Turkish Election Results and Implication

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Turkey re-elected Erdogan, confirmed constitutional changes diminishing parliament and enhancing the powers of the presidency, and returned the Ultranationalists/Erdogan's Party to a majority in the parliament.

Erdogan's voter support was a full ten points higher than the support for his party in parliament. The ultranationalists managed eleven percent support when it was feared they would fall below the 10% threshold. CHP (Secularist) opposition candidate took 31% of the vote. This was an improvement over the 23% of previous elections but short of the numbers needed to force a run off against Erdogan.

Region by region voter maps suggest that the Agean coast and the Kurdish SE quadrant feature limited support for Erdogan, but the bulk of the populace in between those edges is strongly in the Erdogan camp.

Reviews as to how conciliatory Erdogan is likely to be are mixed. Source (https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c6gzmx3zld1t/turkey-election-2018) Source (https://www.npr.org/2018/06/25/623100649/turkey-elections-erdogan-wins-second-term)

Thoughts?

[Fragony]

I find the support he has in European countries with large Turkish communities rather worrying. What they do in Turkey is up to them but I find it rediculous that people with two nationalities are allowed to have any influence in anything, here and there.

[Montmorency]

In 10 years, will Turkey be more dangerous than Russia?

Maybe George Friedman was right.

[Fragony]

Different kind of dangerous, the second they start their engines will bankrupt them in a minute. Turkey the nation you can laugh away as being a threat, but our friends they are not, Turkey keeps a very firm hand on Turks here

[spmetla]

Didn't want to start a whole thread for this article but it's Turkey and world politics related. Turkey always has been one of the necessary but also more estranged NATO members depending on who was governing them.
F-35 Transfers to Turkey Held Back Under U.S. Defense Measure
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-23/f-35-transfers-to-turkey-held-back-under-u-s-defense-measure?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ebb%2024.07.18&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief
Transfers to Turkey of Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 would be barred temporarily under a compromise defense policy measure agreed to on Monday, according to House and Senate aides.

Turkish receipt of the fighter jets would be held back until the Pentagon submitted an assessment within 90 days of the measure’s enactment on U.S.-Turkish relations, the impact of Turkey’s planned acquisition of Russia’s advanced S-400 missile defense system and the ramifications for the U.S. industrial base if Turkey is dropped from the international F-35 program.

The move, reflecting the tensions in U.S.-Turkish relations, is part of a $717 billion defense policy bill (H.R. 5515) for fiscal 2019 crafted by congressional negotiators that awaits final approval in the House and Senate. The measure also would hold back some funds for Defense Department cloud activities, reflecting the controversy over a winner-take-all cloud contract that competitors say would favor Amazon.com Inc.Defense Secretary Jim Mattis had warned Congress against cutting off transfers of the F-35. In a letter to lawmakers this month, Mattis said he agreed “with congressional concerns about the authoritarian drift in Turkey and its impact on human rights and rule of law.” But he said an F-35 cutoff would risk triggering an international “supply chain disruption” that would drive up costs and delay deliveries of the fighter.Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey plans to buy about 100 F-35s, joining the U.K. and Australia as the top international customers. At least 10 Turkish companies are building parts and components, such as the cockpit displays, for other partners, according to Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed.The compromise measure crafted by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees also would let the president waive a requirement to impose sanctions on countries and entities doing business with Russia for as long as 180 days if the party involved is taking steps to distance itself from a commercial relationship with the Russian defense and intelligence sectors, according to committee aides and a Democratic summary of the bill.

There, too, Mattis had urged lawmakers to hold off, writing them last week that “there is a compelling need to avoid significant unintended damage to our long-term, national strategic interests” even though “Russia should suffer consequences for its aggressive and destabilizing behavior as well as its continuing illegal occupation of Ukraine.”

[Elmetiacos]

In 10 years, will Turkey be more dangerous than Russia?

Maybe George Friedman was right.
Unless Russia somehow becomes a failed state, obviously not. It's half the size of Russia, has the 17th largest economy in the World (Russia 12th) no native defence industry to speak of and no prospects for economic development - where Russia's education system is still quite good, Turkey's is in a mess with over 10% of the population now training to be clerics and the second worst rating in the OECD.

[Montmorency]

Unless Russia somehow becomes a failed state, obviously not. It's half the size of Russia, has the 17th largest economy in the World (Russia 12th) no native defence industry to speak of and no prospects for economic development - where Russia's education system is still quite good, Turkey's is in a mess with over 10% of the population now training to be clerics and the second worst rating in the OECD.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_uqFsmFVxOE

Russia is shrinking (in population). Turkey is growing. Russia has minimal opportunities for territorial, economic, or political growth in its periphery. It is hemmed in by seas, the Central Asian steppe, China, and the EU/NATO. Turkey holds critical geography, and leverage over Europe. It is bordered by soft and restive Middle Eastern countries. Its borderlands, especially the Kurdish ones, are a constant thorn in its side tempting more direct management. Unlike most countries in the area, with the notable exception of Iran, Turkey has long experience with being a centralized national state. As we know, most of its neighbors are more brittle.

