View Full Version : Mithridatic Wars- Historical note
seleucid empire
01-14-2012, 11:45
Hello, ive noticed that during the mithridatic wars, pontus and armenia were able to call upon huge numbers of troops very quickly against Rome
Battle of Chaeronea: 120 000
Battle of Orchomenus: 80 000
Battle of Tigranocerta: 100 000
Im going to start a pontic campaign and for role playing purposes i will use fd to give Rome greece and start a war with them on 88 BC
for my campaign if an army has 3000 men then i role play that as 30 000 so i will have four stacks at chaeronea, 2-3 at orchomenus and 3 at tigranocerta
Does anyone know the compostion of these armies?? and how the pontus managed to raise such powerful armies (considering that the seleucids and ptolemies at their height could only muster 70 000)
The qualities of these armies couldnt have been as good as those of the hellenistic kingdoms could they?? but then i read that there were scythed chariots and bronze shields present in the first two battles
I consider such numbers with a pinch of salt, the old problem of antiquarian authors deliberately inflating numbers in order to excite their readers.
Im no authority on the Pontic forces of Mithridates all I know is that against Sulla he fielded a more traditional Hellenistic force centred around a phalanx (Tigranes did the same against Lucullus I believe). Against Lucullus and Pompey however Mithridates fielded a much for Roman-esque force likely heavily composed of Theuropheroi and Thorokatai. He also had some heavy Galatian infantry, at least in the last Mithridatic wars.
Brave Brave Sir Robin
01-14-2012, 14:20
I'm not 100% on this but I don't think Tigranes used a Hellenistic style force at Tigranocerta. The army was centered more around his force of cataphracts, 15,000 strong supposedly. I think that it was more of a traditional Persian-style, allowing various soldiers to fight in their traditional style with a crack cavalry force.
Mithradate's early armies were certainly phalanx-based and he learned the limitations of such forces during early defeats against Sulla. As everyone else mentions, later Pontic armies were based around mobile infantry.
And yes, numbers are inflated heavily.
I consider such numbers with a pinch of salt, the old problem of antiquarian authors deliberately inflating numbers in order to excite their readers.
That doesn't apply to just the authors of Antiquity, either.
That doesn't apply to just the authors of Antiquity, either.
Are you disputing me Ludens? I who have loved thousands of women and befriended billions? ;)
I would go with Brave Sir Robin's information on Tigranes. I will admit it is not my field of expertise.
The population of the Armenian half of the combined Ponto-Armenian lands (if that's how you want to think of it) is estimated to be about 20 million. You'd probably expect more Armenian than Pontic forces in their combined armies during those wars, but considering you're combining the two forces, it wouldn't be surprising if they fielded numbers greater than those by Assyrian forces over half a millennium earlier (notable for fielding the largest force until then). What would really be interesting is how you would manage to replicate the geopolitical situation of the time on the campaign map of EB.
Those numbers must be wrong. Look at this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chaeronea_(86_BC)
40 000 vs 120 000 and romans had only 12 casualties. :D
"Appian and Plutarch claim that only 10,000 of the enemy forces survived and escaped to the nearby town. They add that 14 Romans were not accounted for at the end of the battle, two of which returned at nightfall, making the Roman casualty count an unbelievable 12 soldiers. While these figures are obviously inaccurate,as the close range nature of fighting between the infantry forces must have caused heavier Roman losses,nevertheless,the Pontic forces undoubtedly suffered disproportionately heavier casualties."
Are you disputing me Ludens?
No, I am agreeing with you. I just wanted to say that this is not something unique to Classical sources. Apologies if I was unclear.
athanaric
01-14-2012, 19:36
The population of the Armenian half of the combined Ponto-Armenian lands (if that's how you want to think of it) is estimated to be about 20 million. You'd probably expect more Armenian than Pontic forces in their combined armies during those wars, but considering you're combining the two forces, it wouldn't be surprising if they fielded numbers greater than those by Assyrian forces over half a millennium earlier (notable for fielding the largest force until then). What would really be interesting is how you would manage to replicate the geopolitical situation of the time on the campaign map of EB.
