What if...?

[-Isapostolos-]

Having just finished Mark Whittow's: The Making of orthodox Byzantium, I started thinking about his last chapter.

In it he tells us that Basil II ended the age of reconquest of the eastern terratories to reduce the power of the powerful eastern military families and to consodilate the hold on the newly aquired teratories conquered by his (eastern family) precessors. The eastern families started relying on themselves rather then on Constantinople (which had always been the case before) which ofcourse threatened the intergraty of the empire. This was because the new economic possibilties were opened with the reconquest which were more easily exploited by the families, than by Constantinople.

Basil II had to fight 2 civil wars to keep his throne against the military families because they wanted their own Emperors on the throne. My question is what if the eastern families had won one of the civil wars? The reconquest wouldn't have been halted, so there is almost no telling how far the eastern families could have come because the muslim world was far top divided to give a fight (except maybe the Fatamids). Mosul, Allepo, Tripoli we're all easy next targets, and maybe even after that Bagdad or Samara?

On the flip side, what if Basil had it right? Political life would no longer have been centred on only Constantinople, and this had always been the Empire's survival. If this had stopped being the case a break up of the empire would have been far more likely.

IMHO these arn't unlikely fantasies, and I'm looking forward on other peoples views.

[rasoforos]

I personally think that without Bassilius the second the byzantine empiore might have crumbled to pieces much earlier. He fought wars in the East and west and the most important of all he neutralised the Buglarian threat that was devastating the western countryside.

[-Isapostolos-]

Basil didn't wage war in the east apart from the civil wars. He did enlarge the Empire, but this was more through diplomatic means (I think he inherited Lazika and Vaspurukan).

It is true that he had permantly defeated the Bulgars, but this was more thanks to the crumbling of Bulgar central authority rather than to Byzantine victories. The battle of Kleidion in 1014 which you are probaly referring to has most likely never happened, or didn't have the efeects it is described to have had. According to most people, some 15000 bulgars were blinded and sent home and the king died after seeing his army return in this way.
15000 soldiers is a way to big of a number for medieval standards, and if it had been true than it would have been a blow from which the bulgar people could hardly have recovered, but they did since the war dragged on to 1017. So Basil's title of Bulgaroctonus which he got after the battle is probaly undeserved.

But you do have a point. With the eastern offensive on hold, Byzantium finally had time to give the bulgars a kicking. The defeat of the Bulgars can't be underestimated.

[Pindar]

Under your proposed option then, Byzantium is avoiding catastrophies like Manzikert and Myriocephalum? What in the option allows for this conclusion?

[-Isapostolos-]

Quote[/b] (Pindar @ Jan. 04 2004,22:14)]Under your proposed option then, Byzantium is avoiding catastrophies like Manzikert and Myriocephalum? What in the option allows for this conclusion?
Eventually, yes these would be avoided. (btw why is Myriocephalum a catastrophy? The battle wasn't ended, and the terms the Sultan gave were quite generous)

After Basil, the warrior families were even more kept in check and the army intentionally lost alot of it's power. Thus, the empire lost many of it's experience and fighting skills and wasn't able to defeat the Turks in 1071 at Manzikert.

If the families did retain their power, the army would have been far more of a challenge for the Turks, and maybe the whole near east might have been conquered by the them. On the other hand, the balance of power may have changed to much, so a break=up within the empire could have been made possible. That's what I'm saying.

[biguth dickuth]

Quote[/b] ]
The battle of Kleidion in 1014 which you are probaly referring to has most likely never happened, or didn't have the efeects it is described to have had. According to most people, some 15000 bulgars were blinded and sent home and the king died after seeing his army return in this way.
15000 soldiers is a way to big of a number for medieval standards, and if it had been true than it would have been a blow from which the bulgar people could hardly have recovered, but they did since the war dragged on to 1017. So Basil's title of Bulgaroctonus which he got after the battle is probaly undeserved.

