historical thread

[khurjan]

well i thought i might start posting some historical information on armies and units from then to wet your appetities...if you dont like my thread say so and i will discontinue it...or you can contribute too and we can make it a interesting reading post for others

[khurjan]

history of legion evolution
just a bit about historical roman legion from my west point class papers enjoy it
The Earliest Army
The earliest Roman army is usually described as composed of about 1,000 men per tribe drawn in 100 man levies. The soldiers were armed as Greek Hoplites and fought in a simple Phalanx.


The 4,000 MAN Five Class Army
Tradition attributes the reorganization of the army to the sixth king, Servius Tullius, although the actual process may have taken a number of years. By the time of the war with Veii the army probably had fully developed the 5 classes. Without detailed descriptions of the army formed from the classes one can only make reasonable guesses about its composition. In this model the same number of men are assumed to have been levied from each Century, the phalanx is kept at the Greek standard of 8 ranks, and the overall army size is about 4,000.



If 25 men from each Century were levied then there would have been 2,000 from the First Class, 500 from Classes II through IIII and 750 from Class V. 4,000 men in 8 Ranks will fill 500 Files. That would give the First Class 4 Ranks, Classes II through IIII one Rank each and leave 750 men in Class V for the 500 files of the last Rank.

The last Rank is represented as composed of 500 men of the Fifth Class with the remaining 250 men being used as skirmishers, flankers or camp guards. In the drawing this presumed 250 man unit is not depicted. Although barely visible at this scale, the Phalanx in the drawing above is divided into separate ranks by Class. Each Class is given a different color.

Under the assumption that the Phalanx would have been somehow subdivided into smaller units, the 500 files have been divided into units of 100 files 8 ranks deep and separated by three meters (ten feet) to provide room for the phalanx to maneuver. Of course, the actual armies were never so nicely composed, but this configuration at least gives a reasonable starting point for visualizing the army.



The Early Livy Legion


The earliest legion is generally said to be the 45 unit legion as described by Livy and dates to the early part of the 4th century BC. The maniple consisted of two centuries of 10 files by 3 ranks. All maniples had the same number of men. In front of each Hastati maniple there were 20 skirmishers called Leves. All maniples were armed with the spear and oval shield.

In addition to the Hastati, Principes and Triarii, Connolly includes equal size units of the Rorarii and Accensi, both armed with shields and spears, and placed behind the Triarii.

An Alternative Early Legion


Delbrück offers an alternate interpretation of the Livy legion, different from Connolly in his analysis of the Rorarii and Accensi. He works from Livy's number: 186 men "antipilani" and "sub signis." His explanation is that the Triarii were at one time called the Pilani and that the Triarii, Rorarii and Accensi were positioned behind the standards. Those behind the standards, then, were the 60 men of the Triarii; plus the 120 Rorarii attached in units of 40 men to each of the Hastati, Principes and Triarii maniples; plus the 6 Accensi, orderlies or company clerks; for a total of 186 men.



He considers the Leves, the skirmishers, to be a part of the 40 man Rorarii unit assigned to each Hastati maniple. For the 10 Hastati maniples that would place some 200 skirmishers directly in front of the battle line. These are the men who would retreat through the gaps in the Hastati line. He also mentions that there may have been other skirmishers on the flanks; possibly the other 20 Rorarii of the Hastati maniples. He does not believe the Rorarii of the Principes and Triarii maniples were combat soldiers at all, but rather were unarmed assistants. The Accensi, he says, were totally misinterpreted by Livy. These were the 6 orderlies of the cohort. In muster formation the three 40 man Rorarii units would stand behind the 60 man Triarii maniples. Behind them would stand the 6 Accensi orderlies. This gives the number of 186 men as "sub Signis."

Delbrück argues against the notion that the legion actually went into battle with wide gaps between the maniples. His view is that the legion was really an articulated Phalanx with only small intervals between the maniples to allow adjustments in spacing due to irregular terrain and errors in marching. The gaps would be naturally closed by the men in the adjoining maniples at the time contact is made. If larger gaps opened whole units such as centuries or maniples of the Principes would fill in. The maniples of the Principes would have lined up on the small intervals in the Hastati.



The Delbrück maniple has men on 0.91m (3&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif spacing both for file and rank with the centuries placed side by side. Each century has 10 files and 6 ranks. The placement of the centurions is not given. Delbrück recognizes the requirement for 1.83m (6&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif of fighting room for each individual given by Vegetius. However he interprets the 1.83m (6&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif spacing as being between adjacent ranks, not files. His method is to have alternate ranks step to the side to fill in the gaps in the rank in front. In this way there is 1.83m (6&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif between rank 1 and rank 3 The Delbrück maniple in battle formation had a staggered formation.

