What's so good about Hannibal?

[kataphraktoi]

Who's a better general than Hannibal, I read in a commentary that some consider Hannibal to the greatest general of all time.

What so great about what Hannibal did?

[Red Peasant]

Why does it make you so mad?

It would be more interesting for you to tell us why you think he wasn't a good general.

[magnatz]

Well, Hannibal deserves a lot of respect for winning some battles against the Romans in their own country, which is quite an accomplishment in itself.

But the greatest general ever ? no way.

[The_Emperor]

When you look at the statistics, Hannibal's invasion of Italy during the Second Punic War seemed to be completely suicidal in nature.

In major battles he was outnumbered by the Romans, stranded in a hostile land with no hope of retreat, reinforcement or even supply.

Strategically it was a great move because the Romans expected the War to be fought in Iberia, and they dispatched a force to fight him there... Hannibal then crossed the Alps (no small achievement in itself because of Barbarian tribes and the rugged terrain) and invaded Northern Italy, forcing his enemy onto the defensive.

By the time of the battle of Cannae Hannibal had 40,000 men, but the Romans Advanced with around 80,000. Their plan was to just march through the enemy with brute force and smash them... The Romans had the superior infantry, and the Superior numbers.

Hannibal's army was made up of Gauls Spaniards, Greeks Numidians and Lybians, men from cultures who seemingly had nothing in common, yet Hannibal managed to use all of these troops under one command and break-down the language barrier. At the time that is also quite an accomplishment

Hannibal knew the Romans would march through his Army (they did so at Trebbia) So he did a double-envelopment by moving his pikemen around to the sides while withdrawing his central front line, which was mainly made up of the unreliable Celts. His superior cavalry quickly saw off the Romans and hit the Roman lines from the rear... trapped on all sides and hemmed in by their numbers with no room to maneuver the Romans were massacred.

Only 15,000 Romans escaped death or capture; the survivors were placed in two special legions that were forced to remain under service in Sicily for the duration of the war, as a punishment for their failure. The carthaginians had lost about 6,000 men, mostly Iberians and Gauls.

In total Hannibal waged war in Italy for Sixteen years with the same group of men, Defectors from the other Italian people were his only meathod of re-enforcing his numbers. During that time Scipio conquered Spain and pushed into North Africa, the Carthaginians in Italy were forced to return to defend their homeland, but they were defeated when some of the Numidians sided with the Romans and unexpectedly turned on the Carthaginian army...

While Hannibal is not in my view the greatest commander who ever lived, he certainly has come close, and you can't fault his victories.

[Nelson]

Hannibal was smart tactician and brilliant motivator. His great mistakes were underestimating Roman stubbornness and not preparing for a siege of the Eternal City.

In his defense, he could never have guessed that after thrashing the Romans so soundly in their own backyard AND marching around Italy for years that the boys from Latium would not yield.

[magnatz]

BTW, this site has an excellent timeline of the Punic Wars and all the contemporary events:
http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/timeline-before%20-punic1.htm

[Rosacrux]

Excellent post The_Emperor, sums up the crucial points of Hannibal Barka's success.

I would rank him upon the greatest tacticians of all times (second only to Alexander IMNSHO in the ancient times) but as a strategist he was a failure. He didn't sack Rome (allthough he had his shot after Cannae) he couldn't get enough Latin cities (despite them dislike the Romans) to join his side and he did lose Karthago in the end. Not to mention that those who took him as a council afterwards, failed miserably...

But put him in the battlefield and give him a decent and reliable force to fight with... he just can't lose.

[The_Emperor]

Quote[/b] (Rosacrux @ Jan. 16 2004,22:10)]Excellent post The_Emperor, sums up the crucial points of Hannibal Barka's success.

I would rank him upon the greatest tacticians of all times (second only to Alexander IMNSHO in the ancient times) but as a strategist he was a failure. He didn't sack Rome (allthough he had his shot after Cannae) he couldn't get enough Latin cities (despite them dislike the Romans) to join his side and he did lose Karthago in the end. Not to mention that those who took him as a council afterwards, failed miserably...

But put him in the battlefield and give him a decent and reliable force to fight with... he just can't lose.
Thanks Rosacrux.

I agree that on the battlefield he was a great general who knew who to sacrifice and who to spare.

Strategically his mistake (as Polybius puts it) was to begin his greatest enterprise with the Romans. Had he took the time to marshall his forces and consolidate his power before he struck against Rome, Carthage would have been victorious.

But yeah a great battlefield commander.

[kataphraktoi]

I find it hard to believe Hannibal was so highly regard when there are better generals than he.

For example, I will present the case of an underestimated general whose achievements were taken for granted.

Heraclius, 21st Emperor of Byzantium

Inherited an empire which had lost the Balkans in the face of Avar and Slav aggression. In the east, the Sassanid Persians were running roughshod over the demoralised Roman armies. A Persian vanguard had reached Chalcedon. Roman Mesopotamia, Armenia and parts of Syria were occupied.

Heraclius overthrew the incompetent Phocas who was apathetic in the face of a crumbling empire.

Under Heraclius, the surviving Roman army could not hold off the Persians and lost Palestine and Egypt simpl because of Phocas's degradation of the army. WHat did Heraclius do? He reformed the army by recruiting extensively from the remaning empire's natives.

From AD 620 onwards, Heraclius launched 6 campaigns against the Persians.

Heraclius decided on a strategy which some modern commentators approve off with thumbs up: Instead of awar of attrition, Heraclius decided to take the battle into the heart of Persia to force a decisive defeat of the Sassanids and recover the lost provinces at a stroke.

Heraclius amazingly never commanded an army until his campaigns against the Persians and never lost one battle.

He penetrated deep into Persia (as far as Isfahan) and campaigned inside Persian territory while skillfully maintaining communications with his capital from so far a distance through Trebizond.

At the battle of Nineveh AD 627, Heraclius annihilated the Persian army. The Sassanids sued for peace and returned Roman territory.

Heraclius also recovered the true cross relic and Jersualem as well. First Crusader??

In terms of administrative reform, Heraclius laid the basis for the Thematic organisation that was to be elaborated under his successors. This machinery was to last for 800 more years.

While it is true, his conquests were lost. He did not command the forces that resisted the Arabs. What do u expect from an old man with a mental and physical disease?

While Hannibal's efforts were useless to the Carthaginian state, Heraclius's efforts were not in vain. He rescued a hopeless situation that could have resulted in the fall of the Byzantine Empire and transformed hopelessness into a chance. His army though badly mauled under leser men were preserved and formed the basis of the future Byzantine army under military emperors such as Nicephorus II, Tzimickes and Basil II. This was quite an achievement considering the poor state of the army when he took the crown.

If Heraclius had died after his Persian campaigns, he would have been listed as one of the greats, but due to short-sightedness by many historians and the poor attention given to so important as the 7th century that Heraclius suffers from the conspiracy of silence.

His generalship until the end remained intact.

Phew.

[The Wizard]

Personally I agree with Nelson and The Emperor.

While no general of the age could have defeated him on the battlefield (Scipio won because of a defection of his all-important Numidians and because of a fluke on Hannibal's side, sending his elephants in relatively recklessly, and a huge stroke of luck), his stragetical image was inferior to that of his father, Hamilcar. He managed to get himself trapped in Italy, fighting like a lion but doomed to fail, and with such weak allies as the Macedonians, what can one expect?
Perhaps if he had consolidated his holdings in Iberia better (effectively, the brothers Scipio just marched right past Hannibal's 100,000 man strong army, at the beginning), and had posted better generals there, as well as having increased the size of the Cathaginian navy to defeat the Romans (the Carthaginian navy was a very important part of the Carthaginian forces), he might have recieved supplies, reinforcements and siege equipment to make his final strike, a stab into the very heart of the Republic. Failing to do so left him unable to capitalize on his greatest victories, and eventually led to his defeat at Zama, leading an inferior force to the Romans (less well armed than the Romans and less experienced motivated than both Scipio's forces and his own forces as they had been in Italy).

So, Anibal Barka was a superior tactician, but a lousy strategist. It did lead to the fact that the Romans were afraid of him forever (in the Colloseum, large games always had the imitation of Zama), and there is no denying that in the end, the elements and, to a lesser degree the Gauls, killed more of his troops than the Romans

http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-toff.gif

P.S. What generals do you view as better than Hannibal then, besides Heraclius (not just directed at kataphraktoi http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif)

[magnatz]

Hmm, I have the utmost respect for Hannibal's military accomplishments, but he is far from being the greatest commander ever. Actually he reminds me of Erwin Rommel : charismatic leader, formidable fighter, great tactician, bad strategist, ultimately doomed by lack of reinforcements.

As for a alphabetized and probably incomplete selection of "classic age generals at least as good as Hannibal and arguabily better", what about:

- Alexander
- Belisarius
- Caesar
- Heraclius

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]Actually he reminds me of Erwin Rommel : charismatic leader, formidable fighter, great tactician, bad strategist, ultimately doomed by lack of reinforcements.

ROTFL http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-jester.gif You surelly got to be joking http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-stunned.gif

You can't make direct comparations with Rommel and Anibal. It is just uncomparable.

Let me explain. In Ancient Times the General's power to influence state decisions and his responsability and liberty of action, cannot be compared to the WW2.

Rommel served under the Wermacht, which was subordinated to the High Command, which was under the rule of Hitler. He couldn't influenciate Strategic decisions whatsoever

He had lack of reinforcements due to the incompetence of the German High Command and a very active Royal Navy.
The English knew the war in Africa could influence the fate of the war. They were right.

In fact, Rommel had strategic plans that he could never implement, due to the High Command's and Hitler's short-sightedness.

Anibal was supreme commander of the Carthaginian forces and all strategic plans were his decisions

Have you read Rommel's memoires?

[magnatz]

I am fully aware of the different context of WW2 and PW2, but the analogies I made still stand. Both generals were charismatic figures idolized by the troops, both were great fighters, both were good tactics, both were bad strategists, both carried the war deep into enemy territory against all expectations, both ultimately lost because of logistic issues.
Moreover, both generals were respected and feared by the enemy.

Of course Rommel wasn't personally in charge of WW2, but he was allowed enough slack to actually disobey a direct order by Hitler, such as the last man stand at El Alamein. And Rommels' strategic plans - ie the continent wide pincer movement on Caucasus - were far removed from reality. The one strategic decision that Rommel was allowed to make, ie to ditch the invasion of Malta and launch a head-on attack on Egypt instead, is commonly considered as one of the greatest military screwups ever.

And BTW in Africa Rommel did not serve under the Wermacht. He was subordinated to the Italian Comando Supremo and - while being in command of both the German and Italian troops - he himself was under the orders of a Italian general (first Bastico, then Cavallero). Rommel actually had to appeal personally to Hitler when he wanted his superiors' orders countermanded, which happened quite often.

Ok, so Hannibal didn't have this particular problem, but his Macedonian allies were nothing to write home about either http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]And Rommels' strategic plans - ie the continent wide pincer movement on Caucasus - were far removed from reality.
Not with his tactical genius and good support. Although impossible with the Royal Navy's supremacy in the Mediterranean.




Quote[/b] ]The one strategic decision that Rommel was allowed to make, ie to ditch the invasion of Malta and launch a head-on attack on Egypt instead, is commonly considered as one of the greatest military screwups ever.
Was he responsible? I think not

Besides, Egypt was a fulcral point on the British war effort.




Quote[/b] ]And BTW in Africa Rommel did not serve under the Wermacht.
Yes, I know. I was, inicially, talking about his role in France.




