Ancient phalanx warfare: push or not to push?

[Cheetah]

Since I dont want to hijack a thread discussing the RTW battle engine I decided to start a new one about phalanx warfare. So did they push or not?


Yes some believe pushing was important in Greek warfare. Victor Davis Hanson in his "Western way of War" argues for it but uses some sources taken out of context. CBR

I have found the reference, it is "A history of warfare" by Kevin Keegan, but indeed when he describes the details he refers to Hanson.
BTW, what are those out of context sources?


Its not that individual soldiers didnt try and push an enemy with his big shield but the idea of having lots of men behind the front rank push too is the recipe for disaster. CBR

Hm, why? To me it is difficult to depict an ancient phalanx battle without the push. What were the soldiers in the 2nd, 3rd, etc lines doing? Polishing their armours, picking their noses, or trying to help their comrades? Image that as you said, individual soldiers in the first line pushing their opponents. Now, imagine me as a second line soldier ~;) What shall I do? Wait for him to win or to be defeated, or perhaps to give him a helping hand to push over his opponent? Now, what should the enemy soldier in the second line do seeing my attempt to help my comrade in the first line? Well, intuitively he should help pushing too. Then my 3rd line comrade should join in etc. By this simple logic of cascading help soon the whole phalanx would be pushing forward. And why not?


There was a reason why the best men were at the front and that was to fight and not to be pushed/crushed to death. CBR

When I was in the army (the Hungarian ~;)) I had some experience with pushing. Well, it was not on the battlefield just in front of the canteen ~D but still something very similar. Imagine one or two hundred soldiers trying to get into the canteen, which of course had only one door. All these soldiers pushing at once, moreover the push were focused to one spot, yet, as you see (or perhaps as your read) I am still well and alive. So, imho being pushed by 7 ransk from behind, and even adding 8 from the front of course, might not be deadly at all.

Also how did they fight? The overhead stab with spears, as it is often depicted, imho is not a very powerful way of stabbing. First, holding the spear in such a position and stabbing with it continuosly is very tireing. Second, it is a weak stab relying only on the muscle power of your arm. Third, it has a limited reach.

Last but not least, if there was no push then what was the difference between the "shield wall" and the phalanx? My readings and my intuition would suggest that the shield wall was a static defensive formation, while the phalanx, even though slow to manouvre, could be used offensively. What made the difference if not pushing?

Of course, I am in no way 100% sure that they did push, just atm it seems very plausible to me.

[Red Harvest]

We need to be careful in distinguishing phalanx types (macedonian pike style vs. hoplite style.)

I have been questioning the overhand part for hoplites all day, but I'm becoming more accepting of it. It is shown on the Chigi vase as well as on the Nereid monument--Chigi shows them marching with spears at their sides as well. Perhaps they alternated overhand and at the side to rest one set of muscles while using the other--this would give them more staying power although the switch could be a bit tricky while in fighting. With the big shield in the way I can see why they would be stuck either stabbing high, or low with little in between. I could also see the 2nd rank stabbing from the opposite location (allowing them to get two spears in the fight.) Seems like that a bit of drill would quickly work out a method that provided staying power, effectiveness and the max amount of spear points in the fight.

Thebes used 50 deep at Leuctra to break the 12 deep Spartan hoplite phalanx. This supports the shoving match idea. Plus the word "othismos" is associated with phalanx warfare and means "shove" (or so I've read.) Goldsworthy apparently takes the view that this was not really a shoving match though and the depth served purposes for manouver. I can see where a deeper phalanx could certainly keep the pressure on longer. The men could sustain a lower level of exertion for a longer time.

If I were on the front rank what would I be inclined to do, what help would I want? I would probably be trying to shove my opponent off balance or back using my shoulder and shield. The momentum aids my attack and an off balance opponent (on his heels) is little threat. How much help from behind is "too much?" I don't know. At some point it would clearly be a detriment. However, if one or two opposing guys get jostled or go down in a shallow formation, that file would be likely to get shoved back, while a deeper formation could absorb it.

[Pellinor]

When looking at the effect of depth of a unit, it could be useful to look at other successful deep formations.

I'm particularly thinking of the Napoleonic column. Thousands of men packed into a column which could be a hundred deep: what were the ones behind doing? I don't think they were pushing; all I can think of is:

- replacements for losses in the front ranks
- shouting "Vive l-Empereur" really loudly
- looking terribly imposing on the battlefield

The main benefit of the dense formation seems to be morale. Lines just look flimsy, whereas columns look solid and tough. It's common sense which is going to break the other, and although mathematically the line outguns the column and should beat it into bloody ruin every time, in practice the line often fled *before contact* unless it was made up of steady troops - hence it not be widely used outside the British (Hurrah!) army.

In the case of a phalanx, there is perhaps a similar effect. If you're in an 8-deep phalanx and there's a 32-deep one coming towards you, then you have 32 men coming to kill you, personally. That is worrying. Your immediate opposite only has 8 men after him, which is less so. His morale is likely to be slightly higher, and so he may fight better.

Perhaps more usefully: if you're at the *back* of an 8-deep phalanx then you are safe so long as the 7 men ahead of you can beat off the 32 men they're facing. Do you trust them to beat 5:1 odds and keep you safe? On the other hand, your counterpart is pretty confident that his 31 friends can beat up their 8 opponents, so he's safe.

In addition, you are only 30 feet from the fighting, and he is 100 feet away. You know much more about how many of your friends are dying than he does about his. I disregard enemies killed, as that is a natural consequence of fighting and is supposed to happen, whereas your friends dying is wrong and worrying - so, a morale hit for a friend dying, but only a small bonus (if any) for killing an enemy. Even if the front ranks are evenly matched in the battle, and every time one of your friends dies one of the enemy goes too, I think you are going to get more worried for your own skin than your counterpart is.

Net result: phalanxes clash, front ranks fight for a bit, rear ranks worry about what's going on. The rear man of the thin phalanx has more to worry about, and is therefore more likely to flee first. Once he goes, the other rear rankers and the man who was in front of him are going to worry, and eventually it's a question of sauve qui peut.

To an extent then, if the two armies are man for man identical (in skill, equipment, morale, etc) except that one has more ranks, the shallower formation is likely to flee first - even if the actual fighting is going well for it.

I have entirely ignored frontage here, of course: I assume that both phalanxes have the same width, or that the peltasts are successfully stopping the wider phalanx from flanking the deeper if numbers are the same.

Oh, I know: each phalanx is infinitely long and so has no flanks, and has the same number of men as the other regardless of the number of ranks. Phew.

In RTW, I would say this should be reflected in the morale scores of the individuals. Either give a bonus for being deeper than the enemy, or take say 4 or 5 (or perhaps "the normal depth for that troop type") off the base morale of every unit and add one for every rank they have of depth (perhaps capped at say 8 or 10). At normal depths there is no change, but you can choose to trade off frontage for morale.

Cheers,

Pell.R.

[CrusaderMan]

Pellinor:


I do not agree with your asessment that formations were just for show, neither that the last men on the phalanx would be the first to run off.

First of all you are trying to compare napoleonic war formations of musketeers with ancient phalangites: the differences are too obvious to enumerate but ill give you a clue; gunpowder.


Second of all you are providing the very sketchy observation that men in the rear lines yould run first due to them being scared from a battle they cannot see. I will say this: the largest number of casualties in the phalanx happened only when the phalanx formation broke up, prior to that it was minimal. Now, if the phalangites in the back rows did not push how then was the formation broken when they left (the phalanx certainly did not evaporate from the rear) and if neither phalanx broke, how were all the phalanx battles resolved, none of them lasted for long from what I know.

[Pellinor]

Pellinor:


I do not agree with your asessment that formations were just for show, neither that the last men on the phalanx would be the first to run off.

First of all you are trying to compare napoleonic war formations of musketeers with ancient phalangites: the differences are too obvious to enumerate but ill give you a clue; gunpowder.


Yes there are differences, but there are also similarities (which is rather the point of analogies). Why did Napoleon attack in columns, and why was he so successful, when the use of cannon and muskets would suggest that a large mass of men was just a big target? Why was it not better to split into two or more smaller (narrower, shallower, or both) columns to diffuse the incoming fire?

The only reason I can find is the morale factor: big masses of men are scary to the enemy, and comforting to the men in them.

One would predict that if the point of the column is to break the enemy's morale before they can do enough damage to the column to break it, then men with high morale (able to shrug off the imposing impression) in a line formation (to maximise damage to the column and break it quicker) should be able to stop it. Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the British Army.

And didn't Napoleon have something to say about the relationship between the moral and the physical, in war?

Not conclusive, but suggestive.



Second of all you are providing the very sketchy observation that men in the rear lines yould run first due to them being scared from a battle they cannot see. I will say this: the largest number of casualties in the phalanx happened only when the phalanx formation broke up, prior to that it was minimal. Now, if the phalangites in the back rows did not push how then was the formation broken when they left (the phalanx certainly did not evaporate from the rear) and if neither phalanx broke, how were all the phalanx battles resolved, none of them lasted for long from what I know.

Can I ask a counter question? If the rear ranks are pushing against the front ranks, and the front ranks fled, where did they go?

You are arguing for a dense mass of men pushing forward and fighting in a confined space (I note that a 6' spear, never mind a 20' pike, is an impractical weapon for that fighting style): surely this completely precludes any chance of the front row moving anywhere except into the enemy. The only people who could flee (ignoring those who could fly or burrow into the ground) are those at the sides or at the back.

The choice for the people at the front is just to fight: if they turn to flee into the press of men behind they just put themselves into more danger: the enmy is just as close, cannot be avoided, and has your back to strike without fear of you striking back or defending yourself. As you say, most casualties were inflicted in the rout: if the front ranks started to flee first, then they would all die in the battle *before* the general rout spread. They'd probably caus the general rout by doing so, but they'd die in the front line.

My hypothesis is that the fighting was a bit looser (in general). The front ranks try to kill each other, while the next few ranks poke spears or pikes over their shoulders to help out and the rear ranks provide moral support. Occasionally people will get over-enthusiastic and push a bit, but this is not going to be liked much by those in the front rank (who are trying *not* to get speared). Victory goes to the side which breaks the enemy's morale first.

It is *not* a case of killing all the enemy, or disrupting their formation (though those may affect their morale): the quickest way to get an enemy off the battlefield is to induce him to use his own legs.

IMO, morale is affected by lots of factors - how loud your side is cheering, how imposing the paean was, whether you're being shot at by peltasts, whether your flanks are threatened, how high the enemy's horse-hair plumes are, who the generals are and how good they're reputed to be, whether the enemy are Spartans, when you last ate, how rapidly people are dying, etc.

The crucial factor in my view is what you think the man next to you is going to do. If he is going to break and run, then you ideally need to start running just before he does - you don't need to outrun the enemy, so long as you can outrun your friends. It's a Prisoner's Dilemma situation: if you all stay long enough you win because the enemy will break before your army does; but if you stay and he flees then you die. If you flee and he stays, you stand a better chance of living if your side loses; but on the other hand you may be reviled as a coward if your side wins, so you don't flee until you really think you need to.

Only the men at the back (and sides, but there are fewer of them) have the chance to flee. If they start to go, then the men in the next-to-last rank then get the same dilemma. However, they *know* that at least some of their comrades are scared enough to flee, so they can pretty safely conclude that others will: this is a good incentive to get out while the going's good, and thus a chain rout is triggered (snowball effect).

This is all hypothesis on my part; please feel free to pick holes in it, so long as you don;t mind me picking hole in your pick.

Cheers,

Pell.R.

[Kraxis]

Since Leuctra has been mentioned as the great "depth wins against width", I have to step in.
Leuctra was extremely close until the Sacred Band managed to outflank the Hippeis as the king. The very deep Theban phalanx could not budge the Spartans, and they actually lost many more hoplites in the actual fight that the Spartans. Each side lost about 400, but the Spartans lost them almost exclusively to the Sacred Band. Obviously the Spartans were winning until the flanking maneuver was finished.
Just to point out that depth didn't always win out, the Spartans and Thebans fought another battle some years prior. The Spartans and their allies under king Agesilaos (I think) fought the Thebans and a collection of allies near a lake. The Thebans managed to break the Spartans allies (allies who previously would be able to fight on an equal footing to the Thebans) while the Spartans broke the Theban allies. So now they both faced home but could not get there before defeating the other. So they had a go at each other, the Thebans in 25 ranks and the Spartans in 12. The fight was inconclusive but the Spartans claimed victory because the Thebans hadn't halted them in their campaign and had lost more men. This is the first instance of the deep phalanx, it was revolutionary because it managed to hold the Spartans in an equal fight, but it was far from a steamroller.

So, while I think the hoplites pushed each other they didn't do it very hard, it was more like they leaned onto each other (the first guys still needed to be able to fight). So with consecutive lines the added pusheffect deminished, meaning the second line added much more power than the 25th line.
The Spartans while perhaps a bit stronger than most others were obviously not twice as strong as normal hoplites, that is hard to believe. So somewhere down the line the pusheffect has to have been weakened dramatically, or perhaps it is true what Pellinor says, that the Spartan allies were broken by moraleissues rather than the push. But the Spartans being much more determined would not budge at all and so the depth failed to bring te desired results, though it did let the Theban phalanx stay in a fight it would normally have been beaten in.

Lastly, the underhand spear and the pusheffect is mutually exclusive. If the men behind the fronlines push, then the underhand spear is very dangerous to their thighs and groins, which were in fact the most unarmoured parts. The overhand spear can still be used even if the user is being pushed. Further, if the underhand spear was used then it is strange that the greaves were dropped rather than the heavy helmet, or that the toughest part of the linnen cuirass is the shoulders. Even earlier the hoplon (aspis) even had a leather skirt attached to the lower part to protect the groins and thighs from what is believed to have been stone bullets, javelins and arrows. But it could be that the hoplites went from underhand to overhand as the pusheffects were understood.

[Rosacrux redux]

Very good discussion here. I might as well throw in my 2 eurocents, just for arguments sake.

We have many descriptions from ancient writers regarding hoplite warfare, and all of them talk about certain phases in the phalanx (hoplite phalanx, no confusing with the later macedonian pike phalanx) clash.

Advancing to the sound of the paeanas (a battle song either song by the hoplite themselves alone, or with the use of an avletes - a flutist) was the first stage.

When contact was made between the two phalanxes, the doratismos (spearing) would start. The hoplites would try to find weak spots in the enemy formation, get past (or above?) the aspis* and hit an oponent.

At some point during the doratismos the phalanxes would get pretty close, and the othismos (shoving-pushing) phase would start. The othismos is described as an effort to push the opposite phalanx with the sheer weight and strenght of your own phalanx and there are specific accounts on the role the ranks before the first would play during that phase (=they would push along with the first lines, each man pushing the man in front of him).

The pushing around couldn't last for long, since it was extremely demanding on physical resources (another reason for the obsession of the ancient Greeks with excercise, they needed an extremely fit individual to take the heat in the first lines, especially, of a phalanx) and by some point one of the two phalanxes broke and tried to disengage. If it was a well-disciplined and highly organized army (like the Spartan army, or another of the great city-states) they usually managed to fall back in good order, using their light infantry and cavalry (if present the latter) to cover their retreat. If they couldn't do anything like that and started panicking, carnage ensued.

Rarely a battle between two phalanxes would go really nasty. Usually the winner would lose something like 4-8% of his men, and the defeated not more than 10 or at worst 15%.

But in the times of the peloponesian wars, when the hoplites got rid first of the greaves, then their metal cuirass and adopted the linothorax (and many used no thorax at all) and at the same time the role of the light infantry, with the development of the peltast and the acquisition of more missile infantry and relatively heavier cavalry, the hoplite warfare became a nasty business and casualty rates rose to extreme heights.

The most prominent example is a battle during the Corinthian war (the aftermath to the Peloponesian war) when the Peloponesian league defeated the Athens&Co alliance in the largest hoplite clash ever. More than 50.000 hoplites were fielded in a single battle and casualties (dead and badly wounded) exceeded the 8.000, maybe even the 10.000. This battle is a rather peculiar case, since the right wing of the Pelo army, composed by the elite Spartans, routed the Athenian force they had in front of them (taking advantage of the miscalculations of an Athenian general trying to cover the flank, but breaking the formation during the process) and then turned 90 degrees and flanked the allied army (who got pinned down by the allies of Sparta).

Overhand vs underhand

There is much dispute over this, as the classical sources are never mentioning wether the hoplite would use his spear underhand or overhand. Some of Kraxis' arguments about the overhand grip make very much sense, since the doratismos would be nearly impossible with an underhand grip.

But there are more factors to take into account, like:

- The "hoplon" (aspis) shield was not the only one in use in classical Greece and in hoplite warfare. The other well-known hoplite shield (in use in Boeotea, areas of Peloponesse and several islands, and as well in parts of Thesprotia, Thessaly) is also round, but has two openings in the right and left of it. A spear shaft fits very well through the (rather large) openings, and the user can even manouvre it a bit.
- Several military historians have come to the conclusion that in hoplite warfare most fatal wounds (like 90%) were either wounds in the face and throat, or wounds in the thighs. This adds to the confusion, because it's impossible to reach the thighs with an overhand grip, but equally impossible to reach the face or throat with an underhand grip. At least considering there was a large shield covering the torso.
- ALL artistic depictions of hoplite warfare have the hoplites wielding the spear overhand.
- The evolution of the helmets: the Corinthian helmet (providing ample protection for the face and head) was the norm before the Peloponesian war. During that era, it got replaced by the Pilos, who was really like a simple bowl and offered no facial protection.

This is a really confusing subject, isn't it?

[Watchman]

A bit on the Napoleonic assault column, if I may. The things doesn't really have much anything to do with the hoplite and phalangite formations of Antiquity - it was a stopgap measure invented due to the fact Revolutionary France had to fight off professional armies with masses of enthusiastic but ill-trained volunteers (and, once those ran out, draftees but that's another thing) and there simply was no time to drill them in the proper firing-line techniques.

So momentum, enthusiasm and weight of numbers (applied to a single spot in the spread-out firing line for local numerical superiority, if the opponent now even bothered to stick around and didn't rout before contact) had to make do.

The vulnerability of the deep column to firepower in general (as it'd lose a firefight against a line due to its small frontage) and artillery in particular was known and special measures were devised to remedy the situation. One was psychological warfare. The soldiers wore high, showy hats to appear bigger and often waved them atop their bayonets for more effect, shouted loudly and generally did their best for the whole block of men to appear as intimidating as possible. With luck the enemy officers would lose nerve and discharge salvo from too far away, after which the assault could commence in relative safety. Another was the light-infantry skirmishers, the voltigeurs, in loose order who screened the line troops and shot up the enemy line and particularly officers. If the enemy unit returned fire, all the better - the skirmishers would only suffer light casualties from the volley, and the line column could charge home. If it didn't, well, the skirmishers would be only too happy to shoot the unit to bits.

Artillery had to be neutralized, preferably with counter-battery fire as that arm's obscene density of firepower meant attacking a battery with even cavalry was often suicidal, or simply weathered. It would inflict casualties, possibly quite horrendous ones, but them's the breaks.

After the French strategic situation stabilized they could spare the time to drill the troops properly, but the column was used when the situation warranted.

[CrusaderMan]

Ok, lets start all over again......


Yes there are differences, but there are also similarities (which is rather the point of analogies). Why did Napoleon attack in columns, and why was he so successful, when the use of cannon and muskets would suggest that a large mass of men was just a big target? Why was it not better to split into two or more smaller (narrower, shallower, or both) columns to diffuse the incoming fire?

The only reason I can find is the morale factor: big masses of men are scary to the enemy, and comforting to the men in them.


