France accuses Germany of not loving Democracy - your thoughts?

[Furunculus]

In a SPIEGEL interview, French social scientist Emmanuel Todd discusses why he believes Germany is not a part of the "core West."

I believe that the Germans still feel a secret and, at the same time, slightly narcissistic fear, as if they sensed that they are not quite part of the West. It seems to me that their preferred form of government is the grand coalition, not the abrupt change of power that occurs in France and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Perhaps Germany would rather be like a large Switzerland or a large Sweden, a consensus democracy in which the ideological camps come to resemble one another and the political extended family in the government takes care of everything.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763537,00.html

What think you?

Is this why Britain rejected AV, as it was percieved as a path that would lead to a consensus democracy in which the ideological camps come to resemble one another?

I believe that was certainly a factor in pushing the conservative end of the labour electorate into voting "no", because they define themselves by their opposition to the 'other' and thus revel in an adversarial form of politics.

[InsaneApache]

Is this why Britain rejected AV, as it was percieved as a path that would lead to a consensus democracy in which the ideological camps come to resemble one another?

Well there's not much more than the difference of a cigarette paper between the ConDems and blue Labour. So we've been in this situation since "Call me Dave" took over as leader. Where are all the decisive figures like Benn, Thatcher and Powell? I might not have agreed with what they believed in but at least they believed in summat.

The last couple of government seems to rule by tabloid headline.

[HoreTore]

"France"?

[Furunculus]

Well there's not much more than the difference of a cigarette paper between the ConDems and blue Labour. So we've been in this situation since "Call me Dave" took over as leader. Where are all the decisive figures like Benn, Thatcher and Powell? I might not have agreed with what they believed in but at least they believed in summat.

The last couple of government seems to rule by tabloid headline.
well to conflate the Cons and Lib-Dems does create a close parallel to the blue-labour and a notting-hill luvvies, but it does appear that a useful majority have no truck with the progressive desire to emulate the continent in refashioning politics into a consensual coalition mush.


"France"?

yes, France...................

[Husar]

the USA have two very similar parties and while they make it appear like the differences were huge, what did Obama really change?
AFAIK there is no communist health care yet and gitmo still stands, in Germany however, the green party has become really strong since the Fukushima incident, now that's a change.
The guy doesn't seem to have thought about this a lot.

[Furunculus]

the USA have two very similar parties and while they make it appear like the differences were huge, what did Obama really change?
AFAIK there is no communist health care yet and gitmo still stands, in Germany however, the green party has become really strong since the Fukushima incident, now that's a change.
The guy doesn't seem to have thought about this a lot.

cheers Husar, i do agree about american politics; for all that obama is loved and bush was loathed the change in presidents really didn't effect the US's core interests and priorities, so policy remains remarkably similar.

but is there any truth or logic that you percieve in the following statement:

"It seems to me that their preferred form of government is the grand coalition, not the abrupt change of power that occurs in France and the Anglo-Saxon countries. "

[Tellos Athenaios]

Well not so much “grand coalition”, just coalition government. I'd rather equate that with a healthy democracy where people with minority views have more proactive ways to participate without having to obtain about 30% of the vote first somehow -- so they can then dictate the other 70%.

[CBR]

I'd say his definition of the "core West" is so narrow that it is meaningless.

Then he says:

Todd: Okay, the postwar history is all very well and good, but it had to be put into motion by the Western Allies. Everything that happened earlier failed. Authoritarian government systems consistently prevailed, while democratic conditions had already predominated in England, America and France for a long time.
That is pretty funny as all the countries mentioned had to go though violent times before getting such democratic conditions. When Bismarck was getting grey hair because of an obstinate Landtag, Prussia happened to win 3 wars within 7 years and winning wars generally do wonders for the governments in charge. The last war also stopped a French Emperor...

I'm not sure what he means by consensus because Germany has both left and right wing parties and I don't think governments often consist of parties from both sides of the political spectrum.

About the AV being rejected in UK: A voter turnout of just 42% means a lot of people did not care at all. Maybe it was not a drastic enough change for people to see any difference. Other voters might also have understood that it would mean less influence for their party and therefore voted no.

Even the 1953 wide sweeping constitutional change in Denmark had less than a 60% voter turnout.

So maybe it was just a difficult sell.

[The Stranger]

death penalty for germany for not loving our holy democracy.

[Louis VI the Fat]

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763537,00.html

What think you?
Well, I'm not sure Todd is the designated spokesperson for France, nor that an academic view of the history of liberal democracy in Germany consitutes 'accusing Germany of not loving democracy'.