Turkey is increasingly poised to go its own way in the world, responsive neither to Russia nor the West. It's fair to ask how much international and American opprobrium it could stand to draw, but on the other side of the coin America, Europe, and Russia would prefer not to lose access to Turkey. Depending on what happens in Syria-Iraq, or how the Gulf societies handle reform, opportunities for Turkish power could arise in the shape of some type of aggression. Depends on what the rest of the world looks like. Depends on the state of conflicts in international Muslim society in the future.

:shrug:

I'm not going so far as to say that Turkey is in a position to attempt to recreate the Caliphate, or the Ottoman Empire, but relatively speaking it's not crazy to speculate whether it may become more of a foreign policy hazard than Russia. Russia and its challenge to the world order is predictable and well-defined in a way that sudden fundamental disruptions in the Middle East could overshadow. Russia bringing outright annexation and irredentism back to the table, just like with its dabbling in information warfare, could set the stage for worse things.

[Gilrandir]

Russia has minimal opportunities for territorial, economic, or political growth in its periphery. It is hemmed in by seas, the Central Asian steppe, China, and the EU/NATO. Turkey holds critical geography, and leverage over Europe. It is bordered by soft and restive Middle Eastern countries. Its borderlands, especially the Kurdish ones, are a constant thorn in its side tempting more direct management.



Russia has no less oportunities for territorial expansion. It can move where there is a sizable Russian-speaking population - Ukraine, Belorus - and to the Central Asian steppes (Kazakhstan).



Unlike most countries in the area, with the notable exception of Iran, Turkey has long experience with being a centralized national state. As we know, most of its neighbors are more brittle.


The same is true about Russia.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Monty:

Latest demographic trends suggest that Russia has finally regained balance in birth rate/death rate terms. It did slump heavily after the break up of the CCCP (since the infrastructure of society was kyboshed for a long stretch). I don't think they have ever truly recovered from WW2 though, since they lost such a huge segment of their society in 48 months.

Of course, your larger point about Turkey's comparative growth rate vis a vis the Russians is quite on point.

For me, one of the things that is tension fraught is the degree to which Erdogan's opposition is concentrated in a very small area. Makes the city mouse/country mouse divide in the USA pale by comparison.

[Crandar]

Montmorency

I think your data is outdated. Turkish fertility rates experience a sharp decline. It has already reached the replacement rate, but there's indication that the fall will stop. Given the huge numbers of refugees, we're lucky while supremacists despise Turkey or we would have been flooded with their tears about Turkish genocide.

https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/25/turkey-fertility-secular-religious-divide-erdogan-population-growth

[Montmorency]

Demographic claims are worth your scrutiny, but there's more to say. According to the World Bank figures for 2015, Turkey's fertility rate is 2.05 per woman, Russia's 1.75. (noteworthily Iran's was 1.68, an outcome of post-Khomeini government policies.) Meanwhile, gross population growth in Russia 2016 (as well as the US and China, maybe we could use some more immigrants?) was well below 1%, compared to the Turkish rate of 1.6%, around which it has hovered for decades (actual figure for Russia was 0.2%).

Without going much deeper, we can at least conclude that while Russia's demographic condition has improved since the post-Soviet period, and Turkey is at the replacement rate, Turkey's population size and growth is at least stable. The age distribuion in Turkey is weighted toward the youth, in Russia toward the middle-aged. I'm sure there is much more to dive into here on the subject of demographics. For example, the potential impact of refugees and Arabs in Turkey, or that of Central Asian guest workers in Russia.

Quickly revisiting Iran (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family_planning_in_Iran), it seems their fertility rate is surging again, now that family planning policies have changed to be pro-birth. The Iranian experience tells us that governments can wield a great deal of influence over fertility rates in either direction. Just something we should keep in mind; it may not tell us much (yet) about what these rates could look like for any given country in the future.

Geopolitically, the orientation and drive is there for Turkish expansion: Autocratization, Western alienation, rise of global fascism; Afrin, oil and commerce in Kurdish Iraq, Rojava...

Speaking of, Crandar what do you think of the Rojava (https://itsgoingdown.org/as-afrin-falls-the-world-rises-for-rojava/) experiment?


Russia has no less oportunities for territorial expansion. It can move where there is a sizable Russian-speaking population - Ukraine, Belorus - and to the Central Asian steppes (Kazakhstan).

The same is true about Russia.

Leaving aside Ukraine, the small Caucasian and Central Asian countries around Russia are either friendly to its interests, or else easily pushed around with threats or economic sticks and carrots. The Georgia war is a teaching moment. Turkey, meanwhile, has poorer relations and territorial claims with just about all of its neighbors, as well as non-state threats. Knowing that, we can move on to identifying the two countries interests, desires, and constraints. The relevance to Western interests, desires, and constraints. Russia the revisionist state, or Turkey the rogue state?

And I'm more interested in the realistic manifestation of drift in policy and on the ground, not the extreme one. Like, Russia reconquering the Soviet Union or Turkey invading Greece on the way to Warsaw (with Syrian Arab Janissaries at the vanguard!).

[Seamus Fermanagh]

The USA could certainly use more legal immigrants. A point I have made in several threads over the last decade here.

[Montmorency]

If you want legal immigrants, then - legalize immigration.

[Husar]

If you want legal immigrants, then - legalize immigration.