Quote[/b] ]He was subordinated to the Italian Comando Supremo and - while being in command of both the German and Italian troops - he himself was under the orders of a Italian general (first Bastico, then Cavallero). Rommel actually had to appeal personally to Hitler when he wanted his superiors' orders countermanded, which happened quite often.

Of course. With those pompous "geniuses"... http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-rolleyes.gif

[Math Mathonwy]

Quote[/b] ]I would rank him upon the greatest tacticians of all times (second only to Alexander IMNSHO in the ancient times) but as a strategist he was a failure. He didn't sack Rome (allthough he had his shot after Cannae) he couldn't get enough Latin cities (despite them dislike the Romans) to join his side and he did lose Karthago in the end. Not to mention that those who took him as a council afterwards, failed miserably... I think that Alexander was definitely the most successful commander of all time, but i must say that Hannibal was the better tactican.

[magnatz]

Quote[/b] ]Not with his tactical genius and good support. Although impossible with the Royal Navy's supremacy in the Mediterranean.
That was hardly a tactical manouver, and anyway the Wermacht didn't have a fraction of the resources needed to invade the Middle East and march on to the Caucasus. The concept made sense, but the implementation was impossible.



Quote[/b] ]
Was he responsible? I think not

Hell yes. In May 1942 Rommel flew personally to Berlin to persuade Hitler to overrule the restraining orders set on him by Ugo Cavallero and Kesselring. After the meeting with Rommel Hitler wrote to Mussolini and asked him to ditch Malta and go for Egypt instead. The episode is well known and well documented. Check out:
- any biography of Rommel.
- any military history of the North-Africa campaign.
- the memories of Ciano, Cavallero and Kesselring, probably others too. BTW after the war Kesselring referred to the Malta decision as "the one big blunder".
- the text of the letter that Hitler wrote to Mussolini in support of the invasion of Egypt.



Quote[/b] ]
Besides, Egypt was a fulcral point on the British war effort.

Absolutely. But Rommel couldn't have possibly taken Egypt while the English fleet in Malta was cutting his supply lines. Tactical genius can't replace strategy and logistic.

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]That was hardly a tactical manouver, and anyway the Wermacht didn't have a fraction of the resources needed to invade the Middle East and march on to the Caucasus. The concept made sense, but the implementation was impossible.

Precisely, it was a strategical manouver. But yes, the implementation was impossible.




Quote[/b] ]Hell yes. In May 1942 Rommel flew personally to Berlin to persuade Hitler to overrule the restraining orders set on him by Ugo Cavallero and Kesselring. After the meeting with Rommel Hitler wrote to Mussolini and asked him to ditch Malta and go for Egypt instead. The episode is well known and well documented. Check out:
- any biography of Rommel.
- any military history of the North-Africa campaign.
- the memories of Ciano, Cavallero and Kesselring, probably others too. BTW after the war Kesselring referred to the Malta decision as "the one big blunder".
- the text of the letter that Hitler wrote to Mussolini in support of the invasion of Egypt.
OK. I won't argue any more.




Quote[/b] ]Absolutely. But Rommel couldn't have possibly taken Egypt while the English fleet in Malta was cutting his supply lines. Tactical genius can't replace strategy and logistic.
Well, he was desperate. If he could have conquered Egypt, the Royal Navy's domain in the Mediterranean would amount to nothing. That was what he was hopping for. Egypt was the the most important British stronghold in North Africa and the Middle East. A decisive win would terminate British domain there. Besides, he always fought outnumbered, with short supplies, sometimes stealing them from the captured forces and he invariably defeated the British. He had the hope to keep on pushing.

[magnatz]

To be fair Rommel did support the invasion of Malta, until he found out that Kesselring planned to move the Luftwaffe's X Fliegerkorps from Sicily to the Eastern Front after the invasion , which would have left the Afrika Korps in deep Scheiße. So he did have at least one very valid "political" reason to insist for the Egypt plan.

Interdepartimental squabbles are definitely another issue that Hannibal didn't have to deal with with...

[FoundationII]

I totally agree with The Emperor

[Michiel de Ruyter]

Quote[/b] ]
As for a alphabetized and probably incomplete selection of "classic age generals at least as good as Hannibal and arguabily better", what about:

- Alexander
- Belisarius
- Caesar
- Heraclius


First of all, this is a hard thing to discuss, as all 5 commanders involved lived in quite a different era, involving quite different troops....

But then, Hannibals main strength, IMHO was reading the mind and method of the opposing commanders on a tactical/operational level. And he used this to his advantage during the whole war. AFAIK up untill Zama he never lost a battle. Basically the only troops he had that could be used to his advantage, as they were superior to his opponent, were his cavalry troops, most notably the Numidians.

Now I'll give you my not so humble opinions http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif....

Hannibal vs Alexander: Alexander would in most likelyhood be trounced. Alexander was way too reckless. Issos was the consequence of an operational f*** (though on both sides) and he was forced to fight. Luckily at Issos the terrain did favor him. Most importantly tough, Darios lost his nerve when Alexander attacked. Had he sent in reinforcements to halt Alexander, his right wing could well have overwhelmed the Macedonian left wing, and all would be over. Gaugamela is a similar story. Alexander nearly got himself killed a number of times, and relied heavily on his subcommander, Parmenion....
Hannibal certainly would have used Alexanders aggressiveness to his advantage, like he did towards the Romans.

IMHO the main difference between Alexander and Hannibal is that the Roman Empire, unnlike the Persian, did not collapse under the massive defeats inflicted upon it.

Hannibal vs Ceasar: On a tactical level IMHO not even close. Caesar was defeated at Gergovia, almost somewhere in Belgium (on the Sambre river), and won Alesia by the skin of his teeth. And all against an opponent that was inferior to the Roman army in pretty much all except numbers. Ceasar was very good at an operational/strategic level. In the civil war things again were pretty close, even though he had the better troops, and the opponent suffered big time from a divided and chaotic command (not that dissimilar from the German high command in WW II). It is a testament of his abilities though that he made good use of it.

Do note that some of the most important information on his millitary exploits was written by himself.

Hannibal vs Belisarius and Hannibal vs Heraclius: I do not know enough about either Belisarius and Heraclius to even start commenting on them... but then again, I somehow feel that if the difference in the quality of troops would not be too big he might well have beaten them...

As far as Hannibal himself goes... He knew that Zama would be a slugging match, and that he commanded inferior troops... Also, if his brother had made it to him with the reinforcements to Italy, and had not been defeated at the Metaurus, things could have been very different... as this might have given him the possibility to pin down and destroy the Roman troops remaining in Italy, and given the forcesneeded for sieges... Which could have led to the defection of more Roman allies, and the recall of scipio, and might well have prevented the Numidians from defecting... I think that for that reason, the Poke list has this battle as one of the 15 most decisive in the Western world up untill and including Waterloo.

The others on this list:

Marathon, 490 B.C: The Athenians defeat the Persians, against all odds.
Arbela / Gaugamela, 331 B.C: Alexander defeats the Persians, which means the end of the empire.
Teutoburger forest 9. A.D: the Roman conquest of northern Europe is checked (Vare Vare Redde mihi legiones ).
Chalons / Catalaunian Fields, 451 A.D: Aetius with a mixed force defats attila the Hun, and checks their advance into Western Europe.
Tours, 732 A.D: Charles Martel checks the advance of the Muslim hordes into western Europe.
Hastings, 1066 A.D: England becomes Norman.
Orleans, 1429 A.D: turning point in the Hundred Years War.
Spanish Armada, 1588 A.D: A last ditch effort to impose Spanish hegemony over Europe. As a direct consequence, they lose the revolting Dutch provinces, and strengthen France and England.
Blenheim, 1704 A.D: Turning point in the war of Austrian Succession. Louis XIV ambitions are thwarted, and the French turned back.
Poltava, 1709 A.D: Sweden's power is destroyed, and Russia becomes the big power in Eastern Europe, and becomes one of the worlds big boys.
saratoga, 1777 A.D: turning point in the US War of Independence.
Valmy, 1792 A.D: The French Revolution is saved.
[/list]

[magnatz]

Quote[/b] (Michiel de Ruyter @ Jan. 18 2004,09:43)]First of all, this is a hard thing to discuss, as all 5 commanders involved lived in quite a different era, involving quite different troops....
[...(snip)...]
Absolutely. But I was answering a specific question "What generals do you view as better than Hannibal then, besides Heraclius", so I had to pick up some names... at least I left modern generals out so we don't have to discuss Napoleon http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif

My list was based more on the known accomplishments, rather than on a hypotetic head-on confrontation (for one thing we would be comparing the generals *and* their armies/equipment/doctrine).

I mostly agree with your analysis of Alexander vs Hannibal, however I don't think that Caesar was that bad... ok, the campaign against Gauls is somewhat overstated, but the civil wars are a completely different matter. Caesar's underpowered army had to fight his way all around the Mediterranean against Roman legions commanded by the likes of Pompey and Labienus, and that was hardly a cakewalk. This is a short selection of the main battles of the Civil Wars (I left out the Egyptian civil war)

Dyrrhachium-Lesnikia,Illyria,48BC
This one is a tactical nightmare. The armies were practically besieging each other along two lines of heavily fortified hills along the Illyrian coast. Pompey has the numbers and the position, his cavalry is superior and his fleet is blockading the Adriatic and can land troops behind Caesar lines. Caesar decides not to accept the battle, and attires Pompey's army in the plain of Pharsalus instead.
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Battle-of-Dyrrhachium

Pharsalus,Thessaly August 9, 48BC
Both armies are virtually wedged between a river and rocky heights, Pompey not only outnumbers Caesar in legions, but his cavalry is far superior to the small mounted force Caesar can bring to bear. Both opponents have several crack legions, but the legions of Caesar are more loyal. Caesar wins.
http://www.atrium-media.com/bibliotheca/romanhistory/pharsalus.html

Thapsus,Africa,46BC
Here Caesar fights the low-rate Senatorial army led by Metellus Scipio, reinforced by over 60 elephants, *and* a second army of almost 40,000 men, under King Juba of Numidia, *and* has Lucius Afranius threatening his back. Caesar wins.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Thapsus

Ruspina,Africa,46BC
Caesar leads a small army of 30 cohorts, with minimal cavalry support, inland in North Africa in search of supplies to sustain his African venture. What they find is Titus Labienus with almost 10,000 Numidian cavalry, and perhaps double that in infantry support, both using a new method of fighting (light cavalry and javelin-armed skirmishers in the front rank) that threatens to engulf Caesar in a repeat of Crassus's disastrous defeat at Carrhae. Caesar manages to retire in good order, albeit with heavy losses.
http://www.lbdb.com/TMDisplayBattle.cfm?BID=271&WID=66

Munda,Spain,45BC
Gnaeus Pompeius has gathered the strongest army of the war, some 13 legions, and massed it on top of a formidable ridge. Caesar has only eight elite legions. Caesar wins.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Munda

Caesar article on Wikipedia:
http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_Caesar

Next time Belisarius, my favorite general ever http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/smile.gif

[The Wizard]

Could you add something about Narses too? This general continued after Belisarius, and did better on the stragetical level as well, for he did listen to his diplomatical superior, the Emperor. Belisarius did not and subsequently, Northern Italy was lost to the Longobards. I admire and greatly respect Belisarius, but that was a fluke of epic proportions.