Really? that is like comparing a blowtorch to a lamp.... Maybe morale was not the only thing that won battles, and besides you are still refering to mostly R-A-N-G-E-D combat where marksmanship and morale were more important than cohesion and unified movement. If you thought more you would have found something more.




One would predict that if the point of the column is to break the enemy's morale before they can do enough damage to the column to break it, then men with high morale (able to shrug off the imposing impression) in a line formation (to maximise damage to the column and break it quicker) should be able to stop it. Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the British Army.

And didn't Napoleon have something to say about the relationship between the moral and the physical, in war?

Not conclusive, but suggestive.

Yes, suggestive to various interpretations, too bad yours are all wrong.


Can I ask a counter question? If the rear ranks are pushing against the front ranks, and the front ranks fled, where did they go?

You are arguing for a dense mass of men pushing forward and fighting in a confined space (I note that a 6' spear, never mind a 20' pike, is an impractical weapon for that fighting style): surely this completely precludes any chance of the front row moving anywhere except into the enemy. The only people who could flee (ignoring those who could fly or burrow into the ground) are those at the sides or at the back.

Fly or bury themselves? Well you said that man.
What we know for phx vs phx combat is the following: it never lasted very long, the casualties during combat itself were very low. Why is that? because of the hoplite heavy armour and shield. The spear of the front rank broke off after some time and then the soldiers drew swords and tried to close in, with the second rank supporting them with spear thrusts. There was no chance for the guys in the front to go anywhere, or fly or bury themselves as you have very astutely pointed, and the last ranks did not gradually evaporate from the rear of the phalanx while the battle raged on, like you suggested, unless of course they were total cowards. Besides there is not a single piece of evidence saying that. So how then did you break then a large formation of steady men holding their ground and covered behind heavy shields? Pushing them with a similar formation of stronger men with better coordination with each other would result in several men of the front ranks losing their balance (especially if they were woulded) and other men frantically trying to walk backwards in the safety of the formation which in all probability lead to them getting a spear through their right shoulder or their belly. For the people in the back ranks actually WATCHING me massacre in front and OBSERVING the enemy closing in through their ruined formation and KNOWING that all is lost this would be enough, they would break off and run, with the ones in the front following as best they could ie those who were not engaged in mortal combat, crippled or cut off. But of course, like you said the reasons above were the only ones you could think of.


My hypothesis is that the fighting was a bit looser (in general). The front ranks try to kill each other, while the next few ranks poke spears or pikes over their shoulders to help out and the rear ranks provide moral support. Occasionally people will get over-enthusiastic and push a bit, but this is not going to be liked much by those in the front rank (who are trying *not* to get speared). Victory goes to the side which breaks the enemy's morale first.

It is *not* a case of killing all the enemy, or disrupting their formation (though those may affect their morale): the quickest way to get an enemy off the battlefield is to induce him to use his own legs.

And there is no better way to do that than kill him or disrupt his formation, if you know something about the strengths and weaknesses of the phalanx you should know that. You seem to be contradicting yourself alot.


IMO, morale is affected by lots of factors - how loud your side is cheering, how imposing the paean was, whether you're being shot at by peltasts, whether your flanks are threatened, how high the enemy's horse-hair plumes are, who the generals are and how good they're reputed to be, whether the enemy are Spartans, when you last ate, how rapidly people are dying, etc.

The crucial factor in my view is what you think the man next to you is going to do. If he is going to break and run, then you ideally need to start running just before he does - you don't need to outrun the enemy, so long as you can outrun your friends. It's a Prisoner's Dilemma situation: if you all stay long enough you win because the enemy will break before your army does; but if you stay and he flees then you die. If you flee and he stays, you stand a better chance of living if your side loses; but on the other hand you may be reviled as a coward if your side wins, so you don't flee until you really think you need to.

Yes well all this is pure hypothesis with no proof whatsoever (i.e. bullsh*t).
Maybe you should put your historical RTW knowledge into actual reality. And someone who runs during battle and before anything decicive has happened is not a coward, he is worse, a deserter.



Only the men at the back (and sides, but there are fewer of them) have the chance to flee. If they start to go, then the men in the next-to-last rank then get the same dilemma. However, they *know* that at least some of their comrades are scared enough to flee, so they can pretty safely conclude that others will: this is a good incentive to get out while the going's good, and thus a chain rout is triggered (snowball effect).

It is very unlikely that the majority of hoplites were cowards who would run at the sight of the enemy advancing. Once again you need to read some history.


This is all hypothesis on my part; please feel free to pick holes in it, so long as you don;t mind me picking hole in your pick.

Picking holes? you better shut up, read a good book. :book:

I wonder if the persian front rank at Marathon got scared of the hoplites and flew or buried itself.


Also on the point of the deep Theban formations not moving the spartans: It is very difficult to have twelve men in a column push one another with their shields in the same direction and with all their strength and maintain their formation. Maybe such a push did occur but the well drilled spartans (I read somewhere about columns of men training together on bringing down trees) won through. Maybe the front ranks of the thebans were less enthusiastic at getting in range of the spartans deadly aim (casualties were quite high as you said in the theban side) or probably it was a combination of both. This proves only one thing, that the spartans were the undisputed masters of the phalanx, something that we already know. :duel:

[lonewolf371]

Crusader that was a little harsh, this is a discussion not a presidential debate.

This proves only one thing, that the spartans were the undisputed masters of the phalanx, something that we already know.

I think you would find that the Thebans and Alexander probably disagree.

[Colovion]

Ok, lets start all over again......

Really? that is like comparing a blowtorch to a lamp.... Maybe morale was not the only thing that won battles, and besides you are still refering to mostly R-A-N-G-E-D combat where marksmanship and morale were more important than cohesion and unified movement. If you thought more you would have found something more.


Actually his comparisons are fine. He's talking about Moral in combat and in combat the moral of the force with superior numbers will generally be higher than the opposing force.



Yes well all this is pure hypothesis with no proof whatsoever (i.e. bullsh*t).
Maybe you should put your historical RTW knowledge into actual reality. And someone who runs during battle and before anything decicive has happened is not a coward, he is worse, a deserter.

Actually, everything he said was pretty solid. I didn't see anything wrong with it.



It is very unlikely that the majority of hoplites were cowards who would run at the sight of the enemy advancing. Once again you need to read some history.

Most battles in ancient times were determined because of one side running away before they are engaged, or a flank collapses and the rest run away because of what's happening on their flank. Since this happened almost every battle back then I wouldn't call those who joined in on the chain-route cowards.


This proves only one thing, that the spartans were the undisputed masters of the phalanx, something that we already know. :duel:

Nah.

[Gregoshi]

Yes, suggestive to various interpretations, too bad yours are all wrong.

Yes well all this is pure hypothesis with no proof whatsoever (i.e. bullsh*t).

Picking holes? you better shut up, read a good book. :book:

CrusaderMan (everyone else pay attention too), this is not how to conduct an interesting and educational discussion. There is absolutely no reason to insult or be condescending to another patron. Feel free to disagree with or correct someone's knowledge, but you'll advance your point much further by doing so in a constructive manner. There is a lot you can learn in this forum and there are many opportunities to share your knowledge with others. This can only happen when we maintain a civil atmosphere. On the whole, the posts have been excellent and very civil, however, there seems to be a little bit of a rise in disrespect as of late. Let's keep the dialog at a high caliber that we can all appreciate. Thank you for you cooperation in this matter.

[conon394]

Kraxis

There are at least two other examples of depth of Phalanx not producing a victory. At Delium, the standard depth Athenian Phalanx was only pushed back, not broken by a 25 deep Theban phalanx that had the advantage of charging down hill. At the Piraeus the democratic faction decisively defeated the hoplites of the Thirty, even though they deployed 50 deep against the more typical depth of the democratic army.

Crusader King

“What we know for phx vs phx combat is the following: it never lasted very long"

While your right the ideal of a '5 minute' hoplite clash seems to have become cannonical, I'm not sure the evidence supports this conclusion.
Some battles do indeed seem to have been over quickly, but some like Solgia, Tanagra, Crannon, Delium, and at least one of the early battles at Syracuse with the Athenians, etc, seem to have carried on for quite some time. In the short battles, many hoplites do indeed seem to a have evaporated contra your "It is very unlikely that the majority of hoplites were cowards who would run at the sight of the enemy advancing. Once again you need to read some history", At the first Mantinea, for example many of the troops on the anti-Spartan side fled before any contact with the enemy.

[Duke John]

I do know from the Wars of the Roses that a line did collapse from the rear. It's pretty logical; you see men dying in front of you and behind you there is nothing that can harm you. it's an easy way for a coward to escape death and once he runs the guy in front of him started to worry since his backup is gone. More and more men in the backranks flee and the whole line collapses. The generals in the Wars of the Roses knew this and encouraged the infantry to stay by putting some horsemen behind them.

And about the overhand/underhand use of spears. Athletic spear throwing is done overhand. I have done it too and you can build up alot of thrust even when standing still. And the power is not only coming from the muscle arms (as someone said), you also add extra momentum by turning your torso. The only downside of overhand trusting is the extra strain of constantly holding up the spear.

Then there were also the late medieval pike units who used their pike at shoulder level or sometimes even higher. Although of course they had the advantage of using both hands making it less tiring.

[Oaty]

Well first of all depth definitely does have morale boosters for multiple reasons.

1 the frontlines can't run
2 it'll take a while to punch a whole deep enough to make the rear ranks to see the carnage happening

As far as an army retreating before engagement, that was probably due to the frontline being skittish and causing disruption to there own ranks forcing a rout.

First of all let's look at melee infantry in general first. I'm not too knowledgable in the history of warfare but here goes.

Were there infantry that used the push method in warfare? Rome seems like a perfect example. What was the standard formation for a unit, that'd be a square formation. A typical unit contained 80 men, for a square that'd be a 9 by 9 men. Looking at the battle of Cannae the Romans decided for an aggressive formation. They used the rectangular formation, small frontage but great depth. This was done for a punch through in the Carthaginian lines. Why would that formation be more aggressive for a breakthrough.

2 things possible, 1 it forced the frontline to keep on fighting or the other and that is the depth of the formation caused forward momentum to push back the opponents. Now came the next phase of the battle, the Romans saw the Carthaginian line buckling under pressure and saw a breakthrough was close by. So why would the Romans send in there reserves on a part of the line that was already engaged? Would these reenforcements ensure that the frontline cant fallback or would there pushpower help the frontline in disrupting there formation and punch a whole. Regardless the Romans were looking for a breakthrough so they could flank out on the Carthagens. This was countered by the bringing in Libyan spearmen on the flanks of the already preoccupied Romans.

My guess is the Romans used this tactic to keep the frontline engaged so that the breakthrough could occur.

Now lets take long spears/pikes into perspective. Deadly at long range but of poor use when then enemy closes. If I had a sword I'd be chopping your spear tip to bits. Obviously standing still with a spear is detrimental to your life even if you are thrusting it. Obviously you need forward momentum. If you lose momentum the spear tips will start getting chopped up. So the Phalanx did need momentum but not so much against another phalanx it seems. As standing still in front of a swordsmen is not such a swell idea

My only guess was it wasn't so much of a push as it was multiple factors. With depth every inch of ground you gain will not be lost. So depth was more of a factor of 2 things. 1 the guy behind you stops you from getting pushed back and it forces you to fight.

Now let's take a look at what position unreliable units/allies would take on the battlefield. They'd have the position of the center in most cases. This was a tactical decision done to cut off there rout on the flanks and you could press them from behind. Now they are forced to fight and there only hope is to win or wait until the flanks route allowing them a path to retreat.

Considering the tactics of non phalanx units it does not seem the push was a major part. If they did use the push it was neither excessive or was it used beyond the third rank.

[Watchman]

Let's not confuse Greek-style hoplites with Macedonian-style phalanxes again, shall we ? The former were spearmen, the latter pikemen.

The difference is pretty major, as any late-medieval commander could likely tell you.

As a side note, aside from the Spartans the Greek hoplites were part-time citizen soldiers called to arms when needed - "sunday soldiers" would be the unflattering term. Their typical campaign consisted of about one day marching to a suitable spot to fight their colleagues from the city-state they were at war with, getting it over with, and returning home - whether in triumph or defeat wasn't actually that important, given the comparatively low casualty rates (the hoplite panoply could weigh up to forty kilos, and routers tended to throw away many bits; this made effective pursuit nigh impossible). It's probably not that far-fetched to compare this sort of fighting to national-level football matches, just with more blood and less popcorn.

Such part-time soldiers naturally have their limitations, and the Spartans could often scare their foes into flight merely by their fierce reputation and steady, unflinching advance (trained professionals, they usually didn't do the "phalanx drift" to the right).

Well, their tactics became more "professional", combined-arms (think peltasts) and lethal over the time.

Anyway, so far as I know from my assorted reading spearmen and pikemen are the troops who profit the most from a dense, ordered formation, as their weapons need little sideways room to use and work well "layered". Not that all spear-carrying warriors fought in that manner, but the more sophisticated ones often did. Anyway, such dense formation has the added bonus effect of being rather solid - it gets rather difficult to knock an individual warrior down when what he stumbles against is the guy right behind him, and even if that guy staggers back there's a third one right behind him... you get the idea; the close order absorbs impacts pretty well, not wholly unlike multiple layers of textile do.

Managing a charge in formation that close was probably beyond all but the best-drilled troops, so odds are rapid offensive maneuvers were usually done in looser formation. Kind of inevitable really, as they'd be done in full run at least at the last leg and that plays serious havoc with formations. Still, getting rammed by a man with a big shield and him getting rammed in the back by the next guy, who gets rammed in the back by the third guy etc. is going to add up to some serious momentum that's going to be difficult to resist, and it won't help any if they try to skewer you with a spear on the side too (probably "couching" it much like cavalry do).

As a side note, I've read the Spartans at least had a special "super-dense" formation where the entire hoplite unit packed into about half the space it normally occupied. Standing that close together they'd been pretty unable to fight effectively, so this was probably a special-purpose formation used to receive charges deemed "heavy" enough to warrant it.

So far as I know, however, the Romans normally used pretty loose order and kept a little distance between the engaged front line and the rest of the unit (which replaced casualties and wounded or tired legionaires as necessary) - sword-fighting requires a little more room to go well. Their stabbing short swords ought to have worked pretty well in the face-to-face crush of shieldwall fighting too, but AFAIK they preferred to have some room to maneuver in. There were special exceptions though, for example if they expected to face heavy cavalry (say, Sarmatian cataphracts) head on - then they'd deploy in deep, dense blocks and preferably take some spears along for the front ranks, albeit pilums also worked in a pinch.

Spearshafts aren't all that easy to chop up, though. They were made of strong woods and many centimeters across, and most of the time weren't conveniently braced so as to be optimally shopped. Not to mention the spear-heads could be very long - specimen over a meter in lenght are known from Japan, used in the long two-handed cavalry spears - so you might well have a serious problem even reaching the wooden parts. And of course the people who wielded them were disinclined to cooperate with attemps to vandalize their weapons...

[Rosacrux redux]

A tiny little detail nobody seems to take into account: You are all speculating about what you think is more logical or expected and draw conclusions, while utterly ignoring the ancient sources and the facts they state. For what those facts are, refer to my previous post.

[Pellinor]

CrusaderMan: could you please explain *why* my points are all wrong or contradictory? I am quite prepared to believe they are, but I have this odd sense of curiosity that means that I like to know reasons for things rather than just accepting someone's say-so.

By the way, when I say "the only reason I can find..." please take it as read that I mean "the only *good* reason I can find...". I can find any number of reasons for anything, but I tend to discount some of them (eg one side had the pixies helping them, or battles were decided by which army had more people whose name started with "S", etc).

You state that the front ranks could not flee and the rear ranks would not. How, then, do you account for the documented reports of armies fleeing?

In the absence of any reasoning to support your contentions, I hope you'll forgive me if I place little value on them.


Colovion and Gregoshi: thank you.


Watchman: thank you for the comments on the Napoleonic column. I think that overall they support my argument: if you can't beat the enemy man to man, then use psychology to try to scare him off so you don't have to.


Rosacrux Redux: I'm sorry if you think you're being ignored. I thought you gave a good summary of the mechanics of a battle - knowledge of which is essential to the debate - but you didn't cover the reasons for one side winning rather than the other, which is I think where the debate is headed. As you say, the push is a documented feature; but how many people pushed, how, and to what end?


Oaty: I think I'm going along the same lines as you: the actual pushing was limited to the first few ranks. I'm not sure about how to visualise it, though: is it a full-blown scrum, with the whole frontage (or at least a lot of files) trying to force the enemy as a whole back, or was it a more individual matter of trying to get single soldiers in to the enemy's front rank or two to break up their formation? Or something else entirely?


As far as Romans go, IIRC the default spacing was something like 3' between files and 6' between ranks. That is a different style of fighting, granted, but you'd think that if the Greek hoplites fought by having 8 ranks pushing at once then the unsupported Romans would get walked all over. I note also that Caesar's casualty reports include a huge proportion of centurions (sometimes almost as many as the other ranks, who presumably outnumber them by up to 80:1). Could it have been common practice to have a few of your bravest try to get in amongst the enemy to disrupt them (but often dying in the process), while the rank and file keep formation but try to exploit any gaps created? Is the Greek push a way of doing this?

One potential reason for reinforcing success (a la Cannae) is that if you're going to break through the enemy you need to keep a connexion between your lead troops and the rest of the army. If one section breaks through but has no support, then they may just get cut off, and knowing this may slow their advance a bit. If they know their backs are covered they may be more willing to push on.


One further point: we're talking about troops in close formation trying to get another close formation to flee, without actually causing massive casualties face to face. How come films always portray battles as 20,000 one-on-one confrontations in a field, and how come we need to kill 90% of a unit to get it to flee in RTW? :furious3:

Anyway: there's lots of comments, lots of questions, not many answers.

Cheers,

Pell.R.

[Kraxis]

Rosa, that battle you mention is actually what some would call the pinnacle of Spartan hoplitewarfare.

The king had possibly the best Spartan army ever, it was experienced from campaigning and fighting and it was of course trained as the Spartans did. He himself (his name eludes me but he could have been Agis II or III or another figure ~D ) was a very quickthinking man and a bit of a revolutionary.
When he saw the enemy advance he took two Morae from his left flank (and thus opened a gap in the line) and sent them behind his own line to the right while he was still advancing. They barely made it there before the fight but being Spartans they formed up on the march perfectly.
Unlike your account I'm quite certain the allies were broken quite fast as they were overlapped on both right and left (due to the drift and the gap). Anyway, the Spartans made quick work of the Athenians (who were very much overlapped by the Spartan right), so they fled early and suffered fairly few losses. Then the Spartans formed up with their 'overlappers' at about 90 degrees to their previous advance (showing again their high disciplined and skill) and began to plow down the other troops in the enemy army. No other army could perfect such maneuvers in battle, not even the Thebans.
But the problem with that battle was the inherent risk it had and the fact that it didn't involve things not seen before, and was thus merely a perfect hoplitebattle rather than something new like the Theban tactics at Leuctra and later.

About the fatal injuries. I have indeed heard about a large percentage of thighkills, that baffled me for quite a while, and I'm still a bit puzzled about it, but I have a solution that is useable. How would you kill an armoured warrior fleeing before you? You would strike at his head? You know where your sword/spear has a good chance of missing the little distance between the armour and the helmet. Would you strike the armour and risk it glancing off? Arms? Without which he can easily run on. Or would you strike at his legs? Thighs are rather big targets as they are close together, a spearhed in between the thighs and the man is down possibly even fatally wounded. He can't run on and you can now chase other fleeing hoplites and come back for this one later. See my point? Even when you come back and still find him alive and want to kill him, you would strike below the armour or at the neck/face.

