to be ready for democracy.


Oh but they did. There were constant calls by Iraqis to liberate the country. It was, after all, our duty after mercilessly betraying them in 1991 and imposing a child-killing humantarian crisis on them thereafter. Freeing Iraq became our responsibility, and a moral imperative that could not be ignored any longer.

When you don't have anything to eat, when your 13-year old daughters have to prostitute themselves to truckers, you try rebelling against the government. There was one thing that Saddam understood about staying in power that Mubarak didn't; either you have to give your people the illusion of freedom, or you have to take so much freedom away that anyone trying to rebel is immediately eliminated, and anyone seeing him is immediately eliminated as well. See what happened to the Marsh Arabs, for example.

Speaking about betrayal.

[PanzerJaeger]

Then don't instigate a rebellion. Whether or not it was intended, the Shi'ites in the south-east of the country and the Kurds up north were under the impression that the United States would offer military assistance when they'd rise up in rebellion.
I see that you've gone back to the source material and discovered that no military assistance was proffered or even suggested.


It may not have been the job of the West to free Iraq and lay siege to Baghdad, but that was the idea everyone listening to the clandestine CIA-operated radio expected. The Iraqi rebels were first told to rise up, but when the moment was at its most critical, we decided to pull back. Basically we told them "go and get 'em, we'll be right behind you". Only we really weren't.

Or maybe not...

We never told them "we'll be right behind you". That is where fact becomes fiction. We said that the quickest way to end the fighting was to overthrow the regime, which was true. The West has a long history of attempting to shape public opinion among the populace of its enemies. However, such efforts are never accompanied by promises of military assistance.

Of course, that brings up the tricky issue of actually trying to prove the extent to which the broadcasts had anything to do with the revolts, which has not at all been conclusively determined. It is largely believed that the revolt started within the Shia elements of the military - people who wouldn't have had access to the Voice of Free Iraq. :shrug:


Yeah, but did you know to what lengths the West went to deny what was happening in Iraq.

Considering the fact that Oil-for-Food was first adopted by the UN 6 months after the end of the Gulf War (and only finally accepted by Iraq in 1996), I wouldn't say they went to any particularly extraordinary lengths to hide what was happening. Obviously the Western governments weren't interested in the type of hysterics some activists engaged in, but they worked diligently from the end of the war up until the invasion to help the Iraqi people. The main deterrent was of course the Iraqi government.


Okay, maybe Bin Laden was bitter over the fact that the Saudi government didn't want him to fight in Iraq. But now you're sweeping over a whole different discussion and suggest that the primary reason for 9/11 was the Gulf War. That's plain denial.

The primary reason for 9/11 was the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia.


Bin Laden's offer was rebuffed, and after the American offer to help repel Iraq from Kuwait was accepted, involving deploying U.S. troops in Saudi territory,[57] he publicly denounced Saudi Arabia's dependence on the U.S. military, as he believed the presence of foreign troops in the "land of the two mosques" (Mecca and Medina) profaned sacred soil. Bin Laden's criticism of the Saudi monarchy led that government to attempt to silence him.

Shortly after Saudi Arabia permitted U.S. troops on Saudi soil, bin Laden turned his attention to attacks on the west. On November 8, 1990, the FBI raided the New Jersey home of El Sayyid Nosair, an associate of al Qaeda operative Ali Mohamed, discovering a great deal of evidence of terrorist plots, including plans to blow up New York City skyscrapers, marking the earliest uncovering of al Qaeda plans for such activities outside of Muslim countries.[58] Nosair was eventually convicted in connection to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and for the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane on November 5, 1990.

Bin Laden continued to speak publicly against the Saudi government for harboring American troops, for which the Saudis banished him. He went to live in exile in Sudan, in 1992, in a deal brokered by Ali Mohamed.[59]


Ah yes, the gleeful rape of Kuwaitis by vile ordinary Iraqis. Those same vile ordinary Iraqis who were dumped in mass graves by American soldiers whose general couldn't be bothered to hold on the Geneva Conventions that were oh-so-very-important to count the exact amount of bodies. American deaths were tragedies. Iraqi deaths were statistics. Intriguing issue.

Actually, it is far more base than that. There were so many Iraqi dead that their rotting corpses sometimes presented a health hazard. I would like to see some evidence of the extent of the practice, as my understanding is that it was an exceedingly rare event.

Now, back to what the Iraqis were doing with their living captives...


Thos same vile Iraqis who were threatened with execution if they tried to desert. Those ordinary Iraqis? Those who suffered perhaps even more under Saddam than the Kuwaitis? Just to make sure we're on the same line here, those Iraqis whose children were shot to death if they were supposedly working against Saddam?

Not to justify that what the Iraqis did in Kuwait was okay, of course it wasn't. But now you're pretending that there was some sort of general pro-Ba'athist consensus of the Iraqi people, so much that any mistreatment of the Kuwaitis was jusitified. That's scornful. And if the Iraqis think that all Americans think like you do, maybe, just maybe they've got some reason to dislike Americans.

They may have been threatened with execution if they tried to desert, but they weren't if they refrained from raping Kuwaiti women and shooting civilians in the streets for fun. For those acts, they needed neither orders nor fears of reprisal. In fact, the scale and brutality of atrocities helped George H. W. Bush cement the broad coalition that put an end to them.

This comes all the way back to my initial point - Arab apologists seek to blame everyone but the Arab people themselves. The deaths of Iraqi children were the fault of the United States and the West, and if an accomplice must be named, Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people were but pawns in the power play between these various entities.

The truth is - from Hitler and Stalin to Saddam and Gadaffi - no dictatorship can stand without a level of popular support. For every tortured Iraqi soul, there was an Iraqi willing to profit at the former's expense. It is time for the Arabs to take some accountability in their troubles.

I'm certain Mr. Sarkozy - a proper Westerner raised in the birthplace of human rights and republicanism - cannot possibly comprehend why so many ordinary Libyans are fighting so hard to keep a tyrant in power.


Again, those were the same Iraqis whose families were raped to death in the subterranean prisons of the Ba'ath party. Those Iraqis whose suffering was ignored by the West, probably even extended by (indirect) western support for Saddam's government.
What would you have us do about the subterranean rapestravaganzas? It has already been established earlier in the post - and acknowledged by you - that the suffering was not ignored by the West. In fact, significant breaches of the Iraqi sanctions via corruption in the Oil-for-Food program were ignored in hopes that at least some of the aid was making it to the Iraqis.


Only when it started to get inconvenient for us that we decided to stop Saddam, with some pathetic excuse about weapons of mass destruction or something like that.

Amazing! You've dedicated an entire post toward chastising the West for ignoring the Iraqi people, and then when a Western politician topples the regime with the intent on setting up a democratic state, for whatever reason, it's pathetic! You just can't win with some people. :no:


Okay, good for you. But lets leave this to the Arabs okay? Because when Iran, a non-Arab country, was ready for democracy, we decided to interrupt. Your argument of culture reeks of 19th century colonialist filth. Don't forget that we kept Bouteflika, Ben Ali, Gaddafi, Mubarak, Assad and Saleh in power. So don't give me this "not ready for democracy" nonsense. We never wanted them to be ready for democracy.

Lies and more victimhood, pure and simple. We did not keep any of those people in power. They were not put in power by the West and no Western troops fought to keep them there. This oft-propagated myth of the evil Westerners plotting to keep the region oppressed is pure bunk. The Arabs oppressed themselves, and the West only dealt with those leaders because they were the only viable governments that existed.

And by the way, direct aid to various regimes, and Mubarak in particular, wasn't for torture chambers and professional rapists, but to buy regional peace and stability, which has been quite successful. So the next time you rail against the West's influence in the region, keep in mind it has prevented the kind of devestating regional conflicts that once characterized the Arabian Peninsula.


When you don't have anything to eat, when your 13-year old daughters have to prostitute themselves to truckers, you try rebelling against the government. There was one thing that Saddam understood about staying in power that Mubarak didn't; either you have to give your people the illusion of freedom, or you have to take so much freedom away that anyone trying to rebel is immediately eliminated, and anyone seeing him is immediately eliminated as well. See what happened to the Marsh Arabs, for example.

Speaking of betrayal...

Life sucked for a lot of people under Saddam. It is not the West's fault that life sucked for a lot of people under Saddam, no matter how much you want to believe it is. :shrug:

[Jaguara]

They may have been threatened with execution if they tried to desert, but they weren't if they refrained from raping Kuwaiti women and shooting civilians in the streets for fun. For those acts, they needed neither orders nor fears of reprisal.

