Hannibal Wins at Zama

[Es Arkajae]

Suppose Hannibal defeats Scipio at Zama.

The Roman army is wiped out and Scipio killed.

What effect does this have on history, does Carthage still have a chance at snatching victory in the war or at least denying it to the Romans? ~;)

How important was Zama really, you decide.

[Kraxis]

I actually made two interactive histories (using Adrian Goldsworthy's The Punic Wars as a souce for possibilities) over at the com. One right after Cannae (with you as Hannibal) and one right after a victory at Zama... The one after Cannae ended with a clear defeat for Rome, while the one after Zama never ended (I suddenly didn't have the drive or time for it), but it became clear that the war was hard for the Carthies. Rome sent some reinforcements and Massinissa of Numidia kept harrying Hannibal (so the people decided to do away with him). Maybe I will do another at some time.

What I believe would happen would be a sack of Scipio, he was already becoming very unpopular with the Senate, and unlike RTW he couldn't just ignore them. A serious loss would send him out in the cold with little chance of him returning. The army though would likely survive to a great extent due to the superior numbers of cavalry available to protect their retreat to the habour-camp.
So Carthage would have seen off the threat, possibly even gotten Massinissa back on their side, but they would have lost their foothold in Italy and all their possesions in Hispania. Effectively the war was lost, but a stalemate would be possible as the new Roman commanders would quite likely not be of Scipio's caliber.
Result would be, Carthage can't expand and Rome can't invade. After some time both sides would agree that the war needed to end and the result would be the same, but with a stronger Carthage. That would result in the Third Punic War happening earlier. Possibly while Hannibal was still at home. Result then? No idea, but Carthage could NOT win.

[Red Harvest]

Carthage wouldn't have been able to win that late, even if Hannibal had pulled off a miracle at Zama. Rome had won in Sicily and Spain was in its nominal control. It had wrested back control of the Italian peninsula and forced Hannibal to evacuate to defend Carthage. A loss at Zama would have been a setback for Rome, but based on Rome's responses to disasters in both Punic Wars it would not have mattered other than to extend the war. Rome would have just kept on trying until it succeeded. Unlike Carthage, Rome knew how to finish a war.

[Wrangel]

Guys! You really ar walking on thin ice here... you're dealing with "What would have happened if..." . Historians wouldn't be glad to see this. But then again we are not historians here, and why would we care what they say? They change what is considered facts from year to year anyway ~;) :dizzy2:

[Oaty]

Why not avoid zama all together, lay siege to Rome right after Cannae. If he would have just killed the prisoners right off the bat instead of holding them for ransom.

[Marshal Murat]

Heres a idea.
Word gets to Spain that the Carthaginians overthrow the Romans at Zama. Rebelling against them, the Roman garrisons are surprised and Spain is wrested from Roman Rule. Philip of Macedon, deciding to strike weakened Rome, lands a army in Taranto. Hannibal, after conquering the Numidians, heads to Spain and becomes ruler. Building another army, he marches again up into Gaul and down into Rome. Gaulish warlords flock to his banner. Rome is assaulted on two sides. Soon, Hannibal and Philip unite at some Roman town. Driving to Rome, they lay siege and destroy Rome. However, Hannibal's rule is usurped in Carthage, and now he is stranded in Italy, with few friends, and greater enemies.

[Baiae]

Guys! You really ar walking on thin ice here... you're dealing with "What would have happened if..." . Historians wouldn't be glad to see this.

Why not? Counterfactual history is a serious sideline of military history and many well respected military historians (for example Keegan) have written counterfactual scenarios ranging from ancient times virtually until the present day.

*EDIT* Wow, I'm a full member! When did that happen? Cheers guys (I'm assuming the mods did it).

I'm editing this post. Because I can.

[Kraxis]

Guys! You really ar walking on thin ice here... you're dealing with "What would have happened if..." . Historians wouldn't be glad to see this. But then again we are not historians here, and why would we care what they say? They change what is considered facts from year to year anyway ~;) :dizzy2:
It is not as much of a 'no-no' anymore. I asked my 'teacher' (he isn't a professor since it is only used very sparingly in Denmark, but I don't know any better english terminology for his position) last year and he made it clear that that is what history is all about. What happened and why did it happen and not this ('this' being the counterfactual scenario). So even when we present and write about pure factual history we will invariably think what would have happened had other things intervened. Most books even include at least a few sections talking about what would have happend had this or that nation not surrendered, or if a man had done this or that.

Now back to the subject.

