Great Power contentions

[spmetla]

Thought I'd make a thread for looking at the current interplay between the US, NATO, EU, China, and Russia. At present it seems China and Russia are testing to see what the limits of Biden's foreign policy will be.

Russian activity in/around the Ukraine:
Increased activity in the Ukraine border.
https://www.dw.com/en/us-asks-russia-to-explain-ukrainian-border-provocations/a-57105593

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56616778

While I don't think that Russia will do anything more overt in the Ukraine soon I think it's banking on a Biden foreign policy that was as weak as Obama and Trump when it came to great power problems. I know we have a Ukraine thread so I think I'll leave this for more general great power contentions.

China's grey zone incursion into the Philippines:
https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/22/asia/china-fishing-boats-philippines-reef-intl-hnk/index.html

With Duterte being a 'friend' of China and enemy of the US it places both the PI and USA in a poor position to do anything. Duterte will likely do little to nothing as he's more or less opposed to the US. The Philippines is weak economically and militarily, even if they were to try and compel fishing boats to leave it is more or less impotent and with Duterte in charge it is very unlikely that this pushes him back to the US camp or to ask for US help. The US and Philippines have a Mutual Defense Treaty in place but these 'gray zone' incursions are difficult to counter.

China's testing the limits of Taiwan's independence and what support it has abroad:
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-taiwan-security-idINKBN2BT055

https://www.dw.com/en/taiwans-army-ill-prepared-for-potential-chinese-attack/a-57102659

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-04-07/china-taiwan-conflict-could-come-sooner-rather-than-later

Taiwan remains the most dangerous powder-keg in Sino-US relations. It seems that China is working to draw a line in the sand so that they can make it clear that they will at some point take back Taiwan by force and that any effort to stop it will not be worth the economic problems. Sec State Blinken's diplomacy blitz around the Asia-Pacific region has done a lot to shore up support as he gauges support from key allies (S. Korea, Japan, Australia, UK, EU).
It seems to me that China sees the 'the West' as economically vulnerable and politically divided and in a state of irreversible decline so that if were to force the issue and invade (perhaps one of Taiwan's outer islands first) that so long as they don't directly attack outside military forces that no one would dare to get involved. The annexation of Crimea seems an example they can take to show the impotence of the 'the West'
The recent sanctions and boycotts over the Uighur issue have shown some US leadership and an attempt to take back a moral high ground but do you think the US can garner support over Taiwan too?

Here's a good read by the RAND Corp if you want to consider what a Sino-US conflict would be like, it's a little out of date (2016) but makes considerations for a 2025 scenario too.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html

The US track record at standing up for it's allies in a 'Danzig Crisis' haven't been too good, do you think the US would intervene if the PRC invaded Taiwan but didn't directly attack US forces in the region? Doing so would risk the economic health of the US and Europe which in today's political climate may make even a 'just' intervention on behalf of Taiwan difficult in the West as likely no one has a stomach for WWIII on the behalf of an island on the other side of the world which is theoretically part of the same nation.

[Montmorency]

Props for not using the word "competition."

I'm not sure China bothers to take the risk and expense of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan before the US and other countries have already succeeded in forming "values" blocs that marginalize economic and cultural links with China. It's not inevitable that such blocs succeed, nor that they marginalize links to China if they do succeed.

Crimea, for Russia, had some key features that Taiwan lacks:

1. Immediate military and strategic benefit for Russia (naval bases)
2. Recent history of Russian control and infrastructure
3. Related to above, numerically-dominant ethnic Russian population
4. Annexation doesn't totally destroy Ukraine or precipitate total conflict
5. Actually easy to physically seize, geographically and militarily
Edit: 6. More tenuous, but Putin might have thought it would be easier than it turned out to be to push Ukraine and Europe/US in a favorable direction after the fait accompli.

Though China is not Russia, it will have noticed the sanctions regime that the Crimean annexation cost Russia, and China perhaps has more to lose.

It's quite possible that the Taiwan-China relationship looks a lot like the US-North Korea relationship vis-a-vis nuclear weapons: is disarmament worth a full war?

[spmetla]

I figured contention seemed more appropriate, I thought the space race more a competition, proxy wars and gray zone actions in overlapping spheres of influence seem more 'contentious' to me.

For China, I think they are banking on everyone's economic dependence on them to limit any real ability to intervene. With the supply chains so tied up in China can even the current countries with manufacturing sectors in Europe and the Americas switch off from China's/SE Asian suppliers?

Just look at the current micro chip shortage and its affect on manufacturing not to mention all the other medical production shortages over the past year.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taiwan-says-may-shoot-down-chinese-drones-in-south-china-sea/ar-BB1fobjX?ocid=msedgdhp
Taiwan says may shoot down Chinese drones in South China Sea
By Yimou Lee

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan has spotted Chinese drones circling the Taipei-controlled Pratas Islands in the South China Sea and may shoot them down if they stray too close, a government minister said on Wednesday, a move that could dramatically increase tensions with Beijing.

Speaking at parliament, Lee Chung-wei, who heads the Ocean Affairs Council under whose purview the Coast Guard falls, said that they had recently spotted Chinese drones circling the Pratas, though they have not flown over the islands.

"They have never entered our restricted waters and airspace, they've just flown around them at a certain distance," Lee said.

While China recognises no Taiwanese claims of sovereignty, its aircraft and ships generally stay outside Taiwan's restricted zone, which extends 6 km from its coast.

Asked how the Coast Guard would react if a Chinese drone entered that restricted zone, Lee said they had rules of engagement.

"After it enters it will be handled under the rules. If we need to open fire, we open fire."

The Pratas lie at the top end of the disputed waterway, and have become a relatively new source of intrigue between Chinese-claimed Taiwan and Beijing.

In recent months Taiwan has complained of repeated Chinese air force activity near the islands, which Taiwan's Coast Guard only lightly defends though there are periodic deployments of marines. There is no permanent civilian population, only occasional visiting scientists.

In October, Hong Kong air traffic controllers warned off a Taiwanese civilian flight flying to the Pratas on a routine weekly supply run, forcing it to turn back.

The Pratas, the closest Taiwan-controlled territory to Hong Kong, have also taken on extra significance since anti-government protests began in the Chinese-run city.

Taiwan has intercepted at least one boat close to the Pratas carrying people fleeing from Hong Kong trying to make their way to Taiwan.

Taiwan's other main South China Sea island is Itu Aba, also known as Taiping Island, which is part of the Spratly archipelago.

Lee said they have not spotted Chinese drones there.

Apart from China and Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam also have competing claims for islands and features in the South China Sea.

(Reporting by Yimou Lee; Additional reporting and writing by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore)

[Montmorency]

I don't know what this is.

24674
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[spmetla]

Yeah, that is a weird one from the embassy. Perhaps it just didn't translate well though I think we get the message.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/chinese-fighter-pilot-sends-airspace-warning-in-latest-fracas-with-taiwan/ar-BB1fotn2?ocid=msedgntp

Chinese Fighter Pilot Sends 'Airspace' Warning in Latest Fracas With Taiwan
Kamala Harris moves into her new home
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A Taiwan air force radio operator attempting to warn off an intruding People's Liberation Army aircraft was told "this is all Chinese airspace" as four warplanes buzzed Taipei's defense radars on Tuesday.
Kamala Harris moves into her new home
Tom Brady joining latest trend by launching an NFT company

A Taiwan air force radio operator attempting to warn off an intruding People's Liberation Army aircraft was told "this is all Chinese airspace" as four warplanes buzzed Taipei's defense radars on Tuesday.

a flock of seagulls flying in the sky: Two U.S.-made F-16 fighters take off from the Chiayi Air Base in southern Taiwan during a demonstration on January 26, 2016.© Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images Two U.S.-made F-16 fighters take off from the Chiayi Air Base in southern Taiwan during a demonstration on January 26, 2016.
In the brief exchange between 5:19 p.m. and 5:21 p.m. local time, a radio officer with Taiwan's Air Combat Command said in a standard warning: "This is the Republic of China Air Force. The Chinese military aircraft currently flying at 6,600 meters in Taiwan's southwestern airspace, you have entered our airspace and are affecting aviation safety. Turn around and leave immediately."
The response is partially scrambled, but a PLA pilot retorted: "This is all Chinese airspace."

The correspondence happened over the aeronautical emergency frequency 121.5 MHz and was recorded using software-defined radio, according to the moderator of flight-tracking Facebook page "Southwest Airspace of TW."

The administrator shared a similar incident last week, when a Chinese pilot, replying to Taiwan air force warnings, said of the self-ruled island's air defense identification zone (ADIZ): "This is all ours."

The page moderator, who did not wish to be named, told Newsweek that the Taiwanese air force issued 10 radio warnings to Chinese military aircraft in the island's ADIZ on Wednesday. The warnings began at 4:29 a.m.—the earliest on record this year—and continued until 1:58 p.m. Taipei time.

Taiwan's defense ministry later revealed that 15 PLA warplanes had flown sorties into the southwest ADIZ. The fleet, which came at different hours, included 12 fighter jets, one anti-submarine plane and two early warning and control aircraft.
Taiwan scrambled its own fighter jets to intercept, the ministry said on its website.

However, Taipei did not log the movements of a U.S. Navy EP-3 that was reported in the vicinity around the same time as the Chinese warplanes.

According to the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI)— a Peking University think tank—the American reconnaissance plane transited the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan at just after 3 a.m. local time before flying in a circular pattern south of the Taiwan Strait.

SCSPI, which tracks U.S. military movements in the East and South China seas, described it as a "rare flight path in rare time," apparently referring to the earliness of the overflight.
Kamala Harris moves into her new home
Tom Brady joining latest trend by launching an NFT company

A Taiwan air force radio operator attempting to warn off an intruding People's Liberation Army aircraft was told "this is all Chinese airspace" as four warplanes buzzed Taipei's defense radars on Tuesday.

a flock of seagulls flying in the sky: Two U.S.-made F-16 fighters take off from the Chiayi Air Base in southern Taiwan during a demonstration on January 26, 2016.© Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images Two U.S.-made F-16 fighters take off from the Chiayi Air Base in southern Taiwan during a demonstration on January 26, 2016.
In the brief exchange between 5:19 p.m. and 5:21 p.m. local time, a radio officer with Taiwan's Air Combat Command said in a standard warning: "This is the Republic of China Air Force. The Chinese military aircraft currently flying at 6,600 meters in Taiwan's southwestern airspace, you have entered our airspace and are affecting aviation safety. Turn around and leave immediately."

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The response is partially scrambled, but a PLA pilot retorted: "This is all Chinese airspace."

The correspondence happened over the aeronautical emergency frequency 121.5 MHz and was recorded using software-defined radio, according to the moderator of flight-tracking Facebook page "Southwest Airspace of TW."

The administrator shared a similar incident last week, when a Chinese pilot, replying to Taiwan air force warnings, said of the self-ruled island's air defense identification zone (ADIZ): "This is all ours."

The page moderator, who did not wish to be named, told Newsweek that the Taiwanese air force issued 10 radio warnings to Chinese military aircraft in the island's ADIZ on Wednesday. The warnings began at 4:29 a.m.—the earliest on record this year—and continued until 1:58 p.m. Taipei time.

Taiwan's defense ministry later revealed that 15 PLA warplanes had flown sorties into the southwest ADIZ. The fleet, which came at different hours, included 12 fighter jets, one anti-submarine plane and two early warning and control aircraft.

15 PLA aircraft (J-10*8, J-16*4, Y-8 ASW and KJ-500 AEW&C ) entered #Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ on Apr. 7, 2021. Please check our official website for more information: https://t.co/p4KOVDDcFI pic.twitter.com/TWYcYsCQcg

— 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C. 🇹🇼 (@MoNDefense) April 7, 2021
Taiwan scrambled its own fighter jets to intercept, the ministry said on its website.

However, Taipei did not log the movements of a U.S. Navy EP-3 that was reported in the vicinity around the same time as the Chinese warplanes.

According to the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI)— a Peking University think tank—the American reconnaissance plane transited the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan at just after 3 a.m. local time before flying in a circular pattern south of the Taiwan Strait.

SCSPI, which tracks U.S. military movements in the East and South China seas, described it as a "rare flight path in rare time," apparently referring to the earliness of the overflight.

USN EP-3E Surveillance aircraft is operating in the southern airspace of the Taiwan strait since about 03:00 AM (local time). Rare flight path in rare time. April 7. pic.twitter.com/23T1znH8YF

— SCS Probing Initiative (@SCS_PI) April 6, 2021
Wednesday's PLA flights into Taiwan's ADIZ marks the fifth day such activity has occurred in April and the 67th day this year. Together with Monday's 10 military aircraft, China has now flown 29 sorties around Taiwan in the past three days.

Analysts say PLA warplane incursions into the ADIZ, which are increasing in frequency and quantity, are part of Beijing's "gray-zone" warfare against Taiwan, which the Chinese government claims is part of its territory.

China plans to tax Taiwan's meager air force with the routine flights while intimidating the island's population into submission, according to some analysis, while others have noted the political messaging behind each Chinese military operation.

Earlier this year, defense officials in Taipei revealed the air force had flown 1,000 extra hours deterring PLA aircraft around the island, driving up fuel, maintenance and manpower costs.


I guess as the article says, this is all a gray zone intrusion too, if Taiwan won't defend their air space with force then the Chinese can turn what they consider theirs de jure airspace into their de facto air space.
Sort the same with the fishing fleets, if Taiwan uses force they will seem belligerent not to mention it may lead to an escalation they and the US are not ready for.

In other news Putin extending is term limit again isn't surprising. Guess he'll be there until he's old and senile and likely murderously paranoid like most aging dictators become.

[Crandar]

About Philippines, the cause of the deterioration in the relationship between Manila and Washington was the reluctance (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-philippines-idUSKBN16U28X) of the Obama administration to protect the Philippines against the aggressive foreign policy of China in the southern Chinese Sea. To clarify, I think Obama was right, escalation was not worth it, but Manila was understandably frustrated, so they have been trying a different path, balancing between China and the US.

In my opinion, this geopolitical change will be the prelude to a wider tendency, as China's influence in the region grows at the expense of America. Many analysts seem to believe that diplomatic alliances are set in stone, but, as cooperation with China becomes more profitable, there's little reason for her neighboring countries to remain attached to an alliance that provides no benefits. Even Vietnam, Japan and South Korea are not exempt from this rule, although, in their case, we are not talking about the immediate future.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I don't know what this is.

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That was not a glib use of metaphor, was it? They actually got in the way of making their own point.

[Furunculus]

"Sec State Blinken's diplomacy blitz around the Asia-Pacific region has done a lot to shore up support as he gauges support from key allies (S. Korea, Japan, Australia, UK, EU)."

Don't forget France.
The future of the Indo-Pac contest on the Light side of the force looks set to be defined by "The Quad Plus Two".
While a number of European nations have started to define Indo-Pac strategies, it is only France and the UK that really matter - in having both:
A strategic culture built upon an activist foriegn policy.
And the military assets and reach to contribute meaningfully.

On Great Power definitions - there are many. But I always liked the following:

Can a Great Power be defined in the 21st century as a Regional Power that is also a Middle Power? Or, is it only the necessary precondition for what may later become recognised (internally and externally) as a Great Power? Explanation – being a Regional Power without any opposing regional pole allows the freedom to magnify the projected effect of a Middle-Power into that of Great Power…… Example – By solving its strategic problem with Pakistan India would de-facto become a Great Power rather than merely a Regional/Middle Power.

[spmetla]

I'd say that the middle powers such as France and Germany are able to exert influence as a Great Power via the EU and NATO and the WTO though less so for overt hard power. The UK within the 5 Eyes, NATO, and it's Commonwealth also has the ability to exert influence at Great Power level but only when they are leading a coalition of like minded nations.

France/EU's focus on the Middle East with a US withdrawal from the levant area with a UK boost to the Gulf and Red Sea allow the US to focus more squarely on Russia/China while supporting/leading efforts elsewhere.

[Hooahguy]

This might interest people: the US intel community put out a paper last month detailing various scenarios of what things might be like in 2040.

Its not a short document (https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf), but its really fascinating.

Pretty much gives five scenarios:

A renaissance of democracies, where the US leads a resurgence in democracy around the globe.

A world adrift, where China is the leading but not globally dominant country.

Competitive coexistence, where the US and China both prosper and compete for leadership in a bifurcated world.

Separate silos, where globalization has broken down and the world splits into economic and security blocs for protection.

And finally tragedy and mobilization, where global environmental devastation spurs complete revolutionary change.

[spmetla]

Skimmed through it a bit, interesting read and will need to read it completely at some point soon. Of the five scenarios I fear the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th are the most likely.

[rory_20_uk]

Scenario 1 seems to be somewhat delusional - since the USA has never really been a free Democracy and voter suppression is still alive and well along with good old jerrymandering. For this to change would require a massive change.

I don't think China would want to over extend and would rather consolidate - it does a vast amount of trade primarily to keep the domestic audience happy rather than anything else. And there would be regional powers such as India / Russia and Europe in some form or other

I would imagine separate silos in a sort of love-hate interdependency / competition between different blocks which might even trade as they compete - the USSR bought grain from the USA and Canada after all.

Whether some parts of the world are ungovernable wastelands (as they are now just worse) or not will be interesting - will there have been the will to rectify the situation or will the edges be patrolled by mercs and drones to keep the masses back. Mind you, the same scenario might hold true in several states in the USA.

~:smoking:

[Hooahguy]

I was debating if I should post this in the Biden thread or a new thread, but I think this belongs here: Biden is going to announce tomorrow (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-us-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan/2021/04/13/918c3cae-9beb-11eb-8a83-3bc1fa69c2e8_story.html?utm_source=reddit.com) that there will be a complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by the 20th anniversary of 9/11.

As glad as I am that this futile conflict is ending, I definitely consider the Afghan government to be the 21st century equivalent of South Vietnam and I expect it to fold rather quickly. Definitely within a year or two. Just finished re-watching Ken Burn's documentary series on the Vietnam War so I've been thinking about the comparisons a lot.

Now where do we go from here? Per the article I linked to, this decision was made in part due to other geopolitical considerations:


In addition to major domestic challenges, “the reality is that the United States has big strategic interests in the world,” the person familiar with the deliberations said, “like nonproliferation, like an increasingly aggressive and assertive Russia, like North Korea and Iran, whose nuclear programs pose a threat to the United States,” as well as China. “The main threats to the American homeland are actually from other places: from Africa, from parts of the Middle East — Syria and Yemen.”

“Afghanistan just does not rise to the level of those other threats at this point,” the person said. “That does not mean we’re turning away from Afghanistan. We are going to remain committed to the government, remain committed diplomatically. But in terms of where we will be investing force posture, our blood and treasure, we believe that other priorities merit that investment.”

Naturally Republicans are against this, even though Trump originally had the pullout happening in May. But Afghanistan has been a lost cause for years, and if the past 19 years weren't enough for the Afghan government to get its act together, another 2-5 won't.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Sadly true. Our one hope of establishing an Afghanistan that might have really worked died on 9 September 2001 -- two days before the attack that triggered the War on Terror.

I do not believe Afghanistan is conquerable without the use of a level of resources that is unsupportable (and/or a methodology that is entirely unethical by modern standards), and establishing the cultural change needed for the alteration of Afghanistan's self alteration into a modern nation-state does not appear to be any more in the offing now than it was at this same juncture in the previous century.

[Montmorency]

Maybe we can support Iran in holding the fort down?


Sadly true. Our one hope of establishing an Afghanistan that might have really worked died on 9 September 2001 -- two days before the attack that triggered the War on Terror.

I do not believe Afghanistan is conquerable without the use of a level of resources that is unsupportable (and/or a methodology that is entirely unethical by modern standards), and establishing the cultural change needed for the alteration of Afghanistan's self alteration into a modern nation-state does not appear to be any more in the offing now than it was at this same juncture in the previous century.

The only greater alteration would be to pull the US out of its re-exported backwash of corruption and civic lassitude. It should be maddening that not only has the United States done more to wreck the world at large than the Soviet Union and China combined, it's oligarchism has blown back to stupefy and immiserate its own society (the latter indignation is what denotes the patriot).

Keep in mind that the US being the #1 international center and abettor of elite graft undermines its own putative national interests (https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/4/12/the-strategic-cost-of-transnational-corruption). What an ironic country.

20 year anniversary, salud.

[Hooahguy]

Well as the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. :shrug:

[Montmorency]

Well as the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. :shrug:

Only the best.


Not all forms of military aid produce negative outcomes. Recent research by international relations scholar, Jessica Trisko Darden suggests U.S. military aid may actually decrease the likelihood of some kinds of state violence.[18] In part, this is because some assistance, such as surface-to-air missiles, is not particularly useful for repressing dissidents. However, Darden found that U.S. economic aid was associated with an increased likelihood in levels of mass killings, state killings, and repression, which supports her theory that recipient governments can harness foreign assistance to increase the coercive capacity of their security sectors regardless of the intended purposes of the aid.[19] She found that the coercive effect of foreign assistance was most likely in countries transitioning from authoritarian to democratic systems, as well as in countries with weak state institutions or a recent history of armed conflict.[20] Drawing on cases like South Korea and El Salvador, Darden concluded that ending foreign aid to dictatorial regimes may force them to become more accountable to their citizens and thereby facilitate democratization.[21]

More investigation of the relationships between all forms of foreign assistance and the maintenance of repressive kleptocratic regimes is needed. Unstable governments prone to deploying state violence against restive populations are susceptible to the strategic corruption that America’s adversaries, chiefly China and Russia, wield to buy international influence. Effective anti-corruption in foreign policy may require the United States to eliminate foreign assistance to authoritarian states and prioritize assistance for accountable governments.

China and Russia are not the only countries to view corruption as a foreign policy tool. Indeed, America’s Central Intelligence Agency has long leveraged corruption as a tool of control and subversion in diverse settings with questionable results. In the early 21st century, the [CIA] provided President Hamid Karzai with pallets of hard currency worth millions to fund a patronage system that corralled Afghanistan’s contentious landscape of warlords.[22] American reliance on warlords and strongmen was vital to its rapid military victory in 2001 and contributed to post-conflict stability by empowering informal institutions and actors, but it contradicted the long-term statebuilding goals of establishing the rule of law and creating a centralized formal government.[23] The kleptocracy the United States helped build in Afghanistan has pillaged foreign aid and security assistance at great cost to U.S. taxpayers ever since.

How could anyone think America could teach Afghanistan to be a modern state. What, were we going to push them to absorb Central Asia by conquest?

[Furunculus]

Now where do we go from here? Per the article I linked to, this decision was made in part due to other geopolitical considerations:



Westphalian sovereignty requires states to not to involve themselves in the internal affairs of others, nor too to let third party actors, operating from within their territory, to intervene in the affairs of others.

Afghanistan - having failed this test in letting Al Qaida use its territory as a base for foriegn operations - was given assistance by the west in order to meet its westphalian responsibilities.

However, if we cannot build afghan capacity to hold a monopoly of violence then the only remaining option is to wall it off and operate an obama doctrine of drone warfare. Tall poppies get cut.

[spmetla]

It should be maddening that not only has the United States done more to wreck the world at large than the Soviet Union and China combined,

That's a very debatable point, the USSR occupation of eastern europe and exportation of stalinism certainly hindered development of half the continent.
Both the USSR and PRC were exporters of violent stalinist/maoist revolutionary communism to the entire southern hemisphere. While these were successful at undoing the european empires the damage it wrought on social and economic systems throughout africa, asia, and south america has had lasting consequences that are still felt today.

The US is an extremely flawed power and the unchecked expeditionary actions in the post cold-war era has been damaging but I don't think that it's done more to wreck the world at large at all.


I don't think China would want to over extend and would rather consolidate - it does a vast amount of trade primarily to keep the domestic audience happy rather than anything else. And there would be regional powers such as India / Russia and Europe in some form or other


That would make sense if China was trying to act as a rational power, feeding itself nationalist propaganda about the need to right and revenge all who made the century of humiliation happen will make it difficult to remain rational. When these nationalists feel that they have 'arrived' and demand the world order become sino-centric now rationalism will take a backseat. The parallels between China and Imperial Germany's asperations for "a place under the sun" are certainly worrying.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/china-warns-it-ll-use-military-action-to-stop-taiwan-independence-as-u-s-officials-visit-island/ar-BB1fEf0u?ocid=msedgdhp

The Taiwan dispute is certainly heating up, my personal prediction is that China will take some sort of unilateral action against Taiwan during next winter's Olympic games. It worked well for Putin during the Sochi games and the Beijing games in the Ukraine and Georgia respectively.
I wish the US would recognize Taiwan's independence already instead of this ridiculous one China policy, hell I'd support them sending some elements of 1st SF Group and perhaps some Patriot batteries to demonstrate our commitment to Taiwan.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russian-navy-starts-black-sea-drills-ahead-of-expected-u-s-warship-arrival/ar-BB1fDAs5?ocid=msedgdhp
I'm glad the US/NATO/EU are trying to do something about Russia's build up there but a show of naval force isn't really substantial. Were the stronger EU/NATO members to send ground forces to Poland/Romania it certainly show more resolve than naval forces. The NATO and EU rapid reaction forces are fairly small and if nothing else such a show of force would be useful for identifying and resolving the multitude of problems that will undoubtedly be found.

EDIT:
US Cancels warship deployment to the Black Sea:
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/u-s-cancels-warships-deployment-to-black-sea-turkish-diplomatic-sources/ar-BB1fEV7G?ocid=msedgntp

[rory_20_uk]

I suppose the USSR / China were never thought to be doing more than destabilising things. The USA always has itself as the Good Guy - and it is the disconnect between results and ideals that is most cavernous.

I'm not sure why Taiwan should be recognised as a separate country - they themselves after all claim all of China and very much don't see themselves in that way; countries rarely recognise every splintered province as another country since that might be reciprocated.

As to whether China attacks, I personally think to do so would be so hellishly expensive in lives / resources / military prestige - and at the end of the fight they'd be the proud owner of a wasteland. Mainland China would certainly win if it wanted to, but the cost would be dreadful as contested marine invasions on narrow coasts are - unless it first obliterated the entirety of the country with missiles. Ukraine was taken by surprise, Taiwan has been preparing for an attack for something like 50 years.

And apart from Taiwan, they could attack Russia (a nuclear power with almost nothing but nukes to do in the event of an attack), India (a nuclear power over the tallest mountains in the world), Korea (destabilising the North) or what else? Japan? Vietnam? Afghanistan? Gunboat diplomacy is much less profitable now - certainly compared to economic or cyber options. The Belt Road initiative is far more likely to spread their power than trying to conquer bits of it.

Europe in general hasn't the capability - let alone the desire - to meaningfully stand up to Russia. Most forces are hollowed out and the effective bits being used overseas. As you say, all that can currently be done is to send troops to be used as human shields since there's not the sort of air infrastructure and heavy armour / artillery that would be required to withstand Russia trying. And which European countries want to bear the brunt of a war with a country they currently purchase gas from over a country they barely have any interest in at all?

~:smoking:

[spmetla]

Actively suppressing dissent in their spheres isn't too good either. The squashing of the Hungarian revolt, the Czech revolt, the Cultural Revolution etc...
The US definitely likes to see itself as the Good Guy, we all know that's not always the case. On the whole though it's actions are usually to preserve the status quo/world order. It certainly has done military actions for its own sell interest (or perceived interest) like the Iraq invasion, various drone strikes/assassinations, Bay of Pigs, etc...
The proping up of dictators like the Shah of Iran, Marco in the PI, Park in SK, and so on are certainly against US values but those seem to be a result of trying to do valued based diplomacy with China. The US limited it'd support to the Nationalist Chinese because it was so corrupt and had horrible records of human rights too, however once the US saw that the alternative was Maoist China exporting revolution to every country in the region the US began to tolerate/support just about every anti-communist dictator around the world. Since the end of the Cold War though the US has been able to reduce its tolerance of dictators outside the middle east where apparently we see them as bastions against Islamic nationalism/universalism.

As for why recognize Taiwan, well for one it has been operating as in independent country since WW2 (I'm not including pre-WW2 Nationalist boundaries). Why should the PRC have Taiwan? It wasn't a part of the Qing empire when the PRC and ROC were formed as it was under Japanese occupation. As such it has zero history under the PRC and there's no need to start now just because the Chinese have maps that say two regimes ago it was ruled by mainland China. This isn't like recognizing South Ossetia, Abkazia, Transdnister or Northern Cyprus as separate countries. The ROC has a long history as an independent country and conducts most trade and business as such. Why should they be denied a future outside of a totalitarian China if they want one? They've seen what happened in Hong Kong, why should they be forced to accept that as their future?

Wars are usually not about cost/benefit, if thy were they would be far more rare. Besides, I don't think China would outright invade Taiwan but instead invade the outer islands of Taiwan (I'm thinking Kinmen). This would likely be enough to demonstrate to Taiwan the lack of resolve of the rest of the world while at the same time not being so bold that failure is even conceivable. Chipping away at the outer territories of Taiwan until it's isolated by sea and air is the likely PRC tactic. A bold move like invading Kinmen though would show cracks in US commitment if Taiwan doesn't defend Kinmen by all means necessary (doing so would likely be suicidal without US support).


As you say, all that can currently be done is to send troops to be used as human shields since there's not the sort of air infrastructure and heavy armour / artillery that would be required to withstand Russia trying.
Showing commitment to even the concept of using force, even if not prepared would create a new calculation for Russia in conducting further actions. Right now Europe is likely just seen as a pushover (outside of sanctions). Some sort of resolve, even if risky but short of sending troops into the Ukraine to defend it would likely demonstrate that perhaps the Europeans aren't pushovers.

[ReluctantSamurai]

On the whole though it's actions are usually to preserve the status quo/world order. It certainly has done military actions for its own sell interest (or perceived interest) like the Iraq invasion, various drone strikes/assassinations, Bay of Pigs, etc...

Not sure all the meddling we've done in Central/South America would qualify as preserving the status quo. The GOP and corporate media like to make headlines by citing the current migrant "crisis" at our southern borders, but noone talks about the decades we've spent destabilizing (or supporting coups) in Latin America, resulting in the breakdown of social and economic norms, hence the mass exodus north. It might not be as visually dramatic as our subversive activities in the Middle East, but the results are just as bad, or worse, IMHO.

As far as China invading Taiwan, an interesting perusal of different courses of action:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/14/is-there-really-a-risk-that-china-will-go-to-war-with-taiwan

[Furunculus]

Re: Afghanistan - the view from who famously knows a bit about it:
https://twitter.com/RoryStewartUK/status/1382448165190729728

Re: Taiwan - I'd be more willing to take their continued sovereignty seriously if they would do the same.
They don't, and it betrays an ambivalence that would cause me to shrug my shoulders were it not for TSMC.

[Hooahguy]

Re: Afghanistan - the view from who famously knows a bit about it:
https://twitter.com/RoryStewartUK/status/1382448165190729728

I disagree with this take. I maybe would have agreed a year ago when the Afghan government was holding firm, but in 2020 there seems to have been a Taliban resurgence even with a US troop presence, seizing large swaths of government-held countryside so now all that's left are the cities. They also nearly took the provincial capital of Helmand, Lashkar Gah, only preventing the takeover of the city by promising not to do any more airstrikes on Taliban in the area. And that was with 4-4,500 US troops in the country and people are now saying that 2-3,000 would be enough. We can't just keep people there in perpetuity hoping that one day the Afghans get their act together. In another tweet (https://twitter.com/RoryStewartUK/status/1382654323860008964?s=20) the OP states that perpetual US presence in Afghanistan could be like the continued presence in Germany. But Germany isn't a warzone so the comparison doesn't hold up. The past 20 years have shown that international terror groups don't need Afghanistan to operate and plan attacks so I don't see that as a justification either. It's time to leave.

[rory_20_uk]

Yes, it is one thing having an outpost in a friendly / neutral country compared to having troops in one that is actively hostile.

To point out the obvious, the USA / NATO etc should never have bothered going into Afghanistan and the longer that is spent in that quagmire the more resource is squandered. It took hundreds of thousands of troops to win in Malaya against an insurgency and there at least the borders are the sea, not porous ones with other countries - and even if enough military might was used to subdue the place, what then? Or was the thought if we point enough guns at them for long enough they'd suddenly want to emulate us? Their culture is currently so different from what we view as acceptable in the West the best that can be hoped for is relative peaceful coexistence which we ignore pretty much everything that takes place against the local populace. But we have a lot of experience in doing that so we should cope.

If the argument the "better over there than over here" then Syria is a much better outpost / festering warzone to have - although I thought that this mentality was the whole point of the slavish support of Israel in the area.

~:smoking:

[Hooahguy]

Of course in hindsight we should have never invaded Afghanistan, but even though I was young I remember the jingoism of the immediate post-9/11 world. We were itching to get back at those who did those attacks so I don't think there was serious forethought into what happens after the Taliban is toppled. Plus there still was the idea that we were so star-spangled awesome that as soon as we toppled those oppressive governments, everyone would want democracy.

[spmetla]

To point out the obvious, the USA / NATO etc should never have bothered going into Afghanistan and the longer that is spent in that quagmire the more resource is squandered. It took hundreds of thousands of troops to win in Malaya against an insurgency and there at least the borders are the sea, not porous ones with other countries - and even if enough military might was used to subdue the place, what then? Or was the thought if we point enough guns at them for long enough they'd suddenly want to emulate us? Their culture is currently so different from what we view as acceptable in the West the best that can be hoped for is relative peaceful coexistence which we ignore pretty much everything that takes place against the local populace. But we have a lot of experience in doing that so we should cope.

I still think that invading Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and Al Queda was worth it. The mistake was getting into nation building which is something the US has a very poor track record on. If the the mission had remained a SOF/CIA mission once the Taliban was removed from power by the Northern Alliance and US Coalition then it wouldn't have had this mission creep of the US trying to provide security for the local population. We were never going to be seen as liberators and even in the areas were we were welcomed (the Tajik and Hazara regions) the ignorance general bullying methods used by average US Soldiers/Marines made enemies of people that initially saw us as at least allies against the Taliban.
Hell, we should even have considered bringing the king of Afghanistan back as that'd add legitimacy to the Afghan government and he'd have some sway with the Pashtun tribes which largely are what form the Taliban.

Malaya took lots of troops, time, but most importantly a clear vision and promise of Malayan independence. Not to mention that the commonwealth troops used at least had a broad 'colonial' understanding that while not too culturally aware was at least not completely ignorant of the region. Other thing there is that because it was an 'emergency' and not a war that insurance companies still had to cover for the terrorism done by the communists which meant that employment kept up and there wasn't a flight of capital which would have made the situation untenable.

An Afghanistan with only low footprint elements of SOF and the CIA working to only fight the Taliban instead of nation building and area security missions together with some funding and backing for a new Afghan government *might* have worked. The resulting Afghanistan would probably more resemble the other 'Stans' to the North but would likely have been more successful than the current GIROA government that's there and once the Taliban/Al Queda threat was diminished to the point of not being a global threat we could have left. As for dealing with the pro-Taliban regions, more autonomy for the different provinces sorta like the Moros got with the Philippines might have resulted in an acceptable peace.

Russia retaliates, tells 10 U.S. diplomats to go
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-retaliates-tells-10-u-s-diplomats-to-go/vi-BB1fJG1v?ocid=msedgntp
Russia to consider Biden plan for Putin summit
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56746138

Just a tit for tat response to the new sanctions, it seems a summit between Putin and Biden is still likely to happen. Glad that that there will still be talks at the top, just curious as to what the US goals would be. I doubt that anything would get the Russians to withdraw from the Crimea or stop supporting the eastern separatists. The other 'frozen conflicts' from the fall of the USSR still have the same borders with the only exception being Armenia/Azerbaijan which was only changed through war. The only way I see Ukraine regaining Crimea is if they were to try and take it back themselves, something they are incapable of doing and something I have no desire to see NATO or the EU attempt doing either.

[rory_20_uk]

Yes, Bin Laden hid in Afghanistan... but he was a rich Saudi. Revenge didn't include any action against the Saudis since on this matter, it seems Realpolitik won out And it should have done with Afghanistan. In essence the Taliban (the sovereign government of the country) refused to extradite someone - something many, many countries refuse to do all the time. And with the Afghani, this is also cultural. The response is not to go and get them with extrajudicial assassinations. I'm almost certain there are laws that civilised countries sign up to to not do that sort of thing.

Toppling a government and replacing with another rarely works out the way you want it since it is generally clear who did the toppling and being a puppet of a foreign power isn't something people will tolerate. Given you have driven probably thousands to the ousted "heroes" and the regime will not have democracy (since they'll most likely vote in the last lot given a chance in several areas at least) you are once again supporting a totalitarian leader of a pseudo-colony with most people in to take as much money before the country with legindary ADHD gets bored and goes and kills some other people. And of course you'll not truly have managed to rid either the Taliban nor Al-Queda. The country is massive, CIA spooks don't fit in and unless you want to play whack-a-mole with kill teams it isn't going to work (which again will either require a massive amount of logistical support or are going to be fighting the locals on home turf.

Russia almost wants to be back in the news and seen as a Great Power and the only way for them to do that is to act like a toddler (albeit one with nukes). Few countries televise their invasion plans so unless this is a cunning plan they just want some quality time with Uncle Sam.

~:smoking:

[spmetla]

As much as I dislike the Saudis it's not like they worked or harbored Bin Laden, they'd expelled him a decade before 9/11. That so many of the hijackers were Saudi though should have resulted in a lot more pressure on them to clamp down on extremism. Their funding of extremist clerics throughout the world continues to be a factor in people radicalizing.

I agree on the problems of toppling governments, regime change is extremely difficult, you can't really end a war if there's not one you can make peace with. Even in WW2 we needed Admiral Donitz and Emperor Hirohito to surrender so that their people could accept the war as done. In hindsight all that was really needed was ousting Al Queda from Afghanistan, once the more or less fled to Pakistan the efforts in Afghanistan should have really only been some limited support to the Northern Alliance to help them win the civil war. Putting pressure on Pakistan to keep tabs on Al Queda and not shelter Bin Laden would've been more useful than the billions spent there in the decade before Bin Laden's assassination raid.

Russia definitely is acting like a toddler, I doubt they're doing anything new in Ukraine. The troop buildup is probably most useful for seeing if Biden's backing of NATO has any more teeth beyond the words of support and like you said, to get to the table with uncle sam.

What do you guys think of India, it's got potential for Great Power status but it's widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and fractious internal politics seem to limit it's ability to grow. I know the US is looking to India as a balance to China but I can't see that happening any time soon outside of the limited border disputes.

Also, what do you think of Russia's tepid reactions to China's silk road initiatives? Russia has historical and cultural ties to central asia but China's larger purse will probably erode Russia's ability to influence those nations. Russia has seemed to align itself with China so that it can piss off 'the west' but without the economic might to really sustain that effort. Russia has a lot of territory that used to belong to the Qing Empire so I can't imagine that they see China as a long term ally as they are the last colonial European power remaining in East Asia.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/16/russia-china-belt-and-road-initiative/

[Viking]

Few countries televise their invasion plans so unless this is a cunning plan they just want some quality time with Uncle Sam.

It is unclear how much Russia stands to gain by moving troops clandestinely. Ukraine and Russia have already been informally at war for years, with Ukraine on a permanent war footing. Even if Russia did attempt to move the troops with greater discretion, they could still be discovered. Troops moved stealthily would certainly look suspicious, and could set off alarm bells that could lead to a decisive short-term mobilisation on the Ukrainian side.

Russian troops could now sit on Ukraine's borders for at least month before they do anything. The Ukrainian military, on the other hand, might not necessarily strengthen or fortify much more than it likely would have done during that time (or already have done in the last years), anyway.

At the time of writing, Putin himself might not even know what's next for the Russian forces. With one set of signals, he could withdraw the troops; with another, he could order an assault.

[spmetla]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/white-house-us-china-war-over-taiwan-would-broaden-quickly/ar-BB1gonBp?ocid=msedgntp
White House: US-China war over Taiwan 'would broaden quickly'
Top Iranian General Says Israel Could Be Defeated With 'a Single Operation'
Pentagon Can’t Say When, Where Chinese Rocket Will Crash Into Earth

China and the United States face a growing likelihood of conflict over the status of Taiwan, a contest that current and former officials fear could lead to upheaval unseen since World War II.
“I am sure that we are going to be in a kinetic conflict with China in five years,” retired Army Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, said Wednesday. “I hope I'm wrong, but I believe within the next five years there's going to be a kinetic conflict — missiles, submarines, aircraft; not so much land operations. … It’s just about inevitable.”

That prospect presents a high-stakes dilemma for U.S. officials, who could face a choice between rallying to the embattled island democracy or conceding the loss and allowing Chinese communist officials to achieve a major victory that might empower Beijing to break the broader U.S. alliance network and dominate the Indo-Pacific region. President Joe Biden’s team has declined to say explicitly whether he would send U.S. forces to defend Taiwan, but his administration is telling Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping not to risk a clash with the United States.

"I think it would broaden quickly, and it would fundamentally trash the global economy in ways that I don't think anyone can predict," Kurt Campbell, the White House National Security Council’s lead official for the Indo-Pacific, said Tuesday during a discussion hosted by the Financial Times while contemplating what would happen if the U.S. and China were to come to blows.

Campbell refused to declare explicitly that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in a crisis, in keeping with a long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” about how Washington would respond.

"I believe that there are some significant downsides to the kind of what is called strategic clarity that you lay out,” he said.

U.S. officials and lawmakers are nevertheless growing more emphatic in their message of support for Taiwan, as Campbell’s boss made clear last week.

“What we would like to see is stability in cross-strait relations and no effort to unilaterally change the ‘status quo,’” White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan told the Aspen Institute in remarks that attracted attention in Taiwanese media. “That is how we are going to continue to approach the Taiwan issue going forward, with steadiness, clarity, and resolve with respect to our view that there should be no unilateral changes to the 'status quo.'"

Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned China on Tuesday that “it would be a very serious mistake” to change the status quo — a multi-decade situation in which Beijing has refused to relinquish its claim to sovereignty over the island, but likewise refused to try to bring the island under the mainland regime’s control by force. Chinese communist officials have never renounced the possible use of force, but they have prioritized “peaceful reunification” nonetheless.

Blinken’s statement dovetailed with then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s pledge in October that “whether it's Taiwan or the challenge presented to Japan, the United States will be a good partner for security in every dimension.”

Hodges, speaking to the United Kingdom-based Council on Geostrategy, suggested that the Western failure to make Chinese officials regret their crackdown on Hong Kong over the last year has emboldened Beijing to risk a military conflict.

“I just think the language coming out of Beijing about Taiwan, the fact that nobody did anything, truthfully, about what the Chinese have done in Hong Kong, to include the U.K. surprisingly, how little the response has been, and then the increasing aggression, aggressiveness, by the Chinese in the South China Sea — it seems to me it’s just about inevitable,” Hodges said. “I don’t want to say inevitable, but it’s very close to it.”

A not unsurprising but still worrying situation. Given the diplomatic blitz that Blinken has done in the region I can assume that the 'quad' plus UK and maybe some bits of the EU will stand by Taiwan if the island of formosa is attacked outright.

With the UK's new Carrier Strike Group on it's first operational world tour I wonder if it will choose to pass through the Taiwan straits at all for freedom of navigation purposes or go East around the island when headed to Japan.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/exclusive-china-plans-to-revive-strategic-pacific-airstrip-kiribati-lawmaker-says/ar-BB1gncY3?ocid=msedgntp
Exclusive: China plans to revive strategic Pacific airstrip, Kiribati lawmaker says
SYDNEY (Reuters) - China has drawn up plans to upgrade an airstrip and bridge on one of Kiribati's remote islands about 3,000km southwest of Hawaii, lawmakers told Reuters, in a bid to revive a site that hosted military aircraft during World War Two.

The plans, which have not been made public, involve construction on the tiny island of Kanton (also spelled Canton), a coral atoll strategically located midway between Asia and the Americas.

Kiribati opposition lawmaker Tessie Lambourne told Reuters she was concerned about the project, and wanted to know whether it was part of China's Belt and Road Initiative.

"The government hasn't shared the cost and other details other than it's a feasibility study for the rehabilitation of the runway and bridge," Lambourne told Reuters. "The opposition will be seeking more information from government in due course."

The office of Kiribati President Taneti Maamau did not respond to questions.

The Chinese foreign ministry did not immediately respond to questions.

Despite being small, Kiribati, a nation of 120,000 residents, controls one of the biggest exclusive economic zones in the world, covering more than 3.5 million square kilometres of the Pacific.
Any significant build-up on Kanton, located 3,000 kilometres (1,864 miles) southwest of Hawaii and U.S. military bases there, would offer a foothold to China deep into territory that had been firmly aligned to the U.S. and its allies since World War Two.

"The island would be a fixed aircraft carrier," said one adviser to Pacific governments, who declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the project.

The U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet and U.S. State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Kiribati (pronounced Kiribas) has in recent years been at the centre of a tussle between China and the U.S. and its Pacific allies.

In late 2019 it severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of China, in a decision overseen by Maamau, who went on to win a closely contested election on a pro-China platform.

The diplomatic shift, which mirrored events in the Solomon Islands, was a setback for self-ruled Taiwan, which China claims as a province with no right to state-to-state ties. Taiwan counts the U.S. as an important international backer and supplier of arms.

Kanton has been used by the U.S. for space and missile tracking operations and its near 2-kilometre (6,562 ft) runway hosted long-range bombers during the war.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) said in a paper last year that Chinese facilities on Kiribati would be positioned across major sea lanes between North America, and Australia and New Zealand.

Beijing has labelled the think tank as "anti-China".

Along with its strategic significance, the waters around Kanton are rich in fish, including tuna, although commercial fishing is prohibited as the island is in a marine protected zone.

There are around two dozen residents on Kanton who rely on subsistence fishing and supply ships.

(Reporting by Jonathan Barrett. Additional reporting by Beijing Bureau. Editing by Gerry Doyle)

China's navy has used the establishment of a base in Djbouti to learn how to conduct operations far from their shores and what it would take to really project naval power. wonder if this airfield would lead to a port as well. Either way it's China extending influence into an area that the 'west' has largely ignored since it's been decolonized. I'm sure the locals would appreciate some investment into their infrastructure, also it would make deep sea exploitation easier, mining rare earths from the ocean's bottom will be an industry relatively soon.

[spmetla]

Just thought I'd keep it in this thread as Turkey bringing up the idea has implications for NATO, the EU, and the US relationship with Israel and Turkey.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/erdogan-pushes-for-turkey-to-oversee-jerusalem-and-provide-air-support-to-palestinians/ar-BB1gSciy?ocid=msedgntp
Erdogan pushes for Turkey to oversee Jerusalem and provide air support to Palestinians
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his domestic political allies have floated sending military forces to Jerusalem, including fighter jets, to give Palestinians air cover as the Israel-Hamas crisis gives him an opportunity to boost his regional influence and standing at home.
“If there is a call, let us answer it,” Turkish lawmaker Devlet Bahceli, who leads the nationalist party in a coalition with Erdogan, said Tuesday. “Let us stop the bloodshed and ensure peace and stability.”

That statement reinforces Erdogan’s message in a late Monday speech, in which the Turkish leader proposed to alter the administration of Jerusalem. Such a development would upend the current Arab oversight of the holy sites and place a NATO country and its military in an adversarial setting with Israeli forces.

"At this point, we believe there's a need for a separate arrangement on Jerusalem,” Erdogan said Monday. "In today's circumstances, it would be the most correct and consistent course of action for Jerusalem to be administered by a commission of representatives from the three faiths. Otherwise, it doesn't appear it will be easily possible to achieve lasting peace in this ancient city.”
Erdogan floated the idea of sending an “international protection force" last week following a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, although the Kremlin team showed no public sign of interest in such an effort.

The Turkish leader observed that Israel has air power while the militants in Gaza do not, without committing to a specific military proposal — a notable absence that lends itself to the assessment that Erdogan is trying to boost his sagging political approval ratings at home, rather than orchestrate a major shift in the regional balance of power.

“This is Erdogan being strategically ambiguous on purpose,” former Turkish opposition lawmaker Aykan Erdemir, a senior analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told the Washington Examiner. “He’s proposing a vague idea of either a peacekeeping force or a Turkish deployment, knowing fully well it will not materialize, but at the same time, appealing to his voter base and his fans around the world.”

Still, such a domestic political maneuver could reinforce the suspicions between Gulf Arab states and Erdogan, whose Muslim Brotherhood sympathies and affinity for the late Ottoman Empire has fed tensions between the leaders of the Sunni Muslim world.

“Arab leaders would see this as threatening, even if it’s just rhetoric because ultimately such rhetoric not only appeals to Erdogan’s support base at home, but it also appeals to the Arab street and sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood,” Erdemir said. “Even though nothing concrete is expected to come out of Erdogan’s calls, it still has the capacity to undermine traditional Arab leaders.”

Jordan’s King Abdullah II has “custodianship” of the holy sites in Jerusalem, a status he has determined to maintain in the face of speculation that other Arab powers might try to muscle him out. “I will never change my position toward Jerusalem in my life,” he said in November. “All my people are with me.”
Erdogan and Bahceli, his coalition ally, accused the United States of emboldening Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “The indifference of leaders in the Muslim world strengthens Israel’s hand,” Bahceli said.

I'll assume all of this is just Erdogan posturing for domestic politics benefit but Turkey has been a bit of a wild card the last few years and looking at the resource exploration they're doing around Cyprus I wouldn't put it past them to form an 'alliance' of sorts with Hamas or the PLA.

[Hooahguy]

I'll assume all of this is just Erdogan posturing for domestic politics benefit but Turkey has been a bit of a wild card the last few years and looking at the resource exploration they're doing around Cyprus I wouldn't put it past them to form an 'alliance' of sorts with Hamas or the PLA.
The first part seems to be it. There is no chance in hell that this is a serious proposal. Or even feasible.

Not to mention that the idea of Turkey providing air support for the Palestinians is kinda laughable considering their air force is not doing so great (https://ahvalnews.com/defence/turkeys-air-force-can-barely-fly-its-f-16s-analyst) after the 2016 coup attempt and the subsequent purging of the air force.

[spmetla]

Russia warns Britain it will bomb ships next time
https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-says-dont-get-carried-away-by-warship-spat-with-russia-2021-06-24/
LONDON, June 24 (Reuters) - Russia warned Britain on Thursday that it would bomb British naval vessels in the Black Sea if there were any further provocative actions by the British navy off the coast of Russia-annexed Crimea.

Russia summoned the British ambassador in Moscow for a formal diplomatic scolding after the warship breached what the Kremlin says are its territorial waters but which Britain and most of the world say belong to Ukraine.

Britain said Russia was giving an inaccurate account of the incident. No warning shots had been fired and no bombs had been dropped in the path of the Royal Navy destroyer Defender, it said.
In Moscow, Russia summoned Ambassador Deborah Bronnert for a reprimand over what it said were Britain's "dangerous" action in the Black Sea - while foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused London of "barefaced lies".

"We can appeal to common sense, demand respect for international law, and if that doesn't work, we can bomb," Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian news agencies.

Ryabkov, referring to Moscow's version of events in which a Russian aircraft bombed the path of the British destroyer, said that in future bombs would be sent "not only in its path, but also on target."

The Black Sea, which Russia uses to project its power in the Mediterranean, has for centuries been a flashpoint between Russia and its competitors such as Turkey, France, Britain and the United States.

Russia seized and annexed the Crimea peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 and considers areas around its coast to be Russian waters. Western countries deem the Crimea to be part of Ukraine and reject Russia's claim to the seas around it.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson said the British warship, which was travelling from the Ukrainian port of Odessa to the Georgian port of Batumi, was acting in accordance with the law and had been in international waters.

"These are Ukrainian waters and it was entirely right to use them to go from A to B," Johnson said. British Defence Minister Ben Wallace accused Russian pilots of conducting unsafe aircraft manoeuvres 500 feet (152 m) above the warship.
"The Royal Navy will always uphold international law and will not accept unlawful interference with innocent passage," Wallace said.

Under international law of the sea, innocent passage permits a vessel to pass through another state's territorial waters so long as this does not affect its security.

Britain disputed the Russian version of events, with Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab calling it "predictably inaccurate".

BLACK SEA DISPUTE

During its 2008 war with Georgia, Russia bristled at U.S. warships operating in the Black Sea, and in April the United States cancelled the deployment of two warships to the area.

Ties between London and Moscow have been on ice since the 2018 poisoning with a Soviet-developed nerve agent known as Novichok of ex-double agent Sergei Skripal, a mole who betrayed hundreds of Russian agents to Britain's MI6 foreign spy service.

The British destroyer visited the Ukrainian port of Odessa this week, where an agreement was signed for Britain to help upgrade Ukraine's navy.

Russia said it had ventured as far as 3 km (2 miles) into Russian waters near Cape Fiolent, a landmark on Crimea's southern coast near the port of Sevastopol, headquarters of the Russian Navy's Black Sea fleet.

Britain's BBC released footage from the ship showing a Russian coast guard warning that he would shoot if the British ship did not change course.

"If you don't change the course, I'll fire," a heavily accented Russian voice said in English to the British ship. The BBC said shots were fired and that as many as 20 Russian aircraft were "buzzing" the British ship.

Britain said the shots were part of a Russian gunnery exercise. Russia released footage filmed from a Russian SU-24 bomber flying close to the British ship.

"These aircraft posed no immediate threat to HMS Defender, but some of these manoeuvres were neither safe nor professional," Britain's Wallace said.

Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge; Editing by Kate Holton

I doubt anyone takes this threat too literally it seems that Putin will try and test the limits of the US commitment to NATO by threatening the UK.

An Army brigade posted to Taiwan, and other ways to counter China being floated
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/06/23/an-army-brigade-posted-to-taiwan-and-other-ways-to-counter-china-being-floated/
If the Army is serious about countering the Chinese military in the Pacific, it needs to permanently station an Armored Brigade Combat Team on Taiwan, according to some think tankers.

That type of basing decision would likely abandon the current policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan, which intentionally leaves it unclear as to whether Americans would defend the island in a cross-strait conflict. Uncertain about their superpower backers, Taiwanese leaders are less likely to unilaterally declare independence and China is less inclined to hurry to war.

Still, arguments for a kind of “tripwire force” have gained steam in recent months, including from a fall of 2020 essay published in a U.S. Army professional journal.

Such a force would make China know it would confront U.S. troops on the first day of any planned invasion of the island or push eastward into the Pacific, said Dr. Loren Thompson, CEO of the Lexington Institute. Thompson spoke about the service’s role in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command at an Association of the U.S. Army panel on Wednesday.

“There is no substitute for being there on the first day of conflict,” Thompson said.
Before the United States formally recognized the Chinese government in the 1970s, the Army had 30,000 troops stationed in Taiwan, Thompson said. Currently, the Army has no permanently based troops on the island.
Fellow panelist, Dr. Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, used his opening remarks to lay out a case for the Army’s continued development of ground-based long-range precision fires.

That effort was briefly criticized earlier this year as a kind of funding “power grab” that sought to expand the Army’s role over capabilities resident in the Air Force, Karako said.

That criticism, lodged publicly by Gen. Timothy Ray, head of Air Force Global Strike Command during a Mitchell Institute Aerospace Advantage podcast on March 31 drew quick and sustained backlash from fellow Air Force and later Navy leaders. Those critical of Ray’s comments have emphasized that the Army’s fires pursuit complements the capabilities of the other services.

Bolstering his advocacy of stationing an ABCT along with support capabilities in Taiwan, Thompson said that “there are big problems with depending on long-range air power and naval forces” to deter or prevent an invasion of Taiwan.

The Air Force has only a handful of bases within the 2,000-mile range of Taiwan, he said. And more than half of the two dozen locations suggested for basing air assets for use in the Pacific have runways too short for a B-52 bomber to take off.

To top it off, the air service only has 158 long-range bombers in its entire fleet, many of which are not operational day-to-day, Thompson said.

Thompson added that if the Air Force were to use nuclear-capable bombers on conventional missions to China, it could trigger China’s use of its nuclear arsenal.

The Navy, he said, has a “relatively small fleet to deploy” in the crowded area around Taiwan. And its assets would be vulnerable to growing Chinese Navy capabilities.

By having an ABCT and other assets on the island, the Army could use mobile ground fires to hit invading ground forces and even strike at-sea targets, Thompson said.

He pointed back to similar stationing during the Cold War in Europe to deter the Soviet Union. And currently, U.S. forces in the Baltic region and on the Korean peninsula to deter Russia and North Korea, respectively.

Others, however, have argued that a scenario in which U.S. military intervention is guaranteed may not serve the intended purpose.