Oops...for a second I thought you were talking about Blackwater in Iraq...


Life sucked for a lot of people under Saddam. It is not the West's fault that life sucked for a lot of people under Saddam, no matter how much you want to believe it is. :shrug:

No, but it could be argued that it is the West's fault for how bad life sucks after Saddam. I know a family of Turkmen Iraqi ex-patriots, most of their family is back in Iraq...the head of the family here was imprisoned under Saddam for trying to dodge the draft. This guy, who has every reason to hate Saddam, actually says that he wishes the US never attacked, and that things are far worse now than they ever were under Saddam. Sure, it is just one account, but it is valid just the same.

I do hear though, that the Shi'ites allied to Iran are still very happy that the US came and deposed Saddam...


(Well, I think I just filled my ****-disturbing quota for the week...now that I dropped the hand grenade I think I'll run for the hills :vanish:)

[Leet Eriksson]

I've become more and more convinced that the Arab Street just isn't ready for democracy. They may want a change in leadership, but their culture is structured in such a way that they are not capable of establishing a modern civil society

Pure racist emotional drivel, you probably don't realise it yet, but yes they can and do. You make very sweeping, and false generalizations, yet back nothing up. Their Culture which one sweety? the tunisian? or the egyptian? or the other 20 other arab countries?

[PanzerJaeger]

Jaguara - I will be the first to acknowledge that mistakes were made in the Iraqi intervention - many, many mistakes. That goes without saying. However, I also believe that many of those mistakes were based on the assumption that the Iraqis would step up and act in a reasonable, responsible, and civilized manner.

My only point throughout the exchange with Hax is that the Arabs should be held accountable for at least a portion of their problems. The victim mentality first eluded to by Louis masks deeper societal problems that have little to do with the West.

As I said before, the Eastern Libyans have somehow managed the impossible and garnered not only complete international support for their insurrection but also Western military backing. The only thing standing in their way are their own countrymen, who, amazingly, are willing to stand up to some of the most advanced militaries in the world to keep Gadaffi in power. This is nothing new to students of the Arab world.



Pure racist emotional drivel, you probably don't realise it yet, but yes they can and do. You make very sweeping, and false generalizations, yet back nothing up. Their Culture which one sweety? the tunisian? or the egyptian? or the other 20 other arab countries?

Hello Leet Eriksson. The emotional hyperbole seems to be coming strictly from your keyboard.

Culture can be scaled up and down the throughout full spectrum of human subsets, from one family to the entire race. Arab culture (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_culture) has been identified as having specific elements that distinguish it from others. The fact that there are subcultures within the larger Arab culture does not render it useless as an identifier.

[Leet Eriksson]

Hello Leet Eriksson. The emotional hyperbole seems to be coming strictly from your keyboard.

Culture can be scaled up and down the throughout full spectrum of human subsets, from one family to the entire race. Arab culture (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_culture) has been identified as having specific elements that distinguish it from others. The fact that there are subcultures within the larger Arab culture does not render it useless as an identifier.

No it doesn't, you have yet to back your ridiculous claim by the way, since even the wikipedia article isn't certain Arab Culture is "incapable of having a civil society" whatever that means.

There is no single Arab culture or society: the Arab world is full of rich and diverse communities, groups and cultures. Differences exist not only among countries, but within countries. While there are many different regions in these areas and different factors that distinguish each of them, there are also many factors unifying them into a single Arab nation. this is like literally the first paragraph in wikipedia.

[PanzerJaeger]

No it doesn't, you have yet to back your ridiculous claim by the way, since even the wikipedia article isn't certain Arab Culture is "incapable of having a civil society" whatever that means.

I understand the problem now. This is a failure of communication. I thought it was clear that my claim was supposition with the state of the Arab world itself and it's history as the backing. "I've become more and more convinced..." does not imply a hard factual basis, but an observation.


There is no single Arab culture or society: the Arab world is full of rich and diverse communities, groups and cultures. Differences exist not only among countries, but within countries. While there are many different regions in these areas and different factors that distinguish each of them, there are also many factors unifying them into a single Arab nation. this is like literally the first paragraph in wikipedia.

Yes, it does.

I don't understand the issue you're having. Are you denying the existence of Arab culture? Such a position would stand in contrast to the generally accepted (and very basic) sociological and anthropological understandings of the region, not to mention a fair number (http://www.adc.org/education/lesson-plan-arab-culture-and-society/) of pro-Arab institutions (http://www.accesscommunity.org/site/DocServer/health_and_research_cente_21.pdf?docID=381). I am a sucker for outlier positions though. :yes:

If you're interested in learning more about Arab culture, I would suggest Arab Society and Culture: An Essential Guide (http://www.amazon.com/Arab-Society-Culture-Essential-Guide/dp/0863566162/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1302840547&sr=8-2) by Samir Khalaf. If 500+ pages isn't your thing, Understanding the Arab Culture (http://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Culture-Working-Other-Cultures/dp/1845282000/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&qid=1302840547&sr=8-4) by Jehad Al-Omari is a decent read. I had to read it for a class and it is fairly business oriented, but still gives a good overview of Arab culture.

I hope this helps you. ~:)

[Leet Eriksson]

Oh it sure did, let me re-quote in case you forgot, you did not make an observation, but a claim


but their culture is structured in such a way that they are not capable of establishing a modern civil society

Now you're arguing its an observation yet, get this, tell me to read books about Arabic Culture, somehow these books contain evidence that rings your observation "true", since this is an internet debate, and you have already read these books, why don't you post evidence with references from both books about how arabs aren't capable of establishing a civil modern society, yet hilariously they can do business for sure, but civil society... ditto.

[Leet Eriksson]

A true story that deserves its own post, i'm not one to spam usually but a Friend of Mine Took a Bullet at Tahrir Square fighting for democracy and equal rights, among many issues including gender, and sexual identity, yet some guy in America tells me how my Society and Culture (tm) based on books he Read that we as a cultural unit, reduced to an "identifier" on the internet are incapable of having a civil society, because somehow we must conform to this futuristic funny guy's ideas about Civility, do you see how ridiculous this is?

To Elaborate even further, and to touch on how ridiculous the whole thing is, Arab Culture isn't a hegemony, and "arab culture" does not qualify as an identifier for sweeping generalizations, unless you can back up your claim, your "observations" are wholly irrelevant.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Inevitably, one reverts back to the great Bernard Lewis, whose work explained how Islam impeded the development of a civic society in Arabian societies, and aided despotism:
The received wisdom of the “Orientalist” school is that the lack of civil society in the Arab world is due to the absence, or at best the irremediable weakness, of civil society’s basic elements. For the prevailing trend in that school, Islam has been the primary reason for this because of what is considered to be its “despotic” nature, best illustrated by Islam not knowing any separation of the spiritual and the temporal and by its only acknowledging divine sovereignty, which is believed to inhibit the emergence of any autonomous public sphere. Furthermore, Islam impeded the formation of a civil society that could have resisted despotism for, in the words of Bernard Lewis:


Islamic law knows no corporate legal persons; Islamic history shows no councils or communes, no synods or parliaments, nor any other kind of elective or representative assembly. It is interesting that the jurists never accepted the principle of majority decision. There was no point, since the need for a procedure of corporate collective decision never arose. In heaven there was one God, and one alone; on earth there was no court but a single judge, no state but a single ruler.11
The fact that mainstream Sunni political thought in classical Islam upheld the doctrine that when the unity of the community (umma) was in danger, and in the potential face of anarchy, submission ought to be given to the ruler even if an evil-doer, led another leading author of the Orientalist school, Elie Kedourie, to assert that in Islam:
There can be no question of checks and balances, of division of power, of popular sovereignty, of elections of representative assemblies. … There could be no question of representative bodies being set up to carry on a dialogue between ruler and subject; neither could there be institutions of local self-government in town or countryside; nor could craft or professional associations flourish unhindered, since they would always be suspected of limiting the sway of the government over its subjects.12

http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/publications/salam.pdfBut Lewis is an orientalist, or so say his critics, who note the Arab world has seen an emergence of a civil society in recent decades. The following was written in 2002, and it is my distinct impression civil society has gained much ground since then (but also lost some):


Two turning point events in the contemporary history of the Middle East would, however, allow civil societies to re-emerge and regain strength, for they compelled most Arab states to consider change and start opening up their regimes—although not to the degree often publicized. The first of these events was the impact on the radical governments of the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel. Not only were their “nationalist” strategies now questioned, their failure to deliver on their promises of development and social justice were attacked as well. The second event was the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, which threatened the oil monarchies in their legitimacy while it also exposed for all to see the adventurism and oppressive nature of the Iraqi regime.

