Patton vs. Montgomery

[Longshanks]

Who was the better general in your opinion?

[Rosacrux]

Both were mediocre commanders... but Patton was clearly better in a "mobile warfare" concept... Monty was good at static defence though.

[shingenmitch2]

Patton was better hands down

Montgomery was a fool who was great at self promotion. He won at El Alemain because the table was set by Aukinlek (sp?) and a monkey could have won with the overwhelming material the British built up.

Now look at his failings...

Sicily -- couldn't get up the short side of the island.

Caen -- couldn't break out and then claimed he was "drawing german armor" so that the Americans could break out later at St. Lo.

Falaise -- Couldn't close the small pocket himself and he had the short end of the pincer. He also didn't want to take the "big bag" option of Patton and drive deeper than falaise and bag the entire German front.

Market Garden -- that tragedy was another Montgomery stroke of genious...

How Montgomery was ever considered a great general escapes me...

Patton's attack in Sicily, by contrast was fast and effective. His drive across France ranks up there with deep operational maneuver of his great German counterparts --- Guderian, Rommel, Hoth, Manstein or Hausser. Patton's maneuver for the relief/counterattack on Operation "Wact am Rhein" was also inspired.

[Hakonarson]

Montgomery was a great logician and commander for set-piece battles, but wasn't all that flash at truely mobile warfare.

Auchinlek is the name you're after Shingen, and one of the reasons Auchinlek set up the superiority was that Montgomery insisted upon having it before attacking. To say Monty only succeeded because of Auchinlek is to say that Patton only succeeded because of Eisenhower.

Patton was almost exactly the opposite. Much of the success of his drives is down to other forces (US, Canadian, British) tying up most of the German army in France - he cocked up several operations big time in Africa.

His personal relations weer even worse than Monty's. - I know of one instance where he put an Aide in a forward position for 2-3 days over the protests of his air commander, the Germans located the position and bombed it, killing Patton's aide. Patton then spent heaven and earth to blame his air commander (a British Group Captain - Conningham) for not providing sufficient cover, etc., etc., and the officer had to e moved out despite being completely blameless.

[Nowake]

Guys, are those stories about Mafia helping the americans when landing is Sicily true? http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/joker.gif Just of curiosity ...

[Stefan the Berserker]

Patton.

Montgomery was defeated too often by Rommel in Africa, and to slow in France.

Also Patton recognised the great ability of the M10 76mm mounted on an M4A3E2 Sherman Jumbo and was indeed the fastest american General in 1944/45 Showdown to crush the 3rd Reich.

[Leet Eriksson]

Patton was better,montgomery relied on the natives to help him.

[Belisarius]

Patton was an aggressive general to the extreme, while Monty was almost at the other end of the scale, defensive until victory was a foregone conclusion.
Who was better? Who can say, both had their strengths and weaknesses, myself if I were Commander-in-Chief, would go with Monty as he didnt want to waste his mens lives.

Stefan???? AFAIK The first time Rommel faced Montgomery was at the first battle of El Alemein, and AFAIK Rommel got his arse handed to him (though to be fair he was outnumbered). You must be thinking of the earlier commanders Ritchie and O´Conner.

Faisal. What natives? The Arabs, Egyptians, Italians or the French?


...Market Garden was a bold move, that could very well have ended the war before christmas -44, if the 9th and 10th SS had been positioned elsewhere but around Arnhem.

Dont diss Monty, I dare say that he would have whipped any of us armchair generals any day of the week.

[Longshanks]

Belisarius, even the bad generals would kick the arses of us armchair generals. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/joker.gif

Criticizing a general is a bit like criticizing a professional sports player. We might say "Oh...he sucks" and to some extent its true, at least compared to his competition... however he would kick our @ss if we ever played against him.

[Michiel de Ruyter]

Belisarius,

with a little-bit more luck Market Garden might have succeeded. But 9th and 10th SS where there before the operation started... and the Brits knew it.

And the march did last much longer then expected, even without the occurence of the SS troops.

[Hakonarson]

I read somewhere that the reason British/commonwealth generals tended to be cautious was because those nations had:

1/ fewer men to start with (ie smaller national population)
2/ longer, more bloody and more recent military traditions
3/ a generally conservative social background.

eg in Sicily Patton charged off to Palermo, often ignoring his flanks, while Montgomery took on hte Axis forces over rough terrain by fighting a series of set-piece battles, pausing to ensure everything was in place before proceeding.

[Pellinor]

Belisarius,

At 2nd Alamein Mongomery had massive superiority in men, guns and tanks. His troops were fresh, his supplies were close, he had command of the air, and Churchill had finally realised that he needed to give some thought to the Desert other than sacking generals for failing to achieve unrealistic goals, so Monty had his full backing.

Rommel had almost no tanks, a couple of thousand decent German infnatry who were absolutely exhausted, lots of woefully equipped Italians who had had to walk 1,000 miles to get there, massively extended supply lines subject to attack all the way, a front of 40 miles to cover, and virtually no support from OKH because Russia was far more important.

It still took Monty two weeks to force Rommel to leave his positions. Rommel did so in an orderly fashion, taking most of his material with him, whereas Monty had to stop for a couple of days as he had no formations fit to pursue.

Yes, Monty won: but he won so badly that one cannot give him any credit. Almost anyone could have done better. Where was his vaunted "balance"? Brewing up with the tanks sent in through narrow and uncleared gaps in minefields on top of infantry they could only liase with through the Army HQ, being in an entirely different Corps, that's where.

Auchinleck should have been left in command, but maybe (as Monty was) given reponsibility for only the Desert rather than the whole of the Middle East. He had just done a fine job making up for the errors of Ritchie and Cunningham (who he should never have appointed in the first place, to be fair). With Monty's resources, and a little moral support from Churchill (a worse general than Monty: it's a good job Hitler shortened the war by 3 years because Churchill lengthened it by 4) he would have finished Alamein far quicker, and probably destroyed Rommel in the pursuit. He would at least have conserved some formations for the pursuit, instead of (metaphorically) using his light cavalry to break the spear wall by head on charges while his swordsmen milled about like headless chickens.