Other than that, Todd of course is spot on in his dectiption of Germany's role in the development of liberal democracy the past two centuries: nearly absent. Germany followed a Sonderweg, a different path, alone, from which it finally awoke in 1945. The West did end at the Rhine for most of this time.


Is this why Britain rejected AV, as it was percieved as a path that would lead to a consensus democracy in which the ideological camps come to resemble one another?

I believe that was certainly a factor in pushing the conservative end of the labour electorate into voting "no", because they define themselves by their opposition to the 'other' and thus revel in an adversarial form of politics.The choice for the UK should've been between fptp and proportional representation. The referendum presented a silly third option. I can't believe Clegg fell for it. The LibDems have most to gain from a reform of the voting system, but they have been lured into the trap. It will be a generation before the issue can be touched again.



That is pretty funny as all the countries mentioned had to go though violent times before getting such democratic conditions. When Bismarck was getting grey hair because of an obstinate Landtag, Prussia happened to win 3 wars within 7 years and winning wars generally do wonders for the governments in charge. The last war also stopped a French Emperor...Todd adresses that:





Revolutions often end up as something different from what their supporters proclaim at the beginning. Democracies are fragile systems that require deep historic roots. It took almost a century from the time of the French Revolution in 1789 until the democratic form of government, in the form of the Third Republic, finally took shape after France had lost a war against the Germans in 1871. In the interim, there was Napoleon, the royalist restoration and the Second Empire under Napoleon III, the "little one," as Victor Hugo said derisively.

Liberal democracy took a series of wars and revolutions followed by centuries of gradual growth in Britain. A revolution and later perfectioning in America. And a Big Bang followed by many aftershocks and reactionary interludes in France. But liberal democracy did take hold, was the prevailing wind in all three. Not so in Germany, where it was never really embraced, didn't permeate the culture, was not part of national identity. In this sense - one is tempted to say: in essence - Germany was not a Western country.

[HoreTore]

yes, France...................

Ah, so one random french guy makes it "France"?

Sorry, I thought France had a bigger population than one, my bad.

[Tellos Athenaios]

Liberal democracy took a series of wars and revolutions followed by centuries of gradual growth in Britain. A revolution and later perfectioning in America. And a Big Bang followed by many aftershocks and reactionary interludes in France. But liberal democracy did take hold, was the prevailing wind in all three. Not so in Germany, where it was never really embraced, didn't permeate the culture, was not part of national identity. In this sense - one is tempted to say: in essence - Germany was not a Western country.

Possibly, but not so relevant now is it? Some sense of democracy permeates Germany, down to the way decisions are made in businesses. So if liberal democracy is the benchmark of being Western, then Germany fits right in.

[CBR]

SPIEGEL: Where do you draw the boundary of the West?

Todd: In fact, only Great Britain, France and the United States, in that historic order, constitute the core of the West. But not Germany.
And I still fail to see what this "historic order" does to the modern world. Just because some countries did it earlier than others means what precisely?

[Husar]

but is there any truth or logic that you percieve in the following statement:

"It seems to me that their preferred form of government is the grand coalition, not the abrupt change of power that occurs in France and the Anglo-Saxon countries. "

What's the grand coalition? It used to be the CDU and SPD, that worked for one term, right? Now the CDU is below the greens in some states, so if we should get a SPD + greens as a "great coalition" next time then I guess he is right but the government would be a very different one nonetheless. Between CDU + FDP and SPD + Greens, which are the more usual coalitions there is a lot of change in most states and on more local levels as well. What exactly is this great change in France and Britain he is talking about anyway? Britain has had a monarchy for hundreds of years, not that much change going on there. ~;)
Don't know a whole lot about french politics except that the fact they try to gain more power in EADS hasn't changed at all.
We've also had "Die Linke" as a new party that emerged as an even more left leaning alternative to the SPD, they stand for a more radical change, not that I agree with them but how this guy can say we just want some grand coalition for life and no change is beyond me.
The streets are full of people who want change in the sense of all nuclear power plants being shut down etc.
Now with Stuttgart 21 people are against change but then again when they wanted to close a factory in France the people planted bombs etc. to keep it so they must be really conservative and hate change down there.

[Greyblades]

The choice for the UK should've been between fptp and proportional representation. The referendum presented a silly third option. I can't believe Clegg fell for it. The LibDems have most to gain from a reform of the voting system, but they have been lured into the trap. It will be a generation before the issue can be touched again.
Considering Essex and such that shouldnt be more than 13 years.