[magnatz]

Narses was good too - actually his performance was absolutely incredible for a 75 years old eunuch of the imperial palace without military experience. However he only fought in Italy against the last remains ot the Gothic kingdom, while Belisarius had fought and won campaigns against the Vandals, the Goths and the Persians.

Narses also had the advantage of leading a proper Byzantine Imperial army, rather than the bunch of unpaid Hun mercenaries and Persian defectors that formed the core of Belisarius italian expeditionary force. Actually Narses does deserve a lot of credit for actually standing up and telling emperor Justinian that if he was to lead the expedition then Justinian had better allocate a proper budget. Any other general that tried to pull something like that with Justinian would have been blinded and thrown in a dungeon before finishing the phrase, but Narses had the balls () to formulate the request and the political skills to get it approved - in any case Justinian caved in and authorized the funding, to the general surprise.

And BTW it was Narses, not Belisarius, that invited the Longobards in Italy. Some sources say that he did it in spite of the empress Theodora (she had said that Narses, an eunuch, shoud have stayed at home weaving clothes, and when this was reported to Narses he replied "very well, now watch how I weave a cloth that she will never be able to unravel").

Anyway when the Longobards occupied Italy Belisarius had long been relieved of command and recalled to Costantinopolis - this was not because of some specific mishap of Belisarius, but rather Justinian was continuing the tradition of the late Roman emperors, ie getting rid of generals who had become too popular for their own good (see Aetius and Stilicho). At least Belisarius was mothballed but not executed, and he was even entrusted with another command in 559, when he threw a Bulgar invasion force back across (or more likely, into) the Danube.

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]Interdepartimental squabbles are definitely another issue that Hannibal didn't have to deal with with...
LOL http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-jester.gif

You're right about that http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-thumbsup.gif

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]Next time Belisarius, my favorite general ever
Great choise http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-thumbsup.gif




Quote[/b] ]Belisarius did not and subsequently, Northern Italy was lost to the Longobards. I admire and greatly respect Belisarius, but that was a fluke of epic proportions.

No, you're mistaken. In fact, like magnatz says, it was Narses that invited the Longobards in Italy, out of a divergence with Theodora.




Quote[/b] ]Anyway when the Longobards occupied Italy Belisarius had long been relieved of command and recalled to Costantinopolis
True. Dispite his loyalty, he had suffered the envy of Justinian.

[kataphraktoi]

Would anyone want me to post excerpts from a military book concerninig Heraclius's army and campaigns???

Its quite detailed and a lot of work. WOn't do it unles people are interested.

Kato.

[The Wizard]

Quote[/b] (Aymar de Bois Mauri @ Jan. 19 2004,00:36)]
Quote[/b] ]Belisarius did not and subsequently, Northern Italy was lost to the Longobards. I admire and greatly respect Belisarius, but that was a fluke of epic proportions.

No, you're mistaken. In fact, like magnatz says, it was Narses that invited the Longobards in Italy, out of a divergence with Theodora.
Actually, I was referring to the fact that Belisarius annihalated the Goths instead of Justinian's (better) plan, which was to have the Goths as a buffer kingdom in Italy. That would have nulled Narses' attempt.

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]Actually, I was referring to the fact that Belisarius annihalated the Goths instead of Justinian's (better) plan, which was to have the Goths as a buffer kingdom in Italy. That would have nulled Narses' attempt.
Justinian proposed that? http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-stunned.gif

I find it hard to believe, since he was concerned with the restoration of the Empire. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/confused.gif

[magnatz]

The Goths did propose that solution, but Justinian refused and ordered Belisarius to reconquest Italy instead. Same thing he had already done with Africa.

This deserves a different thread though, lets stick to Hannibal for the moment :)

[k1injuries]

One of the stronger points of Hannibal was his strength of character. Titus Livius, a historian who harbored a solid Roman hatred of Hannibal (due to the rivalry between Carthage and Rome), gave this description of Hannibal:

"No sooner had he arrived, than Hannibal drew the whole army towards him. The old soldiers fancied they saw Hamilcar in his youth given back to them; the same bright look, the same fire in his eye, the same trick of countenance and features. But soon he proved that to be his father's son was not his highest recommendation. Never was one and the same spirit more skillful to meet opposition, to obey or to command. It was hard to decide whether he was more dear to the chief or to the army. Neither did Hasdrubal more readily place any one at the head when courage or activity were required, nor were the soldiers under any other leader so full of confidence and daring. He entered danger with the greatest mettle , he comported himself in danger with the greatest unconcern. By no difficulties could his body be tired, his ardor damped. Heat and cold he suffered with equal endurance; the amount of his food and drink was gauged by natural needs and not by pleasure. The time of waking and sleeping depended not on the distinction of day and night. What time was left from business he devoted to rest, and this was not brought on by either a soft couch or by quiet. Many have often seen him, covered by a short field cloak, lying on the ground betwixt the outposts and sentinels of the soldiers. His clothing in no wise distinguished him from his fellows; his weapons and horses attracted everyone's eyes. He was by long odds the best rider, the best marcher. He went into battle first, he came out of it the last....He served three years under Hasdrubal's supreme command, and left nothing unobserved which he who desires to become a great captain ought to see and to do."

Hannibal also exercised caution and self-control - virtues that Alexander never possessed. Because he was pitted against three quarters of a million men which Rome could muster it was imperative that he possessed those qualities. He could not rely on help from Carthage due to the political combinations.

Source: Hannibal: a history of the art of war among the Carthaginians and Romans down to the battle of Pydna, 168 B.C., with a detailed account of the second Punic war / Theodore Ayrault Dodge

[Plantagenet]

Quote[/b] (Rosacrux @ Jan. 16 2004,16:10)]Excellent post The_Emperor, sums up the crucial points of Hannibal Barka's success.

I would rank him upon the greatest tacticians of all times (second only to Alexander IMNSHO in the ancient times) but as a strategist he was a failure. He didn't sack Rome (allthough he had his shot after Cannae) he couldn't get enough Latin cities (despite them dislike the Romans) to join his side and he did lose Karthago in the end. Not to mention that those who took him as a council afterwards, failed miserably...

But put him in the battlefield and give him a decent and reliable force to fight with... he just can't lose.
Perfect summary Tactical genius, strategical failure.

One of the main reasons he's remembered as a great general is simply that he "invented" the classic double envelopment, which has been the absolute wet-dream of every battlefield commander since. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif

I think he became such a feared boogey-man to the Romans (which has alot to do with his historical legend) because:
1. They weren't used to getting their asses handed to them on the field, so it was very disturbing when it happened.
2. In his most famous victories (Cannae, Lake Trasimene, River Trebbia, etc.), he was outnumbered, but his mastery of tactics and timing negated this disadvantage. Result: Romans (like Fabius) started to fear that even with numerical superiority, they just couldn't beat him, which turned out to be false.
3. Over the years, Carthage, and in particular, Hannibal's family, had become Rome's mortal enemies. It had gone way beyond who ruled Sicily and dominated the Mediterranean to "there can be only one".

These factors combined blinded Rome to the fact that Hannibal's invasion of Italy was in reality a desperate, last-ditch, almost hopeless attempt to save Carthage from her inevitable fate. I also agree that he was certainly out-classed by Alexander. At least, thats my opinion. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-confused.gif

[BlackWatch McKenna]

If he had succeeded, then everyone would have called him a "Strategic Genius".

It is too easy to be an Arm Chair General (none of us have commanded men in battle, have we?). So let me add two more factors to what Hannibal saw on the Stategic frontier ... and then let's discuss what WE would have done:

(1) Roman Navy is superior to Carthaginian Navy; and (2) The coast of Africa is indefensible.

At this point in time, Rome had the upper hand on the seas. Just like Merry Old England, they can deliver their Marines and boys wherever they want, whenever they want. Also, Carthage made subject cities tear down their City Walls - and were not friendly leaders. So, any Romans landing (anywhere they want) march over any defenseless city (which would, with a bit of gold and love, go the Roman way). The next thing you know, you have Roman Legions outside of Carthage.

If anyone tells me that the way for Hannibal to win was to sit on the Strategic Defensive....

That being said - what would YOU have done? I would have done exactly what Hannibal did: Take it to the enemy and hope to sue for peace.

Carthage could not have won that war anyways - they could only hope to sue for peace.

//BW

[Plantagenet]

Quote[/b] (BlackWatch McKenna @ Jan. 23 2004,17:04)]At this point in time, Rome had the upper hand on the seas. Just like Merry Old England, they can deliver their Marines and boys wherever they want, whenever they want. Also, Carthage made subject cities tear down their City Walls - and were not friendly leaders. So, any Romans landing (anywhere they want) march over any defenseless city (which would, with a bit of gold and love, go the Roman way). The next thing you know, you have Roman Legions outside of Carthage.

If anyone tells me that the way for Hannibal to win was to sit on the Strategic Defensive....

I would have done exactly what Hannibal did: Take it to the enemy and hope to sue for peace.

Carthage could not have won that war anyways - they could only hope to sue for peace.

//BW
Roman Navy is superior to Carthaginian Navy

In the beginning (1st Punic War), that wasn't true. The Carthaginians outclassed the Romans at sea, and had it remained so, they wouldn't have had to defend the African coast since the Romans had to beat them around Sardinia, Corsica, & Sicily before an invasion of Africa was possible. So at first, it was more like England vs. Germany, a naval power vs. a land power. But yes, once the Romans adapted to naval warfare and, most importantly, took Sicily, Africa was wide open.

That being said - what would YOU have done?

Again, just looking at a map illustrates the importance of Sicily, Sardinia, & Corsica. For Carthage, they werent only a first line of defense, but a potential launching pad against any point in Italy (as you said about Africa). So I guess I would've settled the original dispute between Rome & Carthage by taking the Mediterranean islands first?

If he had succeeded, then everyone would have called him a "Strategic Genius".

As I pondered the answer to "what would I have done?", I realized that Hannibal chose the most direct route straight to Rome's throat, and hoped by doing so to nullify any need of defending Spain or taking the islands. So you're right; had it succeeded, it would've been a strategic masterpiece and he the 2nd Alexander. He may just have had the biggest pair of balls in the Ancient World. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-yes.gif

[kataphraktoi]

Heraclius's campaigns were fought under the following conditions:

He had to fight deep in enemy territory while maintaining connections and a route to his winter quarters in Trebizond (Pontic region) and, more importantly, his capital which was under the regency of the Patriarch and the Patrician Bonusus.

He had two major enemies:
Sassanids who have occupied Syria, Palestine and Egpyt ALL rich regions and responsible for 3/4 of Roman revenue and source of food.

Avars, overran the Balkan peninsula

Heraclius also eluded and defeated three separate armies under Shah-baraz, Shahin and Shapraklan to trap him in their own territory.

When the Avars besieged Constantinople, Heraclius split his army into three with him commanding the smallest of the three. But that was soon helped by a Khazar alliance.
With this he penetrated yet again into enemy territory.
His farthest penetration into Persian territory is as far as Ispahan (Isfahan), the furthest by a Roman army.

Heraclius operated in mountainous regions 90% of the time in his six campaigns and mostly in enemy territory.

Heraclius had to combine political, military, economical and diplomatic skills together.

I, therefore, ask, is he comparable to Hannibal, if not an equal?

One of the most frustrating things about Heraclian history is that people take for granted how pathetic and desperate the situation was when he took over as Emperor.

The effort was immense that Heraclius suffered a physical and mental collapse.

[Rosacrux]

BWMcKKenna

My main bitching with Hannibal is that he did not go for Rome after Kannae and that he did not manage to strip Rome of it's allies.

