US Air Strike Kills 85 Civilians

[AE Bravo]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/19/us-air-strike-in-syria-kills-up-to-85-civilians-mistaken-for-isi/

US forces mistook them as IS fighters and droned them all. Tired of all these terrorists lately.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

You're playing a little rough with the specifics of the very article you cite.

Drones were not involved. Drones, by the way, are less likely to kill civilians by mistake because the stealth/loiter time gives them more time to assess targets. Mistakes still occur, of course, but the incidence is lower than for a pilot flying rapidly in a combat zone and concerned for her/his own safety. According to the article you cite, it was a aircraft attack and not a drone attack.

Saddening to see the wrong people harmed.

[Strike For The South]

Many Isil fighters are still holed up in the city, and are preventing thousands of civilians from leaving, effectively using them as human shields. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/10/us-backed-syrian-opposition-forces-surround-isil-in-key-city-and/)

Reminds me of Hamas.

I also enjoy the false equivalency people try to create by starting these threads. So deep bro, making me think real hard. The United States does not go out of its way to kill civilians, nor do they use human shields. When something like that does happen, and over the course of American operations, it certainly has, The perpetrators are dealt with using a very unsympathetic military justice system. Of course, this is opposed to the literal dogs they were trying to bomb who deserve nothing more than to be scourged from Earth.

Combat is nasty. People die. More often than not, the people who die have no stake in the outcome of the fight. The American media has done a fairly good job of whitewashing this fact. Seeing a smart bomb hit a target is so sterile, almost medical. The lead up to the war in Iraq talked a lot about bringing democracy but very little about a sectarian conflict whose cost would mostly fall on the shoulders of those with no voice.

Of course bringing democracy to these regions usually devolves into some sort of theocracy where the young men, with no job or marriage prospects are thrown into the meat grinder. It was easier dealing with the autocrats.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/19/us-air-strike-in-syria-kills-up-to-85-civilians-mistaken-for-isi/

US forces mistook them as IS fighters and droned them all. Tired of all these terrorists lately.

Your article says "nearly 60", not "85".

Aside from that, there's a huge difference between the legendary stupidity of the USAF and ISIL's terrorists activities.

I'm going to take the same line as I did when that MSF hospital was hit - it'll be the pilot/aircrew that screwed this up. I was right last time (proved after a lengthy investigation) and I expect I'll be right this time. Such tragedies are usually avoidable, the result of badly thought out Rules of Engagement or failure to check intelligence before pulling the trigger.

These sorts of things will keep happening until there's a complete rethink by the US in how they use heavy weapons. Bombing people whoa re running away is roughly the same as shooting people in the back. In war it's necessary sometimes if you think they're liable to turn around and counter-attack but in the case of ISIL our Air-Dominance makes such considerations moot.

[Hooahguy]

Didnt you and I have a huge argument last time about how British pilots are just as stupid?

[AE Bravo]

I also enjoy the false equivalency
I meant IS when I said terrorists. Just wanted to point out the typical incompetence you can expect from US forces in the middle east, not that they're just as much murderers as IS. The best thing for them to have done is leave it to the Syrian armed forces, because as of now it seems that they're dishing out just as much unintentional collateral damage.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Didnt you and I have a huge argument last time about how British pilots are just as stupid?

We did, then the report came out and showed the USAF had achieved a new level of Top-Down fail (and irrc no one was punished).

Reams and reams have also been written on the general breakdown of basic UK doctrine in Iraq and Afganistan due to being chronically under-manned.

[Hooahguy]

You have such a hard on for hating on US forces (despite the fact that British forces have just the same level of "fail" that you accuse US forces with) that you seem to have forgotten that people were punished for the Kunduz bombing. But hey, you are entitled to your own opinion.

[spmetla]

I meant IS when I said terrorists. Just wanted to point out the typical incompetence you can expect from US forces in the middle east, not that they're just as much murderers as IS. The best thing for them to have done is leave it to the Syrian armed forces, because as of now it seems that they're dishing out just as much unintentional collateral damage.

Though this is a lot of lives in this one incident it is no where near as close to the damage done to Syrian civilians done by the Syrian army and air force. Bear in mind that same air power has protected kurds fighting IS, helped the Iraqis retake some of their cities and helped keep the expansion and free rein of IS in check, at least so much as can be without sending divisions of troops to kick them out.

As for just as much murderers, the US doesn't do this intentionally or on the same scale as IS. We don't enslave women and children and them sell them as sex toys. We don't execute everyone who disagrees with us. We are as flawed as any military and when fighting dudes driving around in pick up trucks and limited military equipment taken from the Iraqis and Syrians it is very hard to tell what is a military target. Seeing as the coalition has done 450 airstrikes around the city since May they seem to have been mostly successful in avoiding civilian 'collateral.'

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

You have such a hard on for hating on US forces (despite the fact that British forces have just the same level of "fail" that you accuse US forces with) that you seem to have forgotten that people were punished for the Kunduz bombing. But hey, you are entitled to your own opinion.

I don't hate US forces, I just think it's unhealthy to be in the same Theatre with them if you aren't waring Stars and Stripes.

It's a prejudice I inherited from the British Soldiers I grew up around.

[Fragony]

Horrible, rip civilians

[Papewaio]

You have such a hard on for hating on US forces (despite the fact that British forces have just the same level of "fail" that you accuse US forces with) that you seem to have forgotten that people were punished for the Kunduz bombing. But hey, you are entitled to your own opinion.

Well USA is just a rebranded Britian 2.0 from many outsiders perspective. Anglosphere and all.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I don't hate US forces, I just think it's unhealthy to be in the same Theatre with them if you aren't waring Stars and Stripes.

It's a prejudice I inherited from the British Soldiers I grew up around.

And we like you lot (and the Oz crowd) and think of you as the trustworthy allies....

Makes you wonder what'd happen if we had to fight side by side with the French.

[Pannonian]

I don't hate US forces, I just think it's unhealthy to be in the same Theatre with them if you aren't waring Stars and Stripes.

It's a prejudice I inherited from the British Soldiers I grew up around.

It's probably the regimental mentality at work. Your regiment, your country, your people, against the rest of the world. In reality the US military, being far bigger than ours, probably gets more opportunities to make more and bigger eff ups simply due to scale. We were pretty horrendous in the early days of mass warfare in WWI.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I meant IS when I said terrorists. Just wanted to point out the typical incompetence you can expect from US forces in the middle east, not that they're just as much murderers as IS. The best thing for them to have done is leave it to the Syrian armed forces, because as of now it seems that they're dishing out just as much unintentional collateral damage.

An inevitable consequence deriving from asymmetric conflict. You saw what happened the last time a conventional military went toe-to-toe with NATO in 1991. Even in 2003 for the reprise Iraq deployed Fedayeen from day one, limiting the "conventional" character of the conflict.

Any opponent of NATO that chooses a conventional warfare approach loses hard and fast. Since they are NOT, on average, stupid, they tend to choose a non-conventional strategy when fighting NATO. Guerrilla (pronounced as /gwair - EE - yuh/ btw, not like the animal as most yanks do) tactics and terrorism are the tools of choice for asymmetric warfare. So, by design, our opponents are more or less always mixed into a larger mass of civilians, un-uniformed, and often posing as (or NOT posing as but actually being) civilians except when actively involved in an operation.

Such conflicts are necessarily more messy and a greater percentage of civilians die in the crossfire. This, for the faction having chosen asymmetric tactics, is actually a plus as there is propaganda/public relations value in dead civilians who lost their lives at the action of the conventional (NATO) power.

[Pannonian]

An inevitable consequence deriving from asymmetric conflict. You saw what happened the last time a conventional military went toe-to-toe with NATO in 1991. Even in 2003 for the reprise Iraq deployed Fedayeen from day one, limiting the "conventional" character of the conflict.

Any opponent of NATO that chooses a conventional warfare approach loses hard and fast. Since they are NOT, on average, stupid, they tend to choose a non-conventional strategy when fighting NATO. Guerrilla (pronounced as /gwair - EE - yuh/ btw, not like the animal as most yanks do) tactics and terrorism are the tools of choice for asymmetric warfare. So, by design, our opponents are more or less always mixed into a larger mass of civilians, un-uniformed, and often posing as (or NOT posing as but actually being) civilians except when actively involved in an operation.

Such conflicts are necessarily more messy and a greater percentage of civilians die in the crossfire. This, for the faction having chosen asymmetric tactics, is actually a plus as there is propaganda/public relations value in dead civilians who lost their lives at the action of the conventional (NATO) power.

To limit civilian casualties, we should leave the hellhole that is the middle east to the :daisy:s who live there, trading only for resources we need, and limit or stop immigration from these countries. More people would die, but they'd die from the actions of their own, and would be nothing to do with us. Since people like Showtime are going to hate us anyway, we might as well leave them to their own devices. They'd still hate us, but it would be cheaper. And IIRC, Showtime comes from the middle east, but is currently living in the west, possibly the US.

[AE Bravo]

Though this is a lot of lives in this one incident it is no where near as close to the damage done to Syrian civilians done by the Syrian army and air force. Bear in mind that same air power has protected kurds fighting IS, helped the Iraqis retake some of their cities and helped keep the expansion and free rein of IS in check, at least so much as can be without sending divisions of troops to kick them out.
How much damage has the SAF done to civilians exactly? Western-backed opposition groups have done more damage than Assad. Recently the democratic forces (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harakat_Nour_al-Din_al-Zenki) who are funded by the UK too in northern Aleppo beheaded an 11 year old Palestinian boy for allegedly being a Syrian government spy. West funds brigades who do IS style killings, it’s no mystery.