I can't speak for Patton, I've not looked at his campaigns. But Monty was a great self-publicist who wanted to be a general but didn't know how to.



Pell.R.

[Belisarius]

Yikes, thats some replies just for defending Monty and not even critizing Patton http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif .

Longshanks, If you want to I can name generals from WW2 much worse then Monty....

Michiel, well luck always play a huge facor in any battle, but it was a bridge to far Monty tried to go.... but it could have ended the war by christmas.

Pellinor, yes Monty had nummerical advantage so? He won. We dont say that Zhukov is overrated because he won against nummerical inferior foes.

[Pellinor]

True, the quality of enemies colours assessments of ability - look at the debates about Wellington/Napoleon: they didn't fight each other (until Waterloo, an off day for Bonaparte), so how to compare them? - but my point re: Monty is not that his enemy was weak, but that Monty almost lost to a weaker enemy.

Failing to break through a weak and over-stretched enemy when you have all the odds in your favour is not exactly a feather in one's cap. It was touch and go for a while: if the battle had lasted a couple more days he would have had to give up - and where would his reputation have been then?

Pell.R.

[Michiel de Ruyter]

Well, Belisarius,

I was unable to finish my answer, because I was suddenly called away. Here is the full answer.

Basic flaws IMHO in the plan:


Using one single road as the line of assault, and point of advance. This road was at some points no wider then say 15 ft. It crossed a high number of major rivers and canals (duh &#33http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif), and was straddled by a number of towns and cities. At other points, there was no coverage at all. This was basically the wet dream for anyone with an 88mm, and a number of "Villers-Bocage" waiting to happen. The allies were damned lucky that all the German heavy armor was on the far bank of the river Rhine, and there was only one ferry, located about 25 km from Arnhem to put them across the Rhine). But even the ill-equipped rag-tag forces of the Germans between the Belgian border and Arnhem were able to breach the allied columns a number of times.

Dropping the 6th Airborne way too far away, (10 - 15 km) with a city in between them and the targeted bridge. The planning idiots ignored the info by the Dutch resistance. They could have dropped almost on to of the bridge at Arnhem (much like the Americans did at Grave) at that time (IIRC). Yet on the map the area looked water-logged, so they decided not to drop the troops there.

Way too strict rules about dropping of supplies, not even imagining the possibility that troops might loose control of the planned supply-dropzone. So, what happened ? The SS troops fought with weapons supplied by the Brits.

The planning-idiots ignored the railway bridge at Arnhem. It lay a lot closer to the drop zone, and was quite easy to defend, being dominated by two hills on one side, and with a flat open country-side on the other. Initially it was also ignored by 6th airborne. There apparently is a debate wether they could have captured it intact or not if they had gone for it immediately. According to most info I have heared, they could.

The lack of proper instruction for use of the radio. Apparently the radio's did work Yet they were set up in the improper way (at least that was a news item a few years ago... someone used one of the original radio's).

The total inflexibility/ignorance regarding info about the weather at the front.

Total lack of use of info supplied by the Dutch resistance, which told them that 9th and 10th SS were in the area to rest and refit, and that Walter Model had set up his HQ in Oosterbeek. They even ignored pics of camouflaged German tanks, taken by their own Spitfires..

The use of an insufficient number of troops. The Americans simply did not have the manpower too secure all the bridges in the Nijmegen area immediately, and secure the dropzone. So they could not send any troops to the Waalbrug at Nijmegen immediately. When they had troops to spare, those ran into the advance-guard of the Waffen-SS troops.

The total idiotic time-scedule. The planning-idiots seemingly did not even consider the option that one of the bridges might be unusable... Nor did they consider the reaction of the locals... the advance was also disrupted by overjoyed locals celebrating their liberation.
Put it this way: The allies can count themselves lucky that the bridge at Grave was captured intact. If not, that would have possibly ment two destroyed divisions. The bridge at Nijmegen gone would have ment a vanished 6th airborne. The blown bridge was the smallest one along he route, and peanuts compared with the others....
[/list]

The reason the Allies came so far was partly because the Germans did not expect Monty to come up with a plan like this. Initially at least Model and a few others could hardly believe that it was the allied plan to capture the bridges (even, IIRC, after they captured the plans). Basically they could not believe the allies would be that stupid.

Why Montgomery came up with this ? From what little I have heared, read and seen: Ego.

Montgomery was heavily critisized for his conduct in North Africa, around Caen, and the fact that he stopped at the Dutch-Belgian border, letting the German 15th army escape destruction in Zeeland. Ironically these troops would hinder the allied advance sufficiently for the Germans to have them to be able destroy the 6th airborne, and hold on to the bridge at Arnhem. Also, all the glory was going to Patton and the Americans (though one can argue/dispute this was just), which was also to his disliking.

Basically, had luck been a bit more with the Germans (ie bridge at Grave blown up, and Frost being stopped before he reached the bridge, then it could have had the exact opposite result:

6th airborne (UK): vanished.
82nd airbonre (US): vanished.
Polish airborne brigade: vanished.
30 Corps: Badly mauled.

What this would mean: basscally no reserves, and probably even more serious trouble if the Germans had gone ahead with the Ardennes offensive a few months later. Also, the Allies would have lost any capability of large-scale airborne operations.

[shingenmitch2]

Speed and concentrated force ultimately saves lives in war --- slow grinding engagements prolong the fight and the war.

The Germans understood this (at least Guderian and some others like Rommel). It was the essence of Blitzkreig. What if Guderian were as slow and deliberate as Monty during the drive to Dunkirk? Would his caution have saved lives? OR would it have allowed the French and British armies more time to maneuver out of the bag to fight another day?