Of course it is not perfect and even if it was it couldn't account for all the instances of thighkills. But we can't ignore the rout as it produced a very large percentage of the deaths. So in all we can't use the total killscore for much besides saying it was this/that that killed them.

I would like to know more about the figure-8 shields you mentioned, I thought they had been long abandoned. Do you possibly have a link to some pics or something, anything.
Anyway, in a hoplitephalanx wouldn't the shields overlap enough for the holes to be eliminated? Or at least be unstable as the shields would move up and down a bit when fighting and pushing.

Also, I'm quite certain the Spartans had dropped the bellcuirass at the time around the Persian Wars and gone over to the linnencuirass. Possibly the others came along later. Also I'm not entirely certain that everybody were so loving about the Pilos helm besides the Spartans. I have seen plenty of depictions of the (in my mind lovely) Thracian helmet on hoplites. Of course these could be glorified images, but generally it doesn't seem as the Greeks were much into equipmentglorification.

conon, indeed battles could last a while. The battle I mentioned with the Thebans and Spartans (I hate that all my info comes from borrowed books I don't have anymore, so I can't just look it up) it seems the battle dragged on and on as neither side caved in, the Thebans pushing to get home and the Spartans resisting of all might. And since hoplitebattles were seldomly indecisive it must have lasted a while for there was only victory or defeat.

Crusaderman... My whole point is that the push was there, but it wasn't so that 12 men were much stronger than 8, and 25 were much stronger than 12, if at all. It would be far too difficult for the last men to push properly. Meaning it would be the first man who pushed everything, the next a little less, the next a little less again and so on. Thus making the deep phalanxes not quite the effective steamrollers were think of them.
But of course the Spartans were the masters of the unchanging world. Everything within hoplite warfare was benefitting them. Lighter armour, quicker maneuvers, deeper formations, they benefitted as they were the best hoplites. But when someone broke those rules, such as when at Corinth the Spartan Mora was assaulted in the flanks by light troops and attacked by cavalry, or they were flanked by an independant unit at Leuctra, then the Spartans were left out just like anybody would. The difference was just that they had a hard time coping with the losses.

[CrusaderMan]

To kraxis: I agree with your point, I never claimed that 50 rows could push uniformly. However 8 or 10 rows could certainly do so and a few more rows could add a little bit extra. It is done today in rugby matches in the scram (spelling?), the front rows try to get hold of each other, the middle rows push with their legs and the back rows provide some weight to the formation.
Strong, trained men can do that.

As for very long battles what I was thinking when I wrote that were battles that lasted thhrough the whole day, not 5 minute clashes.



To whoever mentioned the pike phalanx: Indeed, the pike phalanx was very different from hoplites, they circumvented any casualties by simply using a very long and heavy weapon. However, as we well know, this introduced a whole new set of flaws which any good comander could cover up.

to the moderators: My whole pont was that except in very special circumstances, the back ranks of hoplites (and any other ancient army for example) simply did not ran at the sight of the enemy. There is a certain ironic behaviour however that simply does it for me. I apoilogise and I hope that something was learned from above.


Edit: About the thigh striking: a hoplite who couldnt stand couldnt fight. Strikes in the thighs would simply bring you down on the ground where you would be safe and harmless and the enemy would have the chance to finish you off with the spear butt should they advance.

[Colovion]

The spears were actually lighter. They cut them in half and hollowed them out and lashed them together again so that they both had a longer spear as well as a lighter one.

[CBR]

Sorry for this late reply. A burned out hdd and other stuff kept me from responding until now.


. BTW, what are those out of context sources?

Well here is a quick list in no particular order:

1) Quoting Livy on the battle of Zama about Roman rear ranks pushing on the front. Which is only half the truth as Livy actually says the rear ranks started to press forward AFTER they became aware of the forward movement as the front rank were advancing "as though meeting with no resistance." So Livy is actually saying that the rear ranks didn't do much to help the front ranks fighting which is the opposite of what Victor D. Hanson (VDH) says.


2) VDH about Xenophon: "he noted that Egyptians were especially well suited for fighting in column since their peculiar body-shields allowed the infantryman to rest the shoulder while he pushed"

Now something might be wrong with the translation I have, but Xenophon doesn't say anything about a column formation being good, only about the shield design and that it was good for thrusting (or pushing/showing). That might as well mean the soldiers had a big shield that was also good for bashing into the enemy. Actually Xenophon describes a bit earlier how the extremely deep Egyptian formation (100 men deep) wouldn't do them any good. I guess VDH tries to add them together without reading all of it.


3)Numerous times VDH brings up the pushing term from sources but none of them specifically says anything rear ranks pushing the front. VDH "knows" pushing means all ranks push so take all his sources as evidence of it while none of them actually go into such detail. They could might as well mean the front rank doing the pushing only.


4)VDH describes how clever fighters could take a step back to draw an onrushing opponent off balance and to that he says: "One wonders how this was accomplished when there was pressure at his back as well" The simple answer could very well be that they didn't have pressure on their backs at all. So VDH can find a source that goes into such detail about fighting tactics and they imply no pushing. Now this could be seen as in the charge phase so therefore no men from the rear has come up yet. But that would also mean some hoplites didn't just crash into each other and use only brute force to win.


5)Sphodrias' son who fell 3 times at the battle of Leuctra but managed to get on his feet again. How that is possible when VDH sees the initial charge and spear combat to last only seconds before the pushing starts?




To me it is difficult to depict an ancient phalanx battle without the push. What were the soldiers in the 2nd, 3rd, etc lines doing? Polishing their armours, picking their noses, or trying to help their comrades?

That is one the arguments in the "push lobby". Why were formations so deep if only 1-2 ranks could fight and casualties in general was pretty light before a unit routed to attrition is not the answer as there was no need for so many replacements.

But they are really missing the psychological aspect of warfare. More about that later.

Now one can argue that Hoplite warfare was different than later eras but IMO we can easily draw some conclusion from about 2000 years of melee warfare from classical Greek to Renaissance warfare.

Renaissance pikemen used deep formations too and they didn't have any shields. Sure fighting could get close and vicious but training manuals are mentioned that specifically says that rear ranks should stay off and let the front ranks do the fighting. Paintings/drawings confirm that too and some also show how frantic the fighting could be where soldiers weren't standing/fighting in neat ordered ranks.

Late Medieval Men-at-Arms would use several ranks too. At Agincourt the outnumbered English line was only 4 ranks while the French initially were 8 ranks. At that time most men would be armed with poleaxes or lances but some might have used sword and buckler too.

Polybius tell us that Romans were fighting individually without support from other ranks. That is also what we can read from Livy as I mentioned above. Romans used from 6-10 ranks in each line (depending on era/attrition etc)

The Macedonia phalanx was normally 16 ranks but was also a flexible system that could go into a wider 8 rank line or march the rear half forward and make a very compact 8 rank line. Polybius gives us a short description of how it advanced/charged and mentions how the last 11 ranks would press forward with the weight of their bodies.

But that is not the first 5 ranks, as they have their weapons leveled ready to fight, and its only mentioned in connection with the charge. By having all the "inactive" rear ranks move forward in close formation they ensure that the front ranks stay in position so all stay together and hit the enemy at the same time. When Polybius describes the Roman soldier facing such a phalanx he doesn't talk about weight or ranks but number of spearheads that he has to face


So in what way were the Classical hoplite warfare any different?

They shared same tactical idea as the Macedonia phalanx of putting all men into one line. Although Greek warfare evolved, using more cavalry and light infantry, it stayed with the simple one line only system.

A Roman army was very flexible and operated in 3 lines as standard and sometimes even had a separate reserve (sometimes a whole Legion) The Greeks would either extend the line or increase its ranks if they had the men. But sometimes part of the line was deeper than the rest.

One could say the one line system was a simplistic system that couldn't handle any reverses in the same way as the Romans. Having several allies involved in a battle, with different levels of training and no proper command and control meant that using only one line was the best way of doing things.

Line the men up and charge the enemy. Thats the essence of Classic Hoplite warfare. But apart from being a bit simple was the fighting any different?

The term Othismos is where the big discussion is. VDH tries to put Hoplite warfare into several distinct phases where Othismos is the last one and is mainly pushing. He thinks the actual fighting with spears only lasted seconds and then went over to all pushing. Several of the sources in his book actually tells of fighting and pushing as something that happened at the same time. There is not much in the book that points towards pushing having its own phase.

Othismos is not a very well defined term but is used a lot by contemporary writers and can even be traced back to the days of Homer and thats before proper phalanx warfare. It was apparently used in naval warfare too. A general military meaning of it would be something like: to force the enemy back. To attack and keep up the pressure on the enemy was the ideal of Hoplite warfare.


Let him fight toe to toe and shield against shield hard driven,
crest against crest and helmet on helmet, chest again chest;
let him close hard and fight it out with his opposite foeman,
holding tight to the hilt of his sword, or to his long spear.

(Tyrtaios 11.31-34)


As the many "tearless" battles shows that wasn't quite what all Hoplites actually did as they would rout just before impact but one thing is ideals another thing is realities ~:)

I will take the liberty and quote a Viking reenactor about pushing:


The idea that anyone in combat would engage in a pushing match or rugby scrum is far fetched, at least it seems so to me who know how it feels to stand there with your head exposed to your opponent- THE HEAD IS TOTALLY EXPOSED TO YOUR OPPONENTS' WEAPONS IN A SHIELD WALL!! (emphasis, not shouting). It is not hard to strike at the guy pushing at you with your weapon, especially not if it is ashort weapon like a scram or gladius, quite the opposite; it is easy. We do not do it since we usually do not have the head as a target area and that is almost impossible not to hit the head in a shield wall clash (which we sometimes do to impress the audience before we go at it for the kills, 100- 500 men crashing into eachother does sound and look quite impressive). So, in a real battle I would not engage in a shield wall pushing match, it would expose my vulnerable head and neck too much to my opponent.
What we do sometimes do and that would be very sensible in a real battle is steadily advance in closed order while continuously attacking and pushing forwards in order to get at the enemy. This can, however, only be done against spears or a disorganised enemy or he will have the same chance at hitting you as you have him, but against spears, a disorganised enemy or one with a weak spirit it can be done. It is not pushing, however.

Now that is of course a reenactor who will never experience the fear and chaos in a real battle, but if he thinks going in and start leaning on his shield to push the enemy is bad for his head, then I don't see why a soldier back then would think otherwise.

A soldier in the front rank wants to kill/wound his opponent but he also wants to survive. The shield is the most important part of his protection so he needs to be able to move it to deflect enemy strikes as well as be able to move his whole body for both attack and defense.

The shield can also be used to bash an enemy off balance but if the enemy is in close formation you risk opening up for a strike from an enemy to your right. Best thing for you is to stay in tight formation and use your spear and for a Hoplite that would be something like 1-2 meters away from the enemy.

The second rank might be able to help with spears but the front rank is the one doing most of the fighting and are also the best soldiers as several sources say.



Image that as you said, individual soldiers in the first line pushing their opponents. Now, imagine me as a second line soldier ~;) What shall I do?

Pushing doesn't necessarily mean leaning on your shield. Push/shove/bash pick whatever word you want ~:) If the man in front of you decides to make a quick push forward to unbalance his opponent he wouldn't be happy if you move forward and prevent him from going back. If the whole front line moves forward to go shield on shield and push they still need room for any defensive movement. Having say 7 people in his back/shoulder does limit his ability to do any movement.


Imagine one or two hundred soldiers trying to get into the canteen, which of course had only one door.

And you are alive today because:

a) none of you had big shields and spears
b) you didn't have the same number men trying to go out the door
c) although you might have been real hungry its still not the same as real war with all the chaos, panic and death that follows it
d) you actually did get something to eat so you didn't starve to death

~;)


Also how did they fight? The overhead stab with spears, as it is often depicted, imho is not a very powerful way of stabbing

If you are in a close formation with overlapping shields then using a spear overarm is the best way but we know they could use it underarm too. Overarm is not that tiring as you can rest the spear on your shoulder and raise it quickly if needed. And some battles had several lulls for soldiers to rest a bit. And I actually don't think there is so much difference in power as arm muscles/forward motion with shoulder is doing most of the work for both anyway. But overarm is good for head/torso thrusts while underarm is better for leg/groin thrusts. Overarm will have shorter reach but better control.


if there was no push then what was the difference between the "shield wall" and the phalanx?

Phalanx is a general term that for a Hoplite would mean something like "the main line" or just "the line". All it meant was one big line of close order Hoplites. The standard width per file was about 3 feet although there might have been differences but Hoplites could and did use a densely packed formation with about 1 1/2 feet of frontage per man. A proper shieldwall is actually more like the later. But phalanx and shieldwall doesn't mean the same thing really as phalanx is a general term.

Most Hoplites would break out in a run or at least a trot/jog when charging and a line cant maintain its formation in that way. In some cases part of the phalanx started charging before other parts and terrain could mean holes appeared forcing part of the line to run to catch up. The Spartans were really the only ones who maintained order and marched at a step although sometimes they too made disordered attacks.

Oh yeah the morale/psychology bit..

Units needed depth and 8-10 ranks was considered minimum throughout most of the times (there are a few cases of Spartans doing 4 ranks only IIRC) If we assume that they didn't do it for the purpose of pushing and as attrition isn't the reason either then that really only leaves morale. And we can read from countless accounts of how fragile the morale was. Both Xenophon and Julius Ceasar goes into details on morale and how panic can easily spread.

The more ranks you had the more secure the soldiers would feel. Units could get disordered when moving/charging so even a 8 rank formation wouldn't end up in as solid a formation as some people might think. And in combat losses as well as soldiers pulling back could disorder it too. Soldiers in the rear ranks might not be directly in danger but would still feel they were close to it and be scared, They might not see much of the actual fighting but could still see/sense a lot of other things that could happen: a banner that falls, men crying out that the King is dead etc. If they somehow perceived things were going bad a panic could start very quickly.

Thats why it was important to have good experienced men/leaders in the rear rank too. They would be less inclined to panic and stop any retreating men by shouting pushing or poking them back, as well as move forward and push the middle ranks forward if the frontranks were advancing so the close order could be kept. If they didn't do it then an advancing unit could start to dissolve as a lot of men would hang back. Maintaining the close order was important for the perceived security, as humans under stress feels more secure when close to others.

I can dig out some examples if people wants but I think right now this post is already too long and confused enough heh.


CBR

[Kraxis]

That was some post... ~:)

I think there was a shield to shield pushingcontest.
The reenactor says that it is easy to hit an opponent in the face if you are shield to shield. But if scared you often lose the ability to focus properly (which part of why professional soldiers were that good) and chances are you miss. Then comes the point that the hoplitespears were perhaps not pikes, but they were still long enough to make it very hard to stike a person in the face who is just in front of you, it is much easier to hit his back.
And if there is a push then the sword might never come up over the shield (because it is pinned down).
And lastly, the Corinthian helmet wasn't invented for no reason. Apparently headwounds were common enough. They did chance to the Pilos/Pylos helm, but it was only the Spartans that kept using it, the others changed to the Thracian helmet which once again protected the face.

[CBR]

Yes there could be a shield up against shield pushing/shoving struggle and thats what some sources indicate in a few hard fought battles but I really doubt they had lots of ranks behind them helping with it and I dont see any sources saying it either.

IIRC its mentioned several places how the leaders cried out for his men to take one more step. If he could see the enemy was disordered and had holes in the front line then convincing all his men to push forward could break the enemy line.

This controlled step by step advance is likely to be part of the Othismos but could easily just be the frontrank doing it. It could be more like a quick push forward to bash the enemy back or just move in closer to put more psychological pressure on a already demoralised enemy that then would step back to get back into the "safe" standard spear thrusting range. Do that enough times and the enemy would fall apart.


CBR

[L'Impresario]

Then why would the Thebans use their best troops in 50-men rank deep formation at Leuctra? Were they not sufficiently "brave" and "elite" to have them in the standard 8 ranks? The fear factor due to ranks was really unapplicable then as well, due to the usual flat topography of the battle sites, thus one could not be certain of the enemy rank-depth.
And about people mentioning that the 50 ranks weren't decisive to the outcome of the battle: After having read a series of articles by greek historians regarding Xenophon's objectivity, it seems to me quite logical that he was trying to diminish the value of the victors and throw in some random factors that can justify the spartan loss. Remember, Xenophon was extremely in favour of the Spartans, with countless evidence supporting this. When a "historian" praises so shamelessly his buddy (aka as king Agesilaus), tries to downplay the losses and mistakes of the Spartans,mentions only one time the name of Pelopidas and even "forgets" to write about the significant military reorganisations of the "enemies" (by Epameinondas and Yficrates), then he's doing the next generations a great disservice, by denying very important information, at least regarding the "othismos". The timeframe he describes (being a contemporary as well) seems ideal for the clarification of the various phalanx-differentiations.

Anyway, enough Xenophon-bashing, my point is that the Thebans won twice obviously due to their 50 ranks concetrating on a single side of the enemy (and I dont think anyone believes the entire theban army was 50 ranks deep, as some old historians supported). The fact that the spartan king died and caused a chain rout is , hmm, questionable to say the least.

EDIT: And I 'm not saying ofcourse that 50 men pushed at the same time, but that at least 1/3 could have an effect on the opposite side which had only 12...the effect was surely diminishing after the 20th rank, maybe even with less men, but was significant enough to keep the hardy spartians on their toes- then we have the people on the back replacing the losses and adding fresh men into the fray.

[CBR]

Well if Xenophon is so bad then he might have exaggerated the "not less than 50 ranks" bit ~;)

Dont think Diodoros and Plutarch mentions 50 ranks but they werent interested in going into such detail. But they do add some things that Xenophon doesnt talk about.

IMO we really have some pretty vague descriptions about what happened at Leuctra. If we assume that all Epaminondas did was to make an extremely deep column to ram into the Spartan, that afterall was considered to be the best, and that was the major reason for the victory then that seems to be a great tactic that was forgotten quickly afterwards.

I guess Vegitius was all wrong when he said "valor is superior to numbers" It didnt matter if the enemy was good and even had more men as long as you made a deep column and crashed into his line at some point. ~:)


AFAIK both Diodoros and Plutarch relied on same sources and as I said above they add some details that does tell more about what Epaminondas had in mind. Not only did he put his best men in the left flank intending to do the opposite of what was normal but he made an oblique attack that moved to the left.

A lot of battles ended up having each side overlapping on their respective right and Diodoros say the Spartan line was a crescent formation which indicate the army was overall wider than the Theban line and most likely had prepared to advance in a way to hit both flanks of the Theban line.

Lets looks a Epaminondas' options for winning this battle.

He was clearly outnumbered (about 6000 hoplites v 10000) but at least he had better cavalry although its only mentioned as defeating the Spartan cavalry and then not much else. By making the oblique attack he could prevent his right wing getting defeated, at least for some time. He needed a quick victory against the Spartan right wing that would remove the best part of the enemy as well as killing/capturing the Spartan king. With no leadership and the best men defeated then the rest might not be so eager to fight and thats also what seems to have happened.

How could he make sure to defeat the Spartan right wing quickly? He knew how the Spartans would deploy against his outnumbered army, so by preparing his own army for a quick move forward and to the left he would be able to surprise the Spartan right wing and outflank it. Outflanking the right wing is definitely a good way to win quickly and from Plutarchs descriptions the Spartans tried to react against the outflanking maneuver but was caught disordered by Pilopidas and his Sacred band that charged in first.