In an article published this month for War on the Rocks, Harvard professor Alastair Johnston, National Chengchi University election researcher Tsai Chia-hung, and others, detailed surveys they conducted in 2019 and 2020 on a random sample of the Taiwanese population.

“On the one hand, strategic clarity could enhance deterrence because it increases the Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight,” the researchers wrote of the survey results. “On the other hand, strategic clarity could reduce deterrence because it appears to increase the Taiwanese people’s support for independence.”

Senior Chinese officials warned Taiwan earlier this year that independence could mean war.

I know I've made it clear that I'd fully support this type of 'tripwire' support of Taiwan. I don't think an armored brigade would be the right answer though, perhaps an Infantry Brigade with armor attached as well as significant ADA attachments too.
That it's being floated in a US military newspaper is a hell of a provocation on its own.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I still say that none of us are willing to bleed to stop Russia in the Ukraine/Crimea. So we might as well not provoke them until we are.


As to point two, is there any support among the Taiwanese government for this? Much less the difficulties noted in the piece itself.

[Montmorency]

Apparently Ethiopia's army just got its ass kicked (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/world/africa/tigray-ethiopia-soldiers-captured.html) by the Tigray resistance.

It has been pointed out that though Ethiopia is perhaps the longest-lived African polity today, for almost none of its history has it aspired to democracy; it is one of the world's surviving great empires. And modernity shows a poor track record for empires.

[Pannonian]

Apparently Ethiopia's army just got its ass kicked (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/world/africa/tigray-ethiopia-soldiers-captured.html) by the Tigray resistance.

It has been pointed out that though Ethiopia is perhaps the longest-lived African polity today, for almost none of its history has it aspired to democracy; it is one of the world's surviving great empires. And modernity shows a poor track record for empires.

China and Russia are doing quite well.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Wiki Source (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_of_United_States_troops_from_Afghanistan_(2021))

The US withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan adds another Great Power to the list of those outlasted by the Muslim Tribes of the Afghani mountains. As usual, the Great Power was largely undefeatable by the locals in any conventional way, but susceptible to harassment, guerilla tactics, and ultimately unwilling to continue to pay the cost in blood and treasure of imposing its designs on that polity (term used loosely; the loose political cultural framework of the region is part of its resilience). Persia, Macedon, England, Soviet Russia, and the USA have all failed. Only the Mongols had more than a nominal rule over the area and they did so by nearly depopulating it with a level of brutality seen neither before nor since. Even then, in time, the Mughal were more of its nominal than practical rulers. Nor is it an issue associated with Muslim fanaticism as two of the failed attempts predate that religion.

Yes, I know that my government is currently claiming their belief that the Afghan government will not fall to the Taliban. I suspect that the only substantial difference between this and April 1975 will be the absence of a subsequent musical. I do hope we get the interpreters and their close kin out quickly. It is the least we should do.

[Montmorency]

China and Russia are doing quite well.

China is a solid contender (and the US is something like an - choosing my words carefully here - unusual case), but, ah, Russia's imperial record is not a confident one.


Persia, Macedon, England, Soviet Russia, and the USA have all failed.

The empire-killer sobriquet is at least a little overblown, given that Persian empires have dominated much or all of modern Afghanistan for almost as long as they existed, granting that Afghanistan has always been a political borderland and crossroads of Eurasian trade (even Bronze Age Crete relied on Afghan tin IIRC) and migration of itinerant Denisovans and Aryans and Bactrians and Saka and the like.

But it probably has something to do with the Iranian heartland lying within a thousand miles of what are now Kabul and Kandahar - recurrent campaigning distance, nearer than the Mediterranean in the other direction...


Yes, I know that my government is currently claiming their belief that the Afghan government will not fall to the Taliban. I suspect that the only substantial difference between this and April 1975 will be the absence of a subsequent musical. I do hope we get the interpreters and their close kin out quickly. It is the least we should do.

What we can be sure of is that the Taliban will be forced to moderate its methods if it wishes to hold the rest of the country, just as Hanoi had to. The Taliban reportedly already inversely tailor somewhat the level of repression to the level of resistance by village and province. Most of Afghanistan is way more pissed off at the Taliban than the Vietnamese were with each other (ethnic minorities were more easily marginalized in Vietnam too).


Speaking of Afghanistan, I'd like to take another moment to reflect on the early 2000s as historical era. Holding strong opinions on Iraq's place in foreign policy is a little before my time, but for those - ordinary people I mean - who gratuitously and advisably got wrong almost everything that can be got wrong, what's the retrospective look like? I assume I will one day survive to be similarly wrong about some momentous cycle, a source of great anxiety.

In principle, the (abashed) errant ought to have wanted to outsource their judgement to those who easily and eruditely exposed all the deceits and fallacies of the Criminal Elite and the common-clay currencies (not that erudition was required). Doesn't seem like that took place in practice though? Paul Krugman (https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/21/opinion/a-no-win-outcome.html) is one of the few major pundits or commentators writing today, to my limited awareness at least, whose political analyses throughout the 2000s perform as comprehensively prescient at all timescales.


It helps to recall an observation that Gail Sheehy made last year: ''The blind drive to win,'' she wrote, ''is a hallmark of the Bush family clan. One thing that G. W.'s childhood friends told me repeatedly was that he has to win, he absolutely has to win and if he thinks he's going to lose, he will change the rules or extend the play. Or if it really is bad he'll take his bat and ball and go home.''

Now consider this: More than two months ago George W. Bush endorsed a ''stimulus'' bill so tilted toward corporate interests that even many conservatives were startled. This left only two ways a bill could pass the Senate: Either the Democratic leadership would collapse, or Mr. Bush would accept something that didn't look like a personal win. It didn't, and he wouldn't.

Anyway, there are endless discussions to have about "reasons-as-causes" for why Republicans wanted to take down Saddam Hussein, why the Bush administration invaded Iraq, and why most or a plurality of liberals went along with it, but I like the meta sendups in this vein. I'll reprint (https://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2021/07/the-iraq-war-happened-because-bush-was-a-terrible-president) it in whole.


The second– and third-most downloaded articles at the journal Security Studies both tackle the causes of the Iraq War. This might reflect an imbalance of supply and demand: there aren’t that many articles in leading international-relations journals that focus on the question of why the United States invaded Iraq.

We can find a number of partial explanations. Many believe that American global dominance was at least a permissive condition; the absence of great powers prepared to deter or punish U.S. military action gave Washington a relatively free hand. A more controversial position is that we should basically take the Bush administration at its word – or, at least, once we strip out the hyperbole. In this account, the U.S. invasion was a specific example of the more general logic of preventive war.


… determined to prevent Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons, the US administration was unable to prove that Iraq was not, in fact, developing them. Faced with the possibility of a large and rapid power shift in favor of Iraq and operating with imperfect information about Iraq’s militarization decision, the administration of US President George W. Bush opted for a preventive war, which was mistaken because there was no active Iraqi nuclear program.

Given the weakness of the case that Iraq posed an imminent threat of nuclear proliferation, some contend that the war was intended to demonstrate U.S. power: to “shock and awe” the rest of the world. The September 11 attacks made members of the Bush administration particularly anxious to reassert U.S. dominance.

I’ve come to believe that it’s a mistake to focus on any one cause, especially when we’re talking about “reasons as causes.” Different factions within the Bush administration supported the war for different reasons. I also question analysis which assumes that any given member of the Bush administration understood, or cared, how bad the case for war was. The officials who thought Hussein had a non-trivial WMD program, for example, went looking for evidence that he did. If that evidence didn’t exist then, well, he’d hidden an advanced nuclear program before, hadn’t he?

This leads us to a different set of questions: what about the Bush administration led to such collective irrationality? My colleague Elizabeth Saunders argues that the Bush administration was prone to poor decision making because it combined a president who lacked foreign-policy experience with highly experienced senior officials: “Bush’s inexperience led to poor monitoring of his subordinates” and “contributed to an atmosphere in which subordinates” did not see “themselves as accountable to a well-informed leader.”


A senior administration official told Packer in an interview that “no one ever walks into the Oval Office and tells them they’ve got no clothes on—and persists … I think it’s dangerous that we have an environment where our principal leader cannot be well-informed. It’s part and parcel of the office,” but more so in this administration, which was “scary, because of the president and the atmosphere and the people there.”

Many of the explanations floating around – whether in academia or in more general discussion – sideline Bush altogether. As Fred Kaplan notes in his review of Robert Draper’s 2020 book To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America into Iraq:


Draper’s central insight is to place George W. Bush at the center of the action. When it came to invading Iraq, Bush truly turns out to have been “the decider,” as he once described himself. And in those instances when others took charge, his style of decision-making was to let them, whereas most other presidents would have asked questions, mulled the options, perhaps convened a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) to weigh the pros and cons of a proposal. Draper convincingly shows that, under Bush, there was “no ‘process’ of any kind,” at any stage of the war, from the decision to invade to figuring out how post-Saddam Iraq should be governed.

This tracks with Saunder’s argument: Bush’s total lack of experience – or basic interest – in foreign policy introduced numerous pathologies into what passed for a decision-making process in his administration:


In the weeks after September 11, many of Bush’s underlings were startled to witness this affable but aimless president—uncertain of himself, uneasy with his legitimacy after losing the popular vote and eking out a thin Electoral College edge thanks to a 5–4 Supreme Court ruling, content to spend half of his time away from Washington clearing brush weeds back at his ranch in Texas—suddenly seized with a “piercing clarity of purpose” and an “unchecked self-confidence.” Draper paints a vivid scene of Bush speaking to a group of Asian journalists in the Oval Office, pointing to portraits of Churchill, Lincoln, and Washington, aligning himself as their peer, and viewing himself as “a leader who knew who he was and who knew what was right.” And one thing he knew, being (as Bush himself put it) “a good versus evil guy,” was that “the time had now come to confront Saddam Hussein.”

It is remarkable—and a central theme in the book—how swiftly so many senior officials fell into line, some of them against their better judgment, for reasons of misguided duty, crass cynicism, or converging motives. Wolfowitz, Libby, and a few other neocons had never pushed for an actual invasion—they fantasized about prodding small bands of Iraqi Shias and dissidents to crush Saddam’s army with the help of US air strikes—but they signed on to it, and took part in the cherry-picking of raw intelligence data that seemed to confirm that Saddam had WMDs and was affiliated with al-Qaeda, as the way to fulfill their dream. (WMDs were, as Wolfowitz later put it, “the one issue that everyone could agree on.”)

Draper’s account singles out George “It’s a slam dunk, Mr. President” Tenet for making sure that skepticism from the intelligence community couldn’t derail the war train.


… almost everyone in Bush’s inner circle really believed that Saddam had WMDs—if not nukes, then chemical or biological weapons, which a 1991 UN Security Council resolution banned him from developing. Those types of weapons were certainly within his capacity: he had built them a decade before, even used them in the Iran–Iraq War, but destroyed most of them under UN auspices after the first Gulf War. And there were still widespread suspicions—abetted by Iraq’s efforts to mislead UN weapons inspectors—that some remained hidden and that he could resume production.

But the intelligence analysts who were most expert in the region and in the technology for making and handling WMDs couldn’t find persuasive evidence to make the case that Saddam had any, and Tenet did what he could to suppress their skepticism. A holdover from the previous administration, he had been frustrated by Bill Clinton’s lack of interest in what the CIA had to offer. For any CIA director, the president is the “First Customer”—the sole source of the agency’s power—and under Clinton that power had dissipated. By contrast Bush, especially after September 11, was riveted by the agency’s reports; he had Tenet personally deliver its Presidential Daily Briefing at 8 AM, six days a week. At last, the CIA had a seat at the big table, and Tenet wasn’t going to blow it.

If you can get around the paywall, the review essay is definitely worth reading. Kaplan briefly draws the obvious comparison with Trump, noting that “in Trump, these traits were compounded by a prideful ignorance (Bush at least read books and intelligence reports) but mitigated by a lack of appetite for war.”

We’ve spent twelve of the last 28 years with Republican administrations. Each of the three terms that they served were marked by catastrophic governance failures – Iraq, Katrina, the Great Recession, COVID-19 – that left hundreds of thousands of people dead. Given that record, it makes a certain amount of sense that the party has become subservient to a massive, relatively decentralized disinformation ecosystem. It’s hard to imagine how it could survive without it.

It’s also important to remember that Bush badly botched a critical moment in global history; he left the world a more dangerous place, the country weaker at home and abroad, and his party primed to move in an (even) more toxic direction. Yes, he wasn’t a crypto-fascist. He didn’t seek to profit personally from his position. He did notch a few genuinely good policies. But he was, now matter how you slice, devastatingly bad at his job.

[spmetla]

The empire-killer sobriquet is at least a little overblown, given that Persian empires have dominated much or all of modern Afghanistan for almost as long as they existed, granting that Afghanistan has always been a political borderland and crossroads of Eurasian trade (even Bronze Age Crete relied on Afghan tin IIRC) and migration of itinerant Denisovans and Aryans and Bactrians and Saka and the like.


The graveyard of empires always seemed off when actually looked at, wasn't the graveyard of any empire, it just takes a protracted campaign to actually conquer/suppress/neutralize.


What we can be sure of is that the Taliban will be forced to moderate its methods if it wishes to hold the rest of the country, just as Hanoi had to. The Taliban reportedly already inversely tailor somewhat the level of repression to the level of resistance by village and province. Most of Afghanistan is way more pissed off at the Taliban than the Vietnamese were with each other (ethnic minorities were more easily marginalized in Vietnam too).




Yes, I know that my government is currently claiming their belief that the Afghan government will not fall to the Taliban. I suspect that the only substantial difference between this and April 1975 will be the absence of a subsequent musical. I do hope we get the interpreters and their close kin out quickly. It is the least we should do.
That aspect right there is why I'm confident that there will be an ongoing civil war between the more Dari/turkic plus Hazarra North and the Pashto pro-Taliban South. Just like ISIS seemed on the cusp of victory in Iraq as they neared Baghdad I imagine that the same will happen in Afghanistan as they near Kabul and the North, resistance will harden as they go into territory that is of an 'enemy' ethnicity.

Switching from resistance and terrorism to governance is not easy, the deal with the devil that the Taliban has made with the drug growing and smuggling will be difficult to sustain if they go back to their zero-tolerance attitude of the 90s. Putting the genie in the bottle of connectedness to the rest of the world will cause resistance in the generally pro- Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GiROA) cities.
Moderation will likely cause the more hard-line elements to splinter as reactionary religious movements tend to do as they have to compromise principle for the pragmatism of good governance. ISIS branded groups will likely absorb the more fundamentalist groups too if the Taliban do try to moderate.

There's also the difficulty of having uniformed recognizable militias/military and buildings needed to govern the South. That would give GiROA easily identifiable targets for their limited air force. The Taliban cannot govern from 'within' the population and will need to establish a government with conventional police and so on just like ISIS did as well as the the Tamil had to in Sri Lanka. Attacking a Taliban government is somewhat easier than a Taliban resistance.

I think my major question for the region will be what do Pakistan and China do? Pakistan has always feared a united Afghanistan 'behind' it and China would not be friendly to a Taliban government that would likely export its extremists against the other anti-muslim super power in the region that's currently trying to suppress the Uighurs.

Russia offered U.S. use of Central Asia bases for Afghan intel - paper
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-offered-u-s-use-of-central-asia-bases-for-afghan-intel-paper/ar-AAMgmki
I find the above link interesting, it was Russian pressure that led to the US having to close down its use of the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. I know Russia does fear more Islamic radicals in central asia and the caucasuses and I assume that they'd like US influence in the region to provide some counter to the Chinese silkroad investments that's rapidly eroding Russian influence in Central Asia.

I imagine that with the US out of Afghanistan the threat of a permanent US base in the region is gone which makes courting US influence and money to counter Chinese influence and money as useful.

Russia may be a Chinese 'ally' but I think the Russians see the Chinese as their long term threat that's useful at the moment when Russia is a bit of a pariah in 'The West.' Russia remains the only European colonial power that still has its East Asian territories that were taken at China's expense during the century of humiliation.

[Crandar]

Wiki Source (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_of_United_States_troops_from_Afghanistan_(2021))

The US withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan adds another Great Power to the list of those outlasted by the Muslim Tribes of the Afghani mountains. As usual, the Great Power was largely undefeatable by the locals in any conventional way, but susceptible to harassment, guerilla tactics, and ultimately unwilling to continue to pay the cost in blood and treasure of imposing its designs on that polity (term used loosely; the loose political cultural framework of the region is part of its resilience). Persia, Macedon, England, Soviet Russia, and the USA have all failed. Only the Mongols had more than a nominal rule over the area and they did so by nearly depopulating it with a level of brutality seen neither before nor since. Even then, in time, the Mughal were more of its nominal than practical rulers. Nor is it an issue associated with Muslim fanaticism as two of the failed attempts predate that religion.

Yes, I know that my government is currently claiming their belief that the Afghan government will not fall to the Taliban. I suspect that the only substantial difference between this and April 1975 will be the absence of a subsequent musical. I do hope we get the interpreters and their close kin out quickly. It is the least we should do.
A bit irrelevant to current issues, but my question touches the ''graveyard of empires'' slogan, so I will ask it anyway. Why did Persians and Macedonians fail? Bactria remained a Persian satrapy until the end and the Greeks/Macedonians managed to establish a prosperous kingdom that outlasted Greek/Macedonian control over Iran.

[spmetla]

The list of failures in Afghanistan is shorter than successes, every empire that invaded it up to the modern era succeeded. It is rough mountains land so power is decentralized an it takes a concerted effort over time to conquer all the tribes, getting them on side or making them part of the power base like the Persians did in establishing their Satrapies, Alexander did by marrying Roxanne and settling intermarrying his soldiers up to the Mongols that led to the existence of the current Hazarra minority.

The British, Soviets, and US have failed to 'conquer' or pacify Afghanistan though all with caveats. The British failed at conquering the whole of Afghanistan but did succeed at conquered what they considered strategically important and worth conquering ie the Khyber pass and Peshawar. The British and Russians essentially 'created' Afghanistan by drawing lines around what they would both agree not to conquer, it certainly wasn't a unified political concept before.

The Soviets invaded in the middle of a civil war, the extreme policies of Amin after he took over Afghanistan put it into a state of general revolt. The Soviets wanted to impose a more moderate communism on Afghanistan but Amin had already done his damage. Not that the Soviets would have succeeded, outside intervention into a civil war tends to go poorly, especially when the intervention is to take over one side instead of help it.

The US failure can be termed in failing to stop support for the Taliban and failure in stopping the tacet Pakistan support for the Taliban throughout the war. The biggest failure on the US side though has been I think by injecting too much money and material to the Afghan government which has made it incredibly corrupt and by not engaging the countryside. A conservative rural society can't be won over by securing the cities and major highways and building the Afghan Army as only capable of manning checkpoints instead of conducting effective counter insurgency. The failures in Afghanistan parallel a lot of the Nationalist failures in China and South Vietnam's failures too. Both those nations were famously corrupt and inept, letting Afghanistan become corrupt and inept and just accepting it because 'when it Rome' was stupid. Having the equipment to fight and win regular battles but not doing the reforms and engagement necessary to win over the majority rural population will not win a civil war. The US failure has been a failure to win the important battlefield which was the buy-in from rural Afghanistan for the new government. In hind-sight it should have remained a special forces war from the overthrow of the Taliban on, with the US focused on defeating Taliban and Al-Queda, not providing security and governing, with a return of the King for adding some legitimacy to the tribal leaders.

The current Afghan government has the capability to win, but just holding onto the provincial capitals, Kabul, and the highways is not the way how. US and probable Chinese investment may keep the current government from falling but I don't see them winning a civil war soon. The Taliban have to fail at governing and splinter before that could happen and Pakistan would have to stop trying to prevent a united Afghanistan behind them.

[Montmorency]

Cute cartoon from 1878.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3c/Great_Game_cartoon_from_1878.jpg


Also, I didn't know that Afghan Shah Durrani in the 18th century ruled the combined modern extent of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

[spmetla]

Yeah, the Durrani concept of Afghanistan was forcebly limited to the 'durand' line and adjusted after the Anglo-Afghan wars. Bear in mind the Persians and Russians were threatening Herat at the time too. The tribal regions of Pakistan are all ethnic 'afghans' which is why the Pakistan factor is vital to peace in Afghanistan. It's interesting how Afghanistan has been less a 'graveyard of empires' but a victim of "The Great Game" for the last 200 years. That Afghanistan has a border with China is purely because the British wanted to make sure they shared no common border with the Russian Empire in establishing a buffer state.

The Chinese efforts to gauge if the Taliban will tolerate the Xinjian/Uighur/East Turkestan liberation/terrorist forces will certainly have an impact on the area. If the Taliban say the right things they may get the support the current GiROA doesn't from the PRC though I can imagine that the PRC will hedge all bets.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taliban-delegation-visits-china-taliban-spokesperson-2021-07-28/


Wang said the Taliban is expected to "play an important role in the process of peaceful reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan", according to an account of the meeting from the foreign ministry.

He also said that he hoped the Taliban would crack down on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as it was a "direct threat to China's national security," referring to a group China says is active in the Xinjiang region in China’s far west.

[spmetla]

Chinese Maritime Expansion and Potential Dual-Use Implications on Critical Maritime Chokepoints
https://www.tearline.mil/public_page/bri-maritime-dual-use-hypothetical/

Overview
Though Chinese "Belt-and-Road Initiative" (BRI) investments and related economic activities abroad have been a touchpoint for international studies, this report poses a hypothetical "what if" scenario and seeks to address one facet of the potential implications if Chinese facilities abroad are used for dual-use military/civilian purposes.

The current strategic environment has placed the United States and its allies on a seemingly inexorable path towards confrontation with the People’s Republic of China. Given the close relationship between Chinese corporations and military entities, based on the concept of Military-Civil Fusion, this report addresses the hypothetical implications of the military use of seventeen civilian (BRI related) ports with respect to eight identified critical maritime chokepoints.
Activity
To accomplish the goals stated above, an analysis of open source imagery to assess the type of threats that could be hosted at seventeen BRI ports utilizing both military and civilian shipping as transport has been conducted. The implications and extent of these threats have been graphically superimposed over maps of strategic sea routes to visually reinforce the extent of the potential future strategic obstacles. Consequently, it is assessed that Chinese BRI developments could theoretically pose a threat to seven of eight identified critical maritime chokepoints. However, as a caveat to this conclusion, there are a multitude of factors that serve as obstacles to the realization of this hypothetical end-state.......

First Taiwan Arms Sale in Biden Administration Is Approved
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-04/first-arms-sale-to-taiwan-by-biden-administration-is-approved?cmpid%3D=socialflow-twitter-politics&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=politics&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic

The Biden administration has approved its first arms sale to the island democracy of Taiwan, a potential $750 million deal, amid rising tensions with China.

It calls for selling Taiwan 40 new M109 self-propelled howitzers and almost 1,700 kits to convert projectiles into more precise GPS-guided munitions, according to a State Department notification to Congress on Wednesday.

The proposed sale must go through a congressional review process and then through negotiations between Taiwan and contractor BAE Systems Plc, which is also providing the U.S. Army with the latest version of the howitzer, before a contract is signed and delivery times are hashed out.

Although the new proposed sale isn’t especially large in scope or ambitious in the weaponry provided, it is certain to be denounced by China..........

The first article by Tearline is an interesting look into the potential use of all of China's Civil-Military infrastructure its buying and building around the world and potential implications for a war between the US and/or NATO and China.

[Montmorency]

From the writer who made the best case for describing Putinate Russia as a fascist society, a detailed essay I somehow pulled from my unspeakable reading list on the refeudalization of Russian social relations. Metamodernism is a hell of a weltgeist: everything old becomes a new mixed metaphor.
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/29/the-political-economy-of-a-zombie-nation/


It is crucial to distinguish between two types of elites: the old Soviet nomenklatura4 and today’s Russian spetssub’ekty (“special subjects,” or those possessing a special status that ma­kes them immune to arrests, police searches, or cases brought by ordinary pro­se­cutors). The former were entitled to some financial or material benefits, while the latter are explicitly singled out for immunity in Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code. According to article 447, the category includes all deputies, judges, prosecutors, investigators, governors, mayors, personnel of the accounting chamber and electoral commissions, and a few other categories of public servants. Unlike the Soviet nomenklatura, today’s spetssub’ekty lie officially outside Russia’s declared system of laws.

This group is often colloquially referred to as the “new nobility,” a term first invented by employees of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to de­signate themselves as the crème de la crè­me of the current elite.5 In a broader sense, the “new nobility” has come to signify Russia’s multilayered bureaucratic and paramilitary elite. Yet there remain clear stratifications within this elite that bear close resemblances to those in traditional feudal society. Today’s Russian elite has its equivalent of the noblesse d’épée and the noblesse de robe, or strongmen and bureaucrats. It has a well-structured hierarchy, with clear lines of authority; the old medieval rule that “my vassal’s vassal is not my vassal” works quite well in Russia these days.

At the same time, the supreme ruler administers the system via his Praetorian Guard, namely, the Federal Security Service (FSB). Criminal cases against FSB officers are opened around six times less frequently than against police officers and prosecutors, and around 30 times less frequently than against other spetssub’ekty, as official Supreme Court statistics show. This Praetorian Guard has become the real source of power in Russia, and it is orga­nized along the lines of a medieval military order.

In short, in today’s Russia all the elements that existed in ancien régime France seem to have been restored: There are noblesse (d’épée and de robe) and clergy, and both are becoming increasingly powerful. As of 2016, there were approximately 200,000 FSB employees in Russia, more than 400,000 officers in the Ministry of Interior and ot­her security agencies, up to one million civil servants in “significant” positions, and around 100,000 clerics and monks. This approximates the demographic makeup of pre-revolutionary France, with its 140,000-150,000 nobles and 120,000 priests, together constituting a little over 1 percent of the population.

In the mid-11th century, the Kievan prince Yaroslav the Wise and some of his heirs produced the first Russian legal code, widely known as the Rus­skaya Pravda, or “Russian Law.”7 In many aspects it resembles early European codes like the Lex Salica. One of the most important features of the Russkaya Pra­vda was a detailed description of levies (wergeld) imposed upon murderers. As in most European codes of that time, such levies were to be paid in silver or gold to the victim’s relatives, but what is remarkable is the multitude of different penalties assigned, each corresponding to the particular social status of the victim. The crucial point is that in the Rus­skaya Pravda “there is no wergeld for a kholop,” or slave. In practice this meant that a master could kill his serfs and slaves at will, since they were not considered peop­le. If another person killed a master’s kholop, he would pay not a wergeld, but a penalty as if he had killed cattle or destroyed property. Kholops were in Russia not subjects but objects of property rights who might be sold or exchanged both domestically and internationally.
[...]
Moreover, kholopstvo was not only a legal status attributed to those who were partly slaves and partly serfs, but a category widely used even among the higher strata of Russian society. This practice became especially widespread after the Czar of Moscow retook Russian lands from the Mongols to become the undisputed ruler of the country. The noblemen considered themselves kholops while addressing the Czar from the end of the 15th century until the reforms of Peter the Great.11 What we see in today’s Russia—and what characterizes it much more than banal corruption or the ab­sence of the rule of law—is the rebirth of the kholops’ attitude to the state and to its ruler, and the reconstitution of a multilayered, highly stratified social structure. So much, then, for the 70-year effort to create the classless society and its “new man.”

In today’s Russia one can see the restoration of “feudal” practices in at least two different ways. First of all, a system of wergeld similar to the one described in the Russkaya Pravda is returning to everyday life, even if it is not strictly codified. The existing system presupposes that the life of a state ser­vant is worth more than that of an average subject, a view that differs markedly from the custom in most Western societies... [See examples passim]

he second important trend may be seen on the regional level. The feudal system, after all, was based on several layers of subordination, and it is in Russia’s regions where contemporary practices most resemble the medieval. For one there is the obvious negligence of merito­cratic principles seen in the appointment of regional governors (even since their “election” by local citizens was restored in 2011, not a single ca­se of the Kremlin candidate losing has been recorded). Much more im­portant is the changing attitude of the local masters as to the opportunities their positions open for them.

For centuries in Russia the government service was considered to be a so-called korm­leniye: “feeding,” to put it literally—meaning the possibility for a bureaucrat to enrich himself while holding his position. In short, officeholders treated their posts as private fiefdoms. Before that the Russian czar awarded his outstanding servants and loyalists with pomestya (estates), making them landlords for life but not allowing them to pass the land to their heirs. The practices of the early 2000s resembled this picture, as local governors focused on amassing money in one way or another skim off the budget or take bribes from large industrial companies. The situation later changed as regional administrators began to build full-scale “business empires” that in some cases effectively owned the whole region or town.

Such cases are numerous and well-known in Russia. When Alexander Tkachev was elected governor of Kras­nodarskiy Krai in 2001, he and his father owned an agricultural farm of about 12,000 acres they we­re lucky enough to privatize in the early 1990s. By the time he moved to Moscow 15 years later after having been appointed Mi­nister of Agriculture, he was the largest landlord in all Europe, with more than 1.15 million acres of arable land under his direct control, equivalent to 9 percent of the entire territory of the province he used to govern.

The emerging trend in Russia is toward the transformation of entire regions from pomestya (estates) into real votchinas (patrimonies, or allodia), which were common prior to the 16th century as a kind of absolute hereditary possession that could be transferred from the older to younger generation without restriction. The Russian leadership, by all appearances, has encouraged this trend.
[...]
Such encouragement from the top is perfectly in line with the policy of the “(re)nationalization of elites” announ­ced by Vladimir Putin so­on after his return to the Kremlin in 2012, which manifested itself in a nominal ban on the appointment to public office of individuals who directly or through family members own real es­tate, commercial assets, or even bank accounts outside Russia. Now it is much more rational for elites to keep funds in Russia, since feudalism at home is more acceptable than participating in capi­talism abroad. In short, the “feudalization” of the country is proceeding apace, reinforced by both the Kremlin’s foreign policy and, unwittingly, by the sanctions and other restrictive measures imposed on Russia by Western powers.

One is the ongoing stratification of current Russian society into those who are consi­dered gosudarevy lyudi (Czar’s men) and those who are counted as kholopy. This is not the kind of income inequality that has been intensively analyzed as the crucial problem endangering the stability of Rus­sian society; rather, it is a status inequality, with not bourgeois but distinctly feudal roots and causes. Contemporary Russian society has become a complicated system where legal norms are not so much neglected as entirely irrelevant if the parties to any dispute belong to different so­cial strata. Laws are respected only if the parties to legal proceedings are “equal” in terms of the implicit hierarchy. This stratification has also become the fundamental pillar of a new system of social management, which nurtures not so much totalitarian attitudes on the upper level but omnipresent servility attitudes on the “lower” one, making Russian society hopelessly un-modern. What we can expect from this is by no means a return of totalitarianism in its 20th-century meaning, but rather the creation of an absolutist system similar to those common in Europe two or three centuries ago. The ide­ology of such a system consists of “stability” and it is oriented only on the stable and unchallenged rule of the kholops by their immediate masters and by the “new nobility” as a consolidated social class. It’s not about economic development but social control.



Geopolitical analysis of Russia is incomplete without the lens of its internal structure and hierarchical relations, which determine its fundamentally reactionary commitments on the world stage. Such a system has not, to my awareness, reformed without profound emulsifying violence against the ruling class. :book2:

Unsurprisingly, I believe the basic ideology of conservatism develops itself - if not necessarily then in our historical contingency - into the classic cyberpunk mixture of totalitarianism and demodernism of social purpose. Russia, China, India, America, Islamic State, it's all the same bottom line. "This is our final and decisive battle", once more unto the breach.

(Currently listening to a conversation on how the damn dirty Mexicans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Pakistanis, and Arabs are outbreeding and enslaving the White race and we need to purge them for national security and renewal.)

[spmetla]

China Strengthens Claims Over Disputed Waters With New Maritime Law Against Foreign Ships
https://www.newsweek.com/china-strengthens-claims-over-disputed-waters-new-maritime-law-against-foreign-ships-1624479

China will begin requiring foreign vessels to report their call signs and cargo before sailing into its "territorial sea"—a term it applies to all the islands it claims in the South China Sea and beyond.

The new regulation under China's Maritime Traffic Safety Law will come into effect on September 1, according to a notice published last Friday by the country's Maritime Safety Administration.

Observers say the move could see further attempts by Beijing to control the civilian and military traffic around its claimed territories, which include hundreds of South China Sea features, but also extend to Taiwan, its outlying islands and the Japan-controlled Senkaku island chain in the East China Sea.

The reporting rule applies to submersibles, nuclear vessels, ships carrying radioactive materials as well as vessels transporting "toxic and harmful substances" including oil, chemicals and liquefied gas, China's maritime authority said.

Seems that China is taking advantage of NATO/US distraction in Afghanistan to try and further its goals in the South China Sea. As most vessels will likely comply with it outside of foreign naval ships doing freedom of navigation things it will add to their pushing their claims into de facto control.

[rory_20_uk]

China Strengthens Claims Over Disputed Waters With New Maritime Law Against Foreign Ships
https://www.newsweek.com/china-strengthens-claims-over-disputed-waters-new-maritime-law-against-foreign-ships-1624479


Seems that China is taking advantage of NATO/US distraction in Afghanistan to try and further its goals in the South China Sea. As most vessels will likely comply with it outside of foreign naval ships doing freedom of navigation things it will add to their pushing their claims into de facto control.

Hardly surprising.

There are small moves that countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India are oh so slowly realising they might have to do something themselves which is probably a good thing in the long term.

~:smoking:

[spmetla]

Philippines vows to ignore China maritime law, seeks US help
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/philippines-vows-to-ignore-china-maritime-law-seeks-us-help/ar-AAOiaHk?ocid=msedgntp

Philippine Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana has promised that Manila will ignore China’s amended maritime law, which now requires foreign vessels sailing in the South China Sea to report their information to Chinese authorities.

“Our stand on that is we do not honour those laws by the Chinese within the West Philippine Sea because we consider that we have the sovereign right within this waters. So we will not recognise this law of the Chinese,” Lorenzana said during an event marking the Philippines’ Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States.

Lorenzana made the statement as he continues his visit to the United States to press for a review of the MDT and to lobby for more advanced military equipment for the Philippines in the face of Chinese territorial threat.

China, which claims historical rights over most of the areas in the South China Sea, amended its Maritime Traffic Safety Law in recent months. It took effect on September 1.

The law requires all foreign vessels sailing in the South China Sea to report their information to Chinese authorities.

A 2016 ruling at The Hague said China’s claim over most of the South China Sea has no legal basis, but Beijing has ignored the decision and has continued to expand its presence in the area, building artificial islands complete with runways and docks, igniting more tensions with neighbouring countries.
Several Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, have overlapping claims with China in the South China Sea.

On Monday, the Chinese state-owned publication Global Times reported that the revised maritime law has taken effect as of September 1.

It covers five types of vessels including submersibles, nuclear vessels, ships carrying radioactive materials, ships carrying bulk oil, chemicals, liquefied gas and other toxic and harmful substances, and other vessels “that might endanger China’s maritime traffic safety”, according to the Global Times.

Beijing clarified that the new law does not hinder freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

But the US calls it a “serious threat”, and a foreign policy expert has described it as an attempt by China to force other countries to submit to its control by reporting their ships to Chinese authorities.

In January, China also passed the Coast Guard Law that for the first time explicitly allows its coastguard to fire on foreign vessels within their jurisdiction.
Upgrade, update
Amid concerns over China’s growing dominance in the South China Sea, the Philippines, a longtime ally of the US, wants Washington to increase its military commitments.

Lorenzana, the Philippine defence chief, said it is time for a comprehensive review of Manila’s alliance with the US, saying the Philippines is getting less from its relationship with Washington than even non-treaty allies.

He said there is a need to “upgrade” and “update” the alliance and to make clear the “extent of American commitments”.

“Some questions being asked in Manila are, do we still need the MDT; should we amend it,” he told Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies on Wednesday, referring to the 1951 pact. “What is clear is that we need a comprehensive review of our alliance.”

Lorenzana pointed out that the US treaty with Japan, its World War II enemy, was more explicit than that with Manila when it came to determining whether it applied in the Pacific maritime area, where the Philippines has come under increasing pressure from China over rival territorial claims.

He said this explained why seven out of 10 Filipinos supported President Rodrigo Duterte’s call for engagement with China rather than confrontation and more than half doubted US reliability as an ally in South China Sea disputes.

Lorenzana said US-Philippines relations would “have to evolve in recognition of new geopolitical realities, most especially the rise of China”.

He said Manila and Washington should consider revising the MDT and other defence pacts to ensure both could better respond to “grey zone threats” like state-sanctioned Chinese maritime militia forces that have been intimidating smaller states.

Previously, Duterte had also blamed the US for failing to enforce an agreement it mediated between Beijing and Manila regarding the simultaneous withdrawal of naval forces from the disputed Scarborough Shoal, which until 2012 was administered by the Philippines.

China took over control of Scarborough Shoal after the Philippines withdrew from the area after obtaining a promise from the US. China and the Philippines were supposed to withdraw their troops from Scarborough Shoal, but Beijing did not honour the agreement, and Washington did not enforce it.
US reluctance
Manila has repeatedly protested what it calls the “illegal” and “threatening” presence of hundreds of Chinese “maritime militia” vessels inside its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as defined by a 2016 ruling at The Hague.

Hundreds of Chinese vessels were spotted sailing within the Philippine EEZ on several occasions this year, prompting an angry reaction from Manila. But Duterte had also said the Philippines cannot afford to confront Beijing militarily.

In his statement from Washington, DC, Lorenzana echoed Duterte’s complaints about the US reluctance to supply the Philippines with state-of-the-art weaponry.

He said Manila was in the mid of an unprecedented military modernisation programme and needed to move beyond Vietnam War-era hardware that had been provided by Washington in the past.
“Non-treaty allies … have been receiving billion-dollar military aid and advanced weapons systems from the US. Perhaps, a longtime ally like the Philippines, facing major adversaries in Asia, deserves as much, if not more, assistance and commitment,” he said.

Lorenzana’s remarks came after Duterte in July restored the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) governing movement of US troops in and out of the country, something strategically vital for American efforts to counter China. While there are no more US bases in the Philippines, the two countries hold annual military exercises until Duterte issued his threat to end the pact last year.

Duterte had pledged to terminate the VFA after Washington denied a visa to a Philippine senator who is an ally of the president.

For Washington, having the ability to rotate troops through the VFA is important not only for the defence of the Philippines, but also strategically when it comes to countering China in the region.

In July, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken repeated a warning to China that an attack on Philippine armed forces in the South China Sea would trigger the mutual defence treaty.

It is good to see that some in the Philippine establishment are still wary of China and see the value of US support. Their military and especially their navy and coast guard are woefully inadequate to protect their territorial waters which as an archipelago nation is sad.
As for the US supporting them more, well, the US has in the past always sold them hand-me down equipment as it was phased out. When the US bases were closed though the Philippines kinda stopped any sort of investment in their military, probably due to the use of the military by the dictator Marcos to stay in power so long.
The US still sells them some equipment but equipment itself is much more complicated and expensive than in the past which is why their Navy's largest vessels are former US hamiliton class cutters instead of frigates like every one of their neighbors.
If they want substantial US investment reopening Clark AFB would certainly spur that on, Guam is inadequate for what we're using and our investment would assist in their protection of their territorial waters as land-based aircraft can then patrol the South China Seas more easily.

The above comments are hopeful for US relations but it'd be better if it'd come from Duterte himself instead of a lower official.

[Furunculus]

Surprised the Oz submarine shenanigans hasn't made it to the backroom yet:

Australia cut's bait, Shorfin Barracuda boned, UK happy as a clam, yanks Cock a snook, and china Done up like a kipper!

https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/09/australia-submarines

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australia-build-eight-nuclear-powered-submarines-under-new-indo-pacific-security-2021-09-16/

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/aukus-is-a-sign-of-eu-impotence

https://www-politico-eu.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.politico.eu/article/silver-lining-for-france-in-us-australia-submarine-deal/amp/

[rory_20_uk]

Given how much business Australia does with China I was rather surprised they've chosen purchase this - although it does make a smidge more sense than diesel subs. Anything that annoys the French in general and Macron in particular is something to smile at.

And on what apparently might be a related event, China has asked to join the Pacific trade pact which again was quite surprising since I imagine the entry requirement is a level of transparency that they don't usually do.

Given the UK has also asked to join the group, the UK could end up with a trade agreement with China. Given that both the UK and China would have to be unanimously voted in this is something of a stretch.

~:smoking:

[Pannonian]

Given how much business Australia does with China I was rather surprised they've chosen purchase this - although it does make a smidge more sense than diesel subs. Anything that annoys the French in general and Macron in particular is something to smile at.

And on what apparently might be a related event, China has asked to join the Pacific trade pact which again was quite surprising since I imagine the entry requirement is a level of transparency that they don't usually do.

Given the UK has also asked to join the group, the UK could end up with a trade agreement with China. Given that both the UK and China would have to be unanimously voted in this is something of a stretch.

~:smoking:

What's your view on this?

[rory_20_uk]

What's your view on this?

A purely trade group with no judicial oversight, limited Civil Servant baggage (salaries and pensions) and as yet no mission creep? I'd probably be in favour.

~:smoking:

[spmetla]

Given how much business Australia does with China I was rather surprised they've chosen purchase this - although it does make a smidge more sense than diesel subs. Anything that annoys the French in general and Macron in particular is something to smile at.

Well this is definitely an own goal by China as they essentially drove Australia into US arms through their retaliation for the Aussies looking into COVID19 origin together with their very blatant meddling in Aussie politics and intimidation of Chinese nationals working or attending school in Australia.
Australia has for years just wanted a balanced relationship between Beijing and the US and the Chinese have made clear they demand kowtowing not equality.


Given the UK has also asked to join the group, the UK could end up with a trade agreement with China. Given that both the UK and China would have to be unanimously voted in this is something of a stretch.

I imagine the Australians will opt for the UK's Astute class SSNs as the UK shipyards could spare the expertise to help the Australians tool up for manufacturing while the US shipyards are at capacity already.
Also, closer relations will likely entail upgrades in Australian ports to allow for docking and perhaps dry docking capability of US and UK ships, nuclear subs of course but I'd imagine the Queen Elizabeth CV could use more suitable ports so that she and the Prince of Wales can have a closer 'home port' when on patrol in the Far East.
Also, with the UK having divorced the EU this will likely add a bit more clarity to the UK's foreign policy as it wasn't really clear what their role was to be outside Europe as the commonwealth is not quite the Empire it used to be.

The choice for SSNs makes great sense though, Diesels and AIP are amazing but given the the range that Australia patrols for its natural interests nuclear gives a lot more endurance. Also, by working with the UK and US which already share intel with Five Eyes that means they can essentially plan their patrols together a bit more closely so there's less overlap or capability gap.
The EU/France may be miffed but the UK and US subs are definitely more capable and seeing as the effort is directed against China it's in the interest of Australia to have better interoperability with the US and the UK (seeing as they are asserting they're interests in the region again while Germany and France really only have trade interests).

[Crandar]

Dunno, this sounds more fluff than substance to me. Australia doesn't have the technical capacity to build and maintain nuclear submarines and its naval bases are of questionable quality. To me, it looks more like an attempt to please America and ratify the diplomatic treaty than a genuine endeavour to improve Australia's military potential. It could also work as a distraction for the domestic front. The government's popularity is waning, following allegations of corruption and the parliament rape scandal.

Also I have a feeling Biden forgot Scot Morrison's name.

[Montmorency]

The ASPI brief I posted in the other thread suggests Australia wouldn't achieve an operational SSN fleet of the size it intends until well into the 2030s, although it's a couple years old and can't account for the scope of allied commitments to assisting Australia.

[Furunculus]

the logic of nuclear:

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1438179433001758720

[ReluctantSamurai]

This has gone rather under the radar:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/17/chinas-lehman-brothers-moment-evergrande-crisis-rattles-economy

Econ was never a strongsuit for me, either in high school or college, but this whole Evergrande situation for China bears watching...:shrug:

[Furunculus]

Interesting view on why Canada didn't fit into tha inaugaration of AUKUS, and what it might do to rectify matters:

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canadas-exclusion-from-three-eyes-only-confirms-what-was-already-the/

[spmetla]

While it'd be nice to have had Canada on board I'd rather they invest in Arctic security and patrolling as climate change makes that area more important. Canada hasn't been a significant naval power since the early 1970s when they retired their sole aircraft carrier so they're isn't much they could contribute military wise anyhow.

They're also large contributors towards peace keeping missions world wide which I think is valuable and important as the US public doesn't seem to support US Soldiers under UN rules and regulations meaning we don't contribute many troops, just money. It'd be nice to see them more onboard with the US but being the smaller politer neighbor I can understand also not wanting to just look like a US toady.

As for NZ, they haven't been a close US ally since the 70s when they stopped allowing port calls by nuclear powered ships. They still work fairly close but the fact that when purchasing navy ships that they want to make sure they aren't too capable just so they can't work closely with the US Navy shows that they're good partners but not really allies, at least to the US.



Econ was never a strongsuit for me, either in high school or college, but this whole Evergrande situation for China bears watching...

I'm really curious what the CCP chooses to do. Seeing as they're sharply reining in their companies' forays into capitalism they may just let it collapse and then nationalize it as an example of the folly of using the western economic model. The economic impact will be interesting but the domestic political impact will probably be more telling.

Russia's ruling pro-Putin party wins election but loses some ground - early results
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-putin-party-heads-russian-election-win-after-navalny-clampdown-2021-09-19/

Kinda as expected in Russia's elections when you try to poison and then arrest the biggest opposition candidates.

Always interesting to see the views of some of the electorate though:

One Moscow pensioner who gave his name only as Anatoly said he voted United Russia because he was proud of Putin's efforts to restore what he sees as Russia's rightful great power status.

"Countries like the United States and Britain more or less respect us now like they respected the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 70s… The Anglo-Saxons only understand the language of force," he said.

Other voters voiced anger at United Russia at a polling station in Moscow, where the party has fared worse in recent years than in other regions.

"I'm always against United Russia," said Roman Malakhov, who voted Communist. "They haven't done anything good."

There was also widespread apathy, with official figures showing turnout at around 47%.

"I don't see the point in voting," said one Moscow hairdresser who gave her name as Irina. "It's all been decided for us anyway."

Copied from the ISIS/Taliban thread:
////////////FIRST PART PROBABLY BELONGS IN GREAT POWER CONTENTION THREAD/////////////////////
Bottom line: Is it very easy or very difficult to deter China on Taiwan, and if it's very difficult would adopting the most aggressive posture not ironically encourage China to be both more willing and more able to impose its will (this is known as "tragic drama")

If it's very easy, just make the commitment, station a fleet or two, and call it a day - no discussion needed.
I'd say it's difficult to deter China on Taiwan. As for making a commitment, that's part of the tragedy of the current situation with Taiwan and the flaw in the one-China policy. One-China policy was banked on the idea that opening up China would liberalize them and then allow for a peaceful rise and reunification, that was sorta working up until the early 2000s.
China has now reversed their path of liberalization and gone back toward the path of repression, this has pushed Taiwan's youth from wanting reunification, especially in light of the crack downs in Hongkong, social credit scores, etc...
With this, the US has now become coupled with China economically, it could break this relationship but that would be difficult and costly to the US and all the other major economies that have moved their industrial base and supply chains to China.

The logic of an aggressive posture is that by being willing to risk war and the economic fallout in the near future, that risk is actually higher for China as they depend on sealanes for most of their trade, part of why they're investing in the new belt/road initative. A war would be economically costly to the whole world but would absolutely ruin China if it happened in present day.
This is also tied with the fact that Xi Jinping has been the most powerful Chinese leader in 30 years and seems determined to be cemented in its memory on the same level as Mao Zedong. That type of meglamania can be unpredictable like we saw in the last four years of Trump. Granted Xi is actually smart man and calculating unlike Trump but that doesn't exclude him from wanting to accomplish the goal of reunification by force if needed.
Just remember that the US position and that of its allies in the region is reactionary to China's new aggressive posture. They seek to change the status quo, forcibly if needed and are actively contending with the US at all levels short of conflict at the moment. Combine this with the ultra-nationalism and you get an opponent that won't negotiate on this issue leaving them with only one recourse if they want to force the issue.

Deterring from what and in what capacity needs to be delineated. We already have a NATO commitment to mutual defense, which is the most important step.
Mutual defense is only valuable if the members are capable and willing to defend each other. If some 'little green men' tried to overthrow Latvia's government in a Crimea type scenario are the NATO allies in the region capable of assisting? are they even willing? Trump question whether we should go to war to help Estonia was a huge hit to the idea of mutal defense.
I personally think the major litmus test for NATO will be some crazy thing cooked up by Turkey over some Greek islands, Cyprus, Syria, or Armenia. Do we mutually defend one NATO ally against another. If one NATO ally starts a war that then draws in Russia in a limited way does that trigger article five? The Armenia-Azerbaijan war last year is fortunate in it's not expanding beyond those two countries.

I don't see why the UK and France and Germany need to be militarizing for offensive operations into Eastern Europe. Today we know that Russia's strategic position in its near-abroad is weak, and not getting any stronger, as the (to some surprising) failure to check Ukrainian post-Russian ambitions demonstrated. Putin has a hard time trudging through his priorities for even Belarus. A massive armament campaign for NATO to achieve the capability to credibly strike against a hypothetical Russian occupation of Ukraine or Estonia would be socially corrosive and horrendously costly both before and during (any) deployment, in the latter case in terms of lives and materiel. It would also, naturally, incentivize further hostility from the Russian regime (if you think Europe can recommit to an arms race, Putin certainly can too - to hell with the domestic economy - in order to negate European augmentation).
Who's talking about offensive operations? No sane person wants to start shit with Russia much less go on an offensive against them. It doesn't need to be a massive armament campaign, no one is advocating for a quarter million US troops back in Germany and its allies having dozens of armored divisions standing by.
As for Putin being able to afford an arms race, I don't think he can. There's a reason why India has more modern T-90 tanks than Russia, Russia can't afford them. Russia is so cash strapped they still sell the Chinese jet-engines and air defense systems fully knowing that they will eventually be reverse engineered and that the Chinese will overtake Russia in most of its overseas arms sales.
Russia is currently a threat that needs to be contained, it may not be a long term threat as who knows what it will be once Putin leaves. He certainly doesn't share the lime light, that tends to leave the successors to popular dictators vulnerable to infighting and domestic power plays.
Europe needs to be capable to play the long game against Putin and deter more action on his part in the bordering states. The long-term should be to try and do what failed in the 90s and finally bring Russia home into Europe (not the EU or NATO). China is not a good partner for Russia and never has been, it's been a good source of cash at the expense of Russia losing it's military edge and secrets but China's ambitions in the far east and central asia will lead to their becoming enemies again at some point.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/artic...ina-and-russia

Getting NATO allies to at least get their readiness levels up so they could commit the few forces they have to a crisis if needed would be the most useful. No point in an air force if lack of spare parts means they can't be used when needed.
https://www.dw.com/en/german-militar...ion/a-42603112

Core European sealanes, borders, and airspace are secure from foreign powers as far as I know (not that there's a contender other than Russia here). If you mean that the EU needs more ships to shoot at Ivory Coast pirates or Mediterranean migrants, I don't see why. It might be more helpful to get a handle on what role Turkey is going to play in the region.
As most of European/EU issues center around trade then Naval power is actually one of the best investments they can make. You may scoff at piracy but it is a problem that naval patrols have helped to mitigate. The core causes of piracy exist but short of nation building Somalia, Yemen and plenty of other countries the easier and more cost effective solution is sealane protection. Warships are expensive but if you're going to build ships then ideally they're capable of more than just deterring pirates, probably best to have the capability to lauch and support SOF too, or perhaps fly the flag where free navigation is threatened (South China Seas). Strategic lift capability and reach is extremely useful by air and sea and has uses for humanitarian aid as well moving troops ,there's a lot more to defense spending than tanks and troops though those are necessary too. Building NATO logistical and cyber-warfare capabilities that were independent of the US would be hugely useful and have uses beyond conventional warfare too.
As you mention migrants though the EU seriously needs a lot more investment in FRONTEX. Belarus, Russia, Turkey, and Morocco all use migrants as a weapon, opening and closing the flow over the border as needed to punish the border nations of Europe and create European domestic infighting. It's like a modern day reverse Barbary-pirates scenario, give these concessions or we let thousands more over the border to become your problem. Just look at Lithuania bearing the brunt from Belarus in response to their raising diplomatic status of Taiwan's office.
European sealanes and interests go a bit farther than just Europe's periphery though, the blockage of the Suez was hugely costly to European trade. The arctic is melting and Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland aren't exactly poised to stop Russian resource exploration when that eventually happens. Ice breakers and artic capable coast guard and aerial patrols will be a necessity as the Northwest passage becomes more common for Europe-East Asian trade (shorter and therefore cheaper for Northern/Western Europe).

Do you mean cruise missiles? My knowledge of the relevant systems is limited, but I recall that a modern navy will have strong countermeasures against any such systems, as best demonstrated by the Coalition naval forces during the Gulf War. Wouldn't the best practicable option be quantity rather than superior technical sophistication? Dozens to hundreds of missiles against landing craft close to shore (with the caveat that the entire Chinese sealift would never all be exposed at a single moment) seems like the only option.
It's a fair bit more complicated than that, the weapons and defenses have moved a long way from the Gulf War. If we're relying on line of sight weapons against landing craft then the invasion is already a success. In short though, Taiwan needs what you've mentioned before, good area-denial capability and we should help build it. Taiwan doesn't have much strategic depth so relying on defense to fend off the PLA in the face of drone swarms, ballistic missiles, electronic and cyber warfare can only do so much. Given the geographic, qualitative, and numerical advantage of China that's only a method to buy time. The deterrence is in the capability to come to the aid of Taiwan if needed, this deterrence must not be vulnerable to a Chinese first strike either (a modern day Pearl Harbor in another form) which is why the US has been moving Marines out of Okinawa and to Guam and hopefully now to Australia too. With the Philippines not being available the US has lost a lot of strategic depth too and is relying on only a few major bases to cover and project power into a very large area.

That latter outcome is too high a risk for the CCP, as it would lose enormous quantities of domestic legitimacy, international standing, economic stability, military readiness, and so on, all for the sake of empty posturing; Taiwan would be further out of reach than ever. Since the CCP has demonstrated its rationality many times, assuming it retains that rationality we keep returning to the principle that any overt measure to reduce Taiwan's independence has to be projected to be rapid and decisive from the Chinese point of view.
China's record for rationality has been slipping a lot as of late, they take much more risk for much less gain than the previous three generations have. When you keep telling your population that 'our time is now and the US must step back and allow us to take our rightful place' they eventually expect their leaders to act on it. A generation raised on propaganda eventually results in people ruling that believe that same propaganda.

[Montmorency]

the logic of nuclear:

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1438179433001758720

Interesting conversation in the tweets. Australian Foreign Minister (fm. Defence Minister) thinks it will take "far longer" than a decade to achieve the intended capability of 8 to 12 operable subs.

Former Foreign Minister Bob Carr is quite pessimistic.


We will get the new subs in 2040 suggests Hugh White. Might get up to 12 in 2050s. In the 2030s we may have none functioning. Gain UK but lose France, the bigger European power in the Pacific. Indonesian military now views us as potential threat.

US will see our subs as joint asset making automatic our recruitment for war against China and the Australian continent a nuclear target. Whew! Imagine the mess we’d be in without the steady strategic vision of Dutton Morrison and ASPI.

Elsewhere I've heard that even Australia's current fleet of 6 Collins diesels has trouble maintaining crew levels.


So everyone seems to roughly agree on the lead time. Talk about a Chekhov's Gun. I wonder if the real point wrt China is part posturing and part securing more Pacific bases (possible in the short-medium term with Australian ports). Also, just selling lots of bombs to Australia (part of the AUKUS deal) - have to find a new military-industrial outlet now that Afghanistan is dry!




The logic of an aggressive posture is that by being willing to risk war and the economic fallout in the near future, that risk is actually higher for China as they depend on sealanes for most of their trade, part of why they're investing in the new belt/road initative. A war would be economically costly to the whole world but would absolutely ruin China if it happened in present day.
[...]
Just remember that the US position and that of its allies in the region is reactionary to China's new aggressive posture. They seek to change the status quo, forcibly if needed and are actively contending with the US at all levels short of conflict at the moment. Combine this with the ultra-nationalism and you get an opponent that won't negotiate on this issue leaving them with only one recourse if they want to force the issue.

