Waterloo

[SwordsMaster]

Here is one for you historians, experts in the Napoleonic era.

Was Waterloo decisive?

I know historically it was, but I want to know what you think about it in the "factual" sense. I mean, would Napoleon be able to gather another army with the remainng of his followers?

Would the allies have been finally defeated if they had lost? Was it really impossible for Bonaparte to come back?

Was it a psychological loss more than even a military one?

[Plantagenet]

In my opinion, it was about as decisive as it could be under the circumstances (both Allies already separately engaged at Quatre Bras and Ligny but not decisively defeated, Austrians and Russians not present, etc.).

And again, in my opinion, it was much too late for any sort of negotiated settlement that left Napoleon in power or even free. So even had he won at Waterloo, the glory days were over, and by now the Allies had thoroughly reformed their armies and were producing some quality generals of their own that could stand up to Napoleon on the "modern" battlefield he had created (Archduke Charles, Wellington, Suvorov, Blucher, etc.).

Britain had already decided it was war to the end, even if that meant fighting on alone. France still lacked the means to invade England, while the Royal Navy had established dominance of the seas. Plus, the nationalist feelings of the German people, kept dormant by force since 1648 (and perhaps even since 1250), had been re-awakened under Austria and Prussia, and after the Battle of Leipzig could not be put back to bed, especially by France, who was the main catalyst and enemy of the new German nationalism.

So a French victory at Waterloo would only have postponed the inevitable: Britain, the Netherlands, Austria, Prussia, the German states, and Russia invade France and topple Napoleon.

[Kaiser of Arabia]

If Napoleon had won Waterloo, he might have brought France back to it's former glory. From waterloo he could have captured Brussles, and moved into Germany and Spain Again. He would have had a chance, even though his best Generals were dead (Lannes).
-Capo

[JAG]

Capo - You are talking rubbish, he would not have gone into Spain and Germany, he would have turned east and defended France from the incoming armies of Russia and Austria.

Waterloo was not decisive in terms of militarily, but politically it was dynamite to his chances. He could not have a loss like he did, he simply had to avoid it. What Waterloo showed was that yes he was back, but no he couldn't be the 1809 general. Militarily Napoleon not only had another army in training - bigger than his field army - but he still had 2/3 of his army which fought the Waterloo campaign in tact, this was perfect shape. This was because the Prussians and British forces were equally hit, and this meant that like the retreat from Russia, though he may have to retreat and regroup, the enemy was in NO position to follow up and press home the advantage fully.

It is interesting to surmise what could have been if politics wasn't involved or Napoleon hadn't had the health worries, but it wasn't to be. He still could have fought on and cost the lives of countless thousands more.

[Kaiser of Arabia]

I'm saying he COULD HAVE...
Not that he actually would have, but he would have eventually.
-Capo

[ah_dut]

i don't think so somehow...

[TheSilverKnight]

Quote[/b] (Caporegime1984 @ June 24 2004,10:57)]I'm saying he COULD HAVE...
Not that he actually would have, but he would have eventually.
-Capo
No, he wouldn't have eventually. Russia and Austria were gathering armies into the east and were marching towards France. If Bonaparte had won Waterloo, the British and Prussians would've been forced to withdraw, and Napoleon would commit his armies to the defence of the Northeastern and Eastern borders of France. He wouldn't have dared try another stunt like Spain, for it brought him to an eventual downfall, as would've been the case had he ignited another Peninsular War.

[Accounting Troll]

Had Napoleon won at Waterloo, I think it would have only brought him a few weeks or months at the most because nations such as Russia were already sending out armies against him.

By 1815 Napoleons best days were past him - he was so disease ridden than even answering the calls of nature were agonising. Wellington knew that all he had to do at Waterloo was hold on and wait for Napoleon to make a mistake.

[JAG]

AT - you give Wellington a bit too much credit, or rather Napoleon too little. Napoleon even at this point was still thought of as the best military genius of the age and possibly ever. I forget the exact quote, but the saying that Napoleons hat was worth xx thousand men. Though, yes Napoleon did royally mess up at waterloo, though his Champagne work was his normal genius.



Quote[/b] ]He wouldn't have dared try another stunt like Spain, for it brought him to an eventual downfall

Russian invasion brought his downfall, the Spanish invasion was merely a continue annoyance politically and militarily. He kept sending troops in, breaking his motto throughout the wars of never reinforcing failure and really hurt him on the old propaganda scales.


Quote[/b] ]I'm saying he COULD HAVE...
Not that he actually would have, but he would have eventually.


And yes, as I said and others have he would have done nothing of the sort, he would have been marching to the defence. Not only this but even if he beat the Russians and Austrians, how long do you really think it would last?

[ah_dut]

Quote[/b] (JAG @ June 28 2004,08:49)]AT - you give Wellington a bit too much credit, or rather Napoleon too little. Napoleon even at this point was still thought of as the best military genious of the age and possibly ever. I forget the exact quote, but the saying that Napoleons hat was worth xx thousand men. Thought, yes Napoleon did royally fuck up at waterloo, though his Campagne work was his normal genius.



Quote[/b] ]He wouldn't have dared try another stunt like Spain, for it brought him to an eventual downfall

Russian invasion brought his downfall, the Spanish invasion was merely a continue annoyance politically and militarily. He kept sending troops in, breaking his motto throughout thewars of never reinforcing failure and really hurt him on the old propaganda scales.


Quote[/b] ]I'm saying he COULD HAVE...
Not that he actually would have, but he would have eventually.