You sure that's the population number during antiquity? Seems very high.
No, I am agreeing with you. I just wanted to say that this is not something unique to Classical sources. Apologies if I was unclear.
I think he might have been facetious.
No, I am agreeing with you. I just wanted to say that this is not something unique to Classical sources. Apologies if I was unclear.
Sorry, that was my fault. That joke didn't really work.
seleucid empire
01-14-2012, 21:50
is there any chance the numbers might not be inflated??? and what i wanted to know was what was the quality in general of the units in his army. Was it largely low tier (lots of skirmishers and levy persian style spearmen with some mercenaries and light cavalry), middle tier (hoplites and mercenaries with heavy cavalry) or high tier (phalanxes and heavy cavalry)
Im more interested in the pontic army than the armenian one cause i know the armenian one had 4 000 cats and 100 000 mostly levies
oh btw those people who said the casualties are unrealistic, keep in mind that it was sulla, Romes brightest general to date and also he built fortifications which Archelaus tried to assault
seleucid empire
01-14-2012, 21:59
also the roman army had just been reformed by marius some 20 years earlier
You decide :D
But yes, very inflated and as you said it was Sulla (the fortifications were on the flanks to avoid getting encircled, but the infantries clashed), he pretty much had the power to do so :P
From Lebadeia and the cave of Trophonius favourable utterances and oracles announcing victory were now sent out to the Romans. Of these the inhabitants of the country have more to say; but Sulla himself has written in the tenth book of his Memoirs, how Quintus Titius, a prominent man among the Romans doing business in Greece, came to him immediately after he had won his victory at Chaeroneia, with tidings that Trophonius predicted for him a second battle and victory in that neighbourhood within a short time. And after him, a legionary soldier, Salvenius by name, brought him from the god a statement of the issue which affairs in Italy were going to have. But both agreed about the source of their oracle; for they said they had beheld one who in beauty and majesty was like unto Olympian Jove.
Sulla now crossed the Assus, and after advancing to the foot of Mount Hedylium, encamped over against Archelaüs, who had thrown up strong entrenchments between Mounts Acontium and Hedylium, at the so‑called Assian plain. The spot in which he encamped, moreover, is to this day called Archelaüs, after him. After one day's respite, Sulla left Murena behind with one legion and two cohorts, to obstruct the enemy if they attempted to draw up their forces, while he himself held sacrifices on the banks of the Cephisus, and, when the rites were over, moved on towards Chaeroneia, to pick up the forces stationed there, and to reconnoitre Thurium, as it is called, which had been already occupied by the enemy. This is a conical-shaped hill with a craggy peak (we call it Orthopagus), and at its foot is the river Molus and a temple of Apollo Thurius. The god got this surname from Thuro, the mother of Chaeron, who was founder of Chaeroneia, according to tradition. But some say that the cow which was given by Apollo to Cadmus as his guide, appeared there, and that the place was named as it is from her, "thor" being the Phoenician word for cow.
As Sulla drew near to Chaeroneia, the tribune who had been stationed in the city, with his men in full armour, came to meet him, carrying a wreath of laurel. 6 After Sulla had accepted this, greeted the soldiers, and animated them for the coming danger, two men of Chaeroneia accosted him, Homoloïchus and Anaxidamus, and engaged to cut off the troops in possession of Thurium if he would give them a few soldiers; for there was a path out of sight of the Barbarians, leading from the so‑called Petrachus along past the Museum to that part of Thurium which was over their heads, and by taking this path it would not be difficult, they said, to fall upon them and either stone them to death from above, or force them into the plain. After Gabinius had borne testimony to the men's courage and fidelity, Sulla ordered them to make the attempt, while he himself proceeded to form his line of battle, and to dispose his cavalry on either wing, taking command of the right himself, and assigning the left to Murena. His lieutenants, Galba and Hortensius, with cohorts of reserves, stationed themselves on the heights in the rear, to guard against attacks on the flanks. For the enemy were observed to be making their wing flexible and light for evolution with large bodies of horse and light infantry, purposing to extend it and envelop the Romans.