Several other factors have led to the revitalization of civil society in the Arab world during the past three decades. The most important among them are the following:

. Massive urbanization leading both to growth in the socio-economic needs of the population and to the weakening of primordial ties. What is important to note here is that this phenomenon is continuing at a time when many Arab states are no longer capable of providing such services as housing, better quality health, and education, let alone job opportunities.

. The increasing number of university graduates,
especially those holding European and American degrees, along with the general expansion of education. The subsequent rise of the levels of expectation and ambition of the young is motivating them to organize in order to better articulate their demands. This also explains the developing attention to issues of human rights and women among Arab youth.

. The recent trend of international development agencies (such as the World Bank, UNDP, and others), the European Union, and numbers of bilateral donors to extend grants and loans no longer to national governments only, but directly to “vulnerable” social groups (e.g., women, disabled, youth), to associations carrying out projects related to “human” or “sustainable” development, such as environment protection and rural development, and to local governments (e.g., regional councils, municipalities). As a matter of fact, the role of NGOs in development has become a key feature of the “neo-liberal” approach to socio-economic problems based on private sector initiatives, especially with an increasing trend towards privatization throughout the Arab world.

The political liberalization that took place during the past two decades, even though it was initiated from above and often pursuant to the advice given to Arab rulers by their Western allies. When most Arab leaders promote reforms, it is not because they have come to accept the possibility of having to relinquish power one day, but rather because “they seek to keep it,” as Richard Norton so pertinently puts it. However, whatever the limitations of such reforms so far, they did open up certain outlets for the free expression of ideas, and permitted a large number of interest groups to form NGOs and of social groups to start organizing, be it in the form of clubs, syndicates or associations.

The rapidity with which new technologies such as the internet and satellite television are gaining ground in the Arab world is circumventing state control over information and further exposing the people of the region to foreign experiments of change and dissent, whether successful or not. This is also contributing to their higher levels of consciousness and to greater aspirations.

[Leet Eriksson]

Inevitably, one reverts back to the great Bernard Lewis, whose work explained how Islam impeded the development of a civic society in Arabian societies, and aided despotism:But Lewis is an orientalist, or so say his critics, who note the Arab world has seen an emergence of a civil society in recent decades. The following was written in 2002, and it is my distinct impression civil society has gained much ground since then (but also lost some):



This is Pure **. that has been debunked already by the long dead Edward Said, Bernard Lewis gets the luxury of still talking about drivel and inspiring islamophobes, under a veneer of being Scholarly, but he is not reputable at all.

[PanzerJaeger]

Oh it sure did, let me re-quote in case you forgot, you did not make an observation, but a claim



Now you're arguing its an observation yet, get this, tell me to read books about Arabic Culture, somehow these books contain evidence that rings your observation "true", since this is an internet debate, and you have already read these books, why don't you post evidence with references from both books about how arabs aren't capable of establishing a civil modern society...

Ok, I can do that. I understand what you are looking for now.

Please add the fascinating new book The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (http://www.amazon.com/Long-Divergence-Islamic-Held-Middle/dp/0691147566) by Timur Kuran (Professor of Economics and Political Science & Gorter Family Professor of Islamic Studies at Duke University) to your Amazon wishlist.

He concludes his work with a stark observation.

“If the region's autocratic regimes were magically to fall, the development of strong private sectors and civil societies could take decades. With few exceptions, their civil societies are too poorly organized, and too beaten down, to provide the political checks and balances essential to sustained democratic rule.”

Here are a few more articles that add some detail to my assertion:

Freedom House: (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=101)


In a major study released today, Freedom House concludes that there is a dramatic, expanding gap in the levels of freedom and democracy between Islamic countries and the rest of the world. The study, Freedom in the World 2001-2002, finds that a non-Islamic country is more than three times likely to be democratic than an Islamic state.

"This freedom and democracy divide exists not only between Islamic countries and the prosperous West," said Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom House president and coordinator of the survey. "There is a growing chasm between the Islamic community and the rest of world. While most Western and non-western countries are moving towards greater levels of freedom, the Islamic world is lagging behind.".

The Middle East Quarterly: (http://www.meforum.org/40/can-democracy-prevail)


Seventeen Countries

The best way to find out is by testing this idea against empirical data in those seventeen states.6 The inhabitants of these countries share a number of important qualities. They speak Arabic. Their historical references include the Muslim Arab conquests, the Ottoman empire, and European colonialism. Islam, the faith of 92 percent of the people in these countries, is arguably their most important common cultural characteristic. (Table 3) It is the state religion in all Arabic-speaking countries except Lebanon, designated as such in their constitutions or through the stipulation that the head of state must be Muslim. All incorporate, wholly or partially, Islamic law into their legal systems. Some Arab leaders not only make certain that Islam is implemented on the national level but also use it in varying degrees to justify their legitimacy and their policies. This applies especially to traditional monarchial regimes, such as Saudi Arabia.

Religious freedom in the Arab world is usually restricted, for reasons ranging from state policy to vigilantism by extremists. Thus, at one end, the Saudi authority prohibits the practice of religions other than Islam, to the point that conversions out by Muslims is punishable by death.7 In Algeria, by contrast, the constitution declares Islam the state religion while prohibiting religious discrimination, which was of little use when Islamist terrorists in Algeria deliberately targeted and killed Christians during the recent civil strife in that country. The Libyan government bans Islamic groups at variance with the state-approved teaching of Islam. In Bahrain, the government controls and monitors both Sunnis and Shi'is. In Egypt, Copts face discrimination, while the law limits their rights as citizens; apostasy is not prosecuted by the authorities but has led to murder of real or designated apostates by extremists. In Iraq, the Shi'a and their religious leaders are repressed, while Assyrian Christians in th
at country are in a permanently precarious situation. The Kuwaiti government forbids the founding of non-Islamic publishing companies or training institutions for clergy. In Oman, the mosques and religious services are monitored to ensure that the preachers stay clear of politics and within the sanctioned orthodoxy of Islam.

Human rights has seen some improvements in recent years, such as the release of political prisoners or prisoners of conscience in Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, and Syria, but the region's record on this score remains dismal. Human Rights Watch states that in the Middle East and North Africa in 1997, "the overwhelming majority of people lived in countries where basic rights were routinely violated with impunity and where open criticism of the authorities knew sharp limits."8 Also, as reported by Amnesty International, the death penalty continued to be widely used. Other abuses included ill-treatment of prisoners and torture as in Egypt, "disappearances" in Syria, and killings of civilians in Algeria.9

Women, notwithstanding constitutional guarantees in several countries, have little political power. With only a few exceptions, Arab women do not occupy leading executive, legislative, or judicial positions. Six of the seventeen Arab countries have not yet endorsed women's right to vote and have not yet given women the right to stand for election. (Table 4) Most Arab states have legislation that in many respects relegates women to an inferior status, and only Tunisia has legislated formal equality and monogamy. A study sponsored by the United Nations finds that the "majority of Arab women are either ignorant of their rights or are too impoverished to either claim or defend such rights. High illiteracy levels, economic hardship, unemployment, and poor educational attainment make women's awareness of and claim to their legal and political rights a luxury they cannot afford."10

Indices help specify political and social trends. Gender Empowerment Measure developed by the United Nations Development Program shows the weak role and status of Arab women. Taking into account the percentages of seats in parliament held by women, of female administrators and managers, of female professional and technical workers, and of women's share of earned income it finds Kuwait ranking 72nd (of 174 countries in 1999), Tunisia 75th, Syria 81st, Morocco 84th, Egypt 86th, Algeria 92nd, United Arab Emirates 96th, Sudan 97th, and Jordan 98th.11

Press freedom, as measured by Freedom House, does not exist in most Arab countries. Information control and the muzzling of journalists by governments, as well as self-censorship by journalists for fear of reprisals or being excluded from future access to news, continue. A press study of 186 countries rates the seventeen Arab countries: none have "free" print and broadcast media, 2 (or 12 percent) are "partly free," and 15 (or 88 percent) are "not free." (Table 5)

Prosperity is fairly high across the region, but unevenly distributed. The redistributed oil wealth of some countries is reflected in their gross domestic product (GDP) and in their per capita income. The latter (as expressed in purchasing power parity), ranges from a high of $25,300 in Kuwait to a low of $800 in Yemen, with a weighted mean of $4,100. When the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) is used, only four Arab countries have rankings of high development; eleven others have rankings of medium human development; and the remaining two are ranked with low human development. (Table 6) All the countries scoring high on HDI are Persian Gulf oil states with small populations. They have the financial resources to address the important issues of education, health, and social welfare. Thus far, however, prosperity has not led to advances in democratic government.