Why Xenophon is vague is a good question. Did he know all the details about the battle or just some confused accounts from Spartan survivors? When he says the Thebans was in at least 50 ranks was that Epaminondas leading his marching column that was trying to outflank the Spartan wing?

Epaminondas needed to move quickly as well as move to the left. With the tendency of soldiers shifting to the right then its not gonna be easy just to tell all solders to turn say 45 degrees and move forward. Any complicated and rapid maneuvers would have to be done in a deep column, a good example would be how Scipio maneuvered at Ilipa. Pilopidas' charge could very well have been a planned move as they would reach the Spartan wing first to pin it so Epaminondas had room to go into the flank with his column. Or it could have been a desperate charge as Pilopidas saw that the Spartans were reacting and would be able to shift the line and move in front of Epaminondas. But I think its very likely it was planned. What force could handle a quick advance and hope to fight it out for some time being outnumbered against the mighty Spartans? Only the Sacred band.



Then why would the Thebans use their best troops in 50-men rank deep formation at Leuctra?

We dont really know that do we? Xenophon mentions 50 ranks but not how many and who precisely were in the deep formation. Pilopidas and his 300 men are mentioned at attacking first which could mean they were a seperate part of the line. And actually might have been used to cover the main column doing its outflanking maneuver.



The fear factor due to ranks was really unapplicable then as well, due to the usual flat topography of the battle sites, thus one could not be certain of the enemy rank-depth

A deep column is not likely to be noticed from a few 100 meters distance but Im pretty sure soldiers in the enemy front rank would notice from say 20 meters away: a forest of spears as well a noise of men shouting and trampling feet. But the Thebans were attacking the best Spartans so I doubt an attack that counted on fear alone was a good approach and the sources does indicate Epaminondas had a good plan that involved more than just brute force and fear focused at one place.



it seems to me quite logical that he was trying to diminish the value of the victors and throw in some random factors that can justify the spartan loss

Maybe he did try and diminish it as the Spartans were defeated in a quite pathetic way: The outflanking right wing being surprised and outflanked itself. It couldnt get any worse could it? ~:)



The fact that the spartan king died and caused a chain rout is , hmm, questionable to say the least

Dont think any sources say the death of the king caused a chain rout. Xenophon says the King died first but it took several other important soldiers/leaders to die before they finally fell back.


CBR

[L'Impresario]

Well if Xenophon is so bad then he might have exaggerated the "not less than 50 ranks" bit ~;)

Well, it's true that he could have exaggerated, the man didn't even manage to write more than the bare essentials about one of the greatest battles in ancient Greece, Madineia. Ofcourse even if it was 40 ranks, the target was achieved ~;)



IMO we really have some pretty vague descriptions about what happened at Leuctra. If we assume that all Epaminondas did was to make an extremely deep column to ram into the Spartan, that afterall was considered to be the best, and that was the major reason for the victory then that seems to be a great tactic that was forgotten quickly afterwards.

We don't have to assume that he made such a deep column; "..οι δέ Θηβαίοι ουκ έλαττον ή επί πεντήκοντα ασπίδων συνεστραμμένοι ήσαν, λογιζόμενοι ως ει νικήσειαν τό περί τόν βασιλέα, τό άλλο πάν ευχείρωτον έσοιτο." & "...οι μεν ίπποι καί οι συμφορείς τού πολεμάρχου καλούμενοι οί τε άλλοι υπό τού όχλου ωθούμενοι ανεχώρουν"( roughly translated to: "the thebans had formed a formation with a depth no less than 50 shields,thinking that if they managed to win the troops of/around the king, then all the others would easily succumb" & " the ippoi -not an appropriate term for the specific occassion- and the symforeis -hmm bodyguards i'd say- of the king, as well as the others,due to their being pushed by the masses/mob, started withdrawing").

This is enough evidence if seen under a certain light as we face two facts:
1)The thebans knew they had to face the spartans and their king on the left and so they placed their deep column there (allow me to classify the past participle "λογιζόμενοι" as causative "because they thought")
2)the right wing of the spartans was pushed (back? insert oppinion ~;) ) by a great number of people (and I don't assume that this referred to the enemies)

Now we can assume that in order to achieve such an effect,while having this in mind before battle, the thebans placed the sacred band on the left. But I don't think that this is self evident.


AFAIK both Diodoros and Plutarch relied on same sources and as I said above they add some details that does tell more about what Epaminondas had in mind. Not only did he put his best men in the left flank intending to do the opposite of what was normal but he made an oblique attack that moved to the left.

Xenophon mentions 50 ranks but not how many and who precisely were in the deep formation. Pilopidas and his 300 men are mentioned at attacking first which could mean they were a seperate part of the line. And actually might have been used to cover the main column doing its outflanking maneuver..

How could he make sure to defeat the Spartan right wing quickly? He knew how the Spartans would deploy against his outnumbered army, so by preparing his own army for a quick move forward and to the left he would be able to surprise the Spartan right wing and outflank it.



So here comes Diodoros and he describes the troops on the theban left flank as "άριστοι" , the best , aka Sacred Band ,with possible extra support from the other troops of the same wing, as some claim. Now, I haven't read anywhere a description of the left flank moving to the left, this would be highly unusual for ancient greek warfare, performing such maneuvres. Diodoros also wrote this:"τούς δέ ασθενεστάτους κατά τό έτερον κέρας τάξας, παρήγγειλεν αυτοίς φυγομαχείν καί κατά τήν έφοδον τών πολεμίων εκ τού κατ' ολίγον υποχωρείν"-xv ,55- (again roughly translated:and the weakest,placing them on the other flank-horn is the exact wording-, he ordered them to avoid battle and during the assault, to stay back while walking slowly). The theban right flank didn't move to engage nor was it too far away from the strong part of the army, due to 2 reasons, which brings us to this:


A deep column is not likely to be noticed from a few 100 meters distance but Im pretty sure soldiers in the enemy front rank would notice from say 20 meters away: a forest of spears as well a noise of men shouting and trampling feet.

Don't be so sure that you 'd be able to tell a forest of spears from another forest of spears. Something like trying to discover the proverbial needle applies to men shouting and trampling feet, while you hear your own voice shouting and your own feet trampling ~;) And why would the thebans, who were arithmetically less, sound louder than the frantically chanting Spartans, god curse their foodstuffs...

Back to the 2 reasons I mentioned about the theban right flank avoiding battle but still moving slowly, and not creating large gaps between the various parts of the army (something necessary in order to ouflank the superior spartan army):
1)they didn't want to reveal from the sides the depth of the "ram", while the last marched to clash with the king's division.
2)they acted as a deterrant to the enemy left flank, which could later on sense their right wing crumbling, yet it would be hard to come to their aid without exposing their own flanks.

Arrian comes to further clarify the movements of the sacred band in "Tactics 11.1" but currently i don't have time to analyze this in depth. I 'll only say that by mentioning "ώσπερ έμβολον ποιήσας" regarding how Epameinondas formed the theban and boioteian phalanx in Leuctra and Madineia, which means "formed like a ram", we can assume safely that he couldn't use this part of the army for a flanking maneuvre on the left(which I repeat is nearly impossible to happen in the initial phases of a battle, when the 2 enemy lines face each other). The term "λοξή φάλαγξ" was used for a reason ~D



A lot of battles ended up having each side overlapping on their respective right and Diodoros say the Spartan line was a crescent formation which indicate the army was overall wider than the Theban line and most likely had prepared to advance in a way to hit both flanks of the Theban line.

Yes they did end up like this, but this means that the best troops on each side prevailed and then they turned around to clash.How could the Spartans be so sure that the supposed strong right theban wing wouldnt prevail, as the spartans used 12 shields depth and altho they hads more men, do you think that Epameinondas wouldn't stretch his right wing to at least present a decent front? Some say that a bit more left to the right flank ,the inner intermingled columns were about 6 men deep, but I wouldn't be certain at all.

Lets looks a Epaminondas' options for winning this battle.

Kleombrotos----->10.000 men/12 ranks/ 800 men front
Epameinondas--->6.000 men of which:
300+ (possibly extra men apart from the Sacred Band)/50 more or less ranks(I vote a bit less)/6+ men front aiming specifically for the spartan king)
5500 - or +/8 ranks,presumably some were less deep/ around 700 men front,assuming they maintaned 8 ranks

Let's pit in the cav and the peltast numbers, and now flanking seems a risk, altho a wider spartan front is still expected.

All in all,the surprise element wasn't the flanking maneuvre but the ramming one, as one could easily monitor the enemy phalanx movements on flat ground in ancient greek warfare. This is Epameinondas we talking about not Frederick the Great :dizzy2:



I guess Vegitius was all wrong when he said "valor is superior to numbers" It didnt matter if the enemy was good and even had more men as long as you made a deep column and crashed into his line at some point. ~:)

hmm yes it's correct, assuming you don't get flanked and have a very potent force to do the smashing...so valour does play a role :bow:

This tactic didn't survive in its historical form for long due to obvious reasons, one being Filippos of Macedon, who witnessed the theban military system as a captive. And what could you do with 50 ranks if the enemy had pikes, 16 ranks, advanced cav strategies (as well as better cav) and battlefield communications and enough sense to pin the whole enemy infantry with his main line in advance?
Answer: get yourself a mountain and the romans :rtwyes:

At se er at tro...waiting cb to flood the monastery with his response :help:

[Strategy]

Long time since I was last here, but just thought I'd add a few cents...

The "Othismos" theory of Hoplite warfare is conclusively challenged in the following papers, all well worth a read (try your local library service):

- Krentz, P., 'The Nature of Hoplite Warfare', CA 4 (1985), 50-61
- Krentz, P., 'Continuing the ôthismos on ôthismos', AHB 8.2 (1994)
- A. Goldsworthy, `The othismos, myths and heresies : the nature of hoplite battle', War in History 4 (1997), 1-26

IMO, this bunch of papers demolishes the whole idea of the othismos as a combat model, and even if you don't agree - at least raise questions that I have yet to see adressed satisfactorily by proponents of the "Othismos" idea.

That is of course not to say that actual physical pushing did not at times happen in battles (it probably did), but the idea of masses of men charging in to push at each other in some huge rugby scrum as imagined by VDH doesn't hold (like many other things in the book(s)).

To get back to the original question - why armies deployed in deep ranks, part of the answer has already been mentioned by CBR: Morale. CBR has already gone on at length on the subject; I'd simply note that the benefit of deep columns on morale is a well-documented phenomena all the way forward to the Napoleonic era.

Another reason for deep columns was one of simple C&C. A deep column is much easier to maneuver and keep in order than a long line; a fact that was also factor in the development of Napoleonic columnar tactics, and one that would have been just as true 2000 years earlier. Studying Greek military rhetoric (see, e.g., The Rhetoric of Battle : Greek Military Theory and Roman Culture in Julius Caesar's Battle Descriptions (http://www.ucpress.edu/scan/ca-e/182/lendon.182.pdf) for some discussion) points to the great importance the Greeks attached to keeping order in battle; to the point where disorder alone is often considered enough to explain a defeat.

The reason for a particular depth of a formation was quite simply one of balancing optimal frontage with morale and C&C; this is why veteran, well-trained troops (like the Spartans, Caesar's legions at Pharsalus, etc) could win battles in which they were badly outnumbered; they could maneuver in thinner lines, and had the morale to stand against superior numbers.

To return a moment to the Napoleonic columns, it is interesting to note that Napoleonic battalions deployed in column in 6-12 ranks just like their ancient counterparts. It was no more capable of using all of its muskets (at most 2-3 ranks could fire) than the Hoplite phalanx could use all of its spears. In this case, we have firm reasons evidenced for the adoption of deep ranks - lack of discipline and training forced the French to operate in deep columns rather than the thin lines that had been usual for the professional and strictly drilled armies of the previous era. The intuitive leap is I think obvious - if French infantry found columns useful simply for reasons of order, maneuver and morale, why would the Greek experience be any different?

Won't go into the arguement around Leuktra, but simply note that the deep Theban ranks on the decisive left can be adequately explained by the need for rapid maneuvering by the Thebans on that front. A similar deployment was used by Hannibal at Cannae, where the Libyan infantry drawn up on each flank were deployed in deep columns rather than in line.

Anyway, just my 2 cents.

Regards,

Michael A.

[L'Impresario]

Strategy
Pardon me for being so picky and referring only to parts of your post, but I 'd like to comment very fleetly a few of your most interestig points.

First of all, the relation of ancient greek warfare to napoleonic: Order was admittedly the greatest value for ancient Greeks and the way they conducted war, something that derived IMO more from social and geographical factors (a long discussion this one is, enveloping democracy,place of the individual within even greek oligarchic states, limited human and material resources and more). In the napoleonic era, the need for more ranks was mostly a necessity and bear in mind that the various rival factions in ancient Greece faced opponents that used more-or-less the same military system and formations, with the standard 8 ranks, apart from a couple of exceptions. So morale couldn't be such a deciding factor, regarding formations and in the sense you mention, as the Greeks followed the same principals, therefore a certain battle's result must be deducted from other sources as well, like in the case of Spartans, superior training and discipline (I'm tempted to mention the 12 ranks vs the standard 8 but anyway heh).

The other reason for deeper ranks in napoleonic warfare is maneuvering advantages. If we accept that this also applies to ancient greek, we must redefine the way we view battles during that era. Maneuvering obviously would apply in the case that , as CBR mentioned in the Leuctra example, there was high mobility in hoplite warfare and there were constant attempts to ouflank the enemy while closing towards him frontally, or if 2nd line forces exist. But most ancient writers to the best of my knowledge don't descibe such movements; on the contrary battle was joined pretty straightforward (I'm not throwing in the cavalry or the psiloi into the discussion).
I could be wrong tho so if you recall any specific sources, please do mention them

I'll respect your not wishing to get involved into the "Leuctra" debacle, I'll just say that I strongly oppose the oppinion that the formation of the thebans had any resemblance to the libyan infantry's multiple ranks (quite a radically different situation as well),I' ll refer to my previous post for the possible movement of the left flank, and I'll wait Cbr to further comment on that;)

[CBR]

Now, I haven't read anywhere a description of the left flank moving to the left:

Well here what the three say about the movement:

Xenophon:



Cleombrotus had hardly begun to lead his division against the foe, when, before in fact the troops with him were aware of his advance, the cavalry had already come into collision, and that of the Lacedaemonians was speedily worsted. In their flight they became involved with their own heavy infantry; and, to make matters worse, the Theban regiments were already attacking vigorously

Seems the advance was disordered as not all saw the King advance.


Diodoros:



When the trumpets on both sides sounded the charge and the armies simultaneously with the first onset raised the battle cry, the Lacedaemonians attacked both wings with their phalanx in crescent formation, while the Boeotians retreated on one wing, but on the other engaged the enemy in double quick time.

Not much special here. They seem to have made a general advance.


Plutarch:



In the battle, Epaminondas, bending his phalanx to the left, that, as much as possible, he might divide the right wing, composed of Spartans, from the other Greeks, and distress Cleombrotus by a fierce charge in column on that wing, the enemies perceived the design, and began to change their order, to open and extend their right wing, and, as they far exceeded him in number, to encompass Epaminondas. But Pelopidas with the three hundred came rapidly up, before Cleombrotus could extend his line, and close up his divisions, and so fell upon the Spartans while in disorder

Here we have the Spartans trying to so some fancy maneuver after they figured out what Epaminondas was doing. Cleombrotus suddenly wanted to extend his line but why would he want to do that? Even if the Spartan right wing wasnt overlapping the Theban left from the start, then the natural tendency of soldiers shifting to the right would have meant a overlap in the end. If we are to trust Plutarch then the Spartans were disordered when the Sacred band hit them.

When Xenophon says that most soldiers wasnt aware of Cleombrotus' advance does Xenophon actually mean the right wing trying to shift to the right to counter the Thebans? That does actually fit together if we admit that Xenophon is vague about several details. Plutarch give us the general plan and also the effect of it: going left to try and seperate Cleombrotus from the rest, that Cleombrotus did try and shift right to counter it but was caught disordered. I dont see how Plutarch can be understood in any other way: the Thebans shifted left to surprise, isolate and defeat the Spartan King quickly.



this would be highly unusual for ancient greek warfare, performing such maneuvres

Nearly as unusual as an oblique advance and even an oblique advance that focused on the left instead of the right. And actually a 50 rank deep formation is pretty unsual too. All that in one battle.. ~;)

From what I have read about Epaminondas I would say he was a pretty smart guy who did what he could to do something different than just the usual head-on charge. Greek warfare evolved over time and became more advanced and using rapid maneuvers to surprise his enemies was one the things Epaminondas did.



Arrian comes to further clarify the movements of the sacred band in "Tactics 11.1"

AFAIK Arrian thinks the Thebans was using a wedge. Apparently he understands Xenophons word "ram" to have same meaning of the Hellenistic manuals that means a wedge shaped formation.



How could the Spartans be so sure that the supposed strong right theban wing wouldnt prevail, as the spartans used 12 shields depth and altho they hads more men, do you think that Epameinondas wouldn't stretch his right wing to at least present a decent front?

Epaminondas loved to make surprises didnt he? Just look at Mantineia. Making the enemy think there wont be any battle and then rush out attack them while they are disordered.

He could have made a thinner line to make up for the wider Spartan line or he could also try and make it look like it would be a piece of cake for the Spartans to win.

For him surprise was all important and the plan was to not have his right wing engaged anyway, so letting the enemy overlap on both flanks wouldnt be bad if his plan worked. And his plan had to work as he was so seriously outnumbered, so if the Spartans became overconfident and relaxed by looking even weaker then that would just make things easier.



All in all,the surprise element wasn't the flanking maneuvre but the ramming one, as one could easily monitor the enemy phalanx movements on flat ground in ancient greek warfare.

Its not just a question of what one could see but what one could do about it. Plutarch describes how, when the Sacred band hit them, the Spartans were disordered and the right wing was seperated from the rest. Even Xenophon says how most Spartans were not aware of the advance of Cleombrotus.

If Diodoros is right about the whole army advancing then Cleombrotus would have to get an already advancing army to stop and all soldiers to turn right to counter the Theban maneuver. Again I will give the example of Scipio at Ilipa. He managed to flank a surprised Carthaginian army by a sudden move and he did it with his whole army and not just part of it. Thats an extreme example but nonetheless an example of what could be done.

It will never be an easy maneuver to do but if planned against a overconfident enemy that relies on trusted and wellknown maneuvers then it could be done.


CBR

[Strategy]

Order was admittedly the greatest value for ancient Greeks and the way they conducted war, something that derived IMO more from social and geographical factors...

Was it? You find the concept of order being equally important in latter Hellenistic and Roman traditions, at a time when social and geographic factors had changed. I'd suggest that the obsession with order was valued because it is one of the "universal constants" of close-range warfare (insofar as such universal constants exist). Whoever maintains order, wins. Entropy equals defeat.


So morale couldn't be such a deciding factor, regarding formations and in the sense you mention, as the Greeks followed the same principals...

Xenophon certainly thought morale to be the deciding factor:
"For you understand, I am sure, that it is neither numbers nor strength which wins victories in war; but whichever of the two sides it be whose troops, by the blessing of the gods, advance to the attack with stouter hearts, against those troops their adversaries generally refuse to stand."

And morale follows from order; rigid discipline was needed to preserve unit cohesion and morale under conditions in which any reasonable person would want to run away as fast as possible (i.e., the clash of spears). In battle, the side usually won who managed to preserve order in battle - at least this was what the Greeks believed (this thread runs clear in Greek literature from Thucydides down to Polybius). Note for instance, how Brasidas equates disorder with low morale at Amphipholis when he says at Amphipholis: "Those fellows will never stand before us, one can see that by the way their spears and heads are going. Troops which do as they do seldom stand a charge."