Meanwhile the Chaeroneians, over whom Ericius had been placed in command by Sulla, made their way unnoticed around Thurium and then showed themselves suddenly, producing great confusion and rout among the Barbarians, and slaughter at one another's hands for the most part. For they did not hold their ground, but rushed down the steeps, falling upon their own spears and crowding one another down the precipices, while their enemies pressed upon them from above and smote their exposed bodies, so that three thousand of them fell on Thurium. Of the fugitives, some were met by Murena, who had already formed his array, and were cut off and slain; others pushed their way towards the camp of their friends, and falling pell-mell upon their lines, filled the greater part of them with terror and confusion, and inflicted a delay upon their generals which was especially harmful to them. For Sulla promptly charged upon them while they were in confusion, and by abridging the space between the armies with the speed of his approach, robbed the scythe-bearing chariots of their efficiency. For these are of most avail after a long course, which gives them velocity and impetus for breaking through an opposing line but short starts are ineffectual and feeble, as in the case of missiles which do not get full propulsion. And this proved to be true now in the case of Barbarians. The first of their chariots were driven along feebly and engaged sluggishly, so that the Romans, after repulsing them, clapped their hands and laughed and called for more, as they are wont to do at the races in the circus. Thereupon the infantry forces engaged, the Barbarians holding their pikes before them at full length, and endeavouring, by locking their shields together, to keep their line of battle intact; while the Romans threw down their javelins, drew their swords, and sought to dash the pikes aside, that they might get at their enemies as soon as possible, in the fury that possessed them. For they saw drawn up in front of the enemy fifteen thousand slaves, whom the king's generals had set free by proclamation in the cities and enrolled among the men-at‑arms. And a certain Roman centurion is reported to have said that it was only at the Saturnalia, so far as he knew, that slaves participated in the general license. These men, however, owing to the depth and density of their array, and the unnatural courage with which they held their ground, were only slowly repulsed by the Roman men-at‑arms; but at last the fiery bolts and the javelins which the Romans in the rear ranks plied unsparingly, threw them into confusion and drove them back.
Archelaüs now extended his right wing to envelop Sulla's line, whereupon Hortensius sent his cohorts against him on a quick run, intending to attack his flank. But Archelaüs wheeled swiftly against him his two thousand horsemen, and Hortensius, forced aside by superior numbers, was keeping close to the hills, separating himself little by little from the main line, and getting surrounded by the enemy. When Sulla learned of this, he came swiftly to his aid from the right wing, which was not yet engaged. But Archelaüs, guessing the truth from the dust raised by Sulla's troops, gave Hortensius the go-by, and wheeling, set off for the right wing whence Sulla had come, thinking to surprise it without a commander. At the same time Murena also was attacked by Taxiles with his Bronze-shields, so that when shouts were borne to his ears from both places, and reëchoed by the surrounding hills, Sulla halted, and was at a loss to know in which of the two directions he ought to betake himself. But having decided to resume his own post, he sent Hortensius with four cohorts to help Murena, while he himself, bidding the fifth cohort to follow, hastened to the right wing. This of itself had already engaged Archelaüs on equal terms, but when Sulla appeared, they drove the enemy back at all points, obtained the mastery, and pursued them to the river and Mount Acontium in a headlong flight. Sulla, however, did not neglect Murena in his peril, but set out to aid the forces in that quarter; he saw, however, that they were victorious, and then joined in the pursuit. Many of the Barbarians, then, were slain in the plain, but most were cut to pieces as they rushed for their entrenchments, so that only ten thousand out of so many myriads made their escape into Chalcis. But Sulla says he missed only fourteen of his soldiers, and that afterwards, towards evening, two of these came in. He therefore inscribed upon his trophies the names of Mars, Victory and Venus, in the belief that his success in the war was due no less to good fortune than to military skill and strength. This trophy of the battle in the plain stands on the spot where the troops of Archelaüs first gave way, by the brook Molus, but there is another planted on the crest of Thurium, to commemorate the envelopment of the Barbarians there, and it indicates in Greek letters that Homoloïchus and Anaxidamus were the heroes of the exploit. The festival in honour of this victory was celebrated by Sulla in Thebes, where he prepared a stage near the fountain of Oedipus. But the judges were Greeks invited from the other cities, since towards the Thebans he was irreconcilably hostile. He also took away half of their territory and consecrated it to Pythian Apollo and Olympian Zeus, giving orders that from its revenues the moneys should be paid back to the gods which he had taken from them.
