WWI paper

[ICantSpellDawg]

“Why was the First World War protracted and indecisive? Why did the Allies eventually win?”

5 pages on this using robert grave's book Goodbye To All That and an oxford textbook as well as lecture notes

[ShadesPanther]

mainly it was indecicive because Germany had no obvious signs of the war. They had less food but Germany was not that much worse off (potentially) than before the war.

Allies had better supplies, more men and it mostly was a two front war (until Russia dropped out but the USA joined with their nearly unlimited manpower)

[econ21]

I would place a lot of emphasis on the military technology as the reason for the protracted and indecisive nature of the conflict. Trenches, barbed wire, machine-guns and accurate fast-firing rifles, static heavy artillery, lack of modern communications etc. all made it hard to get a decisive result tactically.

There's an interesting foretaste of this in the eastern theatre of the ACW. Grant and Lee eventually became bogged down in WW1 style trench warfare around Richmond. This kind of attritional warfare meant that victory was only slowly decided and went to the power with the greatest resources of men and munitions. In the case of WW1, with the US entry to WW1, this meant the Allies.

Another key factor is the massive scale of the mobilisations. This meant that entrenchements could extend across Western Europe, ruling out much chance of strategic maneouvre and giving a recipe for attritional warfare. It also meant that both sides were too big to be whupped, until appalling bloodletting and lack of hope of victory had exhausted their will to fight.

The relatively even balance of power between the combatants and the high initial morale of armies on both sides were also important considerations in sustaining the conflict.

I am not sure I would emphasise the "stupidity" of the WW1 generals. I suspect this accusation is rather like that of the Europeans in the 1860s who did not understand the new attrition warfare and thought the ACW generals bungling amateurs. Personally, I am often surprised at how quickly the WW1 generals looked for technological or tactical innovations to break the stalemate. [Even the Schlieffen Plan seems remarkable as an example of an attempted lightning strike before the technology existed for a "blitzkrieg" proper.] But until those innovations suceeded, the WW1 generals realised - like Grant - that war means killing and got on with prosecuting the war in what arguably was the only way possible at the time.

[ICantSpellDawg]

I would place a lot of emphasis on the military technology as the reason for the protracted and indecisive nature of the conflict. Trenches, barbed wire, machine-guns and accurate fast-firing rifles, static heavy artillery, lack of modern communications etc. all made it hard to get a decisive result tactically.

There's an interesting foretaste of this in the eastern theatre of the ACW. Grant and Lee eventually became bogged down in WW1 style trench warfare around Richmond. This kind of attritional warfare meant that victory was only slowly decided and went to the power with the greatest resources of men and munitions. In the case of WW1, with the US entry to WW1, this meant the Allies.

Another key factor is the massive scale of the mobilisations. This meant that entrenchements could extend across Western Europe, ruling out much chance of strategic maneouvre and giving a recipe for attritional warfare. It also meant that both sides were too big to be whupped, until appalling bloodletting and lack of hope of victory had exhausted their will to fight.

The relatively even balance of power between the combatants and the high initial morale of armies on both sides were also important considerations in sustaining the conflict.

I am not sure I would emphasise the "stupidity" of the WW1 generals. I suspect this accusation is rather like that of the Europeans in the 1860s who did not understand the new attrition warfare and thought the ACW generals bungling amateurs. Personally, I am often surprised at how quickly the WW1 generals looked for technological or tactical innovations to break the stalemate. [Even the Schlieffen Plan seems remarkable as an example of an attempted lightning strike before the technology existed for a "blitzkrieg" proper.] But until those innovations suceeded, the WW1 generals realised - like Grant - that war means killing and got on with prosecuting the war in what arguably was the only way possible at the time.

perfect

[GoreBag]

As much as there was a certain lack of technological advancements in WW1, I would say that the main reason the war was so terribly indecisive was that a great deal of generals on both sides were stuck in the Colonial era, thinking that they were fighting a Colonial war with Colonial tactics (minus the pikes, that is). Attack, counterattack, repeat - this was a typical day on the front line, the forces ebbing back and forth. No one really managed to break out of this rut until what would be near the end of the war - tanks started to make an appearance, which allowed for changes in tactics, and the way commanders thought of their troops was altered, but more by gradual learning than by revelation. Point in case: Arthur Currie.