A different but related measure of economic growth, prosperity, and liberty is the Index of Economic Freedom, co-published by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal.12 The 2000 edition of the index-which surveys the economies of 161 countries in terms of their foreign investment codes, fiscal burden of government, tariffs, banking, and more - reports a general improvement in the economic freedom of most Arab states during the past year. Bahrain is the most economically free country among the Arab states, due primarily to "a lack of taxation on personal income and business profits," and ranks as the fourth economically most free country in the world.13 Other Arab states fare far less well: Saudi Arabia comes in at 71, Lebanon at 90, Egypt at 110, and Syria at 139. Libya and Iraq bring up the rear, ranking 159 and 160 (out of 161 countries).

As for political power, the Arab states include nine republics, four of them military dictatorships, while monarchs, sultans, and emirs rule eight others. Parliamentary power, where it exists, is weak, with appointed upper houses, and restrictions on opposition parties, where political parties are permitted at all. (Table 1) Suffrage is typically underdeveloped-nonexistent in several countries, restricted by gender or other factors in others, seldom transparent. Elections for the position of ruler are not permitted in at least eight countries, and elections for the legislative branches are not possible in four of them. (Table 2)



What accounts for this poor political record? A variety of factors - Islam, Arab culture and traditions, the region's political economy - have been blamed for the lack of democracy in the Arab world. Western imperialism and hegemony still serve as useable scapegoats, while Arab leaders and elites are frequently described as anti-democratic, notwithstanding their rhetoric. All these explanations find adherents both within and without the Arab world.

Thus, according to Mehran Tamadonfar, a political scientist who specializes in Islam, a polity is judged to be Muslim to the extent that it observes the basic teachings of Islam, which does not distinguish between the spiritual and the secular. Democracy and popular sovereignty, in the Western sense, are not acceptable, because they challenge the concept of divine sovereignty. The sovereignty of God is not questioned by a human ruler, or a government, that, in effect, enforces God's sovereignty by making the populace adhere to the Shari'a (sacred law of Islam).15

Muhammad Shakir ash-Sharif, a Saudi, writes that

democracy, which is "creeping" [tatasarrub] into the Muslim world, is incompatible with Islam because Islam offers governance by the Creator [al-khaliq], as understood by a properly instructed religious elite, whereas democracy, a non-Arabic term, necessarily implies rule by the created [al-makhluqin], in which unbelievers and the ignorant have an equal say in governance and usurp God's rule.16
By contrast, Michael C. Hudson, an authority on Arab affairs, sees the Arab hostility to democracy as based less in a theological view of politics than in

the insecurity of the ruling elite, based not necessarily on selfishness but on. . . a realistic appraisal of the situation, causes it to act autocratically. In the absence of legitimate structures, they cannot conceive of a loyal opposition-the chances are greater that it is subversive. Opposition leaders are right in labeling the incumbents as despotic. . . placed in the same situation, they invariably do the same thing.17
More cynically, author and journalist Saïd K. Aburish focuses on the reality of tribal power. Arab leaders, he writes "depend on phony claims to legitimacy while representing small interest groups-minorities whose members owe their allegiance to them rather than the state as the representative and guardian of the interests of the people."18 The West, Aburish holds, appreciates this because, "Stability means dictatorship and an ensuing coercion of the people which eliminates the chances of attaining legitimacy and democracy."19 John L. Esposito, a professor of religion and international affairs, agrees: "For leaders in the West, democracy raises the prospect of old and reliable friends or client states being transformed into more independent and less predictable nations which might make Western access to oil less secure." Moreover, observes Esposito, democracy "risks the 'hijacking of democracy' by Islamic activists and further Islamic inroads into centers of power, threatening Western interests and fostering anti-Westernism and increased instability."20

For Ziad K. Abdelnour, an international financier, "the strength of authoritarian governments and the frailty of their democratic opponents" is due to the political economy of the Middle East. Moreover, he links democracy to issues of war and peace. The rulers do not operate only within the parameters of their polities and bureaucracies, but, he says, also make decisions based on

personal political bargaining [dictated] by the rules of the game they play . . . Decisions to wage war and sue for peace are pursued not as reflections of national interests or projections of national power, but rather because they may permit faltering authoritarian regimes renewed access to resources from the international system necessary to shore up their domestic positions.21
Simon Bromley, a specialist in international political economy, focuses on the patterns of social formation. Degrees of liberalization and political participation occur in countries such as Egypt where capitalist development has materialized outside "the direct control of the state apparatus" with its accompanying organization of "a civil society by the bourgeoisie and the working class." In countries like Iraq and Saudi Arabia, where the state has kept control and prevented the creation of civil society, the prospects for democratic reform are limited. For Bromley, "the relative absence of democracy in the Middle East has little to do with the region's Islamic culture and much to do with its particular pattern of state formation."22

Obviously, no single explanation can account fully for the lack of democracy in the Arab world. Privilege and power have often been used to thwart democratic growth, as have religious extremism and special interests. This pattern debases human governance, twists religious beliefs, and undermines international affairs; worse, it usually leads to aggression and repression. The circling of tradition, the sharpening of religious swords, and the improper depletion of society's wealth provide a recipe for continued violence and unfulfilled expectations. The solution rests with the promotion of democracy.

The Journal of Democracy (http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/journal_of_democracy/v006/6.3khalifa.html), which, oddly enough, in an article suggesting hope for civil society in Egypt spends most of its time detailing the lack of civil society in Arab cultures.


A major reason for the slow and uneven pace of democratization in the region is the relative weakness of civil society. In the Arab world, less-than-vibrant civil societies have often proven incapable of consolidating democratic gains, finding themselves easily outmaneuvered and rendered ineffectual by resurgent despotisms. Algeria and the Sudan offer dramatic illustrations.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1463)


The United States has for many years provided funding and training to Arab NGOs with the goal of spurring democratization, but such assistance has not achieved much in this regard. For civil society to contribute to democratic political change, a critical mass of civil society organizations must develop three main attributes: autonomy from regimes, a pro-democracy agenda, and the ability to build coalitions. Although NGOs have grown in number in the region in the past decade, these conditions have not yet been met.

And Foreign Affairs: (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51361/william-b-quandt/civil-society-in-the-middle-east-vol-1)


What is it about the Middle East that makes political systems there resistant to democratization? By now, a vast literature on this topic has developed, much of it emphasizing the role of Islam as an impediment to political liberalization. Norton, the editor of this volume and the director of a multiyear project on civil society in the Middle East, rejects the culturalist explanation for the scarcity of democracy and concentrates instead on the weakness of civil society where authoritarian regimes have taken root. Until political groupings that transcend family, tribe, or clan are allowed to develop, pluralistic politics of the sort that supports democracy cannot thrive. Whether one accepts this argument in full or not, this volume of excellent essays -- some previously published -- is well worth reading. In addition to several general essays, country studies on Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Egypt, and the Palestinians will be found. A second volume will soon be published.


I hope this gives you a good jumping off point for understanding some of the structural problems within Arab culture and civil society that could preclude genuine change. ~:)

[Leet Eriksson]

list of websites

I know its difficult to comprehend but your links still talk about

Whoa

Wait for it



progress

this is 2011, The Arab Spring happened this year that pretty much puts to shame alot of talking points in these articles, additionally they are old and obsolete, try better next time.

EDIT: holy moly, these articles are truly Old. with the latest one being in 2001, no You really should go back to these books you mentioned, with real evidence this time. Yallah i'm waiting ~:)

EDIT2: No sorry, besides the quotes, the links themselves lead to known neocon think tank organizations, Freedom House, and Middle East Quarterly in particular. Already discredited in proper discourse. Can you try something really academic and reputable this time?

[Louis VI the Fat]

This is Pure ** that has been debunked already by the long dead Edward Said, Bernard Lewis gets the luxury of still talking about drivel and inspiring islamophobes, under a veneer of being Scholarly, but he is not reputable at all.That's very much open to debate. I for one do not necessarily agree with the opinion of the Egyptian-American, erm, sorry, 'Palestinian' Edward Said.

However that may be, note that I take a more advanced approach to the issue of Arab civil societies than Lewis. Civil societies have been emerging the past few decades, notably the past decade.