Well, that request usually means "we want to drain other countries of their best workers and then be all arrogant about how these countries don't pull theirselves up by their own bootsstraps after we siphoned off all the bootstraps".

[Seamus Fermanagh]

If you want legal immigrants, then - legalize immigration.

Last I heard it was legal to immigrate to the USA.

I have argued before that we need to increase, at least somewhat, the numbers of immigrants we allow.

I have argued before that we need to have a far better guest workers/temporary visa program.



That stance on my part will not, of course, satisfy you. Such is life.

[rory_20_uk]

Well, that request usually means "we want to drain other countries of their best workers and then be all arrogant about how these countries don't pull theirselves up by their own bootsstraps after we siphoned off all the bootstraps".

So... people should be blockaded from leaving since they should focus on sorting out their own country rather than going elsewhere? Or do people have rights and the ability for self-determination?

~:smoking:

[Montmorency]

Well, that request usually means "we want to drain other countries of their best workers and then be all arrogant about how these countries don't pull theirselves up by their own bootsstraps after we siphoned off all the bootstraps".

We already do that, partly because various industrial lobbies demand it. But allowing skilled foreigners to work and study in the country is useful in its own right for promoting international connection and expertise. So with respect to high-value work and investment, you have to weigh both positives and negatives. The Left position is usually to maximize all positives and actively mitigate negatives: comity with the poorer countries, not isolationism.

However, I was responding to


Last I heard it was legal to immigrate to the USA.

I have argued before that we need to increase, at least somewhat, the numbers of immigrants we allow.

I have argued before that we need to have a far better guest workers/temporary visa program.



That stance on my part will not, of course, satisfy you. Such is life.

I might agree in theory, but what was it they say about blue sky thinking? The meaning of my quip was exceedingly simple, that the problem of authorization is one that can always be solved instantly through bureaucratic fiat. And the problem of authorization is one whose existence makes Americans worse people, incites tyrannous governance, and subjects millions to incalculable cruelty and duress. It began a century ago as an avowedly racist policy and it has never stopped being a racialized implement. The immigration and customs bureaucracy is designed to be almost impossible to overcome except by wealth or special dispensation. Today, burgeoning millions have excellent cases for seeking asylum, and almost none will be granted it. That's my bottom line. These are inescapable truths that have to be apprehended in any policy proposal. That's all I meant.


To synthesize a response to both your perspectives, I advocate reviving the old ideal of pan-Americanism. Start (t)here.

[Husar]

So... people should be blockaded from leaving since they should focus on sorting out their own country rather than going elsewhere? Or do people have rights and the ability for self-determination?

Depends on your position. If you acknowledge their right to self-determination, you cannot block the poor ones from coming in. If that sort of self-determination is not your thing, you might as well block everyone from going anywhere, at least then you apply the same rights to everyone.

[Crandar]

I'm not optimist about Rojava. Their future is almost totally dependent on America's willingness to finance them and the US soldiers present there. There was also the social aspect, because backwards and primarily agricultural eastern Syria could hardly tolerate Ocalan's somewhat incoherent philosophy. However, according to some people who have traveled to YPG-dominated areas, the Kurds have softened up a lot their ideology, in order to find new allies, maintain public order and enforce their alliance with the US.

On the other hand, there are many ethnic and religious tensions, which undermine the stability of Rojava. There was an insurgency lately, where many videos of assassinated YPG commanders were uploaded in tweeter, but nothing new yet, so I guess it has been suppressed. The commentators were extremely edgy, organising polls about their next victim and etc. The main obstacle, in my opinion, is the rapidity of YPG's advance, although they still haven't seriously threatened Hajin for more than half a year.

The cause was that their foreign backers wanted to grab the most important centers (Raqqa, Deir ez-Zhor, Tabqa dam, oil wells) before the Syrians and these objectives were generally achieved (with the striking exception of Deir ez-Zhor). For that to be possible, though, they allied with numerous shady groups and individuals, former members or allies of daesh (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liwa_Thuwar_al-Raqqa). That's not good morally and practically speaking. It hurts SDF's integrity and unity and I'm sure that these opportunists will not hesitate to backstab the Kurds. Accepting everyone as your friend is great in the short term, but it will cause difficulties in the long term.

[Gilrandir]

Leaving aside Ukraine, the small Caucasian and Central Asian countries around Russia are either friendly to its interests, or else easily pushed around with threats or economic sticks and carrots. The Georgia war is a teaching moment. Turkey, meanwhile, has poorer relations and territorial claims with just about all of its neighbors, as well as non-state threats. Knowing that, we can move on to identifying the two countries interests, desires, and constraints. The relevance to Western interests, desires, and constraints. Russia the revisionist state, or Turkey the rogue state?

And I'm more interested in the realistic manifestation of drift in policy and on the ground, not the extreme one. Like, Russia reconquering the Soviet Union or Turkey invading Greece on the way to Warsaw (with Syrian Arab Janissaries at the vanguard!).

In 2013 an attempt to conquer Ukraine seemed an extreme fantasy, not only to the world, but to Ukraine and Russia as well. Not so in 2014 and later. When the whole country is governed by whims of a single person the incredible may come true. If Putin's counterparts in Belorus or Kazakhstan step down (or die which is more likely) and the new leaders displease Russia, it may repeat its Crimean/Donbas scenario.