After this, learning that Flaccus, a man of the opposite faction, had been chosen consul and was crossing the Ionian sea with an army, ostensibly against Mithridates, but really against himself, he set out towards Thessaly in order to meet him. But when he was come to the city of Meliteia, tidings reached him from many quarters that the regions behind him were ravaged again by an army of the king which was no smaller than the former. For Dorylaüs, having put in at Chalcis with a large fleet, on which he brought eighty thousand of the best trained and disciplined men in the army of Mithridates, at once burst into Boeotia and occupied the country. He was eager to entice Sulla to battle, disregarding the protests of Archelaüs, and giving it out that in the previous battle so many myriads had not perished without treachery. Sulla, however, turning swiftly back, showed Dorylaüs that Archelaüs was a man of prudence and best acquainted with the Roman valour, so that after a slight skirmish with Sulla near Tilphossium, he was first of those who thought it expedient not to decide the issue by a battle, but rather to wear out the war by dint of time and treasure. Nevertheless, Archelaüs was much encouraged by the nature of the country about Orchomenus, where they were encamped, since it was most favourable as a battle-field for an army superior in cavalry. For of all the plains of Boeotia this is the largest and fairest, and beginning from the city of Orchomenus, it spreads out smooth and treeless as far as the marshes in which the river Melas loses itself. This rises close under the city of Orchomenus, and is the only Greek river that is copious and navigable at its sources; moreover, it increases towards the time of the summer solstice, like the Nile, and produces plants like those which grow there, only stunted and without fruit. Its course is short, however, and the greater part of it disappears at once in blind and marshy lakes, while a small portion of it unites with the Cephisus, somewhere near the place in which the stagnant water is reputed to produce the famous reed for flutes.
When the two armies had encamped near each other, Archelaüs lay still, but Sulla proceeded to dig trenches on either side, in order that, if possible, he might cut the enemy off from the solid ground which was favourable for the cavalry, and force them into the marshes. The enemy, however, would not suffer this, but when their generals sent them forth, charged impetuously and at full speed, so that not only Sulla's labourers were dispersed, but also the greater part of the corps drawn up to protect them was thrown into confusion and fled. Then Sulla threw himself from his horse, seized an ensign, and pushed his way through the fugitives against the enemy, crying: "For me, O Romans, an honourable death here; but you, when men ask you where you betrayed your commander, remember to tell them, at Orchomenus." The fugitives rallied at these words, and two of the cohorts on his right wing came to his aid; these he led against the enemy and routed them. Then he fell back a little distance, and after giving his men breakfast, again proceeded to fence the enemy's entrenchments off with his ditches. But they attacked him again in better order than before, Diogenes, the step-son of Archelaüs, fought gallantly on their right wing, and fell gloriously, and their archers, being hard pressed by the Romans, so that they had no room to draw their bows, took their arrows by handfuls, struck with them as with swords, at close quarters, and tried to beat back their foes, but were finally shut up in their entrenchments, and had a miserable night of it with their slain and wounded. Next day Sulla again led his soldiers up to the enemy's fortifications and continued trenching them off, and when the greater part of them came out to give him battle, he engaged with them and routed them, and such was their panic that no resistance was made, and he took their camp by storm. The marshes were filled with their blood, and the lake with their dead bodies, so that even to this day many bows, helmets, fragments of steel breastplates, and swords of barbarian make are found embedded in the mud, although almost two hundred years have passed since this battle. Such, then, are the accounts given of the actions at Chaeroneia and Orchomenus.