Twenty men from each Rorarii unit attached to the Hastati are depicted as skirmishers spread in a thin line in front of the legion. They would retreat through the narrow gaps between the maniples. The other twenty men of the Hastati Rorarii units may have been used as skirmishers on the flanks; they are not depicted in the schematic. The balance of the Rorarii and Accensii are placed at the bottom of the schematic to indicate that they were, in Delbrück's reconstruction, not a part of the battle and may have been left as camp guards.

The Triarii maniples are comprised of two 30 man centuries aligned one behind to other to maintain a 6 Rank depth. Delbrück states that a depth of fewer than 6 Ranks would not have been an effective force and that the maniples could make up for the gap because of the distance they had between themselves and the battle lines would allow them time and space to maneuver to close the gaps if necessary.



Delbrück does not specify how wide the small gaps between maniples were, but he does allow enough for the 20 skirmishers to retreat. The model uses a spacing between maniples of 3.05m (10&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif which seems large enough to allow the 20 skirmishers room to retreat and small enough for a few men on either side to close the gap.

Delbrück also argues that the 76m (250&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif spacing of the later legions is an echelon tactic introduced first by Hannibal and adopted into the Roman system by Scipio Africanus, sometime between 211 and 200 BC, probably in Spain. Prior to his innovation the three lines, Delbrück believes, would have been fairly close together, about 30m (100&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif. The legion formation shown here incorporates these elements.



The 4,200-man Republican Legion


At some time after 340 BC the legion was reorganized again. It may have been about this time that 200 of the Rorarii were withdrawn, trained, armed as light skirmishers and named Velites. From this time the legion was configured with the standard 30 maniple formation. The maniple was comprised of two 60 man centuries, usually described as either 10 files by 6 Ranks or 12 files by 5 Ranks. In this version of the legion the large Velites units are shown aligned between the two centuries of the Triarii in the third line as they would have been during muster and, perhaps, during battle after they had retired. The centuries of the Hastati and Principes are shown aligned one behind the other. This is the classic formation as it is usually given, by Montross and Rüstow, for example.

Echelon Tactics
Delbrück credits the development of echelon tactics to Scipio Africanus, probably during his campaigns in Spain. The great advantage of echelon tactics is that it allowed the lines to operate somewhat independently. He also places the introduction of the Pilum to coincide with the new tactics. The legion of Scipio is essentially the same as the earlier legion in its overall formation with the exception that the lines are much further apart, about 76m (250&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif.
The 4,800-man Legion of Marius -- Cohort Tactics


A major change came at the time of Marius and is usually attributed to him, although some elements of the reorganization of the legion may have been implemented prior to Marius' reform. The nominal maniple strength was probably 160 men, divided into two centuries which most authors place one behind the other. The most likely configuration is 16 files by 10 ranks. It has the advantage of scaling down by units of 5 or ten as the maniple strength was depleted.

By the time of Caesar it is clear that the cohort had become the fundamental tactical unit. He describes battle formations and troop movements in terms of cohorts and legions appear more as administrative units than battlefield tactical units. Caesar sends cohorts and groups of cohorts, not legions, on flanking maneuvers.

Since the number of men in a cohort could vary considerably the formation must have been scaleable in some consistent manner so that its fighting efficiency was not destroyed by the reduction in manpower. The typical formation, described above, uses a spacing of 0.91m (3&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif for the files and 1.22m (4&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif for the ranks; allowing for the centurion, then, the cohort would have a front of 15.85m (52&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif. If the three cohorts fought side by side, as is always depicted, then their combined front would have extended to 48.16m (158&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif. The cohort would, in essence, be a miniature phalanx, 10 ranks deep and 58 files wide.



Caesar's legions are usually described as having a strength of about 3,600 men, fewer than the full strength legion. How would the understrength legion have been configured? It seems reasonable that the cohort would be scaled down by reducing the number of files, not the number of ranks. Reducing the number of ranks would decrease the depth and hence the power of the formation. Reducing the number of files would reduce the front but retain the full power of the formation. It therefore seems most logical to retain the full 10 ranks as the depth and reduce the number of files as necessary. The drawing on the right shows two reduced centuries of 5 ranks and 12 files each.

At the battle of Ilerda Caesar's forces were caught on a narrow ridge just wide enough for three cohorts in line of battle. Judson states that this ridge can could be identified in his day and was 110 meters (360&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif wide. The front of a 12 file cohort is 12.2m (40&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif, giving a three-cohort unit a front of exactly 109.73m (360&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif. If Judson's information is correct, it would appear to confirm this formation.



The full strength legion formation in this configuration is shown in the model above.



The Legion of Marius -- Alternate Formations


Delbrück does not specifically discuss the question of gaps between the cohorts of the Marian legion. He argues, persuasively I think, against the possibility of gaps in the pre-Marian legion formation in which the units and, consequently, the gaps were much smaller. To be consistent Delbrück would have to be presumed to eliminate the wider gaps in the post-Marian legion, placing the cohorts close together with only small gaps between them. The drawing below shows this legion with 7.62m (25&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif spaces between the cohorts for the skirmishers. The legion formation in this configuration is much more compact and has a front of only 212m (694&#39http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif.



