Could Germany have won WWII?

[Myth]

How can one say that Germany is nothing? This is absurd. Even after being torn to bits by the allies and russians in WWII it is still the beating heart of Europe economics wise. It is THE country to talk about when we are talking manufacturuing. German cars and industrial machines are a staple for quality, not American ones.

Germany was divided, a lot of intellectuals and scientists were moved to either the USSR or the USA. Most of the inventions claimed to be done by the USA are actually done by European (and mostly German) scientists.

That Germany waged sucessfull war in WWII versus so many opponents is a feat of military prowess which the USA has not even come close to matching. All your wars were versus two-bit third world countries. And even then you sometimes got your arses handed to you (Veitnam). In fact, if Hitler had not spared the British troops the war might have been a tad bit harder, especially since the USA and Canadian navies suffered heavy losses to German submarines.

It is also a fact that the heavy lifting in WWII was done by Soviet troops, and the fall of the Wehrmacht was due mainly to lack of minerals and fuel to resupply the armoured corps and Luftwaffe. Is their modern army not up to the same standard? Probably. But they have they industrial capabilty and the discipline to get back at it if they WANTED to. But warmongering and stealing resources is left to other powers...


Myth Germany lost because it was arrogant, had a big mouth and didn't have the ability to back it up.

Amateurs fight shiny metal object vs shiny metal object. Professionals talk logistics.

Not just the wealth and industrial might to be at war and develop nuclear weapons, nor the industrial might to rebuild an air craft carrier faster than your enemy can conceive it (Midway), the ability to supply both USSR and UK with the materials to fight against an arrogant aggressor and build ships like the liberty.

Then add to it after the Allies defeated the Axis the industrial might to rebuild the economies from scratch. If you want an object lesson in the intent and capability of the US then compare and contrast what Japan and Germany did to their occupied nations and then compare how Western Germany did vs Eastern Germany.

Western Germany was so prosperous that unification for them was a scary thing as the debt to bring Eastern Germany up to scratch was massive.

So lets get real here. WWII Germany was a bunch of bully boy facists who lost most of their great scientists before the war even started. The only awards for logistics that won were best slave and concentration camps and mass graves awards. They started a war, they got trounced and lost all their colonial assets.


Of course logistics plays a key role, and it is closely related to the issues I pointed out:

- Not enough steel to manufacture spare parts (this includes trucks which are what makes an army supply go forward)
- Not enough fuel for not just tanks but also for the non-combat vehicles, so the forward positions were left woefully undersupplied

So much was the issue that a unit of 50 veteran foot soldiers was ass signed to a single anti-tank cannon (I know the name but can't spell it and not make a jackass of myself since I can't spell in German)

In any event, your notion that Germany lost because they got arrogant is too linear IMO. It is never this simple, and never this black and white. First of all, Germany was set up for WWII. Poland was committing genocide in Prussia and waving their d**cks at Hitler from across the yard, knowing that they had a secret deal with France and England that they'd back them up if Germany invaded.

Hitler surrounded the English army on the atlantic coast and could have captured/massacred them. Instead, he let them go, to show a gesture of good faith to Churchill, who then insisted that the war continued.

Stalin was preparing for war regardless of the German invasion. As such, picking a war with the USSR wasn't Hitler's biggest mistake (as some say) but rather the timing of it and the objectives.

Thinking they could thwart mighty Russia in 2 months time (dreadfully short summer in those parts) IS arrogant. And not counting in the fact that Russia had dirt paths and taiga for infrastructure also... And the biggest one (after letting all those Brits go to their island kingdom) is throwing so much manpower in capturing Moscow. Amrygroup Center was essentially wasted effort. He should have gone for Stalingrad and get the Caucassian oil fields and the iron and coal mines in the Ural mountains, then entrench for the winter.

WWII Germany with enough oil, steel and manpower (from occupied Europe. And not all people were opposed to Nazi rule. It sure as hell wasn't teatime and pancakes for the Ukranian folk. Hell, they viewed the German soldiers as LIBERATORS) could keep a firm hold on Europe that the USA would not be able to crack sans nuclear weapons.

Also, excuse me if I'm wrong, but Germany was actually closer to getting nukes than the USA before it all hit the fan... Regarding occupation - German occupied countries did just fine. The most prosperous countries in Europe now are direct descendants of the HRE (Germany, Austria, Northern Italy) or are Scandinavian. USSR occupation is what made Eastern Germany (as well as Poland, Czheckoslovakia, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria) so bad. In fact, this example defeats your own - the German people, when left to freely pursue their industrial and disciplined way of life, can and will build a country that is just awesome.

Germany lends money out now, the USA borrows money. I think that's pretty obvious. Hence, you can see the value of each economy. The real produced and exported goods and services.

That the USA supplied airplanes to the USSR and sent ships to help Britain hold out was remarcable. I admire them for that, but it is, after all an entire CONTINENT and all it's industry directed to war manufacturing. But I say again, if Germany didn't have so much on its plate, the USA would really have a hard time projecting power on continental Europe. Imagine D-Day with a well supplied, veteran, entrenched Wehrmacht waiting for you...

That the USA is a megapower because it can now sustain its economy and mass produce weapons is known. That it has the best power projection in the world currently, is also fact (navy, marines, airforce). But for a country which was left to its own devices on an entire continent I'd rather say this was expected. The industrial might to rebuild France, England and so on is no argument here. Germany was torn inside-out. Entire factories were dismantled and moved to Syberia.


Myth: I don’t want to start a debate on History (there is a place in the org for that) but all your facts are absolutely wrong and come from Rightist/revisionist propaganda.
Germany and its allies (that somehow you forget) lost the war because they were ill prepared for war they initiated and started. All others points (as Stalin preparing a war) are unproved and in fact utterly false. Hitler didn’t want to save the British Army, Hitler, remembering WW1, wanted to secure the flank of his armies, as the French in Lille were still fighting against all odds, and Hitler couldn’t be sure what could come from this. And the battle of Gembloux has proved to the Germans that their tactic could be defeated, so more caution was required.
And yes, you are wrong. Germany even not approached the atomic power, as their path (Heavy Water) was a Cul de Sac.
The myth of USSR saved by the USA material: The first defeat in the Eastern Front came even before the USA was pushed in war (Moscow). And in term of tanks, the Soviets ones were much better than the British, French or US of the times. Or German for the matter.


I've actually seen a T55 and I have a colleague who was part of its crew during the mandatory military service era of not so long ago. They were an average tank - not as bad as the French ones, but nowhere near as good as the German ones. But the sheer volume of manufacturing capability and the manpower behind the USSR is waht made that tank into a monster. Having a 5 to 1 numeric advantage would let spearchuckers win vs. so few German tanks.

So... Let's get it started then! Most of my information on WWII is from history channel/youtube videos/high school and I haven't read a book about it indepth. So i'd like an educational discussion where perhaps I can benefit from the knowledge of more informed scholars. :bow:

[Papewaio]

Hitler surrounded the English army on the atlantic coast and could have captured/massacred them. Instead, he let them go, to show a gesture of good faith to Churchill, who then insisted that the war continued.

Hitler wasn't trying to give a gesture of good will. He was stalled by the French army who valiantly fought the Germans to a stand still and made sure the British could retreat in good order.

The fact that the British could retreat was because they still ruled the Channel and at least the fear of their fleet kept the Germans at bay. That the British people helped the British army retreat speaks to how tenacious the people were. An flotilla of small personal boats and yachts helped rescue the men from the beaches.

One of my great uncles was at both Dunkirk and Normandy. So I've had second hand accounts of it growing up from my mother.

[Papewaio]

The most prosperous countries in Europe now are direct descendants of the HRE (Germany, Austria, Northern Italy) or are Scandinavian. USSR occupation is what made Eastern Germany (as well as Poland, Czheckoslovakia, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria) so bad. In fact, this example defeats your own - the German people, when left to freely pursue their industrial and disciplined way of life, can and will build a country that is just awesome.

That prosperity is directly related to the Marshall Plan and the additional billions pumped in pre and post those four years.
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Marshall_Plan.svg
Look at this page to see a graph of the money spent and it essentially is a picture of the countries you listed. The soviet bloc did not receive that investment because the investment was to counter communism.

The rebuilding of Europe was so successful that "By 1952, as the funding ended, the economy of every participant state had surpassed pre-war levels; for all Marshall Plan recipients, output in 1951 was at least 35% higher than in 1938"

So it wasn't some sort of übermensch it was simple economics and a desire not to repeat the mistakes post WW I. So post WWII recovery can be directly linked to US investment.

[Fisherking]

Hitler wasn't trying to give a gesture of good will. He was stalled by the French army who valiantly fought the Germans to a stand still and made sure the British could retreat in good order.

The fact that the British could retreat was because they still ruled the Channel and at least the fear of their fleet kept the Germans at bay. That the British people helped the British army retreat speaks to how tenacious the people were. An flotilla of small personal boats and yachts helped rescue the men from the beaches.

One of my great uncles was at both Dunkirk and Normandy. So I've had second hand accounts of it growing up from my mother.

I think it was a little of both.

The attack on Dunkirk was halted for several days. I think, in part because Hitler had never wanted war with the UK and admired them. It was Hitler who ordered the battle halted, and then resumed.

It is very conflicted. At any rate, the Germans stopped the attack for three days and allowed a defensive perimeter to be established and the evacuation to be organized, allowing something of around 338,000 allied troops to escape. The entire battle lasted 11 days and it was the French defense that allowed the British time to evacuate, as well as that three day pause in the battle. Had the attack been pressed it would have been an even greater disaster for them.

[Sp4]

Germany was rebuilt after the war, which was mostly made possible by the US and whoever else paid for the Marshall plan (It's been a while since I did this in school, so I can't remember if it was just US)

The way WW2 went, Germany could not have won it. There are a lot of reasons for that, one of the biggest was probably that the country wasn't prepared for the war to get as big or last as long as it did.
Could Germany have won WW2 if WW2 went differently? Who knows? What was Hitler trying to win? What was the idea he had for the country, or empire rather. The better question would probably be whether Germany could have realised his ideas and plans.

[Brenus]

“The attack on Dunkirk was halted for several days.” Not really. Goering and Hitler though that the Luftwaffe could do the job. Even today, we have people over-estimating Air-power… And even if the English would have lost the BEF, it was “only” hundreds of thousand soldiers. More important, they lost all the heavy material, which was a blessing as their tanks were under gunned and too slow.

As the question of the French tanks, they were better than most of the Germans tanks. The German had a better tactic and were trained to be aggressive. They trained for years, when France was very reluctant to go for other slaughter. Unfortunately, the several French Governments (and UK) couldn’t believe that a leader in Europe would go for another one…
But, the reality is that the Germans answered to the Russian Tanks. The Pz IV was the early answer to the T34 and KV. Then they developed the Panther, then the Tiger. But the T34 evolved as well, and in term of innovation, the T34 with the slope armour and large caterpillars were more ahead than the Germans tanks.

[Alexander the Pretty Good]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K_DnRn9hyFU

They might've, but it would've required Nazi Germany to act like not-Nazi-Germany.


The Pz IV was the early answer to the T34 and KV.
Well, the up-armament projects were the answer, but the Pz 4 was designed before the Germans faced the T-34 and KV.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Could Germany have won? Yes. The odds against Germany were pretty steep though.


With Major Shifts from History
An easy win would have required several major alterations of history including a war production board aligning Germany's economy for war; a greater emphasis on motorization and logistical transport/tank recovery units; discarding the use of naval surface vessels past those needed for service strictly in the Baltic so as to greatly increase the numbers of submarines and reprovisioning submarines available; a far greater effort to neutralize/conquer Gibraltar and Malta; A greater willingness to turn the panzer spearheads loose without worrying about their flanks so as to multiply the speed/shock impact; and under no circumstances declare war against the USA until after they have declared war on you. Just a few minor things.....


Without
Absent major changes from what happened, it is possible, though still a bit unlikely, that Germany might have punched through to Moscow -- with it's attendant destruction of a big slice of Soviet heavy industry and their rail infrastructure -- had the Germans followed the conquest of Smolensk with short operational pause and a direct strike at the Soviet capitol (beginning c. 15 Sep not 2 Oct). Would have been tough going logistically, but might have brought Stalin's regime down and/or shattered the entire front as the rail network went down for everything North of Vorozneh [sic?]. Apparently, Sep/Oct of '41 was the only time the Russians were truly on the brink of an outright collapse. The Caucuses campaign in '42 was hard on the Soviets, but never brought them to the brink of collapse.

And yes, ultimately, it all hinged on Russia. Had Germany won there it would have been almost impossible for the USA/UK to retake Europe. With Atomic weapons years away -- and some worried it was many years yet at the time -- it is arguable that some form of peace deal could have been made that left Germany in charge of pretty much all of Europe East of the Rhine.

[Montmorency]

Aside from "everything going right in just the right ways", a few of the more critical changes:

*Taking Moscow and killing/capturing Stalin (who refused to evacuate, historically)
*"Liberating" the Western Republics, including Ukraine, and assimilating/accomodating them politically and socially so as to maximize both long-term resource extraction and collaboration while minimizing the partisan threat and thus required security presence and logistical instability
*Not doing that thing with the Jews and Gypsies, and rather using their patriotism, technical knowledge, and manpower toward the war effort
*Taking Baku and rapidly restoring at least 10% of production
*Going HOI3-style and mobilizing the full war-economy from the beginning
*Keeping Hitler away from Operations
*Not getting involved in Yugoslavia and Greece; this factor is usually underestimated for its contribution to the ultimate failure of the Eastern Campaign
*Abandoning the North African campaign from the beginning as a logistical trap

Oh, and maybe getting Japan heavily involved in Pacific Russia. This would have been militarily and economically ineffectual against the USSR overall, but may just have kept the Japanese busy enough to avert Pearl Harbor. :grin:

[Seamus Fermanagh]

IIRC, Soviet Industry was already on its way east of the Urals by the time the attack on Moscow stalled. Had the Germans taken Moscow and kept the momentum up against the Russians, I think they would still have had to create a defensive line at some point for the winter. Perhaps the allies wind up pumping all their resources into russia from the east, perhaps Japan even manages to make that incredibly difficult for a time, but I think eventually the Germans are still overcome by logistical inequalities. The Nazi's weren't exactly getting the most bang for their buck from occupied land, so unless the Germans drive all the way to the Pacific there's just no way. Eventually they get bogged down in Russia somewhere, and momentum takes over.