In the battle against Lucius Sulla, Archelaus placed his scythe-bearing chariots in front, for the purpose of throwing the enemy into confusion; in the second line he posted the Macedonian phalanx, and in the third line auxiliaries armed after the Roman way, with a sprinkling of Italian runaway slaves, in whose doggedness he had the greatest confidence. In the last line he stationed the light-armed troops, while on the two flanks, for the purpose of enveloping the enemy, he placed the cavalry, of whom he had a great number.
To meet these dispositions, Sulla constructed trenches of great breadth on each flank, and at their ends built strong redoubts. By this device he avoided the danger of being enveloped by the enemy, who outnumbered him in infantry and especially in cavalry. Next he arranged a triple line of infantry, leaving intervals through which to send, according to need, the light-armed troops and the cavalry, which he placed in the rear. He then commanded the postsignani, who were in the second line, to drive firmly into the ground large numbers stakes set close together, and as the chariots drew near, he withdrew the line of antesignani within these stakes. Then at length he ordered the skirmishers and light-armed troops to raise a general battle-cry and discharge their spears. By these tactics either the chariots of the enemy were caught among the stakes, or their drivers became panic-stricken at the din and were driven by the javelins back upon their own men, throwing the formation of the Macedonians into confusion. As these gave way, Sulla pressed forward, and Archelaus met him with cavalry, whereupon the Roman horsemen suddenly darted forth, drove back the enemy, and achieved victory.
There were harmata drepanephora, phalangitai, thureophoroi and thorakitai, italian slaves and light troops (they must have been from peltastai to anatolikoi etc), rest cavalry...
Tigranakerti is said to have been nothing more than a skirmish...
Sorry, that was my fault. That joke didn't really work.
It did; I just wanted to clarify since my OP could have been clearer.
is there any chance the numbers might not be inflated???
Well, it's a given that the numbers were inflated. The question is by how much. From periods in history where we have access to sources from both sides, we know that chroniclers would often report twice (if not more) as many enemies as there actually were. Possibly that's because they counted non-combatants, or because it's in no-one's interest to downplay the enemy threat.
Given Greek-Roman contempt for Easterners, I wouldn't be surprised if the numbers for these particular battles are heavily inflated. Easterners were supposedly too effeminate to be able to fight, so a victory against them only counted if it was at 5:1 odds at least.
That's not to say the Romans weren't outnumbered, just that such enormous numbers are meaningless. A group of 100.000 levies isn't an army. It's a mob; a logistical nightmare that takes days to assemble in one place. It's not impossible, but not particularly effective either. And, whatever else they may have been, Mithradates and Tigran weren't stupid.
seleucid empire
01-14-2012, 22:44
wow it said they were armed with pikes so potentially 4-50 000 pikemen out of 120 000 im guessing (WOW) and thorakai and heavy cav. thats some army. how did they manage to raise such a good quality hellenistic army with that many men??? Form what ive read tigranocerta was a battle between the legionarries and the cats. when the cats fled the entire army fled. Also tigranes the great did some strange stuff like execute anyone who told him the Romans were close by
Tigranakert saw the rescue of part of the royal family, treasure, and harem by an elite cataphract cohort. The battle, if any, would have been one to the west of the Euphrates (LLL's Roman cohorts en route but before reaching Tigranakert) due to the contradiction between LLL's claim of having sacked T-kert and the still-standing famed temple of that city. True sacking came in the third quarter of the first cent. BCE with Antony.
You sure that's the population number during antiquity? Seems very high.