Sir Arthur's philosophy was that every soldier, right down to the lowest private, should know what the objectives of the battle were (an idea basically new and shocking at the time) and deserved his own fair chance at survival. This was a stark contrast when compared to the attritionist tactics employed by both sides until the Battle of Vimy Ridge, where a million (!) artillery shells were fired as bombardment before the assault, and was the first time that the Canadian troops acted in great, masterminded unison in the war. Long story short, the final German offensive of the war was planned out to specifically avoid the Canadian troops. Currie also developed the "creeping barrage" tactic.

By the end of the war, Douglas Haig, a very influential, Scottish-born general under the UK (who only really came into this position because of connections with the monarchy) learned the lesson and changed his tactics from waiting for his infantry to break through the German line so that his cavalry (yes, cavalry) could charge their way into the heartland of Germany to taking small gains with his infantry and consolidating them, which earned the title "leap-frogging across Europe". Oh, and he is quoted as having said "the machine gun is overrated" - an example of the outdated mindset of the commanders of the era.

I think that about covers the general input...

[ShadesPanther]

By the end of the war, Douglas Haig, a very influential, Scottish-born general under the UK (who only really came into this position because of connections with the monarchy) learned the lesson and changed his tactics from waiting for his infantry to break through the German line so that his cavalry (yes, cavalry) could charge their way into the heartland of Germany to taking small gains with his infantry and consolidating them, which earned the title "leap-frogging across Europe". Oh, and he is quoted as having said "the machine gun is overrated" - an example of the outdated mindset of the commanders of the era.

I think that about covers the general input...

The British had cavalry waiting behind the lines for this suppossed great breakthrough at the Somme. Although to be fair Russian cavalry (specifically Cossacks) had quite alot of success on the Esatern Front.

[GoreBag]

The British had cavalry waiting behind the lines for this suppossed great breakthrough at the Somme.

That's what I meant. Sadly, though, I know very little of the Russian involvement.

[econ21]

I am not sure that having cavalry waiting to exploit a breakthrough is an example of the idiocy of WW1 generals. Given the limitations of the technology, it seems sensible. It reminds me of the role of tanks and mechanised infantry in Germany's WW2 triumphs - these mobile arms were not so much to force the breakthrough, as to exploit it quickly.

If they got the chance, WW1 cavalry would have fought tactically dismounted like infantry. I suspect they could have been almost as effective as infantry in that role - at the end of the ACW, the Union cavalry were more effective than infantry in this role thanks to better guns and esprit de corps. But as cavalry, they may have had a strategic advantage over infantry in being able to move faster strategically and exploit a break through.

The problem on the Western front was not that the cavalry could not fight tactically or exploit strategically - they never got the chance to prove they could do either. Rather the problem was that the other arms could never secure an adequate breakthrough.

[GoreBag]

I am not sure that having cavalry waiting to exploit a breakthrough is an example of the idiocy of WW1 generals. Given the limitations of the technology, it seems sensible. It reminds me of the role of tanks and mechanised infantry in Germany's WW2 triumphs - these mobile arms were not so much to force the breakthrough, as to exploit it quickly.

If they got the chance, WW1 cavalry would have fought tactically dismounted like infantry. I suspect they could have been almost as effective as infantry in that role - at the end of the ACW, the Union cavalry were more effective than infantry in this role thanks to better guns and esprit de corps. But as cavalry, they may have had a strategic advantage over infantry in being able to move faster strategically and exploit a break through.

The problem on the Western front was not that the cavalry could not fight tactically or exploit strategically - they never got the chance to prove they could do either. Rather the problem was that the other arms could never secure an adequate breakthrough.

I would say that it is an example of foolishness. Thousands upon thousands of soldiers' lives were thrown away in the hope that they could open a hole so that the cavalry could charge through and win the day in medieval fashion. The attritionist angle was far too outdated to be effective, especially since the machine gun was used widely and effectively.

There is one battle at the back of my mind, however, where there was a cavalry charge...its name eludes me at the moment. It is quite famous for being the last use of a cavalry charge to date.