~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~




A true story that deserves its own post, i'm not one to spam usually but a Friend of Mine Took a Bullet at Tahrir Square fighting for democracy and equal rights,


To Elaborate even further, and to touch on how ridiculous the whole thing is, Arab Culture isn't a hegemony, and "arab culture" does not qualify as an identifier for sweeping generalizations, unless you can back up your claim, your "observations" are wholly irrelevant. Not to be disrespectful to your friend, but would you be awfully dismayed if I repeat my earlier (orientalist?) claim that an emotional invoking of shed blood and martyrdom is a commonly observed trait of a common Arab culture?
(One need only to walk into a Christian church to witness firsthand Middle Eastern martyr cultism.)


martyrs and blood and accompanying colourful language.

[PanzerJaeger]

I know its difficult to comprehend but your links still talk about

Whoa

Wait for it



progress

this is 2011, The Arab Spring happened this year that pretty much puts to shame alot of talking points in these articles, additionally they are old and obsolete, try better next time.

A book published in November of 2010 is obsolete? That is quite a hurdle, indeed.


EDIT: holy moly, these articles are truly Old. with the latest one being in 2001, no You really should go back to these books you mentioned, with real evidence this time. Yallah i'm waiting ~:)

You mean 2004?


EDIT2: No sorry, besides the quotes, the links themselves lead to known neocon think tank organizations, Freedom House, and Middle East Quarterly in particular. Already discredited in proper discourse. Can you try something really academic and reputable this time?

Like Foreign Affairs?

Obviously calling into question the age and sources of the articles instead of their content is a well established tactic of obfuscation, but it does highlight an interesting issue. It was in fact the NeoCons who believed most strongly in the ability of the the Arab peoples to embrace democracy - so I am not sure what bearing that has on the credibility of articles published by supposedly NeoCon influenced organizations that suggest the opposite. :book:

[Leet Eriksson]

That's very much open to debate. I for one do not necessarily agree with the opinion of the Egyptian-American, erm, sorry, 'Palestinian' Edward Said.

However that may be, note that I take a more advanced approach to the issue of Arab civil societies than Lewis. Civil societies have been emerging the past few decades, notably the past decade.


~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~



Not to be disrespectful to your friend, but would you be awfully dismayed if I repeat my earlier (orientalist?) claim that an emotional invoking of shed blood and martyrdom is a commonly observed trait of a common Arab culture?
(One need only to walk into a Christian church to witness firsthand Middle Eastern martyr cultism.)

I don't know where you live, possibly on mars, but you do realize how such a claim is ridiculous? not only are you stereotyping, but displaying cognitive dissonance to the fact that Apparently Middle Eastern People Love the Blood Shed and these Protes.. SORRY Riots REFLECT THAT CULTURE. Are you serious? Observable trait.. what are you an anthropologist?

That is insulting what you say about Edward Said by the way, but he is an Academic with international integrity and still his words ring truer now than ever, how do you reconcile these facts though is up to you.

[Louis VI the Fat]

It was in fact the NeoCons who believed most strongly in the ability of the the Arab peoples to embrace democracy - so I am not sure what bearing that has on the credibility of articles published by supposedly NeoCon influenced organizations that suggest the opposite. :book:But is that true? Isn't much of this neocon assessement wishful thinking / bought science / justification after the fact? The project of the Neocons was spread American influence (not necessarily democracy), to further private interests, and to prolong America's hegemony. For example, Bernard Lewis had always argued that Arab culture was incompatible with a civil society (see my previous post). Suddenly on the eve of the invasion he changed his mind 180 degrees, suddenly argueing that all it took for democracy in Arabian societies was to remove despotic leadership.

[Louis VI the Fat]

I don't know where you live, possibly on mars, but you do realize how such a claim is ridiculous? not only are you stereotyping, but displaying cognitive dissonance to the fact that Apparently Middle Eastern People Love the Blood Shed and these Protes.. SORRY Riots REFLECT THAT CULTURE. Are you serious? Observable trait.. what are you an anthropologist?

That is insulting what you say about Edward Said by the way, but he is an Academic with international integrity and still his words ring truer now than ever, how do you reconcile these facts though is up to you.Cultures exist. Cultures are different. One must be careful with sweeping generalisations, one must also not deny their existence. If I throw a snake into a group of people the Japanese, the Greek, and the Native America will respond differently, mostly according to observable and predictable patterns.


As for Said - it is commonly noted he wrote from a political perspective. That doesn't make his work true-er or falser, but the element is there.

[Leet Eriksson]

A book published in November of 2010 is obsolete? That is quite a hurdle, indeed.



You mean 2004?



Like Foreign Affairs?

Obviously calling into question the age and sources of the articles instead of their content is a well established tactic of obfuscation, but it does highlight an interesting issue. It was in fact the NeoCons who believed most strongly in the ability of the the Arab peoples to embrace democracy - so I am not sure what bearing that has on the credibility of articles published by supposedly NeoCon influenced organizations that suggest the opposite. :book:

No you're wrong too since my whole Internet Forums Debate and Discussions career all these what 15, 20 years? i don't know, i have met many, many people, discussed with alot of people and they all universally agree, NeoCons are really an irredeemable group of misfits, that got thoroughly discredited post invasion of iraq. Yes they have good intentions, arguably that of spreading democracy, but with an attitude like the End Justifies the Means, its anything but. Reminder i'm not attacking the source, but the idea, this isn't obfuscation by any means its a legitimate argument. the neocons hardly represent american foreign policy nowadays anyway..

Now tell me, are the 2 amazon books you linked actually relevant? why aren't you referencing them in your posts?

[Leet Eriksson]

Cultures exist. Cultures are different. One must be careful with sweeping generalisations, one must also not deny their existence. If I throw a snake into a group of people the Japanese, the Greek, and the Native America will respond differently, mostly according to observable and predictable patterns.


As for Said - it is commonly noted he wrote from a political perspective. That doesn't make his work true-er or falser, but the element is there.

No you see you're being scientific now, and rather anthropological as well, the example you present might change depending on the person, not because of his ethnic background, not all the japanese would react the same in such a situation. Bloodshed, and Martyr Cultism isn't really an observable pattern, i'm not sure about Middle Eastern Churches for the only church i ever entered was an Iraqi Chaldean Assyrian church, that was bereft of imagery since it was simple, but thats its own story. Still honoring those who died during the protests isn't related to it either, its very much like honoring other people who died for the various causes they fought for.

Edit: I just corrected a mistake, but yes you mention Assyrians, and no, i'm not sure how to respond to that, but still their religious practice shouldn't be conflated to assyrians as individuals, i mean hell how would they be friends with me, a muslim if that were the case.

[Jaguara]

No you're wrong too since my whole Internet Forums Debate and Discussions career all these what 15, 20 years? i don't know, i have met many, many people, discussed with alot of people and they all universally agree...

A bit of hyperbole there? You have clearly "met" P-J, and he clearly does not universally agree.

I am not sticking up for the neo-cons here, but this does not help your point. You criticise him for not quoting references, but here you are drawing on a mythical beast of "everyone agrees with me" to give credibility to your assertions.

[Leet Eriksson]

A bit of hyperbole there? You have clearly "met" P-J, and he clearly does not universally agree.

I am not sticking up for the neo-cons here, but this does not help your point. You criticise him for not quoting references, but here you are drawing on a mythical beast of "everyone agrees with me" to give credibility to your assertions.

in further review you are right, this adds nothing to the debate so i rescind my statement. However he still needs to make a credible argument for the books he linked earlier, instead of linking me a bunch of websites, on the grounds that they must be Academic, Peer reviewed, and probably non-aligned (i.e not bought science), maybe i'll take him more seriously then, becuase what he linked has already be debunked actually through media and literature, which i'm too lazy to repaste here cause it involves mostly Slavoj Zizek, an actual relevant philosopher, and a whole buttload of other books that escape my mind right now.

[Banquo's Ghost]

in further review you are right, this adds nothing to the debate so i rescind my statement. However he still needs to make a credible argument for the books he linked earlier, instead of linking me a bunch of websites, on the grounds that they must be Academic, Peer reviewed, and probably non-aligned (i.e not bought science), maybe i'll take him more seriously then, becuase what he linked has already be debunked actually through media and literature, which i'm too lazy to repaste here cause it involves mostly Slavoj Zizek, an actual relevant philosopher, and a whole buttload of other books that escape my mind right now.

I would certainly be interested in you posting some of your references. PJ has made his position clear and advanced some evidence to back up his ideas. Whereas I am personally loathe to accept the over-arching theorem, he has piqued my interest. I would be grateful if you could further the debate by providing counter-evidence as this is a fascinating area of study (to someone like me who is instinctively against imperialist agendas).