The only way Germany wins is if they somehow avoid war with Russia. It is crazy to think that ideology and an over-abundance of hateful enthusiasm is what doomed the German war-machine. In more rational hands than the Nazis, they may have won control of most of Europe and retained it to this day.

Soviet industry was on its way east, with some 1500 critical factories (12% of weapons manufacturing) moved East (the Germans trashed/captured over 30k factories of various kinds). While production resumed at the Ural "shadow" facilities as quickly as early December 1941, pre-invasion production levels were not reached until March/April -- and then rapidly surpassed as efforts continued. In terms of material, the window for German victory was the final quarter of 1941.

Punching through to Moscow, especially if it ended up killing Stalin and/or Beria, would have been a decapitation blow. It is arguable that the Soviets might have sought terms. There are even suggestions that Stalin would actually have evacuated and then sought terms (while building for revenge later). At a minimum, the Soviet counter offensive would have been far more limited as, without the rail nexus of Moscow, rapidly slotting in all of the Eastern forces would have been a far more difficult task.

Absent the Soviets suing for peace after a catastrophic shock, there was little or no chance for Germany to win. As you rightly said, the logistics/ecomics were not there. Only the last four months of 1941 were a potential window for victory and only if Moscow fell before December, and preferably with a dead Stalin.


However, I disagree with you as to "avoid war with Russia." Part of the reason for the success of Barbarossa is the extensive forward deployment of Soviet forces and the preponderance of forces south of the Pripyet marshes. A number of writers have argued that, without Barbarossa, Hitler goes to war in mid-1942 to counter the Soviet invasion of Rumania and Bulgaria. In short, the war against Russia was likely inevitable, only the particulars would have been altered.

[AntiDamascus]

If Germany had not declared war on the US post Pearl Harbor could they have won a war in Europe before the US got around to it? Even including a fight with the Soviets.

[boarwild]

If you read RHS Stolfi's Hitler's Panzers East, he makes the argument (quite convincingly) that had not Hitler redirected his armored units south into Ukraine in July/August 1941 and taken Moscow as planned, he could have effectively taken the Soviet Union out of the war. England & the US would have seen Stalin as effectively beaten and would have husbanded their war material instead of shipping it overseas.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

If you read RHS Stolfi's Hitler's Panzers East, he makes the argument (quite convincingly) that had not Hitler redirected his armored units south into Ukraine in July/August 1941 and taken Moscow as planned, he could have effectively taken the Soviet Union out of the war. England & the US would have seen Stalin as effectively beaten and would have husbanded their war material instead of shipping it overseas.

Its a great read. Stolfi acknowledges that it still might have come up a bit short -- the logistics/tank recovery teams might have pulled it off but it would've been close. But Guderian was correct and OKH and Hitler wrong. They needed to have kept up the skeer and didn't. That was the one chance for victory.

'damascus:
Had the USA never been involved in Europe aside from the Lend Lease we supplied before the end of 1942, Germany would still have lost. After the last quarter of 1941, The USSR could have beaten them even had England sued for peace. Stalin and Beria were willing to kill 40 million Russians to win -- say what you will about them being monsters, you cannot fault their resolve -- and Germany never had the wherewithal to land a killing blow after the first Winter. Absent the USA and absent Britain, the USSR may not have won until 1949 or 1950, but eventually they would have. Like Gelcube notes above, the economics of the thing meant that anything that didn't result in a decisive win for Germany in the opening year translated as an eventual -- however Pyrrhic -- victory for the CCCP.

[ReluctantSamurai]

had not Hitler redirected his armored units south into Ukraine in July/August 1941 and taken Moscow as planned, he could have effectively taken the Soviet Union out of the war.

Not likely. Stolfi never took the time to do the logistical calculations for what the Germans could throw at Moscow in July/August. At best, considering the rail repair and re-gauging time, and a brief halt to regroup after all of the furious Soviet counter-attacks against AGC, the Germans could have mustered about 20-30 divisions according to the Quartermaster General Wagner (and this if the Germans suspended all advances on the other fronts).

Let me quote you some numbers in the chapter entitled "Russian Roulette" from Martin van Creveld's book called "Supplying War":

"From the middle of July, the supply situation of Army Group Center was developing signs of schizophrenia. On the one hand Wagner [the Quartermaster General] and Halder [OKH Chief of Staff] were aware of some 'strain', but nevertheless confident of their ability to build up a new supply basis on the Dnieper, from which further operations were to be launched at the end of the month. They appeared not to hear the loud cries of help from the armies. The consumption of ammunition throughout this period was very high, and could be met only-if at all- by means of a drastic curtailment in the supply of fuel and subsistence. 9th Army was fighting around Smolensk, but its nearest railhead was still at Polotsk [a distance of 250 miles]-and this at a time when a basic load of fuel lasted for only 25-30 miles instead of the regulation 65 miles. Around the middle of August, both 9th and 2nd Army were living from hand to mouth, with stocks of ammunition still falling instead of rising in preparation for a new offensive."

Not a very nice situation to begin a major offensive with a city of over 2 million residents at the end of it. And if the strong forces present in the Kiev district are not eliminated, the Germans now have a very long, exposed flank with the majority of available Soviet armor sitting poised for a counter-attack from the south.

And of course everyone assumes that if Moscow falls, the Soviets automatically throw in the towel, which certainly isn't the case considering that a large chunk of their weapons and munition producing areas are completely out of reach of the Germans.

Oh, and this statement sums it all up pretty succinctly considering all the discussion of this type I've been involved with:


They might've, but it would've required Nazi Germany to act like not-Nazi-Germany.

[Sp4]

'damascus:
Had the USA never been involved in Europe aside from the Lend Lease we supplied before the end of 1942, Germany would still have lost. After the last quarter of 1941, The USSR could have beaten them even had England sued for peace. Stalin and Beria were willing to kill 40 million Russians to win -- say what you will about them being monsters, you cannot fault their resolve -- and Germany never had the wherewithal to land a killing blow after the first Winter. Absent the USA and absent Britain, the USSR may not have won until 1949 or 1950, but eventually they would have. Like Gelcube notes above, the economics of the thing meant that anything that didn't result in a decisive win for Germany in the opening year translated as an eventual -- however Pyrrhic -- victory for the CCCP.

What about nuclear weapons?

[Seamus Fermanagh]

The Soviets were closer to a bomb than the Germans ever were. We still don't know who the mole(s?) in the Manhattan Project was.

We learned a lot about their penetration of the project post 1991. The answer is that Fuchs and others had the US/UK effort fairly well penetrated. Didn't mean the Russians could just read our mail and create their own nukes overnight, but they did spool it up quickly despite much tougher quality/science base hurdles. And you are right, GC, the Germans --despite a higher science and quality base than the Soviets -- were several steps behind.


Sp4

Atomic weapons were, to put it kindly, a craft industry at the time. We might have reached a 10/month production level by mid-1946. Would that have been enough of a "hammer" to force a German surrender? Remember, they had endured 1,000 plane raids and fire-bombing infernos on several occasions during the war and their resolve had not faltered.

Tactically, the atomic bombs were devastating to whatever they hit, wiping out all structures that were not especially hardened within a 1 mile radius of the blast and doing sever to significant blast damage (and follow on fire) to anything within a 3 mile radius. However, their accuracy was no more pinpoint than any other air-dropped dumb bomb of that era and the deploying plane had to drop the weapon from a height of 30k feet. This limits effective deployment to fairly large, relatively slow moving or stationary targets. Limited counter-force ability, mostly a counter-value weapon (city killer) At the time, the Germans were better than anyone around in developing and using hardened facilities and dispersed production etc. (Albert Speer was effective, the rat). The Heer was as good as anyone in that era at ducking air-operations against its forces and continuing to fight effectively, and -- assuming the war with the CCCP had succeeded -- the Luftwaffe would have been far more capable of defending against the US/UK air forces than it historically was. Allied air superiority was likely, but not the air supremacy that was enjoyed for the a-bomb missions. Effective use of the bombs against active opposition would be decidedly more difficult.

Finally, there are real questions as to the willingness of public opinion to support a bombing campaign of that nature. Unlike with Japan, there would have been a deluge of pictures available through Sweden and Switzerland that may have swayed public opinion. Sadly, given attitudes at the time, there was less concern over the use of these weapons on "the Japs." Would the same harsh attitude of vengeance have prevailed in employing the weapons against German and other European targets? A somewhat harder question to answer.

[AntiDamascus]

I'm not sure the Germans were viewed in a much better light by the time the war was winding down.

[Brenus]

The answer to this question is in the German Plan. The Plan was to destroy the Russian Armies at the borders, to stop them to retreat and to re-group. Barbarossa failed in this aspect, so the all concept of the Victory for Germany, swift and decisive failed. All the later offensives were just a hope that a new push will finally destroy the Red Army.

“Pz 4 was designed before the Germans faced the T-34 and KV.” : “Work on the Panzer IV began in 1934 when Rheinmettal-Borsig, Krupp and MAN each produced a design under the codename Bataillonsführerwagen (battalion commander’s vehicle), or BW. The Krupp design (VK2001/K) won the design contest, although the original six-wheeled interleaved suspension was eventually replaced by an eight wheeled leaf-spring double bogie system. The resulting tank closely resembled the Panzer III – the Panzer IV Ausf A was actually shorter than the Panzer III Ausf A, although it was wider and taller. By the time the Panzer III design settled down with the Ausf E the Panzer IV was longer and taller, but the same width. What it did have was a bigger turret ring, which would later allow it to carry heavier guns than the Panzer III.”
From Http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_panzer_IV.html

You are technically right. However the 75 mm long barrel was an answer to the T34/KV. And the PZ V "Panther" was still an answer to the T34.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

...You are technically right. However the 75 mm long barrel was an answer to the T34/KV. And the PZ V "Panther" was still an answer to the T34.

Quite right.

The Germans, however, really should have shifted away from the IV in favor of alternate format III's (a more successful chassis) and the V. As it was, they kept upgrading the IV. Easy to say in hindsight of course.

[Brenus]

The V had a lot of mechanical flaws, as gearbox and turret motor weak. Crews had trouble with the caterpillars and it was a hell of work for maintenance and repair.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

The V had a lot of mechanical flaws, as gearbox and turret motor weak. Crews had trouble with the caterpillars and it was a hell of work for maintenance and repair.

Emphatically true of the Ausf D, but significantly less so by the time Ausf G was rolled out. Admittedly the last gear of the final drive was still more prone to failure than it should have been which is why they planned on using the drive from the Tiger II in later iterations of the Panther. Turret rotation speed was slow compared to the M4 with its electrical assist and slightly slower than the t-34 series, but was comparable to all the other AFVs then extant. Apparently the Tiger I was the slowest. Sadly for their maintenance crews, most German AFV's were more labor intensive to maintain than their Allied counterparts.

Apparently, [/insert cheesy Mecklenburg accent] "I want solid repairs -- no short-cuts!" [/cheesy accent] was inevitable for the Germans.

[The Lurker Below]

They seldom do in board gaming either - http://axisandalliesworldclub.net/MatchLog.asp

So far in October the allies have a commanding 99 to 61 lead over the axis.

[PanzerJaeger]

Germany could have won the war up to and including the battle of Kursk had the military leadership been given the operational flexibility to maneuver and react to battlefield conditions. The Soviets were never as strong as their numbers implied, and Allied performance in North Africa, Normandy, Italy, Market Garden, and the Battle of the Bulge strongly suggests that they would not have fared well against first-line German military units; the vast majority of which were in Russia throughout the war. That's not to say that had Hitler not constantly stymied his generals, Germany would have mopped up the Allies with little issue. The likelihood of success that late in the game would be slim, but I can envision a path to victory via large scale envelopments of Soviet spearheads such as those executed during the 2nd and 3rd Battles of Kharkov. The Russian manpower/supply situation was not endless, and I do not believe they could have sustained another season of enormous losses any more than the German forces could after Bagration. If Stalin could have been made to sue for peace or effectively marginalized - which, again, I believe would have been possible but not likely in '43 - the Allies would have been cake.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Germany could have won the war up to and including the battle of Kursk


If Stalin could have been made to sue for peace or effectively marginalized - which, again, I believe would have been possible but not likely in '43

The best Germany could ever hope for by Kursk, was a stalemate. I would like to see some sort of plan that even remotely gives them a chance to win, by that time......


Allied performance in North Africa, Normandy, Italy, Market Garden, and the Battle of the Bulge strongly suggests that they would not have fared well against first-line German military units

A rather harsh and decidedly untrue statement. The Eastern Front, while it certainly attracted a much higher total number of German units, doesn't automatically qualify that theatre of operations as having the 'vast majority' of first-line units.

[ReluctantSamurai]

On the western front post D-Day it was mostly green troops (in fact often too old or too young to boot) or unhappy conscripts from occupied countries that the allies faced.

This can only be said of the static coastal defense units. Without delving too far into OOB's, here's a few units that fought in Western Europe during the summer of 1944:

1st SS Panzer Corps, which consisted of the 1st SS Panzer Division, the 12th SS Hitlerjugend, and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier
Panzer Lehr Division
2d Panzer Division
21 Panzer Division
1st SS Panzer Division Liebstandarte
2d SS Panzer Division Das Reich
9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen
10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg
II Fallschirm Corps containing the 3d & 5th Fallschirm Divisions
schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101 and schwere Panzer Abteilung 503 (both with a mix of Tiger I's and King Tiger's)

......and the list goes on. If you have any kind of access to OOB/TO&E lists (like Nafziger), you'll quickly see that most of those divisions just mentioned were elite or highly rated German units. One could do a listing for infantry units and find a number of highly rated units, as well. So the notion that the Allies in Western Europe fought the dregs at the bottom of the German manpower barrel is a myth.


I think that's irrelevant compared to the air power and artillery advantages the Allies had from D-Day on though.