That Patton left his flanks open was a calculated risk... virtually every great operational encirclement that I can think of had risk to "open flanks" at one point or other during the operation: Smolensk 41, Viasma 41, Bialystok 41, France 40, Blau 42... of course it is a balance of just "how open" are the flanks as the Soviets found out at Kharkov twice http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/smile.gif But clearly Patton struck the propper balance on more than one occasion.

[71-hour Ahmed]

On market garden: Montgomery never got his arse into gear and opened up the canals he had already captured for the landings. The ports were taken undamaged due to dutch resistance (at amsterdam I think, or rotterdam?) and so they could have used them instead of normandy, allowing much more troops into the area. Maybe if he had done as he was meant to instead of pushing market garden he might have ended the war much earlier.

Patton is mildly better imho but not brilliant. in defensive situations i'd prefer montgomery even if I didn't like him. But for the hard fast drive against an enemy patton would be brilliant.

perhaps a general with montys stage setting and caution before the offensive and pattons breakout abilities for afterwards but not one or the other if possible.

[Leet Eriksson]

Quote[/b] (Belisarius @ June 12 2003,15:51)]Faisal. What natives? The Arabs, Egyptians, Italians or the French?
I would'nt say egyptians,but mostly those of northwest africa,you know arabs of morroco,libya,algeria and tunisia(well not tunisia,they hated the allies for some reason).

[Theodoret]

So what if the British made use of the 'natives' (as you so charmingly call them). The British used forces from all over the Empire - and if they hadn't, they would probably have lost.

After all it was the Indian Army which prevented the Japanese from advancing into the Middle East, as well as providing much needed manpower for the war in the Middle East itself. I don't think that is some sign of bad stragegy on the part of the British.

In fact it would have be an exceedingly bad strategy not to use the the sort of resources provided by controlling a quarter of the Earth's land surface and a third of its population. If anything the British didn't make nearly enough use of their Empire.

As for using non-Imperial 'natives', again its good strategy. One of the biggest mistakes of the Germans was to turn the Ukranians, who had originally welcomed them as saviours, against them with their atrocities and enslavement.

[Qilue]

Quote[/b] (Theodoret @ Aug. 19 2003,14:59)]After all it was the Indian Army which prevented the Japanese from advancing into the Middle East, as well as providing much needed manpower for the war in the Middle East itself. I don't think that is some sign of bad stragegy on the part of the British.
General William Slim and the 14th Army were there too.

[Dramicus]

Rommel beats the crap out of all the allied generals... http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif

The Germans not only had him but many others which were commended and praised by both sides after the war... http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/smokin.gif

[DBS]

Quote[/b] ]Quote (Theodoret @ Aug. 19 2003,14:59)
After all it was the Indian Army which prevented the Japanese from advancing into the Middle East, as well as providing much needed manpower for the war in the Middle East itself. I don't think that is some sign of bad stragegy on the part of the British.

General William Slim and the 14th Army were there too.

14th Army was predominantly Indian Army in composition. The Indian Army in WW2 was the largest volunteer army in history. But frankly it is important to understand the very close relationship between the British and Indian Armies - they are essentially Siamese twins, with many organs shared.


Quote[/b] ]Rommel beats the crap out of all the allied generals...

The Germans not only had him but many others which were commended and praised by both sides after the war...

And the Axis were equally complimentary about O'Connor - his successes against the Italians match those of the Wehrmacht during Barbarossa (if not exceed) when you scale up the relative force strengths. They were mightily relieved to capture him one suspects, in a very unlucky accident out in the desert.

Both Montgomery and Patton had aspects of character that made them, on occasion, exceedingly unpleasant. It is relatively pointless trying to say who was the better general. Patton should have been sacked for slapping wounded soldiers. Montgomery seriously miscalculated on Market Garden. But they both got results.

What was so brilliant about the German generals? I am not suggesting Rommel, for example, was not very talented. But his successes also owed a lot to the skills of the German panzer formations in combinmed arms warfare, using tanks, anti-tank guns and infantry together to good effect, while British tanks tended to operate too independently, as a single arm. Credit for that goes to battalion / regiment / divisional commanders. The Germans won huge victories in Barbarossa - but one might almost ask how could they not, when the Soviets had deployed a mass of troops in a forward echelon, had stripped out the Stalin line, had left troops in peacetime locations, and then refused to allow tactical withdrawals?

The German generals were professionals. But so were the British, the US (albeit lacking in practical experience), the French, the Italians and the Soviets (those not purged).

[Dramicus]

not wanting to be disrespectful to the Italians but it is well known that their forces were not of the best quality (dont even mention their equipment)

I think that the british successes against the Italians dont even come close to what the germans accomplished in russia... Now before you start saying how disorganized and malequipped the russian forces were at the time, keep in mind that when the invasion begun, the germans had inferior tanks when compared to the russians (armor and cannon wise, the germans were leaps and bounds ahead in other areas) where at one point, the only way to damage the russian KV tanks was to land a shot right inside the barrel... which was accomplished once...

If the allied commanders were so brilliant then tell me why they nearly failed in the west when confronted with Old men and children while they themselves substantially outnumbered the german forces (who were by normal german standards considered to be completely unfit for combat) in man power, equipment and vehicles... The allies had almost complete air superiority and practacly unlimited hordes of tanks and men... Tell me why the only thing which stopped the german offencive in the ardennes was the lack of fule and ammo...

The allied commanders had nearly endless resources when compared to the german forces, their production facilities were completely out of danger of constant bombing, they had complete control of the air and sea and there people were very motivated... Why did the german forces which were undersupplied, under manned, under trained, and of poor moral manage to last as long as they did?



Patton slapped wounded soldiers? WTF was wrong with him?

Sure market garden was a complete faliure but it was not completely monty's fault, during the day of the attack many things which he had requested were not delivered to his forces, this inturn lead to a series of events which ended in total defeat, wether or not monty is responsible for supply problems is up to you...