And yes, as I said and others have he would have done nothing of the sort, he woudl have been marching to the defence. Not only this but even if he beat the Russians and Austrians, how long do you really think it would last?
sorry JAG but it goes nore like this, 'i would rather 30,000 men came to the field than napoleon the new commmander

[Spino]

Waterloo was decisive in every way. The conclusion of the Waterloo campaign was an enormous blow to the psychology of Napoleon's supporters, both civilian and military. Napoleon simply had to pull off a decisive victory against one or both of the Allied armies arrayed against him at the onset of the campaign. Strategically, the neccessity of such a victory was obvious as it would give him more time to rebuild France's military in the face of the advancing Allied armies. Politically such a victory would have cemented the support of those who took his side upon his return from Elba and would have been a strong persuasion to those 'fence sitters' at home to pledge support to his cause. Lastly, a decisive victory certainly would have helped silence his critics and those Frenchmen arrayed against him. To the anti-Napoleon crowd in Britain, Prussia, Austria & Russia the phoenix-like rebirth of Napoleon inflicting a lightning swift defeat on their coalition so soon after taking power might have persuaded them to sue for peace so long as France did not expand beyond its current borders. The French were not the only Europeans sick of war.

Napoleon's strategic planning and maneuvers during the Waterloo campaign were absolutely brilliant. Wellington and Blucher were caught completely off guard by his advances and their respective armies were divided in the exact manner that Napoleon desired. However despite these masterful strokes and the respective abilities of Napoleon's opponents there were several lesser known factors in play that made this campaign more likely to fail:

- Marshal Ney - Marshal Ney was extraordinarily brave, aggressive and an awesome motivator of men. Ney was also extremely adept at managing a fighting retreat. However, he was utterly incapable of making sound decisions when commanding anything greater than a single corps and given a free hand to conduct war. During the campaigns of 1813 & 1814 Ney's fumblings cost the Grand Army dearly. The worst occured when Napoleon granted Ney an independent command in 1813 with the goal of taking Berlin. Ney's army was utterly smashed at the battle of Dennewitz. He was defeated by Bernadotte (of all people), a former Marshal in the French army and widely acknowledged as one of Napoleon's worst generals This was proof enough that Napoleon's 'Red Lion' was in over his head when in command of anything greater than a single corps and not given clear directions as to where and when to deploy his forces. And yet despite these deficiencies Napoleon placed Marshal Ney in charge of half his army (the 'Left Wing') during the Waterloo campaign, a decision which eventually proved disastrous. Ney's timely mishandling of Quatre Bras and his astoundingly brave and idiotic cavalry charge at Waterloo (where he effectively decimated and exhausted most of the French cavalry for the remainder of the battle) proved more harmful to the French effort that day than anything Grouchy or D'Erlons did or did not do. In many respects Ney was the French counterpart to Blucher except there was no French counterpart to Gniesenau to offset Ney's complete lack of administrative skills and poor strategic vision.

- Marshal Davout - Napoleon's best general and one of the greatest captains of that period, the 'Iron Marshal', was surprisingly not in the field during the Waterloo campaign. Once back from Elba Napoleon appointed Davout as France's Minister of War (who strongly protested the appointment and repeatedly requested a field command) where he could best make use of his excellent administrative and logistical abilities and keep an eye out on the unruly and untrustworthy members of the Assembly (Davout also ran Napoleon's intelligence operations in Central Europe during the years leading up to the Russian campaign). Davout was the one man who's tactical & logistical abilities exceeded those of Napoleon's. I believe that Napoleon later admitted that in light of the Waterloo campaign he should have given Davout a field command and left the War Ministry to Carnot who did such an admirable job in that position years earlier. Yes, Marshal Davout was that good, so good that he was never defeated in battle I firmly believe that had Napoleon given Davout the Left Wing to command during the Waterloo campaign instead of Ney the outcome might have been very different.

In the end even if the Waterloo campaign been an astounding success for the French the best Napoleon could hope for would be the maintain the status of France's borders while remaining its sole ruler. This was a rather tall order but if there was one man who could pull it off it was Napoleon. Keep in mind that the revolutionary armies of France were faced with a far more dire situation than Napoleon faced upon his return to power and despite being confronted with the numerically (and to an extent, qualitatively) superior armies of Europe the fledgling Republic succeeded. However, would Napoleon's gargantuan ego have allowed for that kind of outcome? Not likely.

[TheSilverKnight]

Quote[/b] (JAG @ June 28 2004,00:49)]
Quote[/b] ]He wouldn't have dared try another stunt like Spain, for it brought him to an eventual downfall

Russian invasion brought his downfall, the Spanish invasion was merely a continue annoyance politically and militarily. He kept sending troops in, breaking his motto throughout thewars of never reinforcing failure and really hurt him on the old propaganda scales.
Oh yeah, my mistake. Sorry JAG. You're right, Russia did bring Napoleon's downfall, but the Peninsular War had a good deal to do with his downfall, what with Wellington, the Portuguese and Spanish Guerillas, and all of the battles that were French defeats.

[JAG]

Agreed TSK - it had it's place but I just don't think it was that huge a part of his downfall, of course it hurt him but not that much. You may disagree and I accept that.

Ah_duh .. you are clearly thinking of something totally different or you made the quote up yourself or something. Because that is nothing liek the quote I was getting at.

I think you are too harsh on Spino, he was much better at a tactical level than you give him credit for, as well as the charge at Waterloo is not soley down to his own errors - admittedly a lot of it is though. But apart from that I agree with you totally in all you say, well written.

[King Edward]

The Peninsular war hurt Napoleon in that it turned Wellingtons field army into some of the best and most hardened fighters the world has seen, the just did not know how to lose to the French it also gave Wellington a reputation that the French feared. Although the majority of wellingtons army was not from his peninsular campaign, that core of veterans are what helped the British hold on for so long and wait for the Prussians to arrive.

[Leodegar]

to Spino:

i'd really like to hear your opinion to the following:



Quote[/b] (Spino @ June 29 2004,00:22)]- Marshal Ney - Marshal Ney was extraordinarily brave, aggressive and an awesome motivator of men. Ney was also extremely adept at managing a fighting retreat.