I'm going to embed some interesting visual aids and charts (https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1439261750948470792) from recent Congressional testimony (https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Shugart-SFRC-Testimony-17-Mar-2021-FINAL-compressed.pdf?mtime=20210316153840&focal=none), but first:

If Chinese leadership, for whatever reason, is inexorably on a legitimately-psychotic path of Anschluss at any cost - and there's no pressure particularly forcing military expansion here as a conflict resolution strategy , since as you say their opposition's posture is basically reactive, unlike the case with Germany's or Russia's strategic environments in the 1930s - then the probability of escalation to world war, even nuclear war, skyrockets. And if that's the case then it's simply irresponsible to contest China on this (for argument's sake) ultimate national interest. How could Taiwan be worth it? Bad enough for Taiwan to exist as a free wasteland in a hostilities scenario, let alone the whole region or the whole planet.

In the very easy deterrence scenario, as before, just forward deploy a couple carrier fleets off the east coast of Formosa, offer recognition, park like we parked on Fulda and call it a century. If it's maximally difficult to deter China from invading and bearing heartstopping losses, the price is too high for the coalition and for the world, we could conceivably lose outright; we will need to stand down and pull the defensive perimeter back from Taiwan, maybe even from Vietnam, out to where the Chinese really would be unable to crack open Allied defenses or sustain domestic cohesion if they wanted to. (In this extreme version of events I assume Putin's heir will be begging for permission to join NATO at long last if they aren't an outright Chinese client by then.)


Some images I promised:

https://i.imgur.com/ePDPqhG.png
https://i.imgur.com/PGDW8ns.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/TYIyL5c.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/lw8DgzP.png
https://i.imgur.com/ql9jnXT.png

If, for example, we take this shipbuilding campaign as an attempt to keep the US out of the first island chain, then there should be ample scope for negotiations and deterrence. Maybe something like the Washington Naval Treaty would be available to reassure the CCP and lower the stakes a little (or else we recognize Taiwan and form a defense pact, how's that for hardball?). But if China is committed to overturning the status quo, overwhelming American naval strength in the region toward territorial expansion and hegemony, then we seriously have to reconsider our commitment and ability to keep pace, as well as acknowledge that this kind of mutual arms race is extremely likely to culminate in war, minimally only one of the worst since WW2. In other words, we won't be spending toward "deterrence," we'll be spending toward putting it to use. And I don't really think that's a road we should be heading down. More bluntly, if Chinese policies are interpreted as Hitleresque rearmament, then Taiwan is in the position of Czechoslovakia and we would be in an even worse spot to try to guarantee its security, let alone, in the event, actually attempt to back up the guarantee with action. It's almost the worst of all worlds. Someone who believes in inevitable bloodletting against a muscular China MUST cut Taiwan loose, as soon as possible and with full recognizance between partners and allies. But that's a hard bet to make, eh?

Maybe this last one offers the most food for thought...

https://i.imgur.com/O4xBqq8.png



Mutual defense is only valuable if the members are capable and willing to defend each other.

Within limits. Do we declare war on Russia if it is involved in overthrowing a NATO government? Sure, not like we've even had a shortage of casi belli on that account since 2016. That doesn't entail that NATO is honorbound to throw away its strength in a relentless push toward Moscow. First we ensure that Poland and Romania are secure, then we consider our options wrt Ukraine, then we reduce Kaliningrad, and if the war is still ongoing after a year or more we gradually push into the Baltics until a diplomatic resolution can be found. The linchpin is the mutualized assurances (between allies) and the mutualized costs (between antagonists), not the accumulation itself of overwhelming material advantage (arms race). Obviously European militaries should be minimally functional in their own limits, a notional strength is hardly worth having if it can't be operationalized in practice, but I disagree that there is a justification for significant expansion across many countries.

I don't know what to predict for Turkey's part, but I doubt it's going to be invading Greece anytime while NATO or the EU exist. What's happening with the new canal?

No one wanted the Azeri-Armenian war to spread, since it was such a limited irredentist grudge match between minor countries, without many excesses. To emphasize what I said in a previous comment, it surely does introduce a new era of limited interstate conflict between small states or even regional powers (Crimea/LDPR was the prologue). Morocco-Algeria and Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia are plausible cases. I'm not sure if the Ethiopian Civil War counts as an instance of this paradigm.


As for Putin being able to afford an arms race, I don't think he can.

He can "afford" one compared to the EU, being a dictator of a relatively-militarized state and all. While it's true that Russia's military expansion has been constrained by sanctions, it's still managed a steady modernization post-2014. If we're following the same sort of logic for why China would sacrifice anything and everything over Taiwan.

But we just get back into the real reasons why Russia wouldn't really start shit, right? Their economy doesn't have the stamina for a total mobilization, and at any rate Putin and his power base would be wrecked by public unrest and internal rivals. There's simply nothing in it to Putinists' advantage to escalate except in the scenario where Europe and the US capitulate on the spot and promise to never bother Russia about anything ever again, slinking off with their hats behind their tails (unreasonably optimistic). And unlike China, the Russian elite seem perfectly happy to focus their attention on exploiting their feudal subjects for personal profit at home. Russia is the paper Ritsar here, the one great power it really is easy to deter (from strictly military aggression I should say). We probably don't need to speak much more of Russia on this topic, other than to remind ourselves that the US nevertheless is doctrinally-bound to maintain a strategic reserve against hypothetical Russian (or other) opportunism in any confrontation with China.


The core causes of piracy exist but short of nation building Somalia, Yemen and plenty of other countries the easier and more cost effective solution is sealane protection.

I've learned that of late almost all piratical activity - in the realm of over 90% (https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity) - has been confined to the Guinea Gulf states, including Nigeria, none of whom are close to failed state status currently (and so can't be approached in the manner of counter-Somalian piracy). The issue appears to be a dire lack of economic and social opportunity coupled with systematic corporate environmental and labor exploitation in the area. Just like the US Navy doesn't have much to offer to OAS citizens, European frigates don't have much to offer West Africans. I'm not saying there's no need for a short-term security response to defend sea lanes there, but we know what to do to address the problem. Concentrating more economic resources toward shooting at impoverished Africans is purely wasteful and immoral. It's pretty much the Euro analogue of Build the Wall (and get the Americans to pay for it).


Strategic lift capability and reach is extremely useful by air and sea and has uses for humanitarian aid as well moving troops ,there's a lot more to defense spending than tanks and troops though those are necessary too. Building NATO logistical and cyber-warfare capabilities that were independent of the US would be hugely useful and have uses beyond conventional warfare too.

Why would EU citizens believe it's useful for them, or for anyone, to have Europe invest in force projection 10000 miles away? Leave alone that there is no unity on a European foreign policy or consolidated military, but not even the populaces of the UK and France - with extant colonial interests in the Indian Ocean - would hardly see the value in the proposition, one which inherently prescribes deployment of force against sovereign states with unfavorable trade or related policies (where have we heard that one before?).


The arctic is melting and Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland aren't exactly poised to stop Russian resource exploration when that eventually happens.

Why the heck does Norway need firepower and the will to use it (presumably) against Russian resource exploration? Jesus. I would need a whole lot of convincing for why this is a legitimate postural debate. It feels too much like the proverbial hammer and nail. If it creates dangerous expectations for the US to insist on being able to reach anywhere, Europe of all things doesn't need to approximate such ambitions.


The Bush 'axis of evil' and policy of regime change in Iraq is what really pushed China into firm opposition.

The Axis of Evil famously counted China client North Korea as a member, which tangentially killed any possibility of sustaining the Agreed Framework (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework) on NK nuclearization.


The Suez Crisis essentially ending France/UK great power status and leading to France's divorce from NATO and the expedited policies of France and the UK to decolonize changed the makeup of the world leading to huge social, economic, and political upheavals in all former colonies over the next 30 years. So yeah, your later examples are far closer to the mark though you took them to a another extreme degree.

That's a little unfair in comparison, since the Suez Crisis didn't really change much in geopolitics. France and UK were already consigned to the path if decolonization, and could not plausibly continue to project power as they had in the past; the likes of Suez, and Indochina and Israel before it, just proved it without a doubt for those slow on the uptake. The before-after was a difference in self-image rather than in real capabilities or international relations.

France's separation from NATO was politically inconvenient but I don't know that it reduced the US alliance's - of which France remained a member in practice, they weren't laying down the carpet for Soviet troops - preparedness to fend off any Communist invasion. The Iraq War was more of a strain on Europe's usability for US interests (as neocons saw them), and the War on Terror was clearly a proximate cause of instability throughout the Middle East, even if one thinks of it as an enduringly-unstable region, instability that did directly affect the relations of all the great powers among each other and with the world. I can't deprecate all that for the Suez flash in the pan.

Maybe a better comparison for 'true' turning points would be the Cuban Missile Crisis, since that one 'little' incident officially inaugurated the era of Mutually Assured Destruction. In the 1950s, the Soviets still had too few atomic weapons, and moreover no or almost no ICBMs, with which to existentially threaten the US heartland. (Notably for the wider topic of deterrence, MAD was most successful when both the US and USSR acknowledged its potency and agreed to restrict their own deployments and warhead stockpiles. But all those Cold War concords are extinct or about to go extinct...)


You've said enough that we should try and act on behalf of what's best for the Afghan people. I still think in the long run that would have been supporting the flawed state that was GIROA.

If the GIROA were a viable government, we could certainly have supported it. But it just wasn't. Maybe some other version of it could have been, but it's been amply demonstrated by now that it was never our serious aim or interest to invent such an entity. For the remainder of 2021 all we can do is wait and watch and schedule opportunities for dialogue.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Evergrande update:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/20/shares-in-chinas-evergrande-plunge-again-as-fears-of-contagion-grow

[Furunculus]

The view of my personal Go-To on geopolitics on the wider implications of AUKUS, i.e. not just french submarines:

https://lindleyfrench.blogspot.com/2021/09/aukus.html

[spmetla]

So everyone seems to roughly agree on the lead time. Talk about a Chekhov's Gun. I wonder if the real point wrt China is part posturing and part securing more Pacific bases (possible in the short-medium term with Australian ports). Also, just selling lots of bombs to Australia (part of the AUKUS deal) - have to find a new military-industrial outlet now that Afghanistan is dry!

It's a medium to long term investment in Australian capabilities; yeah it's not available in the worst case scenario of a war in the 5-10 years but assuming diplomacy can avert conflict that doesn't mean that China isn't a long term threat to Australia. Better to start building capability now rather than waiting for a war to actually start. Also, who knows, perhaps Australia will end up leasing a UK or US nuclear boat once they have port facilities in place that would build the expertise needed for once they have their own boats.

Seeing as the US has already been the largest supplier of weapons and platforms to Australia this isn't a new outlet. As you notice, will take a long time to build capability, first though it means investment and upgrading of infrastructure especially ports so there will be construction, education and so on which will yield benefits in the long term.


I'm going to embed some interesting visual aids and charts from recent Congressional testimony, but first:

If Chinese leadership, for whatever reason, is inexorably on a legitimately-psychotic path of Anschluss at any cost - and there's no pressure particularly forcing military expansion here as a conflict resolution strategy , since as you say their opposition's posture is basically reactive, unlike the case with Germany's or Russia's strategic environments in the 1930s - then the probability of escalation to world war, even nuclear war, skyrockets. And if that's the case then it's simply irresponsible to contest China on this (for argument's sake) ultimate national interest. How could Taiwan be worth it? Bad enough for Taiwan to exist as a free wasteland in a hostilities scenario, let alone the whole region or the whole planet.

In the very easy deterrence scenario, as before, just forward deploy a couple carrier fleets off the east coast of Formosa, offer recognition, park like we parked on Fulda and call it a century. If it's maximally difficult to deter China from invading and bearing heartstopping losses, the price is too high for the coalition and for the world, we could conceivably lose outright; we will need to stand down and pull the defensive perimeter back from Taiwan, maybe even from Vietnam, out to where the Chinese really would be unable to crack open Allied defenses or sustain domestic cohesion if they wanted to. (In this extreme version of events I assume Putin's heir will be begging for permission to join NATO at long last if they aren't an outright Chinese client by then.)

Those are interesting visuals, hull count isn't exactly tonnage though they are adding tonnage at a rate we can't match.

The probability of escalation to nuclear war is extremely worrisome, that's why the US has been trying to get more direct communications at lower levels of government with the Chinese. No one wants a war but escalations can happen very quickly and get very deadly.
How could Taiwan be worth it? Well it is vital in controlling the sea lanes for our two major allies in the region, South Korea and Japan. Taiwan is also crucial in manufacturing of microchips, something the global economy is short of and seeing the PRC gain more control of those industries is not in the interest of the US or EU.

In the deterrence scenario, that's why I've advocated in the past for putting actual US troops on the ground. It the PRC choosing to take Taiwan by force means that US casualties and therefore involvement is a foregone conclusion that changes the calculation immensely. US politicians really aren't brave enough to do so though.
The 'first island chain' is the best line of defense though, with Taiwan as a lynchpin in the absence of US bases in the Philippines anymore. If China takes Taiwan and we choose to actually fight them over their next conquest whatever that is the US and its allies will be in a far worse strategic situation from which to do so. There's a reason Japan took Taiwan from China in the 1890s, it is an absolutely strategic location.


But we just get back into the real reasons why Russia wouldn't really start shit, right? Their economy doesn't have the stamina for a total mobilization, and at any rate Putin and his power base would be wrecked by public unrest and internal rivals. There's simply nothing in it to Putinists' advantage to escalate except in the scenario where Europe and the US capitulate on the spot and promise to never bother Russia about anything ever again, slinking off with their hats behind their tails (unreasonably optimistic). And unlike China, the Russian elite seem perfectly happy to focus their attention on exploiting their feudal subjects for personal profit at home. Russia is the paper Ritsar here, the one great power it really is easy to deter (from strictly military aggression I should say). We probably don't need to speak much more of Russia on this topic, other than to remind ourselves that the US nevertheless is doctrinally-bound to maintain a strategic reserve against hypothetical Russian (or other) opportunism in any confrontation with China.
I whole-heartedly agree. Russia is a short to mid term containment priority. Dissuading any further opportunism by Putin is the only really necessary thing as in the term Russian and Europe need to work together for economic and security reasons.
The US will of course need a reserve in Europe but that's the problem with the overall weak standing of NATO in Europe, there's no one there to really take up the mantle in the absence of the US meaning we need to split our resources between Europe and China. China is the immediate and bigger threat, our resources should be focused there. Especially as the two threats involve totally different mixes of what type of war. Confronting China relies much more on Air and Sea power with a capability to retake any islands that China invades. Deterring Russia requires heavy ground units as well as significant airpower as that's what Russia itself values in power projection.


Maybe something like the Washington Naval Treaty would be available to reassure the CCP and lower the stakes a little (or else we recognize Taiwan and form a defense pact,
The US has been trying to get China on board with arms controls treaties with not much luck. It would be immensely in our interest if arms controls weren't just US-Russia.


I don't know what to predict for Turkey's part, but I doubt it's going to be invading Greece anytime while NATO or the EU exist. What's happening with the new canal?

No one wanted the Azeri-Armenian war to spread, since it was such a limited irredentist grudge match between minor countries, without many excesses. To emphasize what I said in a previous comment, it surely does introduce a new era of limited interstate conflict between small states or even regional powers (Crimea/LDPR was the prologue). Morocco-Algeria and Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia are plausible cases. I'm not sure if the Ethiopian Civil War counts as an instance of this paradigm.
Perhaps, they are NATO's wildcard. Doing resource exploration in Cypriot waters under the Turkish navy's cover is a good way to lead to conflict.
The new era of limited interstate conflict is what makes it so difficult. It takes a lot of effort to contain a war to just one region. Azeri-Armenia caught Russia off guard and they were left unable to support their Armenian allies without getting Turkey involved leaving them to negotiate a peace that gave territory to Azerbaijan after Armenia's sound defeat.


Within limits. Do we declare war on Russia if it is involved in overthrowing a NATO government? Sure, not like we've even had a shortage of casi belli on that account since 2016. That doesn't entail that NATO is honorbound to throw away its strength in a relentless push toward Moscow. First we ensure that Poland and Romania are secure, then we consider our options wrt Ukraine, then we reduce Kaliningrad, and if the war is still ongoing after a year or more we gradually push into the Baltics until a diplomatic resolution can be found. The linchpin is the mutualized assurances (between allies) and the mutualized costs (between antagonists), not the accumulation itself of overwhelming material advantage (arms race). Obviously European militaries should be minimally functional in their own limits, a notional strength is hardly worth having if it can't be operationalized in practice, but I disagree that there is a justification for significant expansion across many countries.
The US and NATO have in general been very good at trying to keep whatever wars they're in contained to the region in conflict. The Korean war was not expanded to mainland China and it took firing Macarthur to ensure that the limit remained. The Vietnam war never involved invading North Vietnam because that'd be a sure way to get China involved outright. The war in Iraq never expanded into Iran despite their manufacturing and supplying EFPs to the shia militias and the Afghan war never expanded to Pakistan despite it allowing the Taliban to regroup after 2002.
Marching on Moscow or conducting strikes against CCP leadership in Beijing are sure ways to start a nuclear war. All sides have too much to lose in escalation. Seeing as stopping a war from escalating is extremely difficult deterring a war from starting is absolutely vital.


Why would EU citizens believe it's useful for them, or for anyone, to have Europe invest in force projection 10000 miles away? Leave alone that there is no unity on a European foreign policy or consolidated military, but not even the populaces of the UK and France - with extant colonial interests in the Indian Ocean - would hardly see the value in the proposition, one which inherently prescribes deployment of force against sovereign states with unfavorable trade or related policies (where have we heard that one before?).

The EU has several overseas military missions with thousands of troops supporting them, improving logistical capability to support those and other hotspots they intervene with is useful. The lack of a united EU foreign policy is exactly what makes it so impotent, does Poland want to support French interests in West Africa? Does Spain want to defend Romanian interests in Eastern Europe? Does Greece want to get involved in Danish issues in the Arctic?
As for EU citizens believing it useful? Well, that's were a lack of vision for the future is a problem. What do Europeans want their role in the world to be in a fifty years or a century? Do they want to just be an economic zone with limited influence beyond their borders? Can that ensure they can maintain their current standard of living and social values?


Why the heck does Norway need firepower and the will to use it (presumably) against Russian resource exploration? Jesus. I would need a whole lot of convincing for why this is a legitimate postural debate. It feels too much like the proverbial hammer and nail. If it creates dangerous expectations for the US to insist on being able to reach anywhere, Europe of all things doesn't need to approximate such ambitions.
Firepower? Artic coast guard and air patrolling doesn't need to shoot at oil exploration, just shoo way exploration ships when they are in Norwiegen or Danish economic areas. Seeing as for Norway at least oil/natural gas are a large part of the economy and the majority of their exports it is in their interest that the Russia's don't build oil/gas rigs in what don't belong to them, otherwise you end up with a situation like the South China Seas island buildng as no one will risk a war just to eject a small outpost or oilrig.
Norwegian Officials: Russian Arctic Expansion Making Security Landscape ‘Difficult’
https://news.usni.org/2021/03/22/norwegian-officials-russian-arctic-expansion-making-security-landscape-difficult


The Axis of Evil famously counted China client North Korea as a member, which tangentially killed any possibility of sustaining the Agreed Framework on NK nuclearization.
Yeah, that's why I mentioned it. The policy of regime change was a direct threat to Chinese interests.


That's a little unfair in comparison, since the Suez Crisis didn't really change much in geopolitics. France and UK were already consigned to the path if decolonization, and could not plausibly continue to project power as they had in the past; the likes of Suez, and Indochina and Israel before it, just proved it without a doubt for those slow on the uptake. The before-after was a difference in self-image rather than in real capabilities or international relations.

France's separation from NATO was politically inconvenient but I don't know that it reduced the US alliance's - of which France remained a member in practice, they weren't laying down the carpet for Soviet troops - preparedness to fend off any Communist invasion. The Iraq War was more of a strain on Europe's usability for US interests (as neocons saw them), and the War on Terror was clearly a proximate cause of instability throughout the Middle East, even if one thinks of it as an enduringly-unstable region, instability that did directly affect the relations of all the great powers among each other and with the world. I can't deprecate all that for the Suez flash in the pan.

Neither power were consigned to the path of decolonization, hell France was still in the middle of its war to keep Algeria French when it intervened in the Suez. Following Suez the UK's 1957 white paper led to a very real decline in capability which was then followed by their withdrawal from East of the Suez in the 1960s. The US essentially telling it's to biggest allies that it did not have their back on interests that didn't align perfectly with the US changed the entire dynamic of France and the UK in regards to all of their colonies and former colonies in every part of the world.
Yes, France was an associate but the the betrayal at Suez and the departure of France from NATO spurred their development of an independent nuclear capability as relying on the US was deemed insufficient.


Maybe a better comparison for 'true' turning points would be the Cuban Missile Crisis, since that one 'little' incident officially inaugurated the era of Mutually Assured Destruction. In the 1950s, the Soviets still had too few atomic weapons, and moreover no or almost no ICBMs, with which to existentially threaten the US heartland. (Notably for the wider topic of deterrence, MAD was most successful when both the US and USSR acknowledged its potency and agreed to restrict their own deployments and warhead stockpiles. But all those Cold War concords are extinct or about to go extinct...)
It was certainly a turning point too, it was the first time that US citizens felt that the threat of MAD meant them too, not just their allies in Europe or Asia. Especially scary when you consider how close the Cuban crisis came to nuclear war when the soviet submarine B-59 had 2 out of 3 of its key officers voting to launch nuclear torpedoes against the US Navy.

[Montmorency]

Seeing as the US has already been the largest supplier of weapons and platforms to Australia this isn't a new outlet.

The relationship is preexisting, but the announced sales are new. But hey, this AUKUS just guaranteed tens of thousands of Americans in or adjacent to the arms industry a lifetime career. O.0


Those are interesting visuals, hull count isn't exactly tonnage though they are adding tonnage at a rate we can't match.

What do you make of the constant (technically slightly lower) military spending relative to GDP over time? Methodology on assessing true Chinese military (or other) spending is a challenge I have no insight on, but my gut feeling is that unless we see that figure rise suddenly - especially relative to declining overall growth rates for the economy - our leadership won't need to give serious consideration to our extreme hypothetical here.


Taiwan is also crucial in manufacturing of microchips, something the global economy is short of and seeing the PRC gain more control of those industries is not in the interest of the US or EU.

Of course China's exports and imports and financial access would instantly be slashed on the outbreak of war, and I wonder if there's a detailed analysis of how much of a contingency they need to even take the hit for a few months... but we're imagining none of this matters to a bloodthirsty CCP.

Microchip factories are not super-difficult to build out elsewhere with political support, such as Vietnam or Bangladesh (who would want the opportunity independent of the Taiwan impasse mind you). More inconvenient, shall we say, for the global economy would be the complete stoppage of trade in the Strait, much permanently foreclosed by the presumable embargo on China, and the ultimate destruction of complex infrastructure throughout Taiwan... just unthinkable global aftershocks and realignment.

What can we expect in a scenario where the Chicoms take their hundred-year revenge irrespective of any cost to themselves or others, and we thoroughly contest. Several million (mostly Taiwanese) would die over several years of grueling attrition, a century of development and investment on the island would be wiped out, and the US would see a substantial portion of all its operational assets on the floor of the ocean. And this is just in the case where we "win," which is to say preempt Chinese local air/naval supremacy or the formation of an undislodgeable beachhead, the capture of tens of thousands of American soldiers defending the island, or a nuclear exchange.

If one assumes this grade of confrontation is inevitable, then they're either confident we'll only "get our hair mussed" in the blithe style parodied by Stanley Kubrick, or we have to make a calculated retreat sooner rather than later to prevent more embarrassing setbacks in the future when our bluffs get called. The first option assumes we, and the Taiwanese, can and should absorb more damage than the PLA, and the second seeks to preserve American credibility more broadly in order that the Pacific alliance system survive and China more effectively be deterred from pursuing harder targets such as South Korea.

None of these sound appealing, but the latter is clearly superior from both the human and the strategic standpoint. The longer we entertain the delusion that Taiwan can be defended or that it would be worth it to try, the worse it will be for our international standing and alliance structure in the future, the more it will play into China's (shockingly ruthless) hands. What such morbid musings really demonstrate is why we must start from the position that, until proven otherwise, Beijing is not gripped by one of those historical episodes of collective psychosis, and pursue diplomacy and reciprocal concessions/deescalation.


The 'first island chain' is the best line of defense though, with Taiwan as a lynchpin in the absence of US bases in the Philippines anymore.

If China rapin' errybody out there and America is all-in as well, I hope you'll allow the warplan political accedance of some bases in the Philippines.

I don't know, if China had to fight through the Korean peninsula or land on the Japanese islands amid full, preordained, and ongoing American presence, holding Taiwan would offer very little advantage, while not affecting our own logistics (even in the case where Taiwan might have been used as basing). It would simply be impossible for China to exert air and sea supremacy against the Japanese islands, even with an attempt at Okinawa and the southern island chain. And while South Korea is less geographically secure it has a very large allied military, existing US infrastructure, and is right next to Japan. Granted that China would never invade Korea without a North Korean human shield for a vanguard, but the conditions for a conventional defensive ground war so overwhelmingly favor American doctrine and capabilities that from a cold-blooded perspective it's almost a set match an American general would like to hold.

The SE Asian states, specifically the archipelago states, are vulnerable to territorial losses given the presence of the Chinese reef island system, but by the same token their distance from China makes it difficult for China to secure its gains against counterattack and prevent catastrophic attrition of naval assets; given moderate will to resist among the local population, the likes of the Philippines should be resilient enough against invasion to make the prospect a bloody boondoggle for the PLA. (Scary thought: It's easy to imagine someone deciding that we can nuke Woody Island because China wouldn't retaliate over NBC deployment against as pure a military target as there can be). Vietnam is probably a tricky proposition though, that's all I can say.

There is, on the other hand, one convoluted ethical case to be made about putting our eggs in the Taiwanese basket (all still in the context of the most extreme scenario remember). Namely, since Taiwan is the smallest and most isolated of plausible targets of Chinese incursion, it is better, e.g. to sacrifice 25 million Taiwanese and a <$1 trillion economy than 50 million South Koreans (plus North Koreans) and a $2 trillion economy; better for Taiwan to be ruined than the Korean peninsula again, or Vietnam again; better Taipei than Seoul or Tokyo again (not really the latter, just including it for rhetorical effect).

I'm not sure how much stock I put in that, especially given that in any plausible world a Chinese attack on Taiwan is orders of magnitude higher a priority for the CCP than one on a traditional American partner, but within a certain set of apocalyptic premises it's a defensible argument.


The US has been trying to get China on board with arms controls treaties with not much luck. It would be immensely in our interest if arms controls weren't just US-Russia.

What do you know about this? A comprehensive deal on nuclear proliferation (would have to include Russia at least on this aspect), a freeze on military spending, a cap on naval construction, limits on Chinese island reclamation and US missile defenses in South Korea, for some examples - all of the above would be a generous arrangement for China, AFAICT, and a stable framework for future conflict resolution.


Azeri-Armenia caught Russia off guard and they were left unable to support their Armenian allies without getting Turkey involved leaving them to negotiate a peace that gave territory to Azerbaijan after Armenia's sound defeat.

I'm not aware that Russia is decisively closer to Armenia than to Azerbaijan. Wouldn't they prefer not to burn bridges with either? I do assume that Azerbaijan would have occupied all of NK without Russian mediation.

The good news is that that Azerbaijan basically got what it wanted in regaining lost territories, AFAIK, and Armenia is too weak to retaliate in the future, so in a sense that conflict may be 'settled.' I could easily be wrong though: persistent Armenian revanchism; persistent Azeri revanchism for taking the whole apple; the geopolitics of the Azeri exclave. The implications for Turkish foreign affairs are more worrisome though as they continue to throw around their weight to their south and east.


The US and NATO have in general been very good at trying to keep whatever wars they're in contained to the region in conflict. The Korean war was not expanded to mainland China and it took firing Macarthur to ensure that the limit remained. The Vietnam war never involved invading North Vietnam because that'd be a sure way to get China involved outright. The war in Iraq never expanded into Iran despite their manufacturing and supplying EFPs to the shia militias and the Afghan war never expanded to Pakistan despite it allowing the Taliban to regroup after 2002.

Fair enough. Ultimately what I'm trying to impress on the thread is that Euro allies should not pursue the excess capability to - with US assistance - decisively break through the Russian front. I feel compelled to discourage the proposition because this feels like an undertone whenever the issue of Europe "carrying its own weight" in military terms gets raised. (Of course, we have had Orgahs literally arguing for just this sort of campaign in the past.)


As for EU citizens believing it useful? Well, that's were a lack of vision for the future is a problem. What do Europeans want their role in the world to be in a fifty years or a century? Do they want to just be an economic zone with limited influence beyond their borders? Can that ensure they can maintain their current standard of living and social values?

As implied by the previous, civilian-based strand of this conversation, rich countries must increasingly integrate their economic and foreign policy, to preserve themselves from internal threats, to limit the nefarious influence of non-state economic actors, and to accelerate the development of the Global South, the latter being of special important because we don't want hundreds of millions of climate refugees, starving and thirsty people in an overheated world with no prospects, as a matter of mere ethics, and as a matter of enlightened self-interest. For America and Europe, a wealthy, secure, and resilient Africa and South Asia would be one of the greatest triumphs of all time. All of this entails ever-closer cooperation between European states and organizations, and the USA, to start. There's no isolationism to be found here. More directly, my opinion is:

1. Militarization and force projection is not to Europe's comparative advantage going forward.
2. Someone needs to make clear to the UK and (especially) France that their colonial management is no one else's problem as such.
3. Stop prioritizing military (non-)solutions in the first place!!! How often has this worked out for humanity?


Seeing as for Norway at least oil/natural gas are a large part of the economy and the majority of their exports

Thanks for reminding me that they, uh, need to do something about that.
ReluctantSamurai


Neither power were consigned to the path of decolonization, hell France was still in the middle of its war to keep Algeria French when it intervened in the Suez. Following Suez the UK's 1957 white paper led to a very real decline in capability which was then followed by their withdrawal from East of the Suez in the 1960s. The US essentially telling it's to biggest allies that it did not have their back on interests that didn't align perfectly with the US changed the entire dynamic of France and the UK in regards to all of their colonies and former colonies in every part of the world.
Yes, France was an associate but the the betrayal at Suez and the departure of France from NATO spurred their development of an independent nuclear capability as relying on the US was deemed insufficient.

French military operations/armed resistance in Algeria hadn't really begun yet at this time, it was still terrorism and protest. The UK was decolonizing, this was more or less stipulated in the transatlantic alliance during the war, and was made assured by the independence of India. The only question then was the timetable.

What was the lesson of the Suez Crisis? That the UK and France can still push Egypt around, yes, but the USA and USSR can push around the UK and France in turn. But such an arrangement of facts was not imposed in the course of the Suez Crisis - it had been true for a long time already! Meanwhile, the WoT directly, immediately and enduringly, transformed the world stage in unpredictable ways. The world of 1958 did not look very different on account of the Suez Crisis, whereas the world of 2003 was epochally distinct in a way that was widely recognized and came as a direct cause (with knockons) from 9/11 and the invasions. Don't know what more I can say.

At the risk of offending the Gallic race, French WMDs have not proved a world-shaking development. At any rate, connecting it to the Suez Crisis is not right. De Gaulle promoted French nuclear research from the end of WW2, and the French civilian government had already secretly authorized the development of a weapon in December 1954. (Intriguingly, one of the reasons the French government reacted so harshly to the Algerian independence movement later is that it threatened French planned reliance on the Algerian desert as a testing environment ROFL here's your brain... here's your brain on imperialism.)

The biggest practical effect of the Suez Crisis was internal to capitalist Europe, in that it helped focus some European elites on a "European concept" of the need for closer economic and security integration between states. In fact most capitalist European governments had backed the Anglo-French play in Egypt as a matter of solidarity to the dream of a Eurafrique co-prosperity sphere. Of course, many of these ideas, such as a high-level European nuclear deterrent, a parliament of parliaments, and a Third World Europe, remained theoretical and proved as such in the diplomacy immediately following the Crisis. At the beginning of 1956, capitalist Europe was a protectorate in an American international security architecture, and it remained one at the end of 1956. So the Suez Crisis was of questionable intrinsic causality, as opposed to optics and elite self-image, to subsequent world affairs. But naturally I think the American system was overdetermined - almost no one in Europe before or after 1956 could put up on the promise of rapid European political and foreign policy integration, so it was never going to arise in the Cold War context. If you think these debates could have produced wildly divergent results for Europe's internal trajectory, then the Suez Crisis could be deemed more influential.


the soviet submarine B-59 had 2 out of 3 of its key officers voting to launch nuclear torpedoes against the US Navy.

History is luck, the rest is prejudice.

[spmetla]

What do you make of the constant (technically slightly lower) military spending relative to GDP over time? Methodology on assessing true Chinese military (or other) spending is a challenge I have no insight on, but my gut feeling is that unless we see that figure rise suddenly - especially relative to declining overall growth rates for the economy - our leadership won't need to give serious consideration to our extreme hypothetical here.

It's actually estimated that their budget is much higher than they officially say.
Understanding China’s 2021 Defense Budget
https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-chinas-2021-defense-budget

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that Chinese defense-related expenditure actually reached $240 billion in 2019—nearly 40 percent higher than the official budget ($183.5 billion). Similarly, the International Institute for Strategic Studies put the 2019 figure at $234 billion. The U.S. Department of Defense has stated that China’s actual spending could be higher than $200 billion.


None of these sound appealing, but the latter is clearly superior from both the human and the strategic standpoint. The longer we entertain the delusion that Taiwan can be defended or that it would be worth it to try, the worse it will be for our international standing and alliance structure in the future, the more it will play into China's (shockingly ruthless) hands. What such morbid musings really demonstrate is why we must start from the position that, until proven otherwise, Beijing is not gripped by one of those historical episodes of collective psychosis, and pursue diplomacy and reciprocal concessions/deescalation.


It isn't a delusion to think it can be defended, it would just be very costly.
For a better idea of the costs involved read this RAND report, it's a bit dated but it has an analysis for 2015 and 2025 and looks at short or long duration wars as well as the impact of limited or expanded/severe wars.
War with China
Thinking Through the Unthinkable
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html
Unless both U.S. and Chinese political leaders decline to authorize their militaries to carry out their counterforce strategies, the ability of either state to control the ensuing conflict would be greatly impaired. Both would suffer large military losses from the outset and throughout a severe conflict: In 2015, U.S. losses could be a relatively small fraction of forces committed, but still significant; Chinese losses could be much heavier than U.S. losses and a substantial fraction of forces com-mitted. This gap in losses will shrink as Chinese A2AD improves: By 2025, U.S. losses could range from significant to heavy; Chinese losses, while still very heavy, could be somewhat less than in 2015, owing to increased degradation of U.S. strike capabilities. A severe and lengthy conflict would leave both with substantially reduced total military capacity and thus vulnerable to other threats. China’s A2AD will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to gain military-operational dominance and victory, even in a long war. However, provided the United States is nonetheless willing to fight, China cannot expect to win militarily. Thus, the two could face the prospect of an extremely costly military standoff. This outcome implies that a conflict could be decided by domestic political, international, and, especially, economic factors, all of which would favor the United States in a long, severe war:
•Although a war would harm both economies, damage to China’s would be far worse (perhaps 25–35 percent of GDP after one year). Because much of the Western Pacific would become a war zone, China’s trade with the region and the rest of the world would decline substantially. China’s loss of seaborne energy sup-plies would be especially damaging. Although consumption is a smaller share of the Chinese economy than the U.S. economy, it is expected to grow, leaving the Chinese economy vulnerable to further contraction in the event of war. •Politically, a long conflict, especially if militarily severe and eco-nomically punishing, could expose China to internal division—taxing and testing the state.
•The entry of Japan and, to a lesser extent, other U.S. partners in the region could have a considerable influence on military opera-tions. The responses of Russia, India, and NATO are less important. However, NATO efforts to preserve security in other regions (at least Europe, if not also the Middle East) would permit greater, or less risky, commitment of U.S. forces to war with China. Such a combination of international responses could increase Chinese losses in a long, severe conflict, despite improved A2AD.
In a nutshell, despite military trends that favor it, China could not win, and might lose, a severe war with the United States in 2025, especially if prolonged. Moreover, the economic costs and political dangers of such a war could imperil China’s stability, end its development, and undermine the legitimacy of the state. Yet in the event of war, the military capabilities, motivations, and plans of both sides make a severe, prolonged, and exceedingly costly conflict a distinct possibility. Of the many reasons the United States should not want such a war, the most important are the immense military losses and economic costs to itself and the implications, for the country, the region, and the world, of devastating harm to China. Such prospects underscore the importance of both the United States and China contemplating how to control and restrict fighting should a crisis turn violent, which shines the spotlight on principles and procedures for political control and communication.



I'm not aware that Russia is decisively closer to Armenia than to Azerbaijan. Wouldn't they prefer not to burn bridges with either? I do assume that Azerbaijan would have occupied all of NK without Russian mediation.

Azerbaijan is considered a 'strategic partner' of Turkey and the US. It's still associated with Russia but not closely.


What was the lesson of the Suez Crisis? That the UK and France can still push Egypt around, yes, but the USA and USSR can push around the UK and France in turn. But such an arrangement of facts was not imposed in the course of the Suez Crisis - it had been true for a long time already! Meanwhile, the WoT directly, immediately and enduringly, transformed the world stage in unpredictable ways. The world of 1958 did not look very different on account of the Suez Crisis, whereas the world of 2003 was epochally distinct in a way that was widely recognized and came as a direct cause (with knockons) from 9/11 and the invasions. Don't know what more I can say.
Considering that it was Western Europe that for the previous two-three hundred years called the shots around the world the Suez Crisis was the underlined bold text that told the whole world that the world order had changed away from Western Europe and was not moving back.
Fair point on the other comments though of course I'd disagree on the importance of some of the points.

Philippines supports Australia nuclear sub pact to counter China
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-supports-australia-nuclear-sub-pact-counter-china-2021-09-21/

MANILA, Sept 21 (Reuters) - The Philippines is backing a new defence partnership between the United States, Britain and Australia, hoping it can maintain the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, a view that contrasts sharply with some of its neighbours.

Known as AUKUS, the alliance will see Australia get technology to deploy nuclear-powered submarines as part of the agreement intended to respond to growing Chinese power.

"The enhancement of a near-abroad ally's ability to project power should restore and keep the balance rather than destabilise it," Philippines foreign minister, Teodoro Locsin, said in a statement on Tuesday.

Locsin's remarks, dated Sept. 19, differ to the stance of Indonesia and Malaysia, which sounded the alarm about the nuclear power submarines amid a burgeoning superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia.

Locsin said that without an actual presence of nuclear weapons, the AUKUS move would not violate a 1995 treaty to keep nuclear arms out of Southeast Asia.

The South China Sea continues to be a source of tension, with the United States - a defence treaty partner of the Philippines - and Western allies regularly conducting "freedom of navigation" operations that China has reacted angrily to.

China sees those as outside interference in waters it claims as its own, in conflict with other coastal states, like the Philippines and Vietnam, which have accused China of harassing fishermen and energy activities.

A brief period of rapprochement is all but over this year, with the Philippines furious about the "threatening" presence of hundreds of Chinese "maritime militia" vessels inside its exclusive economic zone.

"Proximity breeds brevity in response time; thereby enhancing an ASEAN near friend and ally's military capacity to respond to a threat to the region or challenge the status quo," Locsin added, without specifying the threat.

"This requires enhancing Australia's ability, added to that of its main military ally, to achieve that calibration."

Reporting by Karen Lema; Editing by Martin Petty

[Montmorency]

The exact level of Chinese spending wasn't the point of interest, it was the level of spending - and spending growth - relative to GDP. If China's spending only grows in pace with its GDP, it may send a different signal than spending/GDP rising to 5% suddenly, for example.

A note on Azerbaijan and Armenia, I had thought both had left the CSTO, but Armenia is still a member. According to these sources,


Russia has long (https://jamestown.org/program/russias-arms-sales-foreign-policy-tool-relations-azerbaijan-armenia/) been Azerbaijan’s main arms supplier. Between 2013 and 2017, its share was 65 percent of Azerbaijan’s total foreign weapons imports (Sipri.org, March 2018). Although Russia is the main arms seller to Azerbaijan, it also provides military equipment to Armenia.

but this article from a year ago


For its part (https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/10/15/will-russian-arms-sales-survive-the-azeri-armenian-conflict/), Azerbaijan has other options, as Russia accounts for only 22 percent of its military purchases, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Azerbaijan also buys weapons from Israel and Turkey, for example.

Maybe they are drifting apart.

[Furunculus]

Two recommended articles from my Go-To in pacific naval geopolitics - @alessionaval - Alessio Patalano:

https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/the-australian-submarine-agreement-turning-nuclear-cooperation-upside-down/

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-to-buy-a-submarine-2021-edition/

Not read them myself yet, but i will.

[spmetla]

Both are good reads, thanks for posting. Makes me wonder about the possibility of Australia leasing UK or US SSNs and then doing actual repairs and services in Pearl Harbor or Guam if they want the capability sooner while revamping of shipyards in Australia and building of actual boats.

Good article from The Diplomat on AUKUS and general US-China considerations:
https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/what-aukus-and-afghanistan-tell-us-about-the-us-asia-strategy/
What AUKUS and Afghanistan Tell Us About the US Asia Strategy
Put together, these two seemingly unrelated developments signal a new U.S. strategy in the competition with China.


By Arash Reisinezhad
September 21, 2021
The Taliban’s rapid takeover of Afghanistan made headlines around the world. Few could have predicted that the predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group would resuscitate their power in summer 2021, after waging a 20-year insurgency against the U.S.-backed government in Kabul.

In the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of 2001, the Taliban began challenging NATO and taking back vast territories in the southwest of Afghanistan after heavy regrouping in Pakistan. The signing of a withdrawal agreement with the U.S. in Doha emboldened the Taliban to press their advantage and end the 20-year-old war. Backed by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Taliban notched swift successes as the U.S. withdrew its remaining troops from Afghanistan. By August 2021, the Taliban had conquered all of Afghanistan’s major cities and ultimately Kabul. By September, they controlled the entire country after taking the mountainous Panjshir Valley, where the National Resistance Front, led by Ahmad Masoud, had vowed to continue fighting the Taliban.

Less than a month later after the fall of Kabul, U.S. President Joe Biden, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison launched a trilateral security partnership, called AUKUS, to counter China. The AUKUS pact will enable Australia to deploy nuclear-powered submarines, which are supposed to be built in Adelaide, making Canberra the seventh country in the world to have submarines propelled by nuclear reactors. The core goal of this trilateral pact is to contain the threat emanating from China’s increased leverage in the Indo-Pacific and its worldwide ambitions. Not surprisingly, the formation of AUKUS spilled over into intensified Indo-Pacific tensions, especially over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East Indian Ocean.

At the first glance, it seems that the developments in Afghanistan and Australia are unrelated events. One centered in the Hindukush Mountains; the other echoed 9,500 kilometers away, in the middle of the Indo-Pacific waters. Nevertheless, within a broader context, these two events are interconnected at the heart of the China-U.S. competition, forming the bookends of a new strategy I dub “leave the Belt, press the Road.” By this, I mean that the U.S. will increasingly target China’s Maritime Silk Road, while largely abandoning the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt. Succinctly put, the major front of the Sino-American infrastructure war is the Indo-Pacific rim, while the heart of Eurasia will be left to the destabilizing forces of the region.

The establishment of AUKUS reaffirms the fact that the cornerstone of Washington’s China containment strategy is pitched in the Indo-Pacific zone. Therefore, U.S. attention to the geographical locations at the heart of Eurasia will be degraded – but this is part of the plan. The U.S. lack of will or capability to keep up its presence in Eurasia may intentionally disrupt the stability of the Belt by generating a threatening power vacuum. The U.S. swift withdrawal from Afghanistan and the following empowerment of Taliban have the potential to destabilize Chinese land-based projects in Central Asia, Pakistan, and even Xinjiang. Although the chaotic drawdown of the war in Afghanistan has taken a toll on Biden’s standing back home, the geopolitical vacuum in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal could be utilized to counterbalance Moscow, Beijing, and even Tehran, who will now have to contend with the empowerment of Islamic extremists in Central and West Asia.
Despite the seemingly sudden developments of the last two months, this trend in the global competition is not new. After almost a ten-year hiatus, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, was formally resumed in August 2017 to contain Beijing’s maritime power projection in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Initially founded in 2007, the Quad consists of Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S., heralding the possible formation of an Asian NATO to counter the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). There were even rumblings about a “Quad Plus” when South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam joined the meetings in March 2020. The Malabar exercises hosted annually by India are a major manifestation of its military component.

In a 2021 joint statement on “The Spirit of the Quad,” the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States highlighted “a shared vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),” and a “rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas” to counter China’s maritime threat. This progress was concomitant with the EU’s increasingly strategic attention toward the Indo-Pacific zone as France, Germany, and the U.K. accelerated their cooperation with the Quad Plus dialogue. Within this context, the AUKUS pact would supplement the Quad in counterbalancing China’s increasing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Although AUKUS and the Quad both show muscle and military technology firepower, they lack a foundational proportionality. The Belt and Road Initiative is Beijing’s major geoeconomic strategy for challenging the U.S. hegemony around the globe, while the Quad and AUKUS are geostrategic and military tools in countering China in the Indo-Pacific zone. Phrased differently, there is a strategic gap between the threatening force and the deterring counterforce. It was this proportionality gap that pushed the Biden administration to launch a specific geoeconomic counterforce against the Belt and Road: Build Back Better World, or B3W, announced in June at the G-7 summit in Cornwall, U.K.

Led by the U.S., B3W aims at countering Chinese global leverage through massive investment in the infrastructural development of the developing countries by 2035. The plan is supposed to provide around $40 trillion, mainly from the private sector, to low- and middle- income countries, from Latin America and the Caribbean to Africa and Asia. Guided by the standards and principles of the Blue Dot Network (BDN), the B3W projects vow to focus on several domains, particularly climate, health and health security, digital technology, and gender equity and equality. The global scope of the B3W would equip its G-7 partners with different geographic orientations to target specific low- and middle-income countries across the world. While the U.S. focuses on the Indo-Pacific, Japan and the EU will concentrate on Southeast Asia and the Balkans, respectively, all with the aim of countering Chinese global influence.

The upcoming competition between B3W, now backed by the Quad and AUKUS, and the Chinese BRI is a prelude to the China-U.S. infrastructure war. The B3W is not just a U.S. financial response to China’s economic ambitions; rather it is a strategic effort to transform the rising geopolitical arrangement of Greater Eurasia and its coastal waters by establishing a new model of development. In other words, the United States is unleashing a geoeconomic counterforce against China’s BRI to achieve its grand geopolitical goals by mobilizing its private companies and those of its allies in massive infrastructure investment to control the BRI corridors. The new infrastructure war will determine the trajectory and path of the geopolitical battle between China and the U.S. for world domination in the 21st century.

On the other side of the global power equation, China has successfully controlled Central Asian markets while pursuing its “positive balance” doctrine among all parties in West Asia, wherein expanding cooperation with Beijing may be the only point all the regional powers can agree on. China’s dramatic economic growth and internal stability have enticed non-democratic political systems in the region. Beijing has established close economic relations with the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, Israel, Iran, and Turkey at the same time. However, Beijing’s successful policy in cementing its connection with West Asia through Central Asia may be disrupted by threats emanating from Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will destabilize the land-based Belt while heavy pressure by the Quad and now AUKUS will counter the maritime Road.

The world is on the verge of China-U.S. international competition. Regional developments, like AUKUS, and domestic transformations, like the Taliban takeover of Kabul, will both be crucial elements in the grand chessboard between the U.S. and China. Now that the dust has settled in Kabul, one could see how the Taliban’s rising power is concomitant with the trilateral AUKUS pact. Both are milestones for a new phase in the Sino-American competition: leave the Belt, press the Road.

Some key highlights:

Although AUKUS and the Quad both show muscle and military technology firepower, they lack a foundational proportionality. The Belt and Road Initiative is Beijing’s major geoeconomic strategy for challenging the U.S. hegemony around the globe, while the Quad and AUKUS are geostrategic and military tools in countering China in the Indo-Pacific zone. Phrased differently, there is a strategic gap between the threatening force and the deterring counterforce. It was this proportionality gap that pushed the Biden administration to launch a specific geoeconomic counterforce against the Belt and Road: Build Back Better World, or B3W, announced in June at the G-7 summit in Cornwall, U.K.

The global scope of the B3W would equip its G-7 partners with different geographic orientations to target specific low- and middle-income countries across the world. While the U.S. focuses on the Indo-Pacific, Japan and the EU will concentrate on Southeast Asia and the Balkans, respectively, all with the aim of countering Chinese global influence.
Glad this article ties in how AUKUS and the Quad are more the military hard power end of the efforts while the B3W (new acronymn for me) sorta replaces what the TTP was supposed to be but with a scope beyond the Pacific. Certainly failed to read much into B3W myself so glad to see the other aspects of DIME are used. I'm all for a good deterrence but would much prefer the other methods being the primary means of influencing around the world.


The world is on the verge of China-U.S. international competition. Regional developments, like AUKUS, and domestic transformations, like the Taliban takeover of Kabul, will both be crucial elements in the grand chessboard between the U.S. and China.
The Great Game again though this article doesn't really address Russian efforts to maintain its influence in Central Asia even with its inability to invest in infrastructure, at least in comparison to China and the US. China and Russia are too often grouped together, yes, they oppose the US but are very much merely partners of convienence for now.
This article by the same addresses that a bit more:
Russia’s Strategy in Central Asia: Inviting India to Balance China
https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/russias-strategy-in-central-asia-inviting-india-to-balance-china/

[Montmorency]

"Nato is such a ridiculous misnomer."

Union for the Mediterranean: Hold my beer.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/70/Union_for_the_Mediterranean_-_updatable.svg/540px-Union_for_the_Mediterranean_-_updatable.svg.png


https://i.imgur.com/wNn5fa7.jpeg

^^ Still funny. Unfortunately, obliquely true.

[Montmorency]

Fascinating thread (https://twitter.com/kevtellier/status/1441774309652025346) on Xi Jinping (https://twitter.com/kevtellier/status/1442292829112266762) that, if accurate, would make much of the speculation here so far obsolete. To the extent these are Xi's guiding lights, he has quite a point about American failure but it's not yet clear that China can offer a credible alternative, one that doesn't fall into a totalitarian spiral.

Also, Germany is probably going to be led by a center-left coalition post-Merkel. A structural model for the US if it aims to survive as a polity, though case solutions will always be bespoke to a degree.


The broad sentiment within China is that the United States is captured by entrenched interests and cannot restructure its system to escape these traps. 1/

Many believe AUKUS is a concrete example of this state capture. Many in China believe the US can only pursue strategic interests that serve entrenched interests such as the military-industrial complex and foreign policy establishment. 2/

Modern party leaders are actively seeking to avoid the fate of the USSR. However, many outside observers assume PRC leaders view political liberalization as the primary cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 3/

Throughout the preceding decades, Deng Xiaoping and many other leaders did not necessarily oppose democracy and liberalization in the abstract. 4/

What Deng opposed was the idea that political reform could come before economic reform. For Deng, economic reform had to start first and privately expressed his belief that Gorbachev was “an idiot” for failing to recognize this. 5/

For modern PRC leaders, the biggest takeaway from the collapse of the USSR was its failure to shed the excess baggage of entrenched state and industrial interests. Moreover, Xi believes a lack of strong leadership meant the USSR would inevitably collapse under its own weight. 6/

When Xi came to power in 2012/2013, he initiated his “anti-corruption drive” to resolve three primary constraints:

- Reduce corruption
- Soften the power-base of entrenched interests
- Uproot the most acute sources of factionalism
7/

In hindsight, the past eight years of Xi’s reign as a continuous effort to mitigate the long-term impact of state capture and factionalism. The fact that we’re eight years in and these problems still exist likely means these are permanent features of the system. 8/

Some argue Xi’s consolidation of state and personal authority marks are a reversion to Maoism. Many of the outwards signs (cult of personality, etc.) are there. However, Xi’s restructuring of the previous political structure is straight out of Deng Xiaoping’s playbook. 9/


"Deng well understood that to gain control over the levers of power, it would be easier to start with a fresh organizational structure than to send one or two leading officials to an old organization that did not match his policies."

In China's current system, norms governing power transitions are either weak or non-existent. It's not enough to simply install new leaders on top of existing organizational structures. The structures themselves must be gutted time and again. 10/

Xi needed to quickly undertake more drastic reforms due to Hu/Wen’s lack of decisive reforms during their administration. 11/

From Xi’s view, Hu/Wen’s inaction wasn’t preserving a system that “worked.” It was a failure to restructure a broken system that would eventually detonate. 12/

Common Prosperity is more than an economic restructuring or wealth redistribution. On a deeper level, Common Prosperity is a restructuring of the state’s relationship with the individual. It’s a redefining of ethical and moral boundaries in Chinese society. 13/

Common Prosperity is not Maoism, but it entails a similar kind of near-spiritual faith in the state’s ability to redefine what it believes should matter in Chinese society and culture. 14/

We’re seeing a clear departure from the highly technocratic and materialist ethos that defined decades of Chinese social/political life. 15/

Although Xi is far more powerful than the leadership generations immediately preceding him, he’s still not a dictator and must contend with powerful internal bureaucratic constraints. 16/

Major initiatives such as anti-corruption drives and wealth rebalancing still require popular/internal support. Xi can’t succeed by swimming upstream. 17/

Concerning US-China relations, China is drawing lessons from the post-2008 US in the same way it draws lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 18/

Many in China believe the US is deeply constrained (even incapacitated) by a combination of its private sector, entrenched state interests, and populist ultra-nationalism. 19/

Xi frequently points to China’s “institutional/governance advantages” in the context of international affairs. Reflecting a belief among China’s political establishment that the Chinese system is superior to others, including the United States. 20/

China’s perception of its own “institutional advantages” reflects more than just a belief in the superiority of the institutions and the governance models themselves. 21/

"Institutional advantage" reflects a belief that the Chinese system can self-correct internally and adapt to externalities in ways the US simply cannot. 22/

China believes either sides’ ability to shed the weight of entrenched interests and conduct deep self-correction in real-time is what will define US-China relations in the 21st century. 23/

[spmetla]

Also, Germany is probably going to be led by a center-left coalition post-Merkel. A structural model for the US if it aims to survive as a polity, though case solutions will always be bespoke to a degree.

Watching the elections there is quite interesting. As I've made known, I'm a huge advocate for truly multiparty systems like Germany as it forces compromise. You get less of the winner take all "elections have consequences" attitude. Allowing the true extremists to just vote for their fringe people is much better than their trying to take over the major party and redefine who's "no true scotsman." Glad that the Greens will have to force some concessions from SPD or CDU; I wouldn't want the Greens running the show but think it's absolutely vital the the environment and climate change remain front and center for parts of the government's elected officals.

I've been rather ignorant of the leads for SPD and CDU though. Olaf Scholz seems an interesting person, wouldn't be too far from Merkel's leadership and policies but seems to just want to steer toward the same goal though with slightly different methods.

[ReluctantSamurai]

From Monty's post above:


Common Prosperity is more than an economic restructuring or wealth redistribution. On a deeper level, Common Prosperity is a restructuring of the state’s relationship with the individual. It’s a redefining of ethical and moral boundaries in Chinese society.

It will be interesting to see how China responds to the current major issues it is facing at the moment. First, the recent devastating floods. Then the looming collapse of EverGrande. And now this:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/28/power-shortages-in-china-hits-homes-and-factories-prompting-global-supply-fears


Widening power shortages in China’s north-east have left homes without power and halted production at numerous factories, while some shops operated by candlelight as the economic toll of the squeeze mounted. Residents in the north-east, where autumn temperatures are falling, reported power cuts and appealed on social media for the government to restore supplies. Rationing has been implemented during peak hours since last week, while residents of cities including Changchun said cuts were occurring sooner and lasting for longer, state media reported. China’s power crunch, caused by tight coal supplies and toughening emissions standards, has hurt production in industries across several regions and poses a risk to already strained global supply chains (https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/aug/19/volkswagen-and-toyota-face-production-cuts-due-to-chip-shortage).