[Tuuvi]

I might agree in theory, but what was it they say about blue sky thinking? The meaning of my quip was exceedingly simple, that the problem of authorization is one that can always be solved instantly through bureaucratic fiat. And the problem of authorization is one whose existence makes Americans worse people, incites tyrannous governance, and subjects millions to incalculable cruelty and duress. It began a century ago as an avowedly racist policy and it has never stopped being a racialized implement. The immigration and customs bureaucracy is designed to be almost impossible to overcome except by wealth or special dispensation. Today, burgeoning millions have excellent cases for seeking asylum, and almost none will be granted it. That's my bottom line. These are inescapable truths that have to be apprehended in any policy proposal. That's all I meant.

This is what I was trying to get at with my comment in the Trump thread the other day. I had a couple of friends, twin sisters, who were born in California but when they were still babies their immigrant parents moved back to Mexico and raised them there until they were teenagers and then brought them back to the US so they would have better opportunities. They struggled with English a bit and culturally they were very Mexican but because they happened to be born on US soil they were considered US citizens by the law and were free to come live in the US whenever they pleased.

Then you have the opposite situation where people were brought to the US illegally as children, have lived almost their entire lives in the US, are fully integrated members of the community and culturally American, but because they don't have papers they're considered "aliens" by the law and are liable to be ripped from their families and placed in a country they don't remember and in some cases don't even speak the local language.

To me these two scenarios demonstrate that the idea that you need government authorization to live in the US and be a member of the community is completely asinine and causes a lot of needless cruelty.


I'm not optimist about Rojava. Their future is almost totally dependent on America's willingness to finance them and the US soldiers present there. There was also the social aspect, because backwards and primarily agricultural eastern Syria could hardly tolerate Ocalan's somewhat incoherent philosophy. However, according to some people who have traveled to YPG-dominated areas, the Kurds have softened up a lot their ideology, in order to find new allies, maintain public order and enforce their alliance with the US.

On the other hand, there are many ethnic and religious tensions, which undermine the stability of Rojava. There was an insurgency lately, where many videos of assassinated YPG commanders were uploaded in tweeter, but nothing new yet, so I guess it has been suppressed. The commentators were extremely edgy, organising polls about their next victim and etc. The main obstacle, in my opinion, is the rapidity of YPG's advance, although they still haven't seriously threatened Hajin for more than half a year.

The cause was that their foreign backers wanted to grab the most important centers (Raqqa, Deir ez-Zhor, Tabqa dam, oil wells) before the Syrians and these objectives were generally achieved (with the striking exception of Deir ez-Zhor). For that to be possible, though, they allied with numerous shady groups and individuals, former members or allies of daesh (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liwa_Thuwar_al-Raqqa). That's not good morally and practically speaking. It hurts SDF's integrity and unity and I'm sure that these opportunists will not hesitate to backstab the Kurds. Accepting everyone as your friend is great in the short term, but it will cause difficulties in the long term.

Do you have sources for these claims? I've been following the situation in Rojava for a while now but I think sometimes Western Leftists are a little naive about the state of the revolution and I'd like to read something from a more neutral perspective.

Also, what do you think is incoherent about Ocalan's philosophy?

[Montmorency]

I'm not optimist about Rojava. Their future is almost totally dependent on America's willingness to finance them and the US soldiers present there. There was also the social aspect, because backwards and primarily agricultural eastern Syria could hardly tolerate Ocalan's somewhat incoherent philosophy. However, according to some people who have traveled to YPG-dominated areas, the Kurds have softened up a lot their ideology, in order to find new allies, maintain public order and enforce their alliance with the US.

On the other hand, there are many ethnic and religious tensions, which undermine the stability of Rojava. There was an insurgency lately, where many videos of assassinated YPG commanders were uploaded in tweeter, but nothing new yet, so I guess it has been suppressed. The commentators were extremely edgy, organising polls about their next victim and etc. The main obstacle, in my opinion, is the rapidity of YPG's advance, although they still haven't seriously threatened Hajin for more than half a year.

The cause was that their foreign backers wanted to grab the most important centers (Raqqa, Deir ez-Zhor, Tabqa dam, oil wells) before the Syrians and these objectives were generally achieved (with the striking exception of Deir ez-Zhor). For that to be possible, though, they allied with numerous shady groups and individuals, former members or allies of daesh (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liwa_Thuwar_al-Raqqa). That's not good morally and practically speaking. It hurts SDF's integrity and unity and I'm sure that these opportunists will not hesitate to backstab the Kurds. Accepting everyone as your friend is great in the short term, but it will cause difficulties in the long term.

Do you have sources for these claims? I've been following the situation in Rojava for a while now but I think sometimes Western Leftists are a little naive about the state of the revolution and I'd like to read something from a more neutral perspective.

Also, what do you think is incoherent about Ocalan's philosophy?

So, is the situation more Spanish syndicalists or Makhnovshchina?

I don't know anything about Ocalan.

How about their social policies?