And yet despite these deficiencies Napoleon placed Marshal Ney in charge of half his army (the 'Left Wing') during the Waterloo campaign, a decision which eventually proved disastrous.

I firmly believe that had Napoleon given Davout the Left Wing to command during the Waterloo campaign instead of Ney the outcome might have been very different.
there is even the opinion that it would have been enough if marshal Grouchy and marshal Ney were on each others place.

the careful and thoughtful Grouchy might have done better at Quatre Bras.
and the charismatic and hot-headed Ney might have done better in chaseing the prussians after Ligny and keeping them from regrouping. even a heavier attack at Wavre might have prevented them from marching three of their four corps to Waterloo.

[Accounting Troll]

Quote[/b] (JAG @ June 28 2004,06:49)]AT - you give Wellington a bit too much credit, or rather Napoleon too little. Napoleon even at this point was still thought of as the best military genious of the age and possibly ever. I forget the exact quote, but the saying that Napoleons hat was worth xx thousand men.
Napoleon used better tactics to win a series of victories, but his enemies adapted in time - in the Peninsular War the British lined men up in rows instead of French columns which gave the British the advantage in infantry duels. By about 1810 he was living on past glories.

Napoleon's lack of knowledge about logistics led him to disasterous expeditions such as invading Egypt and getting cut off by the Royal Navy as well as the better known Russian debacle.

Incidentally, if the Battle of Waterloo had gone the other way, I think that Napoleon would have eventually been defeated by sheer force of numbers, however it would have been a shared coalition victory, not a British victory. Britain would not have had so much international prestiege in the 19th century, which would have made the empire weaker. Remember that the Battle of Waterloo was only fought a few months after a failed American invasion of Canada and the Americans were still looking for signs of British weakness that they would be able to exploit.

[Spino]

Quote[/b] ]I think you are too harsh on Spino, he was much better at a tactical level than you give him credit for, as well as the charge at Waterloo is not soley down to his own errors - admittedly a lot of it is though. But apart from that I agree with you totally in all you say, well written.

Thanks Well I was really leveling most of my criticism at Ney's poor strategic vision which often had a profound effect on how he handled any given tactical situation. In general Ney could be extremely effective on the battlefield provided he was provided with clear cut objectives and issued concise commands by his commander (i.e. Napoleon). Anytime he was left to his own devices it became painfully obvious that he wasn't too adept at formulating a sound plan. However, Ney was ideal for those times when Napoleon had a tough nut to crack or a position to hold at all costs.


Quote[/b] ]there is even the opinion that it would have been enough if marshal Grouchy and marshal Ney were on each others place.

the careful and thoughtful Grouchy might have done better at Quatre Bras.
and the charismatic and hot-headed Ney might have done better in chaseing the prussians after Ligny and keeping them from regrouping. even a heavier attack at Wavre might have prevented them from marching three of their four corps to Waterloo.

I've never heard this before but it seems like a good idea. I don't know the specifics about Grouchy's career prior to Waterloo other than he acquitted himself well enough in numerous campaigns to earn himself a Marshal's baton. Grouchy was far more level headed and responsible general than Ney or even Murat. However, Grouchy lacked that 'go for the jugular' instinct that made Ney and Murat so famous. Regarding Quatre Bras the main goal as provided by Napoleon was simply to prevent the British from linking up with and supporting the Prussians at Ligny. Ney did accomplish this but rather sloppily; his recall of D'Erlons' Corps which Napoleon specifically summoned to Ligny so he could outflank and crush the Prussians at Ligny prevented the French from delivering a far more decisive blow.

Ney's innate aggressiveness might have proved more effective against the Prussians at Wavre but would he have been capable enough to realize and counter the dire strategic situation that saw those Prussian corps slipping away and marching west to aid Wellington?

[Leodegar]

Quote[/b] (Spino @ June 30 2004,21:57)]Ney's innate aggressiveness might have proved more effective against the Prussians at Wavre but would he have been capable enough to realize and counter the dire strategic situation that saw those Prussian corps slipping away and marching west to aid Wellington?
i think the biggest fault after Ligny was that Napoleon and his leading commanders charged the whole situation wrong. they thought the prussian army was more or less rooted and incapable to step in the campaign too soon. that might explain why they were only chased half-hearted by only one corps and not at high urgency. and i think it wasn't that much Grouchy's fault but a mistake of Napoleon and his whole staff.
but at the battle of wavre it was too late. Grouchy faced a regrouped prussian army consisting of four corps behind a river whereas he had only one corps. so the only chance of the french would have been a merciless hunt after the prussian retreat at Ligny. if they had conducted it with all force and haste, they might have been able to turn the more or less organized retreat of the prussians into a head over heels flight. which could have resulted in really taking them out of the ongoing campaign. and perhaps, with the right orders marshal Ney would have been the right man for that.
but i don't think he actually would have done better than Grouchy at the battle of Wavre itself.