It seems to me that whilst modern Arab states clearly suffer from structural deficiencies in providing development opportunities for their peoples, characterising "the Arab" as a monolithic entity is as shaky as any other stereotype. (A trifle like characterising "the European" by reference to the political development of Bulgaria or Moldova). What I am interested in is what role external interference has had in the stagnation of most Arab states, and in addition how pernicious religion has helped this stagnation - indeed, regression in many cases, given that the Arab world was largely quite advanced culturally several hundred years ago.

(I note that this discussion is veering off at a tangent from the original topic. I may move it to a new thread - if anyone objects to a new thread, please let me know by PM with reasons).

[Hax]

Rise and fall, Banquo. Generally, the end of the Islamic Golden Age is pinpointed at 1258 AD, with the sack of Baghdad. However, people often overlook the advances made under the Ottomans, the Safavids and the Mughals.

[Leet Eriksson]

I would certainly be interested in you posting some of your references. PJ has made his position clear and advanced some evidence to back up his ideas. Whereas I am personally loathe to accept the over-arching theorem, he has piqued my interest. I would be grateful if you could further the debate by providing counter-evidence as this is a fascinating area of study (to someone like me who is instinctively against imperialist agendas).

It seems to me that whilst modern Arab states clearly suffer from structural deficiencies in providing development opportunities for their peoples, characterising "the Arab" as a monolithic entity is as shaky as any other stereotype. (A trifle like characterising "the European" by reference to the political development of Bulgaria or Moldova). What I am interested in is what role external interference has had in the stagnation of most Arab states, and in addition how pernicious religion has helped this stagnation - indeed, regression in many cases, given that the Arab world was largely quite advanced culturally several hundred years ago.

(I note that this discussion is veering off at a tangent from the original topic. I may move it to a new thread - if anyone objects to a new thread, please let me know by PM with reasons).

Alright, this is a bit of a big question, but let me clarify first, my whole point in this argument is that a statement like "Arab Culture" used as an identifier to make sweeping generalizations is false, his [PJ] evidence as far as i'm aware is only backed up by 2 books he linked but failed to reference, and when pressed he produced a bunch of links that were already of dubious quality, if i had to link to think tank based websites i'd produce a whole page myself. There is no evidence required to debunk this claim since just as you have stated its more of a stereotype. I have alot of references from the media, and the internet, besides the books by Edward Said, which are rather old but still quite relevant, things that actually affected my debate in this thread actually:

http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/rizkhan/2011/02/2011238843342531.html <-- This is Slavoj and Tariq Ramadan discussing the popular uprising in egypt, pretty much debunking the oft brought up "Clash of Civilizations" trope in political discussion, if you're really curious read everything and watch everything slavoj zizek talks, Ramadan on the other hand is alright for muslim-european matters.
http://www.amazon.com/Rogue-State-Guide-Worlds-Superpower/dp/1567513743/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpt_3 <-- William Blum is probably your best bet for anti-imperialism, you should read the other books published, but this one is important to understand the current events.
http://www.salon.com/ <-- There are tons of articles here, but read the ones by Glenn Greenwald.

As for the arab states and external interference, this is for the history books, but its a combination of external meddling by colonial powers, ottoman stagnation and a whole load of tribalism. If you can ever find it, try looking in big libraries about George Hourani, he touches alot on arabic society in several time periods, but particularly post islamic, the Book is called "History of the Arabs", I read this one in 2008 but if i recall correctly he goes into detail about the colonial period. I'll update this post in the future with more reference as soon as i have the time to rifle through my collection of osprey books, i'm pretty sure i missed several.

[Banquo's Ghost]

Thank you, Leet. Much appreciated.

Much of my reflection on this subject has been through the writing of Robert Fisk, both journalistically and from his book "The Great War for Civilisation". I am just about to start on Eugene Rogan's "The Arabs" from a recommendation, so your suggestions will help a lot - as will PanzerJaeger's.

:bow:

[Hax]

Much of my reflection on this subject has been through the writing of Robert Fisk, both journalistically and from his book "The Great War for Civilisation".

Robert Fisk is an excellent reporter. My father gave me two of his books a while ago, I've almost finished reading "The Great War for Civilisation" and will start with "The Age of the Warrior" soon.

[Strike For The South]

Cultures exist. Cultures are different. One must be careful with sweeping generalisations, one must also not deny their existence. If I throw a snake into a group of people the Japanese, the Greek, and the Native America will respond differently, mostly according to observable and predictable patterns. .

No they will probably run away

[Viking]

Cultures exist. Cultures are different.

I'd agree that the averages that we call 'culture' can be said to exist, but observing and understanding them to the core - proves challenging. In countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, it is hard to observe the culture as laws and secret police will polish your observations both directly and indirectly to the point that they may become useless.

[PanzerJaeger]

his [PJ] evidence as far as i'm aware is only backed up by 2 books he linked but failed to reference, and when pressed he produced a bunch of links that were already of dubious quality, if i had to link to think tank based websites i'd produce a whole page myself.

Here's a quick rundown of what happened, just so you're not confused. Out of the paragraphs and paragraphs of easily verifiable information I've written in this thread, you picked out one sentence that was obviously my educated opinion. If it wasn't obvious, I told you it was my opinion in no uncertain terms. Still you demanded sourcing, so I found you multiple sources from multiple intellectuals dated from 1995 to 2010 who share the opinion that there are deep rooted structural issues in Arab society that are holding back modernization. You seemed intent not on discussing the issue, but attacking the credibility of the sources, zeroing in on two of them claiming some neo-Conservative bias, despite the fact the authors were arguing against neo-Conservative dogma. (You may want to do a bit more research on Freedom House (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_house) - it has been in existence far longer than the neocon movement itself.)

Then, when asked to provide some counter-sources yourself - which is not at all hard to do (Here you go (http://www.amazon.com/Democracy-Civil-Society-Political-Thought/dp/0815630999/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1302891820&sr=1-5), Banquo) - you gave one commentary, one book by an admitted polemicist and 9/11 Truther who only came to prominence after he was recommended by Osama bin Laden (how's that for a questionable source?), and a link to Salon.com - not a specific article on Salon, just Salon.com.

Here are some more sources that may be of some interest. Each of them discuss various structural issues within Arab culture and civil society that impede modernization. As I said much earlier in this thread, revolution is the easiest part of a democratic transition. The Arab Spring will have to contend with and overcome these issues if it is to become a truly democratic movement and not one of dozens of Arab revolutions that have ended in authoritarian rule.

Civil Society in the Arab World: The Missing Concept (http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol9iss2/special_2.htm)

The Islamic Shield: Arab Resistance to Democratic and Religious Reforms (http://www.amazon.com/Islamic-Shield-Resistance-Democratic-Religious/dp/1599424118)

Civil Society and the Democratization in the Arab World (http://www.eicds.org/english/publications/reports/Annual-Report-EN07.pdf)

Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: The Dynamics of Activism (http://www.amazon.com/Civil-Society-Democratization-Arab-World/dp/0415491290/ref=sr_1_15?ie=UTF8&qid=1302891310&sr=8-15) (Not the same as the one above.)

And, gasp, a book from the '90s that I read several years ago and is just as relevant today as it was when published.

Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (http://www.amazon.com/Neopatriarchy-Theory-Distorted-Change-Society/dp/0195079132/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&qid=1302888856&sr=8-9)


Focusing on the region of the Arab world--comprising some two hundred million people and twenty-one sovereign states extending from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf--this book develops a theory of social change that demystifies the setbacks this region has experienced on the road to transformation. Professor Sharabi pinpoints economic, political, social, and cultural changes in the last century that led the Arab world, as well as other developing countries, not to modernity but to neopatriarchy--a modernized form of patriarchy. He shows how authentic change was blocked and distorted forms and practices subsequently came to dominate all aspects of social existence and activity--among them militant religious fundamentalism, an ideology symptomatic of neopatriarchal culture. Presenting itself as the only valid option, Muslim fundamentalism now confronts the elements calling for secularism and democracy in a bitter battle whose outcome is likely to determine the future of the Arab world as well as that of other Muslim societies in Africa and Asia.

Also, let me just say that I have tried to diffuse the situation by ignoring your ad hominems and providing you with sources that give some backing to my opinion. That hasn't worked, so allow me to pursue a more direct route. While I remain unchanged in my opinion, I do apologize if I've offended you. There was no racism meant in my comments, only a criticism of the dominant culture in the region which has adherents of many races. Obviously, I can travel a few hours North to Dearborn to see Arabs who have abandoned certain elements of their culture and successfully embraced the democratic process.