Manufacturers face existing shortages of processor chips, disruptions in shipping and other lingering effects of the global shutdown of travel and trade to fight the coronavirus pandemic. Liaoning province said power generation had declined significantly since July, and the supply gap widened to a “severe level” last week. It expanded power cuts from industrial firms to residential areas last week.


The fallout of the power shortage has prompted some analysts to downgrade their 2021 economic growth outlook for China, and also warned of possible global supply shortages to textiles, toys and machine parts.

[Montmorency]

To segue from that news, here's an interesting thesis (https://www.google.com/url?q=https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwia4LqMoKPzAhWNQjABHfIsBn8QFnoECAgQAg&usg=AOvVaw0wvERH8h8Ea0B6w_WPtRbe) that holds forth as a sort of counterpoint to the Twitter thread. IMO it's premature for current events, though the general theory has some promise and might become more applicable down the line.


The idea of a Thucydides Trap, popularized by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, holds that the danger of war will skyrocket as a surging China overtakes a sagging America. Even Chinese President Xi Jinping has endorsed the concept arguing Washington must make room for Beijing. As tensions between the United States and China escalate, the belief that the fundamental cause of friction is a looming “power transition”—the replacement of one hegemon by another—has become canonical.

The only problem with this familiar formula is that it’s wrong.

The Thucydides Trap doesn’t really explain what caused the Peloponnesian War. It doesn’t capture the dynamics that have often driven revisionist powers—whether that is Germany in 1914 or Japan in 1941—to start some of history’s most devastating conflicts. And it doesn’t explain why war is a very real possibility in U.S.-China relations today because it fundamentally misdiagnoses where China now finds itself on its arc of development—the point at which its relative power is peaking and will soon start to fade.

There’s indeed a deadly trap that could ensnare the United States and China. But it’s not the product of a power transition the Thucydidean cliché says it is. It’s best thought of instead as a “peaking power trap.” And if history is any guide, it’s China’s—not the United States’—impending decline that could cause it to snap shut.

There is an entire swath of literature, known as “power transition theory,” which holds that great-power war typically occurs at the intersection of one hegemon’s rise and another’s decline. This is the body of work underpinning the Thucydides Trap, and there is, admittedly, an elemental truth to the idea. The rise of new powers is invariably destabilizing. In the runup to the Peloponnesian War in the 5th century B.C., Athens would not have seemed so menacing to Sparta had it not built a vast empire and become a naval superpower. Washington and Beijing would not be locked in rivalry if China was still poor and weak. Rising powers do expand their influence in ways that threaten reigning powers.

But the calculus that produces war—particularly the calculus that pushes revisionist powers, countries seeking to shake up the existing system, to lash out violently—is more complex. A country whose relative wealth and power are growing will surely become more assertive and ambitious. All things equal, it will seek greater global influence and prestige. But if its position is steadily improving, it should postpone a deadly showdown with the reigning hegemon until it has become even stronger. Such a country should follow the dictum former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping laid down for a rising China after the Cold War: It should hide its capabilities and bide its time.

Now imagine a different scenario. A dissatisfied state has been building its power and expanding its geopolitical horizons. But then the country peaks, perhaps because its economy slows, perhaps because its own assertiveness provokes a coalition of determined rivals, or perhaps because both of these things happen at once. The future starts to look quite forbidding; a sense of imminent danger starts to replace a feeling of limitless possibility. In these circumstances, a revisionist power may act boldly, even aggressively, to grab what it can before it is too late. The most dangerous trajectory in world politics is a long rise followed by the prospect of a sharp decline.

As we show in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, this scenario is more common than you might think. Historian Donald Kagan showed, for instance, that Athens started acting more belligerently in the years before the Peloponnesian War because it feared adverse shifts in the balance of naval power—in other words, because it was on the verge of losing influence vis-à-vis Sparta. We see the same thing in more recent cases as well.

Great powers that had been growing dramatically faster than the world average and then suffered a severe, prolonged slowdown usually don’t fade away quietly. Rather, they become brash and aggressive.



Slowing growth makes it harder for leaders to keep the public happy. Economic underperformance weakens the country against its rivals. Fearing upheaval, leaders crack down on dissent. They maneuver desperately to keep geopolitical enemies at bay. Expansion seems like a solution—a way of grabbing economic resources and markets, making nationalism a crutch for a wounded regime, and beating back foreign threats.

Many countries have followed this path. When the United States’ long post-Civil War economic surge ended, Washington violently suppressed strikes and unrest at home, built a powerful blue-water Navy, and engaged in a fit of belligerence and imperial expansion during the 1890s.

Here's where the elaboration of the theory begins to look over-fitted and less credible. The depression of the 1890s was over by the time of the exertions abroad, throughout the decade the US had remained the largest economy in the world, and at any rate prior to the era of central banking, recessions and depressions were actually as common as not (that is, veritably 50% of the 19th century saw the United States in economic contraction). This comparison also completely ignores the geopolitics involved, external context, as well as internal politics, and trivializes the thesis of "peaking" power by linking it to low or negative domestic growth per se. I don't think we would gain anything useful, for example, by framing American expansion against Mexico and the indigenous territories (or the formation of the British Raj!) in terms of American (or British) decline! Which is where such logic literally flows, yet I doubt the authors would follow it that way as a generalization.


Germany’s rivalry with Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is often considered an analogue to U.S.-China competition: In both cases, an autocratic challenger threatened a liberal hegemon. But the more sobering parallel is this: War came when a cornered Germany grasped it would not zip past its rivals without a fight.

Again, this sort of theory cannot hold by overemphasizing single-actor teleology as if there wasn't a whole system supporting conditions for war among multiple-multiple parties. A proposition that 'World War 1 occurred because a peaking Germany sought a new power balance" would be so incomplete as to be wrong.


But during the prelude to war, the kaiser and his aides didn’t feel confident. Germany’s brash behavior caused its encirclement by hostile powers. London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, Russia, formed a “Triple Entente” to block German expansion. By 1914, time was running short. Germany was losing ground economically to a fast-growing Russia; London and France were pursuing economic containment by blocking its access to oil and iron ore. Berlin’s key ally, Austria-Hungary, was being torn apart by ethnic tensions. At home, Germany’s autocratic political system was in trouble.

Most ominous, the military balance was shifting. France was enlarging its army; Russia was adding 470,000 men to its military and slashing the time it needed to mobilize for war. Britain announced it would build two battleships for every one built by Berlin. Germany was, for the moment, Europe’s foremost military power. But by 1916 and 1917, it would be hopelessly overmatched. The result was a now-or-never mentality: Germany should “defeat the enemy while we still stand a chance of victory,” declared Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke, even if that meant “provoking a war in the near future.”

Now the theory returns to a semblance of sense, in noting that power struggles often give rise to competing coalitions, and that strategic containment/encirclement between or against coalitions, their loci, can fatally inflame tensions by raising the stakes while introducing opportunity pressures on action (these should be given more attention as such). Such a pattern is relevant to many historical cases. But on the other hand, to the case of China and the US, it is fairly likely in the medium term that China will only become stronger - not weaker - in the Pacific relative to the American coalition so long as it "bides its time"... If this estimation is mistaken or not accepted by Chinese planners, then an invasion attempt would really have to take place within 5 or so years to optimize its prospects, so we'll see what the case is.


This is the real trap the United States should worry about regarding China today—the trap in which an aspiring superpower peaks and then refuses to bear the painful consequences of descent.

Towards a general analysis of the contemporary I find scant evidence that China will be peaking in its influence or economic clout anytime this decade. If anything, we should be scrutinizing American foreign policy according to these theorized declinist proclivities, depending on the development of our domestic governance. The proffered theory could more easily produce a scenario of China building out overwhelming military advantage in the West Pacific that subsequently fails as a deterrent against an ultranationalist-led US, as it engages in rapid rearmament and brunksmanship aimed at reasserting lost primacy...


China is also approaching a demographic precipice: From 2020 to 2050, it will lose an astounding 200 million working-age adults—a population the size of Nigeria—and gain 200 million senior citizens. The fiscal and economic consequences will be devastating: Current projections suggest China’s medical and social security spending will have to triple as a share of GDP, from 10 percent to 30 percent, by 2050 just to prevent millions of seniors from dying of impoverishment and neglect.

Tangentially, I want to contend that demographic dividends and their inversions have become overrated for developed economies (among which we can count China for our purposes, to some extent). Throughout the industrial and post-industrial eras the elderly have been an economic encumbrance (no offense, readers) for the following reasons, primarily: low health, low education, and inability to sustain manual labor. By the mid-century this picture will have changed completely.

In 2050 today's Millennials, Chinese and American alike, will be tomorrow's Boomers, in terms of age range, demographic proportion, and arguably wealth and status (with the necessary caveat that Chinese Boomers are not comparable in wealth to American Boomers in the first place). They will also be qualitatively healthier and better-educated than any preceding generation in world history.

Simply put, Millennials will never match the decrepit image we have of Silents and the Greatest Generation - the main stock of the truly elderly throughout the 21st century so far. Despite the prevalence of so-called "diseases of affluence," they will be far better able than preceding cohorts, or coeval ones in poor countries, to manage independently far into their lifespans. The experience we all have of the elderly as a population is inextricable from the industrial context of those lives, people who by and large have seen their bodies wrecked by hard work, stress and interpersonal violence, inadequate nutrition, and the residuals of an age before the suppression of infectious and parasitic diseases; the Digital generations really have been raised in comparative freedom of such factors (note how this makes inequality across the life-course a more salient differentiator than ever, within groups - but that's a whole other subject). Their upbringing and extensive education will also permit them to continue to engage in the sorts of work that are relevant to the era - we don't lack for bodies to dig ditches - as well as prevent them from completely falling out of touch with contemporary culture the way anyone above 60 or 70 traditionally has.

It is simply a myth that advanced economies will soon suffer from a need/deficit for infinite young bodies flowing into the care economy (which is not to say that it isn't socially important or won't expand (https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/09/new-economy-caregiving/620160/)) and an elderly-fueled deficit in (non-care) consumption activity and tax revenue.

None of the above even takes into account further transformations in existing technologies and industrial relations...

My point here is just that while societies in East Asia and Europe will suffer some drag from the loss of demographic dividends and the coming explosion in over-65s, certainly relative to high(er)-immigration societies such as America, or rising African countries that come down the fertility curve, these trends have to be put in context of the times in which we find ourselves, not the former strictures of the 20th or 19th centuries. An inverted population pyramid is just not going to be fundamentally disadvantaging, because they're fairly straightforward to adapt to, given a certain hump (which I admit will be more arduous for China given its absolute rural population and current developmental stage than for, say, Germany). But then watch India, which is not more than a generation behind China (India has reportedly reached just above replacement rate), yet remains predominantly rural.

[Montmorency]

https://i.imgur.com/Hzgm9P2.jpg

"Why the long face?"



Entirely (https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29995/for-china-social-media-is-now-a-tool-for-disinformation) predictable (https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/127/2021/01/CyberTroop-Report-2020-v.2.pdf).


Cyber troop activity continues to increase around the world. This year, we found evidence of 81 countries using social media to spread computational propaganda and disinformation about politics. This has increased from last years’ report, in which we identified 70 countries with cyber troop activity



We can reflect, as Angela Merkel prepares to retire, that she is arguably the greatest conservative who ever lived. And yet even so, as a conservative, she has left her country utterly bereft of initiative and long-term reform for its structural and EU/foreign policy dimensions. Even the brightest, noblest, and wisest conservatives can just about manage an extended caretaker government. Stable-state ordoconservatism is not fascism, but as a political and philosophical ecosystem it inherently lacks the substance to produce ideas or answers for any identifiable problem.

And though the SPD will head the forming German government, under Merkel both the CDU and SPD have mutually assimilated toward the center to one of the greatest extents in the history of center-right/left competition. I expect paralysis and heightening of tension, as the reasons intensify for the post-Adenauer German center-right/left dropping from a combined 80-90% of the vote to under 50% in this election.

Surprising example (https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/14/the-undeniable-pessimism-of-angela-merkels-worldview/) of Merkel's combination of wisdom and inaction:


Merkel has a deep pessimism about the trajectory of Germany and Europe, as well as of the United States, in their competition with Beijing. Merkel has not spoken about this much in public. As her biographer Stefan Kornelius details in Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World, Merkel fears that open-society systems “might not survive, that democracy and the market economy might ultimately prove to be too weak.”

Sometimes the public gets a glimpse of Merkel’s gloom. After a meeting in Berlin during the eurozone crisis, then-Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov reported that Merkel had told him that “the Maya and many other civilizations have disappeared from the face of the earth.” She chose this dramatic example to emphasize her view of the fragility of Europe. While Merkel doesn’t fail to recognize China’s many domestic challenges, in her many trips to China she has come away deeply impressed with the speed and determination with which the country pursues its development goals. As the German magazine Der Spiegel reported, Merkel feels that “everything needs to move much faster, in Europe and in Germany.”

But in her view, internal blockades and a satisfaction with the status quo stop Germany and Europe from that. One of Merkel’s biggest failures is that after being elected chancellor she never fully shared her gloomy outlook with the German public, let alone tried to win political support for the unpopular measures that might change things for the better.

From Merkel’s view Germany’s and Europe’s inevitable decline in competitiveness and power is made worse by the trajectory of the United States. Merkel has long been concerned about domestic dysfunction in the United States. It was the Trump years that fundamentally shook her belief in the reliability of the United States as a partner for Europe. Very plausibly, she does not see Donald Trump as an accident and thinks another U.S. president turning away from or turning the fire on Europe may be just around the corner. In 2017, she expressed this during a campaign speech in a beer tent in Bavaria: “The era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent. … We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.”

How does one retire, go quietly into the night, without making an issue out of these priors? I agree fully with the insight paraphrased, but what for me conjures a metaphorical cocking shotgun and flaming sword raised high, for her only ever manifested as a pair of steepled hands.

[spmetla]

Merkel fears that open-society systems “might not survive, that democracy and the market economy might ultimately prove to be too weak.”

Sometimes the public gets a glimpse of Merkel’s gloom. After a meeting in Berlin during the eurozone crisis, then-Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov reported that Merkel had told him that “the Maya and many other civilizations have disappeared from the face of the earth.” She chose this dramatic example to emphasize her view of the fragility of Europe. While Merkel doesn’t fail to recognize China’s many domestic challenges, in her many trips to China she has come away deeply impressed with the speed and determination with which the country pursues its development goals. As the German magazine Der Spiegel reported, Merkel feels that “everything needs to move much faster, in Europe and in Germany.”

But in her view, internal blockades and a satisfaction with the status quo stop Germany and Europe from that. One of Merkel’s biggest failures is that after being elected chancellor she never fully shared her gloomy outlook with the German public, let alone tried to win political support for the unpopular measures that might change things for the better.


How does one retire, go quietly into the night, without making an issue out of these priors? I agree fully with the insight paraphrased, but what for me conjures a metaphorical cocking shotgun and flaming sword raised high, for her only ever manifested as a pair of steepled hands.

I whole-heartedly agree with you and it is one of the reasons I lament the lack of a vision to work toward. The leaders of the democratic west fail time and time again to have something for us all to work toward in common. We can't just be partner societies that oppose things. Opposing totalitarianism under Fascism or Soviet-Maoist-Communism was worth while but with the collapse of fascism in Europe and the collapse of the Soviet-Union there's been the abysmal end of history attitude.

We could start by defining what a free and open society is. What type of liberal-democracy can compete and survive in tomorrow's world. Surely we can promote and defend our interests without having to devolve into militarism and fascism again.
People want good governance and tend to be fearful of change; both should be able to be addressed to some degree without compromising our principles.
Immigration always worries conservatives and reactionaries, perhaps actual plans beyond the seesaw of amnesty/open borders or closed border/ race based criteria. This always has been and will be the biggest 'fear' that breeds racist nationalism; especially in European countries that have struggled for centuries to be totally free and dependent nation-states based on their common language/culture/ ethnicity (thinking a lot of Europe but especially former Warsaw pact countries).
Moving faster in Europe to compete with China would work better if liberal democracies stopped selling out all their advantages in pursuit of the bottom line. The adage of 'capitalists will compete to sell the rope they are hanged with' bides true of our huge multi-nationals that look at short term gains and profits at the expense of long term competitive advantages.

If the measures needed are unpopular but necessary then campaign for them. Climate change does need firm action, countries spending more on social measure than they can afford (Greece) need to change.

[Pannonian]

I whole-heartedly agree with you and it is one of the reasons I lament the lack of a vision to work toward. The leaders of the democratic west fail time and time again to have something for us all to work toward in common. We can't just be partner societies that oppose things. Opposing totalitarianism under Fascism or Soviet-Maoist-Communism was worth while but with the collapse of fascism in Europe and the collapse of the Soviet-Union there's been the abysmal end of history attitude.

We could start by defining what a free and open society is. What type of liberal-democracy can compete and survive in tomorrow's world. Surely we can promote and defend our interests without having to devolve into militarism and fascism again.
People want good governance and tend to be fearful of change; both should be able to be addressed to some degree without compromising our principles.
Immigration always worries conservatives and reactionaries, perhaps actual plans beyond the seesaw of amnesty/open borders or closed border/ race based criteria. This always has been and will be the biggest 'fear' that breeds racist nationalism; especially in European countries that have struggled for centuries to be totally free and dependent nation-states based on their common language/culture/ ethnicity (thinking a lot of Europe but especially former Warsaw pact countries).
Moving faster in Europe to compete with China would work better if liberal democracies stopped selling out all their advantages in pursuit of the bottom line. The adage of 'capitalists will compete to sell the rope they are hanged with' bides true of our huge multi-nationals that look at short term gains and profits at the expense of long term competitive advantages.

If the measures needed are unpopular but necessary then campaign for them. Climate change does need firm action, countries spending more on social measure than they can afford (Greece) need to change.

Fact checking might help. As it is, BSers opinions are held to be as worthwhile as those of industry experts, and each vote gained by lies is worth just as much as those following evidence. And lying is much quicker and easier to propagate than fact-checked truth.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Came across this interesting take on the recent AUKUS submarine deal:

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/when-you-re-hole-stop-digging-australia-and-nuke-sub-deal

Thoughts?

[spmetla]

Well the article pretty much just seems to be of the opinion that if you need Allies to contest China then just don't bother and spend that money on climate change.

By that same logic if you can't fix the global climate by yourself why bother?

It's a silly argument. Australia building a capability that they can maintain into the future is useful. The capability is not available in the near-term but that's no reason not to start now.

Defense spending just like climate change spending needs to be looking mid-long term to be effective and efficient.


As I have written recently, Australia needs to take a different approach to the consideration of its security, one that meets the tensions that will result from the rebalance of power that is underway in the Indo-Pacific and that addresses climate change.
Australia has for the past twenty years tried to accommodate Beijing and the US while positioning itself as sort of an even broker for both. Beijing's actions in the last decade have cause the Australians to change from accepting a peaceful rise of China to being willing to oppose a violent rise of China. China lashing out at Australia for daring to investigate the origins of COVID-19 are certainly indicators that while they US may throw its weight around a bit in the indo-pacific it's at least not to the level of expecting countries in the region to behave as client States.
Just like Australia needs to address climate change through global engagement as well as domestic investment into less harmful energy it also needs to change its defense posture to be credible enough to be relevant alongside regional and historic allies.

[Montmorency]

Twitter thread (https://twitter.com/SahilBloom/status/1444702393892024321)/blog post (https://sahilbloom.substack.com/p/chinas-energy-crisis) on the Chinese energy crisis. Striking tangential fact: European natural gas prices have more than quadrupled since Winter 2020.


More than half of China's mainland provinces have been forced to limit electricity usage due to shortages. According to a recent Bloomberg article, the Chinese microblogging site Weibo is filled with stories of people sharing how their daily lives are being impacted by the crunch—no tap water, no cell service, no traffic lights, and even a shortage of candles.

Electricity demand is up through the recovery, but hydro is running low (hot summer), there is a coal shortage (coal prices have tripled since 2019 or Winter 2020), coal imports are down (diplomatic rows with Australia and Mongolia, complete cessation of imports from the former), and because utility prices are fixed by the government, utilities prefer to tactically cut power rather than operate at a loss (this might sound familiar to some Americans).

Although:


Note: It is worth calling out that there is a difference between thermal coal (used for heating) and metallurgical coal (used for steel production and other industrial processes). Based on recent discussions, it is my understanding that Australian coal is predominantly metallurgical, meaning it would not have as direct an impact on the electricity market. Nevertheless, it is a supply dislocation worth calling out.

Moreover, despite our skepticism here, Xi's climate targets apparently do influence the Chinese government, with energy-intensive businesses being burdened by new curbs and blackouts.


The net impact: widespread energy shortages in China, sharp price increases, and continued production delays.

For supply chains, this means continued woes.

For consumers, this means rising prices.

In our interconnected economy, nobody is insulated from this disruption.

More on repercussions (https://twitter.com/SahilBloom/status/1444702393892024321) for Chinese production, and knock-ons to global pandemic recovery (even as China has fully vaccinated approximately all adults in the country).


Meanwhile, here is an analysis (https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/why-is-china-smashing-its-tech-industry) of China's crackdown on its tech industry with the point that China isn't really cracking down on "tech," but on consumer-facing digital platforms and social media; AI and hardware and anything that is conducive to military or industrial advantage is subsidized. So Xi might be deprioritizing what he perceives as unproductive, 'spiritually decadent' enterprise or consumption that disrupts social control and distorts financial and employment/educational markets.


It’s become apparent in the last few months that the Chinese leadership has moved towards the view that hard tech is more valuable than products that take us more deeply into the digital world. Xi declared this year that while digitization is important, “we must recognize the fundamental importance of the real economy… and never deindustrialize.” This expression preceded the passage of securities and antitrust regulations, thus also pummeling finance, which along with tech make up the most glamorous sectors today.

If you’re going to fight a cold war or a hot war against the U.S. or Japan or India or whoever, you need a bunch of military hardware. That means you need materials, engines, fuel, engineering and design, and so on. You also need chips to run that hardware, because military tech is increasingly software-driven. And of course you need firmware as well. You’ll also need surveillance capability, for keeping an eye on your opponents, for any attempts you make to destabilize them, and for maintaining social control in case they try to destabilize you.

It’s easy for Americans to forget this now, but there was a time when “ability to win wars” was the driving goal of technological innovation. The NDRC and the OSRD were the driving force behind government sponsorship of research and technology in World War 2, and the NSF and DARPA grew out of this tradition. Defense spending has traditionally been a huge component of government research-spending in the U.S., and many of America’s most successful private-sector tech industries are in some way spinoffs of those defense-related efforts.

After the Cold War, our priorities shifted from survival to enjoyment. Technologies like Facebook and Amazon.com, which are fundamentally about leisure and consumption, went from being fun and profitable spinoffs of defense efforts to the center of what Americans thought of as “tech”.

But China never really shifted out of survival mode. Yes, China’s leaders embraced economic growth, but that growth has always been toward the telos of comprehensive national power. China’s young people may be increasingly ready to cash out and have some fun, but the leadership is just not there yet. They’ve got bigger fish to fry — they have to avenge the Century of Humiliation and claim China’s rightful place in the sun and blah blah.


The Chinese government has called video games “spiritual opium”, sending video game stocks plunging. Chalk up another win for my theory.

Well, yes but no. :sweatdrop:

At any rate, this is a net negative for the cause of world peace, since a Brave New World where the proles are all electronic vampires intubated on Ethernet* or sensorily-ensconced in a radio cocoon is a world with less smalltime violence and interstate conflict, in principle. What do all the above phenomena smount to? Beyond my ken of course.


*A turn of phrase I'm proud of but which suffers from increasing anachronism

[spmetla]

U.S. troops deployed to Taiwan to train local forces amid growing tensions with China, report says
https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2021-10-07/taiwan-china-american-marines-troops-3161550.html

U.S. troops have been deployed to Taiwan for at least the last year to train local military forces to bolster the island's defenses amid increasing tensions with mainland China, The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday.

Some two dozen U.S. special operators and a small contingent of Marines are deployed in Taiwan, according to the newspaper, which cited unnamed U.S. officials. The special operators have worked with Taiwanese ground troops and the Marines have worked with maritime forces on small-boat operations, according to the Journal.

The Pentagon neither confirmed nor denied the report. A spokesman said American support for Taiwan has remained consistent and is grounded in ensuring “peace, security and stability in the Indo-Pacific — including in the Taiwan Strait.”

“I don’t have any comments on specific operations, engagements, or training, but I would like to highlight that our support for and defense relationship with Taiwan remains aligned against the current threat posed by the People’s Republic of China,” Pentagon spokesman John Supple said in a statement Thursday after The Wall Street Journal report was published. “We urge Beijing to honor its commitment to the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences.”

The news report comes as China has increased its pressure on Taiwan and also invested heavily in recent years to modernize its military. Taiwanese officials said this week that nearly 150 Chinese military planes, including fighter jets and bombers, passed through Taiwan’s air defense zone between Friday and Monday.

“I would note, the [People’s Republic of China] has stepped up efforts to intimidate and pressure Taiwan and other allies and partners, including increasing military activities conducted in the vicinity of Taiwan, East China Sea, and South China Sea, which we believe are destabilizing and increase the risk of miscalculation,” Supple said.

Taiwan Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng on Wednesday warned reporters in Taipei that relations with China had reached a 40-year low and Beijing could be preparing to invade Taiwan by 2025.

While Taiwan has its own democratic government, Beijing considers it a renegade province that must, and eventually, be unified politically with the mainland, perhaps by force.

The deployment of American forces to Taiwan is on a rotational basis, meaning troops regularly cycle in and out of Taiwan to replace one another, The Wall Street Journal reported. While the U.S. presence is small, it is designed to boost Taiwanese confidence that it could fend off Chinese aggression, according to the newspaper.

The White House declined comment on the report. It announced Wednesday that President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping had agreed to hold a virtual summit to address issues between the two nations before the end of the year.

Biden and Xi said earlier this year that they had agreed to abide by the “one China” policy forged in the 1970s, in which the United States officially recognizes China instead of Taiwan. That pact lets the U.S. unofficially support Taiwan, including with arms sales to defend itself.

In May, Christopher Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, told senators during his confirmation hearing for that position that the United States should strongly consider deploying American troops to improve Taiwan’s defenses.

Taiwanese media last year reported some American forces, including Green Berets and Navy SEALs, had participated in training events on Taiwan in recent years, but those deployments were never confirmed by the Pentagon, which has not acknowledged the presence of American troops on the island for 40 years as part of the “one China policy.”

Some of the operations that American forces are conducting in Taiwan might be classified, but the Pentagon also did not seek to disclose their presence there because of political sensitivities with China, especially amid the growing tensions in the region and between Beijing and the United States, the U.S. officials told The Wall Street Journal.

Presence of US Special Forces and some US Marines in a training role is definitely a big deal. Even these few personnel that might be in harms way would significantly change the calculus an overt PRC attack.

The US used to do this and have forces regularly stationed there until the late 70s when the one-China policies really came in.

Will certainly cause a reaction in China as if they weren't already aware they'll be irate and if they were aware than they'll need to do something to assuage domestic public opinion.

[spmetla]

ANALYSIS-With an eye on China, Japan's ruling party makes unprecedented defense spending pledge
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/analysis-with-an-eye-on-china-japan-s-ruling-party-makes-unprecedented-defense-spending-pledge/ar-AAPrVfk?ocid=msedgntp

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) included a goal of spending 2% of GDP - about $100 billion - or more on the military for the first time in its policy platform ahead of a national election this month.

Experts don't expect new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to double spending anytime soon, given Japan's debt-saddled public finances and a pandemic-stricken economy. But it is a sign that the pacifist nation could over time abandon a commitment to keep military budgets within 1% of GDP - a number that for decades has eased concern at home and abroad about any revival of the militarism that led Japan into World War Two.

"LDP conservative leaders want the party to give it up," said Yoichiro Sato, an international relations professor at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, referring to the de facto spending cap, which he called "sacrosanct for Japanese liberals."

Japan’s Largest Warship Launches U.S. Marine F-35s; First Fighters to Fly from Japanese Ship Since WWII
https://news.usni.org/2021/10/05/video-japans-largest-warship-launches-u-s-marine-f-35s-first-fighters-to-fly-from-japanese-ship-since-wwii

Two Marine Corps F-35B Lighting II Joint Strike Fighters took off and landed on Japan’s largest warship, JS Izumo (DDH-183), on Oct.3, marking the first time that fixed-wing aircraft have operated off a Japanese warship since World War II.

The two F-35Bs from the “Bats” of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 242 flew from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, to operate on Izumo to test modifications to the big deck warship so the short takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) version of the F-35 can operate from the ship.

Looks like Japan is ramping up their Defense spending in response to China's recent actions and increase in spending. The decision to modify their "Helicopter Destroyers" into "Multipurpose Ships" ie Light Aircraft Carriers is certainly significant as Japan has avoided 'offensive' military hardware since WWII.


https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-09/china-proposes-bans-on-private-capital-participation-in-media

China unveiled a proposal late Friday, reinforcing its plan to weaken private capital’s influence over a wide range of media activities.

Private capital would be barred from news gathering and distribution operations, according to a public consultation paper posted on the website of National Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic planner.

Also off-limits would be private investments in the establishment and operation of news outlets, including news agencies, newspaper publishers and broadcasters. They will also not be permitted to reproduce news content generated by foreign media.

The move is the latest salvo in China’s broad regulatory crackdown this year on companies in industries including ride-hailing, e-commerce and after-school tutoring. The MSCI China Index has sunk 16% this year on concerns about global inflation and interest rates, geopolitical tensions, how the new regulations would reshape businesses and where Beijing might strike next.

The proposed bans are part of a broader document that also touches on entry barriers for various other industries including finance, Internet and agriculture. The seven-day public consultation is scheduled to end Oct. 14.

While it wasn’t immediately clear whether the proposed restrictions unveiled Friday are fresh curbs or incremental rules designed to close loopholes that private investors had exploited, they do signal regulators’ intent to step up enforcement.

Private capital would further be banned from live streaming events that may sway political and public opinion, according to the proposal. That includes those in the realms of politics, the economy, military and foreign policy, and important social, cultural, scientific and sports events.

This would be a hell of a change in their already controlled media environment. Would be crazy to revert to only State approved media outlets and new sources. China is doing an incredible job of transforming themselves into everything considered oppressive and evil to the 'free world.'

Not being able to reproduce news from foreign outlets will certainly limit any ability for the US to try and engage the Chinese population to sell our side of the story on anything. I imagine access to Voice of America in Mandarin will certainly be banned if it wasn't already.
https://www.voachinese.com/

Huawei Rejected by Three in Four Canadians on Eve of 5G Decision
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/huawei-rejected-by-three-in-four-canadians-on-eve-of-5g-decision-1.1664829

More than 75% of Canadians say that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government should ban China’s Huawei Technologies Co. from taking part in the build-out of fifth-generation telecommunications networks, a new poll shows.

Opposition to Huawei’s participation in 5G is up from 53% in 2019, according to the poll by Nanos Research for the Globe and Mail released on Monday. Trudeau hasn’t ruled out including Huawei and is expected to make a decision soon.
The choice by Canadian voters to reject Huawei in their communications systems is certainly an indicator of how China's reputation abroad and that of its companies has changed for the worse.

[spmetla]

New Zealand could join AUKUS security pact to boost cyber technologies

New Zealand has opened the door to joining the AUKUS defence pact with Australia, Britain and the United States while maintaining its ban on nuclear-powered submarines.

The country’s top diplomat in Canberra said her nation could join the agreement to collaborate on the development of emerging cyber technologies including artificial intelligence quantum computing.
New Zealand’s high commissioner to Australia, Dame Annette King, said AUKUS in no way changed the security and intelligence ties her country had with Australia, the US and Britain.

While New Zealand would never be involved in the development of nuclear-powered submarines, Dame Annette said it welcomed the US and Britain’s increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

“We have reiterated our collective objective to deliver peace and stability in our region and the preservation of an international rules-based system,” she told The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age in a wide-ranging interview ahead of her country hosting the APEC summit’s leaders’ meeting next month.
Britain’s departing Chief of the Defence Staff, Nicholas Carter, last week suggested the trilateral security pact could be expanded to include other allies such as Japan, New Zealand and Canada.

Asked whether New Zealand would like to join AUKUS to collaborate on other technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, she said: “It’s been made clear to us that other countries are going to be welcome to be involved in other parts of the architecture”.

“And cyber is one area that we’d certainly be interested in, but there’s no detail yet – so we will be looking for detail.”

When the AUKUS agreement was announced last month, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern confirmed that any nuclear-powered submarines Australia acquired under the initiative would not be allowed into her country’s territorial waters.
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/new-zealand-could-join-aukus-security-pact-to-boost-cyber-technologies-20211025-p592tr.html

I'm actually quite surprised that NZ wants its hand in this too of course excluding any nuclear vessels in their ports. I'd have figured Canada more likely would join than NZ as New Zealand had worked hard to not be too aligned with the US.

Of course these seems more limited to the cyber and intel side which already has a lot of cooperation under 5 Eyes. Either way, interesting development.

[Montmorency]

A poem

Slaves cannot breathe in America; if their lungs
Receive our air, that moment they are free
They touch our country and their shackles fall.
That is noble, and bespeaks a nation proud
And jealous of the blessing. Spread it then,
And let it circulate through every vein
Of all your empire; that where America's power
Is felt, mankind may feel her mercy too.

[Montmorency]

Things I Did Not Know (https://twitter.com/aniemyer/status/1455008161090449411): After their defeat and loss at Copenhagen in 1807, the Danes responded by planting 90,000 oak trees toward the Navy’s rebirth. The Danish Nature Agency, successor to the royal forester, informed the Defense Ministry in 2007 that their trees were ready.

Forget China vs. America, they're small-time: Denmark is finally ready to unleash its full power.

EDIT: This was the analogy for Nordsøimperiet I was looking for.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z77JFw2D6f8

[spmetla]

Always best to beware of Danes.


China’s advice to stockpile sparks speculation of Taiwan war

BEIJING (AP) — A seemingly innocuous government recommendation for Chinese people to store necessities for an emergency quickly sparked scattered instances of panic-buying and online speculation: Is China going to war with Taiwan?

The answer is probably not — most analysts think military hostilities are not imminent — but the posts on social media show the possibility is on people’s minds and drew out a flurry of war-mongering comments.

Taiwan is a self-governing island of 24 million people China regards as a renegade province that should come under its rule. Tensions have risen sharply recently, with China sending a growing number of warplanes on sorties near the island and the U.S. selling arms to Taiwan and deepening its ties with the government.

Most residents interviewed in Beijing, the Chinese capital, thought war was unlikely but acknowledged the rising tensions. They generally favored bringing Taiwan under Chinese rule by peaceful means, the official position of China’s long-ruling Communist Party.

“I don’t feel panic but I think we should be more alert about this than in the past,” said Hu Chunmei, who was taking a neighborhood walk.

War fears or not, there were scattered reports of runs on rice, noodles and cooking oil in some Chinese cities, according to local media. The more immediate worry for some was the possibility of neighborhood lockdowns as a COVID-19 outbreak spreads in several provinces.

The government moved quickly to try to tamp down fears with assurances of sufficient supplies. A bright yellow sign in an aisle of a Beijing supermarket asked customers to buy reasonably and not to listen to rumors or stockpile goods.

The online speculation started with a Commerce Ministry notice posted Monday evening about a plan to ensure the supply and stable price of vegetables and other necessities for the winter and spring. A line in it encouraged families to store some necessities for daily life and emergencies.

That was enough to set off some hoarding and a discussion on social media that the ministry could be signaling people should stock up for war.

China’s state media has covered the rising tensions with Taiwan heavily, including the often-tough words exchanged between China on one side and the U.S. and Taiwan on the other.

“It is natural to have aroused some imagination,” social commentator Shi Shusi said. “We should believe the government’s explanations, but the underlying anxiety deserves our thought.”

He said the populist views cheerleading for war don’t represent majority opinion but do send a signal or warning to Taiwan.

Other developments fueled the war speculation. One person shared a screenshot of a list of recommended emergency equipment for families issued in August by the government in Xiamen, a coastal city near an outlying Taiwanese island. An unverified report — denied Wednesday by a military-affiliated social media account — said veterans were being called back to service to prepare for combat.

It’s difficult to gauge how many people interpreted the notice as a possible prelude to war, but the reaction was strong enough to prompt a state media response the next day.

The Economic Daily, a government-owned newspaper, said people’s imagination shouldn’t run so wild, explaining that the advice was meant for people who may find themselves suddenly locked down because of a COVID-19 outbreak.

Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of the Global Times newspaper, blamed the the online speculation on the amplification of public opinion during a time of tension.

“I do not believe that the country wants to send a signal to the public at this time through a notice from the Commerce Ministry that people need to ‘hurry up and prepare for war,’” he wrote.

Zhang Xi, another Beijing resident, ruled out the possibility of war and counseled patience in a dispute extending to when Taiwan and China split during the civil war that brought Mao Zedong’s Communists to power in 1949.

“This is a leftover from history, and it’s impossible to solve this right away,” she said.

___

Associated Press researcher Yu Bing, video producers Olivia Zhang and Caroline Chen and photographer Ng Han Guan contributed to this report.
https://apnews.com/article/lifestyle-china-media-social-media-beijing-f1a3711fb0e4e7ac502d21165f406554

While it looks like a misinterpreted government recommendation for what may be a harsh winter given the supply chain problems it is worrisome that the Chinese populace sees this as prep for a war with Taiwan.
For me personally this makes me wonder how worried the Chinese leadership is about economic stability in the next few months.

China and Russia revive push to lift UN sanctions on North Korea
https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/02/asia/china-russia-un-sanctions-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html

China and Russia are pushing the United Nations Security Council to ease sanctions on North Korea, reviving a similar previous attempt that had flailed in 2019.

The two countries filed a reworked draft resolution, seen by Reuters on Monday, that proposes removing a ban on Pyongyang's exports of statues, seafood and textiles, as well as lifting a cap on refined petroleum imports.
China and Russia want the 15-member council to remove those sanctions "with the intent of enhancing the livelihood of the civilian population" in the isolated Asian state, according to the resolution.
North Korea has been subject to UN sanctions since 2006 over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
The draft resolution also includes other measures first proposed by Russia and China nearly two years ago, including lifting a ban on North Koreans working abroad and exempting inter-Korean rail and road cooperation projects from sanctions.
Several UN diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the refreshed draft resolution would find little support. In 2019 Russia and China held two informal rounds of talks on the draft resolution, but never formally tabled it for a vote.
Diplomats said on Monday that China and Russia have not yet scheduled any talks on their new draft resolution. A resolution needs nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the United States, France, Britain, Russia or China to pass.
The UN missions of Russia and China did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the new text, which diplomats said was circulated to council members on Friday.
"It has been always China's will that we should also address the humanitarian dimension caused by the sanctions imposed by the Security Council," China's UN Ambassador Zhang Jun told reporters last month, adding again that the 2019 draft resolution "remains on the table."

While it's clear that the sanctions are forcing NK to the negotiating table I'm not a fan of lifting sanctions that that raises revenue for their regime's weapons programs. Would be nice to not have the NK people starve because of it but that seems partially due to the closed border even with China and reduced trade for food stuffs there.

[Montmorency]

The online speculation started with a Commerce Ministry notice posted Monday evening about a plan to ensure the supply and stable price of vegetables and other necessities for the winter and spring. A line in it encouraged families to store some necessities for daily life and emergencies.

Sounds like the exact sort of messaging (https://www.ready.gov/) the US government (https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/zombie/index.htm) engages in. Have a go-bag with all the neccessities ready at all times, a gallon of drinking water per person per day for 3 days of sheltering in place, etc.


Pyongyang's exports of statues

???


Impoverished North Korea (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-un-statues/u-n-decapitates-north-koreas-statue-export-business-idUSKBN13Q4Z8) is not known for a bustling manufacturing industry but has earned a reputation in some African states for a highly visible export - its huge socialist-style statues.

Well, that's one way to specialize an economy.


EDIT: In another moment (https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1863/6384364?login=true) of relief courtesy of Trump's malleability, it seems the United States was very nearly put in the position of having to walk back NATO withdrawal three years ago.

[spmetla]

Sounds like the exact sort of messaging the US government engages in. Have a go-bag with all the neccessities ready at all times, a gallon of drinking water per person per day for 3 days of sheltering in place, etc.

Exactly except that it's usually only emphasized as disaster preparedness which is why the timing of it is off. I think the disaster may be an economic one though apparently the Chinese main street sees a war with Taiwan as more likely given the focus and rhetoric ramp up of the last year.
The trouble with Kaisa group today and Evergrande still looming together with the CCP crack down on free press, 'free' enterprise and so on are troubling when put together with the revanchist rhetoric.


In another moment of relief courtesy of Trump's malleability, it seems the United States was very nearly put in the position of having to walk back NATO withdrawal three years ago.
So glad he's out of office. I may disagree with some of Biden's policies and the progressive-Dems in general of a few major issues and approaches to problems but at least it's not the courting with one party rule quasi-fascism that the Reps-Trump Cult have veered toward while rejecting all ties with the 'free-world' with NATO and the EU being such large targets instead of allies.

[Montmorency]

Something about Germany (https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/german-navy-chief-vows-long-term-commitment-to-indo-pacific/) and the Pacific.

Looking past rhetoric, I recently learned that Merkel has long been a stalwart of the Orban regime in Hungary, a factor in his ability to resist European disapproval. In fact, both Merkel's CDU/CSU and Orban's Fidesz are members of the "center-right" European People's Party Group in the EU Parliament; she has repeatedly thwarted attempts by constituent parties to evict Fidesz, until her retirement. This is presumably to support a favorable environment for German manufacturing interests in Hungary.

Compares to how the United States defense establishment has approved of, even encouraged, Russian and Chinese anti-satellite technology development because it believes that any international effort to restrict them would infringe on US missile defense aspirations.

:daisy: who can't see past their noses.


Also (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/us/us-airstrikes-civilian-deaths.html?searchResultPosition=1), a reminder that air strikes are no better than drone strikes in their humanitarian record.


In the last days of the battle against the Islamic State in Syria, when members of the once-fierce caliphate were cornered in a dirt field next to a town called Baghuz, a U.S. military drone circled high overhead, hunting for military targets. But it saw only a large crowd of women and children huddled against a river bank.

Without warning, an American F-15E attack jet streaked across the drone’s high-definition field of vision and dropped a 500-pound bomb on the crowd, swallowing it in a shuddering blast. As the smoke cleared, a few people stumbled away in search of cover. Then a jet tracking them dropped one 2,000-pound bomb, then another, killing most of the survivors.

It was March 18, 2019. At the U.S. military’s busy Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, uniformed personnel watching the live drone footage looked on in stunned disbelief, according to one officer who was there.

“Who dropped that?” a confused analyst typed on a secure chat system being used by those monitoring the drone, two people who reviewed the chat log recalled. Another responded, “We just dropped on 50 women and children.”

An initial battle damage assessment quickly found that the number of dead was actually about 70.

The Baghuz strike was one of the largest civilian casualty incidents of the war against the Islamic State, but it has never been publicly acknowledged by the U.S. military. The details, reported here for the first time, show that the death toll was almost immediately apparent to military officials. A legal officer flagged the strike as a possible war crime that required an investigation. But at nearly every step, the military made moves that concealed the catastrophic strike. The death toll was downplayed. Reports were delayed, sanitized and classified. United States-led coalition forces bulldozed the blast site. And top leaders were not notified.

The Defense Department’s independent inspector general began an inquiry, but the report containing its findings was stalled and stripped of any mention of the strike.

“Leadership just seemed so set on burying this. No one wanted anything to do with it,” said Gene Tate, an evaluator who worked on the case for the inspector general’s office and agreed to discuss the aspects that were not classified. “It makes you lose faith in the system when people are trying to do what’s right but no one in positions of leadership wants to hear it.”




And I'd like to make a supplementary point about Afghanistan's reconstruction. In 2019's presidential election, which Ghani won with a bare majority, there was a turnout of 1.8 million voters, less than 20% of the 9.7 million voters, itself an electorate of only around a quarter of the Afghan population of 33-38 million in 2019 - of which up to half should have been of majority age. In short, VEPT (voting-eligible population turnout) in 2019, the height of the Taliban resurgence, 15 years after the formal establishment of the Afghan Republic, was around 10%.

Whar legitimatasi?

[spmetla]

ooking past rhetoric, I recently learned that Merkel has long been a stalwart of the Orban regime in Hungary, a factor in his ability to resist European disapproval. In fact, both Merkel's CDU/CSU and Orban's Fidesz are members of the "center-right" European People's Party Group in the EU Parliament; she has repeatedly thwarted attempts by constituent parties to evict Fidesz, until her retirement. This is presumably to support a favorable environment for German manufacturing interests in Hungary.

Well she is definitely looking out for her own interests but frankly what politicians don't especially those that have been in power more than a decade? Will be interesting to see the post-Merkel Germany, the world and Germany's place in it has changed significantly during her Chancellorship.


Compares to how the United States defense establishment has approved of, even encouraged, Russian and Chinese anti-satellite technology development because it believes that any international effort to restrict them would infringe on US missile defense aspirations.

I think the only real US encouragement of their efforts are to use methods that aren't a danger to existing satellites and that don't add to the debris around Earth. US tests have been on objects in low earth orbit to ensure the debris burns up in the atmosphere. Having the Astro/Cosmonauts in the ISS have to shelter in the outer parts of the ISS in the event of debris impact for several days is a direct result of irresponsible Russian testing.

Missile defense is actually a really important thing to have given the amount of 'tactical' missiles possessed by American's rivals/enemies. I still think it's an embarrassment to the US that following Trump's assassination strike on the Iranian general that the US Soldiers in Iraq were vulnerable to Iranian missile attack because no patriot batteries had been deployed, instead they were in Saudi Arabia protecting them from Houthi missile attacks. His attack was stupid enough but if you're going to play with fire can you at least prep the ground a bit in anticipation of a response.
We're really lucky that those strikes killed no US troops and that the Iranians shot down that civilian liner in Tehran leading to a step down of tensions. A general war with Iran was a very real possibility. RIP to those civilians but it got the Mullahs in Iran to have to focus on domestic politics for a bit due to that SNAFU.


Also, a reminder that air strikes are no better than drone strikes in their humanitarian record.
Of course they aren't, the accuracy isn't better at all, it's just an unmanned platform. The DoD's IG office has a spotty record and is certainly in need of some congressional oversight as are all IGs. If the IG avenues are safe and effective we might have more whistle blowers encouraged which may be bad for reputation but in the end better than guys like Snowden feeling their only avenue was to give journalists lots of classified stuff.
It's a shame more innocents died again and likely no one was held accountable. When doing artillery or air strikes there's generally a procedure called Clearance of Fires, someone in that procedure screwed up and people died as a result.


And I'd like to make a supplementary point about Afghanistan's reconstruction. In 2019's presidential election, which Ghani won with a bare majority, there was a turnout of 1.8 million voters, less than 20% of the 9.7 million voters, itself an electorate of only around a quarter of the Afghan population of 33-38 million in 2019 - of which up to half should have been of majority age. In short, VEPT (voting-eligible population turnout) in 2019, the height of the Taliban resurgence, 15 years after the formal establishment of the Afghan Republic, was around 10%.

Whar legitimatasi?

It's well known that turnout had declined massively in the past few years, the biggest driving factor being Taliban threats in the rural majority of the population combined with disgust with the current government. The turnout was good at the start of the GiROA but the last decade has seen minority votes as the norm.
What percentage of the ballot have the Taliban gotten in their recent elections? Oh yeah, we won't see elections there again.

[Montmorency]

I'm talking about strategic missile defense. I've read that the promise of silver bullets like Star Wars held Reagan back from pursuing more mutual disarmament with Gorbachev, and that when Russia and China began pursuing anti-satellite capability in the 2000s, warning the US establishment about it multiple times, DoD and State declined to contest or negotiate because they saw any curtailment to anti-satellite weapons on international scale as implying curtailment of US missile defense development. (And, to be clear, it is heavily contested whether second-strike missile defense has any utility.)


What percentage of the ballot have the Taliban gotten in their recent elections? Oh yeah, we won't see elections there again.

Right, but it's pretty clear why this polity did not survive, with terminally-declining faith in the ability of the state to provide law, order, development, and security - reflected in the collapse, rather than growth, of political participation. Like I said in August, just because the GIROA was unpopular doesn't make the Taliban popular. And like so many stories from the "Third World," we here still living in comfort would do well to heed the lessons.

What happened in Afghanistan is precisely what Hitler imagined would happen to the Soviet Union once he "kicked in" the door, but Stalin, Russian imperial legacy, and Soviet ideology had made a stable country with something to defend, whereas the Islamic Republic was just Kabul, an American security guarantee, and a few shitty paid-off warlords with no real power or legitimacy.


I'm surprised you haven't noted the latest tensions along the Ukrainian border, which seem in part to follow from Russian oil and gas booming for the first time since 2014 (context (https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-4/pdf/the-2014-plunge-in-import-petroleum-prices-what-happened.pdf)).

[spmetla]

I'm talking about strategic missile defense. I've read that the promise of silver bullets like Star Wars held Reagan back from pursuing more mutual disarmament with Gorbachev, and that when Russia and China began pursuing anti-satellite capability in the 2000s, warning the US establishment about it multiple times, DoD and State declined to contest or negotiate because they saw any curtailment to anti-satellite weapons on international scale as implying curtailment of US missile defense development. (And, to be clear, it is heavily contested whether second-strike missile defense has any utility.)

That's the same program I was referencing. The orbital satellite "star wars" lasers was rightfully abandoned as unfeasible in the 1980s. Ground/Sea based interceptors are the only solution until energy weapons are feasible enough to deploy around the globe or perhaps in space though this would be a real militarization of space that might not be politically worth it.

Russia and China don't want the US pursuing anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM) because they think it somehow degrades their capability of MAD. The US ABM though unless scaled drastically would never be able to defend against a peer threat with a triad of attack capabilities, hundreds of missiles, multiple warheads per missile, not to mention the less than perfect intercept chance of the current systems.
The US system is really only useful for containing smaller regional threats like North Korea or Iran. It's worth the effort of the US and its allies in Europe and Asia to seek such a capability otherwise North Korea, Iran, and whatever other regional threats will always be able to essentially do nuclear blackmail to limit any strong measures in reaction to whatever provocations short of outright war they do.


Right, but it's pretty clear why this polity did not survive, with terminally-declining faith in the ability of the state to provide law, order, development, and security - reflected in the collapse, rather than growth, of political participation. Like I said in August, just because the GIROA was unpopular doesn't make the Taliban popular. And like so many stories from the "Third World," we here still living in comfort would do well to heed the lessons.

Yes, all true, however with the Taliban clearly not wanting to make substantial concessions (minority rights, journalism, pledges against terrorism) in return for international recognition it will continue to devolve into a cyst for the region.

Only time will tell if the Taliban are better for the Afghan people than the corrupt government of GIROA though in the short term the price for peace has been increased starvation, fuel scarcity, oppression of minorities, and economic collapse of everything that depended on government investment/spending.


I'm surprised you haven't noted the latest tensions along the Ukrainian border, which seem in part to follow from Russian oil and gas booming for the first time since 2014 (context).

I've been watching it as well but see it less as a result of an oil boom and more as an opportunity for Putin due to European instability due to internal COVID issues as well as the Belarus migrant crisis. Likely this is a test to see if Biden will be a pushover like Obama was and by creating a foreign policy crisis for EU and NATO while those member nations are focused on domestic issues and problems is the best way to fracture the unity of either organization and work toward his goal of a disunited Europe politically and militarly.

I think I've mentioned before my worry about the Winter Olympics being used as a time for creating a crisis by China, but perhaps it would be Russia to do so. With Europe depending on Russia for a third of its energy it is somewhat impotent to even increase sanctions during the winter months when sourcing fuel shipments from elsewhere would be too slow to respond in time.

My worst fear is that China and Russia create a crisis at the same time. Little green men doing something in Eastern Ukraine during the Winter Olympics with China perhaps arresting the Taiwan/Taipei athletes as 'separatists' or taking overt action against Taiwan's outlying islands would create two major crises which the US would struggle to adequately respond to at the same time. With foreign athletes and diplomats in China as sorta pawns and the EU dependent on Russia for energy security there would be a real impotent reaction at the most from US allies.

Most likely though I just see this as Putin essentially showing the Ukraine how limited and impotent the support from the US, EU, and NATO will be. If Russia is just doing a massive training exercise it's certainly allowed to do that just as the US does with its allies elsewhere which is why I hadn't really commented as my worst-case scenario while possible seems very unlikely.

I don't know how much I'd trust the Ukrainian defense minister but always alarming to read about though:
Russia preparing to attack Ukraine by late January: Ukraine defense intelligence agency chief
https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2021/11/20/russia-preparing-to-attack-ukraine-by-late-january-ukraine-defense-intelligence-agency-chief/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2011.22.2021&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief

Russia has more than 92,000 troops amassed around Ukraine’s borders and is preparing for an attack by the end of January or beginning of February, the head of Ukraine’s defense intelligence agency told Military Times.

Such an attack would likely involve airstrikes, artillery and armor attacks followed by airborne assaults in the east, amphibious assaults in Odessa and Mariupul and a smaller incursion through neighboring Belarus, Ukraine Brig. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov told Military Times Saturday morning in an exclusive interview.
Russia’s large-scale Zapad 21 military exercise earlier this year proved, for instance, that they can drop upwards of 3,500 airborne and special operations troops at once, he said.
.......

This is of course the Ukrainian cry for help which given together with the news of EU hoping to be capable of deploying 5000 troops without US help by 2025 is certainly an indicator of how weak the EU is currently and how little help the Ukraine can hope for.
EU to aim for rapid deployment force without U.S. help by 2025, document says
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/eu-aim-rapid-deployment-force-without-us-assets-by-2025-document-says-2021-11-16/

BRUSSELS, Nov 16 (Reuters) - The European Union is considering a joint military force of up to 5,000 troops by 2025 to intervene in a range of crises and without relying on the United States, according to a draft plan.

The "EU Rapid Deployment Capacity" should be made up of land, sea and air components that could be swapped in and out of any standing force, depending on the crisis, according to the confidential 28-page document dated Nov. 9 and seen by Reuters.

EU foreign and defence ministers began debating the plan on Monday evening in Brussels and continued on Tuesday, aiming to settle on a final document by March next year.

Italy and France, two of the EU's military powers, welcomed the draft. The view of Germany's incoming federal coalition government, expected soon, will prove critical.

"The document combines a high level of ambition but also makes concrete and operational proposals. It's a good balance," French Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly told reporters. Her Italian counterpart, Lorenzo Guerini, said it would also be complementary to NATO and strengthen transatlantic ties.

Two decades after EU leaders first agreed to set up a 50,000-60,000-strong force but failed to make it operational, the draft strategy by the bloc's foreign policy chief Josep Borrell is the most concrete effort to create a standalone military force that does not rely on U.S. assets.

[Furunculus]

Two enduring and implacable requirements for elective warfare in the modern era:
capability
willpower

Even if the EU fields the capability to deploy a brigade sized force into a theatre of war, I suspect it will never be employed in such a scenario!

willpower
The decision to commit to an open-ended spend in blood and treasure is not easily reached under lowest-common-denominator compromise haggling.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Two enduring and implacable requirements for elective warfare:
capability
willpower....
words removed by responder

[Montmorency]

Has the tech been worth it, or effective in curtailing nuclear blackmail?

Here's an example (https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/washington/23satellite.html) of what I meant.

US rejecting (https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2012/1/12/us-rejects-europes-proposed-space-code-of-conduct) EU's condemnation of anti-satellite tests by China as "too restrictive."

If it were possible, assuring the neutrality of the orbital zone is arguably preferable to chasing what looks like a mirage of nuclear defense - and alternatively, a legitimate screen would necessitate a global arms race by the logic of nuclear balance.


What I will say for Russia is that if they ever make good on their bluff to throttle gas and oil to Europe, they will have guaranteed a very rapid subsequent phaseout of petroleum (for renewables/electricity) in the European economy. They can't enforce a friendly government in Ukraine by brute strength, since it would always provoke a rebellious attitude among the mass of Ukrainians. They can't occupy Ukraine militarily for long - a country easy to flood with weapons and already well-stocked with them - before the human and material costs topple Putin's government. China is simply much stronger than Russia, because any overt aggressive measures that Russia could take to secure short-term objectives would severely damage its position in the long-term.


EDIT: Also, I didn't look at it from that perspective when I read it, but the story of the war crime bombing I linked above is also a commentary about how corrupted the War on Terror has made our SF/SOF. Even the CIA agreed, assessing that our forces would just invoke self-defense to summon airstrikes indiscriminately with the expectation that they would never be investigated or challenged.