Murat, that scenario is rather optimistic.
While the Roman graps on Hispania was not the greatest it was fairly firm. Not because the romans couldn't be beaten but because their enemies were far from united. They wouldn't be able to put together any dort of a force in the time it would take for the Romans to either detect it or get the news themselves. So an Iberian uprising is doomed, at best it is mudhole for both parties.
Phillip didn't have the naval power to go to Tarentum. His only true fleet had been bottled up near Appollonia by a superior Roman fleet earlier in the war. He would have invaded Italy if could have done so, Roman defeat or no Roman defeat.
Hannibal would indeed beat the Numidians, and quite likely threaten Massinissa back onto his side. But going to Hispania would be problematic with the Roman fleet out there (and yes it could very much keep an eye on Phillip while keeping Carthage more or less blocked off), not to say that the Iberian populace was no more happy about the Carthies than the Romans.
But should Hannibal finally make it to Cisalpine Gaul he would most likely not find many volounteers. Those that had joined him in the first place had never returned, the local rebellion had been crushed, several times in fact. This was evident quite a few years earlier when Hasdrubal had tried to join up with Hannibal. He had expected many gauls to join him, only a handful thousands showed up, and those were poor or too young, making for bad fighters (which the battle with the Romans showed).
So Hannibal has somehow overcome this and is now marching into the Roman heartland once again. One then has to ask: Why would it be any different from last time? The Romans had learned from the mighty Cunctator how to deal with Hannibal. Don't fight him unless the odds are heavily in your favour, attack where he isn't (which in this case means Africa) and harry him when you can. Rome was stronger in terms of troops than they were prior to Cannae, so Hannibal would be in trouble trying to lay siege to Rome.

Basically Hannibal could only take a march down Italy, plundering and pillaging as he went, then sail back to Carthage with it and the army and await the Romans. Hardly a scenario for a strategic victory I should think.

[AntiochusIII]

Well, Hannibal did what he could, you really can't blame him. (For anyone who disagree, do you want to swap a place with him?)

I think if only Philip V of Macedon is half as good as the other Philip II of Macedon ~D

An ally and a real reinforcements were the only things Hannibal need in the war... Oh! And a new Carthaginian navy. Their port was very, very big after all (400 something harbors!) I'm sure no freakin' Romans would successfully disturb the port's busy fleet constructions other than blocking the materials from a few miles away rather than at Carthage's gate. (The Romans were quite successful, in fact.) Though they must also invent a new way to defeat Rome's now formidable navy or at least bash their way through to Sicily or Spain. With Hannibal's genius it is possible.

Anyway, he loses! Ha ha ha ha ha! (And Carthage is always my favourite faction! It's fun being the only faction able to bust Roman arses very, very early in game with one on one battles NOT some Germanic hordes pouring down the Alps (Like I did.) Even Gauls can't.)

[Ptah]

Why not avoid zama all together, lay siege to Rome right after Cannae. If he would have just killed the prisoners right off the bat instead of holding them for ransom.

Because Hannibal correctly assumed, that attacking the city of Roma directly, was a death-trap which he should avoid at all costs. The Romans were an alliance of many Latin cities within the peninsula, and ancient sources estimate the available military manpower Romans held at that time were around 750,000.

Ofcourse, it is quite impossible that Hannibal would ever face all of those 750 thousand in a single instance, as it would mean the entire socio-economical structure of Rome would collapse due to the absence of men. However, it does mean that despite high casualties and continuing losses, the Romans still would be able to muster its legions every year. Hannibal was fighting at their turf.

While there are many factors than just the military aspect alone, the seige of mighty Carthage in the final Punic wars took around three years. Who knows how long it would take Hannibal to finally conquer Rome itself? Besides, despite the staggering losses at Cannae, none of the Latin cities betrayed their alliance and all of the peninsula was still hostile against Hannibal. Had Hannibal laid siege to Rome, the strategical isolation he faced in the final days of the 2nd Punic War would have come much sooner.

Hannibal's basic strategy was invoking a betrayal from all of the cities in allegiance to Rome. He had to show the people of the peninsula who was boss. To do that, he had to roam around the peninsula and defeat every army he faced, so that they finally got the picture, "you can't win against Hannibal, so join him". This strategy worked to a limited scale in the southern parts of Italy, but it wasn't enough. In the end, this basic strategy backfired.

Hannibal didn't decide to roam around Italy on a whim, he had a basic plan which he had to follow. Disconnet all the surrounding Latin cities from Rome, force them into a new allance with Carthage, and then finish Roma off when they had nothing left in their hands.

[MoROmeTe]

I think of Hannibal as a great tactician, not a very keen strategist. He managed to pull off his march to Italy rather relying on sheer determination than on strategic vision. Bbut lest's see...
Right after Zama, if the Romans lost... The Numidians would probably go back to the Carthaginian side, because they would have wanted or because they would fear Hannibal's revenge. The Roman survivors, and I think there would not be to many of them, would flee back to Italy. Cause Rome would feel very much threatened, by a Hannibal that now had full support from Carthage and its Senate, Rome would take out most of the troops that are in Iberia. By doing this Iberia is open for battle and Hannibal and the Carthaginians might recover their holdings and expand them. At this point either we see the Carthaginians rebuilding their navy and using it to go to Sicily and then Italy or we see hannibal taking again the long march to rome, while the navy is being built to get him reinforcements. Under these conditions I believe Rome would be forced to ask for peace. I think the carthaginians would grant it, under very good conditions for them.
There is always the posibility of another Scipio appearing in Rome... But that's a "what if" of a "what if". Too much for me to handle...