Sacking Rome
Despite Rome being a hard nut to crack (even though the Gauls have cracked it less than a century ago) any city needed troops to defend it. Rome had no troops after Cannae. They recruited 16year olds, gladiators and slaves to man 4 puny legions (Roman-only legions, no allies, 1/2 manpower that is - less than 20.000 men). But Hannibal did not push to Rome. WHY? Politics? Underestimation of the Roman threat after the annihilation of the crem de la crem of Rome's youth? Lack of confidence to his mercenaries? Lack of siege equipment? Fear that he might be trapped in front of the walls of Rome, open to an attack by Rome's "allies"? Dunno... but it was the doom of Karthago in the (not so) long run.

Rome's "allies"
Let's face it: Rome's allies were not excactly "loyal". Most of them (if not all) were subdued by military means or generally by force, and they had to contribute their prime youth to assist Rome in it's campaigns of conquest. They disliked Romans and loathed Roman rule (for the greatest part, even inside the bounds of Latium). Hannibal had very little success in capitalizing over his great military victories, by gaining the support of the neutrals and convincing the "allies" that they could get rid of Roman rule (without having to exchange it with Karthagenian rule - they would fear that prospect more methinks).
Had he marched against Rome with a few Rome's allies alongside and having covered his rear with a set of alliances, he would've sacked the Cita Eternita and history would be different altogether.

Plantagenet

The famous double envelopment (as seen in Cannae) is also the most difficult manouvre to succeed, if not for anything else, because it requires the "cooperation" of the enemy.

To be honest, the Romans at Cannae cooperated extremely well http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]If he had succeeded, then everyone would have called him a "Strategic Genius".

As I pondered the answer to "what would I have done?", I realized that Hannibal chose the most direct route straight to Rome's throat, and hoped by doing so to nullify any need of defending Spain or taking the islands. So you're right; had it succeeded, it would've been a strategic masterpiece and he the 2nd Alexander.
You're right about this, boys http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-thumbsup.gif

I agree that he was desperate and that increases motivation, but it's true. VERY COURAGEOUS move...

[The Wizard]

Yes, very true.

Actually some could call him the stupidest general ever by marching into the lair of his greatest, most mortal enemy... http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif



~Wiz http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-pirate.gif

[nokhor]

i disagree that hannibal was a lousy strategist. i just think that the resources at his disposal were eventually outmatched by the resources of his enemies.

had hannibal not been in command during the second punic war, it most likely would have ended up the way the third one did, with the romans gaining strength until they found some pretext to besiege and raze carthage.

name me one other commander who fought the romans continously for almost two decades, mostly in their homeland. i don't see what hannibal could have done better. of course in hindsight it looks bad because he was ultimately unsuccessful, but should he have waited in spain or carhtage as the romans slowly nibbled away at carthahaginian power? carthahagnian sea power had been crippled as a result of the first punic war. hannibal didn't have heavy siege equipment to take rome after the battle of cannae, because he certainly could not have been able to drag it across the alps. the kind of light siege machines he could have built on the spot at rome would have been inadequate to take the city before serious reinforcements would arrive. and even had he had such equipment before then, they would have seriously decreased the mobility of his army, and that mobiltiy was a major element in his many victories over his opponents, being able to catch them often by surprise. he wasn't dictator of carthage, and so like his archenemy scipio had to deal with political opponents at home who hindered his war effort and didn't support his policies. he tried to break the bonds between the romans and their allies, and failed. how do you measure such a thing before the onset of a war? he left sizeable armies in subordinate theatre, but those commanders proved no match for the roman ones. but if they were the best carthage had to offer, what more could he have done? i've never heard it said that there was a carthahagnian 'alexander' that hannibal snubbed and kept away from a field command because of jealousy. after the outcome of the first punic war, the romans had been growing in strength respective to the carthahagnians. the romans went to war in the second punic war because hannibal attacked a city that wasn't part of the peace treaty of the first punic war but the romans wanted to curb hannibal and carthage's power before it achieve any kind of parity with their own. i personally think, he did the best he could with the resources he had against the kind of opponent he had.

the only better thing he could have done strategically would have been to surrender uncondtionally and turn himself and carthage over to rome to be destroyed as soon as war was declared for that would have just saved everybody a lot of time. but that of course wasn't an option.

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]Actually some could call him the stupidest general ever by marching into the lair of his greatest, most mortal enemy...
That's what the Romans thought. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif

But he proved them wrong... http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-wink2.gif




Quote[/b] ]name me one other commander who fought the romans continously for almost two decades, mostly in their homeland. i don't see what hannibal could have done better. of course in hindsight it looks bad because he was ultimately unsuccessful, but should he have waited in spain or carhtage as the romans slowly nibbled away at carthahaginian power? carthahagnian sea power had been crippled as a result of the first punic war. hannibal didn't have heavy siege equipment to take rome after the battle of cannae, because he certainly could not have been able to drag it across the alps. the kind of light siege machines he could have built on the spot at rome would have been inadequate to take the city before serious reinforcements would arrive. and even had he had such equipment before then, they would have seriously decreased the mobility of his army, and that mobiltiy was a major element in his many victories over his opponents, being able to catch them often by surprise. he wasn't dictator of carthage, and so like his archenemy scipio had to deal with political opponents at home who hindered his war effort and didn't support his policies. he tried to break the bonds between the romans and their allies, and failed. how do you measure such a thing before the onset of a war? he left sizeable armies in subordinate theatre, but those commanders proved no match for the roman ones. but if they were the best carthage had to offer, what more could he have done? i've never heard it said that there was a carthahagnian 'alexander' that hannibal snubbed and kept away from a field command because of jealousy. after the outcome of the first punic war, the romans had been growing in strength respective to the carthahagnians. the romans went to war in the second punic war because hannibal attacked a city that wasn't part of the peace treaty of the first punic war but the romans wanted to curb hannibal and carthage's power before it achieve any kind of parity with their own. i personally think, he did the best he could with the resources he had against the kind of opponent he had.
You have a point here.

It's very difficult to view far back in time, though...

[k1injuries]

Actually, if Hannibal had marched on to Rome after Cannae, Rome's immediate defenses would have amounted to 43,200, a number superior to Hannibal's. The Roman defenses included 2 legions led by Marcellus.

Two urban legions - 10,600
Old soldiers over age - 10,000
Slaves and freedmen - 12,000
Marcellus and his 2 legions - 10,600

Total - 43,200

The old soldiers were still a formidable force because of their training, experience, and discipline.
The slaves and freedmen were offered freedom in return for their services. Wouldn't you fight your best for that?
Plus, Hannibal lacked siege equipment. It would have been a brutal bloodbath.

Along with this, Rome had three quarters of a million men to call up. Hannibal had none as he was cut off from support from Spain due to Scipio and from Carthage because of the Roman control of the seas. Hannibal tried to seize the nearby ports but the Romans reinforced the garrisons of those cities.

Hannibal had counted on defections by the Italian confederacy but the Romans had cemented its relationships. Hannibal's efforts to break the bonds were like arrows against a stone wall.

If Hannibal had marched onto Rome,yes, he would have ended the war, but by the destruction of his own army.

[Rosacrux]

Hannibal completely fully and utterly annihilated 80.000 Roman&Allies in Cannae only. More than 70K Romans and allies died that day. And fully trained, standard legions, not an amalgam of retired, freed slaves, kids and gladiators.

What makes you think that poor excuse of an army could do better against the tactical genious of Hannibal and the ferocity of his army, than the formidable uber-armee that was butchered at Cannae?

[The Wizard]

Exactly what I was going to say. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif



~Wiz http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-pirate.gif

[Ludens]

Quote[/b] (Rosacrux @ Jan. 27 2004,12:23)]Hannibal completely fully and utterly annihilated 80.000 Roman&Allies in Cannae only. More than 70K Romans and allies died that day. And fully trained, standard legions, not an amalgam of retired, freed slaves, kids and gladiators.
http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/confused.gif I thought that the Roman army at Cannae contained a lot of new recruits which were not properly trained, so the difference in quality would not be as great as you imply.

[The Wizard]

It doesn't really matter. A force twice as large as Hannibal's own force, the largest Roman army ever assembled, trapped and slaughtered. I don't think Hannibal would've had a lot of trouble with an army only marginally larger than his own.



~Wiz http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-pirate.gif

[BlackWatch McKenna]

I think it was Livy who started the idea that the Cannae army was a bunch of escapees from the Special Olympics.

[k1injuries]

In the battle at Cannae, the Roman commander Varro committed error upon error. He ordered the maniples of principes to advance into the intervals between the maniples of hastati, instead of remaining in second line as was the norm. Either that or he drew the maniples of each line together, so as to almost obliterate the intervals thus preventing the principes from advancing through the hastati to sustain combat when needed. This novel formation gave the troops a feeling of uncertainty, especially since they were new troops, and and also crowded the whole line out of its comfortable mobility.

The reason why Hannibal won his battles up to Cannae was because he played on the rashness of his enemy commanders. He was able to choose the battlefields, bringing the enemy to him. Such was Cannae.

However, after Cannae the next consul to face Hannibal was Marcellus. Marcellus had what the other generals before him did not: caution and control. Because of this, he was able to defeat Hannibal at his own game - ruse. The Battle at Nola was the next battle after Cannae. Marcellus set a trap for Hannibal at Nola, and Hannibal took the bait. This was Hannibal's first real defeat by the Romans.

Now if Hannibal had marched on to Rome he would most likely have suffered the same ordeal. Marcellus would have been able to set the same trap with the same results, under even better circumstances.

[Hakonarson]

Hannibal himself is supposed to have rated Alexander as the first and Pyrrhus as the second among military commanders, confessed that had he beaten Scipio he should have put himself before either of them.


Hannibal could never have taken Rome - Even after Cannae, Trebia and Trasimene Rome managed to put 25 legions (125,000+ men) under arms, plus the fleet, plus the Latin allies - possibly as many men again.

Those who think it would have been a rag tag army forget the nature of the Roman army at this time.

It was a citizen levy - every citizen was required to maintain the equipment required of him.

So EVERY male citizen of Rome still in Rome was a fully equipped soldier awaiting the call up. Of course many needed to be kept at Rome to keep the wheels of Govt & commerce calling, but they could all have defended the city fully armed

Appart from the very young they'd all had military experience too - the Roman army was called up by lot anew every year, normally 20,000 foot (4 legions) per year - 2 per consul, so the chances of a soldier getting to 40 without having served a year or 2 under the standards were very slim.

There were no poorly equipped 2nd line reserves, and the legions of freed slaves raised were used to replace Roman legions in garrison because of the limitations I mentioned above.

Marching to Italy was surely a master stroke.

The Roman navy controlled the southern coast of Gaul (remember this is the _2nd_ Punic War - Carthage may have started the 1st one in control of the seas but Hannibal wasn't even born then), and in ancient times the sea was the highway - it joined places rather than seperated them as sea voyages were much shorter than land marches and overall much safer too.

The idea of marching overland from Italy to Spain was a truly original thought, and put the seat of the war firmly in enemy territory.

It wasn't Hannibal's fault that the Carthaginians didn't reinforce him - or rather it was the fault of internal Carthaginian politics of which Hannibal was a part of cours, but not directly.

There can be little doubt that without Hannibal's invasion of Italy the war would have gone much worse for Carthage much sooner than it did.

There may have been better Generals than Hannibal, but he definitely deserves to be up among the best of all time.

[Crimson Castle]

Good generals should know of their own limitations - logistics, politcal and tactical considerations. Its a tricky and contentious issue no doubt.