In 2013 an attempt to conquer Ukraine seemed an extreme fantasy, not only to the world, but to Ukraine and Russia as well. Not so in 2014 and later. When the whole country is governed by whims of a single person the incredible may come true. If Putin's counterparts in Belorus or Kazakhstan step down (or die which is more likely) and the new leaders displease Russia, it may repeat its Crimean/Donbas scenario.

No, it's exactly (https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showthread.php/146724-Ukraine-in-a-thread?p=2053581585&viewfull=1#post2053581585) what we would have expected in the situation given the disruption to the Russian order. The surprising thing was that Russia actually had very little ability to achieve its objectives outright and had to settle for a stalemate. Let me repeat that: Putin failed to restore even the status quo in Ukraine. Russia's constraints of action, more than its power, are highlighted in the Ukraine debacle, where Putin could only do the bare minimum of seizing Crimea/fomenting insurgency and had to go abroad to Syria to gain leverage. Even developing non-military means to undermine the entire West turned out easier for Putin than just "solving" the Ukraine problem outright.

And you think this shows Russia has the ability to just invade Kazakhstan or something? Why would they? Russia has CSTO, pipelines, millions of guest workers, and any other number of political and economic levers to pull to manage these countries, which will never be pro-American to the exclusion of Russia; they have no special connection to Europe or America, but they do to Russia. If China came to dominate Central Asia, it would be even more foolhardy to imagine that Russia would think of resolving the problem through military means. If all the Central Asian Muslims suddenly became anti-Russian terrorists, all the more so.

[Gilrandir]

And you think this shows Russia has the ability to just invade Kazakhstan or something? Why would they? Russia has CSTO, pipelines, millions of guest workers, and any other number of political and economic levers to pull to manage these countries, which will never be pro-American to the exclusion of Russia; they have no special connection to Europe or America, but they do to Russia. If China came to dominate Central Asia, it would be even more foolhardy to imagine that Russia would think of resolving the problem through military means. If all the Central Asian Muslims suddenly became anti-Russian terrorists, all the more so.

All of this was said about Ukraine too, yet Russia felt its interests threatend and invaded. In my view, by supporting new Ukrainian regime and helping Ukraine out it could have gained a strategical victory and kept its influence over Ukraine. By rash steps in managed to estrange a formerly friendly people.

Now if Belorus or Kazakhstan were to have a succession crisis and the candiadate(s) for succession declared their course towards Europe or China (for Kazakhstan) it would immediately raise Russia's hackles. And Russia will always have the card of protecting Russian speakers up its sleeve. But perhaps the Ukraine debacle has taught Russia something and it would act by wiser and subtler ways.

[Montmorency]

All of this was said about Ukraine too, yet Russia felt its interests threatend and invaded. In my view, by supporting new Ukrainian regime and helping Ukraine out it could have gained a strategical victory and kept its influence over Ukraine. By rash steps in managed to estrange a formerly friendly people.

Now if Belorus or Kazakhstan were to have a succession crisis and the candiadate(s) for succession declared their course towards Europe or China (for Kazakhstan) it would immediately raise Russia's hackles. And Russia will always have the card of protecting Russian speakers up its sleeve. But perhaps the Ukraine debacle has taught Russia something and it would act by wiser and subtler ways.

Yes, what I said Russia was likely to do came to pass. They did not properly invade, they fomented a proxy rebellion in the eastern oblasts. The size and effectiveness of this rebellion is what fell short of expectations; it did not succeed in breaking off much of the country, and it did not neutralize pro-Western elements in Ukraine, the economic capacity of Ukraine, or Western willingness to cultivate Ukraine. Given the shortfall Russia might have then taken the option of invading the country and confronting the Ukrainian military head on to force a regime change or capitulation, but Russia turned out too weak and constrained to do this. It deployed to rescue Assad in Syria instead. It partnered increasingly with China instead. It wielded hybrid (information and cyber)-warfare instead.


But perhaps the Ukraine debacle has taught Russia something and it would act by wiser and subtler ways.

Russia's actions (aside from Crimea) were and are subtle in the context of geopolitics, that's the critical thing. Starting in the summer of 2014 they played a defensive role preventing the Ukrainian Army from overrunning the Luhansk PR/Donetsk PR, which they probably could have done absent Russian interference. Russia has deployed a comparable number of ground troops to Syria as to Donbass, itself comparable to the American ground force in Syria.


4000 Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border to support rebels in August 2014 according to Ukrainian intelligence reports (http://theweek.com/articles/574972/ukraine-still-war%E2%80%94bloodiest-battle-isnt-over.)
11000 Russian nationals, including 3000 regular combat troops, 850 tanks, and 1700 other armored vehicles in Donbass in 2017 according to Ukrainian military (http://www.janes.com/article/74682/russian-forces-now-11-000-strong-in-the-donbass)
Russia maintains 6,000 military troops, 2,000 tanks and other heavy weapons in the separatist-held area of Ukraine in 2017 according to Ukraine's foreign minister Pavlo Klimkin (https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/05/11/russian-actions-donbas-ukraine-foreign-minister/101550540/) [2000 tanks sounds dubious, possibly 2000 armored vehicles corresponding to above]