Do not be surprised. Over one hundred thousand were able to live in complex cities of the first advanced Mesopotamian civilization (that of Sumer) in the third millennium BCE. That is one city in, granted, a very grain-producing rich area. Yet considering a conservative scaling to the area at least nominally ruled over by the Armenian "King of Kings" in the early to mid first cent. BCE would easily reach to and beyond the ten million marker. The Near East isn't as small as you may think it is (it is easy to think of the region as a relatively small one if your mental map is centered at the States, or Europe, or Russia, and so on).
how did they manage to raise such a good quality hellenistic army with that many men?
Some must have been levied hellenized people, don't imagine the whole army armourclad...
And numbers are inflated, it's obvious...
Also tigranes the great did some strange stuff like execute anyone who told him the Romans were close by
Plutarch was foremost a moralist...
seleucid empire
01-14-2012, 22:49
also from the extract arjos posted up the 120 000 werent even the elite of pontus. the 80 000 at oroc were the true elites. How on earth did they raise 200 000 of such high quality. consider that pontus only conquered asia minor the year before so they wouldnt have had time to raise troops form those provinces
seleucid empire
01-14-2012, 22:50
if they are inflated, what is a likely number of troops?
A year is enough, he just had to enlist the soldiers of his new kingdom...
As for a number, it's up to one's speculation, 40-60k would be already a LOT, giving 40k for Chaeroneia, getting reinforced later on by an elite force of 20k, would make sense with the ability to offer battle at Orchomenus...
Maybe in total they reached 80k, hard to tell...
seleucid empire
01-14-2012, 23:16
ahhh thats better, theres no way i could afford 200 000 troops (6 fullstacks in game). plus im planning to conquer armenia and pretend that its still my ally (replace cats with kinsmen at tigranocerta) so i would need 300 000 or 10 fullstacks lol
especially if their made of phalanxes, mercenaries and chariots
moonburn
01-15-2012, 00:42
the same way that romans considered any more heavily armoured soldier as being armed in the roman style any easterner armed with a slightly longer spear would probably be considered a pikeman and not an haploi
as for numbers and about that remark about the losses sulla took depends what he considered his soldiers if he only considers the men he came in with from italy then any other loss from already existing roman cohorts allies and auxiliary wouldn´t be counted but then again if we considered the medieval agincourt batle then it´s possible
furthermore he could have risked off those who where injured since they survived the batle because mainly an hoplite based forçe is meant to only hold and pin down the enemy and not necessarly kill it that would be for the chariots cavelary and flankers wich sulla managed to nulify
as for the terrain an army with kapadokians should fare better then the romans or hoplites (the ones i believe the romans mistaken for pikeman sarrissa armed ones) so it was missuse of resources
the romans where outnumbered but i doubt they where outgunned wich is why that besides the inflation on their numbers we must also consider that mainly the original 120.000 where better represented then what they trully were
anyway i´m a sulla admirer and i consider him the last man who trully tryed to prevent the dissollution of the republik instead of playing politiks for his own personal gain
seleucid empire (referring to the user here), I'm glad you are interested in history here, but don't get your feet too drenched in the sea of false glory and honor that the layman would impose upon history. If you're here hoping to crack the code, as it were, and determine precisely or anywhere near-precisely how many warriors were mustered by each faction in these wars, I'm sorry to say it's not going to happen. Also, you should ask yourself if you mean the numbers of warriors (those who would fight) or the combined numbers of warriors and those others who would be there to offer a variety of support measures (we don't need to get into this of course)?
seleucid empire
01-15-2012, 09:08
it seems a shame that historians would inflate numbers for the sole purpose of exciting readers or glorifying Roman generals
it seems a shame that historians would inflate numbers for the sole purpose of exciting readers or glorifying Roman generals
seleucid empire, we're not talking about post-modern historians here. We're talking about historians of antiquity. These two sets of historians separated by time and space do not approach history the same way. Sorry for the sad truth, if this is indeed news for you.
Brave Brave Sir Robin
01-15-2012, 20:15
A lot of ancient "historians" (I use that term loosely) did not even view themselves as historians though so it would be unfair to judge them as such.