Actually, now that I've written this, I'm not quite sure what the counter-arguement is; discipline was precisely the advantage of the Spartans, which allowed them to maintain cohesion and order better than anyone else (note too their preference for a slow advance); and by extension to maintain more shallow ranks.

If we can accept that a reason for the deep columns of Revolutionary French armies was that of morale (despite the revolutionary fervor that animated these troops), then I don't see why the same necessity can not have applied to the Ancient Greeks. Unless - of course - one subscribes to VDH's theories that the Ancient Greeks (and by extension the Western world) were a special breed of men and that hoplite warfare was a unique development in the history of warfare.


The other reason for deeper ranks in napoleonic warfare is maneuvering advantages. If we accept that this also applies to ancient greek, we must redefine the way we view battles during that era.

Why would you do that?

Maneuvering a body of men is a far more complex matter than people seem to believe. Simply taking 6000 men and getting them into combat with 6000 other men without having the whole affair descend into chaos is an immensely difficult task. Having them do so at a run over the last couple of meters would not have helped the matter.

The Greeks did not (as far as we know) practise military step; in the absence of any formal drill, maintaining a line of hoplites must have been an enormeous problem.

Maintaining a line abreast is hard even for well-drilled marching bands of today, even without the pressure of imminent death, heavy equipment, and the lack of vision caused by Greek helmets to complicate matters. Deep ranks, of course, reduce the problem by placing the best and most experienced troops in the front and rear ranks (where they can best control the formation). It is probably no coincidence that the file-leaders of the Hoplite Phalanx were often the elder veterans of the army. They knew how to keep the line ordered, while the men behind "only" had to follow to maintain order.

Again note that all troops capable of maintaining thin lines in combat throughout history - from the Spartans forward to the British redcoats, have invariably functioned under draconian discipline. Strong arguement that thin lines simply are not practicable except for strictly disciplined troops - which Greek hoplites were not.


I'll respect your not wishing to get involved into the "Leuctra" debacle, I'll just say that I strongly oppose the oppinion that the formation of the thebans had any resemblance to the libyan infantry's multiple ranks

Uhm - not multiple ranks; the Libyans were very expressly in column formation (thus probably at least 50 ranks deep, if not deeper), and given developments, most likely in order to facilitate rapid maneuver (and eventually the turning of ranks) which would be used to outflank the Roman infantry.


(quite a radically different situation as well)

Is it? Leuktra is a contentious issue in general, given the lack of good information, but I'd contend that the hallmark of Theban generalship under Pelopidas and Epaminondas was the rapid and sudden advance on one flank - and in Leuktra's case we have several sources that attribute the Spartan defeat precisely to the disorder caused by this.

Rapid maneuvers have - throughout the history of warfare - best been carried out in column (as CBR says, compare also with Ilippa where the Roman forces wheel into column and advance rapidly). A formation 6 wide and 50 deep = a column.

Note, I'm not saying this is what actually happened; my point is that the need for maneuverability does suffice to explain the deep column and also explains why contemporary sources do not place quite as much emphasis on the deep ranks as some modern historians like to do.

This point is a common thread in the general othismos debate as well. Deep ranks (whether 6, 8, 12 or 16 deep) in every other battle in history can be explained without the need to imagine mass pushing as the standard mode of combat - why should hoplite warfare be any different?

Sorry about the length of the post, but I do tend to get carried away in the riposte and parry of debate. :duel: Hope its all understandable. :dizzy2:

[L'Impresario]

This is getting bad, I have to answer both to you and CBR, and you missunderstand a lot of my points (which is reasonable,having not analysed in depth many parts of my posts, as I don't like writing so much and not getting rewarded in a material way ~D ).

CBR admitted to all my points on MSN, so you are the one to be converted now ~;)

Jk heh I truly can't stand corrected in the issue, but the other "side" has good points as well, altho they are more deriving from making comparisons with other eras that are distant from ancient greek warfare , IMO and the discussion can take many paths that may be fruitless.

I'll try to read the books you provided, as I'm eager to be persuaded so I can stop writing these pedantic posts, but so far I 'm sensing more speculation than raw facts, and it's very logical considering the nature of the subject.


Was it? You find the concept of order being equally important in latter Hellenistic and Roman traditions, at a time when social and geographic factors had changed. I'd suggest that the obsession with order was valued because it is one of the "universal constants" of close-range warfare (insofar as such universal constants exist). Whoever maintains order, wins. Entropy equals defeat.

No one will attribute such broad terms as order to one culture only, but the way this was effecting a certain society and how this society applied those theoretical issues in its affairs-be it war or day to day life,formulated in a deterministic way many times by its intellectuals or future analysts. Order being a universal constant in war (and not only) should be something that all societies should strive for, esp. in times were war made or broke a civilisation.But not anyone can achieve this. This is were the various factors interact (geographical, social and the list goes on, as people try to differentiate themselves).

Morale is another factor that is more than obvious a deciding element in battle. But how you can use this to refute the othismos is , well, open to a lot of discussion.


If we can accept that a reason for the deep columns of Revolutionary French armies was that of morale (despite the revolutionary fervor that animated these troops), then I don't see why the same necessity can not have applied to the Ancient Greeks. Unless - of course - one subscribes to VDH's theories that the Ancient Greeks (and by extension the Western world) were a special breed of men and that hoplite warfare was a unique development in the history of warfare.

There are other explanations apart from calling the ancient Greeks a special breed heh - which dangerous for many of the young nationalists out there ~;)
As I said, different situations and ways to satisfy same needs yield numerous results. On another note, many used the same style of warfare but only certain leaders managed to raise their people (and theirself that is) above the others, for example Genghis Khan. Too many factors, let's not be so simplistic about the "peculiarities" of history and various cultures, I prefer to accept some things as appreciated by all people in a certain timeframe, and then examine how each found (or failed to) their path into fulfulling their goals (something that at their time might not 've been recognised).
Sorry I'm getting way off-topic but anthropology is interesting as well,not? :book: (all is relevant to everything)



The Greeks did not (as far as we know) practise military step; in the absence of any formal drill, maintaining a line of hoplites must have been an enormeous problem.

Weird, I thought they did,I can't remember tho how often, might try to check some books soon enough.



Uhm - not multiple ranks; the Libyans were very expressly in column formation (thus probably at least 50 ranks deep, if not deeper), and given developments, most likely in order to facilitate rapid maneuver (and eventually the turning of ranks) which would be used to outflank the Roman infantry.


Multiple ranks is a bad choice of words,as in order to have ranks you must at least have 1 hehe. Other than that, I meant ranks with great depth, it's just that I try not to use the same vocabulary over and over (not particularly good at it these days).



Is it? Leuktra is a contentious issue in general, given the lack of good information, but I'd contend that the hallmark of Theban generalship under Pelopidas and Epaminondas was the rapid and sudden advance on one flank - and in Leuktra's case we have several sources that attribute the Spartan defeat precisely to the disorder caused by this.

My basic point it that they hit frontally Kleombrotos' side, and there was no great maneuvre apart from rushing the "emvolon" forward and keeping the weak side away from their enemies. Remember also that Spartans were "masters" at keeping their discipline in all times, even at the bleakest...seems this one was different.




This point is a common thread in the general othismos debate as well. Deep ranks (whether 6, 8, 12 or 16 deep) in every other battle in history can be explained without the need to imagine mass pushing as the standard mode of combat - why should hoplite warfare be any different?

Because different situations breed different reactions as I said. Some try to use the nature of the ancient greek sports, one of the most celebrated ones being wrestling, and linking this to the military organisation, One could say even today such sports are used in military training, but I guess this was particularly a vital part of the "homo universalis", all the rage till the hellenistic and roman period. We don't see the roman 3 line warfare anywhere before their time as well. The role of troops change from time to time obviously, and the phalanx wouldn't fare pretty well in the middle ages, with archers, really heavy cavalry and specialised men-at arms dancing around 'em, while they tried to find an enemy to push ~:cheers:

Been a pleasure gents, but this is why I don't post often...counter-argument upon counter-argument and corrections to some of my misconceptions (when they actually exist such hehe) really excites me as well, but I don't have the heart to push it till the end ~;)
Prefer to prepare an espresso and see others doing the hard work ~:cool:

[conon394]

Strategy

I think you can also find solid evidence for seeing the deep-shield formations as ’maneuver columns’ in the pre-Leuctra battles that involved 25 or 50 deep shields.

Comparing Delium to Nemea is particularly striking. At Nemea, Xenophon states explicitly that the Thebans formed up deep, and that they advanced obliquely so as to out flank they enemy wing. Xenophon certainly seems to mean more than just drift, by the Theban troops. The Thebans easily route their opponents. At Delinum the Thebans also use a deep-shield formation. However, the topography of the battlefield prevents either army from flanking the other. Here even thought they are charging downhill, with 25 ranks against the Athenian 8, the Thebans force back, but do not break the Athenian line.

I would think that if the deep formation was intended to improve the head-on striking power of the Phalanx, Delium should have been a solid success. After all the Athenian line was thin and fighting uphill. Also, the Theban light infantry had (potentially) the luxury of shooting or throwing down hill over the heads of their own troops. In a similar situation Thrasybulus’ thin line at the Piraeus drove off the 50 shield-deep attack of the Thirty (Adding another example of a very deep formation failing when used or forced to make a simple attack straight forward).

[Strategy]

CBR admitted to all my points on MSN, so you are the one to be converted now ~;)

Given that I've been on your side of the fence before, I don't think that's very likely. ~;)

And really, I'm doing the anti-Othismos lobby a disservice here; IMO, the main arguement against the othismos is not that there exist alternative explanations (which there do), but rather that the arguement for the othismos as a physical push is built on premises that don't stand up to examination - not least the question of how such pushing was supposedly accomplished. Another obvious weakness of the theory is that it is built upon a very blinkered view of the ancient world, ignoring the developments of warfare (and society) both prior to and after the "strict" Greek hoplite era (whenever this is defined) as well as the interactions of the Greek world with its surroundings.



My basic point it that they hit frontally Kleombrotos' side, and there was no great maneuvre apart from rushing the "emvolon" forward and keeping the weak side away from their enemies.


I'll have to disagree with you there. I think there is sufficient material in the histories to suggest that the Thebans were attempting and did outmaneuver the Spartans, and definitely nothing to prove that they did not do so. And please note - I am not interested in proving that the Thebans DID outmaneuver the Spartans; just that this is a very valid possibility. ~;)


Remember also that Spartans were "masters" at keeping their discipline in all times, even at the bleakest...seems this one was different.

All the more suggestive of the Thebans pulling off a really surprising maneuver.


We don't see the roman 3 line warfare anywhere before their time as well.

Considering how contentious the Roman art of war is as a topic, I'd hesitate about saying that. :charge: However, the basic theory of combat that challenges the othismos IMO also satisfactorily explains the development of the Roman legions as well.


The role of troops change from time to time obviously, and the phalanx wouldn't fare pretty well in the middle ages, with archers, really heavy cavalry and specialised men-at arms dancing around 'em, while they tried to find an enemy to push

Why not? ~:cool: The Hoplite (or at least something very, very, similar) was still alive and well long into the period when archers, effective heavy cavalry, and legionaries still existed.


Been a pleasure gents, but this is why I don't post often...counter-argument upon counter-argument and corrections to some of my misconceptions (when they actually exist such hehe) really excites me as well, but I don't have the heart to push it till the end ~;)


No problem; we don't have to agree. If you haven't read the rebuttals of the Othismos theories I mentioned above, though, I do heartily suggest a read of them though (I would also recommend the "Face of Battle" theories of Philip Sabin) - and then go back to V.D.Hanson et al. Doing so certainly changed my view of how battle occured in the ancient era. YMMV.

[CBR]

I'll try to read the books you provided, as I'm eager to be persuaded so I can stop writing these pedantic posts, but so far I 'm sensing more speculation than raw facts, and it's very logical considering the nature of the subject.

And from all I have read so far it seems more speculation than facts to suggest massive pushing from lots of ranks heh. Its interesting to note that Victor D. Hanson cant see how more than 16 ranks could actively push. I think you mentioned on MSN that one Greek historian thought, what was it?, 20-25 was the maximum. So they cant explain why 50 ranks was used at all, well except for Thebans doing extreme experiments perhaps heh. And has anyone actually tried equipping hundreds of men with big shields and see how pushing could be done and how effective it would be? I still advice to have lots of ambulances nearby heh.


Morale is another factor that is more than obvious a deciding element in battle. But how you can use this to refute the othismos is , well, open to a lot of discussion.

Well most of the scholars that dont believe in pushing dont refute it really. The question is what Othismos precisely means as its not clearly defined. The Greek saw their way of fighting as something special compared to their "barbarian" neighbours but these "barbarians" also relied more on missile and/or loose order skirmish like warfare.

Sure the Persians also had deep formations but I also think its pretty clear from say Herodotus that they might have had the courage and numbers but neither the equipment not the training to fight like a unit. Their deep formations were meant to produce a hail storm of arrows and actual infantry shock combat was not what they normally did.

Othismos could be explained as close order heavy shock infantry that advanced and fought while keeping this close order formation. Grinding away and pushing the enemy back step by step. The close order formation was essential for mutual support for fighting and morale purposes. That was what allowed a unit to keep on fighting and most importantly keep advancing whenever they had the chance. Winning is achieved by breaking the will of the enemy and its best done by relentless pressure on him.

That the Greeks were the only culture that had a special term for such warfare doesnt necessarily mean it was any different than other cultures that used same type of close order shock infantry. Thats like saying the Spanish only had one type of long pointy stick as they dont have different names for spears, pikes and lances. That just shows the Greeks had way too much spare time and had to put words on everything ~;)



We don't see the roman 3 line warfare anywhere before their time as well. The role of troops change from time to time obviously, and the phalanx wouldn't fare pretty well in the middle ages, with archers, really heavy cavalry and specialised men-at arms dancing around 'em, while they tried to find an enemy to push ~:cheers:

The Romans developed warfare one further step than the Greeks who basically kept their one line system. There is no doubt that different situations(terrain, culture and technology etc) means different armies and tactics used but there is also development as humans discover new ways of doing things. The Greeks might not have been in the same position (different allies of different quality in each battle) as the Romans to develop the 2/3 line infantry system but the oblique advance shows infantry tactics were evolving.

Why wouldnt a Greek phalanx do fine in Medieval warfare? Close order infantry with spears and heavy armor sure sounds like nice infantry to me and lots of Medieval infantry was like that, before polearms and later pikes took over.


Been a pleasure gents, but this is why I don't post often...counter-argument upon counter-argument and corrections to some of my misconceptions (when they actually exist such hehe) really excites me as well, but I don't have the heart to push it till the end ~;)

Thanks for the discussion. Sorry about my long posts ~;) And I know you will spam me on MSN soon anyway ~D

~:grouphug:


CBR

[Strategy]

Well most of the scholars that dont believe in pushing dont refute it really. The question is what Othismos precisely means as its not clearly defined.

On which topic, incidentally, it is worth noting that the "pushing", "pressing", and "over-weighing" (often translated as overmastering) - the words usually used to justify the existence of physical pushing in hoplite combat are not only used for combat between hoplites and phalanxes, but also to describe combat in skirmishes (including cavalry), and between ships.


That the Greeks were the only culture that had a special term for such warfare doesnt necessarily mean it was any different than other cultures that used same type of close order shock infantry.

In Roman literature too, we find combat described as pushing - even when describing combat between forces of cavalry. However, they added another concept as well - that of "impetus" or "force".

Makes one think that perhaps the old "Shock of Impact" miniature rules had something going for them... ~:)

Regards,

Michael A.

[Kraxis]

I have been on the sidelines as I really don't have the resources to check up on all the books and quotes, or even have any myself to add. But now comes my forte.


We don't see the roman 3 line warfare anywhere before their time as well.

Actually, the Roman copied the Samnites in this. The Samnites had the lesser known Duplex Acies where in front they had what I like to call Samnite Hastati, meaning they had heavy javelineers (large trapezoid shields and sword to boot, possibly spear) that could and would melee and behind them in the gaps heavier spearmen to do the primary fighting. It was certainly effective enough that the Romans suddenly had a three lined system anfter a number of humiliating defeats.


And from all I have read so far it seems more speculation than facts to suggest massive pushing from lots of ranks heh. Its interesting to note that Victor D. Hanson cant see how more than 16 ranks could actively push. I think you mentioned on MSN that one Greek historian thought, what was it?, 20-25 was the maximum. So they cant explain why 50 ranks was used at all, well except for Thebans doing extreme experiments perhaps heh. And has anyone actually tried equipping hundreds of men with big shields and see how pushing could be done and how effective it would be? I still advice to have lots of ambulances nearby heh.

CBR

Well CBR, the Thebans were after all as new to the game of deep phalanxes as the others. They were trying something new, and it seemed to worked mostly. It halted the superior Spartans at one battle, it pushed back the Athenians on another (they lost because the Athenian flanks managed to do a Marathon on them). Hmm... deep formations apparently worked quite well. 16 ranks had previosly perhaps proven themselves 'superior' to 8 and 12 ranks, and 25 ranks had possibly bested 16 ranks. So the Thebans thought the logic line and said, "lets go all out here." Not knowing that the many additional ranks didn't really contribute much to the general situation, but luckily added a lot in terms of maneuvering. Thus making the phalanx maneuverable for the first time in its life (unless you had been a Spartan). So quite possibly the Thebans (or rather Epaminondas) set out with a hope to batter down their enemies, but in turn formed a great force for maneuver (in comparable terms).
That the Spartans managed to halt them seemingly twice (depending on your belief of what happened at Leuctra) might very well come down to the Spartans being much better disciplined, generally stronger and generally better soldiers.

Consider the phalanx locked in a push (just for a moment believe that the push was there). The first rank is leaning forwards into the push, just like you do when you try to force open a door (or close it), the next rank won't be standing in an equally low stance as it has to actually push onto the first rank, the third will be at an even higher stance and so forth, until the hoplites are basically standing upright, not generating very much push really. To me 12 seems to be more than enough for the last few ranks to stand upright, further the farther back you get the harder it will be for the rank to actually stay in a perfect line (so the force will be projected onto the first rank), but I haven't done any tests on this.

The problem is truly that the first rank will indeed be very much under heavy preassure. The answer to this could be, and this is a total abandonment of the 'total push' theory, that the two phalanxes pushed at what is about the ability of what the first (best) rank could handle, thus the first rank wouldn't have to deal with the tiring job of actually press. They would 'only' need to be a ram and pointer of the ram, not the ram itself. So the push of the two phalanxes would become a test of stamina and control (why the Spartans were so good). Thus the phalanx would need a certain depth, but not the very deep formation of the Thebans, which obviously wasn't the steamroller we hear about at times, but somehow was effective.
This theory, though, requires that the hoplites trained the push extensively so as to not apply too much preassure to the first rank (and thus kill them). With a few weeks of dedicated training I'm quite certain that the hoplites could have learned it, and this every year for a few years until they reached the ago of 'fieldhoplite'. Well I believe the hoplite would know where the limit was.