4000 Russian personnel in Syria in 2015 according to U.S. security officials and independent experts (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia/russian-soldiers-geolocated-by-photos-in-multiple-syria-locations-bloggers-say-idUSKCN0SX0H820151108)
5000 Russian regular forces in Syria in 2016 according to analysis of voting records (https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/04/putin-has-a-new-secret-weapon-in-syria-chechens/)
48000 Russian military personnel rotated through Syrian theater by end of 2017 according to Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-syria-military/russia-says-48000-of-its-troops-took-part-in-syria-campaign-idUSKBN1EG1EQ)

Kazakhstan has no strategic initiative to align with Europe against Russia, and if it somehow did Russia could embargo the primary long-distance connections without any special action. Because rail and pipe lines run through Russia. Europe's chief relationship with Kazakhstan is for its oil and gas, through the Russian intermediary. Western Europe is currently far more interested in developing relations with India, and for good reason.

If China came to dominate Kazakhstan, invading Kazakhstan would be a good way to alienate Central Asians, get walloped by China, and accelerate Russia's decline to Chinese client state.

The takeaways you should focus on: The Russian periphery is mostly pro-Russian, or else peer-competitor/adversary to Russia; Russia prefers to maintain the status quo in its periphery. Russia has many non-military options for managing its friendly periphery. If Russia came to the point where its only option to maintain its interests in its periphery were to launch an occupying invasion, it would not have the might to carry that (extremely costly) course of action through: a Catch-22.

The Turkish periphery is mostly anti-Turkish; Turkey prefers to change the status quo in its periphery. Turkey has increasing willingness to intervene militarily and politically in its periphery. Depending on developments in Europe, the US, and Turkey's neighbors, as well as Turkey's government, Turkey may be incentivized to assert hegemony in its periphery in the future.

[Gilrandir]

Yes, what I said Russia was likely to do came to pass. They did not properly invade, they fomented a proxy rebellion in the eastern oblasts.

In fact, Russia only succeeded in fomenting unrest. The real rebellion was started by Girkin's group from Russia (exported from then captured Crimea) overrunning Slovyansk.





If Russia came to the point where its only option to maintain its interests in its periphery were to launch an occupying invasion, it would not have the might to carry that (extremely costly) course of action through: a Catch-22.


Russia wouldn't do it openly. It would act in the way it did with Donbas and Crimea, ostensibly denying any involvement.

With all the rest I agree.

[Crandar]

So, is the situation more Spanish syndicalists or Makhnovshchina?
Neither to be honest. Ocalan's democratic confideralism is a soft version of anarchist agrarian communities, mixed with some nostalgia about an idealized past, gender equality and, most importantly, ecology. It's romantic and inevitably quite incoherent, also hurt by the fact that Ocalan is neither very educated nor a very sharp writer.

However, to be honest, I am negatively pre-disposed against anarchism. That being said, what happens in Rojava is a very moderate version of these teachings, since the Kurds actually protect property rights and have not committed themselves to an agrarian reform and a land redistribution. They are probably afraid of scaring the locals and their foreign patrons.
Most of the local frustration comes from their social policies, since many don't appreciate the emancipation of women or their secularism (or even atheism). My source is a Turk who cooperates with them and is very biased in favour of YPG (he votes for HDP).


Do you have sources for these claims? I've been following the situation in Rojava for a while now but I think sometimes Western Leftists are a little naive about the state of the revolution and I'd like to read something from a more neutral perspective.
Unfortunately, I can't find the article about the former daesh fighter who joined SDF. IIRC he was basically an opportunist, who has been transferring his allegiances to the strongest party.
Still not a cool move for YPG.
They probably accepted him, because he was quite influential in the region and excelled at smuggling. About the groups, I was refering to Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liwa_Thuwar_al-Raqqa).

[Montmorency]

However, to be honest, I am negatively pre-disposed against anarchism.

So am I, but I can't help but be loath to see idealistic leftists ground into dust by the angry autocrats around them.

Otherwise we would be proving this aggrieved anarchist (https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bobby-whittenberg-james-anarchy-breaking-up-with-socialism) right:


For well over a century, some anarchists have aligned themselves with socialists of various shades, even fighting on the same side for different periods of time in several failed revolutions. We do not wish to rewrite history or to downplay this alliance, but to learn from it, challenge it, and question its role in the fight for anarchy today while advocating for its immediate and total annulment.

We can define socialism loosely as an economic system in which wealth and property are held either in common or by the state and/or party, in which the means of production and control of distribution are held by the state and/or party, workers, or the whole of society. Socialism can range from leninist totalitarianism to social democracy, to libertarian socialism and social anarchism.

Even under these broad strokes, anarchy escapes. Anarchy is not production and consumption, federations and councils, meetings, and voting and it certainly isn’t the state. Such institutions are authoritarian. Anarchy is autonomous individuals associating with others voluntarily to fulfill their needs and desires. This is probably best exemplified among hunter/gatherer bands. Socialism, like capitalism is an economic system, and anarchy seeks to abolish economics altogether.

Leninism
Leninism is a form of socialism largely characterized by a vanguard party seizing power and imposing the dictatorship of the proletariat upon the masses, allegedly to guide them through socialism into communism.