[Zalmoxis]

I highly doubt Carthage has a chance againts Rome even if they win at Zama. Here's the scenario: Hannibal pulls off a win, the romans are purely crushed, Scipio is killed. The survivors are taken off to Rome, who would already be recruiting a brand new army, perhaps even larger than the previous one. They might take soldiers out of Iberia, but that would not help Hannibal, who could not risk to leave Carthage unprotected for a week. Hannibal would keep winning, crushing the romans, but Carthage does not have the pure manpower of Rome and would be over run by legion after legion. Though, if another army is built quckly by Carthage, and somehow a new, brilliant, general takes it, they will ba in a stalemate, neither side giving in.

[Kraxis]

The Roman military state would not collapse just because its best army was ruined. That had happened plenty times already, and under much more serious circumstances. Rome knew that Iberia was important to hold on to, so no pulling out of it, its wealth in precious metals was astounding for the Romans, it basically payed for the later part of the war.
In Italy itself there was a number of Roman legions marching round and punishing defectors and basically saying "We are the top dogs here... We kicked out Hannibal". So an invasion of Italy or Sicily right after a victory at Zama would not be a certain victory.
The Roman navy would quite likely intercept any invasion force.
Goin to Iberia would be an even more risky undertaking as there Hannibal would face not only the Romans but hostile tribes. They would not want to trade one overlord for another... Again. They thought the Carthies were bad and some of them supported Scipio when he was there. Now they know the Romans are bad too, so what are they going to do? Try to kick out both parties as they duke it out. A threeway fight in foreign lands with little chance of help from home is always a very bad situation. But I agree it would be interesting to see how Hannibal would pull that off.
In any case going to Iberia would be a quagmire.

Also a victory at Zama would most likely not result in massive Roman losses. They did have the advantage in cavalry, so the army would be protected from chasers all the way back to the ships.
So that would be another army in Italy/Sicily for Hannibal to fight.

[Ptah]

I think of Hannibal as a great tactician, not a very keen strategist. He managed to pull off his march to Italy rather relying on sheer determination than on strategic vision.

I think the opposite.

Hannibal's strategic thinking reflects the circumstances Rome and Carthage was in during that time. In order to mass an assault against Rome on a strategical scale that spans the Mediterranean, he would have had to first fight for power against the conservatives (especially Hanno) in the Carthaginian Senate before any large military action can possibly be planned on a reasonable scale. There is no knowing how long this type of internal, political feud would last, and there was high chance the Romans would take that opportunity to intervene and start influencing Carthage on a political/diplomatic basis, as they have so often done against so many foreign states. In short, he would have had to become Carthage's own 'Julius Caesar' before anything could be done. Hannibal was a general, not a politician.

Since the 'Barca Exodus(or 'exile' as some might put)' to Cartagena, Iberia, all his resources were located there, not mainland Carthage. At his disposal were his private army, and nothing more. Relying on support from the politicians of the mainland Carthaginian Senate was unthinkable to Hannibal. Most of the supporters of the expansionist doctrine have moved to Iberia with Hamilcar, and since the mainstream of the Carthaginian Senate was left with the conservatives. These people were highly reluctant against outgoing military action, especially against Rome. They were land-based, agrarian nobles, as opposed to the merchants who supported the Barcas.

Therefore, Hannibal risked a very dangerous gamble, which if it succeeds, would turn his purely tactical resources into a strategical one with tangible substance. He will launch an attack from his own 'private kingdom' in Iberia, and expand his control over the lands without intervention from the mainland Carthaginians. His plan was to shatter the Latin cities' allegiance to Rome, and subordinate them into his own control.

Strategically, it made sense. It was the only option possible to him. Any other alternatives involved politcal struggles within Carthage itself. By the time Hannibal was crossing Gaul, even the Carthaginian Senate did not know his intentions. All they could do was reluctantly admit to the Roman diplomats that Carthage was again, at war against Rome, and sit back and watch in fear, if it would succeed or fail. Even during the peak of Hannibal's conquest in Italia, the Carthaginian Senate wanted to end the war and pull Hannibal back from Roman territories.

Hannibal's mistake was that he underestimated the strength of the bonds of alliance between Roman and other Italian cities. It did not shatter or break easily. It took years of fighting inside Italia just to gain the regions of Calabria and Campania. The Romans and their allies were much more determined and solid than Hannibal thought. In the end, this underestimation was what brought him his isolation.

It was a failed strategical plan, but it was also bold and brilliant. No other general of that time could possibly ever have come up with a plan like that. It was only one army, with one man controlling it. And that one man was determined to bring down an entire empire to its knees with just what he had, and he even almost succeeded. If the Romans were organized like the Persians, which empire shattered after it became clear to the subjects that Darius the 3rd was a loser, Hannibal might have become "Hannibal Magnus"!