[Pannonian]

How much damage has the SAF done to civilians exactly? Western-backed opposition groups have done more damage than Assad. Recently the democratic forces (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harakat_Nour_al-Din_al-Zenki) who are funded by the UK too in northern Aleppo beheaded an 11 year old Palestinian boy for allegedly being a Syrian government spy. West funds brigades who do IS style killings, it’s no mystery.

Thus proving my point. People like him hate us anyway, so we might as well save our money and keep out of that dump. Stop all movement between the west and the middle east. Nothing good comes out of the latter.

[AE Bravo]

I'm nothing like you. I don't hate...

we should leave the hellhole that is the middle east to the s who live there
You don't see this coming out of my mouth. Too much contempt from you, I'd put you on ignore if I wasn't interested in reading the UK threads around here.

[Hooahguy]

So are you claiming that Assad's forces have avoided civilian casualties?

[Greyblades]

Guerrilla (pronounced as /gwair - EE - yuh/ btw

No it's pronounced as /ger -ril - la/, lieutenant is pronounced as /Left - ten - ant/, Myanmar is pronounced as /Bur - ma/ and French is prounounced as /cheeze - eat - ing - sur - ren - der - mon - kee/.

We invented the language we get to say how it's words are pronounced

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

And we like you lot (and the Oz crowd) and think of you as the trustworthy allies....

Makes you wonder what'd happen if we had to fight side by side with the French.

We're leery of you because of WWI, then WII, then Korea, then the Falklands.

~Sorry, you're like our number three lady.


It's probably the regimental mentality at work. Your regiment, your country, your people, against the rest of the world. In reality the US military, being far bigger than ours, probably gets more opportunities to make more and bigger eff ups simply due to scale. We were pretty horrendous in the early days of mass warfare in WWI.

Probably - but the Americans have historically had a problem with recognising other forces' vehicles. During the Iraq War I was told by serving soldiers that Americans were not routinely trained to recognise the silhouette of friendly NATO hardware.

Then there's the Old Story about Patton threatening to turn his army around and assault the USAAF behind him if they didn't stop bombing his men.

[AE Bravo]

Basically what I'm getting from SFTS and Seamus is that the people they're defending dropped a chandelier on a dancefloor full of people at a party they werent invited to. Is the presence itself of these forces and the lackluster coordination with the sovereign entity to bring justice to these bands not unconventional? And how w does that answer my question about why the US isnt better off letting SAR do their jobs?

So are you claiming that Assad's forces have avoided civilian casualties?
No. Though its hard to believe that countless gangs with nato funds have done less damage than a figure like Assad, who transformed himself to some sort of benign figure to cling to whatever he has left. Its not working at all because of neoliberal idealists of course.

[Hooahguy]

Why is that hard to believe? The Syrian army was quite considerable in strength, especially when you factor in air power, which the rebels had almost none. And for what its worth, the group Physicians forHuman Rights claims that the vast majority of attacks on doctors and hospitals were by the regime (over 90%) but who knows really. I havent been able to find a hard breakdown of who is killing who so I suppose you are going to believe one thing and Ill believe another. Personally, I think both sides are complicit in the deaths of civilians in this conflict. I just happen to think that the regime's use of air power tips the balance in his favor. Also the whole gas attack thing doesnt paint a pretty picture either.

[Papewaio]

We invented the language we get to say how it's words are pronounced

Except probably 80% of the English language is loan words from other languages. That's why you have beef and cattle, pork & pigs, houses and bungalows...

[Pannonian]

Why is that hard to believe? The Syrian army was quite considerable in strength, especially when you factor in air power, which the rebels had almost none. And for what its worth, the group Physicians forHuman Rights claims that the vast majority of attacks on doctors and hospitals were by the regime (over 90%) but who knows really. I havent been able to find a hard breakdown of who is killing who so I suppose you are going to believe one thing and Ill believe another. Personally, I think both sides are complicit in the deaths of civilians in this conflict. I just happen to think that the regime's use of air power tips the balance in his favor. Also the whole gas attack thing doesnt paint a pretty picture either.

You're missing the most important bit.


Basically what I'm getting from SFTS and Seamus is that the people they're defending dropped a chandelier on a dancefloor full of people at a party they werent invited to. Is the presence itself of these forces and the lackluster coordination with the sovereign entity to bring justice to these bands not unconventional? And how w does that answer my question about why the US isnt better off letting SAR do their jobs?

No. Though its hard to believe that countless gangs with nato funds have done less damage than a figure like Assad, who transformed himself to some sort of benign figure to cling to whatever he has left. Its not working at all because of neoliberal idealists of course.

We weren't invited to the party. So whatever happens at the party, we shouldn't be there in the first place. If we weren't there, then the party floor dancers can brawl as much as they like. It would result in way more casualties. But the key point isn't the casualties. The key point is our presence at a party we weren't invited to.

[Papewaio]

We weren't invited to the party. So whatever happens at the party, we shouldn't be there in the first place. If we weren't there, then the party floor dancers can brawl as much as they like. It would result in way more casualties. But the key point isn't the casualties. The key point is our presence at a party we weren't invited to.

Well this party had the equivalent of a public Facebook invite to it when the belligerents started bombing people outside the region.

If you don't want to invite the cops best to keep a low profile and not go waking them up in the dead of night.

[AE Bravo]

Why is that hard to believe? The Syrian army was quite considerable in strength, especially when you factor in air power, which the rebels had almost none. And for what its worth, the group Physicians forHuman Rights claims that the vast majority of attacks on doctors and hospitals were by the regime (over 90%) but who knows really. I havent been able to find a hard breakdown of who is killing who so I suppose you are going to believe one thing and Ill believe another. Personally, I think both sides are complicit in the deaths of civilians in this conflict. I just happen to think that the regime's use of air power tips the balance in his favor. Also the whole gas attack thing doesnt paint a pretty picture either.
If there was political or security cooperation with that government more of this information would have been known to us. especially with these various rebel groups having a history of spreading misinformation like the many offsprings of the Muslim Brotherhood. I don't doubt all slides exaggerate reports. One reason it’s hard to believe is if you look at life in Damascus and the more demanding lifestyle in rebel-occupied territories. Many sources claim the gas attack was carried out by a dissident, and is possible considering it’s the dumbest thing the government could have done to undermine its legitimacy.

We weren't invited to the party. So whatever happens at the party, we shouldn't be there in the first place. If we weren't there, then the party floor dancers can brawl as much as they like. It would result in way more casualties. But the key point isn't the casualties. The key point is our presence at a party we weren't invited to.
There would not have been more casualties. You'd know that if you started talking to people and learn something instead of talking at them.

[Greyblades]

Except probably 80% of the English language is loan words from other languages. That's why you have beef and cattle, pork & pigs, houses and bungalows...

And? Our language is the best because it picks up the best of the other language and leaves behind the dregs that make them inferior, thus we get to choose to we call the people between france and poland "Germans", "Deutsche" or "those Nazi twats".

[Pannonian]

And? Our language is the best because it picks up the best of the other language and leaves behind the dregs that make them inferior, thus we get to choose to we call the people between france and poland "Germans", "Deutsche" or "those Nazi twats".

The genesis of the English language allows us to have such descriptive place names as Torpenhow Hill (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torpenhow_Hill).

From tor meaning hill, pen meaning hill, how meaning hill, and hill meaning hill.

[Greyblades]

It's how we vertically rotate, my fellow of african descent.

[Gilrandir]

Guerrilla (pronounced as /gwair - EE - yuh/ btw, not like the animal as most yanks do)


No it's pronounced as /ger -ril - la/, lieutenant is pronounced as /Left - ten - ant/, Myanmar is pronounced as /Bur - ma/ and French is prounounced as /cheeze - eat - ing - sur - ren - der - mon - kee/.

We invented the language we get to say how it's words are pronounced

http://dictionary.cambridge.org/pronunciation/english/guerrilla

[Husar]

http://dictionary.cambridge.org/pronunciation/english/guerrilla

All wrong, it's a Spanish word and Seamus is closest or nails it, depending on how you pronounce the phonetic writing. ~;)

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/translate/english-spanish/guerrilla-warfare

Listen to the two examples here, I prefer the Latin American one.

[Pannonian]

All wrong, it's a Spanish word and Seamus is closest or nails it, depending on how you pronounce the phonetic writing. ~;)

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/translate/english-spanish/guerrilla-warfare

Listen to the two examples here, I prefer the Latin American one.

From my limited knowledge of Latin languages, would "gaireeya" be closest to the mark? And IIRC it comes from the Spanish insurgency against the French invaders during the Napoleonic wars.

[Greyblades]

I'm still pronouncing it ger - illa

[Husar]

From my limited knowledge of Latin languages, would "gaireeya" be closest to the mark? And IIRC it comes from the Spanish insurgency against the French invaders during the Napoleonic wars.