Also, it's not as if the chroniclers of that period would have an easy time getting accurate records. They would have access to commentaries written by the general (Caesar was not the first to do this), but obviously these weren't impartial. Sometimes the best the historian could hope for was to find out how many slaves were sold afterwards. Of course, that number would have included stable boys, armourers, ox-cart drivers, etc. Eastern armies did tend to have a lot of those, so part of the inflation could have come from there.
stratigos vasilios
01-16-2012, 03:50
Are you disputing me Ludens? I who have loved thousands of women and befriended billions? ;)
Hahaha I enjoyed this considerably! :thumbsup:
seleucid empire
01-16-2012, 05:01
didnt caesar or pompey have historians with them while on campaigns??
Brave Brave Sir Robin
01-16-2012, 06:41
didnt caesar or pompey have historians with them while on campaigns??
Who were no doubt close friends or clients and would have vested interest in making their deeds seem grander than they actually were.
Who were no doubt close friends or clients and would have vested interest in making their deeds seem grander than they actually were.
I take it that's a yes?
didnt caesar or pompey have historians with them while on campaigns??
Caesar didn't: he wrote his own commentaries. Pompey may or may not have taken someone with him to write an account of his campaign. In both cases, it was obvious (and perfectly acceptable) that these texts were written to make them look good. In any case, Classical historians weren't historians as we define it today. Their job was to tell a good story, with an emphasis on how someone's vices/virtues led to his failure/success. Obviously, this story was supposed to be true, but it wasn't a complete and unbiased account of what happened.
Propoganda in the classical period. It wasn't until the very modern era when citing sources and being as accurate as possible became such a good thing. Although, even now we have people who try and falsify things to make things look better, historical or otherwise.
The fact is though, that we are fairly limited in the sources we have, its not like we can just run to the shop and pick up a book with an accurate count of the number of people in each battle. We can only use the sources that survived 2000 years into the present or secondary and tertiary sources based on primary sources that didn't survive. And to be frank, I can't even win a game of chinese whispers that lasts 1 minute or 2.
So it is important to realise that: A) these people were writing these documents/notes for a reason and they would have no real problem changing the facts a little to match the purpose of their work; nor any real way of being caught out.
And B) We really have to take what scraps we can (in many cases) in order to try and figure things out. A lot of work involves inferring what things mean and different ways that it could have been translated and so on and so forth. We may never have a definitive version on what exactly took place.
Titus Marcellus Scato
01-16-2012, 14:03
My rule of thumb is that the lowest figure quoted for the enemy army is likely to be closest to the truth, and the highest figure quoted for the friendly army is likely to be closest to the truth, depending on the allegiance of the source.
No historic general would want to underestimate the size of the enemy army, or overestimate the size of his own force.
Caesar I don't know, Pompeivs iirc patronized Poseidonios, but I think the latter travelled on his own, but most likely then showed his work at some aristocratic club back in Roma...
But as others pointed out ancient "historians" were well-off or sponsored people, dedicating their time for a bigger agenda...
Few did courted objectivity, but still held a subtle motive behind their work, be that justification of their military/political career or of own beliefs...
It's a given that numbers were inflated. On the other hand, Philip Sabin argues (in "lost battles" iirc.) that our tendency to reflexively adjust the numbers of combatants in all ancient battles until they were roughly equal or "feel" right isn't very sensible either, because we're essentially ignoring the only evidence we got (unless there's archaeology to go on) to arrive at results that more comfortably match our "gut feelings." He furthermore argues that this tendency began with historians in the 19th century who lived in a time when battles -were- often decided by raw numbers and a small elite force was never going to beat the firepower of a much larger and similarly equipped but far less trained conscript army.