If this were the legion formation then it would be a departure from the earlier legion in that the centuries would now be aligned front to back rather than side by side. In favor of this configuration are: (1) the cohort front fits Judson's information about Ilerda (assuming Judson is accurate), (2) the second century was called the posterior century, and (3) since cohorts were used as quasi-independent tactical units they may have needed the extra depth of the formation.

Against this configuration is the argument for consistency and conservatism. It can be argued that, if the centuries were aligned side by side prior to the reorganization of Marius, then it seems likely that they would have been aligned that way after Marius. The change in the position of the Posterior Century would represent a significant change in tactics, even down to details such as how and when the ranks could employ their pila. The style of fighting had evolved over a long period and may be considered to have been "optimized." That is, the tactics of the individual soldiers armed with the scutum, pilum and gladius which had been evolved to this time were probably those which best suited those weapons; major changes would probably not have been an improvement. Finally, at the level of the century, the soldiers were trained, drilled and led by their centurions who represented a conservative, in the sense "conserving," element in the army; Marius' changes were dramatic enough without also including fundamental changes in tactics at every level and the re-training which would have had to occur.

The 5,130-man Imperial Legion
During the second half of the first century AD, the size of the cohorts was increased. The regular cohort was increased in size to 480 men in six centuries of 10 files and 8 ranks each. The first cohort was enlarged to 810 men in 5 centuries of 18 files and 9 ranks.

The centuries are usually represented as being arranged two deep with the maniples side by side. For the six centuries of the normal cohort this is a logical formation. For the five centuries of the first cohort the scheme does not work. If four of the centuries are aligned in a rectangle they occupy about the same space as the six centuries of the other cohorts. This would allow them to fit nicely into the overall legion formation. That would leave one extra century.


The "extra" century of the first cohort is difficult to fit into the regular legion formation. It could have been attached to the other four centuries of its cohort in some fashion, perhaps to strengthen the right wing.

An alternate formation is possible. If the legion did close gaps by aligning the maniples side by side within the cohorts to form a continuous line, then the formation may have looked something like the drawing below. The front of this imperial legion is shorter than for a Caesarian legion shown because the depth of each century is increased from 5 to 8 Ranks.



Conclusion
From this brief overview of legion formations according to various authorities it is clear that there are some fundamental questions remaining. The legion was a fighting unit with unique weapons, tactics and formations; and was the most successful army of the ancient world. Yet we do not understand how it functioned in some of the most basic ways.

The legion's formation and tactics were changed over time and were adapted to meet local battlefield conditions. Yet there is a core understanding, an "idealized legion," which can be described. The legion incorporated its own unique characteristics; among them were: the regular use of two and three lines, division of forces into centuries, maniples and cohorts, command by Centurions, use of trumpets and standards, and the tactics of the Pilum and Gladius.

[khurjan]

here is some more of my project papers for you to read and be happy
GLADIVS versus SARISSA
Roman legions against Greek pike phalanx



by
khurram wadiwalla
M.A. (War Stud.)


During the first half of the 2nd century BC the Roman legion confronted the Macedonian phalanx. In most of the engagements - including the major ones at Cynoscephalae, Magnesia and Pydna - the Romans prevailed over their opponents and the Republic emerged as the indisputable Mediterranean power. This essay deals with the causes of the Roman military successes by examining briefly the Macedonian and Roman systems of war and searching for possible other factors that contributed to the defeat of the phalanx. The focus of this effort will be the battles of Cynoscephalae and Pydna. For a number of reasons, Magnesia is not going to be treated here. The ancient accounts are considered to be completely fantastic and it is argued that the army of Antiochus III did not have a pure sarissa phalanx formation.1 It is also suggested that the outcome was determined mostly by the action of the Pergamene cavalry of king Eumenes, a Roman ally, and not by an actual clash between the legion and whatever kind of phalanx Antiochus employed at Magnesia.2 Besides, the study of the Roman victories against Philip V and Perseus is more than sufficient for our purpose, given also the space limitation.

First of all, let's have a look at the effectiveness of the weapons and tactics used by the phalanx and the legion during the period of their confrontation. The main weapon of the phalangite was the sarissa, a spear which by that time extended up to 21 feet and it was held with both hands. According to Polybius, all the sarissae had the same length.3 Still, it has been suggested that the first four ranks of the phalanx were equipped with shorter spears of various lengths, from 9 to 18 feet, and that the 21-foot sarissae were carried by the additional twelve ranks.4 At any rate, the fact remains that the sarissa had a really long reach and could pierce the shields and breastplates of the legionaries who stood on its way, as it happened at Pydna.5 On the other hand, the sarissa was obviously a heavy and unwieldy weapon, unsuitable for fighting man to man;6 for this purpose the phalangites had a small sword.7 The men on the front lines carried shields but those at the rear most probably had either no shields at all or small and light ones slung across their chests;8 however, they proved to be inadequate protection against the Roman sword.9 This brings us to the next issue, Roman weaponry.