[Leet Eriksson]

Let us begin shall we:


Here's a quick rundown of what happened, just so you're not confused. Out of the paragraphs and paragraphs of easily verifiable information I've written in this thread, you picked out one sentence that was obviously my educated opinion. If it wasn't obvious, I told you it was my opinion in no uncertain terms. Still you demanded sourcing, so I found you multiple sources from multiple intellectuals dated from 1995 to 2010 who share the opinion that there are deep rooted structural issues in Arab society that are holding back modernization. You seemed intent not on discussing the issue, but attacking the credibility of the sources, zeroing in on two of them claiming some neo-Conservative bias, despite the fact the authors were arguing against neo-Conservative dogma. (You may want to do a bit more research on Freedom House (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_house) - it has been in existence far longer than the neocon movement itself.)

The Freedom house publishes an annual report for the "free-est" countries, they still aren't really relevant. You mention your latest article to be November the 14th 2010, the arab spring happened in 2011, obviously it'll take years before actual democracy is attained, it is none the less a crucial movement for the countries involved.


Then, when asked to provide some counter-sources yourself - which is not at all hard to do (Here you go (http://www.amazon.com/Democracy-Civil-Society-Political-Thought/dp/0815630999/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1302891820&sr=1-5), Banquo) - you gave one commentary, one book by an admitted polemicist and 9/11 Truther who only came to prominence after he was recommended by Osama bin Laden (how's that for a questionable source?), and a link to Salon.com - not a specific article on Salon, just Salon.com.

If you read my post properly, he asked for an anti-imperialist book, William Blum isn't a truther, he may sympathise or ask questions about government complacency but isn't really outright conspiracy theory of zionist engineered 9/11s or whatever the truther movement is about, being recommended by bin laden or hitler doesn't really matter either, that is just a red herring, the actual content of the book is meticulously sourced and documented, he even uses mainstream sources to argue his points.

On the other hand your sources are actually neoconservative drivel, once again, looking through one of the Links, you linked the Middle East Quarterly, a website funded by the Middle East Forum, that actually only has one, yes one researcher on the middle east, rather shoddy work there, especially when the guy (Daniel Pipes) already got discredited by Christopher Hitchens and Juan Cole.

"In 2002 Juan Cole, a professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Michigan who has been a target of Campus Watch, criticized MEF in Salon magazine, writing that "The Middle East Forum is not really a forum. Somebody rich in the community has set Pipes up with a couple of offices and a fax machine and calls him a director." Salon noted that "aside from Pipes, the Middle East Forum has a single researcher, whose job, according to the Web site, extends into fundraising."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East_Forum#Criticism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Hitchens'_critiques_of_specific_individuals <-- Scroll down to Daniel Pipes


Here are some more sources that may be of some interest. Each of them discuss various structural issues within Arab culture and civil society that impede modernization. As I said much earlier in this thread, revolution is the easiest part of a democratic transition. The Arab Spring will have to contend with and overcome these issues if it is to become a truly democratic movement and not one of dozens of Arab revolutions that have ended in authoritarian rule.

Civil Society in the Arab World: The Missing Concept (http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol9iss2/special_2.htm)

The Islamic Shield: Arab Resistance to Democratic and Religious Reforms (http://www.amazon.com/Islamic-Shield-Resistance-Democratic-Religious/dp/1599424118)

Civil Society and the Democratization in the Arab World (http://www.eicds.org/english/publications/reports/Annual-Report-EN07.pdf)

Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: The Dynamics of Activism (http://www.amazon.com/Civil-Society-Democratization-Arab-World/dp/0415491290/ref=sr_1_15?ie=UTF8&qid=1302891310&sr=8-15) (Not the same as the one above.)

And, gasp, a book from the '90s that I read several years ago and is just as relevant today as it was when published.

Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (http://www.amazon.com/Neopatriarchy-Theory-Distorted-Change-Society/dp/0195079132/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&qid=1302888856&sr=8-9)

This is hilarious, let me quote one racist gem:

"Does Arab civil society actually exist? Is the increase in the number of registered civil society organizations (CSOs) an adequate indication of its existence?"

the second question literally contradicts the first.

Lets see what happens when you replace arab with jewish:

"Does Jewish civil society actually exist? Is the increase in the number of registered civil society organizations (CSOs) an adequate indication of its existence?"

Give me a good reason why i should even bother looking through the other links.

[Greyblades]

So um... how long has it been since you guys been on topic?

[PanzerJaeger]

This is hilarious, let me quote one racist gem:

"Does Arab civil society actually exist? Is the increase in the number of registered civil society organizations (CSOs) an adequate indication of its existence?"

the second question literally contradicts the first.

I see you managed to read the first paragraph in the first link I provided. However, you seem to have missed the fact that it was written by an Arab, and apparently not a self-hating racist Arab (http://www.icnl.org/about/_bios/karajah.htm) either:


Sa'ed Karajah is Senior Partner, Legal Counselor and Attorney at Law for Karajah & Associates Law Firm. Since 1996 Mr. Karajah has been involved in community development projects with UNICEF, Jordan River Foundation, Save the Children-Jordan, AMIDEAST and AMIR. He's worked throughout the Middle East, including in Jordan, Saudia Arabia, Dubai, Lebanon, and Yemen. Currently he is a board member on the Jordan River Foundation, one of the most prominent NGOs in the country. This NGO aims to provide opportunities for community development and protection of women and children. As a legal consultant Mr. Karajah has experience restructuring the Arab Center for Engineering & Consultations through EJADA and providing legal aid for other Arab intellectuals and artists. Other past experience includes assisting the Ministerial Committee with the draft of the Companies Law in cooperation with INTAJ, sitting on the governmental committee for reviewing legislation as a preface of Yemen’s membership in the WTO, and participating in a seminar on Civil Society and Rule of Law under the auspices of the Fredrich Nuamnn Foundation. Mr. Karajah has published a booklet on Establishing Civil Associations & Intellectual Property Rights of Arab Artists & Intellectuals, and under the sponsorship of ICNL is currently working on a research paper entitled, Civil Society in the Arab World: The Missing Concept.

Allow me to also remind you of the rapidly diminishing returns involved in constantly playing the race card. :book:


Lets see what happens when you replace arab with jewish:

"Does Jewish civil society actually exist? Is the increase in the number of registered civil society organizations (CSOs) an adequate indication of its existence?"

What does happen? Where is the racism in that question?

And for your information, it is called an establishing question, and is quite common in research papers. Before an author opines on the complexities of a given subject, he or she establishes a base line - the fundamentals the paper is based on.

For example, if I were to write a paper about the benefits of hydrogen fuel cells in consumer vehicles, I might first ask if individual ownership of vehicles is truly necessary as opposed to public transportation.


Give me a good reason why i should even bother looking through the other links.

At this point, I'm not particularly concerned with what you do with them.


So um... how long has it been since you guys been on topic?

My fault and my apologies. It won't happen again. :no:

[Leet Eriksson]

I see you managed to read the first paragraph in the first link I provided. However, you seem to have missed the fact that it was written by an Arab, and apparently not a self-hating racist Arab (http://www.icnl.org/about/_bios/karajah.htm) either:



Allow me to also remind you of the rapidly diminishing returns involved in constantly playing the race card. :book:



What does happen? Where is the racism in that question?

And for your information, it is called an establishing question, and is quite common in research papers. Before an author opines on the complexities of a given subject, he or she establishes a base line - the fundamentals the paper is based on.

For example, if I were to write a paper about the benefits of hydrogen fuel cells in consumer vehicles, I might first ask if individual ownership of vehicles is truly necessary as opposed to public transportation.



At this point, I'm not particularly concerned with what you do with them.



My fault and my apologies. It won't happen again. :no:

Nice try, no really, who said anything about self hating, the research linked even sources a weird arabic dictionary and goes through mental gymnastics to tell me what Mujtama' Madanee in arabic means, which apparently isn't Civil Society, Because? (hint: arabic doesn't work like that) this is akin to linking pseudo-science.

[Banquo's Ghost]

Apologies for not breaking this discussion out of the Civil War in Libya (https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showthread.php?133306-Civil-War-in-Libya) thread earlier.

:bow:

[PanzerJaeger]

Nice try, no really, who said anything about self hating,

That was my deduction, based on the logic that an Arab would have to be self hating to write racist anti-Arab literature....... which was all just a slightly more interesting way of suggesting the quote had no racist intentions as it was written by an Arab.