[Red Harvest]

I agree with Ptah and Kraxis. Hannibal was a brilliant tactician. Unlike Carthaginians before him, he saw that to beat Rome you must take the war into Italy. Rome was showing clear signs that it was going to start fighting with Carthage over Spain. Carthage's experiences with Roman aggression in Siciliy that led to the 1st Punic War and with Roman annexation of Sardinia after the 1st Punic War could leave little doubt as to what would eventually happen.

I can only conclude that Hannibal's mistake was in not sieging and sacking Rome. Whether he could have succeeded after Cannae is a good question. He had taken other amazing gambles and succeeded, but he did not take the pivotal gamble at the moment that it might have worked. If anyone could have succeeded in the endeavor, it was Hannibal. I suspect Rome might have fallen simply because of the state of shock they must have been in following the catastrophe of Cannae. Hannibal had the initiative and the Romans were in terrified awe of him. On paper it doesn't look like he could have done it, but with the tactical momentum he possessed, all sorts of things could have happened.

Who knows? If Hannibal had actually tried to take Rome, perhaps the Romans might actually have decided to come to some sort of terms with Carthage. It is one thing to lose armies and possessions, but it is another when the very end of the state is at hand.

[mambaman]

i'm not sure that Rome was an 'empire' as such before defeating Carthage in the 2nd Punic War-they certainly became one once they had acquired Cartahginian lands, however!

[Oaty]

PTAH


the Carthaginian Senate wanted to end the war and pull Hannibal back from Roman territories.

Not too sure on that. 1 while Hannibal was in Italy, Carthage sent 25,000 troops to Sicily to reclaim it. Hannibal was upset as this was reenforcements he desperately needed plus to win Sicily the better approach was to win the war on the Italian peninsula, force Rome to come to Carthages terms and they could have won Sicily in a treaty without ever having an army there. The senate was taking the opportunity on weakened Rome

Second, Rome landed in the heart of Carthage territory while it took them 2 years to get a fleet to Hannibal to return him and his army to Carthage...... in the middle of that Rome and Carthage had come to a ceasefire. Well upon Hannibals return to Africa the Carthage senate made hostilities towards the Romans breaking the ceasefire. I do'nt know what Hannibals thoughts were and I'm guessing did not support this as I have a feeling he already knew the war was lost and Carthage probably could have come to much better terms while a ceasefire was in effect. That right there tells me the Senate was in favour in opposition to Rome but had too much faith in Hannibal.


As far as winning at Zama he almost did. The battle was a stalemate but slightly in Scipios favour. Instead of the normal Roman tactic of releasing the Hastati and bringing in the Princepes the Hatati kept fighting and were never retired throughout the whole battle. This is where Scipio was trying to reenact Cannae, he pulled his Princepes and Triarii to the flanks. Hannibal in return took his third line to match the line of the Romans. So neither were outflanked and the Romans veteran troops were no match for Hannibals troops. The roman line was looking in poor shape and the cavalry was nowhere in site.

Hannibals tactic for this battle knowing he was outnumbered in cavalry was to allow the cavalry for a quick fight and to route, with most of his cavalry still in tact the Roman/Numidian cavalry had to pursue the cavalry until they disbursed and were in a complete route.

Then finally the cavalry returns Hannibal escapes the battlefield and the remaining troops there get slaughtered. If the Romn/Numidian cavalry could have been delayed another half hour or so Hannibal could have quite won at Zama.

And as far as the cavalry stopping the Romans from being persued, usually cavry do'nt return to a fight that is lost. Mainly in fearof not knowing wether Carthages cavalry was reforming or not and if so seeing the routing infantry would have definately returned to the field.

[Ptah]

As the famous episode goes; Magone, Hannibal's 2nd brother returned to Carthage after the battle of Cannae(Magone led the ambushing cavalry in the battle of Trebia). In front of the Carthaginian senators, he brought numerous huge bags full of golden rings they claimed from the Roman casualties in Cannae. To the Romans, a golden ring wasn't for weddings - it was a thick and heavy stamp used for sealing envelopes with wax. A small mountain of gold formed in front of the Senators. Most of the Senators were excited to see such accomplishment, but Hanno remained silent. At last, he began questioning Magone, which of the cities in Italia have betrayed Rome and allied with Hannibal, and which of Rome's foreign allies sought a new treaty with Hannibal. Magone answered, "none". Hanno replied, "Then the war is far from over", and then proposed to his fellow Senators that they urge Hannibal to force a very advantageous peace treaty with the Romans and pull out of Italia.

The mainstream of Carthaginian conservatives weren't interested in territorial/market expansion as the Barcas was. Sicily was a different matter - it wasn't a "new territory", it was a lost one that had to be regained. None of the Carthaginians really understood what Hannibal was doing inside Italia, but what they did understand was that Sicily or Iberia was already established with significant economical basis and therefore, was easier to make investments in gainin/defending these territories rather than aid Hannibal in Italia. They were sensitive about losing stuff they already had, but never to keen in getting something new.