The main weapon of the legionary was the so-called Spanish sword (gladius), excellent for thrusting and hacking since its double-edged blade was very strong and firm.10 Livy describes very vividly the horrible wounds inflicted by the gladius and the shock of Philip's troops when they saw the maimed bodies of their dead comrades.11 The Roman soldier was armed also with a couple of special javelins (pila), a light and a heavy one; both of them were thrown against the enemy before contact was made. If it did not kill, the pilum could pierce a shield and, due to its design and construction, render it virtually useless.12 Concerning defensive equipment, the most important piece for the legionary was his large rectangular shield (scutum). The scutum left no parts of the body exposed and offered a high degree of protection against Macedonian arrows and short swords but not against sarissae, as it has been mentioned.13

According to Plutarch, the Roman consul Aemilius Paulus was terrified by the sight of the phalanx charging and sweeping everything before it at Pydna.14 It appears that the phalanx of the 2nd century BC was tightened up more than the original Macedonian phalanx and it was equipped with longer sarissae. The Macedonian battle formation was usually 16 men deep; the first five ranks had their sarissae levelled while the rest held them elevated so as to keep off the incoming missiles. In the close battle order of this later phalanx each man occupied half the width of a Roman soldier in formation. Thus, in a frontal attack one legionary had to face two phalangites and ten sarissae simultaneously;15 '... and it is both impossible for a single man to cut through them all in time once they are at close quarters and by no means easy to force their points away'.16 Another advantage of the phalanx was that - apart from the first and the rear ranks - it could be composed of half-trained men who just held their sarissae and pushed.17 So, it is obvious that the sarissa phalanx was a tight formation based on mass shock action and not on individual fighting. On the other hand, the Romans relied on tactical flexibility and skilled swordsmanship.

The legion of the Macedonian wars had a strength of 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry. The light-armed troops (velites) numbered about 1,200. The heavy infantry was deployed in three successive lines, each one composed of a different kind of legionary. The 1,200 men on the front were the less heavily armored hastati; next came the 1,200 principes who were the best swordsmen of young age while the older soldiers, the 600 triarii, were placed at the back. The legion was broken up into smaller tactical units, the maniples, each one consisting of 120 men - except the maniples of the triarii which were 60 men strong. There were 30 maniples of heavy infantry in every legion positioned with intervals between them and arranged in a chequerboard formation; thus, each maniple covered the gap of the line in front of it. Usually, the legion marched into battle in this way.18

After skirmishing, the velites withdrew through the intervals between the maniples and regrouped behind the triarii. Then, the 10 maniples of the hastati came forward and formed a solid line; the legionaries hurled their pila, drew their swords and came to grips with their opponents, trying to exploit gaps in the enemy formation. If the hastati failed to breakthrough, they disengaged and retired through the 10 maniples of the principes. In their turn, the principes formed a solid line and attacked with pila and swords. If the enemy still held its ground, the principes were relieved similarly by the 10 maniples of the triarii. So, the legion kept its adversary under constant pressure by fresh troops. Depending on the circumstances this standard procedure, as well as the width, depth and disposition of the maniples, could be modified.19

Finally, both Macedonians and Romans used cavalry and/or allied troops to cover their flanks, as it is reported by the ancient accounts.

After this basic outline of the Macedonian and Roman fighting methods, a summary of the two great battles which virtually ended the effective military history of the phalanx is necessary. After some minor operations, the decisive battle of the 2nd Macedonian war took place in May 197 BC in Thessaly. King Philip V of Macedon had an army of approximately 16,000 phalangites, 7,500 other infantry and 2,000 cavalry. The Roman side, under the command of consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus, numbered about 18,000 Roman and Italian troops, 8,000 Greek allies - most of them Aetolians - 2,400 Roman, Italian and Aetolian cavalrymen and 20 elephants.

In a thick mist, the advanced forces of the opposing armies met each other unexpectedly on the Cynoscephalae hills. Both commanders sent reinforcements and the reconnaissance skirmish soon developed into a full-scale engagement. Philip, despite the unfavourable terrain and the fact that he had sent many of his men to collect fodder, accepted battle after receiving encouraging messages from the front line. The king, leading on the right wing the half of his phalanx that had formed up, charged downhill and pushed back the Roman left. Yet, Flamininus saw that most of the Macedonians on the left were still in marching order uphill or trying to deploy and immediately launched an attack with his right flank and the elephants against them. The disordered Macedonian left broke easily and fled pursued by Romans and Aetolians. In the meantime, the Roman left was being hardly pressed by the advancing phalanx. Then, an unknown tribune took 20 maniples from the victorious right flank and attacked the Macedonian right from the rear; the exposed phalangites suffered heavy casualties and they were finally routed. The Macedonians lost about 8,000 dead and 5,000 prisoners while the Roman side had 700 killed.20 This was the first time that the sarissa phalanx was defeated by the legion in a pitched battle.