And yet in one of the most famous armored battles between the Western Allies and Germany (Arracourt), which was fought entirely in the fog and rain (hence no air support whatsoever for the Allies, ended in a major defeat for the Germans. One could also point to the Ardennes Offensive in Dec 1944-Jan 1945 as another battle fought largely without air support for the Allies, yet resulted in another major defeat for the Germans despite the element of nearly complete surprise and the presence of two elite Panzer Armies in the 5th and 6th, along with a who-is-who list of German generals. Bastogne grabs all of the highlights and glory, but the defense of St. Vith was just as crucial to stopping the German advance and was a brilliant piece of tactics by Brigadier General Robert W. Hasbrouck who fought with a patchwork of units from several different US divisions against major elements of 6th Panzer Army.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Germany could have won the war up to and including the battle of Kursk had the military leadership been given the operational flexibility to maneuver and react to battlefield conditions. The Soviets were never as strong as their numbers implied, and Allied performance in North Africa, Normandy, Italy, Market Garden, and the Battle of the Bulge strongly suggests that they would not have fared well against first-line German military units; the vast majority of which were in Russia throughout the war. That's not to say that had Hitler not constantly stymied his generals, Germany would have mopped up the Allies with little issue. The likelihood of success that late in the game would be slim, but I can envision a path to victory via large scale envelopments of Soviet spearheads such as those executed during the 2nd and 3rd Battles of Kharkov. The Russian manpower/supply situation was not endless, and I do not believe they could have sustained another season of enormous losses any more than the German forces could after Bagration. If Stalin could have been made to sue for peace or effectively marginalized - which, again, I believe would have been possible but not likely in '43 - the Allies would have been cake.

It is a certainty that, by 1943 if not earlier, Hitler was far more debilitating to German war efforts and there is no doubt that Germany's performance could have been more effective absent his "leadership." So, I suppose Citadel (or something at about the same time frame) succeeding might have engendered enough casualty through encirclement that Stalin asked for a cease-fire (might have been labeled peace but would have only been a cease fire for rebuilding in practice). I really doubt it though. The numbers simply do not line up.

It is possible that I am overestimating Soviet abilities and will for the 1942 season. I don't think that campaign ever carried the potential for a kill blow as did the one in 1941, but I can understand how you make that argument. With Hitler NOT involved beyond the grand strategic level and with Speer active before 1943, it is certain that Germany would have been more dangerous.

I believe that you are both correct and wrong as to the manpower situation though. Postwar analysis reveals that approximately 1 in every 7 Soviets died during the conflict. Russia's population and growth numbers have literally never recovered from that calamity. By any rational measure, you are therefore correct that the Sovs were far closer to the "bottom of the barrel" on manpower than they seemed to be at the time. On the other hand, Stalin was at the helm. He truly had a Total War Game Series AI view of his own casualties and, I believe, had it required 1 in every 4 Russians/Soviets, that Stalin would still have prosecuted the war in much the same fashion. In other words, he would not have reacted rationally to the casualties level as we of the West would define rational.

[AntiDamascus]

I almost don't trust Stephen Ambrose anymore even though I'm sure most of his stuff is right.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Many so-called SS units in the west were shells of their former selves, nowhere near full stregth and often filled with unwilling conscripts from places like Romania, Poland, or even Russia. Stephen Ambrose goes on at length about this in his book Citizen Soldiers, which I'll dig up later.

I'll save you the trouble...and Ambrose is one of the worst sources you could possibly use:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_E._Ambrose


Beginning late in his life and continuing after his death, however, evidence and reports have continued to surface documenting longtime patterns of plagiarism, falsification, and inaccuracies in many of his published writings and other work.

http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/09/0109ambrose.html


In his World War II book Citizen Soldiers, Ambrose clearly acknowledges his debt to Beyond the Beachhead, which was published by Stackpole Books . “I also stole material profitably if shamelessly” from Balkoski’s book and from that of another historian, Ambrose writes in an author’s note. He also cites Balkoski in the text–but the relevant passages tend to borrow Balkoski’s words freely without using quote marks.

Read the rest of the article for a sample of Ambrose's plagiarism and "artful" twisting of another authors' material....:inquisitive:

So ok, I'll give you the OOB for the two SS Panzer Divisions of 1st SS Panzer Corps as of 6 June 1944: (from Niehorster---http://niehorster.orbat.com/000_admin/000oob.htm)

1st SS Panzer Division

42 operational PzIVH with 8 in repair shops
38 operational Panthers with 0 in repair shops
53 operational StuG IIIG's

Artillery: 18) 10.5cm---16) 15cm---6) Wespe 10.5cm SPG---6) Hummel 15cm SPG---10) 15cm NbW rocket launchers

12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend

91 operational PzIVH with 7 in repair shops
48 operational Panther's with 2 in repair shops
3) Marder 7.5 cm SPATG
10) JgPzIV 7.5 cm SPATG

Artillery: 18) 10.5cm---16) 15cm---12) Wespe 10.5cm SPG---6) Hummel 15cm SPG---12) FlaK 88 ATG's---8) FlaK 37 ATG

Do these units look like "shells of their former selves, nowhere near full strength"? Hardly. I won't bore anyone else with details of other units....you can look that stuff up at Niehorster:book2:

I also find it interesting that the first deployment of the King Tiger came not on the Eastern Front, but with schwere Abteilung 503 in Normandy.

And this:


often filled with unwilling conscripts from places like Romania, Poland, or even Russia.

For the vast majority of SS units (especially the older elite units like the LAH, Das Reich, Totenkopf, etc) this sort of thing was not permitted. One simply did not pollute pure Aryan blood with riff-raff~;)

But somehow I don't believe I'm going to have any luck convincing you that many of the units that fought in Western Europe were of good quality (often times elite) with good equipment and good leadership. It's hard to break folks of the myth that the Western Allies won their part of the war on airpower and artillery alone, along with unlimited resources:shrug:

And speaking of overwhelming firepower via artillery and airplanes...why do we never have this type of discussion about the Soviets? Just do a little reading into OOB's for Soviet offensives starting with Uranus. It's simply astounding that any German could survive a Soviet artillery bombardment at the opening of an offensive considering the ungodly tonnage of TNT applied........

[ReluctantSamurai]

logistics and fire support made the difference in the west.

Aye, that it did. And thankfully, perhaps for me, it made the difference in the PTO, as well.....my father fought with the 40th US Army Division, and if the US had to use more manpower in lieu of firepower......well, I might not be here having this discussion:creep:

[PanzerJaeger]

The best Germany could ever hope for by Kursk, was a stalemate. I would like to see some sort of plan that even remotely gives them a chance to win, by that time......

As I previously stated, both the Russian and German armies were exhausted by '43. The Russians had more men in uniform, but the military's ability to recover from the kinds of massive losses experienced in the previous two fighting seasons had largely reached its limit. (This can be seen in the difficultly Russia had replenishing its losses after Kursk as compared to the quick rebound between '41-'42, which contributed to their inability to fully exploit the counteroffensives conducted after the battle and the relatively static nature of the Eastern Front until Bagration.) I believe a large scale envelopment (or several smaller scale ones) could have destroyed not only the offensive capabilities of the Red Army but also Stalin's will to continue the fight. In contrast to the myth, the man certainly did not have a "steel" constitution, and it is conceivable that, facing a major reversal, he would have sued for peace.

The Germans mustered a very powerful force for Kursk, one capable of taking the fight back to the gates of Moscow under the unrestrained leadership of Manstein and Model and with a bit of luck. It was unfortunate, or I suppose fortunate, that it was thrown against a brick wall specifically crafted to destroy it. As I stated, the Germans demonstrated the ability to outmaneuver and defeat much larger Soviet formations late into the war (Kharkov) and even well after Kursk (Iasi Offensive). Neither Model nor Manstein wanted any part of the highly predictable, frontal attack that Hitler approved for Kursk, preferring to allow the Soviets to attack first and defeat them through maneuver and envelopment, which would have played to the German forces' strengths. Given the Soviet's propensity for over extension of their forces, a "backhand" operation could have achieved the kind of envelopment necessary to remove entire Soviet armies from the game.

Essentially, the situation at the front was far more tenuous than is often implied through the numbers, which do not take into account combat effectiveness. I certainly do not think it would have been likely, but it is possible that the Germans could have delivered a powerful enough blow to reverse the fundamental calculus dictating the course of events on the Eastern Front. They had the forces and leadership in place to do so.


A rather harsh and decidedly untrue statement. The Eastern Front, while it certainly attracted a much higher total number of German units, doesn't automatically qualify that theatre of operations as having the 'vast majority' of first-line units.

Allied performance speaks for itself - while consistently overmanned and oversupplied, they also consistently underperformed as compared to their Russian and German counterparts. They lacked a sense of strategic and/or tactical urgency, consistently failing to take advantage of their material superiority or their enemy’s weakness.

Take the Battle of the Bulge for example. The Allies were at the height of the operational capabilities in manpower, material, and experience while the Germans’ capabilities had been eroded to a great degree; many of the units taking part – once arguably the best in the world – were shadows of their former selves, brought up to full strength with Volkssturm and other conscript units. And yet, when the German assault exhausted the resources necessary to keep moving forward, the infighting and confusion/lack of situational awareness that characterized Allied operations throughout the war prevented a decisive response and the vast majority of German forces were simply allowed to withdraw back to their starting lines (and give the Seventh Army quite the mauling in the process). Allowing such a large, weak, and exposed enemy salient to simply evaporate at its own pace without even an attempt at envelopment would have been unthinkable on the Eastern Front, where commanders on both sides would have recognized the need to act without haste to take advantage of the situation.

And speaking of The Bulge, I have a few issues with your characterization:


One could also point to the Ardennes Offensive in Dec 1944-Jan 1945 as another battle fought largely without air support for the Allies, yet resulted in another major defeat for the Germans despite the element of nearly complete surprise and the presence of two elite Panzer Armies in the 5th and 6th, along with a who-is-who list of German generals. Bastogne grabs all of the highlights and glory, but the defense of St. Vith was just as crucial to stopping the German advance and was a brilliant piece of tactics by Brigadier General Robert W. Hasbrouck who fought with a patchwork of units from several different US divisions against major elements of 6th Panzer Army.

a) Not to discount the efforts of the Allied soldiers – they fought hard and did delay the German timetable to some extent – but the offensive ground to a halt due to fuel and ammunition shortages and an inability for supply lines to keep up with the spearheads, as the German commanders predicted.

b) “Largely without air support” is incorrect. The offensive began on December 16 and the battle lasted until January 25; by December 23 Allied air power was again fully operational. So the Allies operated without air support for roughly one week out of a six week engagement, a period in which they were shattered and thrown back in disarray.

c) Calling any German unit that participated in the Bulge “elite” is a bit of a stretch. There were some elite banners carried into battle, but those units truly were shells of their former selves at that point. While the Germans were quite resourceful in quickly building surprisingly competent divisions from scratch through the clever distribution of battle hardened veterans in key positions, an ever increasing number of corners had to be cut by that stage of the war to meet the offensive's start date. I can detail the lack of training, use of Volks personnel to augment depleted units, deficit of fuel and supplies, etc. if you like. Such conditions were present throughout the German force, even in 1SS, Hitler’s namesake unit.

[Brenus]

“that Stalin asked for a cease-fire” I read somewhere that, in fact, negotiations had been started but Stalin wanted a return to the 1941 borders, and Hitler disagreed. Citadel was to show that if Germany couldn’t win in the East, at least it could still bite.
Hitler had shown previously a good instinct for Political Aims whereas his Generals couldn’t grasp the reality outside of the battlefields. The only problem (err, one of) for Hitler was his politic was based on strength and intimidation, and he hadn’t theses any more. The skills and the will of the German Soldiers will avoid a total collapse, but in Kursk, the German Forces only succeeded to dent the Soviets, but they didn’t succeed to reach their initial target. Later one, Model did claim it could have done it, if, but even this wouldn’t have secure the victory as the second pince was stalled completely.
And the Soviet still had 2 Reserved ARMIES.

As the Soviet man power, can I remind here that it was NOT Stalin who had to call on the 55 and 14 years Old to go to war? So Nazi Germany was more on the edge that USSR for this matter, and each liberated territories was adding to the Red Army man power. And I imagine that the volunteers for the former Nazi Occupied Territories were as motivated as possible to take on Germans.

Fortunately, The German War Machine was not adapted to the task, nor her allies were. Lack of strategic bombers, lack of really modern infantry weapons (disregarded because very good one as MG42 and Sturmgehewr 44 but can’t hind the fact that most of the infantry was equipped with Mauser 98), lack of fighters with enough autonomy, absolute disorganisation in the war production and design in new material, rivalry within the army (Wehrmacht, SS), Intelligence (Abwehr, Gestapo), I can carry on… And we can speak about Germany’s Allies: Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy, and Hungary were used as cannon-fodder.

The entire concept of the Blitzkrieg was just flawed. As the Soviet Armies were not destroy at the borders as intended by Barbarossa, and succeeded to withdraw with heavy losses, but still managed to do it, the all Nazi Machine designed for one tactic didn’t adapt then collapse. The only hope was always “a last push” and the Russian would collapse. So the Germans pushed, and pushed, and pushed, and no collapse. But you can read here and there the same sentence.
The point is, nowhere in the Russian Front, after Moscow, you have a sign of a collapse in term of will to fight. The Germans did manage to win others battles and pushes, but the final collapse never happened.

[ReluctantSamurai]

As I previously stated, both the Russian and German armies were exhausted by '43.

I don't believe that they were, judging from the tremendous buildup on both sides before Kursk. Germany had rebuilt its' Panzer armies and brought many of the Grenadier Divisions to nearly full strength. The Soviets, besides the massive concentration of forces within the Kursk salient, had 6 entire armies in reserve including two new tank armies (the 3rd & 5th Guards). I don't think that the Soviets ran out of steam until after the completion of Operation Bagration. By then, both sides had suffered very high casualties, and needed rest and refit before continuing the conflict.


In contrast to the myth, the man certainly did not have a "steel" constitution, and it is conceivable that, facing a major reversal, he would have sued for peace.

In the late fall of 1941, this might perhaps be true IF the Germans had managed to capture Moscow. But by mid-1943, I doubt anything that the Germans could do would shake Stalin's confidence in victory. The Soviets had survived the dark days of 1941-42, had inflicted two major defeats on the Germans at Moscow and Stalingrad, and with the help of Lend Lease supplies and increased domestic production, were pushing the Germans back towards the original start borders of Barbarossa. Why would any defeat on the part of the Soviets cause Stalin to sue for peace?