[Spino]

Quote[/b] (Leodegar @ June 30 2004,17:56)]
Quote[/b] (Spino @ June 30 2004,21:57)]Ney's innate aggressiveness might have proved more effective against the Prussians at Wavre but would he have been capable enough to realize and counter the dire strategic situation that saw those Prussian corps slipping away and marching west to aid Wellington?
i think the biggest fault after Ligny was that Napoleon and his leading commanders charged the whole situation wrong. they thought the prussian army was more or less rooted and incapable to step in the campaign too soon. that might explain why they were only chased half-hearted by only one corps and not at high urgency. and i think it wasn't that much Grouchy's fault but a mistake of Napoleon and his whole staff.
but at the battle of wavre it was too late. Grouchy faced a regrouped prussian army consisting of four corps behind a river whereas he had only one corps. so the only chance of the french would have been a merciless hunt after the prussian retreat at Ligny. if they had conducted it with all force and haste, they might have been able to turn the more or less organized retreat of the prussians into a head over heels flight. which could have resulted in really taking them out of the ongoing campaign. and perhaps, with the right orders marshal Ney would have been the right man for that.
but i don't think he actually would have done better than Grouchy at the battle of Wavre itself.
I completely agree. The French pursuit of the Prussians after Ligny should have been more aggressive. However keep in mind that the weather was appalling on the 17th, with heavy rains beginning sometime around noon and continuing well into the evening (thus creating the muddy quagmire that delayed the French attack by 5-6 hours at Waterloo on the 18th). Those conditions would have hampered any kind of pursuit (or retreat for that matter). Any yet after taking a gander at this excellent map of the Waterloo campaign you can see that from the night of the 16th to the morning of the 18th the Prussians retreated 15+ miles to Wavre, a respectable distance given the weather conditions. I don't believe a more aggressive pursuit would have pushed the Prussians further north than Wavre but it certainly would have left them in greater disarray than they actually were. If this map is reasonably accurate then one thing for certain is that Grouchy would have been better off had the bulk of his forces taken the more direct route north instead of the NE -> N by NW route he eventually took while pursuing the Prussians.

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/waterloo_campaign_1815.jpg

Here's a webpage that discusses the weather for the Waterloo campaign:

http://ams.allenpress.com/amsonli....ge=0413 (http://ams.allenpress.com/amsonline/?request=get-abstract&issn=1520-0477&volume=074&issue=03&page=0413)

The Waterloo Campaign extended from 15 to 18 June 1815, with the decisive Battle of Waterloo taking place on the 18th. The campaign involved the “Army of the North” of Napoleon on the one hand, and the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies on the other. The latter were commanded, respectively, by the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blücher. A shallow but active low and associated warm and cold fronts crossed the battle area on the 16th and 17th.

The weather had important effects on the battles. On the 16th, in a battle between part of the French army and part of the Prussian army, at the village of Ligny, about 40 km south-southeast of Brussels, thunderstorms connected with the passage of the aforementioned warm front made the use of muskets impracticable.

However, the most important weather effects developed on the 17th and during the night from the 17th to the 18th. Violent thunderstorms occurred early in the afternoon of the 17th close to Ligny, while Napoleon was in the process of attacking the Anglo-Dutch force at Quatre Bras. The rains turned the ground into a quagmire, making it impossible for the French artillery and cavalry, and even for the infantry, to move across the fields in extended order, as required by the emperor. The French advance was so greatly slowed down that Wellington was able to withdraw his lighter force to a better position near Waterloo. Thus, the Anglo-Dutch force was almost completely preserved for the decisive battle of the next day.

The rainshowers of the 17th and the night from the 17th to the 18th softened the ground to an extent that, on the morning of the 18th, Napoleon and his artillery experts judged that the battle—the Battle of Waterloo—could not be started before a late hour of the forenoon [1130 local standard time (LST)]. Until the arrival of the Prussian force, about 1600 LST and later, the battle tended to go in favor of the French, but the Prussians turned the tide of the fighting.

[JAG]

Quote[/b] ]Napoleon used better tactics to win a series of victories, but his enemies adapted in time - in the Peninsular War the British lined men up in rows instead of French columns which gave the British the advantage in infantry duels. By about 1810 he was living on past glories.


One of the major concepts of the Napoleonic period which is forever thought of wrong is the whole French columns attacking British lines. Yes the French would march in columns to start the attack but this was mainly a morale factor rather than an actual combat factor. Before the British lines other armies would simply run away when they saw the huge French columns and the beating drums and chants coming from in front of them. This coupled with the considerable prestige and record of the French and the very good skirmishers the French had - which was only matched and beaten by the British - meant that defending units simply buckled before any real combat. So when the French columns met the British with their bigger Skirmish lines and better morale they had to fight, and on the most part what happened was the columns formed line and went into a fire fight. Generally it was not a case of French columns actually attacking and fighting in column.


Quote[/b] ]Napoleon's lack of knowledge about logistics led him to disasterous expeditions such as invading Egypt and getting cut off by the Royal Navy as well as the better known Russian debacle.

Actually I would state that napoleons logistics was better than any other commander, and indeed brought it to brand new levels of effectiveness. The way napoleon constructed his campaigns, the detail he put into them from the lowest levels to the top was awesome. Far from being a logistical nightmare he was a genius. Remember he was an artillery commander he knew exactly what was needed on a tactical level and because of this he put great effort into all the logistical parts of fighting.

He was cut off at Egypt, but there was a hell of alot of political reasons for that campaign, it was not merely a military campaign. But yes it was disastrous and he was beaten there.

[lonewolf371]

Quite honestly from what I've seen and read the battle of Waterloo had almost no influence on whether Napoleon would have had the ability to reforge his empire or even his sovereign leadership of France. The forces Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia were gathering were simply too large. Napoleon hadn't been able to win Leipzig against a bunch of German states, how could he hope to win a war against 4 of the most powerful nations in the world all at the same time? Earlier Napoleon had forged his empire by destroying many of his enemies one by one, but the numbers he'd be facing in this situation would simply be too vast. Even the British and the Prussians had still been gathering forces when he attacked them at Waterloo. And the Austrians and Russians could almost be assured of having a larger force, even if it might not be as well trained.

My point is after his invasion of Russia Napoleon no longer had a chance of keeping his empire. The Russians pretty much managed to decimate him in the same fashion that the Romans had destroyed the Carthaginians millenia earlier.

[JAG]

Lonewolf actually much of what you say is slightly wrong.