Concerning the battle of Pydna not much is known from our ancient sources but possibly things happened as follows. The strength of king Perseus' army is estimated at 20,000 phalangites, 17,000 other infantry, an elite agema of 3,000 men and 4,000 cavalry. On the other side, consul Lucius Aemilius Paulus had at his disposal a force of about 37,000 Romans, Italians, Pergamenes and Numidians plus 34 elephants. In June 168 BC the two armies were met at Pydna in southern Macedonia and the fighting began accidentally over a stream. Initially, the charge of the phalanx was irresistible. The Macedonians advanced swiftly and after some fierce fighting the Romans made an orderly retreat towards rough ground. When the pursuing phalanx entered that area, it started to lose its cohesion and gaps were created in its long line. Realising this, Paulus ordered his legionaries to infiltrate in small groups wherever possible and fight many single combats at close quarters; thus, the phalanx gradually disintegrated. In the meantime, the Roman right had managed with a counter-attack supported by elephants to break the enemy left. On the other wing, Perseus with the main body of his cavalry had already fled. The remaining phalangites, being attacked now by all sides, were slaughtered; the 3,000 picked troops of the agema fell fighting to the last man. Within an hour everything was over. According to the sources the Macedonian losses were enormous, 20,000 killed and 11,000 captured. The Romans had only 100 dead.21

Regarding the causes of the Roman victories, Polybius wrote in his classical comment on Macedonian and Roman tactics that nothing could withstand the frontal charge of the phalanx as long as it preserved its characteristic formation.22 However, ' ... it is acknowledged that the phalanx requires level and clear ground with no obstacles such as ditches, clefts, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, all of which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation .... the Romans do not make their line equal in force to the enemy and expose all the legions to a frontal attack by the phalanx, but part of their forces remain in reserve and the rest engage the enemy. Afterwards whether the phalanx drives back by its charge the force opposed to it or is repulsed by this force, its own peculiar formation is broken up. For either in following a retreating foe or in flying before an attacking foe, they leave behind the other parts of their own army, upon which the enemy's reserve have room enough in the space formerly held by the phalanx to attack no longer in front but appearing by a lateral movement on the flank and rear of the phalanx .... the Macedonian formation is at times of little use and at times of no use at all, because the phalanx soldier can be of service neither in detachments nor singly, while the Roman formation is efficient. For every Roman soldier, once he is armed and sets about his business, can adapt himself equally well to every place and time and can meet attack from every quarter . He is likewise equally prepared and equally in condition whether he has to fight together with the whole army or with a part of it or in maniples or singly'.23

In this way Polybius clearly presented what was most likely to happen in every encounter between phalanx and legion. Having in mind the accounts of the battles at Cynoscephalae and Pydna, it is easy to understand that things happened exactly as Polybius had pointed out. The frontal assault of a coherent phalanx was devastating but in rough and uneven ground this formation could not work. Philip's left wing did not manage to form up in time and Perseus' entire phalanx was disordered because of the terrain. On the contrary, the manipular system enabled the legion to operate much more easily and disperse its attacks. The massive and cumbersome Macedonian formation was unable to protect itself when it was attacked on the flank or the rear by independently acting maniples and at close quarters the phalangites were generally no match for the better equipped and trained Roman swordsman.24

Another major factor that contributed to the defeat of the phalanx was the inadequate flank protection by the cavalry force. In contrast to earlier glorious periods, the Macedonians had neglected their cavalry and relied mostly on the sarissa phalanx, trying to maximize its shock action but not taking into account the disadvantages. It is surprising to see that Philip had only 2,000 troopers, half of them Macedonians, against an enemy which counted on maneuverability and outflanking in order to deal with the phalanx; on the contrary, it was the Roman and allied cavalry that proved to be superior. It is argued that, most possibly, the outcome of the wars would have been different if there had been a strong and efficient Macedonian cavalry force.25

The help of the allies in the Roman victories should also be mentioned. As it has been stated, much of the Roman army was composed of Greek, Italian or other troops. They provided an additional manpower used for a variety of purposes but especially concerning cavalry their contribution had been crucial. For example, the Aetolian troopers at Cynoscephalae performed excellently and prevented a general rout of the advanced Roman forces.26

Next, the elephants seem to have played an important role at the two great battles, smashing through the Macedonian left wing at Cynoscephalae and pushing back the enemy cavalry at Pydna before they were joined in the attack by the Roman forces that routed Perseus' left flank.27 The action of the elephants at those instances resulted in the opportunities that the legionaries awaited for and fully exploited, that is, gaps in the Macedonian line and the right conditions for outflanking.