Generals like Hannibal, Rommel, Caesar, Napoleon, Alexander the Great, were all fantastic on the military side of matters. And they were also politically smart too. But imho they were all too confident in their own abilities and strength and suffered accordingly. Sorry for the paintbrush approach. :)

Has anyone yet mentioned Sun Tze and Clauswitz? They were great strategists with the "big picture" in mind.

[The Wizard]

Caesar and Alexander III of Makedon? Are you mad? These two generals never had logistical problems and never overextended themselves. These two were very good all in one package generals: good tacticians and good strategists. Albeit Alexander was a better general.

Marcellus never really did defeat mighty Hannibal. All he did was use the one thing that Hannibal himself could do nothing against: atrittion. In fact, you might say he annoyed the enemy to death.

Varro was a fool indeed, yet Hannibal would not have had much problems with Marcellus had he fought him truly in the open.

Hannibal lost because of the fact that he was trapped out in the middle of the enemy's land, unable to be reinforced by the fools at home. The Carthaginian Senate had convinced the oligarchy not to support Hannibal, for fear he would grow too powerful. Hannibal had only one motion for support, and that was from the Macedonians, a crap ally if I may.

At school now, I'll go further into this when I'm home.



~Wiz http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-pirate.gif

[Crimson Castle]

Quote[/b] (Wizzy @ Jan. 28 2004,04:12)]Caesar and Alexander III of Makedon? Are you mad? These two generals never had logistical problems and never overextended themselves. These two were very good all in one package generals: good tacticians and good strategists. Albeit Alexander was a better general.

Marcellus never really did defeat mighty Hannibal. All he did was use the one thing that Hannibal himself could do nothing against: atrittion. In fact, you might say he annoyed the enemy to death.

Varro was a fool indeed, yet Hannibal would not have had much problems with Marcellus had he fought him truly in the open.

Hannibal lost because of the fact that he was trapped out in the middle of the enemy's land, unable to be reinforced by the fools at home. The Carthaginian Senate had convinced the oligarchy not to support Hannibal, for fear he would grow too powerful. Hannibal had only one motion for support, and that was from the Macedonians, a crap ally if I may.

At school now, I'll go further into this when I'm home.



~Wiz http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-pirate.gif
Well I did couch my "paintbrush" argument with the statement -"Good generals should know of their own limitations - logistics, politcal and tactical considerations. Its a tricky and contentious issue no doubt."

Alexander the Great and Caesar who probably did not fail in the military arena - failed in the domestic political arena. Both were killed by jealous internal political factions because they went too far and grabbed too much power.

Even Hannibal suffered when he was unable to get support from Carthage to further his war on Rome.

(I should also add that Alexander went too far in his conquest - his own army mutined and forced him to return home.)

Anyhow thats what I wanted to say - a good general would have the big picture in mind and realize that there other other considerations to consider apart from "fightin".

Hmmm... well maybe that is too big a brush to paint for the General picture ... pardon the pun.

But yeah, for tactics - Generals like Hannibal, Caesar, Alexander the Great showed their greatness.

[Hakonarson]

Quote[/b] (Wizzy @ Jan. 28 2004,04:12)]Caesar and Alexander III of Makedon? Are you mad? These two generals never had logistical problems and never overextended themselves.
This is wrong - Caesar's army was virtually starving by the time he beat Pompey at Pharsalus, and Alexander's logistics certainly failed in hte march across teh Gedrossa desert - he also allowed Darius to steal a march and cut his lines of communication before the battle of Issos - had he lost that battle it would ahve ben all over.

they were great generals, but they weer still only human (unless you were alive when they were deified of course http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-speechless.gif )

[The Wizard]

I knew this would be said. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif

Caesar didn't have any supply lines there -- so he couldn't get overextended http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif



~Wiz

[Ludens]

Quote[/b] (Hakonarson @ Jan. 30 2004,01:16)]Alexander's logistics certainly failed in hte march across the Gedrossa desert
Isn't that the desert he crossed when returning from India? He did have a supplies ready in the Indian province from which he started, but the province rebelled and the governor got killed. The supplies were looted and never sent.
But this is just splitting hairs.

[Rosacrux]

Well, Xerxes was a master of logistics. Anyone read Herodotus? You should read this, it's even better than "The Art of War" in that aspect. He had created a huge network of depots with provisions throughout Thrace and Macedonia all the way into northern Thessaly, he arranged the renewal of those provision, he established sea routes (using several hundreds of ships) to feed his vast army with fresh provisions from Asia Minor... well, he accomplished a logistic triumph of epic proportions

Too bad the Greeks handed him his arse in the hand and send the Persian expedition force all the way back to Iran... http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif

Yes, there is something to be learned from this: Logistics alone won't win you the war. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/smokin.gif

[Aurelian]

I am shocked and apalled that no one has brought up Scipio Africanus in this little discussion http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-speechless.gif

Scipio was a better general than Hannibal and proved it on numerous occasions.

Strategically - While Hannibal managed to slip into Italy and defeat the Romans in a series of battles, he was never able to separate Rome from its allies, take the capitol, or even decisively strike at the Roman economy.

Scipio took an inferior Roman army into Spain, where Roman armies under the leadership of his father and uncle had been destroyed earlier, and he completely reversed the situation. He took the Carthaginian base of operations at Nova Carthago, made crucial alliances with the Iberian tribes, and decisively defeated larger Carthaginian armies at Baecula and Illipa. After having destroyed the Carthaginian position in Spain, Scipio then forced Hannibal to leave Italy by invading Africa. While in Africa, Scipio managed to separate the Numidians from their alliance with Carthage. He then outmaneuvered Hannibal into a battle of his own choosing that resulted in Hannibal's complete defeat.

Tactically - While Hannibal is most famous for his envelopment of the Romans at Cannae, Scipio showed equal finesse in the battle of Ilipa. The following was taken from: http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/ilipa.htm

"Finally, Scipio recalled his exhausted light troops and ordered the advance - but the Spaniards only at a slow pace. As his army came within 700 metres of the enemy, Scipio, with the right wing, wheeled the maniples of his wing into column and marched until the heads of the columns were opposite the end of the Carthaginian lines (which was longer than the Roman, due to numerical superiority). The columns then wheeled and advanced quickly toward the enemy, redeployed into line and attacked Hasdrubal's Spaniards, while the Roman cavalry and velites swept round their rear. Marcius and Silanus on the left wing duplicated this manoeuvre. There was little the Carthaginians could do. The African spearmen dared not move to assist their wings, lest they themselves be attacked by the slowly moving Spaniards of the Roman centre. Hadsrubal's elephants stationed on the wings soon panicked and stampeded into his own troops, spreading additional confusion. Hadrsubal's Spaniards fought well, but hungry and outclassed, they were soon routed...

Ilipa can be considered the crowning victory of the Roman army, showing what the manipular system was capable off at the height of it's development. It is generally considered the highest development of tactical skill in the history of the Roman army. If Cannae is the classic example of a double envelopment, Ilipa is the masterpiece: a perfect example of fixing and destroying the enemy at minimum cost. With this battle alone, Scipio establishes himself as one of the greatest generals of all time."

Scipio showed equal skill in his other major victories at Baetica and Zama. Of course, Scipio bested Hannibal at Zama. Scipio was outnumbered 30,000 to 40,000 in foot, but had a 6,000 to 4,000 advantage in cavalry. Hannibal also had an elephant corps in the battle. Scipio's careful preparation for Hannibal's elephant charge nullified the Carthaginian's major advantage, and ensured that the elephants caused more disruption in Hannibal's ranks than in his own. Scipio's superior diplomacy ensured that he had Numidian allied cavalry to secure his flanks, and after a long infantry fight, to clinch his victory.

So, in summation:
*) Scipio beat Hannibal in battle.
*) Scipio never lost a battle, Hannibal did.
*) Scipio was good at taking cities, Hannibal wasn't.
*) Scipio matched Hannibal's daring drive into Italy with equally daring drives into Spain and Africa - that were successful.
*) Scipio was able to separate Carthage from its allies in Spain and Africa, Hannibal was never able to separate Rome from its allies.
*) Scipio repeatedly displayed great tactical skills, as did Hannibal - but again he beat Hannibal.

Furthermore, Scipio went on to play a victorious role in Rome's war against Antiochus of Syria. In that war, an exiled Hannibal only managed to lose a naval battle.

Therefore, Scipio > Hannibal

Here is a decent site on the man.
http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/scipio-africanus.htm

[The Wizard]

Pffffffsssshhhhhhhhht...

Scipio was a good general, but inferior to Anibal. He wasn't the level of tactical genius that Anibal had, and while his stragetical abilities were greater, they weren't the best either.

Scipio reversed the situation because the reversed Anibal's move. Sneaking into Iberia, he attacked the Carthaginians there. While his predecessors in the attempt, the brothers Scipio, had seen some sucesses in the region, they eventually were defeated and executed.

Scipio was a better general than the relatively tactically weak generals that Anibal had stationed in Iberia to protect Carthaginian holdings. Furthermore, Carthagian Iberia was tired from many years of war. It wasn't that hard to defeat the people in Iberia, they were tired of war and easy to submit to Roman gold and " luvin' ".

While Anibal was busy trying to break the stalemate the annoying consul Marcellus had imposed in Italia, Scipio had a great time laying waste to the Carthaginian colonies in Iberia. Hasdrubal was not a very good general compared to Scipio, especially when compared to Anibal himself.

Not only that is my problem, but inferior troops? What? Most of the Roman army was better equipped than the Carthaginian soldiers. The Roman 'steamroller' was very hard for the relatively lightly armed Carthaginian center to stop, and only a general of Anibal's quality could truly do so, and Kartágo only had one of those. Thus, the Romans could break the Carthaginian center and mop up the flanks that remained.

To top that off, Italia was a place that had a far higher attrition rate than Iberia, apparently. This might've been caused by Marcellus in Italia, but maybe also because of other factors. It was because of this that it was not very hard for Scipio to trod around Iberia at his leisure, only having to worry about major battles. Also, Italia was fully under Roman control, while only the southern, Mediterranean side of Iberia was under Carthaginian control. The Gallic tribes to the north also supported the Romans, as did the Celtiberan cities to the north of the Carthaginian-Iberian border.

Furthermore, the Roman Senate actually supported its "men at the front", while the Carthaginian Senate was scared that Anibal would misuse his position and become dictator. In other words, they were scared that their asses would land on the street instead of on a plush cushion. They convinced the rest of the oligarchy of Kartágo to send as little support to Anibal as they could.

As a last tidbit: I motion for Napoleon Bonaparte, one of my favorite generals ever, as one better than Anibal in the whole picture.



~Wiz

[Aurelian]

Scipio was a good general, but inferior to Anibal. He wasn't the level of tactical genius that Anibal had, and while his stragetical abilities were greater, they weren't the best either.

Again, there is no basis for considering Hannibal to have been a better general than Scipio. Hannibal has had much better press over the centuries, presumably due to the romanticism of a lost cause, and due to the fact that he was facing Romans. Historians have tended to build up the concept of Roman tactical invincibility, thus giving Hannibal's tactical victories over the Romans an aura of greatness that has not been extended to Scipio's victories over Carthaginian forces. Similar credit has been given to Rommel, a great general to be sure, but one who has attained more fame by having been on the losing side in an isolated campaign than he might have if he had been just one of the many excellent commanders on the eastern front.