The Germans mustered a very powerful force for Kursk, one capable of taking the fight back to the gates of Moscow under the unrestrained leadership of Manstein and Model and with a bit of luck.

This is just a pipe dream, I'm afraid. The Germans just barely got a glimpse of Moscow's tower spires in Dec 1941 before getting thrown back, and this under conditions of a badly organized and severely demoralized Red Army with a lot of dated equipment and poor tactics. What would lead you to believe it could be done against a now well equipped adversary both on the ground and in the air, who has good to excellent experienced leadership, with better organization (particularly in armor) and the confidence that the German could be defeated? And German logistics isn't any better in 1943 than it was in 1941...horse drawn methods were still prevalent.


a "backhand" operation could have achieved the kind of envelopment necessary to remove entire Soviet armies from the game.

Given the extent of Soviet mechanization (particularly with the ever-growing truck park) and the reorganization of armor into something resembling what the Germans were doing, I don't think you would have seen any 1941-42 style encirclements even if the Germans had not been the aggressor at Kursk. And Soviet generals had learned some very hard lessons in the previous two years to walk blindly into such situations anyways.


it is possible that the Germans could have delivered a powerful enough blow to reverse the fundamental calculus dictating the course of events on the Eastern Front. They had the forces and leadership in place to do so.

Without LRB's to do serious damage to Soviet industry, and LL cranking up to high proportions, I just can't agree with this. Germany just cannot slow Soviet production of weapons and material, and the ever-growing power of the VVS would ensure that no German offensive doesn't get severely punished by airpower.


Allied performance speaks for itself - while consistently overmanned and oversupplied, they also consistently underperformed as compared to their Russian and German counterparts. They lacked a sense of strategic and/or tactical urgency, consistently failing to take advantage of their material superiority or their enemy’s weakness.

At the risk of getting into a pissing contest, for every example you can put up that shows this, I can put up others that show the opposite:inquisitive:


And yet, when the German assault exhausted the resources necessary to keep moving forward, the infighting and confusion/lack of situational awareness that characterized Allied operations throughout the war prevented a decisive response and the vast majority of German forces were simply allowed to withdraw back to their starting lines.

And such things never happened in the ranks of the Heer:rolleyes: If Patton and Collins had been able sway Ike instead of Monty and Bradley, the counter-offensive would have been aimed at the shoulders with the intent of bagging the whole of the troops still in the salient.


but the offensive ground to a halt due to fuel and ammunition shortages and an inability for supply lines to keep up with the spearheads.

This only happened to a large extent to 6th Panzer Army and specifically Peiper's Kampfgruppe. 5th Panzer Army did not suffer nearly so much, and was able to reach as far as Celles before having to turn back.


by December 23 Allied air power was again fully operational.

Not according to Dupuy. Up until the January counter-offensive, air support was spotty, at best...a few good flying days here and there before the fog and snow settled back in. Besides, at the two critical junctions of Bastogne and St. Vith, the Americans inflicted high casualties on the Germans and slowed the advance to such an extent that by Christmas, most of the generals leading the advance had already conceded failure....all pretty much without air support.

And in reference to c) above....yep, the Allies fought nothing but the dregs from the bottom of the barrel, and won solely on the strength of overwhelming material.....

[ReluctantSamurai]

@ PJ

Something for both of our pov's concerning the use of airpower during the Ardennes Offensive:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-19.html

While I don't subscribe to the USAAF's bloated kill figures ( 1161 tanks and AFV's destroyed when the entire offensive contained roughly 1500 at best? seriously?:inquisitive: ), it does show the impact of interdiction missions on the logistics of the operation:


Field Marshal von Rundstedt, upon conclusion of hostilities, summed up the effectiveness of these bridge attacks as follows:

The cutting of bridges at Euskirchen, Ahrweiler, Mayen, Bullay, Nonnweiler, Sirnmern, Bad Münster, Kaiserslautern devastatingly contributed to the halting of the Ardennes offensive. Traffic was hopelessly clogged up and caused the repair columns long delays in arriving at the destroyed bridges.

But it also points up my claim that the initial force of the attack was blunted by ground forces (St. Vith, Bastogne, 1st US Army defensive actions near Monschau) as there were very few good flying days in the period from Dec 16 to the 25th, and on the two favorable days of Dec 17 & 18, Allied FB's had to jettison their bombloads to dogfight with LW fighters in the St. Vith vicinity. Most German generals from Runstedt down to AG commanders all agreed that by Christmas, the attack could be considered a failure.

Enjoy:bow:

[PanzerJaeger]

I completely agree that the biggest impact Allied soldiers played on the ground was in blowing the bridges and dumping their fuel. (An outcome that all in the German leadership had predicted apart from Hitler's yes-men in OKW.)

My issue with the historiography surrounding the battle, which your post seemed to reflect, is that it has been almost exclusively been the purview of American authors writing good things about Americans for an American audience. The result is the exaggeration of the German’s strength, the discounting of the American aerial advantage and an attribution bias in the importance given to the combat actions of the American soldiers taking part in the battle – all, of course, predicated on the notion that the German commanders actually thought the thing would work.

The biggest example of such is obviously much overhyped action at Bastogne. Reading many contemporary works about the Bulge would lead one to believe that the “siege of Bastogne” was a singular moment in the battle and the major turning point – that the town and its crossroads were critical to the German offensive. In reality, while the Germans would have liked to have secured the town, they recognized it as a hard point and the bulk of the 5th’s spearhead bypassed it relatively easily, leaving behind a small containment force – as their doctrine dictated. The same overhyped importance is given to St. Vith.

The reality is that supply shortages, specifically fuel and ammunition, were the primary reason for the end of the offensive, trailed distantly by the clearing weather and the resumption of Allied air capabilities. Model and Rundstedt predicted that they would only be able to make it to the Meuse, and that’s essentially what they did. And despite all that’s been written about the major combat actions undertaken by the American forces, German losses were very light – much lighter than anticipated. By Christmas, the bulk of the German force remained relatively unscathed. It simply did not have the logistical capability to continue. The majority of German tanks lost, for example, we’re abandoned due to lack of fuel and not lost in combat.

As for the quality of the German troops, I agree with you in regard to Normandy. While the majority of German units were second line and of poor to very poor quality, they were much bolstered by the presence of a core of what could accurately be called ‘elite’ and first line divisions. However, by the time of the Bulge, I just do not see how one could call any of the German units ‘elite’, even as compared to their manifestations in Normandy, not to mention those of ’41 – ’43. The training, experience, unit cohesion, etc. simply wasn’t there.

None of this, by the way, is meant to disparage the American soldiers who fought in the battle. While many units broke easily, some did put up very stiff resistance and fought very well – demonstrating that lessons learned in Normandy were retained. However, it seems that the story of an elite German army defeated by plucky American resistence under no air cover has more commercial appeal than the story of a ragtag German army running itself out of fuel and withdrawing on its own accord.

[ReluctantSamurai]

And despite all that’s been written about the major combat actions undertaken by the American forces, German losses were very light – much lighter than anticipated.

German casualty list KIA/WIA/MIA (from Trevor N. Dupuy Hitlers Last Gamble):

Armored and Mechanized Divisions and Brigades: 30039 out of 159564 total (19%)
Fallschirmjaeger and Volksgrenadier Divisions: 44420 out of 170596 total (26%)

Totals: 74459 KIA/WIA/MIA out of 330160 troops committed (23%)

Notsure almost 1/4 of all troops committed to battle constitutes "very light". It doesn't in my book, at any rate....:inquisitive:


The reality is that supply shortages, specifically fuel and ammunition, were the primary reason for the end of the offensive, trailed distantly by the clearing weather and the resumption of Allied air capabilities.

Really? The real reality of the situation is that the inability to secure the major crossroads at Bastogne and St. Vith caused huge delays in the German timetable, and exacerbated an already bad logistical situation by forcing German units into rough terrain to circumvent the Americans holding those strongpoints. Take a good look at a map of that area of the Ardennes. Besides the hub of roads going in and out of both towns, there are....no other roads available. Units have to go cross-country or make large diversions because of impassable steep terrain:wall:


The biggest example of such is obviously much overhyped action at Bastogne. Reading many contemporary works about the Bulge would lead one to believe that the “siege of Bastogne” was a singular moment in the battle and the major turning point – that the town and its crossroads were critical to the German offensive. In reality, while the Germans would have liked to have secured the town, they recognized it as a hard point and the bulk of the 5th’s spearhead bypassed it relatively easily.

Right. If Bastogne was so insignificant that the bulk of 5th spearhead "bypassed it relatively easily", then why did the Germans try for an entire week to take the place? You know something Manteuffel didn't?


a ragtag German army running itself out of fuel and withdrawing on its own accord.

This comment is so sophomoric, that it doesn't even merit a reply:crazy:

[ReluctantSamurai]

The biggest example of such is obviously much overhyped action at Bastogne.[...]...that the town and its crossroads were critical to the German offensive.


The same overhyped importance is given to St. Vith.

I'm returning to these two statements and then to the opinions of the commanding officer of 5th Panzer Army, General Hasso von Manteuffel. I'll leave it to viewers as to which one to believe....

[From The German Generals Talk by Liddell Hart:

[The consequences of not capturing Bastogne]

"To cover these by-passing advances [by Panzer Lehr Division, and 2d PzD] I masked Bastogne, using the 26th VGD to surround the town, with the help of a panzer grenadier regiment from the Panzer Lehr Division."

"Even so, the masking of Bastogne entailed a weakening of my strength for the forward drive, and thus diminished the chances of reaching the Meuse at Dinant."

According to the German timetable for the attack, Bastogne was to be reached on the 2nd day, but it wasn't reached until the third day, and finally bypassed on the sixth. Now what American generals including McCauliffe at Bastogne, and Hasbrouck at St. Vith realized was that for every day the German advance could be held up or slowed, was more time for SHAEF to have to assemble a blocking force at the Meuse (which took the form of the British XXX Corps and the US 2d Armored Division), and a counter-attack (which was executed by Patton from the south, and Collins from the north). In Manteuffel's opinion, with the delays at both junctions, a forced crossing of the Meuse became impossible, and the entire salient was vulnerable to becoming cut off. The junctions were important to keep the momentum going that was gained in the first few days, and to keep the Americans off balance and struggling to halt the advance before it reached the Meuse.

So...myth and overhyped importance, or not:shrug:

A final comment from Manteuffel:

"We had hardly begun this new push [referring to the transference of the main thrust from Sepp Dietritch's 6th Panzer Army to Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army] before the Allied counter-offensive developed. I telephoned Jodl and asked him to tell the Fuhrer that I was going to withdraw my advanced forces out of the nose of the salient we had made--to the line Laroche-Bastogne. But Hitler forbade this step back. So instead of withdrawing in time, we were driven back bit by bit under pressure of the Allied attacks, suffering needlessly heavy losses. On January 5th the situation was so serious that I feared Montgomery would cut off both our Armies. Although we managed to avoid this danger, a large part of them were sacrificed. Our losses were much heavier in this later stage than they had been earlier, owing to Hitler's policy of 'no withdrawal'. It spelt bankruptcy, because we could not afford such losses."


However, it seems that the story of an elite German army defeated by plucky American resistence under no air cover has more commercial appeal than the story of a ragtag German army running itself out of fuel and withdrawing on its own accord.

Doesn't seem to me that Manteuffel would agree with that assessment:shrug:

[PanzerJaeger]

German casualty list KIA/WIA/MIA (from Trevor N. Dupuy Hitlers Last Gamble):

Armored and Mechanized Divisions and Brigades: 30039 out of 159564 total (19%)
Fallschirmjaeger and Volksgrenadier Divisions: 44420 out of 170596 total (26%)

Totals: 74459 KIA/WIA/MIA out of 330160 troops committed (23%)

Notsure almost 1/4 of all troops committed to battle constitutes "very light". It doesn't in my book, at any rate....:inquisitive:

Check your dates. The vast majority of German casualties were incurred in the defensive battles over the next month and well after the offensive ran out of fuel as the Germans used the terrain to extract as much blood out of the Allies as possible. As I said, the German force was left relatively unscathed from their offensive operations.



Right. If Bastogne was so insignificant that the bulk of 5th spearhead "bypassed it relatively easily", then why did the Germans try for an entire week to take the place? You know something Manteuffel didn't?

Again, check your dates. The main German spearhead reached Bastogne on the 20th and left on the 22nd, leaving only the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, which launched probing attacks for the next several days. There was never a major assault on the town; the panzer divisions were only used to encircle it.



This comment is so sophomoric, that it doesn't even merit a reply:crazy:

And yet, that is what happened. I do not have access to my paper sources, but I believe the wiki on such a major event can be cited with a degree of authority.

On the 'elite' German troops:


The plan originally called for just under 45 divisions, including a dozen panzer and panzergrenadier divisions forming the armored spearhead and various infantry units to form a defensive line as the battle unfolded. By this time, however, the German Army suffered from an acute manpower shortage and the force had been reduced to around 30 divisions. Although it retained most of its armor, there were not enough infantry units because of the defensive needs in the East. These 30 newly rebuilt divisions used some of the last reserves of the German Army. Among them were Volksgrenadier units formed from a mix of battle-hardened veterans and recruits formerly regarded as too young or too old to fight. Training time, equipment and supplies were inadequate during the preparations. German fuel supplies were precarious—those materials and supplies that could not be directly transported by rail had to be horse-drawn to conserve fuel, and the mechanized and panzer divisions would depend heavily on captured fuel.

On the German commanders' view of the battle:


Several senior German military officers, including Field Marshal Walter Model and von Rundstedt, expressed concern as to whether the goals of the offensive could be realized. They offered alternative plans, but Hitler would not listen.

Model and von Rundstedt both believed aiming for Antwerp was too ambitious, given Germany's scarce resources in late 1944. At the same time they felt that maintaining a purely defensive posture (as had been the case since Normandy) would only delay defeat, not avert it. They thus developed alternative, less ambitious plans that did not aim to cross the Meuse River; Model's being Unternehmen Herbstnebel (Operation Autumn Mist) and von Rundstedt's Fall Martin ("Plan Martin"). The two field marshals combined their plans to present a joint "small solution" to Hitler, who rejected it in favor of his "big solution"."