How was the quote racist?


Anyway, here is another interesting analysis (http://www.csduppsala.uu.se/devnet/CivilSociety/Outlookserien/2010,PowerPeople/PP,%20Hassan,%20Hamdi%20A.pdf) of the situation.


Civil society in authoritarian structures

An important feature of the Arab state came into being by the penetration of civil society and the transformation of its institutions – educational, cultural, religious – that have become mere extensions of state apparatus-es. For example, under Egypt’s three military rulers, the officers’ corps has become almost a separate caste, living in their own enclosed world of subsidised housing and recreational facilities, just as political independence led to modern-day institutionalisation of families and social networks of tribes and religious or ethnic constellations. Contentious voices also resonate because the exclusionary structure of governance does not reflect the diversity of the population. Contrary to popular images, Arab societies are not homogeneous in ethnicity or religion (Hassan 1999).

Gerber (1987), inspired by Barrington Moore,1 elaborates a series of hypotheses about the significance of the Ottoman rural structures, particularly the absence of a major landed aristocracy, for the nature of modern states, social transformation and revolutions in the Middle East. The absence of a landed upper class in the region up to 1900, and the weakness of this class when it finally did emerge, explains the absence of a coherent basis for the development of a democratic polity. The introduction of the Land Property Law in 1894 in Egypt is a case in point.2 The law was too arbitrary and lacked the time and space to develop and create a landed class equivalent to that of feudal nobility in Europe. This might explain the speed in implementing the land reform that was put forward by Nasser on July 1961.

The meaning of the state in the day-to-day life of ordinary Arabs, and its absence in the discourse of politics, is important in this context. While the Arabic Maghreb3 countries are relatively homogeneous in religious terms, and while the state does not necessarily contradict with ethnic origin (ie, Arab and Berber) and religion, the Mashreq (the Arab world from Egypt eastward to the Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Iraq) is highly heterogeneous. Many diverse ethnic and religious groups inhabit the state with unmistakably parochial communal loyalties that are often in conflict with the loyalty demanded by the state. Thus, the projected image of the Arab regional system is one of bewildering complexity (Hermassi 1987).

Every political crisis in the Arab world reveals the fragility of the state and its incoherent political institutions. The establishment of the state of Israel, the expulsion of the Palestinians, and the persistent military conflicts in the region all have contributed to a widespread siege mentality and belligerent political discourse. Perhaps most importantly, Western cultural symbols, modes of production and social values aggressively penetrated the Arab world, seriously challenging inherited values and practices, and added to a profound sense of alienation.
Within authoritarian cultures, where the political system is immersed in patron-clientalism and coercive interrelationships with the population, individuals who may be alienated by the state seek to find refuge from oppressive political structures. In such circumstances, Robert Putnam (1993) asserts, it is usually difficult for people to pursue the impossible dream of cooperation in the absence of social capital, the most effective precondition for civic engagement and cooperation for mutual benefit. Civic engagement is an emanation from the social and human capital of the society that ultimately becomes a personal attribute of individuals within the same society. As such, people are capable of being socially reliable, simply because they are implicated in these norms and in the trustworthy civic networks within which their behaviour is internalised and ingrained (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). Further, Putnam (1993, p 187) argues:

Stock of social capital, such as trust, norms, and network, tend to be self-enforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high levels of co-operation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well being. Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles.

Thusly viewed, authoritarianism is in part the result of both the kind of state-led economic development that occurred from the 1950s until the middle of the 1970s, and of the resilience of old classes, the adaptability of the new middle classes, and their consequent ability to thwart state policies. After all, authoritarianism cannot escape the logic of politics; on the one hand, where an authoritarian state is poorly institutionalised and enmeshed in clientelist relations with the society it governs, the imperative of political survival will significantly subvert political reforms. What makes these states unique are the ways these regimes penetrate their societies to implement policies and their ability to buffer their societies against pressures from regional and international systems. Following this logic, the Gulf States are a case in point: oil wealth has undoubtedly served to buffer the external pressures on regimes’ political capacity. The ruling families have been able to justify their existence and project support to their legitimacy by insuring that oil wealth has benefitted the populations.

The civil society, one could argue, became with time increasingly ineffective in shaping and formulating the state’s policy choices. The UN Development Program’s Arab Human Development Reports in the last few years, which have analysed what remains the only substantially unchanged region of the world, is a paragon of virtue. These reports illuminated in a chilling detail, as was stated in the 2002 report, the “deeply rooted shortcomings of the Arab institutional structures” that hold back human development in the era of globalisation. They pointed further to the ‘freedom deficit,’ gender inequality, low levels of health care, education and information technology usage, and high unemployment that indicate clearly that the Arab world lags far behind the pace of global change.



The state as the embodiment of family and kinship

In Arabic political thought the term state, dawla, signifies a certain type of patrimonious institution that exercises power and authority delegated by a supernatural entity, Allah. Against this background and except for works on law and ethics, the state was discussed in a political context only as an abstract locus of order and disorder and, more importantly, as a God-given fait accompli. In the writings of Muslim scholars such as Ibn Khaldun, dawla refers to the continuity of power exercised by a clique of successive sovereigns. In Arab/Muslim history rulers have always exercised exclusive power (Hassan 1999). The conception of the state as an organisation of domination over a given territory had not existed. Rather, dawla essentially connotes a political body with three main components: a ruler, his troops, and a bureaucracy exclusively related to him.

What must be stressed is that dawla is distinct from society at large and from what has come to be known in modern times as the civil society (Al-Azmeh 1993). Arab societies have lacked independent urban centres, an autonomous bourgeois class, and a Weberian bureaucracy with legal liability, personal property and a cluster of rights which embody bourgeois civic institutions. Without these institutional and cultural elements, there was nothing in Islamic history to challenge the dead hand of the despot. Social structure in Arab societies has been characterised by the absence of a network of institutions mediating between the individual and the state. It was this social vacuum which facilitated the circumstances in which the individual was often deprived of any protection against arbitrary rule. The absence of civil society explained the failure of capitalist economic development and political democracy (Turner 1994).


Therefore, it is the sorrow state of Arab societies in the last few decades that a work of literature or art can engender and turn the entire state upside down. The assumption of a coherent civil society, moving toward democratisation, would be fruitful only if the constellation of civil society and social movements corroborate this process (White 1994). With the full articulation of ‘the new social movements’, the transformation toward self-limiting democracy can be accomplished in many Arab societies.

It is of great importance, too, to place the public sphere within civil society. The citizen’s right is “rather a political principle involving a new and active relation on the part of citizens to a public sphere that is itself located within civil society” (Cohen and Arato 1992, p 396). Democratisation is usually obtained and brought about through the public sphere, by well-organised working classes. A differentiated and plural civil society is indirectly a prerequisite for democratisation, only if the very same civil society makes up a contingent and vibrant public sphere. This is a task that seems, for the time being, difficult to accomplish in the Arab world, given the dominance of Islamist groups and their reluctance to work with other oppositional forces – let alone that habits of patronage and clientelism still infect all aspects of the state–civil society relations. This being so, the efforts at democratisation are incurably pulled awry.

[Leet Eriksson]

That was my deduction, based on the logic that an Arab would have to be self hating to write racist anti-Arab literature....... which was all just a slightly more interesting way of suggesting the quote had no racist intentions as it was written by an Arab.

How was the quote racist?

See post above, he is basically twisting the root words Mujtama, claims its Ijtma (Root words in arabic are 3-4 letters, this word is 5 in arabic, Alif, Jeem, Ta', Meem, Alif, Ain, the proper 3 letter word he was looking for is jam') to fit his own agenda, then adding a bunch of nebulous ideas to his argument about how civil society can progress. I'll give a "not racist" if thats what you want to push, useless is a better term.


Indeed, the state in Egypt exists with its variety of civic institutions through the imposition of what Bianchi called ‘ruly control mechanisms’. Unlike social movements that have a decisive role in creating institutional preconditions for a transformation to democratic polity in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere in the Third World, the social movements that constitute civil society in Egypt are not capable of undertaking a radical democratic shift. The civic institutions are disorganised and so penetrated by patron-client ties as to be incapable of aggregating the interest of society vis-à-vis the state.

From the same link, i'm not sure how this is relevant to your argument, seeing as not only egypt and tunisia, but yemen are shifting towards a more democratic environment, which pretty much questions the original message i'm arguing how is "Arabic Culture incapable of having a civil society"?