Try to think of Hannibal as a third faction - moral allegiance to Carthage but semi-independant, and that explains a lot of what was going on. The Senate had no direct control over him. Hannibal started actions without any real sanctions from the Senate, and therefore, he had to send Magone to Cannae to demonstrate in most dramatic form just what Hannibal was doing in Italia against the Romans. As long as the war was going well, the Carthaginians didn't really complain about Hannibal - he was one of the rare Carthaginian generals who could win against Romans. That much even the Senate understood. However, their position to Hannibal, was never in full support.

[MoROmeTe]

As the game quotes Hannibal knew to gain victories but not how to use them. I've been reading up on the Punic Wars and I've began developing the idea that even if the Great Enemy of the Romans won at Zama he ight be unable to obtain more than an solid peace with the Romans. A peace that would last during his life and would later be broken by the Romans that needed to expand at the expense of the Carthaginians.
The ideas from my previous post and my current theory are fighting each other in my head. I think it is down to a matter of alliances and of ways of handling the situation.
If Hannibal went back to Italy after a success at Zama then the stalemtate and peace seen inevitable. If t\he chose to go back to Spain and reclaim it then the path of the future is very much cloudy. If another able general could put pressure on Sicily then maybe a strategy of reclaiming Spain and using it as a base for another assault on Italy could work. If Hannibal chose to go to Sicily then the fight would realy heat up, as the romans would not tolerate to loose the adevantages gained in the First Punic War. So, it seems to be that a Hannibal that triumphs at Zama and kicks Romans arses in Sicily could very well pull the Romans to their knees. But again if there was some pressure by a good Carthaginian general in Spain or if Philip attacked from Macedon.
I guess it's not a matter of winning Zama but a matter of making your tactical wins count on a strategic level...

[Tim]

I'd say Rome recovers and goes on to conquer Carthage anyway, but I'll defer to the experts..


"Much has been written about Rome's later great showdown with Carthage. But despite three murderous wars (264-146 B.C.), and a nightmarish sixteen-year sojourn of a megalomaniac Hannibal on Italian soil, the ultimate decision was never in doubt. By the third century B.C., the Roman manner of raising, equipping, and leading armies, the flexibility and resilience of republican government, and the growing success of Italian agriculturists, financiers, traders, and builders-all beneficiaries of past Hellenic practice ensured by the Greeks' successful emergence from the Persian Wars-made the ultimate verdict of the PUnic Wars more or less foreordained. Ggiven the size of the Roman army, the unity of republican Italy, and the relative weakness of Punic culture, the wonder is not that Carthag4e lost, but that it was able to fight so savagely and for so long" pg. 22.

No Glory That Was Greece: The Persians Win at Salamis, 480 B.C. Victor Davis Hanson. From The Collected What If? Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been. ed. Robert Cowley. Penguin Group. 2001.

[Red Harvest]

I've got one book by Hanson, and I am somewhat underwhelmed. There is some good info in it, but there is also quite a bit of subjective stuff that adds nothing to the book. His writing seems to be structured primarily to support a thesis about some innate superiority of western warfare with Greece at its origin. It is less like reading about warfare than reading some blog site. Perhaps this is an unfair assessment from reading one book, but I get an uneasy, uncomfortable feeling at points in his book--not at points where he is discussing actual combat or techniques, but when he diverges into his main themes.

With respect to the quote by Hanson, I believe he is wrong. Had Hannibal taken and ruthelessly sacked Rome, I don't think it would have recovered. The old alliances would have meant nothing with Rome gone and its citizens dead/enslaved. It is possible because of the nature of Roman citizenship that it would have recovered its power, but not likely. Such an event would have broken Rome's aura of inevitable victory. With Rome proper removed from the equation, her recent enemies would have been in a position to carve her up, and would have needed to form new alliances to protect themselves. It is hard to imagine what such a reallignment might have looked like.

Zama was largely irrelevant, the war was already decided. A win by Hannibal there would only stave off defeat for another year or few years.

[Ptah]

The question is;

1) How fast could Hannibal have finally conquered the capitol city of Roma?
2) It is highly likely the Roman alliances would shatter if Roma fell. But, would it fail when Roma was under siege but not yet conquered?

Personally, I think there was no way Hannibal could have conquered Roma within 6 months. IIRC there were two~three new Legions inside Roma during the time Cannae happened. Almost every year during the 16 year campaign, Hannibal had to withdraw to his the winter camps in southern Italia, since now Capua had betrayed Rome and offered an (non-military) alliance.