On "Siege of Bastogne":


However, the two panzer divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps—after using their mobility to isolate Bastogne, continued their mission towards the Meuse on 22 December, rather than attacking Bastogne with a single large force. They left just one regiment behind to assist the 26th Volksgrenadier Division in capturing the crossroads. The XLVII Panzer Corps probed different points of the southern and western defensive perimeter in echelon, where Bastogne was defended by just a single airborne regiment and support units doubling as infantry.

On the condition of the German force at the end of the offensive, the weather situation, the fuel/supply situation, and the typically poor allied response:


On 23 December, the weather conditions started improving, allowing the Allied air forces to attack. They launched devastating bombing raids on the German supply points in their rear, and P-47 Thunderbolts started attacking the German troops on the roads. Allied air forces also helped the defenders of Bastogne, dropping much-needed supplies—medicine, food, blankets, and ammunition. A team of volunteer surgeons flew in by military glider and began operating in a tool room.[93]

By 24 December, the German advance was effectively stalled short of the Meuse. Units of the British XXX Corps were holding the bridges at Dinant, Givet, and Namur and U.S. units were about to take over. The Germans had outrun their supply lines, and shortages of fuel and ammunition were becoming critical. Up to this point the German losses had been light, notably in armor, which was almost untouched with the exception of Peiper's losses. On the evening of 24 December, General Hasso von Manteuffel recommended to Hitler's Military Adjutant a halt to all offensive operations and a withdrawal back to the West Wall. Hitler rejected this.

However disagreement and confusion at the Allied command prevented a strong response, throwing away the opportunity for a decisive action.

Finally, on the orderly withdrawal of German forces and the Allied inability to organize a proper response:


Eisenhower wanted Montgomery to go on the counter offensive on 1 January, with the aim of meeting up with Patton's advancing Third Army and cutting off most of the attacking Germans, trapping them in a pocket. However, Montgomery, refusing to risk underprepared infantry in a snowstorm for a strategically unimportant area, did not launch the attack until 3 January, by which time substantial numbers of German troops had already managed to fall back successfully, but at the cost of losing most of their heavy equipment.

At the start of the offensive, the First and Third U.S. Armies were separated by about 25 miles (40 km). American progress in the south was also restricted to about a kilometer a day. The majority of the German force executed a successful fighting withdrawal and escaped the battle area, although the fuel situation had become so dire that most of the German armor had to be abandoned. On 7 January 1945, Hitler agreed to withdraw all forces from the Ardennes, including the SS Panzer divisions, thus ending all offensive operations. However, considerable fighting went on for another 3 weeks; St. Vith was recaptured by the Americans on 23 January and the last German units participating in the offensive did not return to their start line until 25 January.

I can expand on these facts with paper sources late next week if necessary.

[ReluctantSamurai]

You didn't address the comments made by someone who was intimately involved with the attack...namely Manteuffel. He clearly states that both junctions (Bastogne and St. Vith were necessary for a timely advance to the Meuse, and that having to invest Bastogne cost him both time and strength; time the US Army used to construct a barrier at the Meuse, and to organize a counter-attack.


Check your dates. The vast majority of German casualties were incurred in the defensive battles over the next month and well after the offensive ran out of fuel as the Germans used the terrain to extract as much blood out of the Allies as possible. As I said, the German force was left relatively unscathed from their offensive operations.

What is your point? 23% losses in men, and losing most of the 1500 AFV involved in the offensive is serious no matter at what stage of the battle they occurred. But just for S@#%s and giggles, here's a breakout:

Armored and Mechanized Divisions and Brigades

16-23 December 6620
24 Dec-1 Jan 11584
2-16 Jan 11835

Fallschirmjaeger and VGD

16-23 December 14421
24 Dec-1 Jan 12111
2-16 Jan 17888

Totals

16-23 December 21041 (6.4%)
24 Dec-1 Jan 23695 (7.2%)
2-16 Jan 29723 (9%)


The main German spearhead reached Bastogne on the 20th and left on the 22nd

The defense of Bastogne didn't involve just the town itself. First the defense perimeter had to be pushed back and this fight commenced on the 18th with elements of 2d PzD at Longvilly and Magaret just east of Bastogne. Noville to the north was attacked on the 20th.


There was never a major assault on the town; the panzer divisions were only used to encircle it.

You did not read my earlier post involving Manteuffel's comments. No German armor was used to encircle Bastogne...the 26th VGD drew that assignment. As for there not being a major assault on Bastogne:

There were repeated assaults on Senonchamps and Villeroux (west of Bastogne) and the first major assault on the town itself happened on 23 Dec by major elements of 26th VGD, the 901st PzGren Regiment, and tanks from the 130th Panzer Regiment of Panzer Lehr Division. On 25th Dec, lead elements of 15th PzGen Div joined the attack by assaulting Longchamps (NW of Bastogne), and 26th VGD attempted a break-in to Bastogne itself. On the day after Christmas, lead elements of Patton's 4th AD began arriving followed closely by other units of III Corps and by 26 December, the siege of Bastogne was over. But hey, an entire VGD, and parts of two PzGren and a Panzer Division don't count as a major assault I guess:creep:

Your sources for German armor losses are way off, as US TD's and tanks took a heavy toll in virtually every sector. Of the 800 or so AFV's destroyed, US TD's accounted for over 500 of them. The notion that most German tank losses were abandonment is....well, I'm trying to be polite here:laugh4:

I've already addressed the timid Allied response: Monty and Bradley. If Patton and Collins had had their way, not much would have made it back to the Fatherland.

As it stands, and as we all know, the whole affair was poorly conceived, poorly executed, and cost the Germans most of their effective armor formations in the West for the remainder of the war.

Now....can we move back to the topic of how Germany could've won the war, please, because one thing is for sure....the Ardennes Offensive was not one of those ways.....~;)

[PanzerJaeger]

You didn't address the comments made by someone who was intimately involved with the attack...namely Manteuffel. He clearly states that both junctions (Bastogne and St. Vith were necessary for a timely advance to the Meuse, and that having to invest Bastogne cost him both time and strength; time the US Army used to construct a barrier at the Meuse, and to organize a counter-attack.

Apart from the fact that Hart cannot be trusted as an accurate and objective conduit of information, IIRC, there was more to that quote and I will not have access to my sources until later in the week. Do you mind quoting the text before "Even so, the masking of Bastogne entailed a weakening of my strength for the forward drive, and thus diminished the chances of reaching the Meuse at Dinant"?

Beyond that, you still do not seem to have an accurate understanding of the fuel situation. Find me a source that states the Germans had a) the fuel and b) the capability to transport it to the front to cross the Meuse and operate beyond it.

This is the problem with American aggrandizement of the battle. In order to make St. Vith and Bastogne important actions, one must take Hitler's plan at face value - ie, one must accept that the German commanders truly believed that they could take and hold Brussels, Antwerp, and destroy the entire British contingent in the Netherlands. If one buys into that notion, then St. Vith and Bastogne become incredibly important in delaying the much vaunted German timetable. If they hadn't have been delayed those few days, the Germans may have crossed the Meuse and destroyed three full strength British armies!

Of course, such a notion is ridiculous on its face and no one in the German command actually believed that. Model is well known for agreeing to Hitler's battle plans and simply ignoring them - part of why he had so much success. A more realistic perspective on the battle would take into consideration not yet another one of Hitler's wildly unrealistic offensives, but what the German commanders actually believed they could achieve. Luckily, we have clear documentation of their goals in the form of the plan they presented to Hitler - the small solution.

When examining the offensive based on Model and Rundstedt’s more realistic understanding of their operational capabilities, it becomes clear that the Germans accomplished nearly exactly what they believed possible – they shocked the Allies, inflicted an embarrassing defeat on them that yielded over 20,000 POWs, and advanced to the Meuse with few casualties. Had Hitler issued a withdrawal when Manteuffel requested, the battle would have been won outright and the Germans would have been in a better defensive position moving into the spring fighting season.

You see, to embrace the idea that St. Vith and Bastogne were actually of any real significance, one must also embrace a completely unrealistic view of the German’s operational and logistical capabilities that flies in the face of all data and reason, not to mention the very German commanders that orchestrated the battle. Not only did Model and Rundstedt not want to cross the Meuse (and expose German forces to being cut off), they knew it was not possible.



What is your point? 23% losses in men, and losing most of the 1500 AFV involved in the offensive is serious no matter at what stage of the battle they occurred. But just for S@#%s and giggles, here's a breakout:

Armored and Mechanized Divisions and Brigades

16-23 December 6620
24 Dec-1 Jan 11584
2-16 Jan 11835

Fallschirmjaeger and VGD

16-23 December 1442
24 Dec-1 Jan 12111
2-16 Jan 17888

Totals

16-23 December 21041 (6.4%)
24 Dec-1 Jan 23695 (7.2%)
2-16 Jan 29723 (9%)

My point is exactly the same point I've made from the beginning of this exchange - that the German forces were left relatively unscathed during the offensive portion of the battle. American resistance cause little actual material loss.



You did not read my earlier post involving Manteuffel's comments. No German armor was used to encircle Bastogne...the 26th VGD drew that assignment.

Sigh... not true (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Bastogne).


However, the two panzer divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps—after using their mobility to isolate Bastogne, continued their mission towards the Meuse on 22 December, rather than attacking Bastogne with a single large force.


But hey, an entire VGD, and parts of two PzGren and a Panzer Division don't count as a major assault I guess:creep:

When examining such actions, it is important to understand not just the banners in use but the divisional strength and abilities at play. 26th was a horse drawn Volks division that was so under strength that it was forced to attack Bastogne piecemeal, and not in a major assault.


The 26th VG received one panzergrenadier regiment from the 15th Panzergrenadier Division on Christmas Eve for its main assault the next day. Because it lacked sufficient troops and those of the 26th VG Division were near exhaustion, the XLVII Panzer Corps concentrated its assault on several individual locations on the west side of perimeter in sequence rather than launching one simultaneous attack on all sides. The assault—led by 18 tanks carrying a battalion of infantry—pierced the lines of the 327th's 3rd Battalion (officially, the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry), and advanced as far as the battalion command post at Hemroulle.

Now that you have all of the facts, does it really sound like the Germans made a serious effort to take the town? This is yet another American myth built up around bastogne - rarely will you hear that the Battered Bastards were fighting primarily against a poorly trained, poorly equipped, undermanned, and exhausted Volks division.



Your sources for German armor losses are way off, as US TD's and tanks took a heavy toll in virtually every sector. Of the 800 or so AFV's destroyed, US TD's accounted for over 500 of them. The notion that most German tank losses were abandonment is....well, I'm trying to be polite here:laugh4:

You're asserting that over 62%... 62%... of all German tanks lost during the battle were the result of one weapons system, and you're laughing at me? Weren't you just quoting Allied Air Force claims in excess of 1,000 kills? That does not leave many losses due to fuel shortage, mechanical issues, other tanks, artillery, mines, terrain, infantry anti-tank systems, and the myriad of other reasons tanks are generally lost in combat.

Again, check your sources. You undoubtedly pulled that gem from Harry Yeide's "Tank Killers" page 255. I would be very impressed if you were in possession of Lonnie Gill's "Tank Destroyers of WWII", where the initial claim was made. Regardless, you will note that neither source says that the TDs knocked out 500 German AFVs during the battle, only that they were "credited" with those kills. Digging a little deeper into Gill's primary source work, one finds that those credits came from the TD crews themselves - and with no confirmation (and certainly with no corresponding verification to German records). As anyone who studies such things knows, kill counts for air aces, tankers, and snipers tend toward gross exaggeration.

On the other hand, we have actual German reports of mass quantities of tanks and other AFVs being abandoned due to fuel or other logistical issues. Again, I feel at a disadvantage being away from home and my paper, but a cursory look online offers support. For example, Panzer Lehr was a spearhead unit and involved in heavy combat from the outset. It not only fought during the offensive, but also on the defensive. If any division were to suffer disproportionately from the effects of these mythical American tank destroyers, Lehr would be it. However, according to Danny Parker (http://books.google.com/books?id=ASVTaalp5wgC&printsec=frontcover&output=html_text), page 338:


The Panzer Lehr Division went into battle with 3,000 grenadiers and 104 tanks and assault guns. Fifty-three of their tanks and assault guns had to be left behind due ot lack of fuel or tank-recovery vehicles.

...

German armor losses increased during the retreat later that month, when large numbers of vehicles were lost due to mechanical failure, lack of tank retrievers and the chronic shortage of fuel. The problems were further aggrevated by Hitler's "no retreat" policy during the January campaign.

So we have a very representative Panzer division that fought continuously throughout the battle losing 51% of their tanks to abandonment. Even if these magical American tank destroyers knocked out every single remaining tank lost, the numbers simply would not work.

This is the problem with American pop history surrounding the battle - credited kills are turned into confirmed kills, insignificant actions are turned into major battles, and everyone solemnly pretends that, had it not been for those plucky Americans, the Germans might just have taken Antwerp - even though it is abundantly clear that the Fuhrer had no clothes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor's_New_Clothes).

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Parker's material reveals part of the answer.

Some of those 53 tanks were not left behind for lack of fuel but for lack of a recovery vehicle. That would include a number of the tanks knocked out by US TD's (which they would have claimed as a "kill" since they saw the crew abandon the vehicle they'd just hit. The crew likely abandoned because of a mobility issue and not wanting to fight in an immobile target -- that fact that it was recoverable and could be returned to service with a few hours labor would have not made the TD crew's report). Perhaps there is a good element of truth in the claims of both sides.


EDIT: Please note that my thanks for this post comes from our resident trained tanker. Who probably had to check the tracks every time his track paused for longer than a gear change and who had to know EXACTLY how those kraut tankers would have reacted to being immobile while in somebody's gun sights.

[ReluctantSamurai]

When examining the offensive based on Model and Rundstedt’s more realistic understanding of their operational capabilities, it becomes clear that the Germans accomplished nearly exactly what they believed possible – they shocked the Allies, inflicted an embarrassing defeat on them that yielded over 20,000 POWs, and advanced to the Meuse with few casualties.

This comment is so incredibly stupid that I will refrain from commenting on the Ardennes Offensive any longer. But.....