The alternitive to market garden was an assault planned by patton to breach the sigfried line, although it was not chosen, if it were it is very possible that it could have ended in a much greater faliure than monty's operation... Patton wanted to do an all out strike and force his way through, but the germans were ready at the line and would have most likely fought off the attack and would have held the line untill they ran out of ammo, thus leading to massive allied losses...



but I dont know what im talking about...

http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/rolleyes.gif

[rnollman]

In the movie Patton and A Bridge Too Far, Patton is feared by the German High Command and Montgomery is thought of as a joke. Is this a well-documented point of view or just some American filmakers particular viewpoint (Hollywood)?

I did see a very detailed documentary on how Montgomery beat Rommel at El Alamein (which confirm Pellinor's post about Rommel's orderly retreat which allowed the Germans to move men and resources out of Africa). Rommel was already beaten because he had very few tanks and supplies. The documentary suggests that even with his back against the wall and with defeat a certainty, Rommel held on. I think at one point he had only 30 working tanks!

[edyzmedieval]

Woah! That's a serious thread necromancy! 2003 ~:eek:

[Greyblades]

Well it's happened and it's allways interesting to see how the board operated before I joined.

As for the argument; well it realy depends on the situation, when attacking patton was superior, always pushing ahead never letting up, and montgomery was better in defense, making the Germans and Italians pay dearly for each inch taken. The impression I get from them is that patton was as good at attacking as monty was at defending and it seems a little pointless to argue the superiority of specialist generals unless they actually fought against each other, and I dont think the anglo american relations were quite that bad at the time.

[PanzerJaeger]

In the movie Patton and A Bridge Too Far, Patton is feared by the German High Command and Montgomery is thought of as a joke. Is this a well-documented point of view or just some American filmakers particular viewpoint (Hollywood)?



Welcome to the .org rnollman!

It is very true that the OKW had a minor obsession with Patton - even rearranging troop strengths in preparation for Overlord based on his movements and actions. It can be accurately stated that the German military, as well as Hitler himself, viewed Patton as the best high level Allied commander, and the most likely to be tasked with leading major offensives.

(Interestingly, Eisenhower and the top Allied leadership felt very differently, ranking Patton below many other American commanders and never giving him a critical command after Sicily. That disparity highlighted the differing emphases placed on logistics and battlefield prowess between the Allies and the Germans.)

However, the Germans also had a healthy respect for Montgomery, who was widely viewed up until Market Garden as a very competent commander (which is more than could be said for the German opinion of most British officers). Remember, Montgomery delivered the first decisive German defeat in the West and followed it with a competent (if not wholly inspired) campaign that dislodged the Axis forces from Africa and later delivered a similar performance in Sicily.

It should also be noted that in Normandy the Germans concentrated most of their forces against Montgomery's offensives towards Caen, allowing the Americans, including Patton, to break out in the South. (Montgomery was nominally in control of the whole Allied ground force and participated heavily in the planning of the invasion, but had more direct involvement with operations of the Anglo-Canadian forces after the campaign had commenced.) This was largely due to the German assessment of the strategic situation and not any preferences toward Patton or Montgomery.

After Market Garden, Montgomery's reputation among Allied and Axis commanders alike was severely tarnished.


I did see a very detailed documentary on how Montgomery beat Rommel at El Alamein (which confirm Pellinor's post about Rommel's orderly retreat which allowed the Germans to move men and resources out of Africa). Rommel was already beaten because he had very few tanks and supplies. The documentary suggests that even with his back against the wall and with defeat a certainty, Rommel held on. I think at one point he had only 30 working tanks!

This is also true. El Alamein was certainly no Gazala and was practically already decided before it commenced. However, the overwhelming nature of the British numbers is a credit to Montgomery, who ensured that the battle would be fought on British terms. There is no shame in doing everything one can to guarantee victory before battle. In fact, it should be the aim of every commander.

Montgomery did neglect to take advantage of many opportunities that presented themselves in the German retreat. He never had the flare for risk taking, speed, and manuever that Rommel (or Patton) enjoyed. When he attempted it, the results were disastrous (Market Garden). His strengths were in logistics and planning, but he often had difficulty transitioning from the planning stage to execution, and was less capable of dealing with the fluidity of a rapidly changing battlefield situation than Patton and many of his German counterparts.

And yes, Rommel did have a serious deficit in tank strength, among many other things, which severely compromised his operations. His strategic sense was questionable, but he was an excellent battlefield commander, very much the opposite of Montgomery.

[rnollman]

Good points! And your comments jogged my memory about one point I forgot to mention from the El Alamein documentary. The British forces were disheartened and Montgomery came in with the express purpose of rebuilding his command from top to bottom. He had the charisma necessary to build confidence among his men and the materials to back that up pouring in through his open supply lines while Rommel's line of supply had been choked off. Old Blood and Guts (Patton) was feared and hated by his men for his bravado at their expense, ready to charge forward (" never retreat -- I am never willing to pay for the same real estate twice"). His answer for tough situations was to continuing driving forward no matter what the cost while Mongomery and Bradley were very carefully about how best to spend their human resources and reduce unnecessary casualties.

At one point, in the movie Patton, he complained when asked by Bradley to curtail his operations because of a need to provide for other more critical priorities (a la Churchill), that if he were given the fuel and not Monty that he could push through the Siegfried Line (" a monument to the stupidy of man") into Germany and be in Berlin in 10 days). The movie also made the point that he felt that if he had the support of the Allied command and could sieze this moment in history and he could shorten the war dramatically. It would seem, from the movie he correctly determined that the Germans would counterattack and asked his staff to draw up contingency plans to do an about face with his troops if necessary. No one else among the Allied Command seemed to have that insight (Eiesenhower chided him for "bragging"). The allies, Bradley took a full 24 hours after hearing initial reports of the Ardennes incursion to take it seriously, were caught flat-footed. One wonders if Patton were involved seriously in the Market Garden planning that the mistakes in planning and wishful thinking and fear of rocking Monty's boat would have been tolerated by Eisenhower.