I'm not one to ask about phonetic writing/spelling, for Germans it would be "Gerrija" or "Gerriya", but then again when I actually speak, I always struggle with the very pronounced "r" in Spanish myself because where I come from, we hardly pronounce any r... :laugh4:
The guy in my link pronounces it very well though, it's just whatever you write, different people will say it in a different way depending on their native language and accent I guess. I found a German youtuber who just said "gorilla" (same in German and English) and sold that as the correct pronunciation, but that's just wrong.
The double "L" in Spanish is always pronounced like a "y" or "j" in English and German. So Mallorca is pronounced "Mayorca" and guerrilla is like "geriya" (the "u" after the g is silent and only serves to make the g a hard sound instead of a soft one) and so on. :dizzy2:

[Pannonian]

I'm not one to ask about phonetic writing/spelling, for Germans it would be "Gerrija" or "Gerriya", but then again when I actually speak, I always struggle with the very pronounced "r" in Spanish myself because where I come from, we hardly pronounce any r... :laugh4:
The guy in my link pronounces it very well though, it's just whatever you write, different people will say it in a different way depending on their native language and accent I guess. I found a German youtuber who just said "gorilla" (same in German and English) and sold that as the correct pronunciation, but that's just wrong.
The double "L" in Spanish is always pronounced like a "y" or "j" in English and German. So Mallorca is pronounced "Mayorca" and guerrilla is like "geriya" (the "u" after the g is silent and only serves to make the g a hard sound instead of a soft one) and so on. :dizzy2:

Majorca is pronounced madge-orca. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uz9_YfIQaz4)

[Seamus Fermanagh]

We're leery of you because of WWI, then WII, then Korea, then the Falklands.

~Sorry, you're like our number three lady.



Probably - but the Americans have historically had a problem with recognising other forces' vehicles. During the Iraq War I was told by serving soldiers that Americans were not routinely trained to recognise the silhouette of friendly NATO hardware.

Then there's the Old Story about Patton threatening to turn his army around and assault the USAAF behind him if they didn't stop bombing his men.

OH, be fair at least! We're just about as likely to 'blue-on-blue' ourselves as we are you lot.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

If there was political or security cooperation with that government more of this information would have been known to us. especially with these various rebel groups having a history of spreading misinformation like the many offsprings of the Muslim Brotherhood. I don't doubt all slides exaggerate reports. One reason it’s hard to believe is if you look at life in Damascus and the more demanding lifestyle in rebel-occupied territories. Many sources claim the gas attack was carried out by a dissident, and is possible considering it’s the dumbest thing the government could have done to undermine its legitimacy.

There would not have been more casualties. You'd know that if you started talking to people and learn something instead of talking at them.

A number of points to understand about the Western Mindset on Syria.

1. Assad bombs his own people (Civilians) and therefore his government is Tyrannical. In Western thought there is a moral obligation to overthrow Tyrants, even Tyrannical Kings ordained by God.

2. Many have said that we should have intervened in syria earlier, particularly to destroy Assad's ability to cripple his own country's infrastructure. We should have destroyed his Air Power.

3. Against this other have said we should just leave the Syrians to it, even if we can reduce casualties we are morally obliged NOT to help a people overthrow their Tyrant, they have to do it themselves. The debate between this and point 1 is at least as old the sons of the Athenian Tyrant Peisistratos, i.e 6th century BC.

4. There is a strong argument that, having intervened in Libya, we undermined the good we had done there by refusing to support the initially peaceful Syrian uprising with practical military intervention (a No-Fly Zone) undermined the Arab belief in Western Goodwill. In the face of apparent Western "betrayal" Arabs once again concluded it was "all about oil". This weakened the faction we had supported in Libya and helped ignite a new Civil War there.

At the bottom of all of this is the Western Belief in the superiority of our Constitutional arrangements and our form of government - essentially it's a belief in our cultural superiority based on hard practical observation.

[Greyblades]

I have found myself questioning if our constitutional arrangments and forms of government is even transferable to those without a specific historical and cultural imperitive to maintain it.

Can democracy really be sustained by a people lacking at least some history of self instigated revolution?

[Idaho]

OH, be fair at least! We're just about as likely to 'blue-on-blue' ourselves as we are you lot.

All the British soldiers I've spoken to about Iraq and Afghanistan have all said the same thing. That American soldiers are trigger happy, clueless and a danger to everyone around them.

[Fragony]

Maybe those are the only ones you want to talk with. I know a few Dutch soldiers who were there and they don't say these things at all, all the more that American (and Ausie) soldiers are too reluctant to shoot

[Pannonian]

A number of points to understand about the Western Mindset on Syria.

1. Assad bombs his own people (Civilians) and therefore his government is Tyrannical. In Western thought there is a moral obligation to overthrow Tyrants, even Tyrannical Kings ordained by God.

2. Many have said that we should have intervened in syria earlier, particularly to destroy Assad's ability to cripple his own country's infrastructure. We should have destroyed his Air Power.

3. Against this other have said we should just leave the Syrians to it, even if we can reduce casualties we are morally obliged NOT to help a people overthrow their Tyrant, they have to do it themselves. The debate between this and point 1 is at least as old the sons of the Athenian Tyrant Peisistratos, i.e 6th century BC.

4. There is a strong argument that, having intervened in Libya, we undermined the good we had done there by refusing to support the initially peaceful Syrian uprising with practical military intervention (a No-Fly Zone) undermined the Arab belief in Western Goodwill. In the face of apparent Western "betrayal" Arabs once again concluded it was "all about oil". This weakened the faction we had supported in Libya and helped ignite a new Civil War there.

At the bottom of all of this is the Western Belief in the superiority of our Constitutional arrangements and our form of government - essentially it's a belief in our cultural superiority based on hard practical observation.

We intervened without hesitation in Libya and the place is now a dump, its people crossing over to Europe by the literal boatload. I've come to the conclusion that Muslim countries tend towards Islamism. Any liberal democracy will only be temporary before Islamism reasserts itself. Dictatorship is the longest lasting barrier to Islamism.

[Gilrandir]

All wrong, it's a Spanish word and Seamus is closest or nails it, depending on how you pronounce the phonetic writing. ~;)

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/translate/english-spanish/guerrilla-warfare

Listen to the two examples here, I prefer the Latin American one.


I'm not one to ask about phonetic writing/spelling, for Germans it would be "Gerrija" or "Gerriya", but then again when I actually speak, I always struggle with the very pronounced "r" in Spanish myself because where I come from, we hardly pronounce any r... :laugh4:
The guy in my link pronounces it very well though, it's just whatever you write, different people will say it in a different way depending on their native language and accent I guess. I found a German youtuber who just said "gorilla" (same in German and English) and sold that as the correct pronunciation, but that's just wrong.
The double "L" in Spanish is always pronounced like a "y" or "j" in English and German. So Mallorca is pronounced "Mayorca" and guerrilla is like "geriya" (the "u" after the g is silent and only serves to make the g a hard sound instead of a soft one) and so on. :dizzy2:

As soon as a word is borrowed from one language to another it starts to assimilate in spelling, morphology, pronunciation and meaning. It may go all the way in all aspects or only in one of them. Since the word in question is an English word, it is useless to refer to Spanish any more. So IN ENGLISH guerilla and gorilla are homophones thus pronounced identically.

[Pannonian]

As soon as a word is borrowed from one language to another it starts to assimilate in spelling, morphology, pronunciation and meaning. It may go all the way in all aspects or only in one of them. Since the word in question is an English word, it is useless to refer to Spanish any more. So IN ENGLISH guerilla and gorilla are homophones thus pronounced identically.

Gorilla is a hamophone of guerrilla. It sounds almost the same, and it's animal related.

[Husar]

As soon as a word is borrowed from one language to another it starts to assimilate in spelling, morphology, pronunciation and meaning. It may go all the way in all aspects or only in one of them. Since the word in question is an English word, it is useless to refer to Spanish any more. So IN ENGLISH guerilla and gorilla are homophones thus pronounced identically.

Heresy!


Gorilla is a hamophone of guerrilla. It sounds almost the same, and it's animal related.

Aren't you just repeating what he said?

[Gilrandir]

Aren't you just repeating what he said?

No. Hamophone is something I never heard about. Probably has something to do with smoked meet.

[Pannonian]

No. Hamophone is something I never heard about. Probably has something to do with smoked meet.

Smoked meet. (http://rarehistoricalphotos.com/opium-den-singapore-1941/)

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

We intervened without hesitation in Libya and the place is now a dump, its people crossing over to Europe by the literal boatload. I've come to the conclusion that Muslim countries tend towards Islamism. Any liberal democracy will only be temporary before Islamism reasserts itself. Dictatorship is the longest lasting barrier to Islamism.


I have found myself questioning if our constitutional arrangments and forms of government is even transferable to those without a specific historical and cultural imperitive to maintain it.

Can democracy really be sustained by a people lacking at least some history of self instigated revolution?

It can be argued, and we'll never know, that things would be even worse in Libya if we had not intervened and they'd be better is we'd intervened under the same circumstances in Syria. Muslims will never accept the merits of democracy so long as they see democratically run counties in Europe and the Anglosphere acting in a way they consider two-faced and mercenary.

If we want to spread democracy we have to commit to it - if we don't we might as well do what Israel does and bombs any country to pieces if it looks at us funny.


As soon as a word is borrowed from one language to another it starts to assimilate in spelling, morphology, pronunciation and meaning. It may go all the way in all aspects or only in one of them. Since the word in question is an English word, it is useless to refer to Spanish any more. So IN ENGLISH guerilla and gorilla are homophones thus pronounced identically.