The Times investigation found that the bombing had been called in by a classified American special operations unit, Task Force 9, which was in charge of ground operations in Syria. The task force operated in such secrecy that at times it did not inform even its own military partners of its actions. In the case of the Baghuz bombing, the American Air Force command in Qatar had no idea the strike was coming, an officer who served at the command center said.

In the minutes after the strike, an alarmed Air Force intelligence officer in the operations center called over an Air Force lawyer in charge of determining the legality of strikes. The lawyer ordered the F-15E squadron and the drone crew to preserve all video and other evidence, according to documents obtained by The Times. He went upstairs and reported the strike to his chain of command, saying it was a possible violation of the law of armed conflict — a war crime — and regulations required a thorough, independent investigation.

But a thorough, independent investigation never happened.

This week, after The New York Times sent its findings to U.S. Central Command, which oversaw the air war in Syria, the command acknowledged the strikes for the first time, saying 80 people were killed but the airstrikes were justified. It said the bombs killed 16 fighters and four civilians. As for the other 60 people killed, the statement said it was not clear that they were civilians, in part because women and children in the Islamic State sometimes took up arms.

“We abhor the loss of innocent life and take all possible measures to prevent them,” Capt. Bill Urban, the chief spokesman for the command, said in the statement. “In this case, we self-reported and investigated the strike according to our own evidence and take full responsibility for the unintended loss of life.”

The only assessment done immediately after the strike was performed by the same ground unit that ordered the strike. It determined that the bombing was lawful because it killed only a small number of civilians while targeting Islamic State fighters in an attempt to protect coalition forces, the command said. Therefore no formal war crime notification, criminal investigation or disciplinary action was warranted, it said, adding that the other deaths were accidental.

But the Air Force lawyer, Lt. Col. Dean W. Korsak, believed he had witnessed possible war crimes and repeatedly pressed his leadership and Air Force criminal investigators to act. When they did not, he alerted the Defense Department’s independent inspector general. Two years after the strike, seeing no evidence that the watchdog agency was taking action, Colonel Korsak emailed the Senate Armed Services Committee, telling its staff that he had top secret material to discuss and adding, “I’m putting myself at great risk of military retaliation for sending this.”

“Senior ranking U.S. military officials intentionally and systematically circumvented the deliberate strike process,” he wrote in the email, which was obtained by The Times. Much of the material was classified and would need to be discussed through secure communications, he said. He wrote that a unit had intentionally entered false strike log entries, “clearly seeking to cover up the incidents.” Calling the classified death toll “shockingly high,” he said the military did not follow its own requirements to report and investigate the strike.

The United States portrayed the air war against the Islamic State as the most precise and humane bombing campaign in its history. The military said every report of civilian casualties was investigated and the findings reported publicly, creating what the military called a model of accountability.

But the strikes on Baghuz tell a different story.

The details suggest that while the military put strict rules in place to protect civilians, the Special Operations task force repeatedly used other rules to skirt them. The military teams counting casualties rarely had the time, resources or incentive to do accurate work. And troops rarely faced repercussions when they caused civilian deaths.

At the end of the grinding fight, airstrikes corralled the last Islamic State fighters in a scrap of farmland against the Euphrates River near Baghuz. Coalition air power forced thousands to surrender, sparing the lives of untold numbers of Kurdish and Arab allies.

On the ground, Task Force 9 coordinated offensives and airstrikes. The unit included soldiers from the 5th Special Forces Group and the Army’s elite commando team Delta Force, several officials said.

Over time, some officials overseeing the air campaign began to believe that the task force was systematically circumventing the safeguards created to limit civilian deaths.

The process was supposed to run through several checks and balances. Drones with high-definition cameras studied potential targets, sometimes for days or weeks. Analysts pored over intelligence data to differentiate combatants from civilians. And military lawyers were embedded with strike teams to ensure that targeting complied with the law of armed conflict. In combat situations, the process might take only minutes, but even then the rules required teams to identify military targets and minimize civilian harm. At times, when the task force failed to meet those requirements, commanders in Qatar and elsewhere denied permission to strike.

But there was a quick and easy way to skip much of that oversight: claiming imminent danger.

The law of armed conflict — the rule book that lays out the military’s legal conduct in war — allows troops in life-threatening situations to sidestep the strike team lawyers, analysts and other bureaucracy and call in strikes directly from aircraft under what military regulations call an “inherent right of self-defense.”

Task Force 9 typically played only an advisory role in Syria, and its soldiers were usually well behind the front lines. Even so, by late 2018, about 80 percent of all airstrikes it was calling in claimed self-defense, according to an Air Force officer who reviewed the strikes.

The rules allowed U.S. troops and local allies to invoke it when facing not just direct enemy fire, but anyone displaying “hostile intent,” according to a former officer who deployed with the unit numerous times. Under that definition, something as mundane as a car driving miles from friendly forces could in some cases be targeted. The task force interpreted the rules broadly, the former officer said.

The aftermath of that approach was plain to see. A number of Syrian towns, including the regional capital, Raqqa, were reduced to little more than rubble. Human rights organizations reported that the coalition caused thousands of civilian deaths during the war. Hundreds of military assessment reports examined by The Times show the task force was implicated in nearly one in five coalition civilian casualty incidents in the region.

Human rights groups were not the only ones sounding the alarm. C.I.A. officers working in Syria grew so alarmed over the task force’s strikes that agents reported their concern to the Department of Defense inspector general, which investigated the claims and produced a report. The results of that report are top secret, but the former task force officer, who reviewed the report, said the C.I.A. officers alleged that in about 10 incidents, the secretive task force hit targets knowing civilians would be killed.

The former officer said the report determined that all the strikes were legal.

The inspector general declined to release the report or discuss its findings.

Staff in the operations center in Qatar, who oversaw the air war, also became concerned with task force strikes. Air Force lawyers started keeping a spreadsheet, recording the self-defense justifications the task force used to call strikes, then comparing them with drone footage and other evidence, according to one officer who viewed the data. The evidence appeared to show that the task force was adding details that would legally justify a strike, such as seeing a man with a gun, even when those details were not visible in the footage.

Though a number of officers in the operations center suspected that the task force was including misleading information in the logs to justify strikes, they did not feel they had enough evidence to press the issue, the officer said. That changed on March 18, 2019.

At about 10 a.m., local Syrian forces reported they were under fire and in danger of being overrun, and called for an airstrike, Central Command said. The task force drone tracked a group of fighters as they made their way through the camp to the area where the women and children sheltered.

A 5th Special Forces Group officer in the task force looked at the drone footage and didn’t see any civilians, a task force officer said. But the drone he relied on had only a standard-definition camera. Central Command said there were no high-definition drones in the area that could get a better view of the target.

The Special Forces officer gave the order to fire. With no precision missiles left, the command said, the ground commander called in 500- and 2,000-pound bombs. The strike log classified the strike as self-defense.

In fact, a high-definition drone was available. The task force did not use it. Circling above, it was streaming footage of the same patch of ground to the operations center in Qatar. Because the task force operated at a high level of secrecy, two officers said, the people in Qatar watching the high-definition drone were not aware the task force was about to call in a strike.

Central Command said the task force did not know that the better drone was overhead.

The high-definition drone recorded a very different scene from what was described by Central Command this past week, three people who viewed the footage said. In it, two or three men — not 16 — wander through the frame near the crowd. They have rifles but do not appear to be maneuvering, engaging coalition forces or acting in a way that would seem to justify a self-defense strike with 2,000-pound bombs. A chat log used by analysts who were watching the footage noted the presence of women, children and a man with a gun, but did not mention any active combat, two people who viewed the log said.

[Montmorency]

Always interesting stuff: China intends to seize control of Uganda's only, so I hear, international airport (Entebbe) as debt collateral.

[spmetla]

Has the tech been worth it, or effective in curtailing nuclear blackmail?

Here's an example of what I meant.

US rejecting EU's condemnation of anti-satellite tests by China as "too restrictive."


Who knows whether it has been worth it for sure? However, whether the missiles are 'tactical' or 'strategic' doesn't change the technology required to intercept them. Tactical missiles have been in use since the 1980s and even the patriot missiles of the times struggled to intercept those. Seeing as ballistic missiles are the way to have a long-range strike capability in the absence of an air force that can challenge the US and Allies they are likely to continue becoming more common like with those employed by the Houthis against the Saudis.

This website seems to track what's at least open source knowledge on US and allied BMD systems as well as potential threat missile systems:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/


If it were possible, assuring the neutrality of the orbital zone is arguably preferable to chasing what looks like a mirage of nuclear defense - and alternatively, a legitimate screen would necessitate a global arms race by the logic of nuclear balance.

I would agree but that'd only be possible with the ability to verify others' compliance. Don't want a Washington Naval Treaty situation where the allied powers restricted themselves while their opponents either cheated or ignored the restrictions.
I would say that denying ourselves the ability to shoot down an enemy spy satellite or more would be rather naive.


What I will say for Russia is that if they ever make good on their bluff to throttle gas and oil to Europe, they will have guaranteed a very rapid subsequent phaseout of petroleum (for renewables/electricity) in the European economy.
I think the Europeans are already going as fast as is really feasible considering technology and economic limitations. The current problem with 'green' energy is the inability to store the power. Solar works fine in the day, turbines in the wind but the inability to increase power as usage increases or store the excess limits the ability to go green. With coal being phased out and nuclear expansion frozen too that leaves petroleum power for Europe.
Hydro and thermal power are the only large-scale alternatives currently available but those aren't universally suitable and have their own issues in implementation such as protests against new hydro dams, geothermal not to mention just available of the natural resoure too.
Looks like Iceland and Norway of course lead the way in this, the rest of the EU is far behind though.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_ind_ren/default/table?lang=en

The Russians haven't had to outright cut the taps to show their power:
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/19/energy-crisis-russia-opts-against-increasing-gas-supplies-to-europe.html
Russia chooses not to raise natural gas supplies to Europe despite Putin’s pledge to help

It comes shortly after Putin had suggested the country could provide additional supply to Europe at a time when millions of households are facing soaring winter energy bills.

Speaking to CNBC’s Hadley Gamble at Russian Energy Week on Oct. 13, the Russian president also dismissed suggestions the country was using gas as a geopolitical weapon as “politically motivated blather.”

Offer of more gas ‘conditional on Nord Stream 2’
Russia is Europe’s largest gas supplier, providing around 43% of the European Union’s gas imports last year, according to data compiled by Eurostat.

However, Russia’s natural gas flows to Europe have been volatile since the end of September, adding to market anxiety and skyrocketing prices.


Always interesting stuff: China intends to seize control of Uganda's only, so I hear, international airport (Entebbe) as debt collateral.
Been interesting reading a little about it. Seems they haven't seized control yet but will use the leverage to secure strong friendly terms. Certainly would be called neo-colonialism if done by anyone else.

[rory_20_uk]

Always interesting stuff: China intends to seize control of Uganda's only, so I hear, international airport (Entebbe) as debt collateral.

Bastards!

Oh, when is the USA giving back Guantanamo Bay? Stopping sanctions against Iran for getting upset at a Revolution against the puppet they put in place?

Powerful countries exert their power on the less powerful. It doesn't make it right but it is interesting how we have normalised what the West does and demonized the CCP for basically doing the same.

~:smoking:

[spmetla]

Oh, when is the USA giving back Guantanamo Bay? Stopping sanctions against Iran for getting upset at a Revolution against the puppet they put in place?


Kinda funny with G-Bay as the US still sends Cuba the lease payment every year and Cuba just doesn't cash it. On the serious side though, was hoping that the thaw in relations under Obama would have led to future negotiations about the Naval Base.
The sanctions though had more to do with the Iranians taking Americans hostage.


Powerful countries exert their power on the less powerful. It doesn't make it right but it is interesting how we have normalized what the West does and demonized the CCP for basically doing the same.
Well in all fairness though, the West has in general become much more 'tame' as time has gone on in how it exerts its influence, especially Europe. The mega corporations certainly throw their weight around but the days of invading to take back the Suez, or letting 'Trade Companies' be essentially exploitative nation states with government X protection are long gone. China turning the clock back on how the powerful get to throw their weight around is what's being decried.

When's the last time the US or one of its allies took possession of some debtor nation's key infrastructure in lieu of payment?

[rory_20_uk]

Kinda funny with G-Bay as the US still sends Cuba the lease payment every year and Cuba just doesn't cash it. On the serious side though, was hoping that the thaw in relations under Obama would have led to future negotiations about the Naval Base.
The sanctions though had more to do with the Iranians taking Americans hostage.


Well in all fairness though, the West has in general become much more 'tame' as time has gone on in how it exerts its influence, especially Europe. The mega corporations certainly throw their weight around but the days of invading to take back the Suez, or letting 'Trade Companies' be essentially exploitative nation states with government X protection are long gone. China turning the clock back on how the powerful get to throw their weight around is what's being decried.

When's the last time the US or one of its allies took possession of some debtor nation's key infrastructure in lieu of payment?

Guantanamo bay is illegally occupied. Cuba has said to leave for years and the USA just doesn't. Just as they've been doing it for decades doesn't make it any better.

Tame? The West just invades those they don't like, such as Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan; fire cruise missiles into Syria for the hell of it; assassinate people in Pakistan and the whole illegal rendition to torture people in black sites wasn't that long ago; we also freeze the overseas assets of other countries - much easier to seize assets they've given us to look after. Not to mention giving weapons to allies at a discount to kill those we don't like.

The West also pretends to hold itself to higher standards.

~:smoking:

[spmetla]

Fair point, got nothing.

Edit: For the sake of argument, I'll reply though for the most part I agree with the overall sentiment that rory posted. The West does a lot of saying one thing and doing another. I do disagree that we call out Russia and China for doing the same things we do. Our goals and methods are very different and that's really the difference in what I'd call any 'moral high ground.' The strong always can throw their weight around but might doesn't make right. The West does try to own up to its faults and change when possible.


Guantanamo Bay is illegally occupied. Cuba has said to leave for years and the USA just doesn't. Just as they've been doing it for decades doesn't make it any better.
It certainly is now but right after the Cuban revolution it wasn't exactly clear that the new regime would last, especially with the US hosting the former regime members as well as plotting the return of the old regime ie: Bay of Pigs. Cuba was a major exporter of revolution and violence up to the mid-90s in South America and Africa and it does make sense that the US wouldn't just hand back a base to a hostile government that it has no diplomatic ties with. Then considering that the US didn't really recognize Cuba until Obama it kinda makes it difficult to resolve long standing issues. It's one of the problems of international diplomacy, at what point is a new government a legal one. There's lots of qausi-states that aren't recognized like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Northern Cyprus, and so on. Now that diplomatic ties are somewhat normalized a whay forward can commence.

The US closed its bases in France when asked under de Gaul, the US left Iraq when Maliki and Obama didn't want to renew a Status of Forces Agreement, when the Philippines wanted Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base returned the US did so. Major point I'm making is that the US will leave when asked by governments it recognizes. That Castro family together with US antagonism since the Cold War made that impossible for a long time. That's why since the Obama return of diplomatic relations a return of the Naval Base could actually happen now that we are dealing with a government, we don't need a third party to talk to.


Tame? The West just invades those they don't like, such as Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan; fire cruise missiles into Syria for the hell of it;
Zero argument that the West uses force but I'll caveat that with it doesn't just invade everyone it doesn't like. In Libya it intervened in a Civil War on behalf of the rebels and then failed to actually try and prop them up leading to the terminal chaos of the present.
Iraq there's zero excuse. The reasons for the invasion ended up false and there was zero exit strategy. However, the US did leave when Maliki stood his ground and then the US came back when asked to help with ISIS.
Afghanistan I've debated here enough in the other thread, the US was responding to 9/11, the Taliban offer was not a serious one. The US didn't invade for shits and giggles or just because the Taliban were bad, hell the US was working oil pipeline deals with the Taliban in the years just prior to 9/11.
Syrian cruise missiles; well there's no real legal justification for it. There's an ongoing civil war, the US half heartedly backed the losing side. Majority of US operations in Syria were anti-ISIS together with the Kurds. The situation in Syria though is far more complicated than just the West creating chaos.

assassinate people in Pakistan and the whole illegal rendition to torture people in black sites wasn't that long ago;
Besides the raid to kill Bin Laden there's nothing really defensible about the US actions above. Especially in regard to the toleration of torture under Bush Jr. The actions in Gitmo, Abu Graib, and the CIA black sites are stains on the US that have hurt our interests and reputation far more than any intel gained could be worth.


we also freeze the overseas assets of other countries - much easier to seize assets they've given us to look after.
Generally, there are justifiable reasons to do so. When governments change and the new one is hostile to the powers that control the banks it makes little sense to hand them cash. In the long run though if diplomatic relations are restored then those assets can be released. It's not like those funds just go into our own piggy banks for our own reasons.
The $400 million that Obama gave to Iran was the money owed for halting the weapons programs that the Shah had paid for as a good example. Same with the Taliban in Afghanistan, they may be the de facto government but that doesn't automatically entitle them to all the aid programs and cash support given to the previous government.

Biggest thing I mean for the term 'tame' though is that the West certainly doesn't invade for keeps anymore. It's a bit different than Russia taking and annexing Crimea or the Chinese building islands and then claiming their territory is actually larger than it is.
The Japanese still claim the Kuril Islands and have territorial disputes with China and South Korea. The Russians still hold Prussia, the Chinese have Tibet and claim far more. The fact that Russia and China are using force to resolve these issues is what I referred to as the clock turning back.


Not to mention giving weapons to allies at a discount to kill those we don't like.
Well yeah, that's always been the way the world works.


The West also pretends to hold itself to higher standards.

I'd say the West tries to hold itself to a higher standard though does fail quite often. Admitting fault and culpability doesn't bring back the dead but does allow the West to move forward. There's no shortage of coverups but it's not quite the thought police/social credit score of China that try to pretend that Tiananmen Square never happened and arrest anyone that does. Our athletes don't disappear for weeks to attend 'reeducation' if they bring up scandals against the elites. Western political elites may use corruption to hold onto power but they don't tend to poison their political rivals.
Our previous president fomented an insurrection to subvert the democratic process and is still given his legal rights and due process as are his cronies.

At the end of the day are you able to criticize your country and not suffer repercussions? Can you call out the faults of your country without going to jail (not thinking Snowden type intel dumps to journalists instead of whistleblower)? Could you expect the same safety to do the same if you were a citizen and resident of one of our competitors? Do you think the West does try to minimize civilian casualties in war and is more open than its rivals when it does occur? Doesn't make it better when it happens but it's certainly a sign of trying to hold to a higher standard.

[spmetla]

EU launches €300bn bid to challenge Chinese influence
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59473071

The EU has revealed details of a €300bn (£255bn; $340bn) global investment plan, described as a "true alternative" to China's Belt and Road strategy.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the Global Gateway scheme should become a trusted brand.

China has funded rail, roads and ports but has been accused of leaving some countries saddled with debt.

The Commission chief said countries need "trusted partners" to design projects that were sustainable.

The EU is looking at how it can leverage billions of euros, drawn from member states, financial institutions and the private sector. This will largely take the form of guarantees or loans, rather than grants.

Mrs von der Leyen said the EU wanted to show that a different, democratic approach could deliver on projects that focused on tackling climate change as well as global health security and sustainable development for developing countries.

Projects had to be of high quality, with a high level of transparency and good governance, and had to deliver tangible results for the countries involved, she explained. One EU official told the BBC that Africa would be a major focus of the scheme.

China's strategy has reached into Africa, Asia, the Indo-Pacific and the EU too. China's Cosco company owns two-thirds of the huge Greek container port at Piraeus and the China Road and Bridge Corporation has built a key bridge in Croatia.
"When it comes to investment choices," said the Commission president, "the few options that exist too often come with a lot of small print which includes big consequences, be it financially, politically but also socially."

Andrew Small, a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, told the BBC it marked "the first serious effort from the European side to put packages together and figure out financing mechanisms, so countries considering taking loans from China have an alternative option".

China: Big spender or loan shark?
MI6 boss warns of China 'debt traps and data traps'
'We don't like our land being given away to China'
At a briefing last month, China's ambassador to the EU, Zhang Ming, said Beijing welcomed the EU's Global Gateway strategy if it was open and could "help developing countries". But he also warned "any attempt to turn infrastructure projects into a geopolitical tool would fail the expectation of the international community and harm one's own interests".

Belt and Road has been a centre-piece of Chinese foreign policy.

While it has developed trade links by ploughing money into new roads, ports, railways and bridges, it has also been criticised as a means of providing "predatory loans" in what is labelled "debt-trap diplomacy".

But there are also those who argue the picture is more complicated, and that borrowing large sums of money is hardly risk-free. Moreover, China met a need others did not.

Either way, China's economic and geopolitical footprint has grown as tensions rise with the West.
The question is whether the EU can really act in this geopolitical space, says Andrew Small.

"Or is it too rigid, too bogged down by internal bureaucratic fighting? If they fail at this, it's a big miss," he argues.

One diplomat told me: "It's a good sign that finally Europe is asserting its influence in this area.

"That's a common interest we share with our transatlantic friends in the US and UK."

But a common interest could also create more competition, according to Scott Morris, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development.

After all, the US has its own "Build Back Better World" initiative launched at the G7 last June. "This is a noisy space with a lot of brands bumping into each other," says Mr Morris.

However he's "hopeful" of success for the Global Gateway initiative. He says, "more importantly" than rivalling China, it's a chance for Europe to "achieve a scale of financing that can do some good in developing countries that need some capital".

The EU has pointedly emphasised its "values-based" and "transparent" approach, arguing it wants to create links not dependencies.

But this is also about influence, as the Commission continues to look for ways to flex its muscles on the geopolitical stage and, in turn, find out how strong those muscles are.

Certainly, a positive development. I'm glad to see the EU try and build up its soft power through competitive investment abroad. The limitations due to regime type, human rights records, and so on will certainly mean that the EU or the US's B3W plans won't affect Chinese influence in states that are too politically 'toxic' for the west to invest in. However, this will be good to 'reward' countries that share our values and encourage investment without the dangers that Chinese investment brings.

The EU will certainly face hurdles like what to do when payments default, how to ensure the money goes towards the intended projects instead of just lining the pockets of middlemen up and down the chain in the EU and the invested country, as well as contracting the right construction firms etc... that can build on time and to standard.

"Global Gateway" is at least a positive sign of investment that may result in competition for influence and investment that hopefully benefits the receiving countries.
Perhaps it can help make up for the shortfall in funding for climate change to those affected 'southern countries' that COP didn't adequately address.

[Montmorency]

Bastards!

Oh, when is the USA giving back Guantanamo Bay? Stopping sanctions against Iran for getting upset at a Revolution against the puppet they put in place?

Powerful countries exert their power on the less powerful. It doesn't make it right but it is interesting how we have normalised what the West does and demonized the CCP for basically doing the same.

~:smoking:

Since when did we support the illegal sanctions against Iran, or the 60-year vendetta against Cuba, here?

Of course the Castro government has always rejected our terms, making our rent payments an amusing fig leaf (I wish I could do that for an apartment of my choice). What we can say about it in our defense is that the small piece of land we hold is not economiclly valuable or a hindrance to Cuban governance, unlike what China's move would imply for Uganda, so we're on firmer territory there. The diplomatic repression of Cuba is a much bigger deal.

I wouldn't be entirely surprised if in coming decades China resolves issues of non-compliance with loan terms by collecting on the debt through military force and occupation, as the United States used to do extremely often (https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-ushistory2os2xmaster/chapter/roosevelts-big-stick-foreign-policy/) in Latin America from the 1890s through the 1920s.


It certainly is now but right after the Cuban revolution it wasn't exactly clear that the new regime would last, especially with the US hosting the former regime members as well as plotting the return of the old regime ie: Bay of Pigs. Cuba was a major exporter of revolution and violence up to the mid-90s in South America and Africa and it does make sense that the US wouldn't just hand back a base to a hostile government that it has no diplomatic ties with. Then considering that the US didn't really recognize Cuba until Obama it kinda makes it difficult to resolve long standing issues. It's one of the problems of international diplomacy, at what point is a new government a legal one. There's lots of qausi-states that aren't recognized like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Northern Cyprus, and so on. Now that diplomatic ties are somewhat normalized a whay forward can commence.

It's been 60 years. As Trump up and decided to recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, any government could hand over Guantanamo in a matter of weeks.

It's just not a priority for political reasons. Rory, remember when Obama tried to liquidate the internment center at Guantanamo as he had campaigned on? It was one of the first things he tried as president. Very quickly he dropped the issue and moved to focus on completing the recession stimulus package and launching negotiations on his landmark ACA insurance reform. This was for the barest political and really utilitarian reasons: the mainstream media, and the US Congress almost in unanimity - including the majority of his own party - denounced him vehemently over the issue.

So there's a right thing to do, and it's mechanically-simple, but who wants to deal with it, eh? Liquidating Guantanamo partially resolves an injustice to a few dozen people (most of whom would still be imprisoned elsewhere), whereas the stimulus and the ACA helped hundreds of millions and saved lives.

You would need a president with Biden's guts and disregard for baked-in criticism on foreign policy, to do what he did in telling all the typical miscreants to :daisy: off over Afghanistan. Not Biden himself, of course, he's blown his wad for the term and paid his price...

Speaking of Biden, early days, but he does appear serious about bringing our drone programs (https://airwars.org/conflict-data) under strict control (https://theweek.com/foreign-policy/1007579/biden-nearly-ended-the-drone-war-and-nobody-noticed).

https://i.imgur.com/f73nRMy.png
https://i.imgur.com/iSBHdMZ.png



Our previous president fomented an insurrection to subvert the democratic process and is still given his legal rights and due process as are his cronies.

I'm sure you mean "dude process." :wink:


At the end of the day are you able to criticize your country and not suffer repercussions? Can you call out the faults of your country without going to jail (not thinking Snowden type intel dumps to journalists instead of whistleblower)? Could you expect the same safety to do the same if you were a citizen and resident of one of our competitors? Do you think the West does try to minimize civilian casualties in war and is more open than its rivals when it does occur? Doesn't make it better when it happens but it's certainly a sign of trying to hold to a higher standard.

Whatever you think should happen to Snowden, it can't be denied that he did the right and productive thing for us.

I just posted about our relationship with civilian casualties last month, and once or twice in the summer...

It's great that we have a formal legal process and standard to conform to, it's just that, as in so many domains that operate under the direction of 'armed G-men', there are a lot of people dedicated to submerging and defeating mechanisms of accountability, and no one ever challenges them for it. Beating those people, wherever they are to be found, once and for all, would be the West - namely America - living up to its ideals...


While it has developed trade links by ploughing money into new roads, ports, railways and bridges, it has also been criticised as a means of providing "predatory loans" in what is labelled "debt-trap diplomacy".

But there are also those who argue the picture is more complicated, and that borrowing large sums of money is hardly risk-free. Moreover, China met a need others did not.

Notably, the core tenet of the investment philosophy I delved into earlier is that rich countries can stand to take on vastly more (short-term) risk when it comes to poor countries, rather than offloading the risk as per tradition (https://english.elpais.com/usa/2021-11-26/how-the-wind-power-boom-is-driving-deforestation-in-the-amazon.html). Enlightened, and ultimately self-interested*, altruism, is the only plausible value proposition that can decisively displace China's. And we want to displace China's model not for the petty reason of getting one over them in the Great Game, but because China's model is exploitative and ultimately unproductive for humanity. What's most important is the enduring preservation of the species; all the rest is whistling past the gravedigger.

*In terms of the national collective selves


But a common interest could also create more competition, according to Scott Morris, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development.

After all, the US has its own "Build Back Better World" initiative launched at the G7 last June. "This is a noisy space with a lot of brands bumping into each other," says Mr Morris.

Thus my insistence on transnational consolidation of these efforts. Does anyone have a problem with the US reifying the EU's promises?

[rory_20_uk]

Legality at a Supranational level is always difficult since... whose laws? And of course the UN is never allowed to bite the important permanent members.

The USA isn't prepared to deal with Guantanamo prison for internal political reasons. Completely understandable and instantly we're closer to Realpolitik than any pretence at the "right" thing.

Barring a Marketing campaign that seems to have kicked off after WW2 that has just continued with these childishly simplistic approaches to right and wrong, yes it was ever thus - countries looking after the interests of their countries and by that I mean the rich and powerful in their countries.

A more adult approach would enable nuance and self-reflection. The USA hasn't either got to be "good" or "bad" and is somewhere in the middle so accepting things aren't perfect isn't an admission that everything is wrong. Problems can't all be rectified with external intervention and solutions are often zero-sum (unless one decides to undertake genocide, of course); the UK / France and other Imperial powers created country lines to suit themselves and the leaders since then have been far more concerned with power, money and the ability to blame the events which in some cases were 100 years ago than bothering to sort out the mess.

China is giving loads of money with few if any strings attached, bar be good to China. The EU is going to do the usual with vast amounts of rules to follow and I imagine many countries are going to go with China since it is easier to steal.

~:smoking:

[Montmorency]

Question worth exploring: how is the Vietnamese Communist Party reacting, practically and philosophically, to the CCP's/China's retrenchment?

[Pannonian]

Question worth exploring: how is the Vietnamese Communist Party reacting, practically and philosophically, to the CCP's/China's retrenchment?

Can't imagine they'd be too pleased. Vietnam has fought a war against China more recently than it's fought a war against the US.

[spmetla]

Russia Ukraine: Sending US troops not on table - Biden
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59582013

US President Joe Biden has said that putting American troops on the ground in Ukraine in the event of a Russian invasion is "not on the table".

But Mr Biden warned of severe consequences if Russia did invade.

He was speaking a day after two hours of talks by video link with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The virtual summit was aimed at reducing tensions in the region after a major Russian troop build-up along Ukraine's eastern border.

Russia has accused Ukraine of provocation, and sought guarantees against eastward Nato expansion and deployment of weapons close to Russia.

Ukrainian authorities have said Moscow could be planning a military offensive at the end of January, although US officials say it is not yet clear whether President Putin has made a decision.

Speaking on Wednesday, Mr Putin refused to say whether he would order troops into Ukraine. But he said he could not sit back while the military alliance moved close to Russia.

Mr Biden said he had made it clear to Mr Putin during Tuesday's meeting that there would be "economic consequences like none he's ever seen".

He was confident that the Russian leader got the message, he added.
But when asked about possible military action, Mr Biden said the US's moral and legal obligations to its Nato allies in the region did not extend to Ukraine, who is not a member of the 30-member organisation.

"The idea that the US is going to unilaterally use force to confront Russia invading Ukraine is not on the cards right now," he said.

The US president said he hoped high-level meetings with Russia and at least four major Nato allies to discuss Russia's concerns would be announced by Friday.
The US has not specified what economic consequences it has in mind, but on Tuesday National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Nord Stream 2 - a new gas pipeline from Russia to Germany bypassing Ukraine which is not yet in operation - provided "leverage" for the US and its allies.

Other possible measures include restrictions on Russia's banks converting roubles into foreign currencies, or even disconnecting Russia from the Swift global financial payment system, reports say.
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky said that, while Tuesday's talks brought "no sensations", he was grateful for President Biden's "unwavering support".

More than 90,000 Russian troops are believed to be massed near Ukraine's borders. The movement has strained already tense relations between Russia and the US.

A large part of the recent Russian military build-up is in Crimea, a Black Sea peninsula which Russia seized from Ukraine and then annexed in 2014.

Troops are also gathering near Ukraine's eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, parts of which are under the control of Russian-backed separatists.

More than 14,000 people have lost their lives in seven years of conflict since Russian-backed forces seized large areas of Ukraine's east.



Mixed feelings on the lack of US troops as an option. I personally don't think that economic sanctions short of the getting EU/NATO countries to stop buying Russian gas products will deter Putin. On the other hand, the US forces in Europe are no where near capable of countering or deterring Russia. There's a lot of capability but no longer a full armored division in Germany like there was prior to 2014 so with the current forces available the US wouldn't be able to change the outcome between a full war between Ukraine and Russia without getting the days/weeks to build up air/ground power on the continent first, by which point the war's outcome would probably be decided.
The NATO allies in Europe also don't have anywhere near the capability to deter anything either. The amount of troops Russia has on the border alone is larger than the entire army of Germany, France, or the UK separately.
I just hope the behind the scenes threats are enough of a deterrence. Not sure if Putin will actually do anything though as merely deterring Ukraine from joining NATO would be geo-political win and deter the same from happening to Georgia, Sweden, or Finland (all unlikely NATO allies but potential anyhow). Still think this is more bluff than anything but Putin is certainly not a man afraid of conflict as he seems to get stronger from it domestically despite any repercussions to Russia as a whole.


Can't imagine they'd be too pleased. Vietnam has fought a war against China more recently than it's fought a war against the US.
I imagine on a philosophical view in terms of communism they're likely pleased as it would limit domestic aspirations for more liberalization in Vietnam too. They've never though viewed themselves as subservient to the PRC, they were happy for the help against the French and the US but that was all out of convenience in a war that was more nationalist than really idealism.
On the whole though relations between Vietnam and China will remain frosty. China's revanchism and broad territorial claims are a direct threat to Vietnam's economic areas off its coast as well as the north of the country which was ruled by the Qing Dynasty until the 1880s when the French took it away.
Vietnam has always had closer ties to Russia than China since the fall of Saigon and has understandably courted the US a bit to balance against China since the fall of the USSR.

[Furunculus]

i feel that this essay on taiwan has relevenace to the 'non-alliance' solution to ukraine:

https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2021/12/20/the-united-states-should-not-defend-taiwan/#

[Montmorency]

The US trying to bluff and bluster over Ukraine would be counterproductive; I doubt many foreign policy people throughout Europe believed that Biden would launch WW3 over Ukraine prior to his announcement.

If Russia did invade, the US and EU would however be justified in taking all covert and overt non-military measures to destabilize the Russian state and overthrow the Putin government. Our orientation in such an event: make the cost of war too painful for Putin to bear, or make the cost of Putin remaining in power too painful for Russia's oligarchs/people to bear. Though the latter may be complicated if it turns out that Putin finds a lot of elite support for invading (I don't know if this is or will be the case).


Can't imagine they'd be too pleased. Vietnam has fought a war against China more recently than it's fought a war against the US.

But how does it affect their view on domestic governance? Are Xi's methods influential, or do they see it as a path to avoid? The existing disposition as adequate? Are there any internal controversies?

I wish I knew a Vietnam expert on Twitter or something.

[spmetla]

Russia Lays Out Demands for a Sweeping New Security Deal With NATO
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/17/world/europe/russia-nato-security-deal.html

The proposal, coming as Moscow masses troops on the border with Ukraine, would establish a Cold War-like security arrangement in Eastern Europe that NATO officials immediately rejected.
KYIV, Ukraine — Russia demanded on Friday that the United States and its allies halt all military activity in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in a sweeping proposal that would establish a Cold War-like security arrangement, posing a challenge to diplomatic efforts to defuse Russia’s growing military threat to Ukraine.

The Russian proposal — immediately dismissed by NATO officials — came in the form of a draft treaty suggesting NATO should offer written guarantees that it would not expand farther east toward Russia and halt all military activities in the former Soviet republics, a vast swath of now-independent states extending from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

The proposals codified a series of demands floated in various forms in recent weeks by Russian officials, including by President Vladimir V. Putin in a video call with President Biden. They represent in startling clarity goals long sought by Mr. Putin, who analysts say is growing increasingly concerned that Ukraine is drifting irretrievably into a Western orbit, posing a grave threat to Russian security.

The demands also reinforced the notion that Mr. Putin seemed willing to take ever-greater risks to force the West to take Russian security concerns seriously and to address historical grievances largely ignored for decades.

Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei A. Ryabkov, laid out details about the proposal in public for the first time on Friday in a video news conference in Moscow, amid a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine’s border that Western officials have interpreted as a threat of an invasion.

The demands went far beyond the current conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine. And most were directed not at Ukraine, which is threatened by the troop buildup, but at the United States and Ukraine’s other Western allies.

They included a request for a NATO commitment that it would not offer membership to Ukraine specifically. But NATO officials emphasized that NATO countries will not rule out future membership for any Eastern European countries, including Ukraine.

The proposal highlighted starkly differing views in the United States and Russia on the military tensions over Ukraine. Russia has insisted that the West has been fomenting the crisis by instilling anti-Russia sentiment in Ukraine, and by providing weapons. Mr. Ryabkov cast the confrontation in Ukraine as a critical threat to Russia’s security.

The United States and European allies, in contrast, say Russia provoked the security crisis by recently deploying tens of thousands of troops near Ukraine’s border.

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NATO officials said on Friday that Russia’s proposals were unacceptable in their demands for veto power over now-independent countries. They emphasized their openness to a diplomatic dialogue on Russia’s security concerns, but said that any discussion would also include NATO’s security concerns about Russian missile deployments, satellite tests and disinformation efforts.

The officials also suggested that if Russia did make a major new military incursion into Ukraine, as it seems to be planning, NATO would strongly consider moving more troops into allied countries bordering Ukraine, like Poland and the Baltic countries, because the “strategic depth” against Russia that Ukraine now provides would be damaged or lost.

Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, said in Washington on Friday that while the Russians had a list of security concerns, so did the United States and its European allies, and that Washington was willing to negotiate on that basis.

“We’ve had a dialogue with Russia on European security issues for the last 20 years,” Mr. Sullivan told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations. “We had it with the Soviet Union for decades before that.”

That process “has sometimes produced progress, sometimes produced deadlock,” he said, noting that the United States planned “to put on the table our concern with Russian activities that we believe harm our interests and values.”

“It’s very difficult to see agreements getting consummated,” he added, “if we’re continuing to see an escalatory cycle.”

He declined to say if the United States was willing to provide Ukraine with more powerful defensive weapons, saying a $450 million arms and security package is already in place. He said the pipeline was already so full there is a question of “absorptive capacity.”

The Russian proposal took the form of two draft treaties, one with NATO and the other with the United States.

“Member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization accept the obligation to exclude farther expansion of NATO to Ukraine and other states,” the text suggested. In demanding the written guarantee from NATO, Mr. Putin and other Russian officials have reached into early post-Cold War history, describing what they see as a betrayal by the West in 1990.
They assert that NATO expanded to the east despite a spoken assurance from James Baker, then the secretary of state, to the Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, that it would not.

The agreement was never put in writing and Mr. Baker said later that Russian officials misinterpreted his comment, which applied only to the territory of the former East Germany. Mr. Gorbachev has, in interviews, confirmed that spoken assurance came in discussions only of East Germany.

The new Russian proposal surfaced other historical grievances.

It demanded that NATO withdraw military infrastructure placed in Eastern European states after 1997, the date of an accord signed between Russia and NATO that Moscow wants now as a starting point for a new security treaty.

The Russian Foreign Ministry had earlier demanded that NATO officially abrogate a 2008 promise, known as the Bucharest Declaration, that Ukraine and Georgia would be welcomed into the alliance. The NATO chief invoked that declaration after the meeting with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, on Thursday, saying the offer still stands.

Russia is also insisting that NATO countries do not deploy offensive weapons in states neighboring Russia, including countries not in the alliance — a reference to Ukraine. And the proposal suggested a ban on military exercises at strengths of more than a brigade in a zone along both sides of Russia’s western border, an issue that would address the current military buildup near Ukraine.

Analysts expressed concerns about the Russian demands, saying they appeared to set up any talks between Russia and the West on these “security guarantees” for failure, possibly paving the way for a war in Ukraine.
But they might also represent an opening position, with Russia willing to later compromise in talks. That the demands were put forth by the deputy foreign minister, Mr. Ryabkov, and not by his boss, Sergey V. Lavrov, or by Mr. Putin himself, left wiggle room, analysts said.

“There is a lot of shadow boxing going on, on all sides, and it’s not clear how this ends,” said Samuel Greene, a professor of Russian politics at King’s College in London. “This whole situation is ambiguous by design.”

Analysts pointed out that Mr. Putin had tried to extract similar concessions from President Trump but failed.

Mr. Greene said Russia may now see an opening to renegotiate the post-Soviet security landscape while Ukraine is still weak but likely to become stronger, Western nations are distracted by the pandemic and other problems and the U.S. is more concerned with the Chinese threat to Taiwan.

Putting forward impossible demands was intended to complicate diplomacy over the Russian buildup on the Ukrainian border, said Samuel Charap, a Russian security analyst at the RAND Corporation. “Diplomacy requires compromise and flexibility,” he said. “It usually entails avoiding public ultimatums. Basically, this is not diplomacy. It’s the opposite of diplomacy.”

Mr. Ryabkov, the Russian diplomat, said Moscow was open to “reasonable” compromises. But he also suggested the Kremlin has assessed the United States’ power as waning and that a new accord is justified.

Analysts say that negotiating such wide-ranging new security accommodations would most likely take many months, if they can be accomplished at all. Mr. Putin may have to decide at an earlier moment whether to go ahead with an invasion because the troops garrisoned now at temporary sites near the Ukrainian border cannot remain there indefinitely.

Ukrainian officials have suggested that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August helped precipitate the crisis by signaling waning American resolve for overseas commitments, which emboldened the Kremlin.

The Biden administration has vowed to remain engaged in the international arena and said it intended to repair relationships strained under President Trump. American officials have consistently said they are committed to supporting Ukrainian sovereignty.

Mr. Putin has come close to openly acknowledging that he is using military force to coerce the West to negotiate, though his spokesman has denied this. Mr. Putin has said Western countries were realizing Russia was serious about defending “red lines” related to NATO forces near its borders.

“Our recent warnings have indeed been heard and are having a certain effect,” he told a gathering of Russian diplomats in November. “Tensions have risen.”

A fairly bold and clearly unacceptable proposal by the Russians. While I too think NATO expansion has gone too fast and that the Russians do have a right to be concerned about NATO expansion, I don't think they should hold any veto power on membership to an alliance formed to protected itself from Russia/USSR.

It is ludicrous how the Russians claim the buildup is to protect themselves from Ukrainian aggression which is certainly a laughable reverse of the situation.

I'm happy that there are negotiations ongoing but assume this is just a way to divide the rest too as even engaging in talks that start with a baseline demand such as not doing the Baltic air policing for our NATO allies there is sure to anger the former-warsaw NATO members, while the bigger Western European countries prefer more of the status quo so as not to upset the supply of gas and further postpone needed military reforms/modernizations.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

This is classic willpower haggling crap. Like NATO is going to halt already extant military and training relationships with Estonia, Uzbekistan, etc. This is 'leave ukraine and belarus to us' so they ask for the moon to get us to settle for what they wanted in the first place.

[Pannonian]

This is classic willpower haggling crap. Like NATO is going to halt already extant military and training relationships with Estonia, Uzbekistan, etc. This is 'leave ukraine and belarus to us' so they ask for the moon to get us to settle for what they wanted in the first place.

Sometimes if you start by asking for what you expect to be rejected, you may just get it accepted.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7QzPjHsRsn4

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Sometimes if you start by asking for what you expect to be rejected, you may just get it accepted.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7QzPjHsRsn4

Pan'

I teach conflict management. I see NOTHING wrong with a clear declaration of what you seek and how it meets your needs moving forward to open the discussion especially when coupled with a willingness by the other party to share same -- integrative bargaining at its finest. That is NOT what Putin is about in this.

[Pannonian]

Pan'

I teach conflict management. I see NOTHING wrong with a clear declaration of what you seek and how it meets your needs moving forward to open the discussion especially when coupled with a willingness by the other party to share same -- integrative bargaining at its finest. That is NOT what Putin is about in this.

I wasn't being serious. I just think of that skit whenever I read of starting with what you expect to be rejected. Let's face it, once you've seen that and know it was meant to be rejected, it's hard to forget it.

[Furunculus]

On the subject of Great Power contentions - i continue to be bemused by Germany's self-deception that Foreign Policy no longer matters:

In a cold winter when european energy prices are sky high, at the moment where russia as the principal energy supplier is threatening to invade a neighbour... Germany continues supporting Pipelines that isolate neighbours who Russia seeks to coerce, and blithley sets about decommissioning the last of its nuclear reactors:
https://twitter.com/afneil/status/1473967215657562112

As china commissions a european-navy's worth of naval tonnage every year with the looming insistence of eventual re-unification with Taiwan, Lithuania boldly bucks the trend in offering some support for Taiwan, and German Chamber of Commerce group threatens future investment unless Lithuania winds its neck in:
https://twitter.com/noahbarkin/status/1474039233052659718

We have our differences with France, but they do understand power and the impact of decisions of this type. What infuriates me is the wilful ignorance of Germany in pretending none of this really exists, and their decisions are created a morally certain vacuum. No external factors apply!

[Montmorency]

I mentioned above how I discovered that Merkel was one of the most pro-Orban leaders in the EU...

If you think about it, every foreign policy action Germany has taken since 2008 pretty conclusively demonstrates that the only, or overriding, German foreign policy priority among the ruling class is to ensure the immediate stability of operating environment for German business interests. This applies to German manufacturing in Hungary, German debt holdings in Greece, German petroleum from Russia, and German trade with China. You're just mad they have different foreign policy priorities than you do (though here we are aligned).

Germany is one of the most anti-nuclear countries in the world though - as in near-unanimity among the population - and the phaseout has been planned since the 1990s. Hell, the German Volk are more anti-nuclear than they were anti-Semitic!

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Remove all nuclear power and eradicate the use of fossil fuels.

Surely renewables will magically fill the power gap because that is what we want.

:rolleyes:

[Montmorency]

Remove all nuclear power and eradicate the use of fossil fuels.

Surely renewables will magically fill the power gap because that is what we want.

:rolleyes:

Any sufficiently-advanced investment is indistinguishable from magic. :book2:


Chris Hamilton, president of the West Virginia Coal Association, said he had conveyed to Mr. Manchin that the clean energy tax credits would be a death knell for the state’s coal industry. Even though the clean electricity standard was stripped from the bill, Mr. Hamilton said the coal industry still saw the tax incentives as a threat to the state.

“The credits that were in the bill would have resulted in an almost total displacement of coal generation within a relatively short period of time,” Mr. Hamilton said. “Those provisions were more onerous and more likely to displace coal-fired generation than the clean energy standard,” he said.

Anyone seen Don't Look Up?

[spmetla]

Kazakhstan unrest: Government calls for Russian help
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59880166


Russian-led military troops will be deployed to help "stabilise" Kazakhstan amid anti-government demonstrations.

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for support from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as nationwide unrest escalates.

The protests were first sparked by rising fuel prices, but have broadened to include other political grievances.

President Tokayev claimed the unrest was the work of foreign-trained "terrorist gangs".

However, Kate Mallinson, an expert on Central Asia at the foreign affairs think tank Chatham House in London, said the protests are "symptomatic of very deep-seated and simmering anger and resentment at the failure of the Kazhak government to modernise their country and introduce reforms that impact people at all levels".

The president has imposed a nationwide state of emergency that includes an overnight curfew and a ban on mass gatherings and has vowed a tough response to the protests.

In a televised speech in the early hours of Thursday, he said he had sought help from the CSTO - a military alliance made up of Russia and five ex-Soviet states to help stabilise the country.

Later on Wednesday the CSTO's chairman, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, confirmed in a statement on Facebook that the alliance would send peacekeeping forces "for a limited period of time".

The US State Department said it is "closely following" the situation in Kazakhstan, with a spokesman urging restraint by authorities and protesters alike.

BACKGROUND: Kazakhstan country profile
CONTEXT: Rare protests in a country that bans dissent
President Tokayev is only the second person to lead Kazakhstan since it declared independence in 1991. His election, in 2019, was condemned by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as showing scant respect for democratic standards.

Much of the anger on the streets, however, seems to have been aimed at his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has held a powerful national security role since stepping down. On Wednesday, he was fired in a bid to subdue the growing unrest.

Protesters had been heard chanting Mr Nazarbayev's name, while a video showing people attempting to pull down a giant bronze statue of the former leader has been shared online. According to BBC Monitoring, the now-dismantled monument appears to have stood in Taldykorgan, Mr Nazarbayev's home region.

Staff at Kazakhstan's main airport had to flee anti-government demonstrators, who have also targeted government buildings.

Protesters gathered at the mayor's office in Almaty before eventually storming it. Videos on social media showed a plume of smoke rising from the building, while gunfire could also be heard.

The city's police chief, Kanat Taimerdenov, said "extremists and radicals" had attacked 500 civilians and ransacked hundreds of businesses.

Water cannon were used against protesters in the western city of Aktobe. There are reports that security forces have sided with protesters in some places.

However, getting a clear picture of what is happening in the central Asian nation is proving difficult. The interior ministry released figures of reported casualties among the security forces, but there were no equivalent reports of any injuries or deaths among protesters amid what monitoring groups have described as a "nation-scale internet blackout".

Other attempts to end the protests, which began on Sunday when the government lifted the price cap on liquefied petroleum gas which many people use to power their cars, causing it to double in cost, have been made.

As well as Mr Nazarbayev's dismissal, the entire government has resigned.
Protests are not only about fuel
by Olga Ivshina, BBC Russian

The speed at which the protests turned violent took many by surprise, both in Kazakhstan and in the wider region, and hinted that they are not only about an increase in fuel prices.

This is a traditionally stable Central Asian state, which is often described as authoritarian. Until 2019 it was run by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, whose rule was marked by elements of a personality cult, with his statues erected across the country and a capital renamed after him.

Yet when he left, it was amid anti-government protests which he sought to limit by stepping down and putting a close ally in his place.

Most elections in Kazakhstan are won by the ruling party with nearly 100% of the vote and there is no effective political opposition.

The analysts I spoke to say that the Kazakh government clearly underestimated how angry the population was, and that these protests were not surprising in a country with no electoral democracy - people need to take to the streets to be heard.

And their grievances are almost certainly about a far wider set of issues than the price of fuel.


Unrest in as large and important a CSTO state like Kazakhstan is always worrisome. Given the Taliban are now in charge at the southern end of the 'Stans' I hope that this doesn't spiral out of control as central asian stability is certainly at stake.
I personally don't think this will last long as the population is generally fairly rural and dispersed outside the few major cities.

[Montmorency]

The protests were first sparked by rising fuel prices, but have broadened to include other political grievances.

This is just what happened in Cuba a mere half-year ago, and laterally in France 3 (!) years ago, among many other examples.

Whether motivated by climate adaptation or other reasons, or even as external development, it is evident that governments have little choice but to counter rising food or fuel prices with compensatory aid or credits.

[Pannonian]

This is just what happened in Cuba a mere half-year ago, and laterally in France 3 (!) years ago, among many other examples.

Whether motivated by climate adaptation or other reasons, or even as external development, it is evident that governments have little choice but to counter rising food or fuel prices with compensatory aid or credits.

Not over here in the UK. The Tories still armour themselves with Brexit, even as energy and food prices go up. Even as the PM has been caught lying again (although it's a given every time he opens his mouth), even as he's caught taking money for renovations in exchange for favours, even as his friends and colleagues are caught giving tens of millions to their friends and family, he thinks mocking the acting LOTO as a Remainer is the way to go. Looking at how loyal Tories act (more worship of the national anthem yeah!), I'm not sure he's wrong.

[rory_20_uk]

Our Democracy allows a vote every 5 years, and that's about it. Both major parties benefit from FPTP so of course no one wants to change it.
The PM chooses the person to investigate himself and can withhold information from them with impunity and even lying at PMQs is apparently no biggie. This isn't a problem unless the information gets out of course - and the committee didn't think that the withholding of information was a problem.

We have a website where we can petition for things to be discussed but even that is controlled, hence why change.org was used for the popular one regarding Tony Blair's Knighthood being removed.

The Monarchy seems quite content to be nothing but a figurehead rather than the last backstop when the system is clearly failing - to point out the obvious, we have no President so no alternate source of power and the Lords is subservient to the Commons. There is nothing else in our system to improve matters. So here we are - apparently in a first rate democracy...

~:smoking:

[Pannonian]

Our Democracy allows a vote every 5 years, and that's about it. Both major parties benefit from FPTP so of course no one wants to change it.
The PM chooses the person to investigate himself and can withhold information from them with impunity and even lying at PMQs is apparently no biggie. This isn't a problem unless the information gets out of course - and the committee didn't think that the withholding of information was a problem.

We have a website where we can petition for things to be discussed but even that is controlled, hence why change.org was used for the popular one regarding Tony Blair's Knighthood being removed.

The Monarchy seems quite content to be nothing but a figurehead rather than the last backstop when the system is clearly failing - to point out the obvious, we have no President so no alternate source of power and the Lords is subservient to the Commons. There is nothing else in our system to improve matters. So here we are - apparently in a first rate democracy...

~:smoking:

The problem with our system is that the checks and balances are dependent on the very thing that gives the chief executive their power; the Commons majority. After that, it's dependent on custom. If a PM with a majority has no sense of ethics, there is nothing to stop them from doing whatever they like under the guise of democracy. And if there are enough voters to cast their vote their way, then we have what we have. A PM with no restrictions of any kind, who is good at pressing buttons to get those requisite votes.

We westerners shouldn't be so comfortable about assuming that our democracy is the best thing in the world. It may be less bad than the alternative, but we are quite capable of messing things up ourselves. Reality isn't the all-powerful check on power, if the votes can be relied on. The US might just be on the brink with just enough of a voting coalition to stop Trump. The UK's Tories have found a sure thing and are playing it with all their heart.

[spmetla]

Good debate on France24 on the possibility of Russia invading Ukraine:
If Russia did invade: How far would the West go to support Ukraine?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ExRbjmcf-8

I've personally been thinking that this has gone from rhetoric to a genuine threat. I think Melinda's assessment is closest to what I fear is happening too, Putin would very much like to be one of the Great Men of Russia and there's little other realms he could make that claim aside from resurgence and 'reclaiming' Ukraine for Russia.

[Hooahguy]

I am fairly confident that Russia will invade Ukraine within the next 4-6 weeks or so. The size of the invasion is hard to predict, but my guess is that they will try to seize Kyiv and install a Russia-friendly government. I've been following various open-source intelligence pages, and the information coming out is troubling to say the least. One bit of news that Russia was moving military police units into Belarus to these staging areas could be an indication of plans to secure Kyiv.

[rory_20_uk]

If they restrict themselves to the parts that are mainly Russian friendly then they might be able to benefit from it since they'll be less likely to have an insurrection and have some semblance of excuse that they are doing what the people actually want; going further and trying to hold it makes things worse and worse.

Although the West tends to massively punch under its weight, long range strikes with artillery and missiles from the ground / water or air could reap a heavy toll outside of the Russian soil on high tech equipment, and the Ukranians with additional support would be able to make the rest a hard slog - unlike Iraq and Afghanistan where the locals seem to expect the West to do everything for them and ran off when confronted, Ukranians have been fighting for themselves for some years now. Yes, they'd loose but assuming they don't try a pitched battle this would eventually be expensive - and for Russia, there are more important fronts.

~:smoking:

[Hooahguy]

Maybe, but the locations of the military buildups are heavily indicating that they will not be limiting themselves to attacking eastern Ukraine. For example some of the latest images show Russian brigades near the Belarusian town of Mazyr, which is a mere 3.5 hours north of Kyiv.

The real question is the resolve of the Ukrainian people. It is extremely likely that most Ukrainian frontline forces will be decimated in the opening day of the conflict, as Russia has the overwhelming advantage in artillery, air power, and missiles. But will the government and people fold quickly? Or will we see a widespread insurgency? Hard to say at this moment. People can bluster all they want, but when the shells are flying it will be far different.

Edit: I thought this was a really interesting article about what signs to look for an invasion: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-russia-make-a-military-move-against-ukraine-follow-these-clues/

[spmetla]

I am fairly confident that Russia will invade Ukraine within the next 4-6 weeks or so. The size of the invasion is hard to predict, but my guess is that they will try to seize Kyiv and install a Russia-friendly government.

I'm feeling the same here, conditions are good for Putin. Biden is weak politically and has been struggling to get a unified NATO front against Russia. Europe has no leadership: Merkel is gone and Scholz is new and not near established enough to get Germany to do anything 'difficult' meanwhile Macron and Boris are dealing more with COVID-19 fallout in different forms.
With Biden having put a commitment to no ground troops that means Putin only has to weigh how difficult the economic repercussions are and when it comes to gaining territory, well at some point in the future the economy can recovery but changes to borders are permanent short of revolutions or outside force, both of which are not forthcoming.


If they restrict themselves to the parts that are mainly Russian friendly then they might be able to benefit from it since they'll be less likely to have an insurrection and have some semblance of excuse that they are doing what the people actually want; going further and trying to hold it makes things worse and worse.