During his reign, Basil II reorganized the army and the empire had a theoretical alltogether fighting force of 200,000-250,000 men.
Of course that was, as i said, theoretical but he was usually able to raise armies of 70,000-80,000 men.
The bulgars had, if not so big then, comparativelly bulky armies too.
So 15,000 bulgarian prisoners may had been a large number for the western medieval world but not for the eastern one.

As for the eastern military families, you should know that they had assembled so great estates and wealth that the traditional "thematic" organization of the army was crumbling because most people had no land of their own anymore and were forced to work as underpaid workers in the landlords' great estates.
Therefore, in addition to the Constaninople bureaucrats' lack of interest to the armies, the byzantine army of the time consisted mainly of untrained, unarmored and inequiped peasants.
The great landlords of the military families had their own small personal armies of mercenaries.
The situation in the east of the empire was starting to shift towards feudalism.
Basil II halted this procedure and tried to revive the "thematic" organization.
However, the change was irreversible and after his death the situation deteriorated with the constant civil wars between the bureaucrats in Constantinople and the military families in the east.

It is interesting that Romanos, the emperor who was defeated in Manzikert, was a landlord and was crowned with the support of the military families.
His army consisted of, the central army of constantinople, untrained peasants who were the remains of the "thematic" army, mercenaries of all kinds and some allies like the armenians.

To make a long story short, my opinion is that the concentration of vast lands and tremendous wealth in the hands of a few military families and the indifference of the officials in constantinople for the people in the east as well as their antagonism with the military families, led, not only to the literal starving of most of the peasants in the east, but also to the almost total dismantling of the eastern armies and the increased use of mercenaries.

Under those circumstances, even if the military families had taken over command of the empire long before 1070(i think...), when Romanos was crowned emperor, they wouldn't have gone too far with their mercenary armies.
Remember that their first encounter and defeat by the seljuks was in the mid-11th century, while they were...expanding in the lands of modern Iran
As history showed, it was way too far for them.

[-Isapostolos-]

Quote[/b] ]During his reign, Basil II reorganized the army and the empire had a theoretical alltogether fighting force of 200,000-250,000 men.
Of course that was, as i said, theoretical but he was usually able to raise armies of 70,000-80,000 men.
The bulgars had, if not so big then, comparativelly bulky armies too.
So 15,000 bulgarian prisoners may had been a large number for the western medieval world but not for the eastern one.

This is known to be complete medieval exageration. Those kind of numbers were used as court propaganda and can never be seriously be taken into account. Reliable sources show that Anglo-Saxon England could muster about 14000 troops, but a campaign army could never hope to reach be this size.

Much can be said the same about eastern Europe. Byzantium was only a mediocre power in comparison to Islamic caliphate, which was a superpower. But even they could only muster about 100000 troops. The number of 200000 is absolutely outragous. These are numbers for Rome not Byzantium.

Anway. Few pay lists for soldiers and the like have survived, but in Constantine Porphyrogenitos' Di Ceremonis he tells us of the numbers of soldiers he sent to Crete on expedition in 947. Now Constantine needed a victory to consodilate his rule at court so he needed all the soldiers he could get. Numbers show that these were about 10000, and this was in the age of reconquest of Byzantiu,

Anyway back to the topic, the eastern families were alot more powerful at the end of the 10th century then they were at the end of the 11th. In the 10th they had the backing of the powerful and organized eastern armies, acces to loot from raiding and conquest, lots of valuable contacts in and outside the borders of byzantium and powerful allies.

The families of the 11th century had were indeed quite sloppy, but that was only thanks to Basil and his succesors policy of keeping the army at a low profile and thus the families aswel...

You shouldn't confuse the family's power in the different time frames, because as I have told that wasn't always the same.

Still IMHO, The families we're very capable of conquering the east, although unstability might have followed after more conquests...

[biguth dickuth]

The 200,000 soldiers number was not an exaggeration.
It includes every single soldier in the lands of the empire, even the ones in castle garissons and the "lowest", poorest peasant that could be conscripted at the hour of extreme need. The adequately armed, armoured and trained cavalry of the "themata" was only a few tens of thousands at the time.
Of course, i agree that this number was never reached (it was "theoretical") and so the troop number varied according to the size of the campain. Constantinos Porphyrogennitos may have used 10,000 men in Crete but Nicephorus Phocas used something like 100,000 men to recapture Antioch.
About ancient Rome, in its peak it could retain a total of almost 500,000 men in its entire region.