At Leipzig is was not merely a number of German states, you really think that German states could muster 400,000 men? It is often called the battle of nations for good reason. The French army and it's allies were facing armies from not only Prussia but Austria, Russia and even Sweden. So your assertion that it was not a case of him being hugely outnumbered by some of the most powerful states in the world at the time is very much wrong.




Quote[/b] ]Earlier Napoleon had forged his empire by destroying many of his enemies one by one

Wrong. The 4th coalition eventually beat Napoleon, that is 4 coalitions of many nations. The last coalition was for example made up of Britain, Russia, Austria, Spain, Sweden, later the new nationalized Prussians and many more. Napoleon was practically always fighting 2 armies under command of different nations, this variable was in fact build into his strategic and campaign planning. He divided the enemy armies then conquered them, he was hardly ever alone against a single nation in his campaign's and never was he allowed to take out enemy countries one by one.


Quote[/b] ]but the numbers he'd be facing in this situation would simply be too vast.

I don't think so if you look at it politically if he had won at Waterloo many of the number advantages would have meant nothing. Napoleon won many of his campaign's not because he beat them on the field in huge numbers, or even that he was vastly winning the campaign's, but he won them politically. His major tactic was to march on the capital of the country he was invading and once taken demand they issue for peace. This was successful everytime except for the Russian campaign of 1812. A country is so reliant on it's capital that when it is taken it's numbers of armies tends to mean nothing as there is no base to organise and maintain the army. This was totally different in Russian, as even though Napoleon took Moscow the Russians were not ready and wanting peace, they could survive without their capital. This was his mistake which brought his downfall. So it was very much possible for him to get around any number problems.




Quote[/b] ]Even the British and the Prussians had still been gathering forces when he attacked them at Waterloo.

This too is not correct. At Waterloo and the Campaign the allies had their full forces at their disposal it was Napoleon who didn't, he still had another army being trained and readies at Paris. The armies which the British and Prussians had was their forces, they were not scrambling any more troops.


Quote[/b] ]And the Austrians and Russians could almost be assured of having a larger force, even if it might not be as well trained.

It could be argued that the Austrian army would have been far better trained than the vast majority of the French units. Remember a lot of veterans had died in previous campaigns, where as the Austrians were simply evolving and learning tactics which worked in this new period. The Russians would not have been as well trained, granted. And Again, numbers mean nothing. Napoleon beat an Austrian - Russian coalition in battles before - and handsomely - and so he would not shy away or fear doing it again.

After all this you must remember right back at the start of the French empire and Napoleon what position they were in. At the point of revolution and after they were the weakest they had ever been and indeed they were the weakest nation in Europe. But they were still able to overcome it and enemy armies to forge the single biggest empire in mainland Europe ever seen - bigger than the Nazi's. To say that they would fear this sort of situation again is to totally misjudge the French at this point in time, they still felt they were unbeatable.

[lonewolf371]

Quote[/b] ]At Leipzig is was not merely a number of German states, you really think that German states could muster 400,000 men? It is often called the battle of nations for good reason. The French army and it's allies were facing armies from not only Prussia but Austria, Russia and even Sweden. So your assertion that it was not a case of him being hugely outnumbered by some of the most powerful states in the world at the time is very much wrong.

Granted that Napoleon was outnumbered by not only German states, but before he had always managed to go on the offensive fast enough to prevent all of his enemies uniting and thus a battle such as Leipzig from occuring.


Quote[/b] ]Wrong. The 4th coalition eventually beat Napoleon, that is 4 coalitions of many nations. The last coalition was for example made up of Britain, Russia, Austria, Spain, Sweden, later the new nationalized Prussians and many more. Napoleon was practically always fighting 2 armies under command of different nations, this variable was in fact build into his strategic and campaign planning. He divided the enemy armies then conquered them, he was hardly ever alone against a single nation in his campaign's and never was he allowed to take out enemy countries one by one.

Once again I must restate the point above, Napoleon had never allowed his enemies to unite, because he knew if he did it would cause a situation similar to that at Leipzig. While it was true that all of the four previously mentioned major nations had united in coalitions against Napoleon before, they had always taken seperate "swings" at him, meaning that each of their armies had attacked Napoleon on seperate occasions which had allowed him to defeat them while they were still divided. The closest coalition to defeat France (before the 6th) occured against Revolutionary France (the "2nd" coalition, not against Napoleon) which was eventually defeated.


Quote[/b] ]I don't think so if you look at it politically if he had won at Waterloo many of the number advantages would have meant nothing. Napoleon won many of his campaign's not because he beat them on the field in huge numbers, or even that he was vastly winning the campaign's, but he won them politically. His major tactic was to march on the capital of the country he was invading and once taken demand they issue for peace. This was successful everytime except for the Russian campaign of 1812. A country is so reliant on it's capital that when it is taken it's numbers of armies tends to mean nothing as there is no base to organise and maintain the army. This was totally different in Russian, as even though Napoleon took Moscow the Russians were not ready and wanting peace, they could survive without their capital. This was his mistake which brought his downfall. So it was very much possible for him to get around any number problems.

Perhaps, but first of all you must remember that during this time of Absolute Rulers any threat to their power in their opinion had to be stamped out, whether it be sooner or later. The most Napoleon could have gotten out of Waterloo would be his crown, and eventually the other nations would want to stamp that out as well. As to the numbers, if Napoleon had won Waterloo, he would probably have been able to summon a force of about 420,000 troops, excluding all casualties. This would be matched up against the massive Allied force of 1,000,000 soldiers, outnumbering more than 2 to 1. At Leipzig that was almost the exact ratio: 2 to 1. Wellington and Blucher had roughly 230,000, how many would he face against the Russians and Austrians? And do you honestly believe that after allowing every single one of their butts to be whooped that they would split their forces and allow Napoleon to do it AGAIN?