....it has been a very interesting, and lively discussion. Many thanks:bow:

***NEWS FLASH*** After defeating the Western Allies in the Battle of the Bulge, Hitler managed to negotiate a peace settlement with the war-weary Americans and British. The Soviet Union soon followed suit after the loss of its' stoutest allies, and Hitler and the love of his life, Eva Braun retired to a comfortable villa in Rio de Janeiro, leaving the Nazi government in the capable hands of Hermann Goering, Josef Goebbels, and Heinrich Himmler. After being accused of high treason by Martin Bormann, and subsequently dismissed from all of his formerly held offices, Goering committed suicide by cyanide poison. Goebbels then assumed the office of Chancellor but soon after the war, committed murder/suicide with his wife Magda and his six children after growing increasingly despondent over his wife's supposed infidelity. That left the leadership of post-war Germany squarely on the shoulders of Heinrich Himmler. Himmler, who had always harbored a secret desire for the life of a wandering minstrel, decided to leave the notoriety of German High Command and become a bard of some repute in the rural mountains of Bavaria. Nazi Germany collapsed under the pressures of post-war reconstruction due to soaring inflation and the lack of effective leadership. ***NEWS FLASH***

[Sp4]

Go talk about something else. This is entertaining to read.

[PanzerJaeger]

Parker's material reveals part of the answer.

Some of those 53 tanks were not left behind for lack of fuel but for lack of a recovery vehicle. That would include a number of the tanks knocked out by US TD's (which they would have claimed as a "kill" since they saw the crew abandon the vehicle they'd just hit. The crew likely abandoned because of a mobility issue and not wanting to fight in an immobile target -- that fact that it was recoverable and could be returned to service with a few hours labor would have not made the TD crew's report). Perhaps there is a good element of truth in the claims of both sides.


You're right. However, based on my understanding of the German inventory system in place at the time, the tank in your scenario would be tallied as a battlefield loss to enemy fire unless the Germans took or retook the area in question and held it long enough to have the tank reclassified by a quartermaster. That certainly happened at some points, but you're really playing at the margins. The 500 figure is patently absurd and not corroborated by any records, as are the USAF credits of 1,161. Added together, they would equal more AFVs than the Germans even had, much less those lost. Establishing accurate kill counts is a time consuming and difficult process that involves the comparison of multiple records from both sides and it can never be an exact science, but the one thing any historian worth his salt understands is that one does not take credits at face value as they are always exaggerated. IIRC, even during the war, in trying to establish accurate Soviet armor losses, the OKW reduced German claims by two thirds.


This comment is so incredibly stupid that I will refrain from commenting on the Ardennes Offensive any longer.

That may be best, as it was beginning to feel as though I was trying to have a civil discussion with a petulant child.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

The 500 figure is patently absurd and not corroborated by any records, as are the USAF credits of 1,161.

Nobody with any knowledge of USAAC claims in combat would have put much stock in the number. For example, a quick scan of the wiki (this one with triple sourcing) notes the following from the first shuttle mission (Regensburg Schweinfurt in 1943):

"Spitfire pilots claimed 13 German fighters shot down and P-47 pilots claimed 19.[19][20] Gunners on the bombers claimed 288 fighters shot down,[21][22] but Luftwaffe records showed only 25-27 were lost."

The German Air Force had only 400 fighters committed to intercepting the raid. Losing 75% in an afternoon would probably have been noticeable....not that that bothered the aircrews making the silly claims.

The USAAC consistently claimed far higher accuracy, far higher damage inflicted, and far higher kill totals than could be supported by anything resembling fact.

[Sp4]

Could Japan have secured a permanent pacific Empire?

Yes, that's actually interesting. I know nothing about that theater of the war. Go!

[The Lurker Below]

I offer General Marshall's VICTORY REPORT On the Winning of World War II in Europe and the Pacific published 1 September 1945 under the subtitle "Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 1943 to 1945, to the Secretary of War"

No claims are made regarding accuracy or authority of truth, I simply put this out to share what senior U.S. military staff were willing to share with the American public as their answer to the O.P. question.


The steps in the German defeat, as described by captured members of the High Command were:
1. Failure to invade England. (followed by a paragraph of fancy militaristic leadership words)
2. The Campaign of 1941 in the Soviet Union. (words as above)
3. Stalingrad. (words)
4. Invasion of North Africa. Allied landings in North Africa came as a surprise to the German High Command. (and more words. added first sentence to clarify whose invasion)
5. The Invasion of France. (lotsa words)
6. The Ardennes Counterattack. (words) was Hitler's personal conception....Other German officers believe that this operation was reckless in the extreme, in that it irreparably damaged the comparatively fresh armored divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army...(and more words)
7. The Crossing of the Rhine. (words)

This thing was pretty cheaply produced and very cheaply bound so I don't jump into it too often. But it's interesting to keep around. 123 pages of senior staff garbage mixed in with a few interesting maps and some interesting tables and charts. I know it can add no content to this discussion, but perhaps it will add a bit of context.

[ReluctantSamurai]

#1. Could be true, but I tend to think that it's over-hyped. A complete U-boat blockade would deliver the same result>>>the removal of the UK from WW2.
#2. Probably the most debated topic concerning Germany's chances to win WW2. I have never subscribed to attacking the SU as a mistake. In fact, I think Hitler could not have chosen a better time. After the Stalin purges and huge reorganization of army structure and equipment taking place, The Soviet Union was in an extreme state of unreadiness and coupled with Stalin's blind faith that Hitler would not attack, almost proved fatal to the Soviet Union's existence.
#3. Another over-hyped point, IMO. Yes, it hurt, but it wasn't necessarily fatal, and given proper direction, Germany could very well have fought the SU to a standstill.
#4. N.Africa was always a minor theatre of operations, and Germany only got involved because of the botched invasion of Egypt by its Italian ally. Now if Rommel had just followed orders and maintained a defensive posture after evicting the British from Libya, most of what happened in NA probably wouldn't have happened (again just my opinion).
#5, 6, & 7. The war was already lost by that point and really doesn't play into the OP of how Germany could have won:shrug:

IMHO, the issue gets back to the saying that in order to win, Nazi Germany would have had to not act like Nazi Germany. In this respect, two things would have greatly enhanced Germany's chances:

1. Get their economy on a war footing much sooner than 1943. Germany believed it could defeat the Soviets quickly enough to avoid a war of attrition. The failure of Operation Typhoon should have been a wakeup call that the Soviets were not going to go down any time soon, and that an attrition war was now looming....one that Germany was capable of winning. After Stalingrad, it was painfully obvious that the Soviets were generating military power faster than the Germans despite their horrific losses, and by then it was too late for Germany to catch up.

2. One of the biggest "un-Nazi" things that could have been done after the invasion of the Soviet Union, was to not send in the Einsatz to the Ukraine to do their pacification/genocide thing. The Ukraine harbored a deep resentment for Russians, and Stalin in particular for the forced farm collectivizations of the 30's, and the widespread famine that killed millions of Ukrainians caused by overly burdensome grain quotas. Certainly after the "honeymoon" wore off, Ukrainians would not be feeling much love for the Nazi, but it seems almost certain they would have offered extensive assistance in labor and manpower to help defeat the hated Bolsheviks. An extra infantry corps or two or three might have been enough to tip the scales. And certainly help with constructing/rebuilding the transportation net would have had a tremendous impact in getting supplies and troops to the front. And then all those coal mines, and other local resources needed to be brought back to productivity.

Making mortal enemies of Ukrainians, and allowing Stalin to turn the invasion into The Great Patriotic War, was a huge political mistake, IMHO.

[Montmorency]

In fact, I think Hitler could not have chosen a better time.

What if the timetable had not been delayed for Barbarossa?

[ReluctantSamurai]

That is often mentioned as a cause for the failure of Barbarossa, but I tend to think it had little bearing on the outcome other than delaying the arrival of several divisions. In any case, it had been a very wet spring following the heavy snows of winter 1940, and many rivers, especially the Bug River in the critical sector of AGC were virtually impassable until the flood waters receded enough to permit bridging.:shrug:

[Myth]

Great analysis, RS! Especially about the Ukranian people. I admit to knowing next to nothing about Italy in WWII. My only impressions are somewhat resembling Alo, Alo's captain Bertorelli - incapable soldiers with feathers in their hats. Why didn't Italy prove a better/more valuable ally to Nazi germany?

[wudang_clown]

Making mortal enemies of Ukrainians, and allowing Stalin to turn the invasion into The Great Patriotic War, was a huge political mistake, IMHO.
And killing other peoples wasn't a "mistake"?

Nazi Germany could never win the war precisely because war effort was subordinate to idiotic ideology which eventually resulted in idiotic choices. You can't win a war by making mistake after mistake after mistake. The biggest mistake of the Germans was that they believed in Hitler's racial supremacy theory and their superiority over everyone else. Other mistakes were derivatives of this fundamental one.

[ReluctantSamurai]

@ wudang clown

I don't believe that anyone participating in this discussion is extolling the virtues of Nazism, and I'm pretty sure that everyone involved is rather glad at the historical outcome.

That being said, to dismiss Germany's chances to have won the war simply because of their "idiotic ideology" both misses the point of this discussion, and is incorrect, IMO. Germany did have a chance to win (albeit a very slim one) and most of the things that would have had to happen to allow a German victory would require a Nazi Germany to not be a Nazi Germany (like my suggestion of enlisting the help of the Ukrainians instead of butchering them). That is what we are discussing here, hypothetically, of course.

@ Myth


Why didn't Italy prove a better/more valuable ally to Nazi germany?

I've found this place to contain a wealth of information on Italian military forces during WW2:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewforum.php?f=75

And of course here:

http://www.comandosupremo.com/

You have to do a bit of sifting, but many topics contain very informative and useful links.

Here's what Rommel (who probably had more direct contact with Italian troops than any other general, German, British, or American) had to say about the Italians fighting in the DAK:


“The Italian soldier is disciplined, sober, an excellent worker and an example to the Germans in preparing dug-in positions. If attacked he reacts well. He lacks, however, a spirit of attack, and above all, proper training. Many operations did not succeed solely because of a lack of coordination between artillery and heavy arms fire and the advance of the infantry. The lack of adequate means of supply and service, and the insufficient number of motor vehicles and tanks, is such that during some movements Italian sections arrived at their posts incomplete. Lack of means of transport and service in Italian units is such that especially in the bigger units, they cannot be maintained as a reserve and one cannot count on their quick intervention.”

[Brenus]

A short comment before to go to work: About Italians and German's allies: The German were quick to blame their allies for defeat and claim for themselves in Victory. The reality is nor the Germans or the Croat took Red October Factory in Stalingrad, and the German lines fall as quick as the Hungarian or Italian ones in front of massive Red Army Offensives despite having better equipment.

[Myth]

I have na ex-lover from Russia and another girl I know from there. Both tell me that outside of Moscow the ratio between men and women is skewered. There's usually 20 girls on the dance floor of a club and only 1 or 2 guys. They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII, not sure how accurate this is...

[Montmorency]

They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII

That, and there not being so many GPW vets left these days. :laugh4:

[Beskar]

I have na ex-lover from Russia and another girl I know from there. Both tell me that outside of Moscow the ratio between men and women is skewered. There's usually 20 girls on the dance floor of a club and only 1 or 2 guys. They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII, not sure how accurate this is...

Well, even on the premise that children are born 50/50, there has been at least three generations since the Great War. Any deficit would have recovered in the younger generations by now, so going to a club with a bunch of young adults will not the be the result of the Great War, unless these 20 girls on the dance floor are Old Age Pensioners.

[Montmorency]

As I said:

https://i494.photobucket.com/albums/rr309/desertSypglass/russia-moscow-victory-day-ru189485.jpg

[Papewaio]

Well, even on the premise that children are born 50/50, there has been at least three generations since the Great War. Any deficit would have recovered in the younger generations by now, so going to a club with a bunch of young adults will not the be the result of the Great War, unless these 20 girls on the dance floor are Old Age Pensioners.

1) Any deficit would have recovered in the first generation.
2) More boys are born then girls
3) Boys engage in more dangerous activities and are more like to use more violent (effective) suicide methods. So the ratio over time skews to girls.
4) Socially in a lot of countries men don't dance.
5) Or Myth's preferred date is in her nineties.

[Myth]

She is 30 currently :dizzy2: Don't know about that though. Perhaps it's just more propaganda? A lot of it finds place in modern Russian textbooks. The other girl, whom I met while riding on a bus, took her time to explain to me about this issue. Also she explained that the Russians were the only ones who stopped the Mongol invasion of Europe so...

[ReluctantSamurai]

They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII, not sure how accurate this is

There is some validity to this. Of course, absolutely accurate numbers will never be known, but the Soviet Union lost about 20% of its population and 25% of its resources during WWII.

Mark Harrison states in Accounting for War that "supply-side shocks to Soviet population, fixed capital, and GNP were never made up post-war in terms of trajectory" (as of 1996 when the book was published).

He goes on further to say that "...the USSR began 1946 with an overall demographic deficit of 35 million...combining war deaths, emigrations, and wartime birth deficits."

As a comparison, combined Anglo-American civil + military losses were roughly 1 in 250; Soviet losses were 2 in 9 for military personnel, and 1 in 10 for civilians. And the Soviet Union was the only one of the victorious Allies to suffer significant post-war economic stagnation. All other nations (and in particular the US) experienced economic booms and high population growth.


Or Myth's preferred date is in her nineties

Let's hope not:creep:


~D

[Sp4]

I have na ex-lover from Russia and another girl I know from there. Both tell me that outside of Moscow the ratio between men and women is skewered. There's usually 20 girls on the dance floor of a club and only 1 or 2 guys. They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII, not sure how accurate this is...

Hahaha wow. XD Cool. That's great.

[Papewaio]

There is some validity to this. Of course, absolutely accurate numbers will never be known, but the Soviet Union lost about 20% of its population and 25% of its resources during WWII.

Mark Harrison states in Accounting for War that "supply-side shocks to Soviet population, fixed capital, and GNP were never made up post-war in terms of trajectory" (as of 1996 when the book was published).

He goes on further to say that "...the USSR began 1946 with an overall demographic deficit of 35 million...combining war deaths, emigrations, and wartime birth deficits."

As a comparison, combined Anglo-American civil + military losses were roughly 1 in 250; Soviet losses were 2 in 9 for military personnel, and 1 in 10 for civilians. And the Soviet Union was the only one of the victorious Allies to suffer significant post-war economic stagnation. All other nations (and in particular the US) experienced economic booms and high population growth.