I have often wondered whether given that chance, Patton could have averted the Bulge incursion and seriously moved the war in Europe to a close. With the Russians bearing down on Germany from the East, cooler heads in the German High Command, may have seen an opportunity to usurp Hitler and avoid the retribution by the Ruskies, take control and surrender to the allies avoiding a nasty protracted fight with the Russians for Berlin.

Patton, who ruthlessly drove his men more akin to the German commanders than his fellow Allied counterparts, seemed insensitive to the suffereing of civilians and troops under his command. I believe that is the basis for the German fear of his leadership and a disdain for Montgomery. For Patton expediancy seemed to be the key. He did not hesitate while Bradley, Montgomery, and Eisenhower were very careful to ponder the affects of their decisions on their own men and the civilian population. Patton seemed to take the attitude, "keep driving, driving, driving, we will fix things as we go". Bradley and Montgomery seemed to miss valuable opportunities by stopping to regroup. There always seemed to be other priorities also.

The movie A Bridge Too Far makes the point that the Dutch Resistance was reporting that the Germans were fleeing in panic prior to Market Garden. Then General Model arrives and jokes that the reason the Allied advance is slowing is that they "cannot keep up with our retreat". Within a short-time Model rebuilds the German positions and that window is closed. Had Patton been in charge and been given the resources, he might have been able to deal a decisive blow that might have accomplished the same end.

[Sarmatian]

From the two, Patton is definitely more of a character. It's easier to admire him than Monty. He was a proponent of offensive, mobile warfare and always pushed his men on, but if I were in Allied high command at the time, I would have preferred more cautious approach. Being superior in manpower, firepower, resources etc... the Allies had no need to undertake risky maneuvers.

Just how good Patton was it is difficult to assess. Unlike some German and Russian commanders, he never had to deal with huge enemy formations and face top quality troops under top quality commanders. He would have been probably in a better position to show his skills had he been a Russian or a German general.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Old Blood and Guts (Patton) was feared and hated by his men for his bravado at their expense

Not so. Actually, it was quite the opposite.

I wouldn't put too much stock in the Patton movie as to historical accuracy. The Allies did not have the logistics to drive on Berlin in the fall of 1944, so the question of who should've recieved supplies is moot.


Patton, who ruthlessly drove his men more akin to the German commanders than his fellow Allied counterparts, seemed insensitive to the suffereing of civilians and troops under his command.

On what do you base this on? Once again, quite the opposite is true.


I have often wondered whether given that chance, Patton could have averted the Bulge incursion and seriously moved the war in Europe to a close.

The Ardennes campaign was an Allied intel failure, and there wasn't much Patton could've done to prevent the German buildup prior to the start of the offensive. As I stated earlier, the Allied logistical situation was in no condition to pursue a campaign into Germany in late 1944. In fact, the original planning for operations didn't even consider it until sometime in early to mid 1945.

[Strike For The South]

Did Montgomerys moive win best picture?

Oh, it didn't?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kh9S1Hk975U&feature=related

Patton was probably the last in a long line of Great Scotch-Irish military commanders we had from the south

alas

[MAJR]

Patton and Montgomery had different styles of offensives. If I had to characterise them then I would say Patton was like a heavyweight boxer always looking for the knock out punch while Monty was like a fencer riposting and parying blows until he wore his enemy down for the final blow. They worked well in different settings.

Montgomery often looked to shift the axis of his attack from flank to flank during battles. He always kept the initiative in his battles because he kept the enemy off ballance and reacting to what he was doing. In doing this he became known as the master of the "set-peice" battle while criticism emerged that he either did not understand or could not use mobile warfare but in truth it was not totally his fault. The British didn't have many talented armour commanders and, particularly in the case of El Alamein, when given the opportunity to encircle the enemy and trap them the armour simply became unruly and uncontrolable. The British Armour had evolved from the British Cavalry which had always been notorious for a lack of discipline and so it pretty much remained so Montgomery came to the conclusion that he couldn't trust his armour commanders not to do something stupid and decided it would be better to keep them on a tight leash, as such you never see him attempting ambitious maneuvers of mobile forces - save Market Garden.

Patton, on the other hand, was extremely good at exploitation, flanking and maneuver but when faced with an entrenched enemy in a set-peiece battle situation he proved to be lacking. When given wide country to drive through Patton was excellent and if you wanted someone to take you from point A to point B in the quickest possible time and damn the consequences then he was the guy you went to, and if you wanted someone to make the best of the exploitation phase of a battle almost won then Patton was your guy but he was prone to ignore orders if he wasn't the center of attention and go for targets that could get him personal glory even if it didn't help the Allied cause. To the other point, Patton proved at Brest and against the Metz fortifications in the Lorraine Campaign that when faced with a strongly entrenched enemy he simply had no clue of how to deal with them. He attacked them frontally, tried to use speed and overwhelming force to shift them but the problem was he only seem to know how to attack frontally and often peicemeal.

Of the two of them, however, only one of them scored a great battle victory over the enemy and only one of them was the principal architect of the Overlord plan and the Land Forces Commander for that operation and only one of them was an Army Group Commander and that was Montgomery. Patton, as far as the level he commanded at and the responsibilities he had to deal with, wasn't in the same league as Montgomery.

[Hooahguy]

Operation Goodwood.
'nuff said.

[PanzerJaeger]

Of the two of them, however, only one of them scored a great battle victory over the enemy and only one of them was the principal architect of the Overlord plan and the Land Forces Commander for that operation and only one of them was an Army Group Commander and that was Montgomery. Patton, as far as the level he commanded at and the responsibilities he had to deal with, wasn't in the same league as Montgomery.

Welcome to the .org MAJR!