From what I know the hoplites trained primarely discipline and marching into combat. That could be translated into them actually learning how to push but not push too much (discipline, since the push would be the main area that was needed), this limited push and the ability to do so could very well be the meaning of discipline for the Greeks (anybody who knows better can step in here). It would also explain why the young, impetuous and strong men had to stay and guard fortresses and cities until they they had either learned enough or had cooled down (about 20 years old). While the best hoplites were considered those of about 30 years would fit too, they would have exchanged their strength for stamina, gotten experience (so they would know very well how to do their job) and would still be rather strong as opposed to the older men who would also have lost a lot of stamina.
It would also explain why the Spartans were considered so good in hoplite combat, but didn't seem to smash their enemies with great speed. They would have to wait for the enemy discipline to fall apart and men pushing wrong for them to generate a superior push that would overwhelm the enemy ranks that still functioned properly. Thus in any head to head engagement the Spartans would always win as they could outlast the enemy. And this is exactly what the Spartans were considered able to do.

I haev actually only just gotten the classical :idea: regarding this, so I don't exepct anybody to actually be jumping to my side proclaiming me the man that solved the issue, but I would like for you guys to weigh in if this is a plausible theory. And possibly work along with me.

[L'Impresario]

Good to see, there are still good troops pushing their way forward heh. I'm standing just in the 49th rank tho;)
Just a very minor interruption.


Actually, the Roman copied the Samnites in this. The Samnites had the lesser known Duplex Acies where in front they had what I like to call Samnite Hastati, meaning they had heavy javelineers (large trapezoid shields and sword to boot, possibly spear) that could and would melee and behind them in the gaps heavier spearmen to do the primary fighting. It was certainly effective enough that the Romans suddenly had a three lined system anfter a number of humiliating defeats.

Hmm, I thought it was only 2 lines but I'm not sure.Ofcourse the "reserve" logic was seen even earlier than that, but the functions of that part of the army did change over time.

About training and physical prowess of the ancient Greeks....As I've said already to CBR, there was a research in "Der Spiegel" (July or August issue I think) on the ancient olympic sports and a comparison between the personal "records" and achievements of that time with modern athletes competing in the same fashion as 2000 years ago. You can probably guess the results;) -insert jokes about Greeks and doping as someone has already done heheh-
And the chanting while the phalanx marched, IIRC, was apart from the usual morale boosting "trick", a way to synchronise their step. There are many sources about that I reckon.

[conon394]

Kraxis

The rub as I see is how to go from the run that most hoplite armies are described as advancing at, to the big controlled push you describe. The Spartans are as far as I know the only Hoplites that advanced at a walk. With both forces normally closing at a run, I can’t really see how the organized push would take shape.

[Strategy]

Welcome to the discussion, Kraxis. ~:cheers:


I have been on the sidelines as I really don't have the resources to check up on all the books and quotes,

No libraries with distance-lending services in the vicinity? That sucks.


Actually, the Roman copied the Samnites in this. The Samnites had the lesser known Duplex Acies...

Hmm... while it is fairly well established that the Romans copied at least part of their equipment from the Samnites (at least Livy claims so), and while I know many historians have entertained the thought that the Roman triple-line system was inspired by Samnium (and it is an attractive one), I am not aware of any evidence to substantiate such a theory.

Not to be nasty, but can you provide some sources for that? :inquisitive:


Hmm... deep formations apparently worked quite well. 16 ranks had previosly perhaps proven themselves 'superior' to 8 and 12 ranks, and 25 ranks had possibly bested 16 ranks.

Actually I think it would be pretty hard to make a case for deeper formations being inherently superior to shallow. Historically, I do not believe there is any particular "arms-race" evident towards deeper formations; rather depths seem to vary with the situation (from 8-16) until the development of the regimented Macedonian phalanx seems to have established the standard depths at 16 (with 8 and 32 appearing in special circumstances).

It is certainly also possible to find battles in which shallow lines defeated deep lines; e.g., Olympeium in 415 where an outnumbered Athenian force eight deep succesfully break through a Syracusean force deployed 16 deep. And the Spartans of course fought with great success in shallower formations than their opponents (I believe the common depths recorded for them are 6 and 12).

The Thebans are apparently unique in their use of the 25-deep formation, but as Conon points out, it is possible to argue the usage of the formation as a rapid maneuver column at both Delium and the Nemea (which is of course not the same as saying that this is what they were).


Consider the phalanx locked in a push (just for a moment believe that the push was there).

I think it is Krentz who suggests: imagine a tightly packed crowd, and then imagine that tightly packed crowd carrying 2.5m double-pointed spears (and waving them about) and 60 cm long sharp swords. Now imagine that crowd trying to push at anything (never mind having that thing pushing back) over uneven ground strewn with sharp metal objects, fallen people, excrement, blood and guts. As CBR suggests, I'd like to see 256 reenactors pull off an "othismos" in perfect conditions, let alone in conditions anything resembling what a battlefield would have been like. I'd definitely bring lot of ambulances. ~D


This theory, though, requires that the hoplites trained the push extensively so as to not apply too much preassure to the first rank (and thus kill them).

If this was the case, I think we should heard of it. After all, it is a topic that the sources speak on, e.g., Plato. Dancing and athletics were favored disciplines for a soldier (Sparta). ~D

It's a nice "thought experiment", but I have to say I don't find it very plausible.

Regards,

Michael A.

[Kraxis]

I think it is Appian or some other roman historian that mentiones the Samnites forming up in a twoline version of the Triplex Acies. It is most certainly not a perfect source, but given that the Romans happened upon the Triplex Acies during the Samnite wars, and that the Principes are named just that (and armed with spears initially). Well it seems plausible that the Roman got at least a few headers from the Samnites on how to create a flexible formation.


Kraxis

The rub as I see is how to go from the run that most hoplite armies are described as advancing at, to the big controlled push you describe. The Spartans are as far as I know the only Hoplites that advanced at a walk. With both forces normally closing at a run, I can’t really see how the organized push would take shape.

Well, doesn't the sources that claim the othismos happened, also claim the phalanxes traded melee blows with the spears first? So a charge to scare/create impact/disrupt wouldn't be mutually exclusive with a controlled push, since the melee would have to take place first, and thus giving the rear ranks a chance to form up properly.

Strategy, I'm not entirely new to the thread. Been here before, but I'm very much a rememberer. I have a gluebrain, and that is not always a good thing when you are trying to become a historian. ~:rolleyes:
Btw, have you noticed that you, CBR and I are all danish?

I know that the formation of the Spartans could be 12 or 6, but what I have always been finding is that the 12 ranks were preferred. At least at the decisive parts of the line.
Meanwhile the classical phalanx was an 8-rank formation (I believe the first phalanx battle out on Euboa featured two phalanxed of 8 ranks). For some reason the Spartans, who were never really good on numbers chose to form up deeper than that at some point.
And yes, shallower ranks certainly could defeat deeper ones, but again it would also come down to the quality of the troops. But if the troops had 'easily' defeated their foe in 8 ranks and suddenly got a much harder fight again 16 ranks, I think the message would come across. After a few times it would at least.

But to the main point.
If the very issue of keeping your own strength and eagerness is discipline when it comes to combat, why should it be mentioned as anything than that? One does not point out the obvious, as we have seen far too much with Polybius and his "but everyone knows that" sort of style a few times.
A dancer, dancing in the Greek way would very much need to keep himself under control, not just leaping into it. Wasn't dancing back then group thing? Meaning the individual dancer would have pace himself to the group so it would come off as best. And athletics, well isn't that an obvious good discipline for a warrior to be good at? Strength and fighting abilities are always good to have, I see no problem with that and the limited push.

Further, as some have mentioned the Spartans had that pushing game where the group had to push over a tree (now I'm only referring to another poster in the thread). Not much point in it if it wasn't useable in combat, and Spartans didn't just do such group activities unless they believed it would help them in war. And pushing against a tree in a line would need for the rear people to ease off a bit to not crush the first man... Makes sense right? So if they can handle it against a tree they are a good step on the way to being able to do it in combat.

And honestly, don't bring in reenactors in this. They don't put their lives on the line, and if something is too dangerous they won't do it. For instance you would ask a reenactor if he would prove if cavalry would or would not charge into spearpoints. He just wouldn't do it, and his horse wouldn't be trained for it, so would he really be that good for such a case?
In this case it is the same. Hoplites fought for their lives and their states. If something was dangerous but was potentially more dangerous to the enemy, they would take it. Reenactors would never do that. They would need the perfect conditions, and they wouldn't be trained for it. Give me 2 months and I'm certain I could pull this off (with enough men of course).
Remember this isn't a rugby scrum where everybody pushes at his best ability. It is a case of ordered lines meeting, supported by more lines.
There was a quote of a reenactor saying that pushing was impossible as it would be very easy to kill the pusher. Well, what about the Romans then? They wanted to get into a situation where the distances were as short as in a push, but they didn't suffer from it seems, in fact they had good success with it. Remember that the older oval scutum was heavier than the later rectangular one and was thus too heavy to bossbash with, so the Hastati and Principes had to fight in conditions the reenactor considers impossible... Well I'll be damned... I guess it wasn't like that then.
Battles were dangerous, and men died of non-hostile reasons (stabbed in the thigh by spearbutt from the guy in front for instance), soldiers would do things reenactors would never do.

If the hoplite was brased on both sides by other hoplites there would be little chance that he would glance off the man in front of him when he pushed. The first man letting the formation push for him could concentrate on directing it and fighting the man opposing him.
I keep hearing people mention that fallen hoplites stood whre they died, meaning they were pinned in place. Some sort of push must have been generated to create such a situation. And if a man can stand up dead, then the frontline shields must connect. While a 2nd ranker could be killed, how would the front ranker keep him up if he couldn't lean onto something in front of him? The push from behind must have been significant to keep a man standing in death.
If dead bodies on the ground are a problem why haven't they been mentioned when the Swiss rolled over everybody? I mean a man with a pike slipping should create a significant mess in a formation. Yet he apparently didn't (either fell or created much disruption).

I must say I ahven't seen anything that has made it clear that such a situation is anything less than 'possible'.

[CBR]

Well, doesn't the sources that claim the othismos happened, also claim the phalanxes traded melee blows with the spears first?

Well sometimes we can read about fighting and othismos as something that happens at the same time, sometimes it goes on and off. And AFAIK fighting is mentioned more than othismos. But yes first a big charge forward, lots of fighting with spears and even shield on shield impacts, then units (if one side hadnt had enough already) would be able to get some kind of close order and the scattered 1v1 fighting might die out.

There is no clear evidence that othismos means all pushing and no fighting. It more likely just changed from the confused melee after a charge to more well ordered lines. Most likely seperated a bit and then trying to advance forward to engage with spears and pushing if the enemy was disordered. There are examples of lines falling back, regrouping. and then engaging again as the winner wasnt able to keep up the pressure.



But if the troops had 'easily' defeated their foe in 8 ranks and suddenly got a much harder fight again 16 ranks, I think the message would come across. After a few times it would at least.

Oh yes deeper ranks meant a unit would last longer and some sources advices that lower quality troops should be deeper. That doesnt mean a sure win though as the Athenians in 8 ranks still ended up defeating the Syracusians levy that used 16 ranks in the first battle they had.



Wasn't dancing back then group thing?

Of the Spartan war dance, the Pyrrhic, Plato says: "the motions executed to avoid blows and shots of all kinds(dodging, retreating, jumping into the air, crounching)"



Remember this isn't a rugby scrum where everybody pushes at his best ability. It is a case of ordered lines meeting, supported by more lines.

Spartans are noted as being the only ones who advanced in close order as the other Greeks basically would charge forward in a disordered mass(mess?) And apparently pushing doesnt appear more for the Spartans than other Greeks. The typical Greek charge wouldnt be very well ordered really. The Spartans believed in tight formation and keeping it as much as possible and that is most likely what gave them an advantage apart from having better training with weapons too.



There was a quote of a reenactor saying that pushing was impossible as it would be very easy to kill the pusher. Well, what about the Romans then?

Please read the last bit he says. I will quote:


What we do sometimes do and that would be very sensible in a real battle is steadily advance in closed order while continuously attacking and pushing forwards in order to get at the enemy. This can, however, only be done against spears or a disorganised enemy or he will have the same chance at hitting you as you have him, but against spears, a disorganised enemy or one with a weak spirit it can be done. It is not pushing, however.

Pushing doesnt only mean: plant your shield onto the enemy shield and lean on it until enemy pulls back. A dash forward and a quick bash with your shield and even use your body to add to its weight is not the same as leaning on the shield and keep on leaning.

Unbalancing your opponent, move his shield away for a strike or force him to pull back is what you want. And that can be achieved without all that leaning ~:)



I keep hearing people mention that fallen hoplites stood whre they died, meaning they were pinned in place. Some sort of push must have been generated to create such a situation.

Well Victor D Hanson only provides two Roman sources for situations like that and none of them are referring to Hoplite combat. Im pretty sure I have seen other references to very compressed lines and there it was mentioned how soldiers couldnt fight because of it and is actually mentioned as a disadvantage and a reason to the defeat.

So yes people could end up pressing against each other and reasons like the front ranks falling back into rear ranks, terrain that compressed the unit while moving and panic are the general causes AFAIK. I think Agincourt is mentioned as one of such battles where a line turned into a big and too compressed mass.


CBR

[Strategy]

I think it is Appian or some other roman historian that mentiones the Samnites forming up in a twoline version of the Triplex Acies. It is most certainly not a perfect source,...

Appian contains much that is useful (or at the least interesting); however, I am surprised that I have never heard this titbit before. A quick skim of the fragments of his samnitic history didn't turn it up though. If you should remember precisely where it is, I would appreciate it. :book:


Well it seems plausible that the Roman got at least a few headers from the Samnites on how to create a flexible formation.

Absolutely. With respect to the triple-line system, though, it seems notworthy that the Romans thought the first charge of the Samnites to be the most dangerous (Livy), and usually expected to outlast them once that had been weathered. Such comments don't fit well with a reserve system.


Well, doesn't the sources that claim the othismos happened, also claim the phalanxes traded melee blows with the spears first?

I don't think any sources actually claim the Othismos happened. Historians who invented the othismos, however, have had to theorize a trading of blows first, as all the artistic evidence shows men exchanging spear blows and (as far as I know) no pushing.


I have a gluebrain, and that is not always a good thing when you are trying to become a historian. ~:rolleyes:

Why is that? I'd have thought it would be a great advantage being able to remember all sorts of obscure references. ~D


Meanwhile the classical phalanx was an 8-rank formation (I believe the first phalanx battle out on Euboa featured two phalanxed of 8 ranks).

I'd have to disagree (at least until proven wrong). For one it is rather clear from the sources that individual units formed up in battle in whatever depth was thought appropriate. Secondly, 16-deep phalanxes were certainly not uncommon, with many of our major battles in the era involving such deep phalanxes. I am far from convinced that the "common fact" of 8 being the standard depth is correct.

Wonder if anyone has ever "published" a review of phalanx depths?!? Could be interesting.


For some reason the Spartans, who were never really good on numbers chose to form up deeper than that at some point.

Now I will be nasty, and ask what evidence you have for that (i.e., that the Spartans suddenly formed up deeper).


Further, as some have mentioned the Spartans had that pushing game where the group had to push over a tree (now I'm only referring to another poster in the thread).

Again I'll be a pain and ask for sources. Never seen in it any sources, and V. D. Hanson doesn't mention this in his books - even though this would be excellent support for his theories. I will allow myself to question that "fact"...


And honestly, don't bring in reenactors in this.

Why not? After all this is a simple experiment of how easy it is to push (which is supposedly not dangerous). If farmers and other people who were not professional soldiers could quickly be drilled into pushing, then reenactors should be too.

I know this is unfashionable, but one really shouldn't be afraid of drawing for information on re-enactors; it is only dangerous if you start treating their opinions as facts. In the case of something like pushing, it is instructive to watch reenactors; simply because if trained reenactors find pushing hard or dangerous to recreate (which they do), we may presume that actual hoplites did not find it too easy themselves.


If something was dangerous but was potentially more dangerous to the enemy, they would take it.

Considering that ancient armies would run away without even exchanging blows, I would have to disagree with that statement. ~;)


Give me 2 months and I'm certain I could pull this off (with enough men of course).

Two points: hoplites wouldn't have had time to train for two months before going out to fight, and I think you underestimate the "training" of reenactors. Besides, I would be surprised if this hasn't been tried before.


Remember this isn't a rugby scrum where everybody pushes at his best ability. It is a case of ordered lines meeting, supported by more lines.

Actually it is worse than a rugby scrum. It is two screaming lines of men hundreds of metres wide, all running at each other. There is no way that two hoplite lines would meet each other in any form of order. This is why the Spartans always advanced slowly to minimize the disorder, and even that didn't always work.


Well, what about the Romans then? They wanted to get into a situation where the distances were as short as in a push, but they didn't suffer from it seems, in fact they had good success with it.... Well I'll be damned... I guess it wasn't like that then.

The accepted theory on the Romans nowadays assumes that the Legionary preferred to fight at a distance throwing things at his opponent, only closing with his enemy if he showed signs of weakening. This makes sense psychologically (less chance of getting killed), physically (less exhausting), and from the point of view of equipment (the Roman shield was ideal for defence against missiles, as Livy mentions several times in his histories).


I keep hearing people mention that fallen hoplites stood whre they died, meaning they were pinned in place.

Notably, such sources as do mention corpses "standing", do so to in order to emphasize how fierce the battle was. Just as when we read of the "piles of dead" stacking up, etc. Incidentally, such references as I am aware of are Roman - not Greek. I'm not even sure there exist Greek references to this phenomena at all.


If dead bodies on the ground are a problem why haven't they been mentioned when the Swiss rolled over everybody? I mean a man with a pike slipping should create a significant mess in a formation.

For one, I don't think there are a lot of people suggesting that the Swiss "physically" pushed when they attacked. As for dead bodies on the ground being a problem, this is frequently mentioned in the sources (with Polybius providing one of the best descriptions of how big a problem this could be with Scipio at Zama). Greek vase paintings frequently show hoplites stumbling or falling - something Hanson claims must be because of the "pressure of the ranks". I'll suggest a much simpler explanation - they are shown falling because it was easy to stumble and fall on a battlefield strewn with broken spears, bodies, and wet with blood and gore.


I must say I ahven't seen anything that has made it clear that such a situation is anything less than 'possible'.

But then again no one is suggesting that physical pushing never happened. What is suggested is that hoplites did not normally fight by physically pushing their opponents and that deep ranks can be explained by much more plausible arguments than a desire to add weight to the "push".

[Strategy]

On the subject of morale and deep ranks that we discussed before, btw, the Greeks certainly recognized the benefit of deep ranks on morale, as Xenophon ackowledges in the Cyropaedia 7.5.

Thus the men in front were immediately encouraged by the doubling of their depth, and those who retired were equally cheered, for they saw that the others would encounter the enemy first. The two wings being united, the power of the whole force was strengthened, those behind being protected by those in front and those in front supported by those behind.

Anyway, sorry about the length of my previous post - I'll try to moderate myself in future. ~:doh:

[L'Impresario]

I think some sources for the above-mentioned questions can be found..this is what I can remember without any book-searching...

Quote:
Further, as some have mentioned the Spartans had that pushing game where the group had to push over a tree (now I'm only referring to another poster in the thread).


Again I'll be a pain and ask for sources. Never seen in it any sources, and V. D. Hanson doesn't mention this in his books - even though this would be excellent support for his theories. I will allow myself to question that "fact"...

Heh, haven't you read Steven Pressfield's "Gates of Fire";) I'm not completely sure about this, but many claim that it is highly accurate depiction of spartan society and warfare. IIRC there was 9-10 young Spartans (14-16 years old) that were instructed to bring a tree down by pushing, while their "supervisot abused them hehe.
Maybe some other sources will show up later...