As many Roman commanders found during the First and Second Punic Wars, there was no inherent superiority to be gained by commanding a Roman army. The Roman 'steamroller' was actually not that hard for Carthaginian troops to stop. The Carthaginian's proved that on many occasions, including Cannae, where a screen of Gauls was able to halt the forward momentum of 80,000 Romans deployed in depth for the amount of time necessary to achieve victory on the flanks. Romans fell to the similar tactics of Xanthipus during the First Punic War. Roman defeats on land were at least as common throughout the Punic Wars as victories. Scipio's tactical brilliance was to recognize the limitations of traditional Roman tactics and to take full advantage of the manipular system to execute his own tactics of maneuver, envelopment and flank attacks. In his battles he showed tremendous tactical flexibility, initiative, and the ability to surprise his opponents.

Devaluing Scipio because he faced supposedly weak Carthaginian generals in Spain is hardly fair. Those same generals had defeated previous Roman armies and conquered Spain. Hannibal could more easily be undervalued with the same reasoning - his great victory at Cannae was against a dramatically inferior Roman political appointee. If Hannibal's brothers looked bad after Scipio's Spanish campaigns, it was due to his repeated victories over them.

Furthermore, Scipio managed to achieve his strategic goals in Spain through brilliant operational maneuvering against numerically superior enemies. He forced battle on his opponents, seized their bases, and drove them out of Spain. While Hannibal was able to win several brilliant tactical victories, he never found a way to exploit them. He allowed himself to be stymied by Roman shadowing tactics that deprived him of further victories, and he was outmaneuvered by the Romans when Nero slipped out of his grasp and destroyed his brother's reinforcing army. After Cannae, Hannibal lost the initiative and wasted years reacting to Roman moves.

The idea that the Roman Senate lavished Scipio with men, supplies, and political support is another fiction. When Scipio set out on the Spanish campaign, he took with him "ten thousand infantry, a thousand cavalry, and 30 quinquiremes - the only reinforcements that Rome would commit to Spain for the rest of the war." Carthage did reinforce their armies in Spain... and Scipio quickly pounced on and destroyed those reinforcements. Again, while Hannibal could not receive reinforcements by sea from Carthage, reinforcements from Spain were sent to Hannibal, though he failed to link up with them.

Scipio's invasion of Africa was against heavy political opposition in the Senate. The army that he put together was composed of 7000 volunteers from Rome's allies and the disgraced remnants of defeated Roman armies that had been exiled to Sicily. Like Hannibal, he fought Zama without the majority of his veterans.

As for who was the greatest general in the ancient world, Hannibal gave Scipio his opinion when they met at Antiochus' court in later years:

"Africanus asked who, in Hannibal's opinion, was the greatest general of all time. Hannibal replied: 'Alexander, King of the Macedonians, because with a small force he routed armies of countless numbers, and because he traversed the remotest lands. Merely to visit such lands transcended human expectation.' Asked whom he would place second, Hannibal said: 'Pyrrhus. He was the first to teach the art of laying out a camp. Besides that, no one has ever shown nicer judgement in choosing his ground, or in disposing his forces. He also had the art of winning men to his side; so that the Italian peoples preferred the overlordship of a foreign king to that of the Roman people, who for so long had been the chief power in that country.' When Africanus followed up by asking whom he ranked third, Hannibal unhesitatingly chose himself. Scipio burst out laughing at this, and said: 'What would you have said if you had defeated me?' 'In that case', replied Hannibal, 'I should certainly put myself before Alexander and before Pyrrhus - in fact, before all other generals' This reply, with its elaborate Punic subtlety, and this unexpected kind of flattery...affected Scipio deeply, because Hannibal had set him (Scipio) apart from the general run of commanders, as one whose worth was beyond calculation. "
Livy, The History of Rome from its Foundation XXXV.14

Actually, I think that rather than being a subtle compliment, Hannibal was simply too proud to give Scipio his due for defeating him strategically, tactically, and politically. The choice of Pyrrhus as the second greatest general of antiquity would no longer be made by anyone - he failed to achieve anything he set out to do. Alexander, Scipio, and Hannibal would have been a fairer answer.

In truth though, Scipio had some advantages as a general over even Alexander. Alexander was outmaneuvered by Darius before the battle of Gaugamela, and he came perilously close to death in several of his battles. While physically brave, and risking death as a young man, Scipio kept his person safe throughout his battles. In contrast, Alexander's career was almost cut short at the Granicus, at the very beginning of his Persian campaign. Furthermore, most of Alexander's battles were against Persian armies, which while huge, had been regularly defeated by Greek armies previously. Scipio's battles were won against opponents who had generally been successful in the field against Romans.

Most tellingly, Alexander never defeated a Hannibal in battle.

Here's another excellent site about Scipio Africanus:
http://www.fenrir.dk/history/bios/scipio/spain.php

[BlackWatch McKenna]

Short Version:

Spain > Rome?

Only when I read about the Great Spanish Empire which conquered the ancient world will I draw the analogy that Scipio's campaigns in Spain = Hannibal's campaigns in Italy.

Italian Medium Infantry > Roman Legions?

Remember, the magic of a Republican Roman Legions were that they were the original Point and Click armies. A merely above average general could not help but look brilliant leading Romans.

......
Given the choice, and all things being equal, I would choose a Hannibal to lead my armies before I would choose a Scipio. It speaks volumes that Scipio studied Hannibal with the intent of defeating him - but Hannibal had to come up with this stuff on his own.

In a pinch - I want a creative thinker, not a student.

//BW

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]Given the choice, and all things being equal, I would choose a Hannibal to lead my armies before I would choose a Scipio. It speaks volumes that Scipio studied Hannibal with the intent of defeating him - but Hannibal had to come up with this stuff on his own.

In a pinch - I want a creative thinker, not a student.

Extremelly good point... http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-thumbsup.gif

[Aurelian]

Short Version: Spain > Rome?
Only when I read about the Great Spanish Empire which conquered the ancient world will I draw the analogy that Scipio's campaigns in Spain = Hannibal's campaigns in Italy.

Italian Medium Infantry > Roman Legions?
Remember, the magic of a Republican Roman Legions were that they were the original Point and Click armies. A merely above average general could not help but look brilliant leading Romans.

Study Scipio's battles. His success was due to his not following the traditional "point and click" generalship which characterized Roman armies. He was willing to break apart the legionary structure and use its multiple lines for maneuver and outflanking possibilities. Like I pointed out earlier, against Carthaginians there was nothing inherently superior about a Roman army. They were defeated repeatedly. You might also (unfairly) characterize the Carthaginian army as a point and click force - with its usual cavalry superiority any competent general could beat a Roman army by exploiting the weakness of its flanks.

Of course, the Roman Republic was a tougher nut to crack than Carthage. We'll give Hannibal his due in that respect. However, Hannibal failed. Scipio succeeded against heavy numerical odds in Spain, and against Hannibal himself in Africa.

Given the choice, and all things being equal, I would choose a Hannibal to lead my armies before I would choose a Scipio. It speaks volumes that Scipio studied Hannibal with the intent of defeating him - but Hannibal had to come up with this stuff on his own.

In a pinch - I want a creative thinker, not a student.

Again, study the battles. Scipio didn't copy Hannibal's tactics, he countered them with superior tactics of his own.

When it came down to it, Hannibal had no "creative" tactics to use against Scipio at Zama. He tried to use his elephants in the same way that Xanthippus (successfully) used them in the First Punic War. Scipio countered brilliantly. Without his usual cavalry superiority, Hannibal was at a loss. The rest of the battle became a savage infantry slogging match which the Roman's won.

Of course Scipio studied Hannibal, he was Rome's primary opponent. "Know thine enemy". Doesn't invalidate his accomplishments. Hannibal gets better press because of the romanticism of his march over the Alps and his fight for an (eventual) lost cause.

P.S. Scipio may have introduced the gladius to the Roman army, and the first indication of the cohort as a tactical unit is from Polybius' description of one of his battles.

[BlackWatch McKenna]

Romans > Spanish

Romans were the first Professional Army.

A Roman Army is "point and click" because the troops were so well trained that, if you can imagine it, they can likely do it. Those guys could march and maneuver like no other. Romans had standardized training, and it showed. No one else had it again for 1,500 years.

Troops Types
The Carhaginians, on the other hand, were not like the homogeneous Romans. They were a Hetrogeneous mish-mash and I am not quite sure how Hannibal even communicated with his troops. The Libians may have spoken Carthaginian - but I don't know what his Numidians or Celt-Iberians/Spanish or various Gaulish tribes spoke. I have no idea what language his Italian Allies spoke.

Scipio's Battles
Zama was a closer thing that commonly thought. I did like how Scipio copied Hannibal's Cannae play, though.

It would have been interesting to see how Scipio did in Hannibal's shoes - although I am not sure anyone could have waltzed around Rome for as long as Hannibal did.

What if we give Hannibal a Republican Roman army.....

Scipio Revisited
If you can recommend a book, other than Scipio: Greater than Napoleon, then lay it on me.

//BW

[Hakonarson]

Quote[/b] (BlackWatch McKenna @ Feb. 02 2004,14:41)]Romans were the first Professional Army.
no they were not.

Assyrians and Egyptians had professional armies long before Rome even existed, Mauryan India had a professional army around 300BC IIRC - Rome existed then of course, but its professinal army was still 200 years away.

Other states may have done so - we just don't know much about them.

[kataphraktoi]

Is Hannibal overrated?

Did he rescue a state from destruction?

Did he initiate any lasting reforms or changes?

Was he important to history?

[The Wizard]

*Looks on in glee as kato works up a rant about how good Heraclius really is* http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif



~Wiz

[BlackWatch McKenna]

OVER RATED
I agree with Kato – Napoleon IS over-rated.

PROFESSIONAL WRASSLIN’
As for professional armies, TOUCHE’
Hark schools me in these discussions and he will never let me get away with a broad statement.

That being said, here is food for thought:


Quote[/b] ]Although the Egyptian army became a professional, organized unit, it did not really refine its warfare style. Generally, when an enemy sought protection behind its own fortifications, the Egyptians patiently starved them into submission under the protective cover of huts, then broke through gates and used ladders to scale the enemy stronghold. Hand-to-hand combat was common in open areas. Prior to a battle, Egyptians let their enemies know which day they planned to do battle and if the enemy wasn’t prepared, the battle was rescheduled. However, not all enemies were as civilized, sometimes launching surprise attacks against Egyptian troops.

http://www.touregypt.net/featurestories/war.htm

They may have paid a standing army, and used that factor to call it Professional. But I do not find anything that indicates that the infantry was able to maneuver in any formation or blocks of men smaller than a city (I think their command elements for chariots were in the upwards of 1,000s as indicated by the Pharoah’s commands at Kadesh... That block of chariots numbered 1,000 and the command was “charge”.

As for infantry divisions, there were about 5,000 guys in one. As Mrs. Clinton says, "it takes a village."

Again, Hark is correct and I recognize that these two were “first”:


Quote[/b] ] Assyrians
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gabrmetz/gabr0004.htm

Egyptians
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gabrmetz/gabr0005.htm

But I still have to go along with the premise that it was the Romans and their mad Iron Age skills that set the bar.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gabrmetz/gabr0006.htm

As far as modern military heritage goes, we have more in common with the Romans that we do the Assyrians or Egyptians.

That is why I call the Romans the First Professional Army.

//BW

[Hakonarson]

I think you're being a bit harsh on the Egyptians BW - saying the infantry was organised in 5000 is like saying the same of the Romans - 5000 was a legion after all.