Rome was not an empire which its functions were concentrated in the capitol city alone. Right after Cannae only Capua and its neighboring towns opened up the doors, but rest of the cities inside Italia still firmly remained on the Roman side. I'm not really sure, but I remember it to be Livius, mentioning Roman military potential was at 750 thousand men in Italia alone, during that time. Ofcourse, there is no way all of those 750 thousand soldiers would show up at a battle field at the same time, but it still means Romans could muster 3~4 four new Legions every year. If the siege to Roma lasted more than 6 months, Hannibal would be surrounded himself.

600 knights and about 3000 militia men held out against 150 thousand Turkish forces fully equipped with siege cannons for months, before finally surrendering, during the siege of the Hospitallers in the Isle of Rhodes. The Turkish casualties were estimated at 1/3rd of total numbers. The siege of Constantinople also cost heavy losses to the attackers, even when Constantinople was only a shadow of what it was.

In the final Punic War, the city of Carthage had given up on all arms and armour before the siege was laid, and had to re-equip the soldiers from scratch, when the Romans decided to wipe Carthage off the map. Carthage held out for three years.

Of some 40~50 thousand men Hannibal had, only 15~20 thousand of them were trustworthy. Rest of them were Gallic/Iberian mercenaries with high attrition rates in most every battle, easy to replace, but high attrition rates, wishy-washy morale, and largely unreliable in prolonged mlitary operations.

So, could Hannibal have conquered Roma with only 50 thousand men? Would it have been better for Hannibal to become a stationary target outside the walls of Rome?

Personally, I think not. Hannibal chose not to change his initial strategy, and I think he was right to do so.

[General_Sun]

I probably would've chose the same course of action as Hannibal if I were him.

But if he won at Zama, he might've been victorious in the war. A peace treaty would almost certinaly mean the give up or Scily/HIspania/Sardina, any of these,
as long as the Macedonians were willing to make their threats.

I doubt the Roman fleet could keep both Carthage and Macedon in check, even a small army of 40000 in Itatly would scare the Romans enough to hold off any assult on Carthage. That be que for Hannibal to wrest control of Scily and maybe even march up into Southern Italy... Again...

[Red Harvest]

Ptah,

I don't see how failing to seige Rome was the right strategy. It was a failure, a long slow failure, but a failure nonetheless. Rome avoided fighting Hannibal as a result. Carthage could only hope to win by the fall of Rome. Rome would not bargain. Therefore only capture and destruction were left if Carthage were to win. Hannibal didn't march into Italy hoping to delay the inevitable. He was trying to win. He didn't seem to know that Rome would not bargain when beaten before he invaded. He thought a Cannae would be the victory that decided the war.

How would he have succeeded in sieging Rome? I don't know, I can only guess at possibilities. Nobody could have expected him to march across the alps with elephants and attack the Italian peninsula. Nobody could have anticipated his destruction of a huge Roman force at Cannae. Yet he did. And Zama was a closely run thing too...

Hannibal's allies probably would have been even more loyal had he besieged Rome. Why? The potential plunder was enormous! Plus the immediate potential of dealing a knockout blow to their enemies would have been clear to the Gauls, and others (and the Gauls ambushed and slaughtered the Praetor Postumius his two legions and allies later the same year.) And Roman allies would have had to consider the future even more carefully. A seperate peace by some with Rome under siege would not have been unfathomable.

How long might have it taken? It might have fallen immediately, unlikely, but possible. Recently recruited legions were fodder before commanders like Hannibal. Rome had been badly bled of manpower by Trebbia, Trasimene, and Cannae. There are many ways for a city to fall, and Hannibal was the kind of genius that would be likely to find such a way. Any penetration of the defenses would have likely been fatal--Hannibal had momentum and reputation. Rome might have fallen through some sort of treachery, disease, trickery or whatever. Hannibal marched around Italy for another 13 years. I think he could have maintained a siege long enough for it to prove decisive.

One thing is almost certain, a siege of Rome would have provided a focal point for Rome and its allies: Hannibal. Rome's eventual success was from fighting where Hannibal wasn't. If they had been forced to engage him in further major battles because he was besieging Rome, it is most likely that he would have again bested them. And another "Cannae" might have proven decisive. At the least such a move might have prevented Carthaginian losses in Spain and the loss of his brothers. This would have allowed him to be substantially reinforced.

[Red Harvest]

But if he won at Zama, he might've been victorious in the war. A peace treaty would almost certinaly mean the give up or Scily/HIspania/Sardina, any of these

A peace treaty without Carthage capitulating was not possible. There would have been no reason for Rome to grant a peace treaty. Rome already had control of Sicily, Spain, and Sardinia and they had naval control to enforce it. Even had they lost at Zama and uncharacteristally wanted peace, they would have no reason to give up any territory for it.

Rome wouldn't bargain with Hannibal after Cannae. When Hannibal sent a delegation they refused to bargain and instead allowed 8,000 Roman prisoners to be executed and/or enslaved rather than even ransom or negotiate. They even passed a law forbidding the families of the men from ransoming them (as had been done sometimes previously.) They wouldn't negotiate with Pyrrhus when he crushed their armies either. They wouldn't allow an exchange with Carthage in the 1st Punic War when Carthage defeated the Roman army in Africa and held their consul Regulus. So why would they have agreed to even negotiate after what would have been a minor setback at Zama?