Last but not least, the issue of leadership. It appears that in this aspect too the Romans had an advantage. Philip, although he had realized that neither the place nor the time were suitable, finally made the fatal mistake to engage with only part of his force at Cynoscephalae in order to support his skirmishers28 Furthermore, the phalangites on the left flank tried to catch up with the rest of the charging army 'having no one to give them orders'.29 This incident clearly indicates a break in the Macedonian chain of command. On the other hand, with the 'brilliant initiative of the military tribune' who hit the phalanx at the rear the Romans won a total victory.30 Finally, Perseus seems to have lost control of his army at Pydna and fled early in the battle; his overall performance was lamentable compared to the competence and bravery displayed by Aemilius Paulus.31

To sum up, the inherent weaknesses of the later Macedonian phalanx, the more flexible Roman tactics and better armament for hand to hand combat combined with the allied help, the effective use of elephants, the superiority in cavalry and the successful high and lower command resulted in the victory of the legion over the phalanx. It was time for a new master.

ANCIENT SOURCES

Titus Livius: Books XXXI-XLV.
Plutarch: Flamininus.
Plutarch: Aemilius Paulus.
Polybius: The Histories.

[khurjan]

a bit about celtic warbands for the fanatics
hehe its my feast day fellow citizens
took me awhile to gewt this info up and running too bad i cant put pictures on

here we go

ANCIENT CELTIC WARFARE

hi, cum est usus atque aliquod bellum indicit – quod ante Caesaris adventum fere quotannis accidere solebat, uti aut ipsi iniurias inferrent aut inlatas propulsarent -, omnes in bello versantur . . .

Whenever the need arose and a war broke out – which as a rule happened every year before Caesars arrival that they either opened up hostilities themselves or had to defend against -, they all joined the battle . . . (Caesar, De Belli Gallico VI - 15,1)

Caesar may be a biased source, but his statement tells us a lot about the role of war in ancient Celtic society: it was an important part of life, primarily for the nobility, but, to a lesser degree, also for the average man. We see a similar picture if we take a look at the Irish or Welsh legends, where the heroes go off to fights, most often one at a time or in small groups, but often in the company of their followers and clients to fight mass battles.

A Short, Short History of Celtic Expansion and Retreat
Before we look into ancient Celtic warfare itself, it is necessary to define what time and geographical region I will be talking about. Even though Celtic culture developed probably some centuries earlier, the oldest material I’ll be discussing dates to the beginning of the 5th century BC in central Europe. From that point, the culture expanded until, in the 3rd century BC, it reached its greatest extent with Celts living in Ireland and Spain in the West and as far as Galatia in Asia Minor in the East. This was partly due to cultural exchange and peaceful transmission of ideas, partly due to massive military campaigns like that in northern Italy. From then on, however, the Celts began to lose ground. Starting even in the 3rd century BC, the Romans began to conquer the Celtic lands From the South . Only a little later, Germanic pressure increases from the Northeast. By the end of the 1st century BC, all the Celtic lands but the British Isles were conquered either by the Romans or had become germanised, either by a similar cultural exchange (like that when they became Celtic) or by force of arms. Most of Britain comes under Roman control less than a century later, leaving only what is modern Scotland and Ireland as Celtic territory. The end of what I think of as ancient Celtic culture came when Ireland was christianised in the 5th century BC, followed by Scotland soon after.

The "Typical" Celtic Warrior
To start with, the typical Celtic warrior was male. Even hints that armed females existed are extremely rare. Not a single instance of a female burial containing a shield or a sword has yet been uncovered. About 50 percent of the males, about 25% of the total population, were buried with weapons. Caesar, in his report about the Helvetian census, tells us that of about 350,000 people about 90,000 carried arms, which amounts to about 25% of the Helvetian population that decided to move into Gaul.

A Celtic warrior’s basic equipment consisted of a set of one to four spears. One was a 1.8 meters long fighting spear called a "lancea" that sometimes had very large spearheads of up to 50 centimetres in length. The others were shorter throwing spears called "gaesum" with relatively small, normally shorter than 10 centimetres long spearheads. A warrior also had a large—about 1.2 meter high and 0.5 meters wide—leather-covered, wooden shield with a metal shield-boss. This was likely to have been decorated with painting and sometimes metal ornamentation. With this basic equipment, the average warrior usually wore his everyday clothing consisting of trousers, a shirt, and a mantle.

A must for the Celtic noble, besides his torc (neck ring), was a long-sword with a blade-length of about 0.8 to 1 meter. Those from the early period had definite swordpoints, enabling them to be used for slashing and piercing. In the later period, these swords often had rounded points that allowed only slashing attacks. In rare cases, especially in finds from the eastern Celtic world, such swords had anthropomorphic handles, the pommel most often cast from bronze in the form of a human head. Additionally, the typical noble warrior probably wore armor and helmet, all made from leather. Depending on how rich they were, nobles might have equipment such as helmets, made from bronze or iron, often elaborately decorated with ornamentation and inlays of coral or even gold. Occasionally, the helmet might have additional embellishments such as the one from the famous find at Ciumesti, Romania, which has a figure of a raven with mobile wings fixed to its crest. That helmet must have been an impressive sight when the owner moved down the battlefield. Chainmail suits, covering the body down to the knees and, most often, leaving the arms free, were very rare, and, obviously affordable by only the wealthiest nobles.