The whole army was organised into 4 corps (as we would call them now) of about that strength each, that were each capable of marchign and fightign for some time alone while het rest of the army caught up - it was a very advanced concept not fully rediscovered until Napoleon.

The Egyptians had a very complex army organisation at the time of Ramses II (he of Qadesh fame)- I haven't got the details here, but I do ahve them at home in Stillman & Tallis's "Armies of the Ancient Near East".

Their chariots were not useful for a "charge" at all infact,being rather light and equipped with archers they were actually skirmishers Virtually by definition this requires them to have ben organised in samall units that can be easily controlled.

[Hakonarson]

Quote[/b] (kataphraktoi @ Feb. 02 2004,21:11)]

Quote[/b] ]Is Hannibal overrated?

No


Quote[/b] ]Did he rescue a state from destruction?

No


Quote[/b] ]Did he initiate any lasting reforms or changes?

Yes


Quote[/b] ]Was he important to history?

Yes.

[Aurelian]

Romans were the first Professional Army.

I don't want to knock the quality and training of the Roman army, but during the first two Punic Wars the army was still a general levy of the citizens. They were trained citizens who were grouped into income and age categories to determine their role in battle. The Roman army wasn't composed of career soldiers like professional armies today. That's why the Romans could lose 80,000 men at Cannae and continue fighting.

Over the course of the Punic Wars, and the later wars against the Hellenistic states in the Eastern Mediterranean, the levy system ran into difficulties because the soldiers were kept away from their farms for extended periods of time. The upper class twits who ran the Roman state were able to buy out economically stressed family farms, combine them into latifundia and run them with cheap imported slaves. That undermined the traditional Roman military structure, based as it was on citizen soldiers equipping themselves in line with their property holdings.

The Romans professionalized their army during the following period, when they were forced to begin recruiting the newly enlarged class of landless city dwellers. Thus, the professional Roman army really dates from the Marian period when otherwise unattached Romans signed on with a general who promised to hire, equip, and eventually pension them.

Again, I don't want to undervalue the 'professionalism' of the early Republican army... Rome was militarily active enough that they did get plenty of training and combat experience during their lives, but they weren't professionals in the sense that they were a paid standing force. I suppose you could call the Carthaginians professionals since so much of their army was composed of mercenaries, even though they also had a citizen component.

I think you're fundamentally right that the Roman army was a 'point and click' force. Roman success in Italy was due not so much to brilliant generalship or maneuver, but by the creation of a military organization that was well adapted to the type of enemies that they normally had to face. The legionary structure implied a battle order that allowed the Romans to wear out their enemies by multiple lines of troops who could attack and retire in succession. That battle order was probably less effective against the Carthaginians precisely because they had a more diverse army that could fight in multiple lines and threaten Roman flanks with cavalry superiority.

Scipio's achievement was to use the Roman army creatively and train his soldiers for new maneuver possibilities. The later Marian/Caesarian army fought more like Scipio's army by doing away with the rigid troop classifications and battle order in favor of more flexible tactics based on cohorts.

As for earlier professional armies, you'd have to recognize the Spartans. Their entire society was based on supporting a professional warrior caste who did nothing but train. Hellenistic armies would also have to be considered professional by both pay and maneuver standards. Think how much training went into maneuvering a pike block.


If you can recommend a book, other than Scipio: Greater than Napoleon, then lay it on me.

I don't know of any other modern books that are just about Scipio. Good book, terrible title. Looks like an opening for some ambitious young historian.

[kataphraktoi]

Yes, Wizzy I like my rants, and I will build them up http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif

How could anyone not see how great a general he was???

Deep in Persian territory, Khusrau II tried to trap Heraclius with three large armies. Working in mountain terain (Western Persia), Heraclius out-flanked them and annihilated all three of them. Were they good generals??
Heck yes One of them was Shahbaraz, the Persian responsible for conquering the large eastern provinces of the Byzantine empire with an outpost in Chalcedon opposite Constantinople

And mind you, he still kept his lines of communication open while in deep mountainous terrain with no naval assistance.

Do I have to buy a book for everyone?????

(disclaimer, do not take literally)

Anyway keep debating about Hannibal. Me wants to see who will win the war of attrition.

Books to read.

History of Byzantine state and society by William Treadgold

Byzantium's Holy Wars by Geoffrey Regan

Encyclopedia of military history by Ernest and Trevor Dupoy

John Julius Norwich Byzantium: the early centuries

[Michael the Great]

Quote[/b] (Aurelian @ Jan. 30 2004,08:58)]Scipio was a better general than Hannibal and proved it on numerous occasions.
HA,ha,hah...what a GOOD Joke
http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/handball.gif

[Beirut]

Aurelian,

Thank YOU for bringing up Scipio and defending the truth so eloquently. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/cheers.gif

What I adore most of all, what feels me with the joy of Christmas all over again, is listening to people defend a loser and his loss and decrying the winner of the fight as nothing but lucky.

Never mind the proof of history. Never mind that Hannibal lost and Scipo won. That doesn't mean a thing. Hannibal was better. And the fact that the other guy beat the pants of him means not a thing at all. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/gc-jester.gif

[Easthaven]

I think Hannibal was a better commander. Though Scipio was a well grand strategist, Hannibal was simply beyond his time when it came to tactics. After not having lost a major engagement for over 17 years of constant warfare you gotta expect one loss to arrive sooner or later. As much as he manipulated his enemies, made battles to favor him when it seemed impossible, and made the best of what he had 24/7, he simply could not carry it to the end. He couldn't manipulate Scipio his most attentive student any longer, he could not make the battle favor him for he rushed from across the Med Sea, while Scipio had quite some time to prepare around Carthage for his arrival. He could not make the best out of new recruits (did not have very many vets) or weak and outnumbered cavalry. His time had come. He took a gamble and lost. He was so close, yet so far. A few different factors would have tipped the scale and the 2nd Punic War would have had a different outcome. THough he overcame quite a few impossibilities during the war, he would have overcame the ultimate impossibility.

Do not underestimate Hannibal's capabilites as a General in both tactics and strategy.

[Beirut]

I'm not underestimating Hannibal. He was a great general. That is not in question.

But Scipio was better.

Scipo lured/forced Hannibal into a trap in Hannibal's own back yard, and then stomped him into the terra. Scipio, with great premeditation, managed events and choreographed the scene to bring about a moral and military victory over a brilliant and dealy foe.

Far as I know, that makes Scipio better.

[nokhor]

what if we flip the question around a little bit. if hannibal had been born a roman, and scipio had been the carthahagnian, all the other attributes staying the same,[Hannibal's strategic aggressiveness, Scipio's strategic versatility etc.] which side would have won the Second Punic War?

[BlackWatch McKenna]

Hannibal the Roman with Roman Army (and more roman armies)?

Mother of god - Hannibal would pwn Carthage before you could say, "Circus Maximus."

[Easthaven]

Thats a very good concept. Switch the two commanders' roles. Do you really think Scipio could have done everything Hannibal was able to do if he was in his position? Do you think Hannibal could have stopped Scipio in Italy? I doubt Scipio could have even made it to Italy and if he did I doubt he could have masterminded such decisive victories at Trebia, Trasimene, or the brilliant one Cannae.

Scipio was a brilliant commander, and I rank him the top three Roman commanders of all time and possibly the top ten or so in history. But Hannibal I rank in the top five in history. He was better, IMHO.

[Aymar de Bois Mauri]

Quote[/b] ]Hannibal the Roman with Roman Army (and more roman armies)?

Mother of god - Hannibal would pwn Carthage before you could say, "Circus Maximus."
I totally agree. One cannot compare the Roman army with the Carthaginian one. If the positions were reversed, Carthage would have fallen in less than 2 years...

[Red Peasant]

Brilliant stuff Aurelian, running a 'coach and horses' through the arguments of the Anti-Scipios, and scattering them like chaff on a late summer's breeze, point by point, and with impeccable research and logic.

*bows*

[Michiel de Ruyter]

If I can find the time somewhere this week, I'll try and make my case, in favor of Hannibal...

Right now I am swamped with work for study:

Write essay for economic history.
Do short presentation on the Paris Commune.
Expand bibliography for paper on the emperor Augustus and his relationship with the army.
Do the regular homework.
[/b]

Besides that I need to clean up my room, and organize a decent inventory for my stash of modelkits waiting to be built.

[Michiel de Ruyter]

I have finally found some time... so here it goes..

What made Hannibal so good, in my opinion...

First one has to look at the goal Hannibal set for himself. Which is simply put the destruction of the Roman empire (not necessarily Rome itself).

What did Hannibal know ?

Rome wanted to fight the wars on the soil of its opponent. Rome also wanted the destruction of the Carthaginian empire and to expand (something that is clear in the way the initiated previous wars, the treaty with Saguntum and later wars). Rome had made that clear, not in words, but in deeds in the previous century (Rome always fought "defensive wars" during its existence, however flimsy the pretext). He also knew that he had a party in the Carthaginian Senate that was opposed to the war, almost solely because they were afraid of or opposed to the Barcid family. Which consequently left Hannibal on his own (in the end not that dissimilar as the situation that arose between Rommel in North Africa and the Italian High Command).

So Hannibal knew he had to fight, basically had to do it on his own, and had to take the fight to the Romans. This last part in order to prevent Roman troops from being sent to the Carthaginian lands... Yet it was also clear that the Romans controlled the seas, and that it was all but impossible to regain control, so the sole option to get to Italy was by land, through hostile territory, and live of the land. He also knew that using the coastal road to pass the Alps would mean a certain death, as he could be easily blocked, attacked from sea, and have troops landed in his rear.

He also knew that he would not have the logistical capability to do it on his own, and mount a siege of Rome. So he saw as his best option to try and dissolve the Roman confederation, which was a reasonable assumption if one realizes that Rome had fought until recently numerous wars against its allies, and would do so again in the future (and actually lost in many respects). If he gained enough Italian allies, he would have the support and possibilities to lay siege to Rome.

So Hannibal decided that he would have to out march the Romans, get into Italy before the Romans got into Spain, and destroy the Roman armies in order to both force troops to be recalled from abroad, and dissolve the Roman confederation. And he did so in a masterly fashion, that has been bettered by no-one... (closest IMHO actually comes Xenophon with the withdrawal of his 10,000). He marched with maximum speed, through largely hostile territory with, if taken all into account, not that many losses at all... and basically was in Italy before the Romans knew what had happened.

On a tactical level, he was awesome. He used the vulnerabilities of both the armies he opposed, and the commanders of those armies. His infantry was largely inferior (sole exception being the core of Spanish troops), and not that reliable, and his only edge was his cavalry, which he put to very good use.

All in all, he killed roughly over 100,000 Romans, and inflicted a casualty rate (killed or captured) of IIRC over 80% upon his enemy. He did so using imaginative tactics... his sole miscalculation was the fact that the Roman allies mostly stayed loyal to Rome, even after the massive defeats... Yet he had Rome stretched to its breaking point... One of the reasons the Romans refused battle after Cannae was the fact that they could not afford any more big defeats, or they would be forced to give up their plan of operations, and have to recall their army form Spain.

His campaign in Italy was over when his brother, bringing a reinforcement army, was defeated at the Metaurus river, and a little later, the Roman army landed in Africa.

In the end, Hannibal's sole miscalculation had been the fact that he had expected the Roman allies to come to his side.

Now as far as Hannibal vs Scipio goes...