They already hold in fact or through their Separatist proxies the Russian majority regions, any further expansion would be into Ukrainian majority areas. I don't think they worry much about insurgency for several reasons. One: unlike the middle east there isn't going to be a bloc of neighboring co-religionists funneling in diehard supporters, two: the language and culture are similar enough that 'policing' against dissent will be easier, three: if they go full on oppression like in Belarus, well the West will stand by and shake their fingers.

Putting in a Russian proxy government and then moving toward full incorporation into Russia at some point in the future seems the likely goal.


Although the West tends to massively punch under its weight, long range strikes with artillery and missiles from the ground / water or air could reap a heavy toll outside of the Russian soil on high tech equipment, and the Ukrainians with additional support would be able to make the rest a hard slog - unlike Iraq and Afghanistan where the locals seem to expect the West to do everything for them and ran off when confronted, Ukrainians have been fighting for themselves for some years now.
That's why Biden taking ground troops off the table is such a disaster. Conducting strikes against a near-peer power like Russia even within 'friendly territory' of the Ukraine would require a mix of air and ground enablers to do electronic warfare against Russian radar and intelligence systems, strike against integrated air defense systems and so on. Given the distances from our bases in Germany or Carrier Strike Groups in the Med that type of concentrated and consistence power isn't easy to project, especially if all our NATO allies are dithering.
Also, in the event that aircraft are shot down you want to have recovery forces available, something difficult to coordinate if we don't have troops on the ground and in the same HQ as the Ukraine Army.

The following video is just a simulation from a publicly available 'game' but from what I get (I'm just Army wise not Navy or Air Force) it seems fairly well done showing the capabilities in modern war.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGwU9HKH_Eo&t=22s

I think realistically that the US won't be giving the Ukrainians much aside from intelligence support and perhaps some cyberwarfare support.

Crazy to see the effects in the region though with the heightened tensions. Sweden posting troops in Gotland incase things get hot in the Baltic too. The case of Ukraine and Taiwan too certainly demonstrate that being non-aligned has severe limitations in the case of protecting one's sovereignty, wonder if this would drive Sweden and Finland to being more pro-NATO if not outright mulling joining.

Sweden boosts patrols on Gotland amid Russia tensions
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-boosts-patrols-gotland-amid-nato-russia-tensions-2022-01-13/

As always I wonder where Turkey stands on this issue. Turkey being the wildcard of NATO and having soured its relations with NATO through purchasing S400 systems certainly make their stance unclear. Wonder if they'd allow US warships or aircraft to freely navigate into the Black Sea seeing as we have that airbase in Incirlik and they control the Bosphorus.

[Hooahguy]

I'm feeling the same here, conditions are good for Putin. Biden is weak politically and has been struggling to get a unified NATO front against Russia. Europe has no leadership: Merkel is gone and Scholz is new and not near established enough to get Germany to do anything 'difficult' meanwhile Macron and Boris are dealing more with COVID-19 fallout in different forms.
With Biden having put a commitment to no ground troops that means Putin only has to weigh how difficult the economic repercussions are and when it comes to gaining territory, well at some point in the future the economy can recovery but changes to borders are permanent short of revolutions or outside force, both of which are not forthcoming.
Case in point, Germany just blocked (https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-blocks-nato-ally-from-transferring-weapons-to-ukraine-11642790772) Estonia from transferring weapons to Ukraine, as well as refusing to meet with Biden over Ukraine. Clearly Germany sees the way this is going and would prefer to preserve the Nord Stream pipeline rather than rile things up. Cowards.


I don't think they worry much about insurgency for several reasons.
Eh, I think Ukrainian anti-Russian sentiment is far higher in the western part of the country, compared to the Donbas area which is far more pro-Russian. But this is something that we will only really know for sure when the bullets start flying.


I think realistically that the US won't be giving the Ukrainians much aside from intelligence support and perhaps some cyberwarfare support.
I believe we are also sending hardware as well, but I dont know what exactly.

I hate to say this though, the hard truth is that there is no scenario where the US jumps into a war between Russia and Ukraine. Besides the fact that there's no political will for it, US equipment just isnt positioned for it. How many weeks would it take to get armored brigade combat teams from the US to Europe? We have the equipment for a single ABCT prepositioned now, plus whatever current forces we have on rotation in Germany, Poland, and the Baltics. Now compare that to the current buildup (https://rochan-consulting.com/tracking-russian-deployments-near-ukraine-autumn-winter-2021-22/#:~:text=Two-,BTGs,-from%20the%2074th) of forces in Belarus and on the Ukranian border. It would be a bloodbath.


Crazy to see the effects in the region though with the heightened tensions. Sweden posting troops in Gotland incase things get hot in the Baltic too. The case of Ukraine and Taiwan too certainly demonstrate that being non-aligned has severe limitations in the case of protecting one's sovereignty, wonder if this would drive Sweden and Finland to being more pro-NATO if not outright mulling joining.

Sweden boosts patrols on Gotland amid Russia tensions
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-boosts-patrols-gotland-amid-nato-russia-tensions-2022-01-13/
Yup, I am expecting pro-NATO sentiment to skyrocket after all this. Maybe more in Finland than Sweden but we will see.


As always I wonder where Turkey stands on this issue. Turkey being the wildcard of NATO and having soured its relations with NATO through purchasing S400 systems certainly make their stance unclear. Wonder if they'd allow US warships or aircraft to freely navigate into the Black Sea seeing as we have that airbase in Incirlik and they control the Bosphorus.
Well they did sell their TB2 drones to Ukraine last year, which was used with great effect by Azerbaijan in their 2020 war with Armenia. Doing so made Russia mad, but we will see how effective they would be now considering that Russia has far better technology than Armenia does to counter them.

[spmetla]

Case in point, Germany just blocked Estonia from transferring weapons to Ukraine, as well as refusing to meet with Biden over Ukraine. Clearly Germany sees the way this is going and would prefer to preserve the Nord Stream pipeline rather than rile things up. Cowards.

Absolutely cowards. Short-sighted easy out policies time and time again. Too vital to Europe to be left out and too afraid of 'difficult' choices to be trusted in charge. Though given a century of poor 'great power' decision making I understand their hesitance to assert a strong EU policy of mutual defense against more than just terrorism. After having dumped nuclear without other 'cleaner' options about they are absolutely reliant on Russian fuel to keep their economy stable and prosperous, especially in the winter.

I wonder if that AUKUS sub deal hadn't so taken Macron and the French establishment by surprise whether they could be trusted to lead a bit more in regard to EU vs Russian power plays. Only France or Germany will ever have the economic, military, and diplomatic credibility to lead the EU but France doesn't have the historical baggage holding it quite back, just a preference to maintain its interests in West Africa and its remaining overseas territories.


hate to say this though, the hard truth is that there is no scenario where the US jumps into a war between Russia and Ukraine. Besides the fact that there's no political will for it, US equipment just isnt positioned for it. How many weeks would it take to get armored brigade combat teams from the US to Europe? We have the equipment for a single ABCT prepositioned now, plus whatever current forces we have on rotation in Germany, Poland, and the Baltics. Now compare that to the current buildup of forces in Belarus and on the Ukranian border. It would be a bloodbath.
That's exactly why I've always opposed us reducing our presence in Europe to a brigade of paratroopers, a Stryker brigade, and one rotational brigade of armor. Of all the global environments in which heavy units may be useful for deterrence if nothing else it is Europe. Positioning 1st Armored Division in Texas to reap the local economic benefits of military spending is nice for the economy but absolutely useless being postured to actually use them. There are also the negative effects of two decades of COIN focus that our conventional formations have suffered from.
Not that I'd want a division to have to go in and fight the Russians but moving them (and ideally the European 'rapid reaction forces') to Poland or Romania would at least make the Russians have to doubt somewhat. Even if we sent all we had in Europe to the Ukraine to help it would be the absolute bloodbath you describe. Credible deterrence to Russia requires us and our allies to be able to assemble tens of the thousands, not just thousands.

What are your thoughts of a 'creeping invasion' with a limited incursion in one area, defeat of Ukrainians and then expansion elsewhere, slow escalations are harder to galvanize democratic societies against than outright war.

[Pannonian]

Absolutely cowards. Short-sighted easy out policies time and time again. Too vital to Europe to be left out and too afraid of 'difficult' choices to be trusted in charge. Though given a century of poor 'great power' decision making I understand their hesitance to assert a strong EU policy of mutual defense against more than just terrorism. After having dumped nuclear without other 'cleaner' options about they are absolutely reliant on Russian fuel to keep their economy stable and prosperous, especially in the winter.

I wonder if that AUKUS sub deal hadn't so taken Macron and the French establishment by surprise whether they could be trusted to lead a bit more in regard to EU vs Russian power plays. Only France or Germany will ever have the economic, military, and diplomatic credibility to lead the EU but France doesn't have the historical baggage holding it quite back, just a preference to maintain its interests in West Africa and its remaining overseas territories.


That's exactly why I've always opposed us reducing our presence in Europe to a brigade of paratroopers, a Stryker brigade, and one rotational brigade of armor. Of all the global environments in which heavy units may be useful for deterrence if nothing else it is Europe. Positioning 1st Armored Division in Texas to reap the local economic benefits of military spending is nice for the economy but absolutely useless being postured to actually use them. There are also the negative effects of two decades of COIN focus that our conventional formations have suffered from.
Not that I'd want a division to have to go in and fight the Russians but moving them (and ideally the European 'rapid reaction forces') to Poland or Romania would at least make the Russians have to doubt somewhat. Even if we sent all we had in Europe to the Ukraine to help it would be the absolute bloodbath you describe. Credible deterrence to Russia requires us and our allies to be able to assemble tens of the thousands, not just thousands.

What are your thoughts of a 'creeping invasion' with a limited incursion in one area, defeat of Ukrainians and then expansion elsewhere, slow escalations are harder to galvanize democratic societies against than outright war.

If you wanted Europe to be a substantial help in any military endeavour, you'd want hawks in both Paris and London. But the UK lost its appetite with Iraq, and now views Europe as an enemy as a matter of ideology. Russia has its hooks in the UK government as well, bankrolling its ruling party. It used to do the same in the US, until you got rid of Trump. If I were the US, I would not trust the UK to do anything practically useful against Russia, nor for it to coordinate anything with the rest of Europe.

[Furunculus]

If you wanted Europe to be a substantial help in any military endeavour, you'd want hawks in both Paris and London. But the UK lost its appetite with Iraq,
True, to a degree. France and the UK are the [only] european powers have global reach and great-power perspective for geopolitics. And iraq has damaged the UK's appetite for elective war - but it remains miles ahead of any european war with the exception of France.


[the UK] and now views Europe as an enemy as a matter of ideology.
This is not true. The UK is culturally reverting to a seapower mentality, which has no use for ideologicial enemies as the goal is limited aims and the preservation of trade. If you wanted to make it ideological, the hat would fit even better on the EU as the spurned mistress who actions are bent of limiting the regulatory autonomy of a new regional rival.


Russia has its hooks in the UK government as well, bankrolling its ruling party. It used to do the same in the US, until you got rid of Trump.
This is not true. It is not true in any useful sense where you consider relative capture of the a european countries foriegn policy agenda to organise opposition to it.


If I were the US, I would not trust the UK to do anything practically useful against Russia, nor for it to coordinate anything with the rest of Europe.
This is not in any way true. Of [ALL] european nations the UK has provided the most material and training support to the Ukraine with the express intention of blunting any Russian offensive. Of [ALL] european nations the UK and Poland have provided the most diplomatic support in building a european coalition to oppose a new Russian offensive.

Germany ranks among the top five arms exporters of the world. The refusal to send defensive weapons to Ukraine is not “rooted in the history” as the German government tries to present it but it’s a deliberate geopolitical choice due to the ties with Russia:
https://twitter.com/vtchakarova/status/1483810237358432259

It's not a united West. An active sub-alliance of Britain, Poland, the Baltic and a few others is in fact very apparent in this crisis. As is Germany sabotaging deterrence efforts -- trying to rule out SWIFT -- American weariness and French hesitancy. Not the geopolitics of 2014.:
https://twitter.com/b_judah/status/1483197581358514181

Britain wants to create a tripartite alliance with Poland and Ukraine:
https://globalhappenings.com/top-global-news/89056.html

UK Delivers Light Anti-Tank Defensive Weapon Systems To Ukraine:
https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/01/18/uk-delivers-light-anti-tank-defensive-weapon-systems-to-ukraine/

Germany blocks Estonia from exporting German-origin weapons to Ukraine -WSJ:
https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-ukraine-arms-idUSL1N2U123W

None of this is true. Your dislike of the government (and the policy that won it power), is preventing you from holding any kind of objective view about its [actual] actions.

[Shaka_Khan]

I could be wrong. I think 100,000 soldiers aren't enough to invade Ukraine. Putin might be hiding more near the border. Or maybe this is just a distraction, and his main intention was on Kazakhstan. Or maybe he's just distracting his people away from his domestic problems by raising tensions on the western border.

[Hooahguy]

Absolutely cowards. Short-sighted easy out policies time and time again. Too vital to Europe to be left out and too afraid of 'difficult' choices to be trusted in charge. Though given a century of poor 'great power' decision making I understand their hesitance to assert a strong EU policy of mutual defense against more than just terrorism. After having dumped nuclear without other 'cleaner' options about they are absolutely reliant on Russian fuel to keep their economy stable and prosperous, especially in the winter.
I wonder if Merkel was still in charge if things would have played out the same. Reportedly Biden is trying to work out with the Gulf States to bring in natural gas to help keep Germany afloat, but I dont think it will be enough.


That's exactly why I've always opposed us reducing our presence in Europe to a brigade of paratroopers, a Stryker brigade, and one rotational brigade of armor. Of all the global environments in which heavy units may be useful for deterrence if nothing else it is Europe. Positioning 1st Armored Division in Texas to reap the local economic benefits of military spending is nice for the economy but absolutely useless being postured to actually use them. There are also the negative effects of two decades of COIN focus that our conventional formations have suffered from.
Not that I'd want a division to have to go in and fight the Russians but moving them (and ideally the European 'rapid reaction forces') to Poland or Romania would at least make the Russians have to doubt somewhat. Even if we sent all we had in Europe to the Ukraine to help it would be the absolute bloodbath you describe. Credible deterrence to Russia requires us and our allies to be able to assemble tens of the thousands, not just thousands.
No argument here. I think a lot of the post-2014 thinking has been that Russia would try to do another hybrid war in Eastern Europe like they did in Crimea and the Donbas, not huge invasions. Additionally, with the pivot to Asia, the argument to keep huge amount of troops stationed in Europe has previously been a difficult one to make. But I do think whatever happens now we can be looking at expanded garrisons in Europe. Perhaps Poland will finally get that permanent US base they have been clamoring for. Last time they suggested Fort Trump. Perhaps they would be down with a Fort Biden :yes:


What are your thoughts of a 'creeping invasion' with a limited incursion in one area, defeat of Ukrainians and then expansion elsewhere, slow escalations are harder to galvanize democratic societies against than outright war.

I'm more inclined to think it will begin with an attack in the southeast to link Crimea with the Donbas region. Which is why they are bringing those landing ships to the Black Sea. It would be followed by (or done in coordination with) an assault by the forces in the north on Kyiv to overthrow the government. Supposedly, according to US and UK intelligence, there's a plan (https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/22/europe/bulgaria-romania-russia-intl/index.html) to install a new government in Kyiv, which is in line with this prediction. To me it makes sense for the Russians to want this done as quickly as possible. Especially before the roads turn to mud.

Also should be noted that the terrain of Ukraine isnt the most conducive for an insurgency outside of the cities. Not many mountains, nor are large portions of the country heavily forested. It will be no Afghanistan or Chechnya for Russia.


I could be wrong. I think 100,000 soldiers aren't enough to invade Ukraine. Putin might be hiding more near the border. Or maybe this is just a distraction, and his main intention was on Kazakhstan. Or maybe he's just distracting his people away from his domestic problems by raising tensions on the western border.
They dont need to hold the entire country. If Russia can seize Kyiv and Odesa as well as link Crimea to the Donbas, I would imagine that would be enough to force the capitulation of the Ukrainian government. Doing so would effectively landlock Ukraine which would be devastating for its economy. All this also depends on the fighting will of the Ukrainian people. I also wager that the number of troops involved go up to 200,000 by the time of invasion.

[Shaka_Khan]

I agree that we shouldn't appease. We'd see a more bold Putin now if none of the NATO members were supporting Ukraine.

[rory_20_uk]

Although I'd be more than happy to see the USA choosing to supply troops to Europe, there would be much smaller problem if NATO and the wider EU spent at least 2% of GDP on defence in a meaningful way to deter likely threats.

And the big country here is Germany. If they are so terrified of accidentally conquering Europe for a third time, then they should spend the money on equipping other countries forces... Erm, they did that last time too, and they tended to be worse...

Look, WW2 was dreadful but if the USA stopped killing civilians and committing war crimes we'd have no one to protect the free world from threats such as democratic leaders they don't like...

Europe needs a strong Germany as frankly its still probably a lesser evil than Russia.

~:smoking:

[spmetla]

I wonder if Merkel was still in charge if things would have played out the same. Reportedly Biden is trying to work out with the Gulf States to bring in natural gas to help keep Germany afloat, but I dont think it will be enough.

I think the German stance would be more or less the same just a clear stance instead of this dithering.


No argument here. I think a lot of the post-2014 thinking has been that Russia would try to do another hybrid war in Eastern Europe like they did in Crimea and the Donbas, not huge invasions. Additionally, with the pivot to Asia, the argument to keep huge amount of troops stationed in Europe has previously been a difficult one to make. But I do think whatever happens now we can be looking at expanded garrisons in Europe. Perhaps Poland will finally get that permanent US base they have been clamoring for. Last time they suggested Fort Trump. Perhaps they would be down with a Fort Biden

I'd prefer a Fort Kościuszko as he's got ties to the US Revolutionary War as well as Poland's wars against Russia prior to its partition.

I think the hybrid aspect of 2014 was in large part because Russia needed the deniability. If the US had at the time sent troops to help the Ukraine this aspect of deniability would allow it protest without escalating tensions. After the US and EU essentially just had accept the outcome apart from some sanctions there's no need for deniability.
As for the pivot to Asia, that's in large part a matter of focus and spending, not troop dispositions. No additional troops are going to Korea, Japan or elsewhere in the region. More Naval and Air Force presence and a lot more training exercises. But with the pivot to Asia, outside of the Korean peninsula there's really not much call for large, armored formations short of full fledged war with China or a heavy garrison in Taiwan.
Europe on the other hand is a useful place for armor. Armor was considered for use in the war against Serbia in '99, armor would have been useful if intervening on behalf of the Ukraine in '14, and if something ever happens in the Baltics or Poland you'll need armor again. Stationing heavy units in the US is strategically pointless but good economically.


I'm more inclined to think it will begin with an attack in the southeast to link Crimea with the Donbas region. Which is why they are bringing those landing ships to the Black Sea. It would be followed by (or done in coordination with) an assault by the forces in the north on Kyiv to overthrow the government. Supposedly, according to US and UK intelligence, there's a plan to install a new government in Kyiv, which is in line with this prediction. To me it makes sense for the Russians to want this done as quickly as possible. Especially before the roads turn to mud.

Also should be noted that the terrain of Ukraine isnt the most conducive for an insurgency outside of the cities. Not many mountains, nor are large portions of the country heavily forested. It will be no Afghanistan or Chechnya for Russia.


I agree with your assumptions there.


I could be wrong. I think 100,000 soldiers aren't enough to invade Ukraine. Putin might be hiding more near the border. Or maybe this is just a distraction, and his main intention was on Kazakhstan. Or maybe he's just distracting his people away from his domestic problems by raising tensions on the western border.
100K is plenty to invade. The Ukraine has a long frontier to protect with a much smaller full-time army, Russia just needs to put enough force in the right area to affect a break-through and march on the few major cities. With Russia dominance of the air and sea and so much surrounding land it's not like the Ukraine will be able to mount successful second and third lines of defense. Ukrainian forces trying to deploy into other sectors would be interdicted from the air without much interference.


Although I'd be more than happy to see the USA choosing to supply troops to Europe, there would be much smaller problem if NATO and the wider EU spent at least 2% of GDP on defence in a meaningful way to deter likely threats.
Absolutely agree, but as we've debated here it'd also require political will to use. If the Germans with their current token military were to take a strong stance on behalf of the Ukraine with weapons support, recall its reservists to boost numbers, and start positioning its various heavy units in Poland and Romania it would be a huge deterrent to Russia despite its numerical inferiority and the inexperience of the Germans in modern war.
I'd rather our allies spent their 2% but if they're not willing to even think of applying hard power to support soft power within Europe itself then whats the point. As usual though, I think it's Europe looking to the US for leadership, if Biden were to start putting heavy units in Romania and Poland right now as a deterrent and build up then he could rally other NATO nations to do the same with probably more than just token support.


Look, WW2 was dreadful but if the USA stopped killing civilians and committing war crimes we'd have no one to protect the free world from threats such as democratic leaders they don't like...
While I agree that the US war on terror as thoroughly soured a lot of people on 'hard power' there's a huge difference between defending the borders of a free Europe as opposed to invading Iran or something. France and Germany selling themselves out is just mind-boggling and I don't think the GWOT is to blame.


Europe needs a strong Germany as frankly its still probably a lesser evil than Russia.

It's certainly a lesser evil as it's so afraid of being evil that it's at the point of being considered pathetic. An economic powerhouse happy to please whoever holds its leash so long as there's not hard choices to make.


I agree that we shouldn't appease. We'd see a more bold Putin now if none of the NATO members were supporting Ukraine.
If the Ukraine is invaded do you think we'll finally see other NATO members spend on their own defense too? If not then definatley a more divided world-politik for Putin to take advantage of.
For Biden though, he absolutely NEEDS to handle this right after his Afghan debacle but I think he's so adverse to another war just like everyone else that he's not willing to threaten the force that could actually prevent a war.
The strong despise weakness and I think this attitude guides Putin's worldview.

[Montmorency]

Good stuff Hooah.


Even ignoring that Biden had already overtly communicated multiple times the unwillingness of the US to go to war over Ukraine, no one could have believed ex ante that the US would commit ground forces against Russia in Ukraine. We shouldn't criticize politicians for stating the plainest facts. (The alternative, tough-guy bluffing without basis, was tried by Obama with Assad about a decade ago. It didn't end well.)


What are your thoughts of a 'creeping invasion' with a limited incursion in one area, defeat of Ukrainians and then expansion elsewhere, slow escalations are harder to galvanize democratic societies against than outright war.

The main considerations for Putin must be how many of their economic retaliative options the US and allies would be willing to impose (and for how long, with Ukraine potentially under Russian rule), but also how much resistance there will be from the Ukrainian polity. At one end, desultory unrest is of course no problem for an authoritarian regime - as demonstrated in Kazakhstan this month. But the need for a permanent military occupation, if it comes to that - and it would if Russia intends a closer arrangement than a new Yanukovych - is an imposing prospect both for the occupier and the occupied, yet if Russia managed just to establish a puppet government and pull out, what would be stopping the Ukrainians from overthrowing it in a couple months? Wouldn't they be intensely motivated to do so? That would leave the status quo unchanged at best, with dramatic expenditures to nought by both Ukraine and Russia. Any articles that address these questions?

On the other hand, my father - with deep familial ties in Ukraine and Belarus, but basically ignorant of all politics, foreign policy, and the principles of rational study beyond Fox News and web headlines - thinks the Ukrainian masses are readier to assent to Russian control than to fight it. (He also believes that the only thing stopping Russia from joining and dominating the EU/NATO is American dissent FWIW.)

In terms of a partisan element the primary social group willing to put up long-term resistance against Russian military presence is evidently the Ukrainian far-right and Neo-Nazis. It may be in everyone's interest to facilitate their resistance, under the onerous occupying scenarios, since fascists annihilating against Russian soldiers is - well, not like that, but you get the gist. Geographically, the north and west of the country are best suited to guerilla operations. I don't know what the Ukrainian army has trained for.

https://i.imgur.com/8Ijooml.jpg

In our worst-case though, a successful Russian incorporation of Ukraine implies an inexorable progression toward invasion of the Baltics (since those are easier targets to take and hold military), and it's not an insane gamble to bet regime survival and sustained acquisition through a "limited" war with NATO. After all, there are few possible ways for a NATO thrust through 250 miles of Ukranian or Belarussian forests to the Russian border not to escalate into a century-defining WW3. Would the US and EU be willing to entertain more than a few skirmishes over Kaliningrad in that light? It's hard to believe Russia could reach such prerequisite success in Ukraine though.

[Montmorency]

Remember when I posted in this thread about Task Force 9 (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/us/us-airstrikes-civilian-deaths.html?searchResultPosition=1) in Syria ordering drone strikes and other acts outside of military protocol and likely international law, killing buttloads of civilians and trying to cover it up? Another of their greatest hits (https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/20/us/airstrike-us-isis-dam.html):


The Tabqa Dam was a strategic linchpin and the Islamic State controlled it. The explosions on March 26, 2017, knocked dam workers to the ground and everything went dark. Witnesses say one bomb punched down five floors. A fire spread, and crucial equipment failed. The mighty flow of the Euphrates River suddenly had no way through, the reservoir began to rise, and local authorities used loudspeakers to warn people downstream to flee.

The Islamic State, the Syrian government and Russia blamed the United States, but the dam was on the U.S. military’s “no-strike list” of protected civilian sites and the commander of the U.S. offensive at the time, then-Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, said allegations of U.S. involvement were based on “crazy reporting.”

“The Tabqa Dam is not a coalition target,” he declared emphatically two days after the blasts.

In fact, members of a top secret U.S. Special Operations unit called Task Force 9 had struck the dam using some of the largest conventional bombs in the U.S. arsenal, including at least one BLU-109 bunker-buster bomb designed to destroy thick concrete structures, according to two former senior officials. And they had done it despite a military report warning not to bomb the dam, because the damage could cause a flood that might kill tens of thousands of civilians.

These haven't been the only stories I've posted on the Org on the subject of SOF wilding...



Returning to the Taiwan hotspot, here is an essay (https://tnsr.org/2021/12/a-large-number-of-small-things-a-porcupine-strategy-for-taiwan/) recommending a "porcupine" strategy for Taiwan's defense, a "distributed, survivable, and affordable defense" comprising a "large number of small things" oriented on area denial. This is pretty much what I advocated earlier, but I was surprised to learn that Taiwan has by and large not adopted this doctrine - the Overall Defense Concept - preferring to deepen its reliance on expensive legacy symmetric weapons platforms (such as Abrams tanks, Paladin SPGs, F16s, long-range cruise missiles, and diesel submarines, contrasted with Harpoon and Stinger missiles, UAVs, and missile boats).


To move to a force posture that emphasizes such distributed defenses, Taiwan’s future budgets should include funding for the acquisition of systems so numerous, distributed, and mobile that they could not all be targeted by Chinese missile strikes, along with the associated training and support needed to enable effective combat operations. These defenses would be able to survive and engage Chinese military ships, aircraft, helicopters, and drones attempting to cross the strait and land on Taiwan. Examples of specific ground-based systems that should be considered include the Phalanx close-in weapon system, the Hellfire missile, the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System rocket, the Israeli Spike missile, and additional Javelin and Stinger missiles, all of which are low-cost, proven short-range weapons that could be adapted and deployed in large numbers to make Taiwan more difficult to approach by sea or air. Small fast-attack missile boats, additional naval mines and minelaying capabilities, and additional land-based coastal defense cruise missiles could further threaten approaching ships. Drones could provide reconnaissance and targeting information.
[...]
In order to prepare for the evolving capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, Taiwan should pursue a longer-term development program in addition to near-term plans based on existing systems. Looking to the future, and recognizing Taiwan’s advanced technical capabilities, the large number of small things could include land-based coastal defenses employing advanced technologies against ships, aircraft, and swarms of drones; networks of small, fast, manned and unmanned surface craft and unmanned underwater systems to complicate Chinese naval operations; and drones to increase situational awareness.44 Such systems could be developed and produced in Taiwan with technical assistance from the United States and perhaps other states as well.

Taiwan should continue its legacy programs for conventional systems, but at a level that would free up resources for developing and acquiring distributed, survivable, and affordable defenses. Taiwan’s conventional systems, particularly its F-16s, are important for countering gray-zone provocations that fall below the threshold of armed conflict, have economic and industrial benefits, and enjoy military and political support. However, the opportunity cost of acquiring and operating conventional platforms is high. Taiwan’s leaders should make space in the defense budget to provide for the procurement of affordable short-range defenses and the personnel, training, communications, and situational awareness necessary to operate effectively and contribute to the deterrence of an invasion.
[...]
Nevertheless, the underlying concept of an asymmetric response remains sound: Rather than attempt to match China’s air and sea capabilities, Taiwan should leverage its strengths (especially its geography and technology) and exploit the People’s Liberation Army’s vulnerabilities (especially the need to move large amounts of men and equipment across 100 miles of contested water and airspace). The shorthand for this concept should be “a large number of small things.”



Here is another recent article (https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/taiwans-defense-plans-are-going-off-the-rails/) criticizing Taiwan's military procurement and doctrine as too focused on prestige optics and political dealmaking.


Taiwan can and should do more — a lot more — especially when it comes to preparing to defend the island from attack. Responsibility for why it is not falls squarely on the shoulders of Taiwan’s military bureaucracy. Most notably, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has abandoned asymmetric defense reform in all but name and has not been reined in by President Tsai Ing-wen. Instead, the ministry is now planning to deter an invasion by threatening to retaliate with missile strikes against the Chinese homeland and by pitting Taiwanese units in direct combat against the vastly superior People’s Liberation Army. Moreover, the ministry has the audacity to tell American audiences that this dramatic shift is fully congruent with an asymmetric posture.
[...]
The explanation revolves around habit and institutional inertia. For generations, Taiwan’s military planned to counter an invasion force by meeting and defeating it head-on. The idea was that the island’s small fleet of technologically superior, American-made jets, ships, and tanks could offset the People’s Liberation Army’s numerical advantages. Unfortunately, this approach stopped making sense once China’s military modernization efforts gave it the edge quantitively and qualitatively.
[...]
Senior defense officials are fully aware that the United States still expects Taiwan to pursue asymmetric defense capabilities. But rather than acquiesce to these painful and costly demands, the ministry has instead coopted and repurposed asymmetry’s lexicon so as to rationalize their decidedly symmetric plans.

Take, for example, Taiwan’s decision to spend $5 billion upgrading its fleet of 141 F-16A/B jets. Although it inked a deal in 2011, the upgrades did not start until 2016. Five years later, the first combat wing of upgraded F-16s will stand up this month. The air force even spent another $140 million this year to try to speed the process up so it can hopefully finish the last upgrades in another two years — more than a decade after starting the process. Similarly, in a best-case scenario, Taiwan’s navy will not receive its first submarine until 2024 — but there are indications that the [$16 billion] program is about to be significantly delayed. The last of the M1A2 main battle tanks purchased in 2019 will not reach the island until 2027.

Nor will these shiny new weapons be ready to go into action the moment they arrive. Units will still need to learn how to use and fix them. The services will still have to develop the maintenance capacity to keep them operational. And the Ministry of National Defense will need to stockpile logistics to ensure that these capabilities will have enough ammunition, fuel, and parts to stay in the fight (at least those that survive a first strike). These critical but oft-ignored changes can take years to implement under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of purchases and platforms already coming down the pipeline, the risk that the Ministry of National Defense might choke on the glut of new toys is real.

In essence, these documents reveal that the Ministry of National Defense hopes to extend the battlefield deep inside of China in a way that justifies the pursuit of expensive long-range strike, air superiority, and sea control capabilities.
[...]
Yet instead of worrying about how to wage a prolonged defense of the island — especially in the all-too-likely event that invasion troops make it past the beaches — the 2021 review says that Taiwan’s military must find ways to achieve air superiority and sea control. Never mind the fact that even the U.S. Navy and Air Force are not sure they can attain these goals against a determined, capable, and proximate Chinese foe. The Ministry of National Defense is, with a straight face, committing itself to the pursuit of achieving air and sea control using fourth-generation aircraft, a few dozen major surface combatants, a handful of indigenously produced diesel submarines, and yes — main battle tanks and self-propelled howitzers.


If Taiwan doesn't go asymmetric shit's gonna look like Azerbaijan vs. Armenia, where Azerbaijan is China.

[spmetla]

Even ignoring that Biden had already overtly communicated multiple times the unwillingness of the US to go to war over Ukraine, no one could have believed ex ante that the US would commit ground forces against Russia in Ukraine. We shouldn't criticize politicians for stating the plainest facts. (The alternative, tough-guy bluffing without basis, was tried by Obama with Assad about a decade ago. It didn't end well.)


I'm not advocating bluffing as you only lose even bigger that way. I'd be more for sending in troops to help defend Kiev if the Russians cross the frontier together with a massive support of airpower to deny the Russians air dominance, of at least the Ukrainian interior. Sending in troops to try and defend Ukraine's frontier would be a lost cause but the moment US/NATO troops are there supporting Ukraine's sovereignty the calculus for Putin would change.
To save Ukraine you have to be willing to fight for it to prevent a war. Though in today's political climate I see that in the choice of "Why die for Danzig?" most of Europe favors appeasement.


Returning to the Taiwan hotspot, here is an essay recommending a "porcupine" strategy for Taiwan's defense, a "distributed, survivable, and affordable defense" comprising a "large number of small things" oriented on area denial. This is pretty much what I advocated earlier, but I was surprised to learn that Taiwan has by and large not adopted this doctrine - the Overall Defense Concept - preferring to deepen its reliance on expensive legacy symmetric weapons platforms (such as Abrams tanks, Paladin SPGs, F16s, long-range cruise missiles, and diesel submarines, contrasted with Harpoon and Stinger missiles, UAVs, and missile boats).

It's a good article but the smaller more survivable items would need to be alongside the larger 'legacy' items to work. The 'opportunity cost' for China to actually establish a foothold and gain air superiority needs to be high enough and capable enough to allow the US, Japan, and UK/AUS to actually get support to them. If Taiwan can't hold long enough for its allies to muster strength before a PRC landing I can't see any scenario in which the US would try to land and retake Taiwan.


These haven't been the only stories I've posted on the Org on the subject of SOF wilding...
Yup and I fully support these being investigated and it would be nice if for once the Officers making those decisions finally faced repercussions. The US is certainly too nonchalant about the lives of others. I get guys on the ground in 'heat of the moment' making poor decisions but those in the air-conditioned HQs approving these decisions should suffer some consequences.
Decisions like those may be tactical successes but certainly strategic failures as guys in the heat of the moment don't realize the 2nd and 3rd order effects. Pilots don't casually drop bombs, someone in some HQ gave them the okay, it is never just pilot and observer decision making, even with SOF involved.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

If you wanted Europe to be a substantial help in any military endeavour, you'd want hawks in both Paris and London. But the UK lost its appetite with Iraq, and now views Europe as an enemy as a matter of ideology. Russia has its hooks in the UK government as well, bankrolling its ruling party. It used to do the same in the US, until you got rid of Trump. If I were the US, I would not trust the UK to do anything practically useful against Russia, nor for it to coordinate anything with the rest of Europe.

I would disagree only to the extent that Russian agents appear to have played the Trumps for suckers without even having to shell out enough money to buy very many of their people. Gullible AND cheap.

[Hooahguy]

Some news updates:

The US State Department has ordered (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60106416) the families of embassy staff in Ukraine to leave, as non-essential staff. I am guessing other western nations will follow suit this week as well.

Biden is debating (https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/23/us/politics/biden-troops-nato-ukraine.html?referringSource=articleShare) sending thousands more troops to NATO's eastern flank:


WASHINGTON — President Biden is considering deploying several thousand U.S. troops, as well as warships and aircraft, to NATO allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, an expansion of American military involvement amid mounting fears of a Russian incursion into Ukraine, according to administration officials.

The move would signal a major pivot for the Biden administration, which up until recently was taking a restrained stance on Ukraine, out of fear of provoking Russia into invading. But as President Vladimir V. Putin has ramped up his threatening actions toward Ukraine, and talks between American and Russian officials have failed to discourage him, the administration is now moving away from its do-not-provoke strategy.


In a meeting on Saturday at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, senior Pentagon officials presented Mr. Biden with several options that would shift American military assets much closer to Mr. Putin’s doorstep, the administration officials said. The options include sending 1,000 to 5,000 troops to Eastern European countries, with the potential to increase that number tenfold if things deteriorate.

The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk publicly about internal deliberations.

Mr. Biden is expected to make a decision as early as this week, they said. He is weighing the buildup as Russia has escalated its menacing posture against Ukraine, including massing more than 100,000 troops and weaponry on the border and stationing Russian forces in Belarus. On Saturday, Britain accused Moscow of developing plans to install a pro-Russian leader in Ukraine.

“Even as we’re engaged in diplomacy, we are very much focused on building up defense, building up deterrence,” Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said in an interview that aired Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” “NATO itself will continue to be reinforced in a significant way if Russia commits renewed acts of aggression. All of that is on the table.”

So far, none of the military options being considered include deploying additional American troops to Ukraine itself, and Mr. Biden has made clear that he is loath to enter another conflict following America’s painful exit from Afghanistan last summer after 20 years.

But after years of tiptoeing around the question of how much military support to provide to Ukraine, for fear of provoking Russia, Biden officials have recently warned that the United States could throw its weight behind a Ukrainian insurgency should Mr. Putin invade Ukraine.

And the deployment of thousands of additional American troops to NATO’s eastern flank, which includes Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Biden administration officials said, is exactly the scenario that Mr. Putin has wanted to avoid, as he has seen the western military alliance creep closer and closer to Russia’s own border.

In his news conference last week, Mr. Biden said he had cautioned Mr. Putin that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would prompt Washington to send more troops to the region.

“We’re going to actually increase troop presence in Poland, in Romania, etc., if in fact he moves,” Mr. Biden said. “They are part of NATO.”

During a phone call this month, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III warned his Russian counterpart, Sergey Shoygu, that a Russian incursion into Ukraine would most likely result in the exact troop buildup that Mr. Biden is now considering.

At the time of the phone call — Jan. 6 — the Biden administration was still trying to be more restrained in its stance on Ukraine. But after unsuccessful talks between Mr. Blinken and the Russian foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, on Friday, the administration is eying a more muscular posture, including not only diplomatic options like sanctions, but military options like increasing military support to Ukrainian forces and deploying American troops to the region.

“This is clearly in response to the sudden stationing of Russian forces in Belarus, on the border, essentially, with NATO,” said Evelyn Farkas, the top Pentagon official for Russia and Ukraine during the Obama administration. “There is no way that NATO could not reply to such a sudden military move in this political context. The Kremlin needs to understand that they are only escalating the situation with all of these deployments and increasing the danger to all parties, including themselves.”

Another former top Pentagon official for Russia policy, Jim Townsend, said the administration’s proposal did not go far enough.

“It’s too little too late to deter Putin,” Mr. Townsend said in an email. “If the Russians do invade Ukraine in a few weeks, those 5,000 should be just a down payment for a much larger U.S. and allied force presence. Western Europe should once again be an armed camp.”

During the meeting at Camp David, Mr. Austin and Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared by video from the Pentagon and from General Milley’s quarters, where he has been quarantining since he tested positive for the coronavirus. Officials said that if Mr. Biden approved the deployment, some of the troops would come from the United States, while others would move from other parts of Europe to the more vulnerable countries on NATO’s eastern flank. American officials did not describe in detail the ground troop reinforcements under review, but current and former commanders said they should include more air defense, engineering, logistics and artillery forces.

Besides the troops, Mr. Biden could also approve sending additional aircraft to the region.

Representative Michael McCaul of Texas, the top Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee, said on Sunday that the United States also needed to conduct more training in those NATO nations.

“We need joint exercises in Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Bulgaria, to show Putin that we’re serious,” Mr. McCaul said on “Face the Nation.” “Right now, he doesn’t see we’re serious.”

According to Poland’s defense ministry, there are currently about 4,000 U.S. troops and 1,000 other NATO troops stationed in Poland. There are also about 4,000 NATO troops in the Baltic States.

The United States has been regularly flying Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic-eavesdropping planes over Ukraine since late December. The planes allow American intelligence operatives to listen to Russian ground commanders’ communications. The Air Force is also flying E-8 JSTARS ground-surveillance planes to track the Russian troop buildup and the movements of the forces.

The Biden administration is especially interested in any indication that Russia may deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the border, a move that Russian officials have suggested could be an option.

More than 150 U.S. military advisers are in Ukraine, trainers who have for years worked out of the training ground near Lviv, in the country’s west, far from the front lines. The current group includes Special Operations forces, mostly Army Green Berets, as well as National Guard trainers from Florida’s 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team.

Military advisers from about a dozen allied countries are also in Ukraine, U.S. officials said. Several NATO countries, including Britain, Canada, Lithuania and Poland, have regularly sent training forces to the country.

In the event of a full-scale Russian invasion, the United States intends to move its military trainers out of the country quickly. But it is possible that some Americans could stay to advise Ukrainian officials in Kyiv, the capital, or provide frontline support, a U.S. official said.

People might also be interested in this twitter thread (https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1485241734925897728?s=20). Long story short, the author thinks that Russia can defeat Ukraine within 60 days, with any potential resistance movement being stamped out by the GRU and FSB. Putin's main goals are to keep Ukraine within Russia's sphere of influence via constitutional changes preventing partnership with the EU/NATO, end the Donbas conflict, and force Ukraine to recognize Crimea as being part of Russia. He also mentions something interesting- Putin might want to install a Lebanon-style government, with a power sharing agreement with eastern and western Ukraine so Russia can influence affairs that way.

The big question here is what Ukrainians do. They have been at war for nearly 8 years. There are nearly 400,000 veterans of the Donbas war on top of the 260,000 members of the Ukrainian military. Do they accept peace with such terms, or do they fight on as Ukraine gets burnt to the ground? I recently listened to a podcast where the guest was a UK national who lives in Ukraine and moved in 2015 to help train their army. Even he wasn't sure what Ukrainians would do.

But what I am pretty sure about is that this is the end of "a Europe Whole, Free and at Peace.” Europe will likely be militarized again, or at least the eastern flank. It would certainly be nice if military spending went up so the US didnt have to do most of the heavy lifting. The 2% GDP guideline is kinda BS, mainly because theres no guidelines about it, allowing for countries like Greece to add military pension spending, pushing them over the 2% line. I also wager that Finland and Sweden will strongly consider joining NATO.

[Shaka_Khan]

100K is plenty to invade. The Ukraine has a long frontier to protect with a much smaller full-time army, Russia just needs to put enough force in the right area to affect a break-through and march on the few major cities. With Russia dominance of the air and sea and so much surrounding land it's not like the Ukraine will be able to mount successful second and third lines of defense. Ukrainian forces trying to deploy into other sectors would be interdicted from the air without much interference.
According to this link, Ukraine has 200K active (150K of them army).
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/#military-and-security

I don't know... I'm an expat in a country that's in a state of war, although the ceasefire since 1953 has made the interior of this country quite peaceful. I live just 45 minutes away from the border of a hostile country that has over a million soldiers and has tested hypersonic missiles recently. The country that I live in has 555K active soldiers and 2,750K in reserve. It used to be 650K during the 1990s when the length of military service was longer. In addition, both sides have thousands of tanks and large air forces. And 28,500 US soldiers stationed here act as a trip wire, which makes our northern neighbors think twice before attacking again. I can't help feeling that 100K is a small number to invade with, especially when NATO is supporting Ukraine. This is a very different situation from Crimea. Of course, Russia could increase the number near the border in the near future. I think Putin is increasing his military at the border in increments, seeing how NATO would respond each time.



For Biden though, he absolutely NEEDS to handle this right after his Afghan debacle but I think he's so adverse to another war just like everyone else that he's not willing to threaten the force that could actually prevent a war.
The strong despise weakness and I think this attitude guides Putin's worldview.
I said the same thing about the Afghan debacle when it happened. Many thought that world peace had finally come, and they didn't understand what I was worried about. Now I think they know. You know, many of them assumed that the WWII generation just followed orders to war without questioning, and that the current generation would be different. In reality, most of the Americans opposed participation in the war prior to Pearl Harbor. I've talked to a lot of people who remembered that era, and I found them to be not that different from us. Some of them mentioned that the US should've warned Hitler strongly early on. (Then maybe Tojo would've been more careful). And act soon after if Hitler took Czechoslovakia, instead of after his military became stronger. Of course, Russia is stronger than Germany was in 1938-1939, but Putin won't act rashly if NATO positions to intervene.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I have asserted on these threads before and I still maintain...

Putin is old-school in many ways. He will stop when he knows you are willing to bleed to stop him. If NATO mobilizes and positions to intervene, THAT will tell him it is time to stop.

[Hooahguy]

Unfortunately, few in the west are willing to bleed for Ukraine. Or fortunately, depending on how you look at it.

Also this is an excellent map of where Russian units currently are:
25350
source (https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1485551577192665098?s=20)

Edit: seems like Russia is already laying the groundwork (https://twitter.com/SputnikInt/status/1485582937424863233?s=20) for a casus belli for invading, claiming that Ukraine is massing for an attack on the Donbas.

[spmetla]

According to this link, Ukraine has 200K active (150K of them army).
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbo...y-and-security

I don't know... I'm an expat in a country that's in a state of war, although the ceasefire since 1953 has made the interior of this country quite peaceful. I live just 45 minutes away from the border of a hostile country that has over a million soldiers and has tested hypersonic missiles recently. The country that I live in has 555K active soldiers and 2,750K in reserve. It used to be 650K during the 1990s when the length of military service was longer. In addition, both sides have thousands of tanks and large air forces. I can't help feeling that 100K is a small number to invade with, especially when NATO is supporting Ukraine. This is a very different situation from Crimea. Of course, Russia could increase the number near the border in the near future. I think Putin is increasing his military at the border in increments, seeing how NATO would respond each time.

My point wasn't the overall numbers but that the Ukrainians need to spread their numbers out to cover a large frontier. As the Russians are not likely needing to defend against a Ukrainian counterattack into Russia itself that allows them to mass that 100k so they have local numerical superiority and achieve a breakthrough.
The biggest and most important disparity is in the air power, the Russians have a much larger and more modern air force together with arguably the best ground based air defense system in the world. Once the limited Ukrainian Air Force is destroyed there's very little that the ground based units can do. Areas that put up strong resistance will either be isolated and bypassed or just reduced by Russia's many modern artillery/rocket units.
The entire Ukrainian Air Force is about 120 aircraft including transports and trainers and all of the stuff is essentially cold war equipment with modest upgrades. The Russians have thousands of aircraft available, much more experience and while they also have a lot of cold war era stuff they also have very modern aircraft too.
How The Russian And Ukrainian Air Forces Stack Up Against Each Other
In an air war, Ukraine and Russia can bring to bear many similar aircraft types, but in vastly different quantities.
BY THOMAS NEWDICK DECEMBER 23, 2021
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43603/face-off-over-donbas-how-russian-and-ukrainian-air-forces-stack-up

Ultimately, Ukraine possesses a relatively tiny military force staring down a much larger one, and it has very little real means of counter-striking against Russian airpower facilities near the border. For Moscow, air superiority is likely assured, and Russia has shown that it is willing to accept combat losses during its campaign in Syria. Aside from the various manned air assets discussed here, Russia would likely make extensive use of lower-end drones for artillery spotting and for directing airstrikes, and loitering munitions are also now being employed, including in combat trials in Syria.

Whatever course a Russian intervention in Ukraine might take, there is little chance that it would not involve significant participation by the air assets of the WMD, SMD, and the wider VKS. Despite the gulf between the Russian and Ukrainian airpower in terms of numbers and modernity, Moscow’s defense planners will be well aware that a confrontation with the Ukrainian military would involve no shortage of hazards and that the control of the air will likely be crucial to developments on the ground.

Were there to be a new and large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv could perhaps try to impose enough attrition in the air over a long enough period for Moscow to rethink its actions. But the odds in the sky are very clearly weighted against Ukraine. As such, another strategy could be for Ukraine to forfeit air sovereignty over the war-torn eastern part of Ukraine and fortify everything to the west, especially around Kyiv, in preparation for what could be a long and arduous conflict.

South Korea, especially in the North is mountainous terrain that constricts attacking forces, South Korea has a large and modern air force. South Korea is more than a match for the North in all but the nuclear realm. North Korean convential forces only have a advantage in quantity.
South Korea is ready enough to defend itself that the US forces there are really only a tripwire to ensure that the US remains committed as well as to coordinate the various US assets needed.
Ukraine on the other hand has been fighting an 8 year war against separatists, it has not had a massive conventional buildup and is no where ready to take on Russia by itself.
I think it has the capability to put up a hell of a fight but without the US/NATO coming to to help protect the western regions and Kiev and especially to help in the realm of airpower a Ukrainian defeat seems extremely likely.

Sadly though, even if intervention was done as I would like a South Korea scenario would probably end up a best case end result for the Ukraine with The West/South as a NATO ally/zone and the East occupied and annexed by Russia with Cold War 2.0 in full effect if we can somehow restrict the war to just the Ukraine and not allow a WW3 like what happened with Korea in regards to the PRC and USSR in that war.

[Montmorency]

I have asserted on these threads before and I still maintain...

Putin is old-school in many ways. He will stop when he knows you are willing to bleed to stop him. If NATO mobilizes and positions to intervene, THAT will tell him it is time to stop.

One can't help but observe that if such a mobilization were feasible in the first place, the fact might have laid a prohibitive threshold for escalation in Ukraine as a proximate concern. As Putin surely understands, one doesn't gin up a maximal response on the fly.


I'm not advocating bluffing as you only lose even bigger that way. I'd be more for sending in troops to help defend Kiev if the Russians cross the frontier together with a massive support of airpower to deny the Russians air dominance, of at least the Ukrainian interior. Sending in troops to try and defend Ukraine's frontier would be a lost cause but the moment US/NATO troops are there supporting Ukraine's sovereignty the calculus for Putin would change.
To save Ukraine you have to be willing to fight for it to prevent a war. Though in today's political climate I see that in the choice of "Why die for Danzig?" most of Europe favors appeasement.


Right, it wasn't in the cards and no US admin would make this a priority. Not that I think they should, beyond emphasizing that the fall of Putin's government will become the formal policy of the US government should he invade. To build on my comment to Seamus, Russia has been conditioning its military capabilities and the political ground for this eventuality for 8 years, not including historical predispositions. Sending thousands of soldiers into a foreign land with whatever heavy equipment is on hand to offer assistance without coordination or preparation would make them little more than a sacrificial gesture to be cynically exploited toward greater future entanglement. And this observation doesn't even support a retroactive argument for much closer defense coordination with Ukraine since 2014, since that would have brought up Putin's timetable and shortened his opposition's, if attributing him the absolute will to dictate matters in Ukraine by force.


It's a good article but the smaller more survivable items would need to be alongside the larger 'legacy' items to work. The 'opportunity cost' for China to actually establish a foothold and gain air superiority needs to be high enough and capable enough to allow the US, Japan, and UK/AUS to actually get support to them. If Taiwan can't hold long enough for its allies to muster strength before a PRC landing I can't see any scenario in which the US would try to land and retake Taiwan.

Once they achieve a foothold there is no opportunity cost for the PLA surely; almost by definition those legacy systems will have been thoroughly degraded at that stage, large (physically and logistically) and relatively exposed as they are. You're looking at this from a ground combat level, and as noted in the articles DoD takes the asymmetric view (even if they won't break the habit of enabling the most lucrative arms deals yet). Assuming some level of allied intervention in wartime, Taiwan's only logical option is to deny China any force concentrations on the main island by all means until help arrives. If Taiwan had to choose between zero tanks or zero missile boats, which would leave it less capable of self-defense? There's at least an argument for the F16s providing a few weeks' cover for total mobilization under interdiction, but other prestige systems...


Yup and I fully support these being investigated and it would be nice if for once the Officers making those decisions finally faced repercussions. The US is certainly too nonchalant about the lives of others. I get guys on the ground in 'heat of the moment' making poor decisions but those in the air-conditioned HQs approving these decisions should suffer some consequences.
Decisions like those may be tactical successes but certainly strategic failures as guys in the heat of the moment don't realize the 2nd and 3rd order effects. Pilots don't casually drop bombs, someone in some HQ gave them the okay, it is never just pilot and observer decision making, even with SOF involved.

It's impressive how components or individuals of the US military can veer from obtusely hidebound to wantonly genocidal in the same theaters and time periods.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5KRyA38tYys


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jr50So-zu1M

[Hooahguy]

On a side note, I can't help but notice that 2022 is the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Union. It can't be a coincidence that Putin is seemingly trying extra hard to reestablish Russian influence in Eurasia.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I very much think it is coincidental. I believe Putin has been following this strategy, as resources and opportunity have permitted, every since his position of power was consolidated.

[spmetla]

One can't help but observe that if such a mobilization were feasible in the first place, the fact might have laid a prohibitive threshold for escalation in Ukraine as a proximate concern. As Putin surely understands, one doesn't gin up a maximal response on the fly.


No, it doesn't happen on the fly which is why the current mobilizations should have started a few weeks ago. I imagine that if Putin chooses to invade it will start well before those 8500 US troops notified to prep for deployment have all their equipment and personnel ready to ship. That's why I keep stating that we should have a larger permanent presence in Europe again.


Right, it wasn't in the cards and no US admin would make this a priority. Not that I think they should, beyond emphasizing that the fall of Putin's government will become the formal policy of the US government should he invade. To build on my comment to Seamus, Russia has been conditioning its military capabilities and the political ground for this eventuality for 8 years, not including historical predispositions. Sending thousands of soldiers into a foreign land with whatever heavy equipment is on hand to offer assistance without coordination or preparation would make them little more than a sacrificial gesture to be cynically exploited toward greater future entanglement. And this observation doesn't even support a retroactive argument for much closer defense coordination with Ukraine since 2014, since that would have brought up Putin's timetable and shortened his opposition's, if attributing him the absolute will to dictate matters in Ukraine by force.

You are right, no admin would have made this a priority since Bush Sr, we've been dealing with people pretending that Europe is at the end of history and bad stuff can't happen to it anymore despite the Yugoslavian civil war, the Serbian genocide of the Kosovars, the Russia-Georgia war, the Russian invasion of Crimea, and the warfooting tensions.

As for sending 1000s of troops, why do assume that it would be done without coordination or preparation? I know you think poorly of the US military but you really think it'd be as daft as just driving into the Ukraine and setting up a defense independent of any coordination with Ukraine itself? Really?

It certainly wouldn't be a sacrificial gesture, much rather an overt and undeniable statement of where the 'line in the sand' is.


Once they achieve a foothold there is no opportunity cost for the PLA surely; almost by definition those legacy systems will have been thoroughly degraded at that stage, large (physically and logistically) and relatively exposed as they are. You're looking at this from a ground combat level, and as noted in the articles DoD takes the asymmetric view (even if they won't break the habit of enabling the most lucrative arms deals yet). Assuming some level of allied intervention in wartime, Taiwan's only logical option is to deny China any force concentrations on the main island by all means until help arrives. If Taiwan had to choose between zero tanks or zero missile boats, which would leave it less capable of self-defense? There's at least an argument for the F16s providing a few weeks' cover for total mobilization under interdiction, but other prestige systems...

I'm actually not thinking of this from a ground-combat role at all, once a good PLA foothold is established the likelyhood of Taiwan/Allied success is pretty much nill. Like I said, I see no scenario where US troops would be sent to retake Taiwan, the only possibility of success is deterring an invasion and if one happens to fight enough of a delaying action to allow the US and Japan primarily to come to its aid.
I don't know what specific platforms you're thinking of as asymmetric but generally self-propelled artillery, SAM sites and so on are all mobile, the size of them is directly related to the capability. Smaller more survivable stuff is also far less capable, it'd be important alongside 'legacy' stuff in trying to push any invasion back into the sea.
That said, I actually agree that Taiwan trying to pretend it can achieve any parity at sea or in the air is insane and pursuing missiles for striking the mainland is a waste of resources. It does need a lot of more survivable stuff, yes, but it also needs those legacy items too. The procument may take a while but eventually the current slew of equipment does need to be upgraded. I'd want to see lots of missile boats, lots of drones, lots of antiship missiles and air defense systems but those need to complement other assets too.


It's impressive how components or individuals of the US military can veer from obtusely hidebound to wantonly genocidal in the same theaters and time periods.
Has the definition of genocide changed? As for hidebound, well the military is a big bureaucracy serving an even bigger bureaucracy. Systematic change and accountability is the way to change the current culture which is callous when considering collateral. I'm fully an advocate for holding people accountable as well as those in the chain of command that enabled or covered up said mistakes.