There are some things that most leninists know that most anarchists don’t seem to and should. They know that anarchists are enemies of leninism and that anarchy and leninism are antithetical to one another. They understand that authority is a key issue. They will not budge in their defense of it. We should not budge in our opposition to it. Leninists know too that anarchists have a history of trusting them. They know that they have always been able to fool us with rhetoric for as long as they need us, and lock us up or shoot us when they no longer find us useful.

Many an anarchist has been deceived at one time or another (and this writer is no exception) by rhetoric to the tune of “we want the same things, we just have different ideas about how to get there.” While it may be true that many of the rank and file socialists truly believe that their program will lead to a liberated, classless society, the methods they use are statist and authoritarian and traditionally include the respression, incarceration, and execution of anarchists and other anti-authoritarians.

Libertarian/Anarcho- Socialism and Authoritarian Socialism?
A trotskyist acquaintance once said something about it not being helpful to distinguish between authoritarian and libertarian socialism. At the time I disagreed, but now I think he is right. Socialism is inherently authoritarian. Even with anarcho-prefixes and red and black flags, socialism subjugates the individual, EVERY individual, to the authority of the masses, the headless, unaccountable bureaucracy and separates each individual from the masses, from society as a whole. Each individual must struggle then against the whole of society for freedom, for anarchy. What good is it to free society if each individual is not free from society? From economics? From the commune? From the federation? It is not anarchy if it is not free of bureaucracy, no matter how “directly democratic” it is purported to be.

A highly organized society of councils, unions, and federations just replaces one impersonal, bureaucracy with another and renders people cogs in a new machine. Granted they are cogs in a self organized machine, but cogs in a machine they remain, slaves to a phantom.

Standing on Our Own Ground
The enemy of our enemy is not necessarily our friend. All too often I hear anarchists defending or supporting socialist regimes past or present. Those are the very same regimes that would have us imprisoned or killed. Rather than defending leninist or other left/socialist regimes out of some perceived sense of obligatory allegiance to the left, we should instead be honest and forthcoming with an anarchist critique. We should make it very clear that we oppose both capitalism and socialism. In doing so, we stand on our own ground rather than defending someone else’s indefensible ideology and history. We should not back away from anarchy to defend socialism, an ideology that is inconsistent with our wills and desires and one that has consistently systematically oppressed our comrades. It is not our job to be apologists for leninism or socialism. Rest assured the socialists are not spending their time defending anarchy.

Separate Trajectories
Liberalism, Social Democracy, and Leninism make up a good chunk of what is commonly referred to as “the left.” All of them are characterized by authoritarian rule and bureaucracy. Nowhere along such a trajectory would anarchy fall. Liberalism (at least in rhetoric) and social democracy offer a large, bloated, bureaucratic welfare state and leninism offers a bureacratic totalitarian dictatorship. The pattern along this trajectory shows an increase in the strength, might, and authority of the state. How does one arrive at the conclusion that anarchy, the absence of all government falls somewhere further along this trajectory? How close do we expect to get to anarchy following a trajectory that leads to an all powerful, authoritarian state? How long do we fight alongside the socialists, and the rest of the left advancing their cause at the expense of the fight for anarchy?

We should not view socialists as folks who “just need to take their beliefs a bit farther” because regardless of what lies beyond leninism on that trajectory, of this we can be certain: it is not anarchy. In all likelihood they have already taken their beliefs as far as they intend to.

Because anarchy and socialism are on different trajectories and have such vastly different means of revolutionary practice it is inevitable that we will reach an impasse. The longer we misalign ourselves, the more devastating it will be when we reach that impasse. If you do not understand what happens at this impasse, just ask the ghosts of the anarchists of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions or the Spanish Civil War who were either incarcerated or executed at the hands of “comrades.”

Fight For Anarchy!
Many times allegiance to the left or to socialism manifests itself as anarchists constantly placing themselves in a role where they leave the fight for anarchy to fight for leftism. The socialist doesn’t leave the fight for socialism to fight for anarchy out of “solidarity.” They know what they are fighting for, and it is certainly not anarchy.

But do we know what we are fighting for? Are we so enchanted by co-opted language and pseudo-radical rhetoric, so desperate for allies that we continue to repeat past mistakes knowing full well the consequences? Do we really think think that anarchy is anything remotely like leninism or social democracy, and that if we tag along with lefties long enough, we’ll end up there?

It is true that some early anarchists called themselves socialists or communists. Some still do. It is true that some early anarchists even carried the red flag. We are not frozen in time, however. Since that time, the red flag has been stained with the blood of many an anarchist, autonomist, and other anti-authoritarians. We did not sign a lifetime commitment, for better or worse, to socialism. We are not married to these ideas or these organizations. Perhaps we are historic allies with the socialists, but that brand of nostalgia and unquestioning allegiance has no place in a revolution and has proven to lead us to jails, prison camps, and death at the hand of the socialists.

In the days ahead and the uncertainty they hold, it would behoove us to question our tactics and our allegiances and make sure that we really are aligning ourselves with people who want the same things we do. We set ourselves up to fail again when we align ourselves with and invest trust in authoritarians. The have shown us over and over again what they will do when we ally ourselves with them. To continue to do so in the face of all evidence is sycophancy at best. Anarchy has nothing to concede to authority or statism and we have nothing to concede in the fight for anarchy.