Quote[/b] ]This too is not correct. At Waterloo and the Campaign the allies had their full forces at their disposal it was Napoleon who didn't, he still had another army being trained and readies at Paris. The armies which the British and Prussians had was their forces, they were not scrambling any more troops.

Granted on this point, but even he HAD whooped Prussia AND England, unless he sued for peace IMMEDIATELY afterwards they would return soon while Napoleon was dealing with the Austrians and Russians, and as before it would be Leipzig all over again, with Napoleon fighting on way more fronts than he would be able.


Quote[/b] ]It could be argued that the Austrian army would have been far better trained than the vast majority of the French units. Remember a lot of veterans had died in previous campaigns, where as the Austrians were simply evolving and learning tactics which worked in this new period. The Russians would not have been as well trained, granted. And Again, numbers mean nothing. Napoleon beat an Austrian - Russian coalition in battles before - and handsomely - and so he would not shy away or fear doing it again.

Granted that French morale might still have been better than the Austrians, but NOT that the French were by any means ill-trained or equipped. France during the revolution was hardly the weakest nation in Europe, next to Russia it had the largest manpower pool to draw upon, and an excellent military legacy left to it by the Bourbons. During the late 1700's no other army in Europe could match France save Britain, which had inferior artillery and cavalry. This legacy carried through the reign of Napoleon and while granted that many of the German nations HAD reformed, their armies still did not match up to the training, equipment, and rigidness of the French military machine.

While I will say that my original post was ill-informed, I will also say that nothing in that post was seriously contradictory to what I've researched over the past two days. While Napoleon MIGHT have defeated all of his enemies and regained mastery of Europe, I also say the likeliness for this is VERY low. As history proved. But what is probably most amusing to me, would be what we would be argueing about had Napoleon WON Waterloo...

EDIT: I did take your post seriously and tried to do a little research to make sure nothing in my reply was seriously wrong, thanks for encouraging me to enlighten myself. http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wink.gif

[Spino]

Quote[/b] ]One of the major concepts of the Napoleonic period which is forever thought of wrong is the whole French columns attacking British lines. Yes the French would march in columns to start the attack but this was mainly a morale factor rather than an actual combat factor. Before the British lines other armies would simply run away when they saw the huge French columns and the beating drums and chants coming from in front of them. This coupled with the considerable prestige and record of the French and the very good skirmishers the French had - which was only matched and beaten by the British - meant that defending units simply buckled before any real combat. So when the French columns met the British with their bigger Skirmish lines and better morale they had to fight, and on the most part what happened was the columns formed line and went into a fire fight. Generally it was not a case of French columns actually attacking and fighting in column.

Actually the use of columns to 'smash' or break through troops in line was integral to all nations' infantry tactics in the post-Frederick era. France's revolutionary armies relied almost exclusively on columns with unusually large numbers of skirmishers not simply because of their positive effects on morale but because this was the easiest and most effective formation for fresh, inexperienced troops to form and maintain. I do not believe columns stopping and changing into line formation upon reaching effective musket range of enemy troops was standard practise. Generally when columns were within musket range of enemy troops they would stop only to discharge a single volley before charging. The softening of enemy formations was generally left to artillery and skirmishers which hopefully did a sufficient job prior to the attack. But anyway the greatest strength of the column was its speed and maneuverability, factors which allowed it to travel and maneuver over the battlefield much faster than units in line formation. However, the development of the Ordre Mixte (Mixed Order) formation, a combination of units in both line and attack column formation, was intended to provide columns with more fire support while retaining their shock effect. Despite the obvious strengths of Ordre Mixte and Napoleon's strong preference for this particular formation I don't believe the French ever used it in action against the British (it certainly would have helped matters).

I would argue against your statement that grants British infantry with superior morale. British infantrymen certainly possessed, on the average, superior discipline but not superior morale. In terms of overall morale I believe the French armies of the revolution and Napoleonic era were unmatched by their counterparts. The French army was one based on meritocracy, in that every man knew that if he tried his best he would be recognized for his actions and possibly promoted up through the ranks. This, in addition to the social reforms of the revolution also had the desired effect of making each man feel he had a personal stake in the outcome and more cognizant of the opinion of his fellow countrymen. Napoleon and many of his Marshals were men of humble origins, a fact that virtually every French soldier was aware of ("A (marshal's) baton in every backpack" as the saying goes). This was in stark contrast to the British army which was a microcosm of British society which was based on a strict class system that saw very little upward mobility within each class and a system that was unusually unforgiving of even the smallest of offenses which were often 'corrected' with corporal punishment. Beyond pain and death the average French soldier feared failure because it could adversely affect their opportunity for advancement and put them in a bad way with their comrades and disappoint their emperor. Take note that corporal punishment was virtually non-existent in the French army, it simply wasn't needed. Beyond pain and death the average British soldier truly feared his superior officers who could make his life a living hell.


Quote[/b] ]It could be argued that the Austrian army would have been far better trained than the vast majority of the French units. Remember a lot of veterans had died in previous campaigns, where as the Austrians were simply evolving and learning tactics which worked in this new period. The Russians would not have been as well trained, granted. And Again, numbers mean nothing. Napoleon beat an Austrian - Russian coalition in battles before - and handsomely - and so he would not shy away or fear doing it again.

Even at the end of Napoleon's reign in France I would still place the French military at the top of the list in terms of overall effectiveness. The social effects of of the revolution and the widespread adoption of meritocracy in the French military in addition to the excellent reforms of Gribeauval, Carnot and Napoleon made it the greatest fighting machine of its day.


Quote[/b] ]Granted that Napoleon was outnumbered by not only German states, but before he had always managed to go on the offensive fast enough to prevent all of his enemies uniting and thus a battle such as Leipzig from occuring.