BTW just found this re-enacting arcticle, doesn't mention much about othismos, but still shows some nice pics (altho you won't see a large battle line sadly enough):
http://www.apittman.com/index.html?Allen/Hop.html~content

(This is the index of the site, you have to go to "articles/other" section and find the hoplite research article)

[Strategy]

Heh, haven't you read Steven Pressfield's "Gates of Fire";)

No, no, no, please do not mention that awful book. ~:mecry:

On a more serious note, I'll just refer to the following review:
The Emperor has no clothes: Review of Gates of Fire (http://www.szoraster.com/ClassicalHistoryNovels/Gates_of_Fire.html). It does a much better job of shredding the book than I ever could. ~D

Nice site you linked to, btw (despite the guy praising Gates of Fire as historically sound :wall:).

[Kraxis]

Guys, it seems I have been able to drag myself into a threeway battle here. Even Hitler did better than that. Silly me.

I will be a little general here to begin with.
Firstly the gluebrain isn't good when it remembers info but not the sources themselves. I constantly have to seek out where I found it, and most of what I read I loan from libraries. So when I finally have to present my proof I haven't got it around, or I can get to it (some other person have loaned it). Rats!

Regarding the pushing in general and the charge. I never said that the phalanxes wouldn't be disordered by the charge, that makes perfect sense, why wouldn't they. One has to remember, though, that the charge was more than a way to break the enemy it was also a way to keep your own men from breaking, they were farmers and needed to get an outlet for their fears and adrenaline. At the same time I can't imagine the hoplites sprinting (that equipment is certainly heavy), but rather jogging which isn't really that hard to keep lines in.
During the fighting the frontlines were engaged in, the rear ranks would form up. CBR even accepts that as the most likely course. And it is only then that the push will be delivered. Be it in a short charge kind of way (the ram version) or a long protrated push (elephant version). And I never said that there wouldn't be any fighting during the push. I specifically said that the first rank would be free to concentrate on controlling the line and of course fighting, the men behind him would supply the push.
If the Thebans pressed the Athenians back at Delium, then there must have been a press. If the individual Athenian hoplites got pushed back by the Thebans in front then their formation compressed, then the Athenian frontline would be impossible to press back more as they would now be backed against a veritable wall of men. The rear ranks coudln't see what was going on up front that the men in front was being pressed back. If I don't run then I push back to keep the guys there. And then the ability of the individual push is expended because the other side is no longer an individual but a group. So how can a phalanx be pushed far back or even apart.

Ok so the othismos isn't mentioned, I just thought so from the posts you guys have made. There was that post about he greeks being civilized and so began calling general combat by other names, for instance othismos for the fighting of phalanxes even if it wasn't a true push.
And if the Greeks themselves didn't mention standing deads, well then there isn't much to say on that issue.
Hoplites slipping, that would happen in more open formations indeed, but mostly in the initial stages of a rout. Prior to that the movement would quite possibly be slow enough for the men to find a footing. And if one side being pressed back as at Delium then they would simply not fall over if they stepped wrong.

About the 8 ranks. I never said 8 ranks were the common depth of this time, I called it the classical one. Meaning it was the basic phalanx from which the other depths have derived. I specifically mentioned the battle on Euboa in 669BC because it is the first incident of hoplitesphalanxes.
So while the time we are talking about (I take it it is from 500 to 350 BC?) and the 8 ranks might have been surplanted by deeper phalanxes in general (12-16 ranks), does that not make the point that phalanxes moved towards a deeper formation?


Appian contains much that is useful (or at the least interesting); however, I am surprised that I have never heard this titbit before. A quick skim of the fragments of his samnitic history didn't turn it up though. If you should remember precisely where it is, I would appreciate it. :book:

I remember using it when I discussed with Red Harvest about the early Roman troops, and even eatlier when we discussed I think the Macedonian phalanx. I believe he mentioned that the historian wasn't too good a source. But the problem is that I can't remember the title of the thread. Maybe Red can?


Again I'll be a pain and ask for sources. Never seen in it any sources, and V. D. Hanson doesn't mention this in his books - even though this would be excellent support for his theories. I will allow myself to question that "fact"...

Didn't call that one a fact. Just used it. I specifically took that from another poster (and mentioned it), if you look at page one it is there. If it aint true, then it is just another nail in this theory's coffin.


Why not? After all this is a simple experiment of how easy it is to push (which is supposedly not dangerous). If farmers and other people who were not professional soldiers could quickly be drilled into pushing, then reenactors should be too.
I know this is unfashionable, but one really shouldn't be afraid of drawing for information on re-enactors; it is only dangerous if you start treating their opinions as facts. In the case of something like pushing, it is instructive to watch reenactors; simply because if trained reenactors find pushing hard or dangerous to recreate (which they do), we may presume that actual hoplites did not find it too easy themselves.

I don't believe the reenactors have tried out drilling themselves to the point where they can push with just enough force. It takes consideral time to learn it and for little benefit for them. The cost/benefit equation doesn't add up when it is also dangerous.
The pushing was dangerous of course, if the men are improperly trained and led. Each man eligible for hoplite sevice (non-Spartans here) trained what amounts to about a few weeks every year, didn't they? They didn't just march out and fight without any training besides what they did at home. And it was common enough that the men younger than 20 years would not go into field battles, but guard the city. Couldn't it be that those young men were simply not trained well enough to stand in the line yet? That their hotheadedness would spell disaster in the push? I think that is quite likely.



Considering that ancient armies would run away without even exchanging blows, I would have to disagree with that statement. ~;)

That is true enough. Men ran when the other side charged. But non professionals are somewhat unreliable. Some times they will stand and some times they will run given equal situations. War have time and again shown that even cowards will do dangerous things if their believe it will help them. And not pushing against one that does could be equally dangerous if not worse. And remember the first ranks were hte best and those who riskes the most. The unreliable troops were in the rear and middle where the danger from the push was less pronounced.


Two points: hoplites wouldn't have had time to train for two months before going out to fight, and I think you underestimate the "training" of reenactors. Besides, I would be surprised if this hasn't been tried before.

No hoplites didn't train much before a battle but they did train when at peace. Yeah much like our militia forces, you know a weekend here, a few days there. But if there is peace it is enough to get the men into a state where they can do it. It isn't like we humans forget what we have learned after a few months or weeks.


Actually it is worse than a rugby scrum. It is two screaming lines of men hundreds of metres wide, all running at each other.

Ar come on now. You know what I mean. In Rugby the two lines lock heads and push in a stance that is about 30 cm over the ground, everyone giving it all they have. A hoplite push could never be that intensive as the men could not go that low or lock heads for that matter. It would of course be more scary to meet armed foes, but as you said they often ran prior to contact. But rugby scrums are worse in terms of push.



The accepted theory on the Romans nowadays assumes that the Legionary preferred to fight at a distance throwing things at his opponent, only closing with his enemy if he showed signs of weakening. This makes sense psychologically (less chance of getting killed), physically (less exhausting), and from the point of view of equipment (the Roman shield was ideal for defence against missiles, as Livy mentions several times in his histories).

Entirely new to me. Never heard that the legionary was like that. What then of the famous bossbashing tactics in melee, or the heavy losses of the opponents. Pilas were dangerous but not so dangerous as to cause numberless of casualties. And would he enemy just sit and let the Romans pelt them with superior javelins? No, the fighting would be a mixed bag of it. They would advance, have the first lines throw their pila then engage in a brief fight (and get tired) split up again, rest, reform and thow more weapons at each other and meet in another charge and fight. And so on until one side cracked. Lulls in combat seems to be a logical solution to the problem of the rear rank's pila while at the same time take into account the enemy unwillingness to just sit there and take it. Also I thought that was hte accepted way.


For one, I don't think there are a lot of people suggesting that the Swiss "physically" pushed when they attacked. As for dead bodies on the ground being a problem, this is frequently mentioned in the sources (with Polybius providing one of the best descriptions of how big a problem this could be with Scipio at Zama).

Never said that the Swiss were pushing, just that they didn't seem to have problems with bodies. They could advance at a steady pace without getting disrupted by their own men stumbling over bodies. So apparently bodies had to be in a rather thick and consistent layers to cause such situations. Hoplite combat, we have established many times was not all that bloody until one side routed, so layers of dead doesn't really seem plausible.

Ok I think I have officially confused myself here. So I think I will sum up what the theory is about.

Phalanxes meet and charge in. Contact where the lines are disordered and combat might even resemble oldstyle 1v1s, but as the charge is spent the men find their places once again, meanwhile the first ranks continue their fight. As they fight the ranks behind hem begin to add the preassure and the lines lock shields, if it has not already been done. To keep from being a large target and to brace for the push the first ranks crouch down and lean into the shield. And so the push has begun. The two sides begin the wrestle... this continues until one side has broken down (men pushing in a long line will invariably cause it to bend and buckle). Then a final push will cause a rout as the lines are breached, but of course to me it seems more likely that the weakened side will already have broken.

Strategy you yourself quoted Xenophon saying: "those behind being protected by those in front and those in front supported by those behind.
Those behind supported those in front, but he says not how. While he does mention that the doubling of the lines encouraged them that is not equal to supporting them as it is a passive thing to be encouraged by having a lot of friends behind you, while support is active. Support could as easily mean to help in a push.

I do not argue against the deeper phalanxes were primarely for morale issues. I have stated earlier in another post that the deeper phalanxes were not seemingly stronger since they could not defeat the enemies head on more easily than before, if at all.
All I say is that there was a push.

Sorry CBR, but I think it is better if I keep to one since you both say pretty much the same. :bow:

[Strategy]

Guys, it seems I have been able to drag myself into a threeway battle here.

Yes, we've got you now. Charge!!! :charge: ~D


If the Thebans pressed the Athenians back at Delium, then there must have been a press.

Well, this is the literal interpretation favored by the "Othismos faction". However considering that ships, skirmishers, and horses are also be described as "pressing", I think this is a dead end arguement. I think there is even one place where Herodotus describes an "othismos of words" or something along those lines.


So while the time we are talking about (I take it it is from 500 to 350 BC?) and the 8 ranks might have been surplanted by deeper phalanxes in general (12-16 ranks), does that not make the point that phalanxes moved towards a deeper formation?

Considering that we have differing depths being registered from battle to battle, I'd say not. It would be interesting to see a survery of this, though.


I remember using it when I discussed with Red Harvest about the early Roman troops...... I believe he mentioned that the historian wasn't too good a source.

Appian should be treated with caution, certainly, but IMO it is a mistake to disregard him entirely (at least where no contradictory evidence exists).


They didn't just march out and fight without any training besides what they did at home.

If the enemy invaded and was burning the fields, the hoplites would actually have to do so (i.e., turn out on very short notice).

Personally, I cannot quite reconcile the idea that something was simple enough that hoplites could easily do it without constant training, but at the same time be too difficult for reenactors to do.

Of course the fact that reenactors cannot pull it off doesn't mean that it is impossible. Either way, we do seem to agree on one thing - that the Push was a dangerous thing to be doing on a hoplite battlefield. Where we differ is on how dangerous it was.


Entirely new to me. Never heard that the legionary was like that. What then of the famous bossbashing tactics in melee, or the heavy losses of the opponents.

Really!?! :surprised: More surprising since you essentially describe the same theory below, with the lulls between fighting. ~;) Maybe you got confused because I said they spent more time throwing things than actually meleeing?


Strategy you yourself quoted Xenophon saying....Those behind supported those in front, but he says not how.....Support could as easily mean to help in a push.

There's just one little problem with that; Cyrus's infantry was Persian and Allies: Javelinmen, Archers, and Persian spearmen. They are unlikely to have been pushing. ~;)

The morale thing was just a comment to L'Impressario (since we briefly discussed whether the experience of Napoleonic columns was relevant here).

More comment later...

[Kraxis]

Well, this is the literal interpretation favored by the "Othismos faction". However considering that ships, skirmishers, and horses are also be described as "pressing", I think this is a dead end arguement. I think there is even one place where Herodotus describes an "othismos of words" or something along those lines.

Hey I said more than just a push. I specifically mentioned how it would have been had it been an individual push (each man pushing back the opponent). Eventually the Athenian line would be rocksolid, and the Thebans would not be able to push them back much more. In all about 20 meters or so (as it really only compresses the Athenian line). Hardly a pushed back line. Something must have made those men in the rear (good men btw) pull back, and their job was to be persistent and hold the men in front in their place. So a step backwards towards these guys would likely result in a push forwards again.



If the enemy invaded and was burning the fields, the hoplites would actually have to do so (i.e., turn out on very short notice).

Personally, I cannot quite reconcile the idea that something was simple enough that hoplites could easily do it without constant training, but at the same time be too difficult for reenactors to do.

Of course the fact that reenactors cannot pull it off doesn't mean that it is impossible. Either way, we do seem to agree on one thing - that the Push was a dangerous thing to be doing on a hoplite battlefield. Where we differ is on how dangerous it was.

I say it again, the hoplites trained outside of warfare. They trained before the need arose. How else can different hoplites from different states (minus Sparta of course) be superior to each other in a battle? They trained, they were no total newbies the first time they went into battle. Why would the younger men be kept home? They are after all the strongest and fastest, so it would have to do something with experience and discipline. And how does one learn that? Through training. It would have been easy to put the young men into the line near the rear but for some reason they were not there.



Really!?! :surprised: More surprising since you essentially describe the same theory below, with the lulls between fighting. ~;) Maybe you got confused because I said they spent more time throwing things than actually meleeing?

I took notice to the 'only closing if the enemy showed signs of weakness' part. If that is true then the lulls would only been in singular as the enemy would be weakened from the first pila assault, then was perhaps able to fight one time and then they would get pelted again and then flee. It seems to me that there were more lulls than one, for how can there ever be a need for Principes or even the three lines of the Marian army?



There's just one little problem with that; Cyrus's infantry was Persian and Allies: Javelinmen, Archers, and Persian spearmen. They are unlikely to have been pushing. ~;)

Xenophon was a Greek, and quite a greecophile. Not that he laughed at everyone else, but he judged them as to how it was supposed to be for the Greeks. So I do not find it entirely impossible that he gave the persian forces greek attributes (look at the Egyptians at Cunaxa). In this case pushingpower. And honestly, the Persians were not entirely foreign to pushing it seems. Marathon the great example, but even Cunaxa shows signs of pushing.

[Kraxis]

If it is Gates of Fire that brought in the 'game', then my theory begins to lose its historical basis, and becomes nothing more than just another idea.
So I would like to know if it is the only instance of th 'game'...

[Strategy]

I say it again, the hoplites trained outside of warfare. They trained before the need arose. How else can different hoplites from different states (minus Sparta of course) be superior to each other in a battle?

Same answer as in any other period of history: Morale. Interestingly, Xenophon agrees completely when he states that: "neither numbers nor physical strength make for victory in war, but whichever side - with the gods' help - advances upon the enemy stouter in spirit, their foes usually do not stand against them".


Why would the younger men be kept home?

They weren't. From the age of 18 a man would serve in the phalanx.


I took notice to the 'only closing if the enemy showed signs of weakness' part.....It seems to me that there were more lulls than one,...

Certainly, that was the point. Although sometimes troops could face off from each other for long periods of time without closing in (5 hours in one combat in Caesar), my assumption was plural - when troops failed to make their opponents flee, they'd naturally fall back and the process would start over again.

Regarding Xenophon, I think he served the point. He specifically states that increased ranks helped morale. He does not specifically state that ranks were used for pushing, and can only be made to do so by speculating.

I enjoyed reading your "clarification" of the othismos theory; I still do not agree with it, of course. ~D

I disagree with it for a lot of reasons (at its core, I feel it lacks good evidence + the purely physical problems as discussed in this thread); but the two main objections I really have to the othismos theory are:

1. It relies on the front rank of a Greek phalanx being basically suicidal; certainly I find it hard to think of any other description for men willing to advance into a hedge of spears to push at an enemy. Considering the very real reluctance of most normal people to get themselves killed (even in the most martial of cultures), I find that idea a bit hard to swallow.

2. It represents an anomaly in the development of Hellenic warfare. Unless we assume that a pike phalanx also engaged in physical pushing man-to-man (and while some would like to claim so, the evidence against that is pretty overwhelming, IMO), the Macedonian pike phalanx represents as great a departure from the hoplite way of fighting of the greeks, as the "Othismos" based hoplite phalanx represents from the Homeric fighting that preceded it. Even if one assumed physical man to man pushing persisted in pike phalanxes, the development of the pike phalanx would make absolutely no sense at all. If you want and expect one's men to go in and push, why would you increase the length of their spears and make their shields smaller?

To be satisfactory, IMO, any explanation would at least have to answer the above two questions satisfactorily. The alternative theories (I've posted one in another thread), IMO, are much simpler and do so.

Have a nice weekend. ~:cheers:

[L'Impresario]

Guys, it seems I have been able to drag myself into a threeway battle here. Even Hitler did better than that. Silly me.

I'm still with Switzerland on this issue (starts fiddling with bank accounts) :)

Hey, "Gates of Fire" seems awful in English..good thign I didn't read the original version.
And don't blame Pressfield, blame the people he mentions as his "vital sources": Paul Cartledge, G.L. Cawkwell, Mary Renault, VDH, D. Kagan and John - damn his celebrated soul, he 's really a bad historian and this shows us how history is being treated at an academical level in the western world during the last decades, nice topic but anyway- Keegan, among others. Ow and Hunter B. Armstrong, he should know better than being dragged down to the mud with Pressfield (notice the Pressfield ;)).


About the 8 ranks. I never said 8 ranks were the common depth of this time, I called it the classical one. Meaning it was the basic phalanx from which the other depths have derived. I specifically mentioned the battle on Euboa in 669BC because it is the first incident of hoplitesphalanxes.

Strangely enough many Greek historians ,when talking about the phalanx formation, start by reffering to the standard 8 ranks and the deviations from it, you know which heh. Then one usually elaborates on the conditions of a certain battle that led a general to alter this depth..... a Greek historian I 've just started reading (his name won't say much- like all greek ones:)- Kotoulas), writes on the subject of tactical decisions in the Pelopponesian war and hoplite warfare in general, that ancient Greeks used pretty much standard modes of engaging and usually the only critical choices left to be made by the "strategoi", would be depth and width of the phalanx, along with positioning of cavalry and auxilliaries.


Well, this is the literal interpretation favored by the "Othismos faction". However considering that ships, skirmishers, and horses are also be described as "pressing", I think this is a dead end arguement. I think there is even one place where Herodotus describes an "othismos of words" or something along those lines

Othismos is mainly mentioned in hoplite warfare most of the times afaik.I seem to forget the passages where it appears in other forms of battle...care to elaborate, I really want to check up on the context from the original passages. Also,there is indeed a metaphorical phrase :"othismos logon- ωθισμός λόγων" which means a heated argument/discussion. And "othismos" is related not to one , but two similar verbs that could make a difference in a certain context tho: "ωθώ" (otho) and "ωθίζω" (othiso)...if we get some texts with these verbs I could attempt to clarify the difference, but I got no philology degree;).
Really hard attempting to collect all the sources regarding this one.....

[Strategy]

Strangely enough many Greek historians ,when talking about the phalanx formation, start by reffering to the standard 8 ranks and the deviations from it, you know which heh.

I know, and IMO that is an error. I haven't seen any surveys on this, though. A pity. Something on this in the style of Krentz's survery on the length of hoplite battles would be quite interesting...


Othismos is mainly mentioned in hoplite warfare most of the times afaik.

I believe that its mentioned in pike warfare as well, but I may be mistaken.


I seem to forget the passages where it appears in other forms of battle...care to elaborate, I really want to check up on the context from the original passages.