You're right about the way it's pronounced, it's pretentious to try to pronounce is in a Spanish accent unless you actually speak fluent Spanish.

They aren't exactly homophone though because guerrilla and gorilla are pronounced with different vowel sounds in the syllable.

[Gilrandir]

They aren't exactly homophone though because guerrilla and gorilla are pronounced with different vowel sounds in the syllable.

Pronunciation (and transcription) of both:
http://nordmine.ru/dic/guerilla

http://wooordhunt.ru/word/gorilla

They ARE homophones. If you mean the first syllable: almost any unstressed vowel in English either becomes a schwa or an /i/. In both words in question it is schwa.

[Husar]

Pronunciation (and transcription) of both:
http://nordmine.ru/dic/guerilla

http://wooordhunt.ru/word/gorilla

They ARE homophones. If you mean the first syllable: almost any unstressed vowel in English either becomes a schwa or an /i/. In both words in question it is schwa.

Heresy! :sweatdrop:

In German we also call the Belgian city of Liège Lüttich, even though it's not hard to say Liège.
This could all have been solved with Esperanto, or was it Espresso?... :dizzy2:

[Pannonian]

It can be argued, and we'll never know, that things would be even worse in Libya if we had not intervened and they'd be better is we'd intervened under the same circumstances in Syria. Muslims will never accept the merits of democracy so long as they see democratically run counties in Europe and the Anglosphere acting in a way they consider two-faced and mercenary.

If we want to spread democracy we have to commit to it - if we don't we might as well do what Israel does and bombs any country to pieces if it looks at us funny.


I don't see why we should spread democracy. If the people want democracy, they can get it themselves through their own effort. Why should we get involved? We as part of the UN support self determination, which involves self and which involves determination.


No. Hamophone is something I never heard about. Probably has something to do with smoked meet.

Hamophone is something that's almost the same, and which involves animals. It's a tight definition and rarely used, which is why I've just invented the word.

[Montmorency]

I sat it like, "görilla". :rolleyes:

[AE Bravo]

1. Assad bombs his own people (Civilians) and therefore his government is Tyrannical. In Western thought there is a moral obligation to overthrow Tyrants, even Tyrannical Kings ordained by God.
Even in western thought it isn’t totally justified (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_intervention). Also, I'm sure you’re familiar with the Melian dialogue, where democratic Athens had similar pretexts to invasion of Melos but their designs over the land were more important all the same in the realist sense. In order to truly understand the western mindset you have to acknowledge the geopolitical reality underlying its liberal agenda.

4. There is a strong argument that, having intervened in Libya, we undermined the good we had done there by refusing to support the initially peaceful Syrian uprising with practical military intervention (a No-Fly Zone) undermined the Arab belief in Western Goodwill. In the face of apparent Western "betrayal" Arabs once again concluded it was "all about oil". This weakened the faction we had supported in Libya and helped ignite a new Civil War there.
But then these forces would find themselves in the same dilemma they were stuck with in Iraq. Although Islamists pride themselves in being post-colonial freedom fighters, they would like nothing more than the direct presence of western forces.

Here: http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/shia-cleric-says-any-uk-troops-in-iraq-are-invaders/614803

This man is the most prominent Arab Shia cleric. He now believes that fighting the west is more important than fighting Daesh.

Like Greyblades pointed out, who knows if you can spread these ideas in a place that has zero tradition of democracy. Best thing to do for both side's sake is to stay away from each other until the middle east sorts itself out.

We intervened without hesitation in Libya and the place is now a dump, its people crossing over to Europe by the literal boatload. I've come to the conclusion that Muslim countries tend towards Islamism. Any liberal democracy will only be temporary before Islamism reasserts itself. Dictatorship is the longest lasting barrier to Islamism.
Well, you're wrong. Islamism or even conservative Islam is not inherent across the board in the Arab world. Although you'd like to think so, so there's no point in explaining.

[Montmorency]

Islamism is inherent in that Muslim societies want political leaders to be spiritual leaders, and vice versa.

That is why the West cannot defeat Islamism other than by offering a direct alternative - in other words, state theology. And that would be difficult.

[AE Bravo]

Islamism is inherent in that Muslim societies want political leaders to be spiritual leaders, and vice versa.
Explain. What Muslim societies want their leaders to be spiritual leaders? Are you saying they prefer clerics or conservatives over monarchs or army veterans?

[Montmorency]

No. Islamism is modern and progressive. It believes that Islam in its religious institutions and its spiritual principles must permeate political organization and action, among other things. Do not refer to it in terms of Church and State; both are only a subset of Islamic life.

This is what most modern Muslims want or welcome. This new and inclusive ideology - or at least its ideal - is exactly what so many Western Muslims identify with, and ultimately why so many find purpose in anti-Western commitments.

To spell it out (now I'm speaking more directly to the issue of Islamist violence):

"Radical terrorists", native to the Middle East, attack the West because obviously the West usually would act to counter their influence.

"Disenfranchised Muslim youth", native to Western states, attack the West because they have found their identities outside the West AND in particular (for those who favor the most violent approaches and factions) because they recognize the capacity and obligation for it.

Those who compare "radical Islam" to international Marxism are correct, in a way, but even they likely don't quite recognize how much more powerful and unifying ancient heritage is than economic grievance.

[Montmorency]

Those who compare "radical Islam" to international Marxism are correct, in a way, but even they likely don't quite recognize how much more powerful and unifying ancient heritage is than economic grievance.

And before you get pedantic, let me clarify: the perception and promise of and from heritage, which amounts to the same.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Pronunciation (and transcription) of both:
http://nordmine.ru/dic/guerilla

http://wooordhunt.ru/word/gorilla

They ARE homophones. If you mean the first syllable: almost any unstressed vowel in English either becomes a schwa or an /i/. In both words in question it is schwa.

In American, perhaps, but not in English which I shall now call "Commonwealth English".


I don't see why we should spread democracy. If the people want democracy, they can get it themselves through their own effort. Why should we get involved? We as part of the UN support self determination, which involves self and which involves determination.

You're right, Germany and Japan don't deserve democracy - neither does the Arab world. Today, now more than ever, states have tools that allow them to suppress their own populace so long as they have a few men willing to operate them. Today dictators have air forces, to defeat them you need one of your own Air Force. It's not like outside help for rebels is a new thing.


Even in western thought it isn’t totally justified (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_intervention). Also, I'm sure you’re familiar with the Melian dialogue, where democratic Athens had similar pretexts to invasion of Melos but their designs over the land were more important all the same in the realist sense. In order to truly understand the western mindset you have to acknowledge the geopolitical reality underlying its liberal agenda.

I think I acknowledged that it's not the only Western philosophical strain - it is none the less an important one.

Arab miss-trust of the Western "Liberal Agenda" is miss-placed. It comes, I think from a basic miss-understanding of how a Liberal Democracy works. I have observed, from the Arab Spring, and now in Turkey that authoritarian Muslim governments are primarily concerned with retaining power. This fundamentally different to Western governments which are primarily concerned with the maintenance of peace and prosperity. The reason for this is that Western governments are necessarily transient they will be voted out of office, usually in a decade or less.

So what do the "Liberal" Western governments want in the Middle East? Just the same - peace and prosperity - peace in the Middle East means peace in Europe and prosperity means trade.

Previously there was a third concern - containing Communism - and this led the West to support Tyrants as the lesser of two evils. By keeping Tyrants in power we ensured a degree of peace and Prosperity in the Middle East at the expense of some freedoms, and we kept the Communists out. Now the imperative to "hold the border" against the "Red Menace" has receded. The Middle East is now no longer a major proxy battleground and we have had time to reflect on the consequences of our policy.

The reality is that we don't want Tyrants, we want Democratic governments we can partner with, governments that are also more concerned with maintaining peace and prosperity than holding on to power.

So, yes, there is a degree of self-interest but Western Powers are entirely sincere when they say they want democracy in the region because democracy will benefit us over the long term and will not do us serious harm in the short term, for the aforementioned reasons.


But then these forces would find themselves in the same dilemma they were stuck with in Iraq. Although Islamists pride themselves in being post-colonial freedom fighters, they would like nothing more than the direct presence of western forces.

Here: http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/shia-cleric-says-any-uk-troops-in-iraq-are-invaders/614803

This man is the most prominent Arab Shia cleric. He now believes that fighting the west is more important than fighting Daesh.

Like Greyblades pointed out, who knows if you can spread these ideas in a place that has zero tradition of democracy. Best thing to do for both side's sake is to stay away from each other until the middle east sorts itself out.

As I recall he was in exile in Iran until we overthrew Saddam and he has always been in favour of attacking British and American troops. We could walk around without weapons handing out bread and milk and so long as we wore uniforms he's call on his followers to shoot us.


Well, you're wrong. Islamism or even conservative Islam is not inherent across the board in the Arab world. Although you'd like to think so, so there's no point in explaining.

Behold - the reason we don't always support democracy in the Middle East, apathy. Not malice.

[Montmorency]

You can suppress an army with an air force, but not a "populace".