Ancient battles could be decided by a single freak occurrence, by a lucky shot killing a general or a sudden panic sweeping away a flank. On a battlefield with hardly any way of communicating orders once the fight is underway and where people are expected to march within arms' reach of enemy soldiers with the intent to stab and kill them and soldiers have no idea what is happening because they can't even see directly in front of them if they're in the middle of a formation numbers have far less meaning. And in more recent times too we have reports of small forces charging at bayonet-point and driving off far more numerous enemies. A small force can beat a large one. In fact a large army in antiquity may well prove detrimental because it's even harder to control and once chaos starts developing and a mob-mentality develops everything is likely to go to ruin. The Romans certainly never seemed to have much success when they mustered huge forces. (Cannae of course, but I vaguely recall other examples... Arausio maybe?)
So yeah, I don't doubt that Sulla liked to make his enemies look more impressive by claiming they were uncountable... but neither do I doubt that an Eastern king could muster an army of a hundred thousand that then would run away without fighting much at all, even in the face of a much smaller Roman force. Especially since at the time the Romans were getting a reputation of invincibility that's almost as good as the real thing. Just like Hannibal could beat much larger Roman forces and subsequently make it so that no Roman force was able to face him in open battle in part because the soldiers would expect to be beaten. After all, nobody is arguing the Romans were exaggerating their own numbers at Cannae, are they? It's not like their historians, dubious as they are, -only- describe occasions where the Romans are the ones hugely outnumbered yet victorious.
It's a given that numbers were inflated. On the other hand, Philip Sabin argues (in "lost battles" iirc.) that our tendency to reflexively adjust the numbers of combatants in all ancient battles until they were roughly equal or "feel" right isn't very sensible either, because we're essentially ignoring the only evidence we got (unless there's archaeology to go on) to arrive at results that more comfortably match our "gut feelings." He furthermore argues that this tendency began with historians in the 19th century who lived in a time when battles -were- often decided by raw numbers and a small elite force was never going to beat the firepower of a much larger and similarly equipped but far less trained conscript army.
This POV, even though being very popular amongst modern scholars of Ancient history, completly neglects the reality of 19th Century warfare: there are numerous example of small forces beating much larger forces in the 19th Century. And those opposing armies usually used (basically) the same tactics and weapons. In Ancient times there often were huge differences between the equipement and tactics of the opposing forces, what by itself would have been sufficient an explanation for a small force beating a large one.
Those 19th Century historians, and Delbrück would have been the most important of them, also did not question that a small army, for example a force of crack Roman troops commanded by someone like Sulla, would have been able to defeat a much larger force of enemies. The "Sachkritik" introduced by Delbrück into historical research but askes whether the given numbers are possible at all (and raising, operating, moving and commanding armies of several hundred thousands requires a good deal more than just having the sufficient number of people living in your kingdom), if those numbers do match other circumstances, like terrain, and if the numbers do match the accounts giving of deployment, fighting and outcome.
As such the numbers of the Romans at Cannae are beyond doubt, while those of the Persians at Issus are highly questionable (I had explained that in a lengthy debate over at the TWC some years ago and won't go into detail here).
In case of Sulla's campaign against Mithradates, for example, Delbrück points out that there are supiciously many paralles in the description of that campaign and Marius' campaign against the Germans - so that events might or might not have been that way. Delbrück assumes that Mithradates' forces would have rather been composed of mercenaries than of levies, what would have excluded the numbers given at all: neither could have been his forces anything close to the to several hundred thousand nor could it have been able to suffer anything close to the casualties claimed by the Romans and still be capable of fighting.
For example, a pitched battle like Chaironea cannot have been fought by Sulla with the loss of just 12(!) men. Either the figures of his casualties are seriously downgraded or the events are seriously exaggertated. Delbrück assumes the second option to be true, and that the battle rather was a brief encounter where Archelaus quickly withdrew from (certainly not because he outnumbered the Romans 3:1) with only very little casualties on both sides.
If the sources permit, a good rule of thumb is to look at how the victors measure up their enemy, and how the losers measure up themselves. You can imagine to which side of this range you may find a quantity likely nearer the true amount. Likewise for the other case.
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