Can't remember any that use the specific word othismos at the moment; but then again, I can't think of very many places were the specific word othismos is used in geneal. "Pressing" and "Weighing" are the words most often used to justify the othismos theory; and they can be found in a non-hoplite context in Xenophon, Hellenica 4.6.8, 5.4.42-43 (light infantry) and in Polybius (Kynoskefalai, Ecnomus). Get hold of the Krentz/Goldsworthy articles, however; I believe one of them discusses the issue in detail (IIRC).

A pity the perseus server is so unstable; some searches on the greek texts there could perhaps help.

[L'Impresario]

Sorry,for some odd reason I feel my mental stamina to comprehend and type things is leeched, don't have the will to respond at all...
Just to save face,
a)the spartan charge that throws you back 30 feet isn't my own oppinion/analysis/research result;

b) those passages from Xenophon don't have any word related to "othismos" in a grammatical sense,and to some extent meaning-wise (the "pressing" they refer to is more figurative than physical), on the contrary I stumbled upon IV,3.19 "...και συμβάλλοντας ασπίδας εωθούντοpushed one another[/B], this is about the shield clash and push, the verb in bold is a a direct product of the oth- root words, used commonly-not 100% sure- with shields in similar context);


I believe that its mentioned in pike warfare as well, but I may be mistaken.
c)it's true-not that you are mistaken ;-); wont comment further as I just started reading Arrian from frontcover to backcover this week and I try to pay attention to the language similarities with Xenophon, plus pikes and pushing seems fishy to almost everyone, so I need to get more sources in order to express an oppinion with some solid basis.

Oooofff *passes out, summons last ounces of strength for next week*

>placeholder<

Lol, told you it's serious: point "a" refers to the other thread :dizzy2:
I won't bother to step in there for now :help:

[Strategy]

No need to make excuses; your comments always make for interesting reading, and we are (I hope) not in a contest here.

Regarding the spartan charge, I didn't mean to imply that you had invented that; I do wonder whether it is something that may have been suggested/speculated on by some historian (or someone else), and then passed into the "public knowledge". Lots of "historical facts" have after all developed that way.

Sorry, but since I do not have the Goldsworthy/Krentz articles on-hand, I can not give you more precise references right now (there are limits to my memory :dizzy2: and my library :book: ) and I won't have time to order any more books/journals from the public libraries this side of X-Mas.

Stay cool. ~:cheers:

[Kraxis]

I will get back to your two points Strategy, but not now. I have a Method exam right now. Yup at this very moment. Ok, it is a strange one that lasts 54 hours and we can write at home.

[L'Impresario]

Hehe it isn't a contest, else all those non-push believers should 've joined the "righteous" side a long time ago ~;)


I also found out by googling "othismos", that on "our" side are the "hoplomachia" minature strategy game creators:

http://perfectcaptain.50megs.com/hoplomachia.html ~D


Another footnote regarding "othismos" in a non-infantry context:Try to get Arrian's partly saved text in "Tactica" or "Ars Tactica", where he says that placing the cavalry in deep ranks isn't near as effective as doing the same with infantry. His explanations aren't based only on the fact that the infantry can get in a truly close order which is certainly a morale booster. But I can't find the whole passage(to find the whole work would be impossible anyway), just 4-5 sentences.

And on a lighter note for francophones: Seems like we missed something from our analysis....you could just push the guy on your right and that would explain the shifting towards the right ~:eek:

http://www2.unil.ch/iasa/iasa_c_est_aussi/electre/guerre/livre_elec/guer1_2_2.html

Am I missing something? ~:confused:

[Hurin_Rules]

Very interesting discussion.

On the issue of face vs. thigh casualties, I think we have to recognize a few things.

There are no absolutes. What I mean by this is that you could deliver a blow to the face with an underhand grip and you could deliver a blow to the thighs with an overhand grip-- sure, it would be much more difficult than the opposite, but in the chaos of a battle anything could happen. Also note that when a hoplite was holding his shield, the only two areas it didn't cover were his head and legs.

That being said, perhaps the explanation for the mixture of head/thigh casualties is something like the following:

When you advanced to the initial impact you tended to carry your spear underhanded or side-gripped. This explains the 8-shaped shields with the spaces on either side. An underhanded grip allows you to use the full force of your legs and body to drive the spear, much like the knight would use his lance underhanded in the clash of mounted shock combat after the advent of the stirrup in the Middle Ages. This gave a spear thrust with maximum force but not much agility/precision. Once the initial shock had been halted, however, I know I'd probably want to switch to overhanded. This would give me a bit more agility with the spear and a height advantage too. The combination of these two would produce a mixture of head and thigh casualties.

Just my $0.02.

[conon394]

L’Impesario

I'm rather curious about something you wrote a few posts back… Sorry because it is a bit OT.

“And don't blame Pressfield, blame the people he mentions as his "vital sources": Paul Cartledge, G.L. Cawkwell, Mary Renault, VDH, D. Kagan and John - damn his celebrated soul, he 's really a bad historian and this shows us how history is being treated at an academical level in the western world during the last decades, nice topic but anyway- Keegan, among others. Ow and Hunter B. Armstrong, he should know better than being dragged down to the mud with Pressfield (notice the Pressfield ;)).”

It is a nice broad statement you make, but I would be interested to know what your objections are to Paul Cartledge, G.L. Cawkwell, and D. Kagan. How are they mistreating history or classical studies? Simply by serving as sources for a historical fiction novel?

[L'Impresario]

It is a nice broad statement you make, but I would be interested to know what your objections are to Paul Cartledge, G.L. Cawkwell, and D. Kagan. How are they mistreating history or classical studies? Simply by serving as sources for a historical fiction novel?

It isn't a broad statement, but rather aimed at how Pressfield handled his "sources" and how he used the "published wisdom" of those distinguished professors he "stole", as he terms this.
Within the scope that ,as he seems to claim, he wrote a fictional book and based its historical parts and elements on the works of the aforementioned persons, then the "tree bashing game" of the young Spartans could be something historically accurate. Ofcourse then you can be taken back by other inaccuracies in his book and the way he describes the scene with the tree (I really laughed when I read the specific passage in english some days ago).
Why would I argue with all those nice people from Oxford,Cambridge and Yale, esp. without having read any of their works in its entirety with the exception of Cartledge. If you want me to go head on with them(and I don't think that what they write is so ambiguous anyway), sorry this isn't even close to my field of studies ~D
Maybe later....life holds surprises ~;)

..but wherever I see the name "John Keegan", I bait easily....one word: " A History of Warfare" , good thing he used "A" :book:
After this book, I see everything he writes under a different light. Also it's a warning to all those trying to go deep into very different fields, that may differ vastly from their area of expertise.

[Strategy]

Back to the pushie thingie...

One point to keep in mind is that the objection is not to pushing happening in the ranks, e.g., if the men in front start giving ground or refuse to move forward, the natural way to stop them or to goad them would be the push them gently; and this (i.e., physical pushing to keep men from running) is one of the arguements, in addition to morale, for deep ranks suggested by the "anti-othismos" theorists. Similarly - as with Arrian - if you want to receive a charge, what better way to support your mates is there than to provide them support from the rear by giving them something to lean on?. The objection is solely to the idea given in VDH (among others) that hoplite battles (and others) purposefully developed into large scale shoving-matches with victory going to the side best able to push.

Hoplomachia is a fun ruleset, but I think it displays the problem with the othismos idea very well; it is a ruleset that does fairly well for simulating Hoplite vs Hoplite battles, but is completely useless for anything else. Which of course is ok, if you believe hoplite warfare was a unique development in the history of warfare as VDH does.

Unfortunately, I won't be able to get hold of Arrian this year; will be leaving in a couple of days :santa3:, so no more inter-library loans until I get back. Your suggestion made me dig into my library again though, and I found a very similar discussion in "Maurikios's (Maurice's) Strategikon", which goes something like this:

As far as the depth of the line is concerned, the Ancient authorities thought.... For there can be no pressure from the rear up through the ranks, as happens with an infantry formation, which may force the men in front to push forward against their will. Horses cannot use their heads to push people in front of them evenly, as can infantry.

Which of course could argue for the pushing being the most important function of ranks. However, Maurikios then goes on at great length (about a page):

Since, however, it is true that the number of outstanding soldiers, those capable of acting as file leaders in hand to hand combat, in any tagma is limited, it is necessary to regulate the depth of formation according to the type of unit......

He then goes on to suggest depths of 7-10 men for different cavalry units, dependent on their quality and morale.

.....The depth, therefore, must be no more than eight or at most ten men, no matter how weak the tagmas might be, nor should it be less than five, even for the best units...the injudicious practice of forming all tagmas ten deep [is bad since] spies can easily and quickly estimate the strength of the whole army by counting the file leaders.

In other words, morale alone is sufficient for Maurikios (or whoever) to prescribe deep battle lines (since cavalry have no benefit from pushing).

In the discussion on infantry, he goes into detail on the organization of the troops; of the 16 men in a file, the best 8 best men should be equally divided between the four first and the four rear ranks, with the rest in the middle (again a morale issue). He also cites as the reason for closing ranks to prevent some from hesitating and even holding back

In combat, he says:

The men to the rear keep their heads covered with their shields and with their lances support those in front. Obviously,...,the first line should keep themselves protected until they come to blows with the enemy.

Interestingly, he prescribes that if the men in front do not have javelins, they should throw their lances as javelins and use swords. On the role of the file closers:

The file closers should be instructed that if they hear as much as a whisper from one of their men, they should prod them with the butt of their lance. In combat, also, they should push forward the men in front of them, so that none of the soldiers will become hesitant and hold back.

Note how the "pushing" here is prescribed to the file closers (not the entire line) and is connected with the morale issue - i.e., to make sure your own troops don't flinch - not with "bowling over" the enemy line.

Of course, Maurikios is describing the Byzantine army of the 6th century AD, not the hoplite army; but considering that the Byzantine heavy infantry system of the time was built around 16 rank deep spearmen phalanxes, and the durability of the system, I would suggest it has some relevance.

Anyway, L'Impressario, I would suggest putting it on your reading list (it's Greek too). Easily one of the most fascinating books by the "ancients" about ancient warfare, due to its very down-to-earth explanations.

Back to work for me.

Regards,

Michael A.

[CBR]

Another footnote regarding "othismos" in a non-infantry context:Try to get Arrian's partly saved text in "Tactica" or "Ars Tactica", where he says that placing the cavalry in deep ranks isn't near as effective as doing the same with infantry.


Robert D. Luginbill mentions Arrian's comments on cavalry. But it is a bit vague only saying that horses cant press/shove the horses in front and Luginbill of course see that as proof of pushing.

As we know the rear rank could push forward those on front of them to keep the tight formation (both Livy and Polybius describes it) when advancing I would say its the same thing Arrian is talking about.

If a reluctant rider stopped up or slowed down then those directly in his rear couldnt get him to move on as infantry could do. Cavalry combat is in most cases described as a fluid affair with charging and counter charging and sometimes units basically went through each other as riders would open up their formation.

AFAIK horses would never crash into another horse and a rider needs space to use a sword so the opening up of ranks was natural. That didnt stop ancients from using deep formations but it would never have given the same advantage as when infantry did it.

So Arrian's comments can be understood in that way without having anything to do with multiple ranks pushing on the front rank to push the enemy back. Infantry could keep a tight formation by physical pushing while cavalry couldnt.


CBR

[Rosacrux redux]

Hmm... L'Impressario is quite diplomatic, but I'll go hellenic upon Keegan arse:

John Keegan is the renowned author of some of the most vomitues faeces ever passed by as "militay history".

There's nothing more I'd like to add to the above statement.

[conon394]

So
I see, you don't like Pressfield (I realy have no opnion, seeing as I have never read his books), and your no fan of Keegan (I not a big fan either). But yes, I would be intereested if you have a particular critic of Cartledge, or as it seems some braoder issue with historians from what famous universits or what?

I did not mean to suggest that writting stye wasin general vauge or unclear, just on that one post I was unsure of your point.

[L'Impresario]

CBR & Strategy

My note was made not to showcase the lack of pushing and the value of ranks in cavalry tactics(something that seems quite obvious) but to highlight the antithesis that Arrian uses to describe the tight formation and pushing of the infantry.


Robert D. Luginbill mentions Arrian's comments on cavalry. But it is a bit vague only saying that horses cant press/shove the horses in front and Luginbill of course see that as proof of pushing.

This is also what I read from a Greek historian (supporter of othismos) in his introduction to Arrian's Anabasis, but the specific passage isn't in its original form, thus I believe the translation and the choice of words might be too strongly in favour of the pushing theory. If it is an accurate translation, then he makes a very good case in favour of othismos by using just a single passage, that refers to what the cavalry CAN'T do and using key words to support his theory (like "επωθούσι"-pushing forward, for lack of better translation at hand, and "ενειρείσεις"- hmm sorry, I can't think of something equivalent in english right now :embarassed: ).But I can't find the original source as I said...

Rosacrux redux

Can I assume that your dislike of him stems from the fact he hasn't proposed you to help in providing the historical background for the next CA epic game "Easter Island:Total War" ~D

This may soud crazy, but Keegan is chasing me during the last 3-4 days: First I get the usual monthly military magazine and it has a very nice arcticle refuting his "masterpiece" (but you need a book to criticise AHoW)-makes my day ~:) - . Then I read in a Sunday newspaper an A. Beevor interview, stating how proud he is being Keegan's student and that he is the most important military strategist of our times..something must be amiss there at Sandhurst ~;). Wonder what will happen next....


conon394
No worries, I'm a bit vague in quite a few instances but I know you didn't suggest that anyway(and even if you did, then it would be a good opportunity to delve deeper into the subject in question).

Pressfield's "Gates of Fire" IMO is worth of the 15 euros I spent on it a long time ago, it's a good read, accurate or not, appealing to your average non-history fiction reader as well. It's been overly hyped tho as you might 've assumed. On the other hand, it depends on your personal preferences...for example I consider Eco's "Il Pendolo di Foucault" possibly the best of its kind but then I know people who 'd prefer "The Da Vinci Code" anytime over that and others who say Eco is copying even more shamelessly than Dan Brown the work of others. ~:handball:

Regarding professors from reknowned universities, I can only say one thing: I 'd love to be able to engage in dialogue with any of them and show them the error of their ways, but a) I don't know in great detail their "ways" b) most of them surely know infinitely (well sort of, just being modest for a second heh) more than me, the majority of them spent a lifetime of writing,teaching and researching....now if there are some black sheeps among them or if they aren't as good as classical studies' professors of past times, well I'm not even remotely the most suitable person to pinpoint that (with the beloved exception of Mr. Keegan ~;) ).

So no characterizations from me till I get way over 30 :balloon2:

On Cartledge, I 'll post in the other thread about the evolution of warfare a link to an article he had written about Spartans and the appearance of the hoplites.

~:)

[Strategy]

But L', the mere point of pushing isn't proof of the othismos. If - as suggested - the purpose of the deep ranks is to keep the formation in place, then those in the very rear will have to push at those standing in front of them if they try to retreat. Similarly, if any hesitate in moving forward when ordered to do so (apparently not unusual), they will need to be pushed by those in the back. Most people are willing to accept that this could happen, given that both circumstances are well-documented from other periods (one could probably find similar instances in the Napoleonic period if one looked, for that matter ~;) ).

The othismos theory, on the other hand, doesn't only assume pushing - it assumes men packed tightly as sardines, closed with the enemy and somehow managed to push at them. That is the point where the rubber band flies off, and there Appian really doesn't offer much help, as I see it.


Regarding professors from reknowned universities, I can only say one thing: I 'd love to be able to engage in dialogue with any of them and show them the error of their ways,...

Actually, many of them are on-line these days. A significant number of them are members of the Society of Ancients (http://www.soa.org.uk) and frequent their mailing list intermittently; and Philip Sabin (mentioned above) has his own mailing list for his miniature rule set Strategos. Most of those I've been in contact with have been unfailingly pleasant and polite, and usually happy to answer any questions. Even had a couple of guys send me hard-to-find articles from the US. :thumbsup:

Regarding Keegan, I haven't read anything but "Face of Battle" which I didn't think was that bad; and its certainly the book I'd consider his "Masterpiece". Regardless of his other work, one can't deny the importance of that book on the study of historical warfare. The approach followed by him there has been important for at least two other "popular"/influential historians: VDHanson and Goldsworthy (author of a stack of books on Rome).

[L'Impresario]

....othismos theory, on the other hand, doesn't only assume pushing - it assumes men packed tightly as sardines, closed with the enemy and somehow managed to push at them..
This is exactly the point I'm also trying to verify in the text of Arrian in "Tactica", as all other conditions are met, such as the notion of pushing. The translation I'm talking about, features the phrase ".because they (the riders) neither do they push forward {important element that may be transalted otherwise, still having in mind that there is soem kind of pressure, and by the looks of it seems more intense than leaning, yet isn't clear -to me at least- if it is a movement that lasts for a relatively long time} the riders infront of them,as it isn't possible to make a horse push another horse, as there exactly at the shoulders and the sides are the "ενερείσεις" of the foot troops-pushing? leaning? arghh!!- performed, nor willl the riders if they become a single mass with those standing in front of them,will they do/act/behave like the footmen, ,but more likely the horses would be disturbed and annoyed...."
Hope it isn't completely non-sensical and that the author hasn't put many personal views therein heh

EDIT: good thing Perseus is still avalaible, you got to love this site
"ενερείσεις" >enereidô :1 to thrust in, fix in, ti tini Od.:-- Mid., enereisamenos petrai gonu having planted his own knee on the rock, Theocr.
The plot thickens as I can't find Arrian's passage from the database....

EDIT2: this is the exact word, from the exact passage, but still haven't found it. Anyway, this is almost what I suspected but I said many times, the whole context matters more.
enereisis, eôs, hê, pressure, Hp.Off.12: pl., Arr.Tact.16.13.

[Strategy]

This is exactly the point I'm also trying to verify in the text of Arrian in "Tactica", as all other conditions are met, such as the notion of pushing.

Ok - my bad. Don't forget to let us know your findings. :bow:

[Strategy]

An interesting titbit I fell across regarding the discussion of the "unusual" 50-deep theban phalanx, and the "usual" depths of a phalanx etc., the battle of Piraeus 403BC between the Athenians and the exiles/Phylians is quite interesting (Xenophon Hellenica 2.4):

and they made a line not less than fifty shields in depth; then, in this formation, they advanced up the hill. [12] As for the men from Phyle, they too filled the road, but they made a line not more than ten hoplites in depth. Behind the hoplites, however, were stationed peltasts and light javelin-men, and behind them the stone-throwers.

Although the terrain here may have encouraged the deep Athenian column; it is interesting since it proves that the 50-deep phalanx was not the exclusive preserve of Thebans (and Piraeus, of course, predates Leuktra). Even more interesting is one of the battles that follow on the Athenian "revolt":

And Pausanias, being hard pressed and retreating about four or five stadia to a hill, sent orders to the Lacedaemonians and to the allies to join him. There he formed an extremely deep phalanx and led the charge against the Athenians.

The "extremely deep" phalanx, of course, seems similar to the "extremely deep" phalanx described for the Thebans at Nemea, suggesting that the Spartan King's forces were lined up in more than 16 ranks. Thus yet another instance of a deep phalanx in a non-Theban force.

[Strategy]

For anyone interested in this subject (and Greek/phalanx warfare in general), allow me to recommend:

Hans van Wees : Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities

Basically, he highlights all the contradictory evidence that certain historians (Victor Hanson being a prime example) prefer to ignore as they build their popularly accepted theses of greek warfare and society. Most interesting to me was the discussion of Greek "imperialism"/"aggressiveness" as well as the evidence he shows for a completely alternative development of phalanx warfare than is customarily given.