[AE Bravo]

No. Islamism is modern and progressive. It believes that Islam in its religious institutions and its spiritual principles must permeate political organization and action, among other things. Do not refer to it in terms of Church and State; both are only a subset of Islamic life.
I feel this is a strawman. How exactly are you addressing what I said about Islamism not being inherent all over? Again, there are a handful of societies that are over this "promise." You're saying that Islamism is what people ultimately aspire to. If I'm being pedantic, your claims are way too broad. I don't disagree with your comparison to the effects of Marxism, but you're presenting a narrow view pitting Islamism with a western alternative when the alternative already exists in that world.

This fundamentally different to Western governments which are primarily concerned with the maintenance of peace and prosperity. The reason for this is that Western governments are necessarily transient they will be voted out of office, usually in a decade or less.
Still, this presents its own problems as elected western officials have little experience in foreign policy as opposed to the lifelong middle eastern presidents who have shown better compliance to international laws and peaceful complacency. Adventurist attitudes and impulsive actions have not made things better.

The reality is that we don't want Tyrants, we want Democratic governments we can partner with, governments that are also more concerned with maintaining peace and prosperity than holding on to power.
Again, this does not show in the policies chosen so far. It's one way of looking at it through some constructivist lens. The west often endorses torture methods by these regimes by sending terrorists there to carry out methods that are illegal in the west, constantly fund the Islamism they are supposed to be combatting, and break bread with dictators. I find it mind-boggling that nobody here wants to admit that western policy conflicts with the liberal vision they're supposed to encompass.

Agree to disagree at this point. There's some whitewashing here as if the west safeguards international laws and doesn't regularly violate them.

Behold - the reason we don't always support democracy in the Middle East, apathy. Not malice.
That was directed at him personally. Not all people from the west.

[Pannonian]

You're right, Germany and Japan don't deserve democracy - neither does the Arab world. Today, now more than ever, states have tools that allow them to suppress their own populace so long as they have a few men willing to operate them. Today dictators have air forces, to defeat them you need one of your own Air Force. It's not like outside help for rebels is a new thing.

You missed out the all-important first step before we established Germany and Japan as working liberal democracies. As a preliminary step to refashioning them in our image, we first obliterated them. We left them with no working society whatsoever, on the brink of starvation unless they took whatever we offered them, political as well as economical. And they starved at first as well, hammering home the lesson that they're dead unless they followed whatever we dictated to them. Then we rebuilt them from ground up, knocking aside anything we didn't like.

Are you willing to do that with any of the Arab states?

If rebels can't topple dictators who have air forces, why is it any problem of mine?

[Pannonian]

Again, this does not show in the policies chosen so far. It's one way of looking at it through some constructivist lens. The west often endorses torture methods by these regimes by sending terrorists there to carry out methods that are illegal in the west, constantly fund the Islamism they are supposed to be combatting, and break bread with dictators. I find it mind-boggling that nobody here wants to admit that western policy conflicts with the liberal vision they're supposed to encompass.

I have no problems admitting that western policy conflicts with the liberal vision that we're supposed to encompass. I also have no problems with the self determination and mind your own business doctrine that's often thrown back at us. So my solution, bearing everything in mind, is to respect liberalism and self determination. I want a liberal democracy in the UK and the west, which we're used to. But since the Muslim world isn't used to liberal democracies, they can have whatever the hell they want, as is their right in the principle of self determination. And equally inherent in the principle of self determination is our right not to have anything to do with them. We shouldn't meddle in their affairs, and that is their right, and they shouldn't meddle in our affairs, and that is our right. And in enforcing our right, we shouldn't accept anyone moving from Muslim countries. They don't have the right to move here; it is a privilege which we can grant as we wish, and we can equally withhold it as is our right.

[Montmorency]

I feel this is a strawman. How exactly are you addressing what I said about Islamism not being inherent all over? Again, there are a handful of societies that are over this "promise." You're saying that Islamism is what people ultimately aspire to. If I'm being pedantic, your claims are way too broad. I don't disagree with your comparison to the effects of Marxism, but you're presenting a narrow view pitting Islamism with a western alternative when the alternative already exists in that world.

I'm trying to peg "Islamism" more precisely, really. There have been discussions (as here) of the need or possibility of Reformation within Islam. Islam has been in a (very roughly analogous) state to Christian Reformation for generations now, and the various Islamists movements are what largely make it up.

[Strike For The South]

Sometimes reformations don't always turn out the way you want them.

The sensible thing to do is support and arm the strongman. Democratic movements in the near east end up in hilarious Islamism 9/10 times. Rebels demand support and then complain when the support is not total and unquestioning.

The near east simply doesn't have the base of liberals to make supporting democracy a worthwhile endeavor. Why should the west empower them with the vote when it will just allow them to martial more resources against us?

[AE Bravo]

They already are arming the strongman. Not where it’s needed of course. The west is equally obsessed with the middle east as it is with failing in it. Democratic movements in the near east end up badly because the west chooses to arm Islamists that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar think they can buy off enough to be moderate. Westerners go with that solution because radicals have a higher success rate (ie Iraq, Lebanon) while democratic movements are easily put down.

Everybody know the west either cow tows for oil money and basing deals or forfeit their gains over Islamists while funding them in a never-ending circle jerk. There's no actual commitment to democracy from western leadership.

[Strike For The South]

They already are arming the strongman. Not where it’s needed of course. The west is equally obsessed with the middle east as it is with failing in it. Democratic movements in the near east end up badly because the west chooses to arm Islamists that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar think they can buy off enough to be moderate. Westerners go with that solution because radicals have a higher success rate (ie Iraq, Lebanon) while democratic movements are easily put down.

Everybody know the west either cow tows for oil money and basing deals or forfeit their gains over Islamists while funding them in a never-ending circle jerk. There's no actual commitment to democracy from western leadership.

What would actual commitment look like to you? If actual commitment ended up with Islamists in power, why should the west bother helping?

[spmetla]

They already are arming the strongman. Not where it’s needed of course. The west is equally obsessed with the middle east as it is with failing in it. Democratic movements in the near east end up badly because the west chooses to arm Islamists that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar think they can buy off enough to be moderate. Westerners go with that solution because radicals have a higher success rate (ie Iraq, Lebanon) while democratic movements are easily put down.

Everybody know the west either cow tows for oil money and basing deals or forfeit their gains over Islamists while funding them in a never-ending circle jerk. There's no actual commitment to democracy from western leadership.

Unfortunately that's because democracy in the middle east does not have checks and balances and usually ends up being the feared tyranny of the majority. I look at what's happening in Turkey right now and that's exactly what it's steering toward too. Yes, he's the elected leader but he'll use that majority support to make himself president for life if possible.

As for your earlier points on it not being a party we were invited to that's a yes and no truth. The West has been intricately tied into the middle east since Ottoman Empire started to weaken. That's when the French reserved the right over the Russians to be the guardians of christians in Lebanon and Syria and so on. Once we broke the Ottoman Empire apart the West has never really left. The Arab infighting led to colonialism instead of tolerating anarchy in syria and mesopotamia, we've been closely involved ever since. While yes, we weren't specially invited to this fight in Syria by their government we have always had an interest in what happens there and will probably continue to try and get 'our' side whatever that is into power.

I actually wish we would fight IS proper and go in on the ground in a big way before handing it back to Syria/Iraq/Kurdistan or perhaps carving out a Sunni Arab Republic(liberal dictatorship) of Upper Mesopotamia or something. But seeing as we are mostly just in the air we will continue to have all problems of differentiating between IS targets or civilians when relying on local intel, aerial imagery and very very limited SOF as forward observers.

[AE Bravo]

What would actual commitment look like to you? If actual commitment ended up with Islamists in power, why should the west bother helping?
Actual commitment would have been staying in Iraq and not leave it to the local scavengers Iran and Saudi.

Islamists come to power in failed states. There are more stable states that can be pressured but there is a lack of commitment due to economic interests. If the west can't help, it shouldn't bother. It's funny because everyone would be better off this way, yet here we are.

As for your earlier points on it not being a party we were invited to that's a yes and no truth. The West has been intricately tied into the middle east since Ottoman Empire started to weaken. That's when the French reserved the right over the Russians to be the guardians of christians in Lebanon and Syria and so on. Once we broke the Ottoman Empire apart the West has never really left. The Arab infighting led to colonialism instead of tolerating anarchy in syria and mesopotamia, we've been closely involved ever since. While yes, we weren't specially invited to this fight in Syria by their government we have always had an interest in what happens there and will probably continue to try and get 'our' side whatever that is into power.
So there's no need to obey UN charters? For historical reasons?

[Montmorency]

Islamists come to power in failed states.

This is a myth, and it threads throughout the various causal and conceptual confusions.

Islamists have the most difficult time in "failed states" - which is why IS has surprised so many. IS wants to build its own institutions, rather than relying on existing ones as Islamists have historically done.

[AE Bravo]

This is a myth, and it threads throughout the various causal and conceptual confusions.

Islamists have the most difficult time in "failed states" - which is why IS has surprised so many. IS wants to build its own institutions, rather than relying on existing ones as Islamists have historically done.
No, they really have a more difficult time in stable countries. It's pretty clear they thrive in failed states.

[Montmorency]

No, they really have a more difficult time in stable countries. It's pretty clear they thrive in failed states.

No. First, failed states, failing states, and unstable states are not all the same thing.

You should really consider who thrives where, and what it means for a street gang to thrive in the looting as opposed to a governing ideology or organization. One thing that might help is to notice that if Islamist groups are more likely to produce combatants in times of outright conflict, then that does not mean they are thriving at that time or that they were not thriving before the conflict.