Scipio never had to cope with the strategical and operational difficulties that Hannibal did, as far as I know. He had full government support, and his supply-line was guaranteed because of Roman naval domination. In Spain he faced inferior commanders, and, AFAIK a population that was not as hostile, except for the Carthaginian colonies. He had also learned his lesson, concerning Hannibal and his use of the aggressiveness of other commanders..

As far as the Roman army being a point-and-click army, to a certain extent it was, and had to be, due to the fact that senior command was a politically appointed position (it was part of someones political career ), and usually not manned by "professionals". So the army relied on the lower officer corps to get things done (much like NCO's and lower officers do today). If handed to a gifted commander, amazing things could indeed be done.

At Zama, Hannibal was forced to fight (thank you Carthaginian senate). Also, the fact that Scipio had to work with largely new recruits is new to me.. I know for a fact that Hannibal had, and that is why he had his veterans of the Italian campaign manning the third line... last, but not least, Hannibal had lost his edge in cavalry, as Massinissa had betrayed him... if anyone had the edge, the Romans had.

Last but not least, we have to rely on Roman writers for all our data, and they do tend to be biased (usually make the Romans look better then they are). In the Osprey Campaign volume about Cannae a compelling case is presented that Aemilius Paulus was the commander at Cannae, and not Varro (both historians are in the Pauline camp for various reasons, things do not add up with Varro's previous record in the army, and neither do the number of days in the command rotation, or if they do, the events do not make any military sense...).

So, to recapitulate why I think Hannibal is a greater commander then Scipio:
Hannibal had to deal with far greater difficulties then Scipio on all levels. Yet the results he achieved have only been surpassed by very few, and Alexander was the only one in antiquity.
Hannibal has laid down some of the basics of every military operation since, and, especially what he achieved at the tactical level, has been the goal of every commander since.
When they finally met at Zama, Scipio held three out of four aces in the deck, and was able to deal with the only ace Hannibal had. He had leveled the difference in cavalry (he might actually have had the advantage), and by doing so he had negated the possibility for a repeat of Cannae. He had the upper hand in the infantry department. He held the initiative... and even then, the battle was by all accounts a close run thing...
Last but not least, the argument that Scipio is superior to Hannibal because he defeated him, is a fallacy. Many great commanders have been defeated by less great commanders...
Montgomery defeated Rommel, Zhukov c.s. defeated von Manstein, Napoleon lost at Waterloo, Lee lost to Meade, yet is generally accepted that the loser was the superior commander if compared to the victor... I know of no one who rates Montgomery over Rommel, and most rate Manstein above Zhukov, and Lee above Meade.
[/list]

[BlackWatch McKenna]

That about sums it up.

[Nelson]

Scipio was better than Hannibal as Grant was better than Lee.

All four were very good at winning battles. Scipio and Grant knew how to win wars with strategic master strokes culminating in victories like Zama and Vicksburg.

If perceived disadvantages should enhance the stature of Hannibal or Lee, neither should perceived advantages diminish Scipio or Grant. And if Hannibal and Lee won stunning victories, were their opposites not sub par? If a good commander magnifies the strength of his force poor commanders must detract. When Scipio met Hannibal and Grant met Lee, in both cases the magic was over for the losers. Even if the victories seem inevitable then this fact is all to the credit of Scipio and Grant.

Scipio and Grant took great risks. Both were broad minded enough to exploit their respective navies. And both could appreciate the Big Picture better than their opponents.

[Michiel de Ruyter]

Scipio took great risks ?

The whole Roman operational concept for the conduct of this war was to fight it on Spanish soil and Carthaginian soil... as they had been waiting for that chance... The Romans sent an army towards Spain, and when news of Hannibals departure came, it was ordered to block and if possible defeat Hannibal's army if they ran into it. When it became clear that Hannibal had marched faster then expected, and marched north, it was ordered to continue to Spain and continue the Roman plan for the conduct of the war; The detruction of the Roman armies only caused a temporary halt to those plans, and the invasion of Africa.

Where they ran into problems was when Hannibal was quicker then they suspected, ran around them through the Alps at a faster pace then expected, and hammered the snot out of the three Roman armies sent against them.
The whole concept of operations was not taking risks. The whole concept for the Roman conduct of this war was one that came from the previous Punic War, and was decided upon even before the war started and Scipio rose to his eminence....

Hannibal knew what his only possibility was to win a war, and acted upon it. His sole, and very understandable miscalculation was the fact that the vast majority of the Roman allies stayed loyal to Rome. Hannibal knew as well that Rome would destroy Carthago in due time, if he was not the one to take out Rome... the events of the previous half a century had shown it, and the events for the next 300 years did prove Hannibal right. What went wrong for hannibal was that the only element of chance in his concept went against him, and he ended up having to fight a war he could not win.

As for great risks, where were those for Scipio ? In Spain, in the north he would have the support of the locals, who had only just been subdued by Hannibal, which would give him a very secure base of operations. In Africa, the romans had command of the seas... destroy the countryside, and wait for Hannibal to come out...


As for Grant, yes he took them, but he was damned lucky as well twice to not have his army totally or largely destroyed, first at Shiloh, and second at Wilderness... at Shiloh he only got away with it because Southern commander f***ed up the execution of the plan, and Johnston got shot.
And even in the Vicksburg, he knew he could take them...with a fairly good chance of all going right. His genius in that campaign lies in the fact that he seized his opportunity.

[BlackWatch McKenna]

Man, what if the North could have picked up General Lee in the free agency draft.

[Red Peasant]

Excellent stuff here from both Aurelian and Michiel, well done both. It summarises a lot of material I've seen and read before and with your own excellent, personal viewpoints as well. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/cheers.gif

By personal preference, I will still go slightly for Scipio, but, naturally, strong arguments can easily be made for both Alexander and Hannibal, as will justly be expected. It's a matter of personal opinion. What I didn't like were opinions that completely slated and/or disregarded Scipio, and just because he was Roman I feel. People tend to judge the Romans with the benefit of hindsight and so feel that the Romans couldn't lose, but it wasn't like that. The Romans were scared of the Carthaginians, to the point of being neurotic, and Carthage was richer and more developed than Rome. The result of the Punic Wars was not 'inevitable', especially as viewed at the time.

[Easthaven]

Hannibal's gamble was not a lack of strategic mind or a deficiency in his plan. He actually succeeded in convincing most of southern Italy to defect to him, Capua being a major one. What he underestimated was not necessarily ally defections but the power of those defections, Rome's manpower pool and the stubborness of Rome itself.

His new allies provided food and some troops but became more of a burden when he had to protect them all from the vengeful Romans. Yet he succeeded in defeating the Romans consistently throughout his 17 year endeavor. But without the possession of a major port or the full support of his senate at Carthage he could not recieve any significant reinforcements. Thus, he was stuck with what he went in with For 17 years he had to make his army last and still be strong enough in both numbers and skill to defeat the Romans in their own territory. Granted he acquired a few troops from new allies but nothing compared to how much Rome could come up with. Rome continued to exert more and more of its massive manpower to regain losses. The system was simply stronger than expected.

Scipio, though a brilliant commander skilled in calculation, was not stranded in the middle of enemy territory against an enemy whose manpower pool was HUGE and ability to project that power was efficient. He was not leading an army of culturally different groups who fought mainly for the gold and he was not opposed and handicapped by his own senate. He had the advantage of being able to study his ingenius opponent. He had the advantage of the Roman legions and the Roman masses. He had the advantage of a wide open communication and supply line. He had the advantage of reinforcements. He had the advantage of transportation. The only clear cut challenge he could have had that was equal to the challenges Hannibal faced was if he had to face Hannibal himself in Spain or Italy or whereever(not when Hannibal had every advantage stripped away and forced into a final battle that finished off an already completed war).

The Battle of Zama, Hannibal had new recruits and only had a handful of veterans from his italian campaign, which he placed in his third line several hundred yards from his main lines as reserve. He had an insignificant number of cavalry(his only strength against the superior enemy infantry). He was also forced into this predicament by the Carthiginian senate and circumstance. Scipio had superior cavalry, superior infantry (veterans I might add, bent on redeeming themselves and vengeance), strategic advantage (no rush, practically had north africa in the palm of his hand as Hannibal was in Italy). And he had all the other advantages stated earlier. This is not a fair contest in determining who was the better general by winning this battle, hell no.

Its pretty simple really, Scipio could not have done what Hannibal did if their positions were switched, but Hannibal without a doubt could probably have done what Scipio did. Simple as that.

I'm not trying to downgrade Scipio, I think he was a brilliant general, among the best in history. But Hannibal was simply the better commander.

[Michiel de Ruyter]

Quote[/b] (Red Peasant @ Feb. 20 2004,23:12)]Excellent stuff here from both Aurelian and Michiel, well done both. It summarises a lot of material I've seen and read before and with your own excellent, personal viewpoints as well. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/cheers.gif

By personal preference, I will still go slightly for Scipio, but, naturally, strong arguments can easily be made for both Alexander and Hannibal, as will justly be expected. It's a matter of personal opinion. What I didn't like were opinions that completely slated and/or disregarded Scipio, and just because he was Roman I feel. People tend to judge the Romans with the benefit of hindsight and so feel that the Romans couldn't lose, but it wasn't like that. The Romans were scared of the Carthaginians, to the point of being neurotic, and Carthage was richer and more developed than Rome. The result of the Punic Wars was not 'inevitable', especially as viewed at the time.


Thanks for the compliments Red Peasant,

you gave some excellent points as well... so cheers to you as well. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/cheers.gif . Especially some of the points you made, made me think things through before making my replies...

I forgot Scipio for a second (when IIRC you brought him up) and hid in shame... I do think that of the ancient generals, they are the top... Imagine what would have happend had the three of them served on the same general staff http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/idea.gif http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/idea.gif ....

And the only thing inevitable at that time was the fact that there would be a new clash of arms between Rome and Carthage... I am of the opinion though that without Hannibal the Carthaginians would not have had a chance, and the war would have been much shorter...

Problem with studying (ancient) history is that one has the bneefit of hindsight, and it is damned hard to [n]not[/b] include that in the judgíng process...

[The Wizard]

Quote[/b] (Michiel de Ruyter @ Feb. 21 2004,14:36)]I forgot Scipio for a second (when IIRC you brought him up) and hid in shame... I do think that of the ancient generals, they are the top... Imagine what would have happend had the three of them served on the same general staff http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/idea.gif http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/idea.gif ....
Considering their backgrounds, I think they wouldn't have liked each other a whole lot http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif



~Wiz

[kataphraktoi]

We should try a RTW re-enactment when RTW comes out.

Katzinthecradleandthesilverspoon

[Gawain of Orkeny]

Well since this is the greatest general of all time how about Napoleon.Maybe we should take a poll.

[Red Peasant]

Quote[/b] (Michiel de Ruyter @ Feb. 21 2004,13:36)]Problem with studying (ancient) history is that one has the benefit of hindsight, and it is damned hard not to include that in the judgíng process...
That is true, but it has advantages as well in that we can make a more considered judgement.....yet still disagree http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/biggrin.gif

[Spino]

Quote[/b] ]Imagine what would have happend had the three of them served on the same general staff

It probably would have been an epic clash of egos. Lots of thunder and nary a drop of rain or lightning bolt in sight. Early in Napoleon's career he was given joint command of the French forces in Italy, a post he shared with his rival Dumieriez (or was it Moreau?). Napoleon balked at the idea of sharing command, not simply because it conflicted with his personal goals or was an affront to his ego but because rule by committee always compares unfavorably to a solitary voice of authority.

Or, as the Emperor-to-be put it,"Better one bad general than two good ones." http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/tongue.gif