On the subject, i believe that if the military families had taken over earlier than they did, they could have conquered the entire middle east, perhaps more. However, they would eventually go into another civil war and when the seljuks would come, the byzantines would experience the same kind of defeat. Their only chance would be, perhaps, to stay on the defensive along natural borders like mountains and rivers (like the older romans had done along the river Rhein). But the Byzantines wanted to revive the old dream of world domination and that would not lead to victory against a people of able warriors and raging pillagers with such a momentum.

About Basil II, he didn't keep the army at low profile. Instead, he reorganised it. His successors, however, did, in order to keep the landlords at bay.

Ooh I was wrong about Romanus Diogenis. He became emperor in 1067, not 1070. By the way, his army at Manzikert was about 50-60,000 men.

[kataphraktoi]

Quick Byz stats:

At 1025, the army was estimated max to be 250,000 soldiers. The most ever mobilised was 40,000 - 50,000 when one frontier had to be denuded to concentrate on the other frontier.

Methinks Basil II brought meaning back to the word "Emperor" which also meant commander in chief of the armed forces. He did not blunt the empire's military edge. In fact he ensured its stability and a healthy respect for authority. He improved the peasants lot some of whom were soldier-farmers with once inalienable grants of land.
Under Basil II, there were first class generals in Constantine Diogenes, Nicephorus Uranus, Basil Boiannes.
The military nobles were responsible for instability in the empire's history, in fact they showed their military capabilities by betraying Romanus at Manzikert and fighting a civil in Anatolia and inviting the parasitic Turkomans as mercenaries. Basil demonstrated that the Emperor should always be the head of the army, his successors were all incompetent.

I've run out of bile.

[-Isapostolos-]

Let me Quote something from Mark Whittow's book:

A mid 6th century lawyer in Constantinople wrote this about the size of the army (so the army during Justinian's reign)


Quote[/b] ]Whereas there should have been a total effective force of 645000 men (Roman empire size), the number had dropped... to barely 150000. Some of these moreover were stationed in Italy, others in Africa, others in Spain, others in the Caucasus, and others in Egypt. There were also a few near the eastern frontier with Persia

Let me now quote a part we're he tells us of the size of the army during the age of reconquest:


Quote[/b] ]Similary, one of the oldest and largets themes, Thrakesion, only numbers 1000 men in 911 and 950 men in 949 (both important Crete expeditions). Clearly 17000 men in 911 and 10000 in 949 represents for the Byzantine Empire very large forces ineed. The figure of 120000 is out of all proportions with the rest of the evidence

Now this should prove that even the Eastern roman super power couldn't muster the enormous amount of men of theoratical 200000 or now the number of 50000-60000 you describe at Manzikert or the 100000 at Antioch (which was about 2 decades later than Constantine VII).

Basil II did stabilise, but he also stagnated the offensive. With the decline of the eastern families through Basil, the army declined along with them. If the eastern families had remained in power and Basil would have lost, they would probaly have been alot more capable of stopping the Turks.

Basil was a soldier Emporer, but even though he meant well with taking down the families, he had set a trent for his succesors, making it too easy for them to keep the families in check and holding the army at a low profile.

Even though the families caused lots of instability and mayhem, they were also the ones that made the reconquest possible. It wasn't the emporer in Constantinople that reconquered the east, it was the military prowness of the families that granted the Byzantine empire it's revival. I think we shouldn't forget that, because they deserve all the credit.

[kataphraktoi]

Isopostolos,

I agree with you about the military families, but between the lesser and greater evil, the military families were surely the greater evil. Byzantium's offensives coincided with the rapacious grab for the soldier's military lands, theoretically inalienable by the military families. Example, John Kurkuas, one of the great generals was one of these officers who participated in the exploitation of soldier's land for their own gratification. The soldiers owed the commander loyalty rather than the state which is a dangerous precedent.