[spmetla]

Actual commitment would have been staying in Iraq and not leave it to the local scavengers Iran and Saudi.

So there's no need to obey UN charters? For historical reasons?

I agree 100% we should have stayed there. The way each administration can change our foreign policy and how we treat or stand by 'allies' is a major weakness with our government. Having served there and heard from friends there now the state its in is really disheartening for the waste of lives on all sides. Especially when guys like al Sadr still want to kill us in the minor role we're playing now.

As you said if the west can't help it shouldn't but it certainly can help. The major problem and weakness though is that no western country has the will to go all the way and help. Libyan anarchy could have been avoided and the dilemma in Syria should have ended years ago but the half measures applied to look like something is being done instead of bold, dangerous, and expensive action isn't done. That said, Islamists also come to power in in non-failed states. They may be lighter on the stoning of women etc.. but that doesn't mean that isn't their end game.


UN charters are of course useful but power always wins out as you well know. China is building islands because it knows the UN has no fangs to stop it. Russia doing it's power plays in the Ukraine and Crimea. Unfortunately the rules often don't apply to the big powers so in crucial areas like Syria the big powers will continue to play games. Russia won't be stopped and neither will the US. Doesn't make it right but wishing the world otherwise won't stop it either.

[Gilrandir]

Heresy! :sweatdrop:

In German we also call the Belgian city of Liège Lüttich, even though it's not hard to say Liège.


Proper names are a story apart so it is gonna be a long lecture. To avoid it in a few words:

Toponyms are not neccessarily borrowed from a source language - they may have their counterparts in the target language - especially in places with ethnically/linguistically mixed background (Wroclaw vs Breslau, Lemberg vs Lviv, Danzig vs Gdansk).

[AE Bravo]

No. First, failed states, failing states, and unstable states are not all the same thing.

You should really consider who thrives where, and what it means for a street gang to thrive in the looting as opposed to a governing ideology or organization. One thing that might help is to notice that if Islamist groups are more likely to produce combatants in times of outright conflict, then that does not mean they are thriving at that time or that they were not thriving before the conflict.
This is a weird argument to make. They are imprisoned or put to death in virtually every other non-Islamist country. In unstable environments they get the opportunity to have a steady income from foreign benefactors, have their ranks gain experience, and carry out illegal operations since they don't have to worry about legitimacy yet. They also have an easier time governing because of the tribal politics and patronage systems they excel at.

Chaos creates space for Islamists. They may come to power on other occasions but it's obvious where they undergo rapid growth. AQ in Yemen, for example, have come a long way and are the second most powerful now.

Unfortunately the rules often don't apply to the big powers so in crucial areas like Syria the big powers will continue to play games. Russia won't be stopped and neither will the US. Doesn't make it right but wishing the world otherwise won't stop it either.
Russia is there legally. The US has made too many (illegal) mistakes to be compared to Russia in the middle east.

[spmetla]

Russia is there legally. The US has made too many (illegal) mistakes to be compared to Russia in the middle east.

Although it is not in the open I'm sure there is back door agreement with the Syrian government allowing the coalition to bomb ISIS in their territory. The US has been coordinating their strikes with the Russians since the middle of last year.

Because of the all the bluster by Obama against Assad and his government there is no way that his administration could in the open work with the 'evil regime' against ISIS. I'm sure that the Syrian government will continue to allow/tolerate so long as the US never actually enforces any sort of no fly zone against them.

The US can be compared the Russia though in regards to Syria and Iraq, yes the US has made far more mistakes. For the greater region though, Russia/USSR and the PRC too has made no shortage of mistakes; usually in the supplying 'friendly' rebels to whatever cause with far too many AKs and RPGs making rebellion a little too easy for any slightly weak government which certainly aided the Islamist movements. Just look at Afghanistan, Yemen, Lebanon, Somalia/Eritrea, and of course Africa too.
It's one of the reason I'm for arming the Kurds but not the FSA. Our pro-democratic rebels always lose in every civil war in Africa, Middle East, or South America. They just lack the brutality that marxist/maoist and islamist rebels can and will impose on civilians that win wars against governments.

[Montmorency]

Chaos creates space for Islamists. They may come to power on other occasions but it's obvious where they undergo rapid growth. AQ in Yemen, for example, have come a long way and are the second most powerful now.

This isn't the correct causal chain. Islamists thrive until harshly targeted by military leaderships, which is only a short-lived arrangement at best. Where central governments collapse outright, violent Islamists can simply hope to emerge as the largest and most cohesive groups in the territory. Notably, this hasn't worked out well in Libya. In Afghanistan, the Taliban could achieve some kind of hegemony and thus stability, but Libya is so large and full of competing powers that no single group can take over. Libya is currently a great place for hiding out, training, and black market enterprise, but not at all if you're hoping to govern land and people.

Al Qaeda is doing rather poorly in Yemen this year. They miscalculated in a big way there. There are indeed a number of small-time Islamists groups still making a piece of the pie for themselves. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda won't see much of it. I would also point out that Al Qaeda only achieved the (anachronistic) prominence you have in mind while there was not such "chaos".

[AE Bravo]

Although it is not in the open I'm sure there is back door agreement with the Syrian government allowing the coalition to bomb ISIS in their territory. The US has been coordinating their strikes with the Russians since the middle of last year.
There is no political or security cooperation with the Syrian government. Backdoor agreements are of course necessary to prevent confrontation.

The US can be compared the Russia though in regards to Syria and Iraq, yes the US has made far more mistakes. For the greater region though, Russia/USSR and the PRC too has made no shortage of mistakes; usually in the supplying 'friendly' rebels to whatever cause with far too many AKs and RPGs making rebellion a little too easy for any slightly weak government which certainly aided the Islamist movements. Just look at Afghanistan, Yemen, Lebanon, Somalia/Eritrea, and of course Africa too.
Who has destroyed three separate Arab states to the point of no recovery? Not Russia. There's a difference between arming rebels and destroying a country's infrastructure through airstrikes.

This isn't the correct causal chain. Islamists thrive until harshly targeted by military leaderships, which is only a short-lived arrangement at best. Where central governments collapse outright, violent Islamists can simply hope to emerge as the largest and most cohesive groups in the territory.
It sounds like you're repeating what I'm saying. They're able to function in places like Libya where in less hopeless countries they are imprisoned, executed, or deported. Their parties can be shut down by despots easily, this has happened a lot this year. I admit I can't keep up, don't understand what you're saying half the time. My English isn't that good.

Al Qaeda is doing rather poorly in Yemen this year. They miscalculated in a big way there. There are indeed a number of small-time Islamists groups still making a piece of the pie for themselves. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda won't see much of it. I would also point out that Al Qaeda only achieved the (anachronistic) prominence you have in mind while there was not such "chaos".
You know I'm referring to AQAP. Why do they have their moments? Because of Yemeni factionalism and interventions that had targeted their enemies.

[spmetla]

Who has destroyed three separate Arab states to the point of no recovery? Not Russia. There's a difference between arming rebels and destroying a country's infrastructure through airstrikes.


No argument from me on these points. I will caveat that with Libya the US administration actually intended to just sit it out and watch but Sarkozy essentially forced NATO into by striking the Libyan army on the march east. Syria and especially Iraq have been colossal mistakes in intent and then follow up.

[Montmorency]

Nice piece on the Afghanistan theater from the US Army War College, August 1: The Mysterious Case of the Vanishing Taliban (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Mysterious-Case-of-Vanishing-Taliban/2016/08/01)


2015 was a bad year for the Afghan National Security Forces. They ended the Western calendar year badly battered, like a punch-drunk prize fighter on the ropes. At least 5,500 of them died in 2015, the worst annual casualty toll since American involvement in Afghanistan’s civil war began in 2001. By the end of Western calendar year 2015, the 215 Corps based in Helmand had virtually disintegrated, with perhaps only 35 percent of its table of organization and equipment strength still present and able to fight.1 For comparison, U.S. Army doctrine considers an infantry unit to be “combat ineffective” if it suffers 30 percent casualties. Continuing the steady 12-year long pattern, about 35 percent of the Afghan Army and the Afghan Police deserted in 2015. “Ghost policemen” and “ghost soldiers” were reported by Afghan officials with credible accounts suggesting as many as 3 policemen out of every 10 now receiving pay (from U.S. taxpayers) do not actually exist, or are no longer alive. The ANA’s 10,000 commandos, who are good solid troops, were literally exhausted from being shuttled from one firefight to another all over Afghanistan, often pausing between battles just long enough to throw some more ammunition onto the helicopters.

The Taliban captured four districts in Helmand province in 2015, two districts in Badakshan and, spectacularly, the city of Kunduz, one of Afghanistan’s largest urban centers. In the first phase of the Battle of Kunduz, which apparently started as a prison break, fewer than 500 Taliban troops routed some 4,000 Afghan security forces, who mostly fled the city without firing a shot. They kept running until they reached a hilltop fort outside Kunduz where a small detachment of a dozen or so U.S. Special Forces Soldiers were calmly preparing for a repeat of the Alamo. Eventually, after more than two weeks and the U.S. bombing of the Doctors without Borders hospital in Kunduz which resulted in the killing of 42 staff members and patients, the visible Taliban presence was driven back out of the city. By early 2016, the situation appeared so bleak that Nicholas Haysom, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of the normally upbeat UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), predicted that “For 2016, survival [of the Afghan government] will be an achievement.”2

For Western analysts, the outlook for 2016 was indeed grim. The intelligence community expected the Taliban to come out of its corner for this round of the fighting after January and February swinging from the heels. Predictions outlined by the Director of National Intelligence in his annual testimony to Congress called for a repeat of 2015 only worse; an acceleration of the Taliban’s momentum from 2015 which would not give Afghan security forces breathing space to rest, reequip, and replace losses with troops transferred from less hard-hit areas. In short, analysts feared the worst. They expected exactly what well-led American troops would do in this situation — that the Taliban would keep up the pressure, be aggressive, continue attacking, and keep the opposing fighter back on his heels and on the ropes until he inevitably went down for the count.