This is a great point. Monty and Patton are often compared as equals, but by Normandy they occupied very different positions. Although, I would argue that while Husky may not have had the morale impact that El Alamein had, the latter didn't take any more military acumen to achieve and Patton's half of Husky was certainly hailed as a great battlefield victory. Further, Montgomery's Overlord revealed more weaknesses than strengths in his abilities. We will of course never know if Patton could have done better at grand strategy.



Operation Goodwood.
'nuff said.

That could be interpreted two different ways, depending on which side of the fence one sits regarding the intent of the operation. :grin:

[G. Septimus]

can I take an example?
Montgomery: :britain:
Failed to accomplish Market Garden
his most and yet famous battle, El Alamien, was fought between a few German Panzers and a heavy relief Force of Brits
did a good job for patting his Troops

Patton:usa:
did his best to hold out against an Elite SS Troop under Sepp Dietrich in Bastogne
Spearheaded Normandy
Encircled Sicily

[MAJR]

Welcome to the .org MAJR!

This is a great point. Monty and Patton are often compared as equals, but by Normandy they occupied very different positions. Although, I would argue that while Husky may not have had the morale impact that El Alamein had, the latter didn't take any more military acumen to achieve and Patton's half of Husky was certainly hailed as a great battlefield victory. Further, Montgomery's Overlord revealed more weaknesses than strengths in his abilities. We will of course never know if Patton could have done better at grand strategy.

On El Alamein.

The Panzer Armee Afrika had entrenched in the strongest defensive position yet seen in the war. Its flanks were secured by the Mediterranean to the north and the Qatarra Depression to the South and at its front had been laid the largest minefield of the war, further Rommel had organized his defensive line so that his strongest mobile armoured units were free and available to be deployed against any breakthrough attempt. The only way to get to the Panzer Army Afrika was to make avenues through the minefield - using bayonets to find the mines and hands to remove them - and advance through them. There is quite a strong arguement to be had that had Rommel not been in Germany on sick leave and had Stumme not died on the first day of the battle that the 8th Army's advance could have been stopped dead in the minefield.

The numerical advantage of the 8th was crucial to victory but the victory was not a foregone conclusion and people looking to lessen the worth of Montgomery had embelished the advantage he had - I have seen some people claim he had a 10 to 1 advantage. Montgomery did not have the 3 to 1 advantage accepted in military theory to insure victory. The actual numbers of the two forces were:

8th Army - 195,000 men, 1,029 tanks, 435 armoured cars, 530 servicable aircraft, 892 to 908 artillery pieces and 1,451 anti-tank guns

Panzer Army Afrika - 116,000 men, 547 tanks, 192 armoured cars, 480 servicable aircraft, 552 artillery pieces and 496 anti-tank guns.

Also the claims that the numerical superiorty was all that it took to win this battle conveniantly ignores the fact that the British had enjoyed similar superiority in numbers over the Panzer Army Afrika at Gazala and had been soundly beaten.

On Overlord.

The original plan for the Normandy landings had been created by Freddie Morgan and the staff of COSSAC. Eisenhower was assigned to be SHAEF and asked for a Land Forces Commander for the operation - he wanted Alexander but got Montgomery. Without any consultation with Eisenhower, Montgomery arrived in the UK and was presented the COSSAC plan. He criticised it for being too restrictive and said it needed to be enlarged. Walter Bedel Smith was present and he backed Montgomery up.

The COSSAC plan called for a three beach landing - Gold, Sword and Juno if I remember correctly - then a lightning drive to Caen to secure that, a defensive force would be left behind in Caen while the main body swung west to take Cherbourg and clear the port for use before turning back to drive the Germans beyond the Seine.

The Overlord plan called for a five beach landing followed by a holding action in the east designed to draw in and hold down the German reinforcements coming into Normandy, in the west the Allies would aim to clear the Cherbourg Peninsula, take Cherbourg and open the port for use before breaking out and driving the Germans beyond the Seine.

Montgomery laid this plan out in detail to the Allied Top Brass in his St Paul's lectures in April and May. Montgomery stated his goal as being to cross the Seine by Day+90 but that the first 40 days of the operation would be solely aimed as securing their lodgement area on the European Mainland and linking up the beaches.

He then made the mistake of saying that he could take Caen on Day+1 and no one has let him live it down since. It doesn't matter that the Canadians were the only Allied force to achieve their D-Day objective, nor does it matter that those objectives were ambitious but not vital and the failure to take them did not effect the master plan, all that mattered was that Montgomery said he could do something but didn't manage it and thus it was enlarged to the proportions of a epic failure even though it was only a minor set back.

In truth Montgomery had wanted to take Caen early and use it as an anchor to his positions on the Allies left while the majority of the fighting would happen beyond it around the Faliase region but even though Caen wasn't taken early the Germans reacted in the way Montgomery's expected by putting their reinforcements against the British/Commonwealth forces, the only change was that the majority of the fighting happened around Caen rather than beyond it.

Even if the Overlord plan itself had more flaws than strengths as far as Montgomery's planning went, even if things didn't go totally to plan the basic master plan was still followed and the Allies not only accomplised the main aim of the operation but also crossed the Seine well ahead of schedule so Overlord as an operation can viewed as nothing but a success and Montgomery must recieve credit for planning it and commanding it, so whatever way you look at it Overlord is a plus point in Monty's carear.

My point about Patton not having a great battle victory to his name over the enemy was more about what he personally can claim as a solo effort. He never had his own El Alamein or Alam Halfa, his supporters never point out one great battle he commanded that proves his worth as a battlefield commander but always point to his mobility and speed. While it is true, however, that his turning movement at the Battle of the Bulge was a masterpiece the attack that followed it was weak and understrenght and did nothing to stop the German offensive, only once Patton was reinforced by forces from 6th Army Group, the skies cleared to allow the Aircraft to engage and the German's ran out of steam did Patton make any headway, and his attack into a snowstorm following the relief of Bastogne caused him to suffer more casualties through adverse weather conditions than inflicted by the enemy.