[Ptah]

Harv,

I'm not the one to side with Hanson on this, at least in his way of explaining things. But my opinion is that there was no way Hannibal could have won against Rome in a single war lasting a single generation. Hannibal was purely militaristic in nature. He is neither a politician nor a keen diplomat. On the other hand, Rome used smart politics and diplomacy as well as military strategy to defeat Hannibal.

I agree with your initial premise, that the only way to win that war was to conquer Rome. But it was not an option - it was impossible, at least in my opinion. His military strategy was solid, brilliant, and made sense. But if Hannibal was as much a politician and diplomat as he was a military general, he would have realized it took more than just crushing military victories to sever Roma from its "37 allied Italian cities" and "eight Latin tribes". The failure of Hannibal was that he couldn't see beyond military issues.

His strategy was based on the assumption that when a certain leader fails, his subordinates will betray him. Show to the world that the 'leader' was an incompetent imbecile, and soon all his underlings will join you. When the 'leader' had nobody on his side, then it was finally the time to strike.

It was the normal action in most of the cases, but not for Rome. Hannibal was Carthaginian in nature and I doubt he understood why the Roman allies refused to break their allegiance to Rome, despite its crushing defeats again and again. Carthage suffered numerous rebellions from its subordinate city-states whenever Carthage lost a war or a battle. Rome, did not.

Rome followed the way of the 'Cunctator', because after Cannae they've finally figured out what Hannibal was upto. Since then they refused to fight Hannibal out in the open, re-established diplomatic channels with wavering regions, strengthened foreign alliances, and ripped apart the fundamentals of Hannibal's stratgey. Finally, Hannibal was isolated into southern parts of Italy. Rome regained control of all of the three most important city-states of southern Italia(Syracuse, Tarentum, Capua) once more.

You say that Hannibal's allies probably would have been even more loyal had he besieged Rome. Except, even after word of the results of Cannae had spread, Hannibal srtill had no allies! As mentioned only Capua and a few cities in Calabria opened up. Rest of the cities inside the peninsula still lay loyal to Rome. Macedonia was neutralized thanks to the brilliant diplomatic efforts of the Roman ambassadors to the Greek city states. Ptolemaic Egyptians still supported the Romans. Of the mentioned 750 thousand military potential, 1/3rd of them were Roman citizens. The rest 2/3rds did not have Roman citizenship and yet, they still remained on the side of Rome. The cities with Etruscan heritage alone could muster total 50 thousand men, Samnite cities 70 thousand.

The siege of Syracuse took 2 years for the Romans. The military potential of Syracuse was negligible at best when compared to the Romans or Carthaginians, and still, it held out for two years against Marcellus. Even if we consider Archimedes and his war machines as a factor, he is still only one man. Considering how siege battles go, it'd be impossible to assume Hannibal could have taken Roma in less than a year. Legions were fodder for Hannibal in an open field battle that only took a day to decide the outcome, where Hannibal's tactical prowess proved to be overwhelmingly superior to any of the Roman generals. However, laying siege to a city and assaulting it is another matter. All of the rest of the factors(disease, treachery, trickery, etc..) you mention remains only a possibility - a gamble at best. I'd say its a pretty weak basis to form a siege upon.

Hannibal could roam Italy for another 13 years because he precisely tried to avoid being cornered into attrition. Whenever winter came he withdrew his forces to Southern Italia, tried to strengthen his control over the cities under his control. Try to pay wages for the mercenaries, conscript the precious few Italians cities of Greek heritage, refresh his forces, and etc.. Each spring he would roam around the flats trying to provoke any of the Roman armies to an open battle, except that never happened. At this point Hannibal realized things were going wrong, and desparately tried to gain Tarentum which harbors would enable logisitic lines to open up from Carthage in North Africa.

What if Hannibal remained in front of the gates of Roma? Hannibal had no real reinforcements. His men were limited. Only one of two attempts to send supplies and reinforcements to Hannibal succeeded. The rest of his supplies came from Calabria he conquered.

What's to stop Rome from mobilizing forces and initiate actions to regain the territories at Southern parts of Italia? They could take the same course of action they eventually took - send a few Legions around Hannibal to tie him up at Roma, and send a second force to Southern Italia to regain all the lost cities. No matter how genius Hannibal was, he can't be at two places at once. If he remains in front of Rome, he loses his basecamp he established. If Hannibal decides to break the siege to go save his conquered territories, then Roma is saved.

After all, that is what the Romans did in a larger scale. They isolated Hannibal inside Italia, and struck at his base in Iberia and the mainland of Carthage. If they can do that, they could always do it in a smaller scale. Isolate Hannibal in front of Roma, and go strike the Southern cities. If Hannibal tries to save them, then the siege is broken. If Hannibal does not move, he loses the only "supply depot" he had inside Italia. Then his army cannot rest, be fed, be paid, etc etc.

