WW2 Q

[The Blind King of Bohemia]

Hi lads, i've got to do a question for my military coursework and it is

Was Blitzkrieg a flawed operational tool?

Could people help me out? WW2 is really not my strong point in history and if anyone can give info or suggest reading material i would be eternally grateful http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wave.gif

[Sulla]

First off, flawed means not perfect right?

To my knowledge, Blitzkrieg was this:

Huge force concentration at one point in a defensive line, supported by the airforce and artillery(divebombers/tactical bombers). The airforce was critical for succes (also later on, with the airforce being mobile artillery for the Armoured divisions), and so were the armoured forces.

Once the armour broke through it would dash forward, only stop for resupplying etc. It wouldnt wait for the infantry (it had mechanised or motorised infantry with it) on foot to follow. The walking infantry would clear pockets of resistance left behind the advancing spearheads.

The aim would be, capture a lot of ground and strategic points, encircle enemy armies. You can imagine the horror of such a tank breakthrough, especially early in the war, when germany was the only country having organised Tank divisions. They actually had less tanks then France and of a lesser quality, for example, but the french organised there tanks in a way to support there infantry (So a mixed infantry/tank division).

Did it have flaws, well no system is perfect. I think (but not a expert on this) logistics was a nightmare (need for a lot of trucks to do the supplying) as horses (who were still the main supply providers at that time) couldnt follow up on the mechanised units.

Also if a defensive army would succeed in locking down the breach (cant recall that happening) the Spearhead would be cut off.

For germany, especially l8r in the war, it would be hard to mount such an offensive because of a lack of fuel.

But in the end, I would say Blitzkrieg was a highly effective way to wage war. They captured (from 1939) Poland, Nethlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Greece, Yugoslavia and large portions of africa and Russia before the turn of the tide. History shows us that places where germany was forced to fight a "sitzkrieg" (Leningrad, Stalingrad, etc etc) they werent very succesfull. They simply couldnt afford the loss of live and equipment (attrition).

"edit" Check this site for some information and links
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/blitzkrieg.htm

In addition, the blitzkrieg caused panic among civilians and soldiers alike.

[Brutal DLX]

Quote[/b] (The Blind King of Bohemia @ April 21 2004,12:57)]Was Blitzkrieg a flawed operational tool?
No, it wasn't. As with other strategies, they can fail if certain key elements are lacking, but if the means are available, the operation conducted according to doctrine and if the circumstances (natural conditions as well as makeup, setup and alertness of enemy force(s)) are favorable, there is no inherent flaw that could render this strategy ineffective.

Whether or not it was a mistake to use it in WW2 in general or in certain locations specifically, is another question. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/smile.gif

[Sir Moody]

well considering the Blitzkrieg is the basis for most modern Tactics i would suggest it was effective

[Michiel de Ruyter]

Blitzkrieg itself was not a flawed tool IMHO.

But for Blitzkrieg to be used effectively, the following is needed:

A largely mechanized force; this is where Germany already had problems. The German army was actually all but motorized, and to reach the required level of mechanization needed they had to use almost everything they could get their hands on, and loads of outdated equipment.
A close cooperation between armor, mobile infantry and in the German case airforce. The Germans had forgotten or not chozen to mechanize their divisional artillery
to an extent that they could keep up with the armored spearheads. So the spearheads were out of artillery cover almost as soon as the advance started. Therefor the Germans used the Luftwaffe as an airborne artillery, with the infamous StuKa as it's greatest exponent.
A good infrastructure; This would reduce wear and tear on the armor, and ease the supply of troops.
A logistics apparatus that could keep up with the armored advance.
[/list]

Now the things were it went, partially, wrong for the Germans. These flaws became evident in Russia.

The German forces were never sufficiently mechanized. Mechanized artillery was not in existence, and had to be improvised rapidly as the need for them arose; That is where the Wespe and Hummel came in (together with a few conversions) in the artillery department, and various mobile AT-guns. Only from the development of the Pz V onwards, there was almost from the beginning the development of selfpropelled AT/AA/Artillery versions.

In Russia there was simply no decent roadnetwork (and a different railgauge to the German one), which ment that the logistic troops could not keep up supplying spare parts, ammo and the like; wear and tear on the armor was devastating. The logistic capabilities of the Germans were simply not able to cope with the demands as they lagged the proper mechanization. Infantry lagged behind even further, and the spearheads almost outran even the Luftwaffe coverage.

The Germans never came round to developing a strategic airforce. By the time they realized their error it was too late, as they had to start form scratch (sole exception being the Condor).

Blitzkrieg itself in essence is nothing more then the scaled up version of what most commanders on the battlefield strive for: Achieve local superiority and break the enmy lines, and then cutting of his line of retreat if possible. The scale is massive, and it uses all arms.

[Plantagenet]

De Ruyter has hit the important points that could make it difficult to execute the strategy. You'll notice most of those points are environmental/operational/planning factors, not inherent weaknesses in the strategy itself.

For instance, while every panzer division would ideally contain Mech. Inf., the original strategy only called for Mot. Inf.. The difference between the two types only became a problem in Russia, where lack of adequate roads meant that Mot. Inf. just couldn't keep up with the tanks, whereas Mech. could (tracks vs. wheels). Likewise, tanks outpacing the artillery only became a problem in Russia (which is why Mech. Art. wasn't developed until late). Even then, it could be compensated for by tactical bombers; but once you start losing more tac. bombers and experienced pilots than you produce/train, well, you can see where that goes.

But did it have any inherent weaknesses? I can think of 2:

1. By its very nature, Blitzkrieg created a deep salient, which eventually became a corridor through which ran the spearhead's supplies. If it was cut, the spearheads became surrounded and cut-off. The German generals knew this and always planned accordingly, but after Hitler took over supreme command, the Russians pulled it off at Stalingrad, and were able to isolate and destroy an entire German army. It wasn't the fault of the strategy or the generals (who warned Hitler repeatedly it was about to happen), but it was a weakness in the system that the Russians exploited because Herr Jackass allowed them to.

2. It was a purely offensive strategy meant to avoid the defensive stalemate of WWI. Those generals who were able to adapt it for defensive purposes (Rommel, Manstein) did so on their own initiative, and generally against Hitler's wishes. But even brilliant commanders like those 2 eventually had to face the fact that your armor can only charge from hotspot to hotspot plugging gaps and blunting advances if they are well-fuelled and equipped.