The Celtic Battle-Chariot
Even though it was not used always and everywhere in the Celtic world, the battle-chariot is considered a very typical part of Celtic warfare. It was called a "carpentom" or similar term, and was a light, two-wheeled vehicle drawn by a pair of yoked horses, little more than four meters in length and less than two meters wide. The chariot consisted almost exclusively of organic material; the main metal parts were the iron tires and the iron fittings to strengthen the hubs. In some cases, metal rings and connectors were used to strengthen joints and flexible connections. What made the Celtic chariot so special, however, was that the chariot-platform was not fixed to the axle but hung free in a rope suspension. This made it a lot more comfortable to drive and a lot easier to fight from.

Usually two persons rode in the chariot. The charioteer sat in the open front of the chariot and actually drove. The warrior stood behind the charioteer and threw his spears from the chariot before alighting and fighting on foot. The charioteer stayed close enough to retrieve his warrior and carry him away from the battle if he were wounded or killed. This system is well documented in the Irish Ulster Cycle, as well as in the works of Roman and Greek historians.

Celtic Warrior Bands
Also quite typical among the Celts were warrior-bands like the Irish fianna or the Gaesates who fought in the Italian Wars against the Romans. Such warbands consisted mainly of young men led by charismatic leaders like the Irish Fionn Mac Cumhaill or the two kings of the Gaesates. The latter seem to have been used as high response troops in battle, according to the Roman sources. Most probably these groups had a religious dimension, requiring various initiation rituals for membership. They most probably enjoyed a special status in Celtic society. Members of these warrior bands probably were known for performing heroic feats. For example, historians recorded that the Gaesates fought naked in the battles in the Po valley in Italy where the Cisalpine Celts opposed the Romans. Most notably these warbands seem to have consisted mostly or even exclusively of infantry.

The Nature of Celtic Warfare
The Celts fought many battles. Some involved rather small numbers of combatants, but there were also mass battles in which at least tens of thousands or perhaps even hundreds of thousands participated, if we believe the numbers reported by various ancient historians. However, in contrast to the rigid Roman military organisation, Celtic warriors seem to have been much less used to fighting in formations and organized units. The records we have from ancient historians paint the picture of mostly unorganised groups. The ancient Celtic warriors engaged their enemy as if they would defeat them simply by overrunning them, trusting their brute force more than elaborate tactics and clever strategies. This may well be due to a trait of Celtic mentality, which valued individual prowess with arms and heroic feats more than fighting in tight groups and trusting in the combined power of many men in close military formations.

Military organisation seems to have been based, in case of the infantry, more on where one came from than the type of weapons one carried, although chariots and/or cavalry were set aside to fight together. The warbands, who were most likely the high response troops of the Celts, often formed the first line of the infantry, hurling themselves upon the enemy in the first assault.

In battles, the Celts also made use of what has been dubbed "psychological warfare." Before actually engaging the enemy, they are said to having made a horrible noise by clashing their weapons against their shields, crying and singing, with horns (carnyx) being blown and maybe drums being beaten. In the early period, these practices, together with the wild onslaught by the first lines of warriors, seems to have shocked Roman troops so that much that they simply gave way and fled from the field in fear for their lives. Also, before the actual fight, the Celtic war leaders paraded in front of their troops, performing heroic feats, proclaiming their own deeds, belittling their enemies, and challenging enemy leaders to duels. The results of these individual combats were apparently regarded as omens of the outcome of the battle.

However fierce that first onslaught, the ancient Celts had, according to the ancient historians, little endurance. If their first assault didn’t succeed, the Celtic forces were easy to defeat, or so the historians say. On the other hand, the historians might have been perpetuating the image of the Celts as barbarians by ascribing superior physical strength but less endurance to them, especially since endurance was regarded as one of the primary Roman virtues. Evidently, to actually defeat the Celts was not as easy as the ancient historians wanted their readers to believe, since quite a number of reports tell us that the Celts continued to fight valiantly to the end, even when the battle already was lost. Often the Celts were depicted as killing themselves and their close relatives rather than surrendering and being sold into slavery.

However, the most of the battles seem to have been rather small, involving only a few warriors on both sides. Most probably they occurred as a result of raids on neighbouring tribes, such as the raids mentioned by Caesar in the quote at the beginning of this essay, or in the Irish story of the cattle raid of Cooley. Raiding was a practice well-attested for the Irish as late as the 15th century CE. Of course, if such a raiding party were intercepted, a battle would result. We also should assume that raids were not limited to cattle but could well have targeted other valuables or slaves. Such raids, of course, brought retribution which could, of course, lead to larger military operations. Most such raids and military operations probably were taken up in late spring, when weather and agricultural necessities allowed for small and large military operations to take place.