So my point about Patton remains unchanged. He was not the kind of general you wanted to command the main body of troops in a battle but you could ask for no one better at exploitation and persuit.

[MAJR]

can I take an example?
Montgomery: :britain:
Failed to accomplish Market Garden
his most and yet famous battle, El Alamien, was fought between a few German Panzers and a heavy relief Force of Brits
did a good job for patting his Troops

Patton:usa:
did his best to hold out against an Elite SS Troop under Sepp Dietrich in Bastogne
Spearheaded Normandy
Encircled Sicily

Patton relieved Bastonge, he didn't defend it. That was Anthony McAuliffe and the 101st Airboune division. He didn't spearhead Normandy he was kept in reserve until the operation was almost finished and his 3rd Army wasn't activated until after Bradley's 1st Army had achieved the break out, he was used to decoy the Germans with the fictional 1st US Army Group while the crossing happened and the majority of the fighting took place. Patton didn't encircle Sicily, he took Palermo against negligable opposition and drove to Messina where he proved no more effective against the German rearguard than the 8th, his race to Messina was onesided as Montgomery had not only given up the prise but had suggested Patton take it.

Market Garden was not a typical Montgomery operation, not least of which because he took a a back seat and allowed Browning and Brereton to plan it and them and Dempsey to execute it with minimal interferance from him, even so it was very nearly successful, still a failure but very narrowly so. For El Alamein see my last post.

[PanzerJaeger]

On El Alamein.

The Panzer Armee Afrika had entrenched in the strongest defensive position yet seen in the war. Its flanks were secured by the Mediterranean to the north and the Qatarra Depression to the South and at its front had been laid the largest minefield of the war, further Rommel had organized his defensive line so that his strongest mobile armoured units were free and available to be deployed against any breakthrough attempt. The only way to get to the Panzer Army Afrika was to make avenues through the minefield - using bayonets to find the mines and hands to remove them - and advance through them. There is quite a strong arguement to be had that had Rommel not been in Germany on sick leave and had Stumme not died on the first day of the battle that the 8th Army's advance could have been stopped dead in the minefield.

Indeed, Rommel's absence and Stumme's death during the beginning phase of the battle proved disastrous. The Axis also faced critical supply shortages, especially in fuel. That lack of fuel alone eliminated his ability to make the kind of sweeping maneuvers that had allowed him to defeat larger armored forces in the past. He was forced to fight a battle of attrition, which usually favors the numerically superior force.



The numerical advantage of the 8th was crucial to victory but the victory was not a foregone conclusion and people looking to lessen the worth of Montgomery had embelished the advantage he had - I have seen some people claim he had a 10 to 1 advantage. Montgomery did not have the 3 to 1 advantage accepted in military theory to insure victory. The actual numbers of the two forces were:

8th Army - 195,000 men, 1,029 tanks, 435 armoured cars, 530 servicable aircraft, 892 to 908 artillery pieces and 1,451 anti-tank guns

Panzer Army Afrika - 116,000 men, 547 tanks, 192 armoured cars, 480 servicable aircraft, 552 artillery pieces and 496 anti-tank guns.

Also the claims that the numerical superiorty was all that it took to win this battle conveniantly ignores the fact that the British had enjoyed similar superiority in numbers over the Panzer Army Afrika at Gazala and had been soundly beaten.

10-1 huh? That sounds like Rommel fanboy speak. However, the raw numbers alone don't tell the whole story either.

Of Panzer Army Africa, German forces made up less than half of the total size.

DAK consisted of less than 50,000 men, 249 tanks, 150 serviceable aircraft, ~200 artillery pieces, and ~350 anti-tank guns. Further, only 118 (88 PzIII L and 30 PzIV L) of those German tanks were capable of engaging the 522 Allied medium tanks committed to the battle on anything close to equal terms. That weakness became especially acute as the British broke out into the vast expanses of Western Egypt. The 252 Shermans were virtually unstoppable once they breached the AT belts.

While the Italians were induced into greater levels of competence and tenacity under German leadership than under their own, they were still of far less quality than their British counterparts, particularly in weaponry and equipment.


On Overlord.

I generally agree. Most people, especially Americans, who decry Montgomery's abilities in comparison to Patton neglect to mention that he was the principle architect of Overlord - the greatest Western Allied victory of the war - while Patton was only given a command after the battle had essentially been won.

Of course, Monty was again dealing with a far inferior enemy in terms of manpower and material, this time enjoying an even greater disparity than at El Alamein. Further, Hitler had the senior German leadership in a state of complete paralysis throughout the battle. Essentially, Monty did not have to deal with aggressive and sustained large scale counteroffensives, and could act at a leisurely pace not enjoyed on the Eastern Front. Still, the Allies were kept bottled up for two and a half months by the beleaguered German forces, even after their disastrous response to the initial landings. I'm interested in your source as to Monty's claim of a 90 day campaign, as every time I've seen it written it has been sourced to his own memoirs, in which he does quite a bit of retroactive justification of his actions.

In any event, as I said before, I think he was a far better strategist than tactician. The multiple attritional offensives against Caen are evidence of this. Most German and Russian commanders would have recognized the city as a hardpoint to be bypassed far sooner. IIRC, Monty later claimed that Cobra was planned on the 13th of June and that they were all part of the plan, but a careful examination of the operations, their objectives, and their outcomes undercuts that conclusion. If they were merely diversionary in nature, they certainly could have been done with far fewer casualties.


So my point about Patton remains unchanged. He was not the kind of general you wanted to command the main body of troops in a battle but you could ask for no one better at exploitation and persuit.

I completely agree, and I would even discount Patton's abilities in exploitation. Running out of fuel at the Moselle River demonstrated a remarkable level of arrogance, hubris, and/or lack of tactical awareness. Had the Germans been able to mount a major surprise counteroffensive, as they did some months later, Patton would helpless on his own front or unable to support another.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Of course, Monty was again dealing with a far inferior enemy in terms of manpower and material, this time enjoying an even greater disparity than at El Alamein. Further, Hitler had the senior German leadership in a state of complete paralysis throughout the battle. Essentially, Monty did not have to deal with aggressive and sustained large scale counteroffensives, and could act at a leisurely pace not enjoyed on the Eastern Front.