[Furunculus]

Well not so much “grand coalition”, just coalition government. I'd rather equate that with a healthy democracy where people with minority views have more proactive ways to participate without having to obtain about 30% of the vote first somehow -- so they can then dictate the other 70%.

that in itself would appear to be a significant socio-cultural difference that really does suggest that a coalition/majoritarian gulf divides the 'west' from the rest................?


Well, I'm not sure Todd is the designated spokesperson for France, nor that an academic view of the history of liberal democracy in Germany constitutes 'accusing Germany of not loving democracy'.

The choice for the UK should've been between fptp and proportional representation. The referendum presented a silly third option. I can't believe Clegg fell for it. The LibDems have most to gain from a reform of the voting system, but they have been lured into the trap. It will be a generation before the issue can be touched again.

are you accusing me of rampant hyperbole........... mon amis? :evil:

and yet....................... it was clearly understood by many that a "yes" vote would be a path to further reform no doubt including proportional representation, and still it was rejected. a majoritarian electoral system was retained, and thus a difference exists between nations that prefer proportionally represented coalition government, is this significant?

[Tellos Athenaios]

And I still fail to see what this "historic order" does to the modern world. Just because some countries did it earlier than others means what precisely?

Means he is ignorant. :shrug:

[Tellos Athenaios]

that in itself would appear to be a significant socio-cultural difference that really does suggest that a coalition/majoritarian gulf divides the 'west' from the rest................?

Sure there is a significant cultural difference between the UK, USA, France and Germany in the sense that in Germany (as in the Netherlands, Denmark, and the rest of Scandinavia) there is definitely more emphasis on building a consensus first to follow up with efficient execution to make up for lost time building the consensus. But then again there is definitely as big a cultural divide between the USA and any of those countries (for the which see these boards), and between the UK and the others (buying yourself a Lordship, and much more of a class society yet), and France and the others which is summed up in the words of Dr. Who ("That's France for you, a whole different planet").

To me that is just the normal churn of each having a different history, at times in leadership positions and exporting their ideas and at times in the backseat an absorbing others' ideas -- but not something that inherently separates Germany from an imaginary core west which includes a constitutional monarchy, a confederacy union of states in an exercise in theoretical politeia, and a republic with such a strongly entrenched elite that at times it is more of an oligarchy.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Means he is ignorant. :shrug:And Stephan Hawk is igon...igger...iggorant about physics and Haberman is teh pseudophisolophist and Bruddel is also an iggorant he does'nt unnerstand history at all they all think the now so much but they shuld read teh innernets !!

[Rhyfelwyr]

Well they should read the Backroom, this place is the pinnacle of intellectual excellence.

[Furunculus]

And Stephan Hawk is igon...igger...iggorant about physics and Haberman is teh pseudophisolophist and Bruddel is also an iggorant he does'nt unnerstand history at all they all think the now so much but they shuld read teh innernets !!

to be fair, i consider Timothy Garton-Ash an 'intelligent' idiot.

opinions on emotive subjects such as culture are difficult to judge qualitatively, and poor conclusions often result.

[Tellos Athenaios]

Means what? He cherry picks time and events to support a narrative which hopes you don't mind the instances of William the Conqueror, Louis XIV, Henry IV, Henry VIII, James I, Napoléon, Charles X etc. You can say that they are spasms in a narrative of getting more and more what we have come to see as Western, but you can't then turn that on its head and say because such a narrative might fit these countries and not Germany means Germany isn't part of the West (today). He basically projects his own idea of “Western” back in time, and there's another word for that: anachronism.

[Louis VI the Fat]

What is the relevance?Imagine the year 2050. A famous historical demographer says 'Broadly speaking, after 1989 'Eastern Europe' became a liberal democracy.'.

A: 'He is taking a cheap shot at Poland! Poland has always been a part of the West!!'
B: 'What on earth is the relevance of saying that Hungary and Romania were not part of the West until 1989? Surely this is of no historical importance?'
C: 'The guy is an ignorant'

[Louis VI the Fat]

Gah! Why is this thread not in the Monastery!? Are the lazy Monastery mods not paying attention!? :no:

The debate about the 'German Sonderweg' (peculiar path) is over a century old. It is central to an understanding* of the most important events which shaped nineteenth and twentieth century European history until 1945.

* Not 'THE explanation', but one 'explanation', albeit one that has been very influential.