Yes, but you assume that had Napoleon beaten Wellington and Blucher in the Waterloo campaign he would have had to fight another Leipzig simply because the rest of Europe's military would be arrayed against him. This logic is flawed simply because Leipzig was the exception, not the rule. Napoleon was always at his best when the odds were stacked against him and in those situations he always sought to divide and conquer his enemies. However, for whatever reason it seems to me that whenever Napoleon had (or perceived that he had) the luxury of numbers and position he would get sloppy and not take great pains with respect to maneuver and/or his battlefield tactics. I believe Napoleon's tactics at Borodino, Wagram and Leipzig all seem to support this hypothesis.

By the way, great thread so far guys Polite, well mannered, open minded and well formed responses all around http://www.totalwar.org/forum/non-cgi/emoticons/wave.gif

[econ21]

Spino, I am not sure you are right about the columns. Yes, relatively untrained but high morale revolutionary French armies did use them to overrun the more conventional lines employed by their opponents. And yes, almost all armies would form assault columns when intending to smash throw a given point. But I suspect in most periods, it was not usual to attempt this until the enemy defences had been worn down by artillery, by firefights in line formation, by maneouvre etc.

Some of the more recent literature I have read on this argues that the idea of columns of Napoleonic French forces attacking English lines is a misconception. It argues that the French typically tried to form line from their columns when confronted with steady English troops. The reverse slope defence used by Wellington meant that this maneouvre was often left too late, with the resulting confusion and delay being one reason Wellington's redcoats nearly always broke French infantry attacks.

At the battle I know best, Waterloo, D'Erlon's attack was in columns so large that they were almost stacked lines. While some argue that these columns were terrible formations suited only for crude melee, others have argued that they were actually wider that the British formations in more compact 4 rank lines and quite suited for a firefight. At any rate, the columns did not charge the British, but engaged in a fierce firefight that was only ended by the charge of the British heavy cavalry into the French flanks. Later on when the Guard attacked the British line, they came on in columns but deployed into line when encountering opposition and delivered some sharp volleys. They were ultimately broken by overwhelming firepower from lines of Allied infantry that outnumbered and outflanked them.

[lonewolf371]

Quote[/b] ]At any rate, the columns did not charge the British, but engaged in a fierce firefight that was only ended by the charge of the British heavy cavalry into the French flanks.

I thought that after coming over the ridge the British fired a volley at the French and charged. However they were soon counter-charged by both the French infantry and cavalry. In the ensuing melee, the British were only saved by yet another charge by British cavalry on the French flanks.

[econ21]

Quote[/b] (lonewolf371 @ July 07 2004,21:43)]I thought that after coming over the ridge the British fired a volley at the French and charged. However they were soon counter-charged by both the French infantry and cavalry. In the ensuing melee, the British were only saved by yet another charge by British cavalry on the French flanks.
No, I never heard that one. Melee - in the sense of bayonet to bayonet fighting - was pretty rare in Napoleonic battles. Usually one side would break and run before the other reached them. In that sense, melee between infantry was a morale contest. Most wounds were due to musket and cannon balls. That's why I say that relying on assault columns to simply smash through is probably a misrepresentation of French tactics. Sid Meier's Gettysburg system - applied to Waterloo by Breakaway Games - probably captures this well. You wait until the enemy unit flags are "drooping" - the enemy are wavering - before attempting a charge.

Perhaps the best account of the practical details of combat at Waterloo I have read is in John Keegan's "Face of battle" book. It's pretty consistent with other stuff I read by historians who specialise more in Napoleonic warfare, but has an attractive analytic structure.

One reason I am sceptical about your account is the mention of the British being charged by French cavalry. A problem with the D'Erlon's attack was that he did not bring much cavalry - just a cuirassier brigade (Travers?) in support on the left that was overrun by the Household Cavalry. Also, I don't get the reference to "yet another" British cavalry charge - the heavy brigades only charged once, at the climax of D'Erlon's attack (and were almost wrecked by the end of it).

But I agree with you to the extent that the outcome of the attack was in the balance until the British cavalry charged. I think this supports the idea that it was not a stereotypical "French column charging steady line" encounter, but more of a fierce firefight.

[lonewolf371]

This site (http://waterloobattletours.users.btopenworld.com/page15.html) and this site (http://www.napoleonguide.com/battle_waterloo.htm) both describe the British soldiers behind the ridge charging the French infantrymen. The British later began to be overwhelmed when the Charge of the Scots Greys arrived to their aid and drove the French back all the way to their artillery batteries. In addition, one of the sites also states that the British formed a square because of the threat of French supporting Cuirassiers. The reason why I said "yet another" was becaused I had used the word "charge" a lot recently, and I felt it was becoming repetitive. In addition, the word "charge" isn't accurate for the French, I only used it to depict the melee combat that followed.

In addition, I also believe that melee combat was not used as sparingly as you believe, in The Mammoth Book of Soldiers at War several Napoleonic soldiers describe many engagements in which melee combat ensued. The reason for this is largely the same as that for large formations: due to the fact that during Napoleonic times most guns were still largely inaccurate the only effective way to utilize them was to have soldiers in massive formations shooting at each other, the philosophy being that this protected them against cavalry and also "if all these soldiers shoot in the same general direction, they're bound to hit something". Because guns were so innaccurate, when attacking enemy fortified positions after weaking the defending soldiers with artillery, the attackers would advance in columns and engage the other side in melee combat, in which case the side with superior discipline/morale would almost always win.

This is largely the main reason for the United State's success in the Mexican American war: the Mexicans often fortified their positions with trenches and such but the superior trained Americans (using Napoleonic tactics) often over-ran the Mexican positions with relative ease.

[econ21]

Certainly British infantry charged the French infantry - that was usually how such encounters ended. As far as I understand, Wellington's reverse slope defence meant that the attacking French columns were often surprised by the sudden appearance of British lines and subject to sharp volleys at close range. Typically, the French would halt and try to return fire, sometimes trying to deploy into line first. But the British would charge forward and break them.