Let's hope not:creep:


~D

It explains the generation that fought in WWII having skewed ratios of men to women. It does not in any ways go remotely close to being a reason for skewed demographics from the baby boomer generation onwards.

Any skewed demographics real or perceived post WWII would have to be because of lifestyle choices. Male to female birth rates should be the same. There might be a ratio change due to poor nutrition and maybe males die off quicker.

But all one needs to do is look at a western dance floor to see a ratio skewed towards females. It isn't an accurate way to poll populations.

[Sp4]

Women just go out more... We're sitting here playing video games :yes: ^^

[Myth]

Exactly. Women go out for fun. Men go out for women.

Men go out for fun too. But fun for us is women, booze and food. So if we can't get a girl, we drink and then we get the munchies at 4 AM.

[Empire*Of*Media]

This Thread is About WWII or Modern Women's life ?!!!!!:laugh4:

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Well, even on the premise that children are born 50/50, there has been at least three generations since the Great War. Any deficit would have recovered in the younger generations by now, so going to a club with a bunch of young adults will not the be the result of the Great War, unless these 20 girls on the dance floor are Old Age Pensioners.

As a result of normal PH factors, there is a slight advantage toward girl children, usually in a .2% or so swing. You are, of course essentially correct that with 3 full generations of "turnover" since 1945 that a more or less 50/50 balance must have reasserted itself.

That said, I don't think that the Russians have yet recovered from the deaths of so many during the Stalin era. Russia lost more than 13 % of its population (maybe even higher if the Soviets had been inflating the population numbers for propaganda purposes) in WW2 and those figures are exclusive of the purge/starvation campaigns of the 1930s or the Gulag efforts of the Post-War era. The pre-war CCCPP claimed over 168 million. Current day Russia claims fewer than 144 million. By contrast the UK had 46.5 million in 1939 and has over 62 million today. France had over 40 millions in 1939 and now has a population of over 61 million. The USA had 132 million in 1940 and has over 310 million today.

Some of Russian's retrograde is the divesture of all of its other countries -- the stans, Belorussia etc. But even if you add in their current total population, Russian barely keeps pace with France in terms of growth percentage.

[El Barto]

Back on the Pacific front… what would have happened if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbour? What would have happened to Australia, would it have been invaded, would there have been a sort of no-man's land across Insulindia?
How long would it have taken for the US to join the Allies? I don't know to what extent they were already helping the Allies in the Southeast Asian area, if any.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Back on the Pacific front… what would have happened if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbour? What would have happened to Australia, would it have been invaded, would there have been a sort of no-man's land across Insulindia?
How long would it have taken for the US to join the Allies? I don't know to what extent they were already helping the Allies in the Southeast Asian area, if any.

Deserves its own thread.

That Summer, the USN was already fighting against the Unterseebooten in the Atlantic -- Roosevelt was pushing for us to intervene on behalf of Britain but couldn't get past the isolationist lobby at that time. Lend Lease was finally getting Americans back to work, but that did NOT translate as a desire to involve themselves in a European war for many.

In the Pacific, we really weren't positioned to do anything but haul out Case Orange and go for a big fleet battle with the IJN. The Embargo etc. was begun because, at the time, it was truly believed that Japan would find a face-saving excuse to back down in China or, if they went to war, would be striking against the Phillipines with their limited sea-lift. The Phillipine Army would fight a delaying action until the USN could smash the IJN and then Japan would sue for peace with their navy broken and no way to project power. Obviously, it didn't turn out that way.

Roosevelt and Winston were ecstatic that Germany declared war -- it was gonna be impossible to sell "Germany First" when only Japan had attacked or declared.

[El Barto]

Erm, what is Case Orange?

I really do think -from reading your posts- that both the US and Japan overestimated their own power.

Still, if Germany hadn't declared war -I don't think they could have with their ideological blindfold, but let's assume so- the US could've taken charge of the APcific front and the UK and the Soviet Union could've engaged Germany.

Another big question is what if the Japs had attacked Vladivostok and then Mongolia and Siberia instead of trying to fight across the Pacific? The US would've been mired in its own internal politicking and I don't think the Red Army could've handled two land fronts across such a large distance, but I don't know how good their railway network was beyond the Urals.

[Montmorency]

No one in the world would have had the logistics to cross 1500 miles of empty taiga to get to the Urals.

Disabling the Pacific ports would have been the limit for the Japanese, and in that case would at least have dealt a noticeable blow to the Lend-Lease transfer. At that point, there would have been nothing for the Soviets to create a second front against - no enemy infantry on the opposing side, and no strategic points to defend from them anyway.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Erm, what is Case Orange?

I really do think -from reading your posts- that both the US and Japan overestimated their own power.

Still, if Germany hadn't declared war -I don't think they could have with their ideological blindfold, but let's assume so- the US could've taken charge of the APcific front and the UK and the Soviet Union could've engaged Germany.

Another big question is what if the Japs had attacked Vladivostok and then Mongolia and Siberia instead of trying to fight across the Pacific? The US would've been mired in its own internal politicking and I don't think the Red Army could've handled two land fronts across such a large distance, but I don't know how good their railway network was beyond the Urals.

Case Orange, or rather War Plan Orange (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Orange), was the USA's ongoing planning program for war with Imperial Japan.

Of COURSE the USA and Japan overestimated their power. As did Germany in 1941, As did Germany in 1914, As did the USA in Korea and Vietnam, as did Pompey facing Sertorius. Pretty much everybody all the time overestimates their ability at the outset of wars.

The Japanese could have dealt the Russians a blow and either conquered Vladivostok or neutralized it along with the minor Pacific ports. It would have been a blow to the USSR, but not a crippling one. Had the Japanese seriously gone after the Russians, they would have had to have paid a horrible blood price to advance against an opponent with far better armor and artillery. On top of it all, logistically, there was, essentially, one double tracked rail line over which ALL of the logistics would travel and which would have been exposed to partisans with dynamite for virtually all of its distance. It was tough enough for the Mongols, and they didn't have to try to haul artillery shells and ammo reloads with them. Even had they been able to defeat the USSR forces, they would have been able to advance, at best, at the speed of their mule transport. All the while, the Soviets would be maintaining there and of the rail line while falling back toward their sources of supply. Simply not practicable.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Disabling the Pacific ports would have been the limit for the Japanese, and in that case would at least have dealt a noticeable blow to the Lend-Lease transfer.

As it turned out, this would be the case; but I doubt that anyone in 1941 could have predicted that Vladivostok would eventually become the single largest conduit for LL supplies to the Soviet Union.


was the USA's ongoing planning program for war with Imperial Japan.

All the Rainbow plans were rather overoptimistic as to what could be achieved. The US grossly underestimated IJN air capabilities, and even more so the Japanese innovation to place all six of their large fleet carriers into a single task force (something totally against the then current USN policy of having only one carrier per task force). Any sortie by US 1st Fleet would've meant alot of unrecoverable iron on the bottom of the ocean instead of the shallow water of Pearl Harbor, where all but several of the ships sunk were eventually salvaged. The US also had no information concerning the new land-based LRB's available to the Japanese---namely the G3M & G4M. It's not hard to imagine the USN 1st Fleet suffering the same fate as the PoW/Repulse when faced with land-based air from Saipan and Truk.

One other factor US planners failed to take into consideration for their Rainbow plans was the lack of fleet oilers in the Pacific Fleet, and lack of training in at-sea replenishment. In 1941, there were only 11 fleet oilers in the whole of the Pacific Theatre, and seven of them were servicing the West Coast. That leaves only four oilers at PH to service USN fleets. Not nearly enough to support a cross-ocean sortie to the PI (and no major stockpiles of fuel west of PH).

So essentially, once the PI's were attacked, it was a certainty they would fall to the Japanese.


Had the Japanese seriously gone after the Russians, they would have had to have paid a horrible blood price to advance against an opponent with far better armor and artillery.

This would have been true if the Japanese had chosen to advance in the tank-friendly country in the vicinity of Khalkin-Gol...but not in the rugged, forested terrain of Kharbarovsk and the westward approaches to Vladivostok. Khalkin-Gol is noted as a major set-back for the IJA, but what few realize is that for the first half of the campaign the Japanese were advancing and driving the Soviets and MPRA back. Zhukov's blitzkrieg-style victory grabs much of the limelight, but neglected is the horrible casualties suffered by Red Army regulars, and MPRA soldiers. Coox, in his monumental work Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia 1939, places Japanese casualties somewhere around 17000-20000. Soviet & MPRA casualties will never be known accurately, but when interviewed in the mid-fifties, several Soviet generals who participated in the campaign did not deny the assertion made by Japanese estimates of 30000 casualties.

Bottom line for the "go-north" option available to the Japanese was the virtual lack of strategic targets. Above all things, the Japanese needed oil. When the US embargo hit them in the summer of 1941, they had roughly two years stockpiled. With the exception of a limited supply of oil in the Sakhalin Islands, there is no oil in the Soviet Far East, and very limited sources of other raw materials needed for war. So unless the Germans compensated the Japanese heavily for attacking the Soviets in the Far East (another topic deserving of it's own thread...ie. what could the Germans have proffered?), Japan was going after DEI oil and rubber.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

RS:

Good points.

I agree completely on the LL point. Yes, our trucks would eventually make a huge impact on CCCP offensive logistics, but nobody knew that in 1941.

I agree also, for the most part, regarding Japan's fighting ability moving West. I think the Russian emphasis on artillery would have been more problematic than the tanks in most of the terrain and I agree completely with you on the nature of the strategic objectives. The only easily exploitable resource that would have been of benefit to Japan was lumber and Siberia is hardly the only practical source for that. There were a number of other valuable resources to be exploited, but all of a "long term" character rather than the immediate critical need for POL that you rightly identify as the proximate cause for the war.

I simply don't know what would have happened it there had been a Japanese attack but no Pearl Harbor. War Plan Orange really did envisage a grand clash between the two fleets somewhere between Iwo and Okinawa. Battleship forces were about even, with the Japanese having 11 to our 10 (Yamato so new it squeaked); Japan outnumbered us in cruisers (CA and CL) as well as destroyers [their designs were not as robust, but they did have the 24" torpedoes]; subs were about equal [though ours were tasked against shipping more than the IJN's so in a fleet action the edge would probably have been to Japan here as well.

While superficially the carrier fleets were equal, too many of ours were in the Atlantic and the Japanese were all in the Pacific. Ours carried more per carrier and physically tougher planes [c. 320 total in 4 carriers], they had more planes overall [492] and better trained pilots. Moreover, it is likely that at least 25% of US fighters would have been Buffaloes while 25% of the Diver bombers would have been Vindicators.

Midway illustrates that signals intelligence and luck can overcome numbers, so the USN might have engineered a carrier victory -- but the odds are long that it would actually have been a victory the other direction.

In short, if we had managed to actually execute Plan Orange, I suspect that the result would have been a telling victory -- at significant cost -- for Japan. But we would have been years recovering from the defeat. Eventually, US manufacturing would catch and surpass, but it would have given the Japanese far more than 6 months to "run wild."

[ReluctantSamurai]

While superficially the carrier fleets were equal, too many of ours were in the Atlantic and the Japanese were all in the Pacific. Ours carried more per carrier and physically tougher planes [c. 320 total in 4 carriers], they had more planes overall [492] and better trained pilots. Moreover, it is likely that at least 25% of US fighters would have been Buffaloes while 25% of the Diver bombers would have been Vindicators.

Several things would have given the IJN a decided advantage in opposing any USN Rainbow plan:

1. Fleet doctrine---While it's true that USN carriers had larger aircraft capacities, the IJN concentrated their carriers into a single TF and could bring to bear overwhelming firepower on any 1941-early 1942 USN carrier group. Because USN doctrine at that time forbid more than one carrier per TF, USN carriers would have been picked off one-by-one.

2. Superior aircraft---The F4F could, and did, hold its own against the Zero-sen with proper tactics like the Thatch Weave (Wildcats actually had a positive kill/loss ratio vs. Zero's); the SBD was as good or better than the IJN Val; but the TBD was a complete turkey (as Midway proved) when compared to the Japanese Kate. The long-ranged Mitsubishi G3M Nell, and later the G4M Betty could be decisive battle winners as the fate of the PoW/Repulse Task Group showed that mainline battle groups without CAP were very vulnerable.

3. Superior air tactics---Given the vulnerability of unescorted battle groups, 1941-early 1942 USN doctrine prohibited carriers from traveling with the main battle line, but instead acting as "scouts". With the considerable range advantage enjoyed by the early-war Japanese aircraft, the IJN could hit the US fleets long before the US carriers could retaliate. Add to the mix the land-based LRB's, and you have a recipe for a total disaster, IMHO. So no, I can't agree with the Japanese suffering anything resembling "significant" losses.

4. Superior naval tactics---IJN cruisers were much more modern than USN cruisers (until the Cleveland & Baltimore class came into service), they carried the deadly Long Lance torpedo, and were far superior in night tactics to any other navy in the world. The destruction of the ABDA forces in the Java Sea in 1941, and the fierce battles later on in the Solomons in 1942-43 can attest to superior IJN cruiser and destroyer tactics.

And an important point to overlook is the quantity of fleet oilers in the US Pacific Fleet in 1941. I will have to dig up my numbers on cruising ranges for US ships, but suffice it to say for the moment that the USN did not have the capability to sail large battle groups much beyond Midway. It wouldn't be until the advent of the large Servron fleets of 1944-45 that USN TF's could sail right to the Marianas, Okinawa, and eventually the Japanese mainland.


Eventually, US manufacturing would catch and surpass, but it would have given the Japanese far more than 6 months to "run wild."

And this is America's ace-in-the-hole. Japan just could not hope to be able to outproduce the US in anything from weapon systems to manpower. So the key word in that statement is "Eventually". How long is 'eventually' and does the American public support the war for that long despite huge losses in life and material?

A rather interesting analysis to that end:

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Several things would have given the IJN a decided advantage in opposing any USN Rainbow plan:

1. Fleet doctrine---While it's true that USN carriers had larger aircraft capacities, the IJN concentrated their carriers into a single TF and could bring to bear overwhelming firepower on any 1941-early 1942 USN carrier group. Because USN doctrine at that time forbid more than one carrier per TF, USN carriers would have been picked off one-by-one.