If Basil did not stop their rate of exactions, a cantonisation of the empire would have been possible even causing civil war as the one seen after Manzikert. The civil war was not between the civil admin and the military families but between military families who ruined the empire's strengh.

Although I have to admit, I would have liked the miltary families to rule as Emperors under better circumstances.
I often wonder how far the reconquests would have been.

Egypt? Jerusalem? Sicily? Rome?

Tomorrow I pick up a book about Byz armies. Yipeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

[kataphraktoi]

Hmm concerning Basil stagnating offensive. I believe he added a new dimension to the Byzantine offensive. While some of us know that his "offensives" were not really offensives, they demonstrate that the Byzantine army was capable of offensives. The lightning conquests of Nicephorus and Tzimickes were not fully consolidated until the reign og Basil. SO while Basil did indeed stagnate offensive, he stagnated superficil offensive and added consolidated offensive to the equation. The fact that borders of Phocas and Tzimickes fluctuated while Basil's was relatively stable until Manzikert made Basil a greate offensive general than the last two.

I still wish Basil had an heir............

I was racking my brain about the numbers and realised I qouted the wrong number, instead of 250,000, it was half that. 125,000 sounds bout right.

I had a chew over of Justinian's 150,000 strong army. I wonder if the smallness of their numbers was due to the expensive payment of tribute to various "allies" or "foederati". A considerable portion of state expenditure was spent on this.

Whereas in Basil's time, squeezing tribute would be like squeezin milk from a rock. Also, there were numerous soldiers in reserve being paid in debased coinage(Since Nic Phocas II) compared to active soldiers with better quality nomismata.

My sources are mainly from Warren Treadgold who devotes a considerable amount of time deriving approx/ figures of the Byzantium's armies.

He argues that at least 80% of Byzantium's army in 6th and early 7century was preserved during the Arab invasions. 80,000 - 90,000 and maintained by payment of salaries and hereditary land for military service. He also points out that paying a soldier after Justinian was easier than under Justinian. Which could mean the ability to pay for more soldiers. So the empire in a reasonable time of 300 years increased its armies by 30%. The increase would have been possible with the new territories gained and which doubled the empire's size.

125,000 would have to be from:

- Rise of the Tagmatic corps
- Mercenaries (extensive recruitment during the offensives)
- Active soldiers
- Soldiers in reserve (a great number)

So for Byzantium to muster anything greater than 60,000 at a time would have been difficult in the reconquest era. But I still believe 40,000 - 50,000 is possible, but most historians settle on 30,000 as the average size of deployment.

100,000 at Manzikert is even unbelievable....not even the Byzantine state could afford this in the late 1060's..

[-Isapostolos-]

Quote[/b] (kataphraktoi @ Jan. 16 2004,10:04)]I agree with you about the military families, but between the lesser and greater evil, the military families were surely the greater evil.
Yes I think I agree with your statement. In the end the Basil's stabilisation was necessary, otherwise the newly conquered territories might never have been consolidated. But I still think that Basil should have been succeeded by an aggressive warrior Emperor, so preferably one from the military families. After more conquests, another ‘Basil’ should have risen, and consolidated his predecessor’s achievements.

And then we could have asked ourselves the question how far they would have come, while still keeping the Empire’s integrity. Alas it was not to be. I seriously think that Islam would have fallen, if the reconquest would have been made complete.

One way or the other I think the period of reconquest was one of those major turn points in history; it could have gone either way.

Anyway, I need to get my meal now, I will reply to your second post shortly afterwards.

[-Isapostolos-]

Mark Whittow, who also spends quite some time describing the size of Byzantine armies, and stresses the fact that you can't just take any medieval military number for granted, only when comparing the numbers with similarly strong nations, could you possibly make an estimate.

Anyway, the number I used for Justinian’s armies, was the army at full strength. Ancient/Medieval super powers didn’t get any bigger than this. Supposedly that Byzantine armies were indeed sized between 50000-100000, how could the Bulgar menace ever have taken it’s roots if it didn’t have anything near the same number as Byzantium had? Bulgaria also only had armies in thousands, just like Byzantium did. The Byzantines probably had more men, but thanks to the Byzantine priorities in the east and the natural defences of the Haimos mountains, Bulgars usually had the upper hand. I guess the same could be said about the Byzantines withholding the Arabs with help from the Taurus mountains, although most of the credit goes to their military capabilities.