The notion of a German Sonderweg is not a post-1945 invention, though its negative connotation is. From the early nineteenth century, the positive denotation of a Sonderweg stressed a German superiority to the tenets of the French Revolution; a belief that a strong monarchy, army, and authoritarian structure destined Germany for world power status; and a belief in the importance of placing spiritual over material values -- Kultur over Zivilisation. Two world wars later, Germans would have a difficult time convincing anyone that their special path had done them any good. Historians, then, simply turned the tables on the concept of Sonderweg. Now Germany's peculiar story, whose conclusion was the tragedy of National Socialism, was described as one fraught with repression and capitulation. Scholars told a tale in which the movements among the nation's political, economic and social spheres became unsynchronized. Whereas in other countries these spheres moved in tandem, in Germany they did not, as the political and the social failed to keep pace with economic modernization. In this interpretation, the Frankfurt Liberals shoulder much of the blame. Because of their failure in 1848, and their sub sequent acceptance of a "revolution from above" by Bismarck, the middle class failed to carry out a bourgeois revolution¾ as all good bourgeoisie should¾ and allowed the pre-industrial elites to remain in power. This supine middle class, so the argument goes, submitted to the aristocracy and aped its values, hence Weber's "feudalization of the bourgeoisie." This argument was made as early as 1912, when W alter Rathenau remarked:





It will be difficult for future writers of German history to understand how, in our time, two class systems could penetrate each other; the first is a survival of the feudal system, the second the capitalist system... But it will strike him as even odder that the newly arisen capitalist class had first of all to contribute to the strengthening of the feudal order.
This bolstered feudal elite, it is argued, was able to survive the crisis of 1918 and, it is implied, played a significant role in Hitler's accession to power in 1933.
But why is this seen as "peculiar?" What was so sonder about this Weg? Concomitant with these ideas is a comparison of Germany's development to that of her western neighbors, France and Britain. Germany missed out, i t is argued, on the bourgeois revolution that instituted the liberal constitution and societies in both Britain and France, the two countries credited with establishing the norm from which Germany is thought to have deviated.
These ideas have been very persuasive, and were best synthesized by Hans Ulrich Wehler, a German historian portrayed as the chief representative for this "new orthodoxy" in the study of Imperial Germany. In 1973 Wehler published Das deutsche Kaiserreich, in which he declared a direct continuity from Bismarck to Hitler, thus identifying the sources of fascism. Robert Moeller noted that this path of continuity "had few bends," and was instead the timeline of a patholo gical imperium:





The infant Kaiserreich had suffered through a depressed and unhappy childhood, dominated by an authoritarian father. Even after 1896, a prosperous adolescence was not enough to undo the ravages of youth or loosen the repressive mechani sms of "preindustrial" elites. A cowardly bourgeois adult remained incapable of overthrowing the "pre-industrial" father, succumbing rather to abnormal "feudalization." The trauma of Weimar, though never fully described by Wehler, was foreshadowed in the Kaiserreich, and represented a recapitulation of many of these youthful experiences.
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~epf/1998/andrews.html (http://userwww.sfsu.edu/%7Eepf/1998/andrews.html)


For a critical reassessment of this debate:


The Peculiarities of German History is a stimulating contribution to a debate which obviously has implications beyond Germany and Europe. It is a work that has the power to revivify old questions and create new ones, and it offers an opportunity for, and a challenge to, serious reconsideration of basic historiographical positions. Perhaps the book's most important contribution, however, is to be found in Blackbourn's conclusion, where he makes a case for Germany being "much more the intensified version of the norm than the exception,"arguing that Deutschland experienced a heightened version of the dynamic capitalism, crass materialism, and cultural despair that occurred elsewhere. This is an ech o of Eley, who chooses to speak of British, French, and German particularities, rather than only German peculiarities. Blackbourn warns of the dangers of relying on the notion of the peculiar to explain what happened between 1933 and 1945, believi ng that an exaggerated emphasis on German peculiarity merely serves to mystify the tragedy of National Socialism. However, if German history is viewed as normal, or even possible, rather than as an aberration, one's sense of the tragedy of National Socia lism becomes more acute. What lesson, after all, is to be learned from an aberration? To conclude with some advice from Blackbourn to future historians: That does not mean that we should write the history of Germany as if it were like the history of everywhere else; only that we should not write it as if it were quite unlike the history of anywhere else.

[InsaneApache]

I thought that everyone knew the west stopped at Dover.