With D'Erlon's attack, there were quite a few units involved and so what happened might have varied. I've read some accounts that are like you say - English volley, English charge. Others imply that the firefight was much more in the balance when the English cavalry charged. The English were heavily outnumbered, so even some initial successes would have required reinforcing as you say.

However, I've never read any account saying that the French charged. Yes, Travers' brigade of cuirassiers did cut up some Allied infantry on the French left (KGL and Hanoverian) but that was before D'Erlon's men reached the ridge and before the encounter with Picton's division.

I forget where I saw statistics for bayonet wounds - but they were around 1% of total, IIRC. Of course, you would try to charge key fortified positions at bayonet point but it was not the general tactics for attacking. Recall, La Haye Sainte only fell at Waterloo when the defenders ran out of ammunitition - the bullet trumped the bayonet.

[lonewolf371]

In my last post I had hoped to imply that the French had not charged at all, which they did not, but they both engaged in melee combat. Perhaps the largest reason some sources vary is the fact that the ability to see what was going on on the field was very poor, due to smoke, loud noise, and being in the midst of formations. I would not be surprised if many soldiers gave different accounts to their families and when writing in their diaries after the battle.

I am also not really too surprised at the 1% bayonet thing, due to mass formations, most cannon would be able to do much more damage than a bayonet charge.

Not to mention most casualties were due to sickness and disease.

[Pindar]

Through the Looking Glass:


Quote[/b] ]Would the allies have been finally defeated if they had lost? Was it really impossible for Bonaparte to come back?


I seems that the standard view regarding Napoleon's return from exile is that it was vain glorious. Even had Napoleon won at Waterloo, the combined might of the Coalition would have overwhelmed France before the winter. I would like to suggest a counter position.

This view operates off of a victorious Northern Campaign scenario. This might have been achieved at Ligny or perhaps later at Waterloo. Ligny seems a prime candidate for a possible decisive action given Blucher chose to stand alone with an exposed position instead of withdrawing. Recall that well into the battle, d'Erlon was marching on Blucher's vulnerable right flank from the East, but did not send the standard messengers ahead announcing his approach. General Vandamme informed the Emperor that the troops moving from the East were 20,000 enemy combatants and this forced Napoleon to withhold sending forward the Guard against the Prussian center that was disorganized and drained of any reserves. The resulting delay allowed the Prussians to recover and ultimately survive until darkness. d'Erlon (due to confused orders) ended up reversing his course and actually began marching back toward Ney at Quatre Bras. Had d'Erlon appeared and/or the Guard attacked when originally planned, the Prussian force may have been completely swept from the field. My guess is that a decisive action at Ligny would have precluded any stand by Wellington. He most probably would have marched toward Amsterdam either to hold the port or more likely to embark to England.

Regardless, with the assumption of a successful Northern Campaign the following benefits could have been gained:

*Napoleons own position within France would have been greatly strengthened against the royalists and may have swayed theretofore neutral parties to his side.

* There may very well have been a popular revolt in favor of the Emperor by his many Belgian supporters. This would have provided an extra supply of troops.

* A defeat or withdrawal of British forces may have led to a crisis for the Tory Government. If my recollection is right, England was stunned by the swift success of Napoleon’s return to power and the Whigs were pressing for an accommodation with the obvious choice of the French people.

*Bonaparte would have been able to concentrate his forces against a basically singular front.

*The Coalition may have become even more hesitant to engage a reinvigorated France.

*The Austrian factor: The 900,000 odd Coalition forces typically sited as presentable against perhaps 400,000 French assumes a Coalition continuity that may not have existed. The Council of Vienna that had convened after Napoleon’s abdication saw Austria’s standing seriously compromised. Russia immerged as the strongest nation on the Continent and began to act accordingly. The Czar’s forces had occupied Poland and claimed it as their own. When Austria objected, they were bluntly told they could attempt to forcibly remove the Russian army or accept it. In addition, Prussia appears to have fallen more and more under the Czar’s sway. Prussia was offered Saxony to quell any opposition they might have had to Russian moves, again against Austria’s wishes. The English appeared distant and uninterested in Austria’s new situation. Austria was alone and surrounded by contrary interests. Napoleon reinstated to the throne of France and initially victorious in the North may have helped Austria recall its old ties to a Bonapartist France. Napoleon’s wife and the mother of his child was a Hapsburg. His heir was therefore of Hapsburg blood. Napoleon’s old Marshal Murat’s (the King of Naples) ill-timed move against Austria had placed the Kingdom of Naples in question. Austria already controlled Northern Italy. This gave Metternich several diplomatic options. It may well have been to Austria’s advantage to see a weakened, but still potent Bonapartist France to act as counter to a belligerent Russia. At the time of the Northern campaign neither Austria or Russia appeared to be rushing to engage the werewolf. With a damaged Prussia and Russia far away and arguing to stand as a reserve force, any thrust into the heart of France would have to have been taken up by Austria. With the economic and military burden pointing more to Austria, Metternich may have been considering the possibilities of a renewed France. Russia certainly was considering the long supply and shear distance of campaigning in France daunting. Assuming Napoleon was more interested in simple survival than any expansionism (which would have been impossible) it may have been possible for Austria to reach an accord with France. A Coalition absent Austria could not have overcome France.

Consequently, a victorious Northern Campaign by Napoleon may have provided the necessary positioning for a continued Bonapartist France.

[lonewolf371]

We could easily discuss what-if's to no end, but in most cases I believe if we look at the odds those favoring Napoleon's fall and subsequent exile are probably more numerous than those favoring his rise back to the status of emperor. All most any scenario in which Napoleon could rise again would require the other nations to still be held in awe of his military genius, which is almost completely speculatory.