Ukraine: US troops on alert as West voices unity
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60118193

The Pentagon has said some 8,500 combat-ready US troops are on alert to deploy at short notice.

But they would only be deployed if the Nato military alliance decides to activate a rapid-reaction force, "or if other situations develop", said Pentagon press secretary John Kirby.

There are no plans to deploy to Ukraine itself, he added.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_190458.htm

In 2022, the VJTF will comprise a multinational force of several thousand troops. The Franco-German brigade of 3,500 troops will serve as the core of the force, drawing on the 1st Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Hussar Regiment. Led by France’s Rapid Reaction Corps in Lille, the Franco-German brigade is a bi-national unit, underlining the strong bond between NATO Allies Germany and France. Other NATO countries, including Spain, Portugal, and Poland will also provide forces. The majority of the force is comprised of units from the lead brigade.
Glad something is being done to at the least reassure the eastern half of the alliance. Interesting to see the Truman carrier group put under NATO directly, something that hasn't happened since the 1980s. The current Rapid-Reaction forces are led by France and the core unit is the Franco-German brigade so France and Germany would have to agree to action for NATO to be capable of reaction, something I see as extremely unlikely and a good highlight of the problems in achieving NATO unity, though putting them on alert and doing the planning for mobilizing will be a necessity to find the sticking points politically and militarily.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

One can't help but observe that if such a mobilization were feasible in the first place, the fact might have laid a prohibitive threshold for escalation in Ukraine as a proximate concern. As Putin surely understands, one doesn't gin up a maximal response on the fly.

You are correct, sadly. USA efforts to counter Russian ambitions over the last decade or so have been pretty feckless. Nor has NATO taken up the challenge of seriously ramping up its deployment capabilities and general readiness. Were we to attempt such a rapid deployment now it is fairly likely that it would be a bit of a flustercluck.

The NATO powers would do better to accept that Russia is a resurgent power and enable themselves to set up a credible deterrent. It may not be the "halcyon" days of the Cold War reborn, but the Russian push for power and for the status of a (the?) premier European power predates the CCCP by a long time. Russia is no longer a Soviet state, but it remains Russia.

[Montmorency]

You are right, no admin would have made this a priority since Bush Sr, we've been dealing with people pretending that Europe is at the end of history and bad stuff can't happen to it anymore despite the Yugoslavian civil war, the Serbian genocide of the Kosovars, the Russia-Georgia war, the Russian invasion of Crimea, and the warfooting tensions.

As for sending 1000s of troops, why do assume that it would be done without coordination or preparation? I know you think poorly of the US military but you really think it'd be as daft as just driving into the Ukraine and setting up a defense independent of any coordination with Ukraine itself? Really?

It certainly wouldn't be a sacrificial gesture, much rather an overt and undeniable statement of where the 'line in the sand' is.

What I said was to demonstrate why they wouldn't do it. Russia has spent years preparing to fight in Ukraine with and against allies and proxies, and is very close to Ukraine geographically and sociopolitically. The US has not, and is not. This isn't a condemnation of the US military, it's just the facts on the ground. No US commander could condone rushing into Ukraine to contest a Russian advance with whatever forces on hand because it would be an operationally-catastrophic maneuver in our present world. And because it would be so reckless and doomed a maneuver, the threat of transporting some thousands of US or Euro soldiers toward Ukraine wouldn't deter Putin (though I assume he would try to simply avoid American concentrations if they pushed into Ukraine while staying west of the Southern Bug). Maybe a large "show of force" would have been taken as deterring in September, when most of the Russian combat elements and troop numbers were already in place, but it's at least as likely that Putin made the decision a while ago, and the rest is psyops and squaring away the logistics.

Regardless, this has gone on too long and at too great a monetary and political expense for Putin to back down without something to show for it. Pace Russian ambassador Konstantin Gavrilov, the wolf's been howling wolf around the glebe daily for a long time.

As for responses, Russian elites still have plenty of assets and properties in US and European jurisdictions, don't they? Expropriate all of it as frozen assets pending Russian policy change. To whatever extent possible, degrade the survivability of any collaborationist Ukrainian government.

But if Ukrainians can't or won't credibly resist, we shouldn't try to recklessly exploit their status by funding guerillas. Except Azovites. Stoking unrest in South Russia would be fair game however (though I don't believe we have the tools or credibility for it).


I don't know what specific platforms you're thinking of as asymmetric but generally self-propelled artillery, SAM sites and so on are all mobile, the size of them is directly related to the capability.

There's a list of procurements in the first essay, which I think the author most dichotomizes well, as well as a list of recommendations (quoted in my post). Taiwan doesn't need additional tanks, at least?

[Shaka_Khan]

The US seems to be making the Far East a bigger priority for now.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

The US seems to be making the Far East a bigger priority for now.

Not sure if that is because we are focusing more on issues in the Western Pacific rim, or if the NATO/EU powers functionally make us take at least the appearance of a more collegial role.

[Pannonian]

What's this about the Ukrainian PM warning the west not to escalate things? Have I missed any news?

[spmetla]

I think he's worried about the flight of capital and people, if he says "yes, there's war in a week" then he'd be expected to call up the reserves and so on. Foreigners in the business sectors would also likely leave the country and there might be a run on the banks etc... so oddly enough it is in his interest to keep the appearance of tensions down.

Also, by calling out the West it chips away at Russian excuses to invade to secure Ukraine from the West. As the President of the country stuck in the middle between the two power blocs he has a very delicate balancing act, especially when he's been told outright that no one will fight for Ukraine but themselves, means he needs to avoid any stance that would give the Russians excuses to go in.

Ukraine’s Zelensky’s message is don’t panic. That’s making the West antsy.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/30/ukraine-zelensky-russia-biden/

Now the 44-year-old Zelensky is enmeshed in some of the highest-stakes brinkmanship in Europe in decades.

Zelensky’s Ukraine finds itself in the crosshairs of Moscow’s attempts to reassert its influence in what it considers its sphere of influence and prevent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from moving into the states that once constituted the Soviet Union.

So Zelensky treads a fine line, knowing that Ukraine’s economy could take a major hit even if Russian forces hold back. He must speak of the threat to the country. Yet, at the same time, he seeks to avoid, as he put it, “panic in the markets, panic in the financial sector.”

“Zelensky is struggling with crisis communications,” said Orysia Lutsevych, an expert on Ukraine at the Chatham House think tank in London. “Clearly he wants citizens to remain calm, but panic may spread from conflicting or lacking information. It’s a hard task to deliver.”


Zelensky accused Western officials and media of causing panic and destabilization in Ukraine by insisting that, as he put it, “tomorrow there will be war.” Russia’s real intention, he also said, could be not to invade, but instead to weaken Ukraine internally.

“We could lose the economy,” he said.

At another point, he challenged NATO to make up its mind whether to admit Ukraine to the alliance. Moscow has issued a list of demands to NATO, including a guarantee that the former Soviet states of Ukraine and Georgia will never become members.

“Tell us openly we will never get into NATO,” he said.

His posture though and trying to thread the line will mean little though if Russia does invade at which point everyone will wonder why he ignored the West so long. With Ukraine's public opinion not in belief of an imminent invasion it would be difficult to actually mobilize the reserves which if there is no invasion would hurt him terribly in Ukraine's domestic political scene.


The US seems to be making the Far East a bigger priority for now.
Not sure if that is because we are focusing more on issues in the Western Pacific rim, or if the NATO/EU powers functionally make us take at least the appearance of a more collegial role.

I think part of it is that the US expects Europe to be more pro-active in its own defense too. If Biden did what I want and put divisions in Europe right now (edit: I mean by stationing divisions there, not necessarily to war or even the border of NATO, but back to Germany and maybe Poland/Romania ) there'd be little need for the other NATO members to put up much of a force. Given that except for Japan the entire G7 are NATO members should mean that they can put more than a token of effort into their own defense, especially for nations such as Germany and France which are major arms exporters.
The UK vowing to double their NATO contributions to the Baltics is a good sign but France, Germany, and Italy need to do more too. If they don't then it'd be extremely difficult in US domestic politics to justify a build up in Europe.

Keeping the focus on the PRC though is vital and I agree with, we no longer have armed forces capable of the long held "two war policy" so best to martial resources where our direct interests are under threat. Taiwan and the South China Sea are more important than the Ukraine. A threat against the Baltic States and NATO though would be more important than Taiwan and the South China Sea though but at least in Europe there are more Allies available, at least on paper.
In the Far East only the US has the capability to challenge the PRC. South Korea, Japan, and Australia are good and capable allies but without anywhere near the numbers, quality, or capability to challenge the PRC and project power beyond bases on their own soil.

[Montmorency]

If Biden did what I want and put divisions in Europe right now

I just can't get over how the extraordinarily-consequential, costly, and unauthorized unilateral decision to do this (not that any available American president would), could, in theory, be legally upheld in Republican-ruled courts, but even the small-bore, legislatively-backed customarily preferential policies of the current executive just get casually struck down. It's annoying (with Korean intonation). Also ruinous to state and society, but there's a lot of insult in these injuries.

Anyway, some interesting factoids in this article (https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/how-joe-biden-will-punish-russia-for-an-invasion-of-ukraine/) on punitive measures against Russia available to the US, such as:


Intellectual property law is another such node; the chief elements of the global intellectual property regime were designed by the United States, largely for the benefit of US firms. To participate in the global technology economy, Russia had to adapt to this legal structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This now makes Russia vulnerable across an array of fronts. Effectively, the administration can take steps that would make Russia’s tech sector toxic, preventing Russian companies from exporting devices that have any US components or other US intellectual property. This would definitely hurt the Russians on the international market, and it also would deter European and Asian tech firms from collaborating with their Russian counterparts. The US won the Cold War in part because it could cut the USSR off from international developments in information technology, and the weapons at the disposal of the United States have only grown more lethal. The use of these weapons of course requires the active cooperation of European, Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese companies, but a vicious attack on Ukraine might well make that cooperation more forthcoming. Indeed, the Russian military itself depends on foreign chips (largely from Taiwan) in its more sophisticated equipment.

Watta plot twist! Unify the plot strands, now that's good writing for once.

Here's a planet-brain idea, two birds with one stone: Offer Iran a deal whereby they publicly drop relations with Russia, in exchange for which the US expresses legitimate gratitude to the Iranian government, providing cover for both sides to formally recommit to JCPOA. There's a missing incentive for Iran there, but the structure of the gambit makes sense IMO. The biggest obstacle to rapprochment between the US and Iran, at least over nuclear proliferation, is America's belligerent uncredibility and reactive public sentiment in both countries, something a double maneuver banking off Russian escalation, with immediate payoffs for both parties, could neutralize.

Relatedly, reshuffling a major US OOB into Europe would probably no longer even be the deterrent it used to be considering that everyone knows that China is mightier than Russia and that the American military has its hands full with its West Pacific commitments.

[spmetla]

Ukraine tensions: US boosts troops in Europe
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60234377

US President Joe Biden is to send extra troops to Europe this week amid continuing fears of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Pentagon says.

Some 2,000 troops will be sent from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Poland and Germany, and a further 1,000 already in Germany will go to Romania.

Moscow denies planning to invade but has deployed an estimated 100,000 troops near Ukraine's borders.

It fiercely opposes Ukraine joining the Nato military alliance.

The tensions come eight years after Russia annexed Ukraine's southern Crimea peninsula and backed a bloody rebellion in the eastern Donbas region.

Moscow accuses the Ukrainian government of failing to implement the Minsk agreement - an international deal to restore peace to the east, where Russian-backed rebels control swathes of territory and at least 14,000 people have been killed since 2014.

Glad to see the US doing this, notable though that this is being done bilaterally between the US and Poland/Romania and not under the NATO C2 chain.
I hope that this will start the conversation within our Congress to go and restation a heavy BCT permanently again in Europe. The current deployment of paratroopers and Strykers are certainly not the type of capability that would make Putin worry about the US deploying into Ukraine as to do without multiple heavy BCTs would be stupid and this is clearly more about reassuring Poland and Romania. This crisis may also be useful for getting NATO contributions from some of the lagging member states as well as internal conversations about the future of NATO.


I just can't get over how the extraordinarily-consequential, costly, and unauthorized unilateral decision to do this (not that any available American president would), could, in theory, be legally upheld in Republican-ruled courts, but even the small-bore, legislatively-backed customarily preferential policies of the current executive just get casually struck down. It's annoying (with Korean intonation). Also ruinous to state and society, but there's a lot of insult in these injuries.
As I clarified in my edit, I wasn't wanting him to put divisions in Ukraine but neighboring NATO states. As for costly, if there permanent bases in Europe for these larger units it would be cheaper than our currently rotating brigades in for nine month tours to Europe. Permanent basing though is a straight up Congressional matter, the president can request and propose but Congress, specifically the Armed Services committees would have the final say in it.
As it is for temporary boosting of troops in an area I don't see what's illegal about it so long as Biden doesn't unilaterally start a war. The US did sign the Budapest Memorandum that would give casus-belli to intervene on behalf of Ukraine but the US isn't obligated to do so.


The memorandum has been invoked recently in response to some on the right, including Fox News host Tucker Carlson and some congressional Republicans, arguing that the United States effectively has no business taking sides between Ukraine and Russia. One popular Twitter thread responding to Carlson said the Budapest Memorandum amounted to the United States having agreed to serve as “the guarantors of Ukrainian security.” A bipartisan group of members of Congress last week wrote an op-ed stating that the memorandum assured the United States “would come to the aid of Ukraine in the event it was preyed upon.”

The reality is much murkier. The agreement is not an official treaty. It is neither legally binding nor does it carry an enforcement mechanism. And while it provides security assurances, they do not include specific promises with regard to a potential invasion.

The brief memorandum contained five points that the signatories — which also included Britain and Northern Ireland — said they would “reaffirm,” including:

“None of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”
“To refrain from economic coercion” in accordance with other agreements.
And, perhaps most pertinent with regard to a potential U.S. response today:

“To seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine … if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”
Indeed, the agreement was murky enough that, when it was announced in early 1994 but before Ukraine ratified it, there was plenty of confusion about just the kind of situation we now find ourselves in. U.S. officials often talked around the issue, but they also stated on multiple occasions that it wouldn’t mean the United States was suddenly entering into new and novel security commitments. (Hence, the repeated use of the word “reaffirm.”)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/01/what-budapest-memorandum-means-us-ukraine/

The vagueness of the treaty certainly hasn't helped resolved the last eight years of Russian occupation and intervention, guess that's what Ukraine gets for voluntarily giving up its nuclear arsenal, not a good example in the cause of non-proliferation.


Relatedly, reshuffling a major US OOB into Europe would probably no longer even be the deterrent it used to be considering that everyone knows that China is mightier than Russia and that the American military has its hands full with its West Pacific commitments.

Would reshuffling US Army units into Europe really affect America's West Pacific commitments? As I've argued on here I don't see many situations in which Heavy BCTs would be used against China, Korea yes, China not so much which would be 90% an air and sea campaign with likely only Marines and lighter US units put in Taiwan if that were somehow safe and prudent to do but certainly not to the level of retaking Taiwan.
Heavy BCTs in the US are hard to deploy as they have so much equipment to ship, strategically they are useless unless forward deployed or against an opponent that cannot stop the buildup of combat power over a period of months (ie Iraq in Desert Storm and OIF).
If the US does decide with more commitments to Europe, I hope this will be matched with further commitments by our larger NATO partners already there as they certainly have the ability to pony up for their own defense which is less the case for our allies in the West Pacific.

Edit: Also crazy to see the reaction to this on right-wing forums/etc is a mix of "why aren't we sending them to our border instead" and "why bother defending Europe." Both of which are just crazy, especially the first one, not sure why everyone on the right thinks that troops on the border is going to help much, how about reform immigration and more money for border patrol. As for the other aspect, the new isolationist slant of the right is mind-boggling to me, crazy how they don't see that we benefit from maintaining the current world order, expensive as it is.

[Montmorency]

Interesting from a Finnish Internet commenter:


The Latvian military is truly weak. They went all-volunteer as part of the NATO accession plan. The reason was mainly the one-size-fits-all approach of NATO. The former Warszaw Pact states were pressured strongly to give up conscription and reduce their military establishments into forces that couldn't pose a credible threat to any neighbour. The point of the modernised military would be to supply NATO with a rapid reaction battalion or two for allied deployments. Essentially, the NATO expansion meant the disarmament of Eastern Europe.

In fact, this nature of NATO accession was one of the main reasons why Finland didn't join the NATO. It would have ruined our capability to fight a land war.



As I clarified in my edit, I wasn't wanting him to put divisions in Ukraine but neighboring NATO states. As for costly, if there permanent bases in Europe for these larger units it would be cheaper than our currently rotating brigades in for nine month tours to Europe. Permanent basing though is a straight up Congressional matter, the president can request and propose but Congress, specifically the Armed Services committees would have the final say in it.
As it is for temporary boosting of troops in an area I don't see what's illegal about it so long as Biden doesn't unilaterally start a war. The US did sign the Budapest Memorandum that would give casus-belli to intervene on behalf of Ukraine but the US isn't obligated to do so.

I was making a Pann-type aside about political realities in the American executive, that there is near-unlimited deference to the authority of President as CinC in the commitment of American military personnel, assets, and clout, but a conservative judiciary is fully comfortable with defying objectively more modest policy preferences in such domains as public health or immigration/the border, even when such actions have the explicit imprimatur of enabling statute. One wonders whether in theory an American president would even fact intervention against an order for all US military personnel to rebase to Moscow or Beijing. I think it's a sad testament to the bizarre militarization of American society (and of course the lawlessness of our reactionaries).

I don't doubt that our armored formations are more useful and imposing in Europe than in Taiwan.


https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/01/what-budapest-memorandum-means-us-ukraine/

The vagueness of the treaty certainly hasn't helped resolved the last eight years of Russian occupation and intervention, guess that's what Ukraine gets for voluntarily giving up its nuclear arsenal, not a good example in the cause of non-proliferation.

Provisions of the memorandum:

Respect Belarusian, Kazakh and Ukrainian independence and sovereignty in the existing borders.[16]
Refrain from the threat or the use of force against Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Refrain from using economic pressure on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to influence their politics.
Seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine if they "should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used".
Refrain from the use of nuclear arms against Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Consult with one another if questions arise regarding those commitments.[12][17]

America commited itself to "respect" Ukrainian sovereignty, not to uphold it unilaterally. This is the stuff rory_20_uk loves to see. Respect is free (though our governments don't always remember).


Would reshuffling US Army units into Europe really affect America's West Pacific commitments? As I've argued on here I don't see many situations in which Heavy BCTs would be used against China, Korea yes, China not so much which would be 90% an air and sea campaign with likely only Marines and lighter US units put in Taiwan if that were somehow safe and prudent to do but certainly not to the level of retaking Taiwan.
Heavy BCTs in the US are hard to deploy as they have so much equipment to ship, strategically they are useless unless forward deployed or against an opponent that cannot stop the buildup of combat power over a period of months (ie Iraq in Desert Storm and OIF).
If the US does decide with more commitments to Europe, I hope this will be matched with further commitments by our larger NATO partners already there as they certainly have the ability to pony up for their own defense which is less the case for our allies in the West Pacific.

What I was trying to say is that, logically following from previously stated facts - most importantly the known US focus on East Asia and the need to reserve most American air and naval power for a potential conflict there - is that more heavy forward deployments in Europe could be perceived more as an attempt at deterrence rather than a force that the US really intends to support in combat against Russia. Because the US would typically find itself unable or unwilling to commit naval and air combat/transport assets necessary to support a war against Russia while the situation in the SCS remains unsettled. Without that support any US forward deployment under these doctrinal and geopolitical constraints would have to be defensive from where it's located, which unlikely to be Ukraine or the Baltics (though of course Putin would have to be astonishingly adventuristic to try to act on this perception even if he held it). The only exception would be a remarkable expansion and integration of European airpower in NATO. Basically it's about the effectiveness and true potential scope of an American committment to European combat.

[Hooahguy]

Interesting from a Finnish Internet commenter:

I dont think what this commentator says is really true. Lithuania, Norway, and Estonia all have conscription in some form, and Greece and Turkey have mandatory service. Poland had it until 2008, 9 years after joining NATO. Lithuania abolished it in like 2007 I think and then brought it back in 2015. So I have a feeling that if Finland wanted to join they wouldnt have an issue with their conscription. From looking up the issue, it seems that there was pressure to remove the conscription based service format, however this was more due to striving to get up to the level of quality of other NATO allies than a desire to not be a threat to their neighbors. Which is a dumb concept anyways because in what world is Latvia a threat to Russia?

[Furunculus]

also a little problematic to describe poland as 'disarmed', given that it has four operational divisions right now, at least three of which are mechanised.

while france, germany and UK each field circa 200 tanks, poland has the best part of a thousand, which by 2030 will likely be composed to M1A3 and K2-PL.

[Pannonian]

I dont think what this commentator says is really true. Lithuania, Norway, and Estonia all have conscription in some form, and Greece and Turkey have mandatory service. Poland had it until 2008, 9 years after joining NATO. Lithuania abolished it in like 2007 I think and then brought it back in 2015. So I have a feeling that if Finland wanted to join they wouldnt have an issue with their conscription. From looking up the issue, it seems that there was pressure to remove the conscription based service format, however this was more due to striving to get up to the level of quality of other NATO allies than a desire to not be a threat to their neighbors. Which is a dumb concept anyways because in what world is Latvia a threat to Russia?

Eurovision Song Contest?

[Montmorency]

This is why you gotsta have the expertise (https://twitter.com/drfarls/status/1490100018749059072):



nobody remembers that the 82nd Airborne is also pretty good at embassy evacuation, expat evacuation, HA/DR and even refugee management. All things folks near this mess might need/appreciate.
Yes. If Russia does what Russia has visibly prepared to do (but which it may not do!) then there will be refugees, retreating Ukrainian troops, questions about borders, and general disruption of life across the region.

I've made the point before that the crisis will have deterrence, Mitigation, and Punishment components. The deployment of [NATO] troops is less important to Deterrence and even Punishment than it is to Mitigation.

[spmetla]

EU’s chip production plan aims to ease dependency on Asia
https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-technology-business-europe-european-union-309e0cd669f4f5958885beb93d04e8cf

BRUSSELS (AP) — The European Union announced a $48 billion plan Tuesday to become a major semiconductor producer, seeking to curb its dependency on Asian markets for the component that powers everything from cars to hospital ventilators and game consoles.

At a time when natural gas shortages and Europe’s reliance on Russia for energy shows the political risks of economic dependency, the 27-nation bloc is moving to boost its economic independence in the critical semiconductor sector with its Chips Act.

“Chips are at the center of the global technological race. They are, of course, also the bedrock of our modern economies,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said. The plan still needs the backing of the EU parliament and the member states.

The EU move mirrors U.S. President Joe Biden’s $52 billion push to invest in a national chip-producing sector to make sure more production occurs in the United States.

As the economy has bounced back from the COVID-19 pandemic over the past year, there has been a supply chain bottleneck for semiconductors. In Europe, some consumers have had to wait up to almost a year to get a car because of a lack of spare parts.

“The pandemic has also painfully exposed the vulnerability of its supply chains,” von der Leyen said. “We have seen that whole production lines came to a standstill.”

“While the demand was increasing, we could not deliver as needed because of the lack of chips,” she added. As a result, factory belt lines ground to a halt, some factories had to temporarily close and workers were left unemployed because of lack of electronic parts.

Semiconductors are the tiny microchips that act as the brains for everything from smartphones to cars, and an extended shortage has highlighted the importance of chipmakers, most of which are based in Asia, to global supply chains.

Von der Leyen said Europe’s Chips Act will link research, design and testing and coordinate EU and national investment. The 43 billion euro plan pools public and private funds and allows for state aid to get the massive investments off the ground.

The prospect of massive industrial subsidies at first seems like a blast from Europe’s past, when overreaching state involvement stifled creativity and kept ambitious newcomers out of the market. The EU itself has been trying to undo this over the past decades with rigorous vetting whether state aid was not impeding competition.

The EU Commission promised that every Chips Act project will be carefully vetted on anticompetitive grounds, but that the sheer size of setting up production facilities demand a push if the bloc is to become a global player.

“Europe needs advanced production facilities, which come, of course, with a huge upfront cost. We are therefore adapting our state aid rules,” said von der Leyen.

Now, EU nations only have 9% of the global market share of semiconductors, and von der Leyen wants to increase that to 20% by 2030. Because global market production is expected to about double over the same time, “it means basically quadrupling our efforts,” she said.

She said the plan will add 15 billion euros ($17 billion) in public and private investment on top of funds already committed in the EU’s budget.

The EU also wants to get involved in chip production for geopolitical reasons and become more resilient in its strategic independence. Still, von der Leyen did hold out her hand for cooperation.

“Europe will build partnerships on chips with like-minded partners, for example, the United States or, for example, Japan,” she said.

With the US and EU both looking to relocate 'strategic' manufacturing to their own shores to reduce dependency (on chips so far and perhaps rare minerals too) I wonder if we'll see that push in other industries as well such as the EUs fuel imports. Can only hope that future energy sources like fusion can become realized sooner than later as burning various forms of hydrocarbons and the inability to store 'green' energy in the quantities needed hurt economically not to mention the environment too.
The COVID crisis and subsequent supply chain hits have certainly put cracks into the global trade system we've all relied upon for 30 years or so. One ship blocking the suez for several weeks had huge effects on European supply chains, the increasing tensions and risk of war in multiple parts of the global makes for few 'safe' manufacturing hubs for importing key components.

[Pannonian]

EU’s chip production plan aims to ease dependency on Asia
https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-technology-business-europe-european-union-309e0cd669f4f5958885beb93d04e8cf


With the US and EU both looking to relocate 'strategic' manufacturing to their own shores to reduce dependency (on chips so far and perhaps rare minerals too) I wonder if we'll see that push in other industries as well such as the EUs fuel imports. Can only hope that future energy sources like fusion can become realized sooner than later as burning various forms of hydrocarbons and the inability to store 'green' energy in the quantities needed hurt economically not to mention the environment too.
The COVID crisis and subsequent supply chain hits have certainly put cracks into the global trade system we've all relied upon for 30 years or so. One ship blocking the suez for several weeks had huge effects on European supply chains, the increasing tensions and risk of war in multiple parts of the global makes for few 'safe' manufacturing hubs for importing key components.

I'd look to recycle as much material for high-tech products as possible. Something that isn't reflected in the raw numbers of pure capitalism.

[Pannonian]

Britain's foreign secretary goes to meet her Russian counterparts to re-emphasise Britain's hard line on Ukraine. Russian diplomat asks her whether Britain recognises Russia's sovereignty over Rostov and Vornoezh oblasts. Liz Truss states that Britain will never back down over Ukraine. Russian diplomat points out they're not in Ukraine (Rostov and Voronezh are in Russia).

He probably twigged her level after she talked about our Baltic allies coming over the Black Sea.

[rory_20_uk]

Britain's foreign secretary goes to meet her Russian counterparts to re-emphasise Britain's hard line on Ukraine. Russian diplomat asks her whether Britain recognises Russia's sovereignty over Rostov and Vornoezh oblasts. Liz Truss states that Britain will never back down over Ukraine. Russian diplomat points out they're not in Ukraine (Rostov and Voronezh are in Russia).

He probably twigged her level after she talked about our Baltic allies coming over the Black Sea.

At one level, talking is better than fighting.

Why Russia would care what our tiny armed forces might do it almost funny. Germany should be taking the lead and since they're not the USA seems to be content to spend money the Europeans would rather not.

~:smoking:

[Pannonian]

At one level, talking is better than fighting.

Why Russia would care what our tiny armed forces might do it almost funny. Germany should be taking the lead and since they're not the USA seems to be content to spend money the Europeans would rather not.

~:smoking:

Just because talking is better than fighting doesn't mean our foreign secretary has to be as idiotic and ignorant as she is though. I'm not a professional diplomat, and even I know that the Black Sea is nowhere near the Baltics. The Russian diplomat also noted that there was no negotiation or even discussion going on, but only Truss passing slogans at him as though they were supposed to achieve something. I'm not sure if that counts as talking. I suppose the Tories have been used to Brexit diplomacy, being there in person but actually passing the message for the benefit of the audience at home, that they've forgotten that diplomacy is supposed to engage with the person you're talking to, not the papers back home.

[rory_20_uk]

Of course she's an ignorant idiot. For a minister to not be would be noteworthy.

There is nothing the UK can offer nor threaten that Russia needs or wants. It is purely something to distract the papers from what the PM does.

~:smoking:

[Furunculus]

Just because talking is better than fighting doesn't mean our foreign secretary has to be as idiotic and ignorant as she is though. I'm not a professional diplomat, and even I know that the Black Sea is nowhere near the Baltics. The Russian diplomat also noted that there was no negotiation or even discussion going on, but only Truss passing slogans at him as though they were supposed to achieve something. I'm not sure if that counts as talking. I suppose the Tories have been used to Brexit diplomacy, being there in person but actually passing the message for the benefit of the audience at home, that they've forgotten that diplomacy is supposed to engage with the person you're talking to, not the papers back home.

hmmm, i prefer these views:

https://twitter.com/b_judah/status/1491868196714029058

What Lavrov did to Truss in Moscow is as boorish as if Johnson had spent an hour abusing Von Der Leyen over Northern Ireland and then deliberately played a trick on her about which Ulster counties are in the UK names and leaked it. Tyrone and Fermanagh? Or Monaghan and Cavan?

https://twitter.com/DanielKorski/status/1491796846150242322

I’m not sure I get all the hot takes on the Truss/Lavrov meeting. It looks to me like the British Foreign Secretary was clear, denounced Russia’s illegal behaviour, defended the freedom of European states and that the Russian foreign minister, true to form, was rude and bullying

and this one:

https://twitter.com/john_ritzema/status/1491752868256354306

sorry, but FBPE twitter getting excited about Sergei Lavrov being thuggishly rude to Liz Truss is just a golden example of people continuing to beclown themselves because of brexit

[Pannonian]

hmmm, i prefer these views:

https://twitter.com/b_judah/status/1491868196714029058


https://twitter.com/DanielKorski/status/1491796846150242322


and this one:

https://twitter.com/john_ritzema/status/1491752868256354306

And you've brought FBPE into it. I referred to "Brexit diplomacy" earlier to describe the behaviour of supposedly being on a diplomatic engagement but where the messaging is aimed at the papers and media back home rather than with the person in front of you. You've presumably taken that as free rein to go full on linking the discussion with Brexit,

See rory, this is the kind of behaviour I've been talking about. Everything the Tories do is excused, because they are getting Brexit done, with Brexit being an identity to be defended rather than a policy to be enacted.

[Montmorency]

Of course she's an ignorant idiot. For a minister to not be would be noteworthy.

There is nothing the UK can offer nor threaten that Russia needs or wants. It is purely something to distract the papers from what the PM does.

~:smoking:

OTOH, Putin met personally with Macron over at least 5 hours. A head of government's time is rarely valueless, so there's probably something to it.


hmmm, i prefer these views:

https://twitter.com/b_judah/status/1491868196714029058


https://twitter.com/DanielKorski/status/1491796846150242322


and this one:

https://twitter.com/john_ritzema/status/1491752868256354306

Bruh your minister told a foreign government that the UK will never recognize Russian sovereignty over provinces whose Russian sovereignty has not been questioned. The haste and intemperacy of the minister is on display, even if the gaffe doesn't have wider diplomatic implications. There's only three Eastern European names any official really needs to know: Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea.


The British Foreign Secretary (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5207486) told the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry about the need to withdraw Russian armed forces from the Ukrainian border. Sergei Lavrov replied that the military is on the territory of his country. Liz Truss repeated that they should be withdrawn. To this, the Russian minister again objected that the military is not violating anything, since they have the right to conduct any maneuvers on the territory of the Russian Federation.

After that, he himself addressed a question to his British colleague: “Do you recognize the sovereignty of Russia over the Rostov and Voronezh regions?”

“Great Britain will never recognize Russian sovereignty over these regions,” the Foreign Minister replied after a short pause.

British Ambassador to the Russian Federation Deborah Bonnert had to intervene in the situation, who delicately explained to Mrs. Truss that we were really talking about Russian regions.

[Furunculus]

Nonsense, your own quote shows it:

Truss - The British Foreign Secretary told the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry about the need to withdraw Russian armed forces from the Ukrainian border.
[talking about little green men in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea]

Lavrov - Sergei Lavrov replied that the military is on the territory of his country.
[pretending there aren't any little green men in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea]

Truss - Liz Truss repeated that they should be withdrawn.
[still talking about little green men in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea]

Lavrov - To this, the Russian minister again objected that the military is not violating anything, since they have the right to conduct any maneuvers on the territory of the Russian Federation.
[attempting to shift the conversation as if we have all accepted "that [all] the military is on the territory of his country."]

Lavrov - After that, he himself addressed a question to his British colleague: “Do you recognize the sovereignty of Russia over the Rostov and Voronezh regions?”
[pretending that we have all accepted that russia's military isn't sitting inside others peoples borders, asks: why do you object if our military is inside our border?]

Truss - “Great Britain will never recognize Russian sovereignty over these regions,” the Foreign Minister replied after a short pause.
[refusing to accept the premise - continues with the understanding we all share: that there are little green men in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea]

No. I think i prefer the quoted tweets above, thank you.

[Furunculus]

And you've brought FBPE into it. I referred to "Brexit diplomacy" earlier to describe the behaviour of supposedly being on a diplomatic engagement but where the messaging is aimed at the papers and media back home rather than with the person in front of you. You've presumably taken that as free rein to go full on linking the discussion with Brexit,

See rory, this is the kind of behaviour I've been talking about. Everything the Tories do is excused, because they are getting Brexit done, with Brexit being an identity to be defended rather than a policy to be enacted.

the first two were the substantial points, from serious FP/IR pov.

the third was more of a bit of gentle fun for those who choose to beclown themselves by making everything about brexit (which was why i referred to it separately).
something you have accused me of, no? :clown:

[Montmorency]

[refusing to accept the premise - continues with the understanding we all share: that there are little green men in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea]

That's what you wish she had done, but she wasn't thoughtful enough to detect/reject the red herring.

'Comment on the rightful ownership of Alaska.'
'Alaska belongs to Ukraine!'

or

'A lasker? Wozzat? No to Russian military buildup in annexed territories.'


Throughout the rising tensions President Zelensky has tried to keep life in Ukraine going, though some Western administrations have taken alarmed/alarmist postures since the start of winter. Ukraine's been on Level 4 travel advisory for a while now (though so have many other countries, due to Covid, so it's hard to tell.) In late January the State Department ordered embassy family members in Ukraine to leave, and recommended voluntary departure of staff, offering repatriation loans. Similar to Afghanistan at the beginning of summer 2021. Now, as in Afghanistan early last August, the US is issuing a blunt outright call for American nationals to leave the country; other countries are as well, including the UK, Norway, and South Korea. Such a disruptive move levied at a sovereign partner hopefully isn't being taken lightly, as some sort of bluff by Western powers. If there is a war, I hope Gilrandir can take the time to delurk at some point to let us know if he's OK.

[Pannonian]

That's what you wish she had done, but she wasn't thoughtful enough to detect/reject the red herring.

'Comment on the rightful ownership of Alaska.'
'Alaska belongs to Ukraine!'

or

'A lasker? Wozzat? No to Russian military buildup in annexed territories.'


Throughout the rising tensions President Zelensky has tried to keep life in Ukraine going, though some Western administrations have taken alarmed/alarmist postures since the start of winter. Ukraine's been on Level 4 travel advisory for a while now (though so have many other countries, due to Covid, so it's hard to tell.) In late January the State Department ordered embassy family members in Ukraine to leave, and recommended voluntary departure of staff, offering repatriation loans. Similar to Afghanistan at the beginning of summer 2021. Now, as in Afghanistan early last August, the US is issuing a blunt outright call for American nationals to leave the country; other countries are as well, including the UK, Norway, and South Korea. Such a disruptive move levied at a sovereign partner hopefully isn't being taken lightly, as some sort of bluff by Western powers. If there is a war, I hope Gilrandir can take the time to delurk at some point to let us know if he's OK.

The fact that the UK diplomat intervened to explain that Rostov and Voronezh were in Russia shows the error that Truss had made, no matter how Furunculus tries to spin it.

You guys are lucky. At least you've got rid of your Russian flunkies. Ours are still in charge.

[spmetla]

Russia’s military build-up enters a more dangerous phase
New satellite images show troops and equipment massing ever-closer to Ukraine
https://www.economist.com/interactive/2022/02/11/russias-military-build-up-enters-a-more-dangerous-phase

.....Around 100 Russian battalion tactical groups—fighting formations of 1,000 or so troops, accompanied by air defence, artillery and logistics—have gathered on Ukraine’s borders with Russia and Belarus. The build-up has entered a new phase. Russian units are heading from large bases into staging areas near the border. Troops are moving to link up with their equipment. Vital enablers for war, like field hospitals and engineering units, are being put into place. All of this is visible. America and its nato allies scrutinise Russia’s mobilisation using spy satellites, surveillance flights and other means of gathering intelligence.

..........taken together, these satellite images show that Ukraine is now ringed by Russian forces to its north, east and south. That gives the Kremlin options: a thrust into the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine to support Russian proxies there; a deeper attack along Ukraine’s southern coast all the way to the Dnieper river; punitive raids against Ukraine’s armed forces—or even a drive all the way to Kyiv. On February 11th America urged its citizens to leave the city within 48 hours. As Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, noted on the same day: “We're in a window when an invasion could begin at any time.”


Looks like all the open-source indicators are showing an invasion likely happening the middle of next week. I see that the US has sent B-52s to aid in deterrence, nuke 'sniffing' aircraft, and now another 3000 paratroopers from 82nd Airborne to Poland.

I can only hope that this is some gigantic bluff but from what I think of Putin this is the real deal, he'll certainly cement himself into Russian history.

If it does happen I do wonder how far he will go. Given the economic repercussions that will happen I can imagine that he's just gonna go all out and puppet/annex 'Novo-russiya' and puppet Ukraine sorta like the union status that Belarus has with Russia.

[Furunculus]

The fact that the UK diplomat intervened to explain that Rostov and Voronezh were in Russia shows the error that Truss had made, no matter how Furunculus tries to spin it.

You guys are lucky. At least you've got rid of your Russian flunkies. Ours are still in charge.

How can 'ours' be described as Russian flunkies?

Who are they and what have they done that is flunkey'ish?

[Pannonian]

Bruh your minister told a foreign government that the UK will never recognize Russian sovereignty over provinces whose Russian sovereignty has not been questioned. The haste and intemperacy of the minister is on display, even if the gaffe doesn't have wider diplomatic implications. There's only three Eastern European names any official really needs to know: Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea.

Even her fellow Tories have noted the volume of content on her Instagram, surmising that her reading of her office of foreign affairs is to use it as a platform to campaign for the office of prime minister, rather than to do the job that it's supposed to involve. I suppose it's hard to blame her, since her predecessor has shown how that can be done. Either way, she's not in the Ukraine to engage with the Russians, she's in the Ukraine to engage with the Tory members.

[Furunculus]

Interesting twist with the UK being suggested to head a european security council:

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/02/13/eu-hands-britain-post-brexit-olive-branch-offer-lead-new-security/

[rory_20_uk]

Even her fellow Tories have noted the volume of content on her Instagram, surmising that her reading of her office of foreign affairs is to use it as a platform to campaign for the office of prime minister, rather than to do the job that it's supposed to involve. I suppose it's hard to blame her, since her predecessor has shown how that can be done. Either way, she's not in the Ukraine to engage with the Russians, she's in the Ukraine to engage with the Tory members.

Such points were being made in Yes Prime Minister 50 years ago.


Interesting twist with the UK being suggested to head a european security council:

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/02/13/eu-hands-britain-post-brexit-olive-branch-offer-lead-new-security/

Assuming the head of the organisation has some (relatively speaking) military might it was either the UK or France. And France has the latest toy of head of the EU, Boris might like to have something new to posture on to help with headlines with his Base.

~:smoking:

[Montmorency]

Con PM Tugendhat (https://twitter.com/TomTugendhat/status/1492830556358328321), surprisingly for his background, repeats the excellent point that the most effective way to resist Russia available to the West would be to crack down on internal and exported corruption.

More contentious is his estimation that "He’s trying to keep the pot simmering to keep the pressure on us and expose our divisions. He knows he could walk away now and lie about his great victory at home - the number of foreigners who have been to Moscow show he’s the main man - or he could see what else he can get."

I don't know, maybe, but it's hard for me to see what Putin can spin as a win if he cuts bait now. An American/EU promise to veto Ukrainian NATO/EU hopes in exchange for observable demobilization in the east (Crimea is a lost cause) is certainly a compromise that I hope our governments have sounded out for what it's worth. But if it were that simple wouldn't the deal have been finalized and publicized long ago? If he just returns troops home following the conclusion to the scheduled exercise with Belarus, what exactly does he tell the public in closing?

Related (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-proposes-russia-continue-diplomatic-work-european-security-push-2022-02-14/): Putin messaging openness to more diplomacy.

[Pannonian]

Con PM Tugendhat (https://twitter.com/TomTugendhat/status/1492830556358328321), surprisingly for his background, repeats the excellent point that the most effective way to resist Russia available to the West would be to crack down on internal and exported corruption.

More contentious is his estimation that "He’s trying to keep the pot simmering to keep the pressure on us and expose our divisions. He knows he could walk away now and lie about his great victory at home - the number of foreigners who have been to Moscow show he’s the main man - or he could see what else he can get."

I don't know, maybe, but it's hard for me to see what Putin can spin as a win if he cuts bait now. An American/EU promise to veto Ukrainian NATO/EU hopes in exchange for observable demobilization in the east (Crimea is a lost cause) is certainly a compromise that I hope our governments have sounded out for what it's worth. But if it were that simple wouldn't the deal have been finalized and publicized long ago? If he just returns troops home following the conclusion to the scheduled exercise with Belarus, what exactly does he tell the public in closing?

Related (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-proposes-russia-continue-diplomatic-work-european-security-push-2022-02-14/): Putin messaging openness to more diplomacy.

Aaron Banks, one of the biggest backers of the Brexit campaign, was a bankrupt. Yet he was able to back the Leave campaign with umpteen million pounds. Entirely unrelated to this, of course, was the fact that he has close associates who made their money in Russia, dealing with Putin and oligarchs. We know this is unrelated because Banks has launched various lawsuits against anyone who's had the audacity to suggest that the Russian were backing Brexit via Banks. AFAIK he's not actually won any of these lawsuits, and the last hearing he was due to attend, he didn't attend.

Something that we wouldn't have seen during the Cold War, is the Russians friends our PM, one of the leading figures of Brexit, has, including the owner of one of the capital's main newspapers. Nor would we have seen our now PM take time out from his political career to play a game of tennis with the wife of one of Putin's friends. That got him over 150k I think, which was quite lucrative for one tennis match. Dash the thought that the money wasn't for the tennis match, but for talks on political favours accompanying the meeting.

Also see the Russia Report, the UK security committee's investigation of the Brexit campaign, which said that the UK government did not find any Russian interference because it refused to look for it.

Brexit has been one of Russia's most cost-effective political campaigns ever, in how much damage it has done to one of its major competitors, at a trifling cost. Most of the work was done by the natives themselves, with just a few operatives needing payment.

[Furunculus]

all this dirty money doesn't seem to have had much affect in weakening UK push-back against Russian aggression?
to the extent this can be judged it is relative to our european neighbours, and they look much more wobbly-knee'd that than the UK (with the honorable exceptions of the eastern baltic states).

i love the idea that russia bought brexit. makes me want to invest in tinfoil futures.

----------------------

separately - the always excellent lindley-french:
https://lindleyfrench.blogspot.com/2022/02/frozen-war-whiff-of-munich.html

[rory_20_uk]

all this dirty money doesn't seem to have had much affect in weakening UK push-back against Russian aggression?
to the extent this can be judged it is relative to our european neighbours, and they look much more wobbly-knee'd that than the UK (with the honorable exceptions of the eastern baltic states).

i love the idea that russia bought brexit. makes me want to invest in tinfoil futures.

----------------------

separately - the always excellent lindley-french:
https://lindleyfrench.blogspot.com/2022/02/frozen-war-whiff-of-munich.html

A threat of cutting off money before anything has happened would not only mean there's no threat, but also would tell the rest of the world the UK could do this again when not happy. If Russia had attacked and the UK had impounded / suspended / taken the money then at least there would have been some causus belli - like what the USA did to Germany in WW1.

Our "push back" was some words, withdrawing troops last weekend and the only thing NATO has unanimously said is that there will be no help for non-NATO members.

Compared to Germany almost soiling its britches and France sucking up then yeah - the UK is leading the field in European in pseudo-action.

~:smoking:

[Furunculus]

UK input was 2000 Anti Tank Guided missiles and a trilateral agreement with Poland and Ukraine.

Germany provided 5000 helmets, and prevented Lithuania transferring some military-aid artillery pieces on to Ukraine.

[Pannonian]

all this dirty money doesn't seem to have had much affect in weakening UK push-back against Russian aggression?
to the extent this can be judged it is relative to our european neighbours, and they look much more wobbly-knee'd that than the UK (with the honorable exceptions of the eastern baltic states).

i love the idea that russia bought brexit. makes me want to invest in tinfoil futures.

----------------------

separately - the always excellent lindley-french:
https://lindleyfrench.blogspot.com/2022/02/frozen-war-whiff-of-munich.html

Does it mean it's ok for our politicians to take Russian money then? Corbyn got flak for taking the Russians' side over Salisbury, deservedly. Why does the other side taking hostile money get excuses made for them?

Personally, I'm suspicious of influence from various countries in whom I have little faith that they have good intentions for the UK. Russia and China prime amongst them.

[Pannonian]

A threat of cutting off money before anything has happened would not only mean there's no threat, but also would tell the rest of the world the UK could do this again when not happy. If Russia had attacked and the UK had impounded / suspended / taken the money then at least there would have been some causus belli - like what the USA did to Germany in WW1.

Our "push back" was some words, withdrawing troops last weekend and the only thing NATO has unanimously said is that there will be no help for non-NATO members.

Compared to Germany almost soiling its britches and France sucking up then yeah - the UK is leading the field in European in pseudo-action.

~:smoking:

We should investigate Russian influence in our politics, and publicise how individuals in government have Russian links. Supposed military action is open and can be easily verified. I want as little Russian influence in our politics as possible. If we are to admit them as a legit influence, they should at least be in the open.

[rory_20_uk]

We should investigate Russian influence in our politics, and publicise how individuals in government have Russian links. Supposed military action is open and can be easily verified. I want as little Russian influence in our politics as possible. If we are to admit them as a legit influence, they should at least be in the open.

That MPs in general and lobbying in particular requires oversight by either MI5 or Special Branch is beyond question.

The issue is broader than just Russians buying influence.

~:smoking:

[Furunculus]

Does it mean it's ok for our politicians to take Russian money then? Corbyn got flak for taking the Russians' side over Salisbury, deservedly. Why does the other side taking hostile money get excuses made for them?


At no point did i suggest it was.
Your premise is that UK is bought and paid for by the Russian state, my response is that there is no sign that Russia is getting any foriegn policy input for that money.
And this is the difference here; Corbyn (then) Germany (today) seem to be taking the wrong side, but there is no evidence that is true of the UK today.



Personally, I'm suspicious of influence from various countries in whom I have little faith that they have good intentions for the UK. Russia and China prime amongst them.

I agree.

[Pannonian]

That MPs in general and lobbying in particular requires oversight by either MI5 or Special Branch is beyond question.

The issue is broader than just Russians buying influence.

~:smoking:

I'm ok with that. The problem, the Commons committee (I think it's Commons) found, is that the security services have been actively looking away from investigating them. And more recently we see that the Met had been overlooking lawbreaking in Downing Street until public opinion (and I suspect timing) made it expedient to investigate. The people who are supposed to enforce the rules and protect the country have been looking aside to allow the government free rein. And most of the right media have been aiding this by spinning explanations and excuses for them.

Something that we can start with in this current Parliament is requiring ministers, including the PM, to answer the questions being asked, and imposing substantial sanctions against anyone found to have misled the House. Maybe the Chief Liar will have to man up or get out then.

[Furunculus]

UK input was 2000 Anti Tank Guided missiles and a trilateral agreement with Poland and Ukraine.

Germany provided 5000 helmets, and prevented Lithuania transferring some military-aid artillery pieces on to Ukraine.

that trilateral gets official today:

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-by-the-united-kingdom-poland-and-ukraine-17-february-2022

What it looks like:

https://twitter.com/ConGeostrategy/status/1494336288027070472

[Montmorency]

Genocide and all sorts of 2014-throwback propaganda.

Hm, seems any Russian diplomatic/de-escalation feint has now concluded and we're in the casus bellus stage. If he has indeed just been drawing this dialogue out under false pretenses, does Putin seriously not realize that he's only pissing off the third parties even more? If he invades, he'll probably receive stiffer resistance and a harsher EU/US penalty than he would have if he had arranged a blitz offensive at the end of last year.

The US government's information war spoiler strategy has been interesting.

Reminder that this live map (https://liveuamap.com/) exists.

February 19 will be the 79th anniversary of von Manstein's armored counterattack toward Kharkov, in NE Ukraine.

Some (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44319/pontoon-bridge-appears-in-chernobyl-exclusion-zone-that-could-give-russia-unique-access-to-ukraine) of many articles and bits of information:

https://i.imgur.com/1EW03kT.png
https://i.imgur.com/xCcLWBk.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/RR65rOj.gif

[spmetla]

Genocide and all sorts of 2014-throwback propaganda.

Hm, seems any Russian diplomatic/de-escalation feint has now concluded and we're in the casus bellus stage. If he has indeed just been drawing this dialogue out under false pretenses, does Putin seriously not realize that he's only pissing off the third parties even more? If he invades, he'll probably receive stiffer resistance and a harsher EU/US penalty than he would have if he had arranged a blitz offensive at the end of last year.

The US government's information war spoiler strategy has been interesting.

Reminder that this live map exists.

February 19 will be the 79th anniversary of von Manstein's armored counterattack toward Kharkov, in NE Ukraine.

Some of many articles and bits of information:

Yup, having been following what TASS has been putting out the last few days there is certainly the effort to make it look like the Ukraine is just being unfair to the separatists and unwilling to talk about Minsk 2 negotiations or abide by Minsk 1.

Also that pontoon bridge is quite the development if true. Guess a radiological fallout zone is a weaknesss in defense as who would you station there if you were the Ukraine.
https://tass.com/politics/1405525

The plan for a peace settlement in Donbass relies on the Minsk agreements, achieved in February 2015. Among other things they envisage ceasefire, pullback of weapons, amnesty, resumption of economic relations and a flexible constitutional reform in Ukraine. The authorities in Kiev have repeatedly professed their readiness to act on these agreements, but in fact have ignored them for many years. In particular, Kiev refuses to have a direct dialogue with Donetsk and Lugansk and objects to granting Donbass a special status. Also, it procrastinates on the negotiations in the Contact Group.



The USG's spoiler strategy is interesting for sure. Was talking with a friend this week about how our declaring that Wednesday would be the invasion was almost a sure way to delay it as there's no way the Russians would want to make it look like Western intelligence was right even if the info was correct down to the minute of the attack. Also, there's the factor that a crying wolf effect might happen if the Russians drag out the threat leading to NATO/EU disunity and then renewed opportunity for an attack.
My buddy also thinks that part of getting overt Chinese support was likely a promise to not completely distract from their Winter Games events and hold off until afterward.

I'm actually pleased to see the aggressive information campaign as I think too often in the past the US and NATO have just assumed that they were so in the 'right' that there was no need to push information to dominate the airwaves and discussion.

[Hooahguy]

The USG's spoiler strategy is interesting for sure. Was talking with a friend this week about how our declaring that Wednesday would be the invasion was almost a sure way to delay it as there's no way the Russians would want to make it look like Western intelligence was right even if the info was correct down to the minute of the attack. Also, there's the factor that a crying wolf effect might happen if the Russians drag out the threat leading to NATO/EU disunity and then renewed opportunity for an attack.
My buddy also thinks that part of getting overt Chinese support was likely a promise to not completely distract from their Winter Games events and hold off until afterward.

I'm actually pleased to see the aggressive information campaign as I think too often in the past the US and NATO have just assumed that they were so in the 'right' that there was no need to push information to dominate the airwaves and discussion.
Yup, I think the policy of pushing out tons of information has worked fairly well and kept the narrative in the West's court, with Russia trying to reclaim the narrative a couple times with feigned withdrawal stories over the past week (which has largely failed). My thinking is that there was solid intel that the 16th would be the day of invasion, but when the word got out the Russians changed their plans to not give western intel credibility, as you said. But with today's evacuations, bombings, and artillery bombardments, I think we are on the brink of invasion. I would be shocked if Russia doesnt do anything by the 20th.

[Montmorency]

Cool article on some of the technology (https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2022/02/11/radar-interference-tracker-a-new-open-source-tool-to-locate-active-military-radar-systems/) behind contemporary OSINT. And we've all been seeing those commercial satellite ~1km snapshots of military formations from Maxar and the like, so clear and crisp. The great powers must enjoy the sensitivity to capture such resolutions down to a few meters.


I noticed this older social media clip (https://twitter.com/4emberlen/status/1491418129414914048) of Russian movements, featuring some armor. I'm unsure whether the music was added over the clip in editing, or if it was a diegetic soundtrack from the car's sound system. Either way, I refuse to believe that it was playing by coincidence. The song is a rock cover of the famous Soviet march, "Three Tankmen."


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnITVgRY4ZU


On the border the clouds go gloomy
On the frontier a harsh silence is embraced
On the high banks of the Amur River
The motherland's guard stands.

There, a solid barrier has been set up for the enemy
There it stands, brave and strong
At the borders of the Far East:
The armored strike battalion.

They live there - and the song is the guarantee -
An indestructible, strong family
Three tankers - three cheerful friends
The crew of a combat vehicle.

Thick dew fell on the grass
Fogs fell upon the taiga
That night the samurai decided to
Cross the border by the river.

But the reconnaissance reported accurately
And it went, swept by the command
In the native land of the Far East:
The armored strike battalion.

The tanks dashed, raising the wind
Formidable armor advanced
And the samurai flew to the ground
Under the force of steel and fire

And it finished off - the song is the guarantee -
All enemies in the fiery attack
Three tankmen - three cheerful friends
The crew of the combat vehicle!

Damn Russian trolls.

[spmetla]

China Seeks to Protect Ties With the U.S
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/china-seeks-to-protect-ties-with-the-u-s/ar-AAU6h3S?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531


Behind the Beijing-Moscow joint stance against NATO enlargement is Mr. Xi’s eagerness to show solidarity with Mr. Putin as both countries’ ties with the U.S. have soured, according to people with knowledge of Beijing’s thinking. Just as Russia is worried about threats to its security from any NATO expansion, one of the people said, China is concerned about “its territorial integrity as a result of the U.S. meddling in Taiwan.”

“They feel like they’re in the same boat,” the person added. Beijing sees Taiwan as Chinese territory and bringing the self-governing island into its fold as part of Mr. Xi’s “China Dream” of national revival.

However, China’s leadership appeared to have underestimated the reaction to the Feb. 4 statement from the rest of the world.

Many in Washington and Brussels saw the entente as one of the clearest signals yet that Beijing intends to join forces with Moscow to reshape the global order closer to their two countries’ authoritarian vision. That, on top of Beijing’s coercive behavior toward countries from Australia to Lithuania and increased military activities near the Taiwan Strait, has offered more support for President Biden’s effort to work with allies to guard against China.
While tilting closer to Moscow, the Chinese leadership still sees it in its interest not to have the bottom fallout of its ties with the U.S. It needs continued access to American financial and technological resources to ensure economic security and development—an access that could be jeopardized should Beijing decide to help Moscow evade sanctions in the event of an invasion.

“China recognizes its relationship with the U.S. is contentious and competitive,” said Bonnie Glaser, director of the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund, a Washington-based think tank. “But they don’t want to be pushed into the Russian camp.”

It would be interesting to see how China can walk the line between Russia and the US/EU economic benefits. I think it was hoping that the US/NATO and EU would prove to have more disunity in response to Russia's build up. A more united 'West' that acts as a bloc makes it much more difficult for the PRC to play off individual countries against each other as its overreaction to a Taiwan embassy in Lithuania has proved in regard to EU relations.