[Skullheadhq]

Germany just doesn´t have a democratic tradition. They should reinstate a Hohenzollern emperor and make it an Absolute Monarchy again.

[Husar]

Germany just doesn´t have a democratic tradition.

Neither did France around 1800. :inquisitive:

[Tellos Athenaios]

Imagine the year 2050. A famous historical demographer says 'Broadly speaking, after 1989 'Eastern Europe' became a liberal democracy.'.

A: 'He is taking a cheap shot at Poland! Poland has always been a part of the West!!'
B: 'What on earth is the relevance of saying that Hungary and Romania were not part of the West until 1989? Surely this is of no historical importance?'
C: 'The guy is an ignorant'

False equivalence. The question was “where do you draw the borders of the West”, but I'll play: if in 2050 we look on Poland and it is anything like Germany is now then to me it is fair to say that they are part of the West. Again, these grand narratives are a matter of cherry picking time and place.

[Cute Wolf]

well, if the Fourth Reich suddenly sprung out, I just hope this time only Germany vs France war, let all of us outside them just watch the war via TV and eating popcorn.

[ELITEofWARMANGINGERYBREADMEN88]

France, really? Consdering this nation seen more internal problems in the past 220 years then any other nation did speaks volumes here.

[Rhyfelwyr]

What is "the West" even supposed to mean?

The whole idea of "Western liberal democracy" is stupid because it conflates geography/culture with a form of polity.

Sure, culture and political ideals tend to complement each other and influence each other, and Germany may lack a long tradition of democratic values, but I think it is quite clear that it is now a strong liberal democracy and they won't be going for the jackboots anytime soon.

If you are going to be so strict in going back hundreds of years for democratic traditions, then only the UK (make that England in fact) would qualify, and sort-of France.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Germany just doesn´t have a democratic tradition.Neither did France around 1800. :inquisitive:This is precisely the point. It is common to divide Western history between pre-modern and modern. Pre-modern is before the Industrial Revolution and the advent of liberal democracy. Modern history then is history from 'around 1800'. A bit sooner in Britain than in France. This 'industrialised, liberal democratic' mix then started its spread around the world.

What do all you nay-sayers think, for example, Fukuyama is talking about when he speaks of 'The End of History'? This 'history' of which he speaks about is the spread of industrial democracy, which triumphed in 1989 over its main competitor. That is, when the Western model triumphed over yet another undemocratic adversary.

The point Todd makes about Germany is that Germany from 1800 to 1945 was not part of this industrial-democratic world. But was, rather, its fiercest challenger. It's nothing new. It is not even a French point of view, but a German one. Generations of Germans saw a conflict between 'Western Zivilisation' versus 'German Kultur'. This distinction originated with Kant. The distinction does not even exist in English, where civilisation denotes both material and immaterial advancement. (Why Anglosaxonia is accused of being obsessed with materialism)

It reverberates to the present day, as when Samuel Huntington, in contrast to his opponent Fukuyama, titled his work 'Clash of Civilisations'.



False equivalence. The question was “where do you draw the borders of the West”As above. The above is the historical debate to which Todd refers. In that discourse, the West is 'the modern industrial liberal democratic world'. Indeed, I would say this is the common definition of the West.

There is no chery picking about time and place. Todd is very specific: (West) Germany in 1945 was forcibly pulled into the Western camp. Before 1945, Germany was an adversary to the West.

[CBR]

Why make a distinction at 1945? If we are to forget the change to constitutional monarchy in Prussia in 1850 or the Weimar constitution in 1919 then should not we just forget about France until say late 1870?

[Beskar]

I like modern Germany.

[Strike For The South]

Clash of Civilizations was high brow xenophobia

Harumph

[Louis VI the Fat]

Xenophobia is what the college kids call the common sense of the grown ups. :smug:

[Strike For The South]

Xenophobia is what the college kids call the common sense of the grown ups. :smug:

Common Sense is the rallying cry old people hide behind when they become to tired to think

[Louis VI the Fat]

Four days is how long it takes the puppy smartass to come up with a witty retort. :smug:



So cute, so innocent! :smitten:

Mummy and I have been talking. And we have decided...are you ready for this?...we've decided that....soon we'll let you ride your bicycle to school alone!!

[Strike For The South]

I was banned

Harmuph

You know that and yet I still took time to write this reply

:blush:

[Rhyfelwyr]

Get a room guys...

[Louis VI the Fat]

AND SPOIL THE PHONESEX!?