I’m interested about the 80% of the armies surviving the Arab conquest. Mark Whittow says that you can’t be sure how many soldiers survived, but it couldn’t be allot. Even though they might actually have survived most were disbanded, since the empire wasn’t able to pay them, contradicting with what you are saying.

I find it hard to believe that Justinian had a more a difficult time paying relatively less soldiers, than any Emperors from the 7th-8th centuries onwards paying theirs. Remember the Empire had lost it’s most valuable provinces, so paying big (super power) armies would logically be very difficult. Thus, the surviving armies were split up between four themes, Opsikion, Thrakesion, Armenikion and another I don’t recall. Only because of Arab overconfidence and inexperience at sea did the Empire manage to survive, not because it had a similarly sized army as the Arabs.

Believe it or not but the Tagma’s were also only a 1000 men at best and needed to be combined with other themes to get this size, while foreign soldiers were in their 100’s or non at all. 30000 soldiers would be the biggest size of the army after the 7th century, but not any bigger and probably smaller. Considering that the biggest campaign army is 17000, the rest would garrisons and reserves.

Considering that at Manzikert the army was in decline I can’t imagine the actual fighting army (so without the disloyal Armenians) being any bigger than 15000.

Anyway, what book are you purchasing about Byzantine armies. Do you have a link maybe?

[kataphraktoi]

My sources are from Warren Treadgold's two books.
Unfortunately, i cannot remember the titles accurately.
But links there are but not to online copies of the book, but on sale at amazon.
http://www.amazon.com/exec....=507846 (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0804726302/qid=1074350994//ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i2_xgl14/103-0647795-7467818?v=glance&s=books&n=507846)

http://www.amazon.com/exec....=507846 (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0804724202/qid=1074350994//ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i4_xgl14/103-0647795-7467818?v=glance&s=books&n=507846)

Another source is Osprey's Byzantine armies 886 - 1118 with a good discussion on the size of the army.

My arguments to believe Justinian could not pay for more soldiers:

- Expensive tribute to enemies and "allies"
- The Bubonic plague that reduced the population and hence taxable population
- The reconquest was a neutral gain for the empire mrerely increasing burdens rather than relieving
- Ruinous wars

Basically, even with rich provinces like Egypt and the east, their richness was neutralised by unlucky and unfortunate events during Justinian's reign.

The Byzantine empire after Justinian was able to afford the armies that they did because of:

- low pay until doubled under Theophilus in the 9th cent.
- new sources of gold discovered (in Armenia under Theophilus)
- recovery of Asia Minor
- Efficieny distribution of wealth to the soldiers on a cheaper basis than before

Byzantines were able to save 80% of their forces because:

Of the shifting and preservation of forces to defendable limits hence we have the name of the themes of the Opsikion, Anatolikon, Thracesion, Cibbyraeots and Armeniakon.

Thracesion - army of Thrace
Armeniakon - army of Armenia
Anatolikon - amalgamation of units residing in the former praesental armies
Opsikion - mixture of forces

These armies can be traced to Justinian's period

Therefore, the 80% preserved was part of a deliberate policy of preservation under Byzantine emperors beginning with Heraclius.

I agree with the sentiment that to keep an armyof at least 90,000 soldiers from the 150,000 under Justinian is hard to believe, but Treadgold's arguments were quite convincing.

Ian Heath of Osprey fame mentions from several sources and that the Tagmatic armies ranged from 6000 - 24,000. In military treatises a force of 8000 tagmatic troopers accompanying the Emperor was considered "normal". Even when the number is toned down, the Tagmata was easily over 1000 with 6000, a reasonable minimum for the size of such elite warriors divided amongst the several regiments of the Tagmata.

The book I purchased was Romano-Byzantine armies 4th - 9th century. They are good for citing sources but not much after that in terms of narrative and the plates, the plates