It didn’t happen. For the first four peak fighting months of 2016, the Taliban mysteriously more or less went to ground. In June, Afghanistan’s TOLO News reported that insurgent attacks dropped 17 percent lower than in May.3 This may have been partly due to the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan occurring during most of June, but no drop of comparable size in insurgent attacks occurred during Ramadan in 2015.

We know Taliban military leaders are familiar with Mao Tse Tung’s famous treatise on guerilla warfare. Translated copies of it have been found in cave complexes and abandoned camps in Afghanistan for many years, as well as a lot of other Western literature on warfare and American military history. Indeed, the Taliban study American military history and American military thinking carefully. They occasionally make pronouncements on their website which reflect this historical knowledge. We don’t know, of course, whether they follow Mao’s advice on insurgency and guerilla warfare to any degree, because we lack that kind of insight into their thinking and planning processes. However, Taliban activity so far this Western calendar year looks like a page taken straight from Mao’s treatise. In Maoist guerilla doctrine, guerilla forces in the initial stages of their military operations do what they can to harass their enemies — kidnappings, executions, bombings, and attacks on remote security outposts only when success is certain. When the Maoist guerilla movement transitions to the third stage, which is marked by the permanent formation of larger bodies of troops, the creation of permanent supply and training bases in secure territory, and the steady flow of new men and materiel into action, then Mao Tse Tung said guerillas will operate more like regular forces. That was what 2015 looked like in Afghanistan. However, Mao noted, if guerilla forces at this stage suffer a setback, they should revert back to the lower level of guerilla activity (the second stage) until conditions are favorable to progress again to the highest, or third, stage of guerilla operations.

That is certainly what 2016 in Afghanistan looks like so far. The predicted mass attacks and major guerilla operations in Helmand, Kunduz and elsewhere — 2015 The Sequel — simply have not materialized. Instead, we have seen the sorts of things guerillas do when they are in stage one or stage two of an insurgency — stopping busses, kidnapping citizens, murdering men suspected of cooperating with the government, suicide bombings, and pinprick attacks on the most remote police outposts, many of which that were in rural Afghanistan were wisely withdrawn earlier this year. The Western year 2015 witnessed Taliban guerillas massing in units of a thousand men or more on numerous occasions. This year, they’re gone. The beleaguered Afghan security forces have had time to rest and regroup. The 215 Corps is being completely rebuilt during this lull in operations. The commandos, President Ghani’s firemen, have had time to rest, retrain, and assimilate new commando course graduates into their ranks. The miniscule Afghan National Air Force (the term the Afghans use to refer to it) has had breathing space to conduct overdue maintenance, obtain spare parts, repair aircraft, and train with the first of the new Super Tucanos (propeller driven flight trainers built by Embraer and adapted to a light ground support role). The underlying question in the Mystery of the Vanishing Taliban so far this year is: Why? [Mont: Interesting that the US has come to the point of buying Brazilian prop-driven planes for the Afghan air force - but why do they cost millions each? At this point, it might make more sense to start a production line of revamped All-American '50s props. Probably cheaper, probably more effective in operations, probably better for American defense contractors.]

There are at least five possible explanations, some combination of which may or may not be true. The first possible explanation is the “Kunduz was the Taliban Tet” theory. During the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, similar to the Taliban takeover of Kunduz, Vietcong guerillas succeeded in surprising government security forces by briefly and spectacularly seizing a number of towns and parts of cities; Vietcong sappers got into the U.S. Embassy grounds in Saigon. Having been told for many years by endless Pentagon briefings that the Vietcong were a spent force, the civilian population of the United States was shocked by the Tet Offensive. The Vietcong won a major propaganda victory, largely convincing the American public that the Vietnam War could not be won. This propaganda success, however, came at a devastating cost for the Vietcong movement, which was almost wiped out by casualties and counterattacks as the U.S. and the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) recovered their balance and struck back. Efforts to explain this to the public ran into the “Boy Crying Wolf” effect. Having been consistently misled by ecstatically optimistic U.S. Department of Defense press releases for years, anything the Pentagon now said was deeply suspect — another lesson unlearned from the Vietnam War. Producing a steady jet of wildly optimistic progress reports erodes your credibility and makes it less likely the public will believe you and trust you when you really need them to.

In the case of the Vietcong, the reports of its devastation were true. After the 1968 Tet Offensive and even by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 1972, the Vietcong were a pale shadow of their former organization, their ranks depleted by as much as 80 percent and their leadership decimated. Tet was a complete military disaster for the Vietcong, and a less corrupt, incompetent, illegitimate, and universally-reviled South Vietnamese government might have pulled victory from the jaws of defeat. Using this analogy, the “Kunduz was the Taliban Tet” theory of diminished Taliban activity in 2016 posits that Taliban military efforts in Kunduz and Helmand in 2015, while successful as propaganda, were terribly costly in casualties to the Taliban rank and file and seriously depleted the cadre of experienced mid-level Taliban military commanders, the Taliban equivalent of field grade officers.

The Taliban are exceptionally good about policing up the battlefield before leaving it, so it is difficult to assess how many casualties they suffered in 2015. They almost always remove their dead and wounded, scrub signs of casualties as much as possible (e.g., covering up blood stains, bandages, and body parts) and even pickup their spent shell casings before pulling back. So this theory is hard to substantiate, but it does fit the facts and the apparently Maoist doctrinal approach seen so far this year. Arguing against this theory is the fact that the Taliban has an almost infinite number of replacements in Pakistan steeped in jihad and eager to join the fight in Afghanistan. The Taliban recruiting pool is indoctrinated and trained in hundreds of radical madrassas in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) funded by the Pakistani Government. All Taliban field commanders are Mullahs (or the slightly higher title, often self-promoted, of Maulvis) and there is no shortage of religious leaders in Afghanistan, either. The pirimuridi system of training young men to be Mullahs essentially clones religious beliefs and codifies doctrinal behavior. It is therefore doubtful that in 2015 the Taliban incurred the same level of debilitating, irreplaceable casualties that the Vietcong suffered from Tet.

The second possible explanation is the “Internal Political Problems” theory. The brilliant extermination of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour in Baluchistan via drone strike earlier this year threw the Taliban into its second leadership succession crisis in less than a year. Within two weeks, a religious pseudo-scholar (in academic terms, none of the Taliban leadership is anything more than a cloned ideologue with a very weak scholarly understanding of Islam) named Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada emerged as an acceptable middle ground figurehead between the rival tribal factions of the jihadist organization. For the last 15 years a profound ignorance about the Taliban and a persistent anthropomorphic interpretation of it along Western cultural lines has knee-capped the fight against them. Even in 2016, organizations like the Office of the Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) persist in conceptualizing the Taliban as some sort of European political movement with a Western military hierarchy. The problem with the “Internal Political Problems” theory is that this might be what would be happening if the Taliban were a Western organization and thought like Americans. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Taliban is a classic Islamic millenarian movement, the direct ideological descendant of the Hindustani Fanatics movement of the mid-1800’s in the Punjab and Hazara regions of what today is Pakistan. No matter how badly the State Department wants to shoehorn every actor on the world stage into the rational actor theory of human activity, the Taliban are decidedly Other. Taliban thinking, hierarchies, and lines of authority are utterly different from Western concepts of organizational theory. Mullah Omar and his successors were and are not, as most Western leaders continue to believe, some sort of World War II four-star General Eisenhower-style supreme military commander of the Taliban. This completely misunderstands militant millennial Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan and the culture of the Pashtun frontier, as I have written many times before over the past decade.4 The failure of Western analysts to discover that Mullah Omar was dead for two years, or to even guess the outcome of Mullah Mansour’s succession, illustrates clearly the extent to which the Taliban mindset remains opaque to Western understanding. So the “Internal Political Problems” theory might make sense if the Taliban were General Motors or the British Labour Party, but they are not. Using Western words and ideas to describe something so completely Other does not work well. But the Taliban are like a primordial grove of interconnected ancient trees which are at the root core the same organism and which have the same ideological DNA, but which grow independently and struggle for water and light with the other trees as well as with the other organisms in the ecosystem. You can chop down the central tree, the Mullah Omar or the Mullah Mansour tree, and this hurts the grove, but the organism soon regenerates a central tree and the root network remains deep and strong. The other trees continue to grow and do what they do because they are part of the entity, but they also continue their struggle for resources and even compete with one another. Overall Taliban military control remains largely in the hands of Haqqani Network scion Sirajjudin Haqqani. Furthermore, we have seen even less external evidence of discontent with Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada‘s selection as Emir than was evident with Mullah Mansour’s earlier accession to power to replace Mullah Omar. This is in large part because Pakistan’s ISI was eager this time to avoid the unseemly strongman tactics that accompanied Mansour’s power grab and to make the selection of his successor more transparent to the Taliban Ulema via a process that seemed more inclusive and consensual.