It's not an easy situation there by any means, one of the thorniest in modern history.

[Tuuvi]

So, is the situation more Spanish syndicalists or Makhnovshchina?

I don't know anything about Ocalan.

How about their social policies?

I agree with Crandar that Rojava isn't very comparable to either one but if you had to make a comparison I'd say it's closer to Spanish syndicalists than Makhnovshchina.

Ocalan is the founder of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). As the story goes, The PKK began as a Marxist-Leninist party which sought independence from Turkey and the creation of a communist Kurdish state. However at some point Ocalan became disillusioned with both Marxism and nationalism, and shortly after being captured and imprisoned in Turkey crafted his own political philosophy, Democratic Confederalism, which was heavily influenced by the American leftist Murray Bookchin's ideology Communalism. The PYD (Democratic Union Party), the political wing of the YPG, is a Syrian offshoot/sister party of the PKK and so their political program is based off of Democratic Confederalism.

Some articles:

Democratic confederalism in Kurdistan

Bookchin, Öcalan, and the Dialectics of Democracy (http://new-compass.net/articles/bookchin-%C3%B6calan-and-dialectics-democracy)

DEMOCRATIC CONFEDERALISM (https://komun-academy.com/2018/06/27/democratic-confederalism/)

The Communalist Project (http://new-compass.net/articles/communalist-project)

Social Contract of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (https://internationalistcommune.com/social-contract/) - English translation of Rojava's quasi-constitution

[Fragony]

What is currency currently going on in Turkey? Looks like bad. Mad dog Erdogan chapeau, at least Allah is with you

[Fragony]

This is interesting, Turkey close to a default, bad news for EU-banks who got money there. Greece is already dead can't covertely recapitalise over their backs anymre

[AE Bravo]

This is interesting, Turkey close to a default, bad news for EU-banks who got money there. Greece is already dead can't covertely recapitalise over their backs anymre
Just strongarmed Qatar into a $15bn investment. That could reassure all those who intended to pull assets.

[Fragony]

Just strongarmed Qatar into a $15bn investment. That could reassure all those who intended to pull assets.

Might look like that but reality is that 15bn got pulled out, Qatar and Turkey are not friends right now

[Furunculus]

Just strongarmed Qatar into a $15bn investment. That could reassure all those who intended to pull assets.

$220bn needed within the next twelve months...

[AE Bravo]

Yeah, it's a lifeline at best.

[Fragony]

$220bn needed within the next twelve months...

Even that is a pretty optimistic. Still happy with the Erdo Khan. This is pretty tragic for a lot of Turks working in Europe they never expected this. Qatar probably took over their trourist-industry I can't find anything meaningful on in how much trouble Turkey is in, I heard it is very vulnerable for a little sting, we will know more monday I guess, downgrade is in but that shouldn't mean anything as there is hardly any coin to be found there

[Crandar]

Why do you say that the Qatari-Turkish alliance is in tatters? It seems as strong as ever to me. Yesterday Saudi Arabia donated millions to Kurdish Syria, so that Americans will stay and deter Syria and Iran from reuniting the country, which means that Qatari-Turkish interests will continue to thrive. By the way, Turkish tourism is on the rise (http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-sees-30-percent-rise-in-number-of-tourists-minister-135108). People have forgotten about the terrorist attacks, but the biggest contributor is the collapse of the lira. Here hotel owners whine about Romanians and Russians (muh orthodox brotherz!) preferring Istanbul to the beauty of Athens (https://www.b2green.gr/el/images/articles/lg/57358/rosos-agorazei-polykatoikies-stin-athina.jpg)and Thessaloniki (http://typosthes.gr/files/1/2015/12/04/%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%B5%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%B1.jpg).

[AE Bravo]

Yeah, I don't know how Fragony got that impression. The connection between them is so strong some get completely carried away, like that guy that went viral after exchanging his half a million riyals to lira on video while reciting lame poetry for instance. From what I've read, there's no sidestepping the IMF. He will have to give in to higher interest rates and an independent central bank. The former he called evil and the latter he wants under his control.

[Fragony]

None other than an impression mind you, I really don't know

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Yeah, I don't know how Fragony got that impression. The connection between them is so strong some get completely carried away, like that guy that went viral after exchanging his half a million riyals to lira on video while reciting lame poetry for instance. From what I've read, there's no sidestepping the IMF. He will have to give in to higher interest rates and an independent central bank. The former he called evil and the latter he wants under his control.

Higher interest rates will be harder on his constituents than for the comparatively wealthy communities on the Bosporus, Dardanelles, and the Aegean. So that makes sense. As a "strongman" style leader, any powerful institution over which he has little influence would be unappealing. On the other hand, it will be a Central Bank of Turkey...sub rosa, his influence might be notable. Not sure on the IMF track record on such things.

[Fragony]

There is no central bank in Turkey anymore they are stripped, Erdogan took control of it, even replaced the pretty well respected head of it with his son in law, ouch. Erdo Khan't it's not all that liracal.

edit, that last sentence is pretty good, I can congratulate myself

[AE Bravo]

It's waxing liracal dammit.

[Fragony]

Just isn't the same thing if you beach it, offshore but different