2. Superior aircraft---The F4F could, and did, hold its own against the Zero-sen with proper tactics like the Thatch Weave (Wildcats actually had a positive kill/loss ratio vs. Zero's); the SBD was as good or better than the IJN Val; but the TBD was a complete turkey (as Midway proved) when compared to the Japanese Kate. The long-ranged Mitsubishi G3M Nell, and later the G4M Betty could be decisive battle winners as the fate of the PoW/Repulse Task Group showed that mainline battle groups without CAP were very vulnerable.

3. Superior air tactics---Given the vulnerability of unescorted battle groups, 1941-early 1942 USN doctrine prohibited carriers from traveling with the main battle line, but instead acting as "scouts". With the considerable range advantage enjoyed by the early-war Japanese aircraft, the IJN could hit the US fleets long before the US carriers could retaliate. Add to the mix the land-based LRB's, and you have a recipe for a total disaster, IMHO. So no, I can't agree with the Japanese suffering anything resembling "significant" losses.

4. Superior naval tactics---IJN cruisers were much more modern than USN cruisers (until the Cleveland & Baltimore class came into service), they carried the deadly Long Lance torpedo, and were far superior in night tactics to any other navy in the world. The destruction of the ABDA forces in the Java Sea in 1941, and the fierce battles later on in the Solomons in 1942-43 can attest to superior IJN cruiser and destroyer tactics.

And an important point to overlook is the quantity of fleet oilers in the US Pacific Fleet in 1941. I will have to dig up my numbers on cruising ranges for US ships, but suffice it to say for the moment that the USN did not have the capability to sail large battle groups much beyond Midway. It wouldn't be until the advent of the large Servron fleets of 1944-45 that USN TF's could sail right to the Marianas, Okinawa, and eventually the Japanese mainland.



And this is America's ace-in-the-hole. Japan just could not hope to be able to outproduce the US in anything from weapon systems to manpower. So the key word in that statement is "Eventually". How long is 'eventually' and does the American public support the war for that long despite huge losses in life and material?

A rather interesting analysis to that end:

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

RS:

We are, essentially, on the same page here. You and I both view a Japanese short term tactical victory as the very likely end result of a late 1941 attack and or any confrontation resulting therefrom up through March of 1942. We are both, additionally, well aware of the economic/logistic inevitability of a Japanese defeat over the long run. Our only remaining argument is to the scope/nature of such an early victory. I suspect our answers to the "war weariness" concern to be pretty similar as well.

With that said:

1. The USN would have been operating in fairly coordinated task groups. Yes, the emphasis on smaller single-CV groupings would have created more of a CAP problem and less of an AAA interference to attack, but a lot would depend on whose scouts spotted who first and most accurately. Assuming a USN signals advantage, such as we often enjoyed due to Magic, they might have gotten in a few licks from coordinated strikes before the Japanese could begin picking off carriers and the one-CV per group would have slowed down the killing even as it limited defensive effectiveness. I still give the Japanese the advantage here (the kido butai concept was good), just not so widely as you.

2. Plane comparison is good and I agree. Early on though, the Brewsters and Vindicators that would have been part of the force would have hampered USN effectiveness. The limitations for the IJN were the fragility of their aircraft -- they simply lost more to all combat causes than we did as a result of their under-armoring and unsealed tanks. The Zero would have slaughtered the Buffaloes and probably -- due to pilot skill at that stage of the war -- outfought the Wildcats. The Kate outclassed the Dev easily, but the Dev's could have ended up playing just the same role they did at Midway (Judas Goats that let the Daunts drop unopposed). The Dauntless made the Val look like a piece of crud on payload even if the rest of things were mostly a wash. The only capital ships sunk by Vals were British County class -- notoriously under-armored -- and it took 8 to 10 hits to accomplish that. All in all, with numbers and pilot skill during the first few months factored in, you have to give the edge to the IJN, but the tactical tools for a Midway style lucky-timing strike would still have been present.

3. I don't know that I'd attribute the early successes as much to superior tactics as superior training. IJN aviators were SCARILY well trained (in some ways too well as later war throughput figures show). The whole point of USN doctrine was to prevent a USN force from facing what Force Z was destroyed by. Our AAA was a good notch better than our British counterparts and the whole point was for the battle groups NOT to be denuded of air cover. Nells and Bettys were great for payload and range, but not for survivability against fighters. Had the Japanese used the Zero range advantage (Kates and Vals did not outrange the Dauntless) to wipe out the CAPs and then sent in the LBA, then all Hell might have broken loose. Though, if they were getting uncovered that quickly, I think the Battle Fleet would have withdrawn rather than put themselves into harms way without air cover and with many miles to go to reach their counterparts. That WOULD be a recipe for disaster.

Japanese martial tradition here, would have worked against them holding back the LBA and holding off any strike until the Zeros had achieved air superiority -- precisely because it would also create the chance for the yanks to discern this and withdraw before the moment of decision. Therefore, I think you would have seen strikes by coordinated Japanese naval air groups, but from a range at which the USN could reply (and at least hope for a Midway like result). The LBA would have added to the USN's woes, but would probably have been committed while a CAP still existed and would have suffered notable losses. Again, I think the likely winner is Japan, but not quite in lopsided fashion.

4. Depends on a Day or Night engagement. Presuming the former, I think the advantage has to go to Japan because of the Torpedoes, but the main battle line gunnery would have been fairly advantageous for the USN. At night it would go the other way. USN 1941 radar could detect splashes only out to 20k yards and our night optics and training levels did NOT come close to the IJN. Combine the torpedoes with Japanese optics/drill at night and you would see the USN take a hammering. We did much better and damage control than the IJN....and we would have had to have done so. And nothing would save the pre-war cruiser classes from 2+ Long Lance hits -- they didn't have the armor to do it.

5. Fleet sailing oilers that could refuel at useful speeds WERE in short supply, but remember that Plan Orange envisaged refueling only the DDs and tanking up in Guam and/or the Philippines. Had a Japanese surprise attack neutralized both options prior to March 1942, than the plan would probably have been hamstrung until the new oiler class showed up in greater numbers. Historically, Guam and Luzon went quickly, but facilities in Mindanao and elsewhere were usable through mid March. Hard to say if a Japanese surprise attack on the Philippines instead of Pearl would have sped that up. On the whole though, until the new fast oilers came in, the USN was not well equipped for fast refueling at sea except for DDs fueling from carriers.

6. Staying in the fight. I suspect that, given attitudes both cultural and regarding "fair play," a Japanese surprise attack on the Phillipines that killed thousands of US personnel might have been as galling. 9-11-01 prompted enough anger to fuel 4-5 years of fighting spirit and a willingness to put up with more after that. Besides, a Japanese naval victory early on would likely have incurred a vengeance response that lasted long enough for the Fleet numbers to ramp up and for success to begin to be seen. Still, if a victory against Plan Orange was big enough and the Japanese could have focused on harming the USA enough, then maybe. I just think that they had too much to do for resources to project power past the Hawaiian islands...or to them for more than a raid for that matter. Still, the other side of things could be argued.

[ReluctantSamurai]

In regards to #1 in your previous post:


All in all, with numbers and pilot skill during the first few months factored in, you have to give the edge to the IJN, but the tactical tools for a Midway style lucky-timing strike would still have been present.

I disagree with this for the following reasons:

Midway was a defensive battle with two modifiers...the cracking of IJN transmission codes, and the availability of long-range Cats based from Midway to do the spotting for the carrier fleets. Any implementation of a Rainbow plan will require the USN to be on the offensive and far from any land-based assistance. Cracking the IJN transmission code has as much a luck factor as skill.

Given the operational range advantages of Japanese scouting aircraft over the SBD, and the very aggressive nature of IJN I-boat patrols, I don't see many situations (if there are any at all) where the USN gets the in first strike when fighting anywhere between Midway and the Marianas. Even in late 1943, with carrier superiority (and the new doctrine of multiple carrier TF's) and the Hellcat filling out Navy VF squadrons, US carrier groups moved within range of Japanese land-based airpower with extreme caution, and for short durations only.


Staying in the fight. I suspect that, given attitudes both cultural and regarding "fair play," a Japanese surprise attack on the Phillipines that killed thousands of US personnel might have been as galling.

The much debated elimination of the PH attack. Would the American public react the same without it? That's the seven and a half million barrels of oil per year question:shrug:

One unconventional way of looking at the PH attack was that it forced the USN to depend on its carriers almost exclusively for the next year or so, which eventually led to the creation of the fast carrier TG's we have come to know as the mainstay for the US from 1943 to the end of the war......

[Gregoshi]

Excellent discussion SF and RS. Very informative and entertaining. :bow:

[Seamus Fermanagh]

In regards to #1 in your previous post:

I disagree with this for the following reasons:

Midway was a defensive battle with two modifiers...the cracking of IJN transmission codes, and the availability of long-range Cats based from Midway to do the spotting for the carrier fleets. Any implementation of a Rainbow plan will require the USN to be on the offensive and far from any land-based assistance. Cracking the IJN transmission code has as much a luck factor as skill.

Given the operational range advantages of Japanese scouting aircraft over the SBD, and the very aggressive nature of IJN I-boat patrols, I don't see many situations (if there are any at all) where the USN gets the in first strike when fighting anywhere between Midway and the Marianas. Even in late 1943, with carrier superiority (and the new doctrine of multiple carrier TF's) and the Hellcat filling out Navy VF squadrons, US carrier groups moved within range of Japanese land-based airpower with extreme caution, and for short durations only.


Went back to things and scanned a bit. Turns out you were right about the signals. While we repeatedly broke their codes, it took us weeks/months at a time and their most recent code update was 4dec41. It is thus unlikely that useful sigint would have been available in our focal time frame of 21dec41-15mar42. That suggests a scenario more analogous to the Coral Sea in its opening phases and -- given concentration of forces -- a more distinct Japanese advantage, especially in light of LBA.

Thus, defeating the Japanese fleet en masse would have required a number of repeated interventions by luck for the USN and/or murphy to the detriment of the IJN. Such things are possible, as any student of history knows, but not really likely. As Runyon said, "the race is not always to the swift, nor battle to the strong....but that's the way to bet."

I still think it ends up being more than a simple demonstration of concentrated airpower annihilating the opponent at little loss to one's self. I believe that Japanese air losses during successful missions against the US carriers would have drained much of their striking power, forcing the final confrontation between battle lines to settle the matter. However, having neutralized USN air cover, the Japanese would have been able to control the timing of such an engagement allowing them to pick both a night time setting and a concentrated initial effort. The Japanese would have taken casualties but would have been able to inflict a decisive defeat.

Such would have delayed a return to offensive operations into early '43 if not later. Ouch.

Odd to think that the Pearl Harbor attack may have been, ultimately, a huge life saver for the US.

Good argument, RS, very informative.

[El Barto]

Why a nighttime setting? How would that have benefitted the Japanese Navy?

[ReluctantSamurai]

Why a nighttime setting? How would that have benefitted the Japanese Navy?

Because until late 1943, the Japanese nearly always got the better of night engagements with the USN. Google these battles and see what I mean: (in chronological order)

Savo Island
1st & 2nd Naval Battles of Guadalcanal
Kula Gulf
Vella Gulf August 6-7 1943 (the first time USN DD's got the better of their Japanese counterparts, mainly due to an improved torpedo design and more importantly, better tactics, which up to this point hamstrung the DD's by forcing them to screen the cruisers)
Vella Lavella
Empress Augusta Bay
Cape St. George

Even after the victory at Vella Gulf, the USN got toasted at Vella Lavella, came out much better at Empress Augusta Bay, and finally exerted dominance for good at Cape St. George on 26 Nov, 1943.

[El Barto]

I'll do thorough reading of all those later tonight, but, in the meantime… how did the lack of light (at night) affect submarine operations? Submarines didn't win battles by themselves but they could do some surgical strikes indeed (except in Silent Hunter where you can destroy a handful of Yamato-class BBs)

[ReluctantSamurai]

how did the lack of light (at night) affect submarine operations?

At night subs can run on the surface and use their radar to locate and track targets. Speaking of Yamato-class BB's, one of my favorite sub engagements was the ambush pulled off by the skippers of SS 227 and SS 247 (USS Darter & USS Dace, respectively) at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. IJN Adm Kurita was attempting to force the Palawan Passage in an effort to destroy the landings taking place on the island of Leyte. On Oct 23, 1944 Darter and Dace engaged and sank the cruisers Atago and Maya, while heavily damaging Takao. Unfortunately (for the USN) they missed both the Yamato & Musashi who were both in the Japanese Task Force. Musashi was later sunk by carrier planes from USS Intrepid, USS Essex, USS Lexington, USS Enterprise, and finally from USS Franklin and Cabot. In all, she took an incredible 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs before rolling over and sinking at 7:36 in the evening of 24 October, 1944. ~:eek:

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Why a nighttime setting? How would that have benefitted the Japanese Navy?

RS' suggested examples are good ones.

Summary: Better night optics (at least on the newer cruisers and the Yamato class) translating into a higher percentage of hits; better drill (they did more of their training at night and were less flustered by the inherent confusions of night actions); slightly higher ship speeds (making targeting harder at all times, but even more so at night with less visual sighting ability); equally accurate, longer ranged, and far more hard-hitting naval surface torpedoes. Night-time was the better time for torpedo attacks as the destroyers could close to optimal firing ranges without being spotted (daylight you can see what they're doing and adjust, at night you might not even see the destroyer before the attack had been launched -- especially with the LL torpedoes -- and if the first chance you have to evade is when you are spotting torp tracks visually at night....)

All of this changed when the USN drilled more for night actions and developed the 3rd and 4th generations of search and gunnery targeting radar. During the time frame RS and I are discussing, search radars were somewhat crude and targeting radars couldn't spot shot splash at enough distance or provide truly accurate angle of shot. In 1941 it didn't do much more than give a strong estimate as to distance of target.

[The Lurker Below]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VImNBuJW3sQ

All this talk of Pacific naval battles brings back my favorite youth reading topic. A few weeks ago the planes in the video above flew over the park I was in, twice. Nearly all the planes are finished with US Navy color schemes with appropriate decals. They are all homemade aircraft, and not supposed to be WWII replicas at all, but with the appropriate painting, they were very passable. Though I despise the use of the word awesome, when these things passed overhead at 400 feet...it gave me goosebumps.

edit, failed to embed video, left you with link instead. sorry, am not internet savvy.