Getting the EU nations, especially Germany, to consider not having access to Russian gas yet remain committed in their opposition to Russia is undoubtedly recalibrating the PRC's measure of 'Western' resolve versus the easy out of maintaining economic ties and only enacting symbolic sanctions.

There's also the side that the PRC, like the rest of the gas importing world does not want to see fuel prices go up suddenly given the fragile economic climate worldwide.


EDIT:
Putin confirms he will recognise breakaway Ukraine regions
https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-europe-60454795

Putin has finished speaking now, and after a long address, in which he said Ukraine had no history of being a true nation, and accused - without evidence - the Ukrainian authorities of corruption, he confirmed he would recognise the independence of two breakaway regions

He's signed the documents and asked the Russian parliament to ratify the decision as soon as possible.

He finished his speech by saying “I’m sure I’ll have the support of the Russian people. Thank you.”

I guess it goes up a notch, only annexation await at some point in the future for these two regions.

So what's the next step? Say that Kiev is attacking sovereign nations under Russia's protection and that a security corridor must be established?

[Shaka_Khan]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8woKbFkA9I


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65x7GtUL7T8

[rory_20_uk]

Russia recognises as a country people clamouring for assistance and provides assistance and installs a pliant leader.

USA: "Oi! That's OUR thing!"

A massive part of East Ukraine the people mainly speak Russian, are pro-Russian and in many cases want to be part of Russia.

Now, in the Good Old Days this issue would have been solved by deporting everyone which isn't happy or is ethnically different out of the country, such as in newly formed Poland or Kalingrad.

But back on topic, Russia manages to up the ante just a bit more by taking two areas of nigh on worthless land leading to widespread condemnation, demands for withdrawal and promises that no troops will be sent.

~:smoking:

[spmetla]

A massive part of East Ukraine the people mainly speak Russian, are pro-Russian and in many cases want to be part of Russia.

Now, in the Good Old Days this issue would have been solved by deporting everyone which isn't happy or is ethnically different out of the country, such as in newly formed Poland or Kalingrad.


I understand and if this was done peacefully would be on board with their going independent and eventually annexed by Russia.

I know the current world order really has no good mechanism for enabling provinces/towns/regions to declare independence and get annexed by other countries as the current nation they are in usually don't want that to happen. Looking at the former Yugoslav states, present day Ethiopia/Tigray, Sudan>South Sudan, Catalonia, South Tirol, Taiwan, and the dozen 'frozen conflict' quasi states of the former Soviet Union.

However, allowing a country to redraw the map by force and take away their neighbor's territory is not really acceptable. The creation of Kosovo is really the only example in recent history of the US doing that and that was more in response to the Serbian actions against the Kosovars/Albanians.

The population exchanges sadly do work, no problem with the Sudetendeutsch after Benes understandably kicked them all out of Czechoslovakia after WW2. The Greeks and Turks were far more peaceful after the 1920s population exchange.


But back on topic, Russia manages to up the ante just a bit more by taking two areas of nigh on worthless land leading to widespread condemnation, demands for withdrawal and promises that no troops will be sent.

The land is certainly not worthless and actually was a very valuable part of the Ukraine in mining exploitation. The major problem of course is that the newly independent 'republics' don't control the whole of their own 'countries' and will likely need Russian 'peacekeepers' help to 'secure their borders.'

[Hooahguy]

A massive part of East Ukraine the people mainly speak Russian, are pro-Russian and in many cases want to be part of Russia.

This just in, France invades Belgium and seizes Wallonia.

[Montmorency]

I've seen even more vaguely-trollish Tiktoks of Russian mobilization, including but this one is just inexplicable.
https://twitter.com/YWNReporter/status/1496187284177264652 [VIDEO]

The gist of it is, a (seeming) radio announcement plays as the driver rolls alongside a convoy, with the speaker criticizing Ukraine


Let me ask, you want to start a war with the Russians? Are you out of your mind? Do you know whom you're dealing with? Russians liberated you from the fascists at the cost of 20 million of their own lives? And you want to make war against them? What ill did they ever do against you? What are you talking about?

then increasingly-epic music plays as trucks roll into the twilight. I have even less idea of what's going on anymore (in the Midwestern (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positive_anymore) sense).


Senator Chris Murphy (https://twitter.com/ChrisMurphyCT/status/1494428782823890944) has a clear explainer on why he believes Putin is operating from a position of weakness.


On the new fronts (https://twitter.com/camgottaplan/status/1496121604862095360) of information warfare, in response ot the US embassy's anti-Russian memeing:


Have a friend at a US consulate, they have a person who's job is just to monitor the Twitter of the RU consulate and get approval to counter-meme anything they post. Brave new world haha


Finally, Trump continues to be a total freak:


Well, what went wrong was a rigged election and what went wrong is a candidate that shouldn’t be there and a man that has no concept of what he’s doing. I went in yesterday and there was a television screen, and I said, “This is genius.” Putin declares a big portion of the Ukraine — of Ukraine. Putin declares it as independent. Oh, that’s wonderful.

So Putin is now saying, “It’s independent,” a large section of Ukraine. I said, “How smart is that?” And he’s gonna go in and be a peacekeeper. That’s strongest peace force… We could use that on our southern border. That’s the strongest peace force I’ve ever seen. There were more army tanks than I’ve ever seen. They’re gonna keep peace all right. No, but think of it. Here’s a guy who’s very savvy… I know him very well. Very, very well. [Ed. rofl]

By the way, this never would have happened with us. Had I been in office, not even thinkable. This would never have happened. But here’s a guy that says, you know, “I’m gonna declare a big portion of Ukraine independent,” he used the word “independent,” “and we’re gonna go out and we’re gonna go in and we’re gonna help keep peace.” You gotta say that’s pretty savvy. And you know the response was from Biden? There was no response. They didn’t have one for that. No, it’s very sad. Very sad.



Russia recognises as a country people clamouring for assistance and provides assistance and installs a pliant leader.

USA: "Oi! That's OUR thing!"

Russia's been at it a lot longer than we've been around. So has England. An American-centric lens doesn't make sense in a conflict where medieval settlement patterns are invoked.


A massive part of East Ukraine the people mainly speak Russian,

It should be foregrounded in any discussion of the conflict that almost everyone in Ukraine speaks Russian. Next, Joe Biden to liberate Ireland's English speakers from Celtic oppression and genocide? That one's slightly more plausible.

Indeed, as with much of his rhetoric, Putin has been incoherent on this point. The Ukrainians turn up variously as antagonists of Russian folk, or as wayward, brainwashed Little Russians with no distinct identity or legitimacy themselves. Are Ukrainians a subset of Russians who deserve to be ruled by the Czar of All Russians, or are they predatory fascist Russophobes?


are pro-Russian and in many cases want to be part of Russia.

Still gotta sift through the particulars of this, to be fair, lesser-known conflict without falling afoul of propaganda. This just isn't true, though a plurality probably don't have any strong preference of suzerain as long as they can get on with their lives (as has been the case for most of human history).


The land is certainly not worthless and actually was a very valuable part of the Ukraine in mining exploitation. The major problem of course is that the newly independent 'republics' don't control the whole of their own 'countries' and will likely need Russian 'peacekeepers' help to 'secure their borders.'

I'd never heard of mining, but that it was a site of heavy industry which the Russians subsequently dismantled and looted.


I know the current world order really has no good mechanism for enabling provinces/towns/regions to declare independence and get annexed by other countries as the current nation they are in usually don't want that to happen. Looking at the former Yugoslav states, present day Ethiopia/Tigray, Sudan>South Sudan, Catalonia, South Tirol, Taiwan, and the dozen 'frozen conflict' quasi states of the former Soviet Union.

There's no good mechanism because it's usually a matter of force as to the allocation of resources. When one faction or ethnic community can't get what it wants or needs by political means, the other options are separation or armed conflict to seize the state apparatus. So you have the situations in Myanmar and Ethiopia (though Ethiopia's civil war has been started by its former ruling class). And it's a whole other level of conflict when an external power foments and fabricates unrest,

So there is no such thing as a peaceful resolution mechanism without a preexisting mutual consensus on separation or reform.




Does anyone have any context for this video (https://twitter.com/francska1/status/1495474850458226689)? It's purported to be national broadcast from the end of 2021 showing the leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party declaring that


At 4am on 22 Feb you'll feel [our new policy]. I'd like 2022 to be peaceful. But I love the truth, for 75 years I've said the truth. It won't be peaceful. It will be a year when Russia once again becomes great.

That's pretty ominous, and prescient. How does it reflect on recent events? Was it all preplanned? Did Zhirik let something slip improperly? Is or was the declaration part of Russian information strategy?

[Furunculus]

I'm in poland and acts like this - threatening to sue if Poland builds nuclear power plants - as well as Nordstream generally are going down like a bucket of sick:

https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1496392433113907200

adding to that the (lack of) support for Ukraine with acts such as blocking the lithuanian(?) artillery and a meagre 5k helmets in military aid is making Germany look like a very undependable ally.

[Pannonian]

EU imposes sanctions on all members of Russian Duma and other influential individuals. UK imposes sanctions on 5 Russian banks and 3 oligarchs. No sanctions on anyone who has donated to Tory party during Boris Johnson's time as PM. I guess those banks and oligarchs must be punished for forgetting to top up the party coffers.

[rory_20_uk]

EU imposes sanctions on all members of Russian Duma and other influential individuals. UK imposes sanctions on 5 Russian banks and 3 oligarchs. No sanctions on anyone who has donated to Tory party during Boris Johnson's time as PM. I guess those banks and oligarchs must be punished for forgetting to top up the party coffers.

In neither case will it make a jot of difference.

~:smoking:

[Pannonian]

In neither case will it make a jot of difference.

~:smoking:

If so, why aren't the Tory government doing more?

[Shaka_Khan]

China isn't imposing economic sanctions on Russia.

[rory_20_uk]

If so, why aren't the Tory government doing more?

Because we are a small island the other side of Europe - a modern day phrase would be "We've not got the ships, we've not got the men, and not got the money too"... Pax Britannia is long since dead. And the last time we got involved in a war in that neck of the woods (the Crimea) it went horribly wrong.

A united Europe would struggle to project strength there. And Europe - be that NATO / EU or whatever - isn't. No country in Europe has forces with the reach, nor the logistical chain to back up anything like a near-peer war. Few, if any, in Western Europe have the will to do so.

Europe can stop buying their fuel. But European voters care a lot more about fuel bills than the Ukraine. Ironically, the UK doesn't purchase much Russian gas so we don't even have that lever to pull; I read an article that the UK could help the EU with LNG imports (since we have excess terminals and Europe doesn't have enough to compensate for the loss of Russia) but LNG is more expensive. We've stopped selling Russian debt - leaving only ten or so other places to sell it.

One of the few upsides in not mattering as a country is being able to kick back, look at big geopolitical issues and go "oh dear - someone really ought to do something about that..."

~:smoking:

[Pannonian]

Because we are a small island the other side of Europe - a modern day phrase would be "We've not got the ships, we've not got the men, and not got the money too"... Pax Britannia is long since dead. And the last time we got involved in a war in that neck of the woods (the Crimea) it went horribly wrong.

A united Europe would struggle to project strength there. And Europe - be that NATO / EU or whatever - isn't. No country in Europe has forces with the reach, nor the logistical chain to back up anything like a near-peer war. Few, if any, in Western Europe have the will to do so.

Europe can stop buying their fuel. But European voters care a lot more about fuel bills than the Ukraine. Ironically, the UK doesn't purchase much Russian gas so we don't even have that lever to pull; I read an article that the UK could help the EU with LNG imports (since we have excess terminals and Europe doesn't have enough to compensate for the loss of Russia) but LNG is more expensive. We've stopped selling Russian debt - leaving only ten or so other places to sell it.

One of the few upsides in not mattering as a country is being able to kick back, look at big geopolitical issues and go "oh dear - someone really ought to do something about that..."

~:smoking:

I'm not talking about sending ships, planes, or boots on the ground. I'm talking about sanctions against Russian money. It's entirely within our power to do so. But despite all the noise about us being hardline against Russian aggression, we're doing less about Russian money than the EU are. None of those who've donated to the Tory party during Johnson's reign have any action taken against them, and precious few besides. What's the explanation for doing less than the EU on this matter?

[rory_20_uk]

I'm not talking about sending ships, planes, or boots on the ground. I'm talking about sanctions against Russian money. It's entirely within our power to do so. But despite all the noise about us being hardline against Russian aggression, we're doing less about Russian money than the EU are. None of those who've donated to the Tory party during Johnson's reign have any action taken against them, and precious few besides. What's the explanation for doing less than the EU on this matter?

I hope you're not expecting me to defend Boris.

What I did say is that neither the EU nor the UK sanctions will do anything. Not buying Russian gas probably would eventually - but I don't see the EU jumping on that one. If the USA blocks Russia from the international banking system that would probably at the very least cause a massive inconvenience.

~:smoking:

[Hooahguy]

China isn't imposing economic sanctions on Russia.
Saw that coming a mile away, considering their claims on Taiwan.

[Montmorency]

Because we are a small island the other side of Europe - a modern day phrase would be "We've not got the ships, we've not got the men, and not got the money too"... Pax Britannia is long since dead. And the last time we got involved in a war in that neck of the woods (the Crimea) it went horribly wrong.

A united Europe would struggle to project strength there. And Europe - be that NATO / EU or whatever - isn't. No country in Europe has forces with the reach, nor the logistical chain to back up anything like a near-peer war. Few, if any, in Western Europe have the will to do so.


What I did say is that neither the EU nor the UK sanctions will do anything. Not buying Russian gas probably would eventually - but I don't see the EU jumping on that one. If the USA blocks Russia from the international banking system that would probably at the very least cause a massive inconvenience.

Russia/Russian plutocrats have hundreds of billions in assets in Europe, disproportionately in the UK. Not "what can" be done, much to do. It means nothing to speak of devastating financial repercussions against Russia without these steps, because the elite will parasitize the mass of Russians to the end unless you expropriate everything of 'theirs' you can identify. The Russian standard of living is irrelevant. The oligarchic standard of living is everything.

[Pannonian]

I hope you're not expecting me to defend Boris.

What I did say is that neither the EU nor the UK sanctions will do anything. Not buying Russian gas probably would eventually - but I don't see the EU jumping on that one. If the USA blocks Russia from the international banking system that would probably at the very least cause a massive inconvenience.

~:smoking:

The UK is one of the biggest investment locations for Russian oligarchs, due to our willingness to allow money laundering. The Taliban are in a bind because everyone is freezing their assets. Why isn't the UK doing the same with Russian oligarchs?

[Montmorency]

torschlusspanik


The Russians are invading, and to a cover of Rammstein's Sonne at that.
https://twitter.com/YWNReporter/status/1496659399796051969 [VIDEO]

Publicly, he's staking out the middle ground (Donbas clearing operation). But the mythopoetic and nuclear-threat rhetoric aren't really compatible with anything but total conquest - not that Putin's obligated to obey the logic of his words.


Путин заявил, что принял решение о проведении военной операции по защите Донбасса (https://tass.ru/politika/13825671)

Putin announced that he had decided to conduct a special military operation to protect Donbass.

Russia will not allow Ukraine to have nuclear weapons, Putin added. The plans of the Russian Federation do not include the occupation of Ukrainian territories, he said.

Circumstances require decisive action from Russia, Putin said.

RF considers it important that all peoples of Ukraine could use the right of self-determination - Putin.

The actions of the Russian Federation are not connected with the infringement of the interests of Ukraine, but with protecting itself from "those who took Ukraine hostage" - Putin.


Russian state media already discussed a partition of Ukraine back in 2014, but the material they've been presenting now is even more extreme.

https://i.imgur.com/JFG4B1l.jpg

Clockwise from left: "Stalin's gifts"; "Gifts of the Russian czars"; "Ukraine"; "Lenin's gifts"; "Khruschev's gift."

From a mainline (American) paleoconservative outlet/commentator (https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/unpatriotic-conservatives-2022/):


To repeat myself: I am opposed to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. I think Russia should leave Ukraine alone, but whatever happens, I am adamantly against following the US leadership into hawkish actions against the Russians. It’s not at all because I support Russia or in any way approve of what it’s doing. (I hope Russian families and Russian soldiers stop to think about what exorbitant cost is extracted from them so that Putin can restore Greater Russia.) It’s rather that I am sick to the point of puking of these people — the American elites — sh*tting all over so many of us, yet expecting us to send our sons (and daughters) to fight its damn wars. Especially when the goal is to extend American political and cultural hegemony over the world, to allow the Western-oriented elites in those countries to ruin the lives of the normal people in those places in the same way they have ruined ours.

Put another way, I adamantly oppose risking the lives of boys from Louisiana and Alabama to make the Donbass safe for genderqueers and migrants. If that makes me a reactionary troll, fine, I’ll own that. I love my country and would put my life on the line to fight for her against foreign invaders. But we are not the good guys I used to think we were. We can’t even protect schoolgirls in Louisiana and Alabama from this toxic ideology that is destroying their moral sense, but they expect us to gear up in case we are called to fight for Ukraine?

Biden has said American troops won’t be fighting for Ukraine. I don’t believe him. It’s not that I think he’s consciously lying, but rather it’s that things could go very bad, very quickly, with US troops in the region. And it’s that my trust in anything anybody in Washington says is about at the level of a synod of bishops.

It is incontrovertible that the human Right today is inreasingly beglamoured by a psychotic evil, and we must defend ourselves.

[Montmorency]

Some thoughts, with roughly appropriate soundtrack.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_74nVpLVn9Q

I think the Azeri-Armenian war of 2020 will go down as a milestone of the 21st century, whether on par with 9/11 and a handful of others, only time will tell. Setting the stage for the principals of the contest such as to be reminiscent of the Balkan wars or the Spanish Civil War.


I can't help but think this episode will only reinforce the Israeli commitment to occupying as much land as they can get away with. The message of a territorially-larger country overwhelming a smaller one's occupation of its territory by dint of a bigger population and military as well as allies must for Israel be on par with the one received by North Korea and Iran when Hussein got wiped out. And Israel's holdings are honestly more modest than Armenia's were, following the return of the Sinai to Egypt. (I assume the logic behind the Armenian occupation around Nagorno-Karabakh was in the first place precisely to give itself, a smaller country than Azerbaijan in every way, a buffer between its heartland and the opposition.)

Moreover, that this was such a lopsided, quick, and decisive conflict might encourage future irredentism and authoritarian adventurism around the world: 'If it worked for Azerbaijan, maybe it can work for us.'

:coffeenews:

Some significant developments of the past two years, from Russia's perspective:


An uncontrolled pandemic kills up to a million Russians (cf. excess deaths estimates), while the domestic vaccine is mustrusted to the point of refusal by half the public.
Massive protests threatening Putin's closest allies (Belarus, Kazakhstan) challenge Russian authority and provoke militarized assistance with backroom concessions.
Russia's man in DC is deposed, but the United States is more divided and chaotic than ever as it struggles with the wounded pride of Afghanistan, Covidiocy, and an ongoing insurrection up through the elite.
In a war between former Soviet states (longtime Russian clients) that threatens Russian influence in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan proves decisively - for the first time since perhaps WW2 - that one sovereign state can straight up conquer another in conventional warfare without much fuss, annex territory, and get away with it.
China, Russia's crucial strategic partner, takes notice and immediately heightens irredentist rhetoric and maneuvering over Taiwan.
The pandemic-linked global supply chain crisis returns oil and gas prices to their highest in almost a decade. The EU is burdened by high energy expenditures into Winter 2022.



Putin doesn't have many good years in power left. In principle, this was the best window of opportunity he could expect to get to settle imperial legacies. It would also be just the move, in his mind, to reassert his authority and image domestically (dispel the malaise of an F-tier pandemic response) and in the near-abroad (Belarus, Central Asia, Baltics). But like I said earlier, with oil and gas (mostly oil) representing a majority of Russia's exports, and a plurality of government revenues, Putin is being short-sighted. Unless the West really does flake at the last minute, this is the pivotal opportunity for Europe to diversify and decarbonize its energy demand, a process that in its culmination signals the terminal decline of the Russian economy (which has already struggled to stay afloat the existing sanctions regime).

Biden, get that money "printer" rolling and pay off our allies and citizens.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oURMrJMcMmQ

[spmetla]

Watching the photos and videos on various media sources my heart goes out to the Ukrainians right now. I'm just wondering whether any Ukrainian units will be able to stand their ground against so much firepower. Those MLRS barrages are something to behold not to mention everything else being done.

I can only hope that even the kitchen sink of sanctions is thrown in as it's too late to do anything else. Perhaps we'll see how far the Russians have penetrated and where in the next few hours. Given the countrywide strikes by Russia overnight I'm sure the command-and-control ability of the Ukrainian army is severely degraded, and their limited airpower is likely destroyed or soon to flee westward.

Hope the rest of Europe is ready for a mass of refugees from a fellow European state.

[Shaka_Khan]

Saw that coming a mile away, considering their claims on Taiwan.
Same here.
Economic sanctions by the EU and North America alone won't stop Putin, not right away.

[Kagemusha]

It seems that Russia has neutralized lot of military airports,installations and depots with cruise missiles already.Also major ports have been targeted. At least three separate armoured recon elements have crossed from Belarussia towards Ukrainian major cities. Also similar Armored elements have crossed from Crimea towards North, while attacks have started along the entire "separatist" frontier.

I would expect that within today the main bodies of those armoured formations will pour in from North and South, while probably amphibious landings will happen at Black Sea coast. On top of that my bet is that paratroops and air mobile infantry will start landing on key locations soon enough. Black Day for all of us.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sw9Y9VupVkk

[Crandar]

The analogies with Azerbaijan are unconvincing. Azerbaijan took back the Azerbaijani lands, which had been conquered by the Armenians 25 years ago. The land was globally recognized as Azerbaijani, despite being ethnically cleansed and under Armenian military occupation.

[Kagemusha]

Russian air assault starts near Kiev:
https://twitter.com/i/status/1496805801628995587

[Furunculus]

Russian air assault starts near Kiev:
https://twitter.com/i/status/1496805801628995587

just heard from polish radio (we've been into Wielun in the car), that russian forces were at the ring road going around kiev....

[Montmorency]

The analogies with Azerbaijan are unconvincing. Azerbaijan took back the Azerbaijani lands, which had been conquered by the Armenians 25 years ago. The land was globally recognized as Azerbaijani, despite being ethnically cleansed and under Armenian military occupation.

The perceived legitimacy of the claims is irrelevant to the geopolitical impact. Putin, Xi, et al. didn't sit there thinking 'Ah, so it's allowed to take territory from another state as long as it's within internationally-recognized borders.'

We should interpret the event functionally as open season on irredentism.

[Crandar]

What perceived legitimacy? Everyone recognized these lands as Azerbaijani. How can an act that conciliates the de facto with the de jure situation be described as irredentist? As I said, he didn't take any territory from Armenia, since Armenia occupied Azerbaijani territories, according even to Armenia itself. Also, unlike Russia, Azerbaijan was not diplomatically isolated. That was more true for Armenia, which is largely why it was crushed in the conflict. I don't know from where Putin got his inspiration (not sure how China is relevant), probably from nowhere, if I had to guess, but Azerbaijan is one of the worst examples imagined. It would be more appropriate for Ukraine, if it had invaded the Donbass, in order to throw out the Russian occupying troops.

[spmetla]

Certainly, terrifying watching the war's coverage on twitter. Seems Ukraine is putting up more of a fight than the Russian's expected though with the major breakout in the South to Kherson and the current battle over the airport west of Kiev who knows how long they can hold. The casualties on both sides must be intense though, based off what I've seen so far probably KIA in the high hundreds and WIA in the thousands for Russia and KIA and WIA in the high thousands for Ukraine.

The current cyber attacks on Russian websites are likely from the US/NATO which together with the war being close to NATO borders will create very dangerous possibilities for expansion of the war. Can very easily see scenarios where Russia's shoot down NATO aircraft or do artillery barrages against Ukrainian positions near Romania or Poland leading to the possibility of escalation. This thing is extremely dangerous.

The current 1984-esque thinking by China is mind boggling of we 'respect Ukraine's sovereignty' while also saying this is not an invasion and they understand 'Russia's legitimate security concerns.'

I'll expect Finland and Sweden to either go outright NATO applicants or just short of in military partnership in the near future.

The fate of Moldova will be interesting as that is still a sore spot for Romania as the people are ethnic Romanians that Russia has repeatedly separated from Romania and tried to russify over that last two centuries.

[Furunculus]

The UK is one of the biggest investment locations for Russian oligarchs, due to our willingness to allow money laundering. The Taliban are in a bind because everyone is freezing their assets. Why isn't the UK doing the same with Russian oligarchs?

i believe we are now doing just this - stage #2 has arrived after the first bunch of measures taken earlier in the week:

https://twitter.com/SamRamani2/status/1496896779983683584

rumour has it that italy and france are vetoing kicking russia out of the SWIFT intebank system:

https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/status/1496892887732297730

[Montmorency]

I've heard a lot of reports that NE Ukraine (Sumny/Chernihiv) are being penetrated, deeply at that, which dovetails with this report (https://militaryland.net/ukraine/ukraine-marks-undefendable-areas/) from a month ago that the Ukrainian army was designating most of the area between Kiev and Kharkiv undefendable. Seems a little odd, since those areas have the most forest cover in Eastern Ukraine AFAIK. Or maybe this is also part of the Ukrainian army's supposed doctrine of organizing regulars for guerrilla operations subsequent to the opening phase of conflict, if the rest of Eastern Ukraine isn't conducive for it (Ukraine's typical terrain made it almost a green zone for German forces during WW2, I've read, with almost all partisan activity being concentrated in and around the borders of contemporary Belarus). Any corrections on this point are appreciated.

[For clarity, this is just a pre-war map highlighting the oblasts in question]
https://i.imgur.com/8aAOGac.jpg


What perceived legitimacy? Everyone recognized these lands as Azerbaijani. How can an act that conciliates the de facto with the de jure situation be described as irredentist? As I said, he didn't take any territory from Armenia, since Armenia occupied Azerbaijani territories, according even to Armenia itself. Also, unlike Russia, Azerbaijan was not diplomatically isolated. That was more true for Armenia, which is largely why it was crushed in the conflict.


I'm telling you that's beside the point. Whether you think Azerbaijan was justified in starting a new war doesn't change the fact that two conventional forces clashed, one lost bad, and had to give up territory (and it's not inconceivable that Azerbaijan could have occupied all of NK/A and much of Armenia had Russia not intervened diplomatically). If you just have a strong sense of Azerbaijan being 'good guys', I repeat, that's irrelevant. They could be the very best like no one ever was, or worse than Hitler. Consequences are a function of power, not good or bad. A small country like Azerbaijan used war to (re)take land for the nation. If they can do it, so can (potentially) anyone else. The implications of such a weltgeist are immediately accessible.

Frozen territorial claims have been heating up everywhere over the past 15 years from the West Pacific to Atlantic Africa, but the 2020 war was the first time since WW2 that anyone I know of has been able to settle them by force. Azerbaijan won. Armenia can't touch them, and was lucky to retain its government; the people of NK/A were lucky to avoid ethnic cleansing. Armenia could in the future get roiled into a suicidal war of revenge, or Azeri leadership a hankering for conquest, but the variables are permanently changed. From the Azeri POV they enjoyed almost a total success (and we should hope they are satisfied). World leaders can observe these developments for themselves. Don't rule out Cypriot unification within the decade, for an example closer to home.


I don't know from where Putin got his inspiration (not sure how China is relevant), probably from nowhere, if I had to guess, but Azerbaijan is one of the worst examples imagined.

You don't need a lot of imagination or effort to understand it, he laid out his in great detail, as have his cronies. He's a palingenetic Russian ultranationalist, with all that entails. What my post described was the development of the [I]opportunity at this point in time. Why here, why now? I don't think it's a coincidence that China and Russia immediately took on a more escalatory posture to their respective claims as the dust settled in the Caucasus.

China is in the picture because it has very similar aspirations wrt Taiwan, and haven't carefully built the second-most powerful military in the world just for the sake of posturing.

But we can at least safely rule out Republican Senator of Alabama Tuberville's (the Slavic version of his name might be Bulbashovka) account: “He can’t feed his people. It’s a communist country, so he can’t feed his people, so they need more farmland.”



rumour has it that italy and france are vetoing kicking russia out of the SWIFT intebank system:

https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/status/1496892887732297730

The US should of course finance whatever is needed, including any short-term production boost Saudi Arabia can be convinced to release, but the EU really needs to take a hard line and start issuing more bonds on this very special occasion. EU countries need to take the opportunity to agree on a comprehensive energy security/decarbonization package. While the bandage is already being ripped off, seize the moment to do as much as possible.

[Crandar]

It's not about Azerbaijan being the goodies or the baddies, but that the comparison was completely unsuitable, for the legal and diplomatic reasons I cited. Could Cyprus be reunited? Yes, sure, if something like the previous referendum passes. Could Turkey conquer the rest of the island. Not a single chance, in Greece only the crazies of the Golden Dawn believe in that stuff.

As for Putin's motivation, you make the mistake of buying his bubble intended for domestic purposes and then spinning it to fit the dominant narrative in geopolitical discourse since the '90s about ideology being a primary factor. Not sure about the dust settling either. It's been more than a year since the Armenians capitulated.

EDIT: Fidonisi has been taken. Zelenski is presenting its defense as the Ukrainian Hotgates. He's too melodramatic I believe, which might actually undermine morale.

[Montmorency]

Live maps of the military dispositions have begun coming out for what they're worth, this one from militaryland dot net. (https://militaryland.net/ukraine/deployment-map/) I think an earlier version displaying just the starting deployments supports the impression that Ukraine planned to largely abandon the NE, with something like 3 brigades for the whole area compared to 9 or 10 around Donbas.

https://i.imgur.com/wqvYb99.png


It's not about Azerbaijan being the goodies or the baddies, but that the comparison was completely unsuitable, for the legal and diplomatic reasons I cited. Could Cyprus be reunited? Yes, sure, if something like the previous referendum passes. Could Turkey conquer the rest of the island. Not a single chance, in Greece only the crazies of the Golden Dawn believe in that stuff.

As for Putin's motivation, you make the mistake of buying his bubble intended for domestic purposes and then spinning it to fit the dominant narrative in geopolitical discourse since the '90s about ideology being a primary factor. Not sure about the dust settling either. It's been more than a year since the Armenians capitulated.

EDIT: Fidonisi has been taken. Zelenski is presenting its defense as the Ukrainian Hotgates. He's too melodramatic I believe, which might actually undermine morale.

A country can conquer land that is legally its or not, and with or without diplomatic support from other countries. But the fact on the ground is that very success or failure of conquest, which is the part that I've repeatedly emphasized. The question is ultimately whether world leaders believe the comparison is suitable. I'm confident many do, because observers have no reason to link or restrict the lessons of that war to the quality of some legal justification. That sounds naive. Azerbaijan didn't accomplish what it did by the exercise of law.

So, Putin has spoken and governed as a nationalist his entire career, exalted the Russian Empire and Russian Soviet power, derided Ukrainian autonomy, spent a lot of political and economic resources on trying to suppress it, and finally declared - in his capacity as autocrat - a very likely ruinous (to all sides) European ground war, Europe's and Russia's biggest offensive since the advance against Berlin in 1945, on the stated premise that Russia cannot allow the existence of a divergent Ukraine as a matter of national pride, propriety, and security. Your reaction to this is that you have no idea why he's invading, but that his stated reasons have nothing to do with the truth? C'mon man.

Though separately on the future of the Azeri-Armenian conflict as such, reading this analysis (https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer) leaves me discouraged. Almost 100 killed counted since the Nov 2020 ceasefire in border clashes, compared to fewer than 200 from 2015 to the 2020 war (excluding 2 – 11 April 2016), though this year has been quiet.


Audio (https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/02/25/7325592/) supposedly from the island battle Crandar mentions. All 13 defenders were killed. I'm assuming it was a volunteer assignment.

"We are a Russian ship, lay down your arms."
"Russian ship, go :daisy: yourself."

The senselessness of war.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LDrFVdms8yk

[spmetla]

Live maps of the military dispositions have begun coming out for what they're worth, this one from militaryland dot net. I think an earlier version displaying just the starting deployments supports the impression that Ukraine planned to largely abandon the NE, with something like 3 brigades for the whole area compared to 9 or 10 around Donbas.

I've been using a different one but seems to be tracking similiarly:
https://liveuamap.com/

As for the NE, when you look at it with the river to the East and then the heavy Russian force at Karkiv it turns into a pocket that could get cut off. A shorter line of defense instead of a no step back approach makes sense against a superior force, especially considering that's what Manstein had to do in almost the same area after Stalingrad was lost.

The Russian loss of that VDV helicopter Battalion (this is just an estimate) at Gostomel airport is certainly a tremendous set back. Like market garden it may not change the course of the war but certainly let the enemy know you're still a potent fighting force.

Supposedly a heck of an air battle/air defense over Kiev tonight, can only wonder what's happening. The 'Ghost of Kiev' rumor about some lone Ukrainian pilot becoming an overnight Ace are unproven just yet but who knows. The rumors of it though are the type of thing that oddly enough help the nerves of the guys on the ground.



Audio supposedly from the island battle Crandar mentions. All 13 defenders were killed. I'm assuming it was a volunteer assignment.

"We are a Russian ship, lay down your arms."
"Russian ship, go yourself."

The senselessness of war.

Followed that too, truly horrible for those that died there. A sensless death but heroic none the less, especially in our 'european culture' which has always admired doomed last stands from Thermopylae to the Alamo and beyond.


So, Putin has spoken and governed as a nationalist his entire career, exalted the Russian Empire and Russian Soviet power, derided Ukrainian autonomy, spent a lot of political and economic resources on trying to suppress it, and finally declared - in his capacity as autocrat - a very likely ruinous (to all sides) European ground war, Europe's and Russia's biggest offensive since the advance against Berlin in 1945, on the stated premise that Russia cannot allow the existence of a divergent Ukraine as a matter of national pride, propriety, and security. Your reaction to this is that you have no idea why he's invading, but that his stated reasons have nothing to do with the truth? C'mon man.

Following the squashed protests today around Russia though I'm glad to see not all there have bought into his nationalist view. Though they won't change the outcome perhaps the economic pressures, internal domestic pressures, the oligarch pressures, and if this war goes on long and poorly the military pressures can do something to oust him for someone saner.
The next few days will continue to be interesting, Russia's full might hasn't come to bear yet though the initial assaults have not proven easy.


The question is ultimately whether world leaders believe the comparison is suitable. I'm confident many do, because observers have no reason to link or restrict the lessons of that war to the quality of some legal justification. That sounds naive. Azerbaijan didn't accomplish what it did by the exercise of law.

I think the only thing different in the Azeri example is that it was a limited war over territorial claims, a peace deal with the Armenians was an option. The wars of regime change like in Iraq or now in Ukraine leave no one to make peace with, this one being tied with territorial claims though makes it even more difficult.
The Azeri war certainly showed force can change borders with conventional arms. Iraq tried it with Iran and then with Kuwait both with failed results but had they succeeded it would have changed the status quo for sure, no such sanctions happened to the Azeris, no such outcry but then they are more western aligned and the territory in question was de jure theirs though ethnically and defacto Armenian. Another population change (ethnic cleansing/evictions) there will make the change permanent.

[Montmorency]

Announcement from Germany (https://twitter.com/tobiaschneider/status/1496758132776652803):


Inspector of the Army this morning on LinkedIn: "The Bundeswehr, the army that I am allowed to lead, is more or less empty. The options that we can offer politicians to support the alliance are extremely limited."

On Linkedin lmao



I've been using a different one but seems to be tracking similiarly:
https://liveuamap.com/

I use it too, for the sidebar updates, but so far it's not satisfying in regard to mapping the advance. Though civvies have almost no truly reliable ways of doing so, I still like to see the ballpark. For now I'm thinking of comparing the conservative Militaryland map against this fascist Russian channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iwnCYspPpM)'s probably-optimistic operational analysis . Not that I blithely embrace the simple nostrum of the truth lying in between, but...

https://i.imgur.com/pElQkvh.jpg


As for the NE, when you look at it with the river to the East and then the heavy Russian force at Karkiv it turns into a pocket that could get cut off. A shorter line of defense instead of a no step back approach makes sense against a superior force, especially considering that's what Manstein had to do in almost the same area after Stalingrad was lost.

It just seems like the best area in Eastern Ukraine to have a hedgehog defense with small units. I don't know what's done what, but at least some of the donated Javelins/NLAWS appear to be proving their effect; plenty of forested roads and villages from which to heroically blast apart armored columns. Especially considering that... 9-10 UA brigades are in serious jeopardy of being cut off between opposition and the Dnieper within the next 24 hours, that is, the forces deployed along the Donbas front. That army is being outflanked from north and south and oversees the very worst terrain for defense in depth. Am I crazy or...???


Supposedly a heck of an air battle/air defense over Kiev tonight, can only wonder what's happening. The 'Ghost of Kiev' rumor about some lone Ukrainian pilot becoming an overnight Ace are unproven just yet but who knows.

Is that precedented? It would have to be, like, an Su-27 with a full 6-missile A2A loadout hitting every shot, or else anachronistic WW2-style dogfighting. The other fighters Ukraine fields only have 4 A2A mounts from quick reference.


Following the squashed protests today around Russia though I'm glad to see not all there have bought into his nationalist view.

Well, we had bigger protests against the Iraq War, and they didn't change anything. Somehow we have to get the picture across to the Russian people, and the elites, backed up with action, that maximal economic terrorism against Russia will persist even if and when Putin conquers Ukraine. I'm not going to say the only acceptable offramp is regime change in the Kremlin, since we should be willing to accept peace from a chagrined Putin retreating his forces, but then he might face regime change anyway (and so would never back down while still in power). But that's the principle of the thing, which is what we should try to communicate. On-target messaging, economic devastation, and heavy casualties are the only plausible effective combination.


The Azeri war certainly showed force can change borders with conventional arms. Iraq tried it with Iran and then with Kuwait both with failed results but had they succeeded it would have changed the status quo for sure, no such sanctions happened to the Azeris, no such outcry but then they are more western aligned and the territory in question was de jure theirs though ethnically and defacto Armenian. Another population change (ethnic cleansing/evictions) there will make the change permanent.

I could be wrong, but I thought the Armenian-occupied areas outside NK/A were still basically unsettled by civilians following the cleansing of the original post-Soviet war, on account of the constant danger and according to some kind of diplomatic agreement. And also that Armenia doesn't have a lot of excess Volk to export, being the size of Connecticut. One of the reasons the Azeri victory seemed so clean as to be an example to those who want to draw inspiration from such things.

For example, this former town (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalbajar) of 7000 Azeris before the 1990s war had only hundreds in Armenian population when retaken in 2020.

Not to say that there weren't crimes (https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-refugee-execution-video/30921794.html) against civilians when the Azeris encountered them, but compared to most other global flashpoints there aren't that many civilians around through much of the combat area.

[Montmorency]

Actually, LiveUA added some frontline movements. Side-by-side.

https://i.imgur.com/pQwaqVa.jpg

I suppose the consensus is that Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Melitopol are cut off if not surrounded.


Also, interesting, if this somehow doesn't fall afoul of sanctions then NATO really needs to up its game fast.


As Ukraine crisis deepens, China lifts all wheat-import restrictions on Russia (https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3168278/ukraine-crisis-deepens-china-lifts-all-wheat-import)
Agreement reflects deepening ties between Beijing and Moscow while addressing China’s need to enhance food security
China could provide a lifeline to Russia’s economy after the United States and its allies imposed swift economic sanctions on Moscow this week

Although the majority of Russia's wheat export (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/17/infographic-russia-ukraine-and-the-global-wheat-supply-interactive) goes to Turkey and Egypt.

[Kagemusha]

Apparently Russian armoured spearhead has reached periphery of Kiev from North and West linking with the Airborne at Hostomel airport. Some infiltrating Russian military units have already been detected and neutralized already inside the city, but i predict the Battle of Kiev is about to happen.
One observation is that there seems to be thousands strong Chechen Rosvgardia unit somewhere at Northern border of Ukraine and Belarus. I hope Putin is not sending them to Kiev, which might spell massacre.



https://twitter.com/MuradGazdiev/status/1497178182113546240/photo/1





https://twitter.com/Imamofpeace/status/1497198251031732229/photo/3

[spmetla]

Russia Issues Ominous Warning to Finland, Sweden Should They Join NATO
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-threatens-finland-sweden-nato-ukraine-invasion-1682715

"Finland and Sweden should not base their security damaging the security of other countries," Zakharova said during the press conference.
"Clearly [the] accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO, which is first and foremost a military alliance, would have serious military-political repercussions that would demand a response from our country," she said.

This comes after Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed that the country was receiving support from both nations.


Not surprising but also exactly why this invasion is so self-defeating in that it is strengthening NATO and giving it purpose again while also demonstrating in the strongest possible way the importance of having allies if you dare to have an opinion that differs from your superpower neighbor.

Meanwhile in the Black Sea the potential for escalation despite Russian dominance of the sea is there in the strike on a Turkish owned ship, a Moldavian ship, and a Japanese ship too. This will give a lot of pressure on the Turks to consider closing the straits for more Russia ships into the Black Sea.

https://www.reuters.com/world/turkish-owned-ship-hit-by-bomb-off-coast-odessa-no-casualties-turkish-authority-2022-02-24/
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/russian-forces-fire-neutral-european-26329832
https://splash247.com/two-more-ships-hit-in-the-black-sea/


Apparently Russian armoured spearhead has reached periphery of Kiev from North and West linking with the Airborne at Hostomel airport. Some infiltrating Russian military units have already been detected and neutralized already inside the city, but i predict the Battle of Kiev is about to happen.

I've been watching that penetration too, given the tough resistance that the Ukrainians have put up elsewhere I expect this will be a hell of a hard slog for the Russians. Their sorta ownership of the air will make it hard for Ukraine to redeploy heavy units to contain this pocket but a mix of light and medium forces operating in the suburbs of a major city is difficult for any army to fight against.
I imagine though that supplies of ATGMs and Stingers are running low though their prevalence throughout the country as denied the Russians the ability to rely on low flying close support from gunships and CAS.

I hope that Taiwan takes note of the above and sees that they need high- and low-end capability to have an effect defense as Montmorency has advocated.

[Kagemusha]

I've been watching that penetration too, given the tough resistance that the Ukrainians have put up elsewhere I expect this will be a hell of a hard slog for the Russians. Their sorta ownership of the air will make it hard for Ukraine to redeploy heavy units to contain this pocket but a mix of light and medium forces operating in the suburbs of a major city is difficult for any army to fight against.
I imagine though that supplies of ATGMs and Stingers are running low though their prevalence throughout the country as denied the Russians the ability to rely on low flying close support from gunships and CAS.

I hope that Taiwan takes note of the above and sees that they need high- and low-end capability to have an effect defense as Montmorency has advocated.

It seems Ukrainians are digging in at Kiev and i sincerely hope Russians will get bogged down there. Each day the Ukrainians can hold there can have a huge impact on this whole conflict. What is needed now is something that would act as a rally point. Never mind that this whole thing is an human catastrophe in huge scale and what Ukrainians are experiencing right now is inexcusable by any rhetoric from the Russians. What West needs to do is to keep the handheld Anti Tank and Anti Air capacity flowing into Ukraine by any means necessary. Worst enough being left alone to fight. The Ukrainians should never run out of ordinance to fight with. I sure hope the best for them in this God Awful mess this situation is.

[Pannonian]

There are some noises from China about respecting Ukrainian sovereignty. It remains to be seen if they will fully turn against Russia, and if Russia will continue without at least tacit Chinese tolerance. Threatening to bring the whole economic system down and bring the Chinese down with us may be the most effective way the west can contribute.

[Kagemusha]

It seems that the Russians are right now trying to take down the power plant of Kiev. Im worried that this might turn really ugly this very night.

Concerning China. I am kinda worried that China has made some sort of deal with Russia maybe in part of Shanghai 5. If Europe stops buying the Russian Oil and Gas the only market large enough to do so left is Asia.

[Furunculus]

china says it supports ukranian sovereignty, but encourages dialogue to address russian security concerns.

they're fully behind russia.

[Montmorency]

My apologies, the Mig-29 (https://www.digitalcombatsimulator.com/upload/iblock/c43/edsabdsfxtzv170rybq6hfxp7p3tic4e/MiG-29-A.png) - the model of plane said to be flown by the Ghost of Kyiv - can carry 6 A2A missiles. The story is theoretically possible, though not feasible outside a videogame. Are there any Ukrainian planes still flying beyond Kiev?

So it seems over the past 20 hours Sumy fell, Hostomel was recaptured by Russia, and all the major contact point cities from yesterday are being reduced. Yet DoD reportedly considers this a slower advance than expected?

Russia announces intent to stage talks. An indicator that they won't advance past the Bug? I.e. a looming partition of Ukraine. Also may be an attempt to preempt or defuse sanctions not yet applied.

I'm unsure of whether Zelensky is right to remain the capital. In light of the Russian announcement that they intend to kill him, I wonder if he believes martyring himself will galvanize future resistance. Even his buddy Kiev Mayor Klitschko, and former Pres. Poroshenko, are in Kiev, though they claim intent to personally resist with arms. You can find a news clip interviewing Poroshenko as he gets choked up with his militia behind him.

The Militaryland team apparently has people on the ground; some of the videos on their Twitter are original content driving around the highways of Ukraine.

In general, a lot of OC video clips are locked behind the social media platform Telegram, if you want to venture to those channels (https://t.me/s/voynareal).


Apparently Russian armoured spearhead has reached periphery of Kiev from North and West linking with the Airborne at Hostomel airport. Some infiltrating Russian military units have already been detected and neutralized already inside the city, but i predict the Battle of Kiev is about to happen.
One observation is that there seems to be thousands strong Chechen Rosvgardia unit somewhere at Northern border of Ukraine and Belarus. I hope Putin is not sending them to Kiev, which might spell massacre.

https://twitter.com/MuradGazdiev/status/1497178182113546240/photo/1

ngl big Isengard vibes.

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1497179295726411779



[video=youtube;Afw8e-abVa8]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Afw8e-abVa8

[Furunculus]

important update from Germany:

https://twitter.com/hemicker/status/1497230857207263239


Germany‘s 5000 helmets are finally on their way in two trucks. They will be given to the Ukrainian authorities outside their country, in order to avoid any risk for the German side, according to @dpa

interesting view on what success looks like from the daddy or british IR:

https://samf.substack.com/p/a-reckless-gamble?r=15i4j0&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email&utm_source=url

[Kagemusha]

How i see it. Once the assault on Kyev starts. Longer the Kiovan can stand the initial assault more hard it will become for Russians to take the city. I am hoping for it to become "Stalingrad" for Putin, but to be honest when i am looking at the childlike faces of the Ukrainian conscripts and compare those to the hardened Russian veterans and even more so to beasts like these Kadyrovs Chechen Mountainers. I worry, but i believe miracles can and will happen. One should never underestimate men or women defending their homes, families and their freedom. Never underestimate that.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9Dg-g7t2l4

[Shaka_Khan]

As I expected, the Ukrainian situation is different from Afghanistan. The longer this war drags on, Putin's popularity in Russia will decline further. And I think the Ukrainians not falling as quickly as Afghanistan did will encourage NATO to support Ukraine more, perhaps by supplying more weapons. Hopefully, this would discourage China from invading Taiwan.

[Montmorency]

Interesting assessment (https://twitter.com/RealCynicalFox/status/1497142318083805184) from D1:


Day 1 of Combat ��, Takeaways from available information:

1.Russians broke with their own doctrine of relying on heavy, concentrated support fires.
2.Failure to prepare the operational area with adequate preparatory fire to break up and destroy Ukrainian defenses was a critical hinderance
3.Russians allowed themselves to dilute their own strength by advancing (and dividing their forces & fires) along 4 axis of advance. None were capable of achieving their objectives as a result.
4.Insufficiently supported troops failed to achieve necessary tactical breakthroughs with strategic implications for the battlespace
5.Airborne/Air Assault forces cannot operate well against even a semi-intact air defense network, or in contested airspace.
6.Airborne/Air Assault insertions against superior local forces are an expensive waste of highly trained manpower.
7.Commando actions ala Joachim Piper in the Ardennes 1944, in Kyiv, did not achieve much success. Commando infiltration of Kyiv a major success prior to operations – massive Ukrainian security failure.
8.Russian morale is lower than expected. Some units appear to have anticipated being met with grateful Ukrainian crowds instead of stiff opposition.
9.Leadership at the Platoon, Company & Battalion level highly questionable in some units based on behavior.
10.Russian troops are ‘green’ overall, noticeable reluctance to dismount APCs/IFVs and provide infantry screen for the armor when in contact. Heavy resulting casualties vs man portablt anti-tank weapons
11.Overall battleplan’s basic assumptions on opposition levels and Russian capability fundamentally flawed. Command & Control rigid and inflexible.
12.Ukrainians delayed mobilization far too long. Decision not to hold on the Dnieper politically more viable than abandoning East Ukraine, but possibly a critical strategic failure militarily

I did notice from the many OC clips that there didn't appear to be much aerial bombardment or heavy artillery barrage going on, but I figured it was just availability/survivor bias (usually civilian filmers).

And:


Ukrainian Forces downed Russian IL-76 near Vasylkiv with paratroops on board - Chief Commander of Ukrainian Armed Forces

Ukrainian army repelling airborne troops assault at Vasylkiv airbase: Il-76 and 2 helicopters shotdown

Yes, it may be the case that Putin blundered into an overly-speedy plan (seize Kyiv w/in 24 hours?) that poetically damaged his army's initiative. Maybe that's what DoD was commenting on. Russia has a whole doctrine that ought to oviate the problems of rushing forward (develop the joke) mechanized and airborne elements. But I still wonder if Ukrainian late mobilization, and whatever it is I don't understand about their concentration ahead of an obvious pincer attack zone, isn't a relatively greater miscalculation.

At any rate, the quoted fellow has a site providing daily operational analysis (https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2022) of the war, so a good complement to the Russian fascist Youtuber. I appreciate the professional format and citations. (From 10PM Moscow time)


Russian forces entered the outskirts of Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro on February 25. Russian sabotage groups in civilian clothes are reportedly active in downtown Kyiv.
Russian forces have so far failed to enter Kyiv’s eastern outskirts. Ukrainian forces have successfully slowed Russian troops, which have temporarily abandoned the failed attempt to take the city of Chernihiv and are instead bypassing it.
Elements of the Russian 76th VDV (Airborne) division have concentrated in southeastern Belarus likely for use along the Chernihiv-bypass axis toward Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
Russian forces will likely envelop Kharkhiv in the next 24 hours after failing to enter the city through frontal assaults on February 24.
Russian forces have achieved little success on frontal assaults or envelopments against Ukrainian forces in Donbas but may not have intended to do more than pin Ukrainian forces in the east.
North of Crimea, Russian forces fully captured Kherson and are likely on the verge of seizing Melitopol in the east. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian forces had bypassed Kherson earlier and headed directly for Mykolaiv and Odessa.
Russian forces may be assembling in Stolin, Belarus, to open a new line of advance against Rivne in western Ukraine.

1) Belarus/Kyiv axis: Russian forces entered the outskirts of Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro on February 25. Russian forces have so far failed to enter Kyiv’s eastern outskirts. They have abandoned for now the failed attempt to take the city of Chernihiv and are instead bypassing it. Elements of the 76thVDV (Airborne) division have concentrated in southeastern Belarus likely for use along the Chernihiv-bypass axis toward Kyiv in the next 24 hours.

2) Kharkiv axis: Russian forces will likely envelop Kharkiv in the next 24 hours after failing to enter the city through frontal assaults on February 24. Russian forces are now advancing on a broad front along the northeastern Ukrainian border as of February 25.

3) Donbas axis: Russian forces have achieved little success on the frontal assaults or the envelopment but may not have intended to do more than pin Ukrainian forces in the east. The Russians have not weighted their ground offensive efforts toward breaking through Ukrainian defensive positions on the line of contact, taking Mariupol from the east, or driving rapidly through Luhansk Oblast to the north. Ukrainian forces remain largely in their original defensive positions in the east. The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may alternatively seek to envelop and destroy Ukrainian forces at and near the line of contact at a later date.

Crimea axis: Russian forces fully captured Kherson and are likely on the verge of seizing Melitopol in the east. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian forces had bypassed Kherson earlier and headed directly for Mykolaiv and Odessa.

Social media users observed a Russian armored column assembling in Stolin, Belarus, on February 25.[29] These forces could potentially conduct a new line of advance against Rivne in western Ukraine.
Russian Naval Infantry have not yet conducted amphibious landings but retain the capability to do so against the Odesa or the Azov Sea coasts or both.
Russian forces continue to refrain from using their likely full spectrum of air and missile capabilities. The Ukrainian air force also remains active. Russian operations will likely steadily wear down Ukrainian air capabilities and eventually take the Ukrainian air force out of the fight.
Russian forces have not yet attempted the decapitation strike several analysts and outlets have forecasted and may attempt to do so in the near future.
Russia has sufficient conventional military power to reinforce each of its current axes of advance and overpower the conventional Ukrainian forces defending them.

https://i.imgur.com/VSDgVFH.png

I think I'm going to settle more into seeking daily or bi-daily situation updates from here on.


With Russia going in for florid fascism, I fear Youtube will start blocking the Soviet music as well.



How i see it. Once the assault on Kyev starts. Longer the Kiovan can stand the initial assault more hard it will become for Russians to take the city. I am hoping for it to become "Stalingrad" for Putin, but to be honest when i am looking at the childlike faces of the Ukrainian conscripts and compare those to the hardened Russian veterans and even more so to beasts like these Kadyrovs Chechen Mountainers. I worry, but i believe miracles can and will happen. One should never underestimate men or women defending their homes, families and their freedom. Never underestimate that.

https://i.imgur.com/gYu9Es8.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/BuI7gJA.jpg

Freedom Fighters, 2004 (Xbox): "The game is set in an alternate history where the Soviet Union has invaded and occupied New York City. The player takes the role of Christopher Stone, a plumber turned resistance movement leader, fighting against the invaders."

Petro Poroshenko is not the player character we deserve, but he is the one we need.

[Kagemusha]

Apparently another Air assault operation has started at Vasylkiv South of Kiev. Apparently paratroopers. I guess the Russians are trying to cut off Kiev from third side now.

Clashes near the city center and at the power plant. It is bit over 3am at Kiev. I think this is it.The major assault is starting.

[Montmorency]

Operations Room is a nice animated AAR channel, but relevant for just publishing a video on how the Serbians shot down the only F-117 (stealth strike fighter) ever lost in combat.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Is3R4ie21Mc

It was mostly luck that an SA-3 could down such an advanced aircraft, but the incident was enabled by command getting overconfident and starting to fly sorties without anti-SAM escort craft.

Puts me in mind of the transport planes and helicopters reportedly shot down over various parts of Ukraine lately.

[Shaka_Khan]

I heard a lot of gunfire via one of the live streams. I don't know which one because this YouTube channel (WacMilk) is showing multiple cities. It seems to be Kiev/Kyiv, but the source's audio is low, whereas this one is louder.

[Kagemusha]

New dawn rises and Kiev still firmly in Ukrainian control. US has apparently offered evacuation for the Ukrainian president and his answer was on a video released this morning: "I dont need a ride.I need more ammunition."

[Kagemusha]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I4yLkZLuMkM

[Shaka_Khan]

Although Zelenskyy and Poroshenko were political opponents, they are now united against the invasion.

[Crandar]

Followed that too, truly horrible for those that died there. A sensless death but heroic none the less, especially in our 'european culture' which has always admired doomed last stands from Thermopylae to the Alamo and beyond.
On a slightly positive note, they may have actually surrendered (https://twitter.com/_conflitfrance/status/1497466461815726080), so there's still hope that the garrison (or at least a major part of it) survived. Fog of war is especially prevalent in the early stages of the conflict, so anything needs to be taken with a pinch of salt, especially the most emotional stories.

EDIT: More confirmation (https://twitter.com/RWApodcast/status/1497589103616937994) from the ministry.

[Kagemusha]

Gotta hand it to the Ukrainians. Looking at the resolve of this people while they brace again for the coming night. Is unbelievable They are pretty much arming every one from 16 year old nerd boys to 60 year old Grandmothers, while the afternoon has been very slow in way of fighting near the capital, as if the Russians are also drawing breath and concentrating their forces for i believe even lot more harsh assault then yesterday. But the Ukrainians seem to be ready. I hope them strength to get through this night. My thoughts and prayers go with them.