Its a lose-lose scenario. Nothing could have saved Hannibal, unless like you have said, Hannibal somehow miraculously conquers Rome in a short time. The final question is, would/could Hannibal risked have such a gamble?

He wan't a gambler playing with his money. He was a general who had distinct responsibilities. All of his actions are entirely calculated and reasonable. Even the long march across of Gaul and over the Alps was a calculated risk with good chance of success. (He left Iberia with over 90,000 men. When he crossed the Alps only about 1/4th was left. He recruited Gallic mercenaries to form a total force of about 50 thousand.)

And then at Cannae, he felt something was not right. Messengers arrived to tell Hannibal that Capua is willing to change sides, but the rest of the cities remained closed. So, at this point, which he has some anxieties, but does see limited success in that Capua turned like he expected.. was he able to give up on all of that and go risk a all-or-nothing gamble at the gates of Roma?

We think that laying siege to Roma could have been an option, because we already know the outcome of the war. Hannibal did not. If I were in his shoes, I wouldn't risk a gamble like that. Ofcourse, I'm not Hannibal, but I'd doubt even the headstrong Alexandros would risk a gamble like that.

[Tim]

With respect to the quote by Hanson, I believe he is wrong. Had Hannibal taken and ruthelessly sacked Rome, I don't think it would have recovered. The old alliances would have meant nothing with Rome gone and its citizens dead/enslaved. It is possible because of the nature of Roman citizenship that it would have recovered its power, but not likely. Such an event would have broken Rome's aura of inevitable victory. With Rome proper removed from the equation, her recent enemies would have been in a position to carve her up, and would have needed to form new alliances to protect themselves. It is hard to imagine what such a reallignment might have looked like.

Zama was largely irrelevant, the war was already decided. A win by Hannibal there would only stave off defeat for another year or few years.

The topic deals with Hannibal winning at Zama, not a counterfactual on the sack of Rome. As we know, Hannibal never moved on Rome -historians debate as to why- but to me, it was because he simply didn't have the manpower. Yes he roams at will for more than a decade on the penisula, but although he can't be defeated on the field, he hasn't got the ability to take Rome itself.

History is ripe with such examples -superior military skill/leadership versus overwhelming odds- Charles XII versus Peter the Great and even Frederick the Great, military genuis of the 18th century, was nearly overwhelmed during the Seven Years War and seems to have written out a suicide letter- and in this case, Hannibal had bitten off more than he could chew. For me, the only reason Hannibal didn't move on Rome is because he simply didn't have the ability.

[Red Harvest]

Ptah,

I'll quote Goldsworthy on the result of Cannae: "By the end of the campaigning season of 216 the war in Italy had been irrevocably changed. Throught southern Italy many states defected to Hannibal, including parts of Apulia, nearly all of Samnium and Bruttium, and, most disturbingly of all, Campania." These areas where Rome had her most tenuous grasp had indeed gone over to Hannibal. He was far from being without allies.

By bottling up Rome her focus would have been forced to shift to Hannibal, easing the pressure on his allies in Italy. With Rome under continued direct threat, they would have been force to confront him directly, and that was something the Romans were unable to do successfully in 216 BC. To besiege Rome would have sent a signal of confidence to his allies.

[The Wizard]

I think an important fact is being ignored here -- the Roman view towards war. Romans fought war on the basis that they would always, no matter what the hardships were, win in the end. A war for the Romans would only end, in their view, once there was a treaty which was highly favorable to the Roman state, and only then. Take a look at what happened with Macedon under Perseus after it was defeated by Aemilius Paullus, or Pontus, or indeed Carthage after the 2nd Punic War.

This attitude towards waging war is probably the sole reason -- and it was probably enough as it is -- keeping them fighting after Cannae. I've read another book by Goldsworthy, In The Name Of Rome, and there he proposes that the fact that enemies such as Pyrrhus and Hannibal failed against Rome was because they had a Hellenic approach to warfare: end a war after a few well-concluded battles. I tend to agree with him; while Romans always knew they would win in the end and therefore would go to extreme lengths to achieve that, their "organized" enemies (i.e. Carthage and the Successor States) were not so tenacious in the least, although the thought just came to me that Hannibal must have been an exception (looking at the other important enemies of Rome such as Pyrrhus, Philip V, Perseus and Antiochus the Great).

Therefore, I find that there would be a very small chance indeed that Hannibal could have forced the Romans into a peace treaty simply by winning Zama. Also, capturing Rome was indeed a very hazardous job IMO, also because of this Roman attitude. Even if Hannibal would have succeeded, the whole siege probably would have crippled his army.

No, the Romans would have gone on with the war straight on until they won -- or got destroyed. However, that's unlikely given their own resources and comparing those to Hannibal's.



~Wiz