Monty never had to fight a battle or campaign where there was a good chance of losing. While the success of Overlord was no 'gimmee' by any means, 21st AG was never in any great peril even from D+1. Part of this can certainly be attributed to Monty's preparedness, and partly to luck. One can only wonder how 21st Army would've reacted had 5th Panzer been thrown at them instead of Patton's 3rd Army, later on after the breakout.

I'm currently reading a book entitled "Colossal Cracks" written by Stephen A. Hart, a senior lecturer at The Dept. of War Studies, Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. While not an immediate Monty fanboy, he has some interesting points to make about the part played by 21st Army, and Monty's tactics. One point he raises, and one which I was never much aware of, was the morale problems of 21st Army due in part to war weariness at home, and from unexpected heavy casualties from the fighting around Caen. Monty pretty much HAD to apply overwhelming firepower (as nearly all Allied commanders both British, American, and Soviets did) to keep casualties as small as possible in face of the manpower shortage being faced by Britain.

I'm about halfway through....I'm sure I'll have more comments when I finish it.


Most German and Russian commanders would have recognized the city as a hardpoint to be bypassed far sooner.

Given that the majority of supplies were still coming in 'over the beach' even into July, I don't think such a maneuver was possible. The beaches needed to be protected, and leaving such a large concentration of German armor in ones rear was not to be recommended, IMHO.

[Hooahguy]

Welcome to the .org MAJR!

That could be interpreted two different ways, depending on which side of the fence one sits regarding the intent of the operation. :grin:

I wasnt aware that the British aimed to get ravaged by the Germans in that battle.
:beam:

[ReluctantSamurai]

Montgomery came to the conclusion that he couldn't trust his armour commanders not to do something stupid and decided it would be better to keep them on a tight leash, as such you never see him attempting ambitious maneuvers of mobile forces

I would like to see some sources that address this statement. Monty kept all of his commanders on a tight leash, "grip" as he liked to call it, throughout the entire campaign in Europe. There were certainly competent commanders in both the British and Canadian armies. I just think Monty's style of command led him to be more interfering even to the point of bypassing Crerar and Dempsey to deal directly with corps commanders.


and if you wanted someone to make the best of the exploitation phase of a battle almost won then Patton was your guy but he was prone to ignore orders if he wasn't the center of attention and go for targets that could get him personal glory even if it didn't help the Allied cause.

Another statement I'd like to see some evidence for. I can think of only one instance where Patton might have let personal feelings get in the way of judgement...that of the Hammelburg mission.


Without any consultation with Eisenhower, Montgomery arrived in the UK and was presented the COSSAC plan.

This statement runs counter to the sources I have which state that Ike and "Beetle" Smith had looked at the COSSAC plan and didn't like it, and gave it to Monty to rewrite (and the COSSAC planners did everything they could to prevent Monty from even seeing the plan without consulting them first).


While it is true, however, that his turning movement at the Battle of the Bulge was a masterpiece the attack that followed it was weak and understrenght and did nothing to stop the German offensive, only once Patton was reinforced by forces from 6th Army Group, the skies cleared to allow the Aircraft to engage and the German's ran out of steam did Patton make any headway, and his attack into a snowstorm following the relief of Bastogne caused him to suffer more casualties through adverse weather conditions than inflicted by the enemy.

Patton was one of two Allied commanders who favored cutting off German forces in the Bulge at the base of their penetration, something he had recommended even at the Dec 19 SHAEF meeting in Verdun. At a subsequent meeting on the 28th, four proposals were put forth: contain the penetration and continue with already planned offensives, push the Germans back starting at the nose of the salient, cut off German forces at the Bastogne salient, or cut off all German forces by striking along the base of the entire salient.

Needless to say, noone favored the first option; and the option with the least risk...the second, was favored, not surprisingly, by Monty. Ike, Bradley, and Hodges favored the limited version of cutting the Bulge at Bastogne, and Patton and Collins were the only commanders who favored cutting the Bulge at Diekirch in the south and Elsenborn in the north, thereby trapping the entire 5th & 6th Panzer Armies...the option with the most risk. As Patton put it: "If you got a monkey in a jungle, hanging by his tail, it is easier to get him by cutting off his tail than kicking him in the face."

He goes on further to say (in his personal diary): "I want to attack north from Diekirch but Bradley is all for putting new divisions in the Bastogne fight. In my opinion, this is putting good money after bad. In this weather, on the defensive, the Germans can hold us well enough so that we can never trap them there, whereas if we attack close to the base, they will have to pull out and we will regain the ground and probably catch just as many Germans as the other way."

Command styles were never more prevelant than the decision to take a less risky course of action to resume the initiative in the Ardennes Campaign. Monty opting for the least risk, Ike and Bradley for a midling course, and the US Army's two most aggressive commanders, Patton and Collins opting for the most risky course.

[PanzerJaeger]

I will be interested in MAJR's response to your points, RS.


I wasnt aware that the British aimed to get ravaged by the Germans in that battle.
:beam:

Well yes. I was referring to the controversy over whether the battle was intended all along as a diversion for Cobra or as a full scale offensive in its own right. Regardless, it did not go "well" by any stretch of the imagination.

[Jaguara]

I have always found these Mongomery/Patton discussions amusing, moreso since I am not really a fanboy of either of them. I must say though, that I am impressed that this discussion has stayed so civil, maintaining a high level of academic discussion as well (as opposed to rhetoric).

Personally, I think both Montgomery & Patton have their faults, and though they have their merits as well, in an overall historical view, I am not particularly impressed with either. Do either deserve to be quoted in the ranks of Napoleon and Alexander? No. Not even close.