A third explanation is the “Orientalist Theory,” which holds that the Taliban was indeed part of the 200-year long, classic, cyclical repeating Northwest Frontier charismatic “Mad Mullah” phenomenon. This theory holds that the death of Mullah Omar will lead, as it always has in the past 200 years, to the gradual but steady decline of the movement, as the followers of the latest Mad Mullah drift away, are killed, or splinter into small, largely impotent sects. One could argue that the appearance of a so-called ISIL cell in eastern Afghanistan fits this pattern — its arrival and rise coincide with the death of Omar as the charismatic leader of the most recent iteration of the classic, repeating Mad Mullah movement. Certainly, the so-called ISIL or ISIS cell in Afghanistan has little or nothing to do with the terrorist quasi-state actor by that name in Iraq and Syria. None of its members speak anything but Pashto, few are from ethnic groups unknown in Nangarhar province, and most are disaffected former Taliban competing for smuggling routes and the concomitant monetary rewards which they bring in. The more money you have, the more fighters you can pay. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s (i.e., HiG’s) most recent break with the central Afghan Taliban organization and his predictably dead-end “negotiations” with the Ghani government may also fit this pattern. Time will tell if the historical pattern of jihad on the Northwest Frontier will hold true again this time — such an overall decline in the Taliban would take years to detect. More importantly, the kind of Islamic radicalism which the Taliban represents today is no longer the isolated disease organism that its predecessors represented a century or two ago. Global Islamic radicalism is an experiment which escaped the CIA laboratory in Afghanistan during its proxy war against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s, and it has metastasized into a sprawling, interconnected cancer with strong cells in almost every country across the Islamic world. The information age and social media have changed the battlefield, and this genie is not going back in the bottle any time soon. So the “Orientalist Theory” for explaining the Mystery of the Vanishing Taliban in 2016 is as unsatisfying as the “Internal Political Problems” theory, because it fails to take into account the evolved 21st century context of Islamic radicalism.

A fourth possible explanation is the “Taliban as a Learning Organization” theory. If the Taliban senior leadership had attended the U.S. Army War College and learned the theory and practice of strategy, Kunduz would not have been captured in 2015, and Helmand would not have been a major battlefield. The United States and the rest of NATO were on a glide slope to a near-zero presence in the country, air assets were being withdrawn, and the Taliban were getting exactly what they wanted: The removal of foreign troops from Afghan soil. All they had to do was lay low for a year or two, play possum, make it appear that they were a spent force, and let the U.S. and the other small NATO-country contingents complete their withdrawals. After that, without U.S. advisors and airpower as an impediment, the Taliban could have resumed its offensive operations and taken over much of Afghanistan with relatively little opposition.

Viewed from a Sun Tzu strategic standpoint, 2015 was a major strategic blunder. Its outcome was to effectively reverse President Obama’s timeline for troop withdrawal combined with the broad reauthorization of U.S. air strikes against Taliban targets in support of Afghan security forces. Some analysts believe that any amount of U.S. presence is not a significant factor in Taliban thinking. After all, they fought against U.S. forces all through the period of President Obama’s escalation of the war, when there were as many as 130,000 American troops and 260,000 American civilian logistics contractors in the country — almost 400,000 U.S. personnel in country by old Korean War standards of counting. The Taliban has been fighting for 14 years against the United States and the American-backed Kabul government, this analytical perspective points out, so it follows that the Taliban simply does not care if some American assets remain in support of the “puppet infidel regime” in Kabul. Jihad is jihad.

Yet, the Taliban is without doubt a learning organization, at least at the tactical level of war, as anyone who was involved in the struggle to get ahead of the improvised explosive device (IED) threat in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2012 will attest.5 Reducing the IED threat was a fast-paced game of measures and countermeasures in which the Taliban figured out what American forces were doing to stop IED attacks and developed tragically effective responses at an astonishing rate. The ability of illiterate, sandal-wearing peasants to intuit intricate technological capabilities and defeat them with duct tape and car parts created a grudging respect among most Americans I knew in Afghanistan for the ingenuity and resourcefulness of men who could not write the numbers 1-10 on a piece of paper or tie shoelaces. After the earliest phase of the deadly IED chess game involving WWII-era pressure plate technology, the Taliban progressed to remote detonators. American analysts quickly realized the Taliban were using cell phones as detonators for homemade roadside bombs. When a U.S. vehicle convoy was in the blast radius of their bomb, Taliban observers would call the cellphone detonator attached to the roadside bomb. So American forces fielded simple vehicle-mounted cell phone jammers which blocked cell phone calls in the immediate vicinity of the convoy. That worked for a short time. Then, the Taliban deduced what was happening remarkably quickly and implemented a simple countermeasure — running 10 cents worth of monofilament wire from the bomb itself to a detached cellphone antenna 100 meters or so from the bomb and outside the jamming radius of the American jamming devices. Astute observers drew parallels to the underestimation of the Vietcong in Vietnam, where a network of listening posts and bicycle runners totally defeated the entire Arclight grid square-based strategic bombing effort.

Thus, at least at the tactical level of war, the Taliban are clearly a learning organization and a fast-learning one at that. The explanation for the Mystery of the Vanishing Taliban could be that they learned from 2015 that it is better to wait the Americans out and encourage us to leave their country by their quiescence. I think however that this is unlikely. The evidence from the last 14 years indicates the “they just don’t care” argument has a lot of validity, and it is a year too late to be applying the lesson of 2015 in any case. Those horses are out of the barn and the decision to keep important American assets in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future has already been taken.

A fifth hypothesis for explaining the Mystery of the Vanishing Taliban is the “One Damn Thing After Another Theory.” This suggests that in 2016 Taliban operations have thus far been hamstrung by, of all things, the calendar, combined with the execution of Mullah Mansour by drone in Baluchistan. According to this theory, the reduced level of major Taliban attacks in 2016 is a result, in sequence, first of the poppy harvest, which consumed March and part of April. This was followed by Mullah Mansour’s timely demise — not because of internal political problems, but for the more prosaic and somewhat comical reason that all senior Taliban men, one suspects, immediately put a great deal of distance between themselves and their previous cell phones and SIM cards (especially after an article in the Wall Street Journal unhelpfully explained to the Taliban in detail how Mansour was tracked and killed), and for several weeks, no Taliban commander in the field in Afghanistan knew any Pakistan-based Taliban leader’s new cell phone number(s). This simple lack of a phone book, the “One Damn Thing After Another Theory” posits, severely interrupted battlefield operations by disrupting operational communications. This temporary disruption was then followed by Ramadan, which as discussed earlier did not have a major effect on Taliban operations in 2015. For a variety of reasons involving Taliban command and control methodologies, this theory is not particularly strong either.

That brings the mystery back to square one. Whatever the answer is to the puzzle of why the Taliban have been so relatively scarce and relatively quiet on the battlefield so far in 2016 compared to 2015, however, three things are certain: First, while the Taliban rarely make tactical mistakes, because they are hardened fighters with a lot of tactical experience, Taliban leadership does make strategic mistakes, and fairly often. They do not have a Command and Staff College or a War College. This could be capitalized on far more effectively than has been the case over the last 14 years.

Second, whatever the reason is, it is not a reason or combination of reasons that Western military minds would develop if faced with an identical problem set. The Taliban simply do not think like we do. Any American who has ever had a conversation with an Afghan and thought they were going from Point A to Point B in the discussion and found themselves at Point Q instead understands this. Human information processing is not a universal, organic, mental sequence hardwired into the brain at birth. It is learned, and it is learned in a unique cultural environment. “Rational actor” (or “rational choice”) macroeconomic theory is wrong because everyone in the world does not think the same way and arrive at the same conclusions. Flying airliners into skyscrapers on September 11, 2001, should have been the expiration date of rational choice theory and the day this line of Western thinking was discarded into the dustbin of intellectual history. “Rational” is simply an academically-biased, orientalist meta-descriptor for the Enlightenment-based Western educational process and Western cultural values in decision-making.

Third, and finally, wherever the Taliban are, whatever they are doing, they will be back, perhaps this week, perhaps next month, but if not this year then next year or the year after that. Because in their minds, God wills it, and you do not negotiate with the will of God.

Not explored above is simply the possibility that the Taliban are satisfied with a long view (partly by Maoist terms) and do not feel the need to actively fight to militarily occupy all the territory, even if there will be opportunistic or strategic-propaganda offensives on a sporadic basis. A split-state plus persistent low-level conflict may just be what would lend the Taliban administration institutional strength and space to develop, while the Western-backed rump always needs to struggle just to avoid dying on the vine. Sort of like the situation with the FARC today, just inverted in some key respects (e.g. local penetration, geography occupied, relative demographic proportions, commercial links to region and world). Also, it's a good way to mitigate the odds of getting your clock cleaned all over again once Syria, Ukraine, etc. no longer require as much attention. Common 4X strategy.

A complementary, more straightforward and immediate explanation could be that the ISIS franchise/splinter Taliban are causing too many problems for the core, and dealing with them is for the moment a higher priority than launching flashy offensives at the G-Men, who serve as a fixed quantity anyway.