Canadian error at Falaise or misinfomation?

[White_eyes:D]

Ok, I politely disagreed with the final assessment that the Canadian troops were responsible for the German's escaping the pocket Falaise in the "Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise" thread. I have just finished watching a show that was checking the messages from the Canadian high command to the Canadian 4th Armoured Division.

In it, he showed that the Canadian's were giving the wrong coordinates twice and they didn't want to move in the dark and risk friendly fire. The Polish also didn't know where the reinforcements were coming from. The Canadians had an SS commander surrender and give up information beforehand and Canadian high command chose to listen to that SS commander rather then there codebreakers who received the message three times that they were breaking out. They even told the Canadian 4th Armoured Division to wait and provide support to the Polish from over 2.5Km away for over an hour.

So who do you think was responsible?

I blame Canadian high command, personally.:book2:

[PanzerJaeger]

I blame the Germans, who maintained unit cohesion and fought tenaciously to keep the pocket open against incredible odds, specifically the 2nd Panzer Division which broke into St. Lambert and held the road open and the 2nd, 116th, 9thSS, 10thSS, and 12thSS Panzer Divisions for breaking through Polish lines and isolating them on Hill 262.

[White_eyes:D]

No question that the germans fought hard to get out of the pocket but they really knew what they were doing. Having a high ranking SS officer surrender is not to be taking lightly. It paid off in the end, since Canadian allied command was taking his words as truth that the German army was not trying to break out, even though the code breakers were hearing different.

The Allied aircraft also didn't destroy as much as was reported. I think they estimated that they destroyed or disabled 68 tanks or something like that. The truth was more around the 20's range.

Edit: Not to say the aircraft didn't do it's job, just that it was not as effective as they thought at taking out the heavy armor.

[druzhina]

Canadian stuff up? Compare with the Death of a Battlegroup, Worthington Force at Point 140 (http://steel-chariots.22web.net/wrthfrc1.htm) by Chris Johnson at the Steel Chariots (http://steel-chariots.22web.net/CanadaSteelChariots.htm) site.

Druzhina
Illustrations of Costume and Soldiers (http://warfare.gq)

[KrooK]

If anyone can be blamed, its French tank division. Canadian and American troops helped Poles (Canadians finally supported Mace Hill and Americans helped into defence of Trun). French division had Germans easy to kill. They could attack from south and finally close the gap. It would let polish division regroup and close the pocket. However they decided not to attack.
Jaeger - no matter how hard Germans could fight. Into situation in the end of Calaise battle Germans could only move east. If all allies units did they job Germans would be destroyed. No tank can fight attacked from 3 sides and without air support. Discipline and training (Germans had both) is not important.

[White_eyes:D]

Lt.-Col. Worthington had shown great daring and dash in his night advance through the German 89th Infantry positions. A combination of factors ultimately led to the destruction of his battle group. Most notably was the error in direction, but loss of communication and the fact that this was their first battle also contributed to their eventual misfortune. The 4th Canadian Armoured Division was often criticized for a lack of offensive drive during the push to Falaise. The experience of Worthington Force illustrates the perils that can befall those who are tasked with missions that ultimately prove too daring in nature.I am going to guess that was the reason they didn't want to advance in the dark. In that program I watched they didn't really know why they stopped after getting close to their objective but losing a battle group might have been enough to give them pause.