Famous Battles and Statements of Ancient Celtic Warriors
During history, the Celts fought a number of famous battles that have been recorded by historians and, as such, have come down on us.

Immediately after their first appearance in written history, Celts came into military conflict with the Mediterranean world. After moving into the Po valley, they pushed back the Etruscans after probably defeating them in some battles. The Celts then celebrated what was probably their most famous victory. During a military campaign of the Celts against an Etruscan city in the year 390 or 387/386 BC, the Romans were called in as negotiators. During the talks, a Roman emissary killed one of the Celtic leaders. Understandably enraged, the Celts sent emissaries to Rome demanding that the murderer be handed over to them, but the Roman Senate decided not to heed their request. Upon hearing this, the Celts decided to march on Rome, defeated a Roman army on their way, and entered the city of Rome. The Romans had decided not to defend the city, but instead had retreated to the Capitol hill. The Celts lay siege to this hill for some time, until the Romans agreed to pay a high ransom. When the sum was collected, the Romans complained about the Celtic scales, claiming that they were not properly balanced. At this, a certain Brennos, leader of the Celtic army, threw his sword on the scales and exclaimed, "Vae victis" (Woe to the defeated). This defeat severely affected the Roman psyche, instilling a fear of Celtic troops marching on Rome that led them to take extreme measures as late as the 3rd century AD, when independent Celts had ceased to exist everywhere but in Scotland and Ireland, far away from Rome.

Alexander the Great encountered Celts when he arrived in the lower Danube during his campaign on the Balkans in the second half of the 4th century BC. On this occasion was made the famous statement that the Celts feared nothing but that the heavens might drop on their head; Alexander had expected to hear that they feared his military might.

In the early 3rd century BC, the Celts appeared in Greece, again led by someone named Brennos. The Celts attacked Delphi which, according to the sources, was defended successfully only because an earthquake hindered the Celts. The leader Brennos asked his close friends to kill him after he was seriously wounded in the battle. The bulk of the Celts retreated back north, but a group of them split off and crossed the Dardanelles to Asia Minor, where, after fighting a number of battles, they settled in central Anatolia.

From then on, however, the Celts were on the losing end. Northern Italy was lost during the 3rd century AD in a number of consecutive battles, the most famous of which probably was the one at Telamon in 225 BC. Though the Gaesates fought valiantly, the Celts were defeated.

In the years 58 to 52 BC Roman legions, led by Julius Caesar, conquered Gaul. In his commentary De Bello Gallico, Caesar described a number of battles that took place during this war. In the last years of the war against Rome, the Gauls more or less united under the leadership of an Avernian noble named Vercingetorix. Though Vercingetorix won some battles against Caesar (who was barely able to save his own life in the battle of Gergovia in 52 BCE), but he was finally defeated in the battle of Alesia in the same year. This effectively ended Gaulish independence.

In the second quarter of the 1st century AD the Romans conquered Britain as part of a number of relatively limited battles. The last of the famous Celtic battles for which there are records happened in Britain. First there was the rebellion under the leadership of Icenian queen Boudicca in 61 CE. Finally in the year 83 or 84 CE, the battle at Mount Graupius, assumed to be as far north as near Aberdeen in Scotland, where the Celts were defeated. This battle was the last time the Romans recorded encountering use of the Celtic chariot in battle.

From Ireland, the only records of battles are the myths, such as cattle-raid of Cooley in the Ulster Cycle. Since these are related only in the myths, we cannot be sure whether they were actual historical battles or completely belong to the realm of legend.

Conclusions
War and warfare definitely played an important role in ancient Celtic society. The nobility most probably was a warrior elite that spent considerable time training with weapons. For them, fighting and raiding were quite common occurrences. The client landowners most probably were also required to fight if and when the need arose, both to defend their own land and to attack enemies. Since they were involved in the production-cycle, they probably did not have as much training as the nobility and probably were less often involved in actual military conflicts.

[khurjan]

do you want more info peeps??? just drop me line here

[Shahed]

Salaam Khurram Sahib

That's very interesting. I am still reading through it http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif , do you study history ? btw there is a history forum called Monastary here at .org

Thanks for those posts. I am sure I will have some questions once I get to finish reading everything (should happen during the course of this working day http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif )

[khurjan]

Quote[/b] (SeljukSinan @ July 27 2003,19:08)]Salaam Khurram Sahib

That's very interesting. I am still reading through it http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif , do you study history ? btw there is a history forum called Monastary here at .org

Thanks for those posts. I am sure I will have some questions once I get to finish reading everything (should happen during the course of this working day http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif )
hey bro thanx you like my thread

actually i work as military historian for us army and i write review thesis for the cadet studies

the reason i am posting it in this forum is to give all the restless souls here a chance to read about actual units and armies and people from thattime...makes a useful guide to measure the rtw units against


i will be posting more tomorrow as its pretty late here

[Catiline]

Good stuff, but it belongs in the Monastery, so I'm moving it htere...