waterloo

[VAE VICTUS]

ok i have heard, and read so many different reasons as to why napoleon won waterloo(or why wellington won it whichever) that my head is spinning.
why did he really lose?
thanks
VV

[matteus the inbred]

too many reasons, depending on who you read!
it rained heavily the night before, making for a late start to allow the ground to dry out for moving artillery, the last thing Napoleon needed.
he failed (for many reasons, not all his fault) to prevent the Prussians from rejoining the battle.
he appointed the wrong Marshals in the wrong commands (revisionists mainly blame Ney and of course Grouchy for making poor tactical decisions; but of course Napoleon appointed them to their respective commands in the first place, and this wasn't the first time he'd picked the wrong man for the job)
he had some kind of tactical 'battle fatigue', to which he was occasionally prone (such as at Borodino) where he couldn't be bothered to do anything clever and just slugged it out, thus underestimating the British infantry on a battlefield chosen by Wellington. there is no reason for Napoleon not to have been familiar with Wellington's troop quality or expertise at using terrain as his Marshals would have told him about this (and there is anecdotal evidence that they did).
it's hard to say whether the quality of the French army and particular their commanders was poor or not poor comparatively, after all Napoleon had accomplished great things with a very low quality army in 1814...he was certainly missing the likes of Davout and Murat, anyway.

even so, given his strategic and (up till now) tactical brilliance in the 1815 campaign, it's odd that he failed to defeat an army that was not anywhere near the best that Wellington ever commanded. it's even possible to argue that Waterloo was lost before it was even fought, as the failure to detroy the Prussian army at Ligny and damage the British at Quatre Bras made fighting against the clock at Waterloo inevitable. personally, i think with his 1805-1812 army and its commanders Napoleon would have won fairly easily.

[InsaneApache]

In a nutshell. The ground was boggy and wet. The battle start was delayed several hours because of the wet. Grouchy, although urged by his senior staff, refused to ride towards the sound of the guns, instead he chased Blucher. Prince Jeromes' diversionary attack (Hougomont) developed a momentum all of it's own, sucking in the left flank of the Grande Armee. At a crucial juncture Napolean became ill and left the battlefield. In his absence Ney counter attacked the British line with his cavalry. Just think horses v pikes you'll get the picture. Wellington kept his men on the reverse slope of the ridge, negating any artillary fire that wasn't screwed up because of the mud. The Prussians turned up about 4 in the afternoon. The Grande Armee ran away. Interesting trivia, Napoleans army still outnumbered the Allies even as they routed.

History pdq :san_grin:

[Templar Knight]

His attack on the Château d'Hougomont failed, which set the pattern for the rest of the day. He hoped that an attack here would draw out Wellingtons reserves. Its stubborn defence continued to draw thousands of valuable French troops which included:

Detachments under the command of Jerome Napoleon's brother
The divisions of Foy, Guilleminot and Bachelu
Nearly the entire corps of Reille
Kellermann's cavalry corps
Bauduin's brigade failed to enter Hougomont on the north side
Soye's brigade managed a small breach on the south side could not exploit it.

Apparently: Napoleon's hemorrhoids contributed to his defeat at Waterloo. Apparently his piles prevented him from surveying the battlefield on horseback.

Edit (too fast IA :san_embarassed::san_grin: )

[matteus the inbred]

yeah, the 'illness of some kind' (piles/indigestion/fainting) appears to be fairly substantiated and effectively turned command over to Marshal Ney, who wasn't up to the job despite being insanely brave.
Grouchy's failure may be compared to that of Bernadotte at Jena-Auerstadt, although Napoleon had no Davout to pull his irons out of the fire this time.


Interesting trivia, Napoleans army still outnumbered the Allies even as they routed.
i didn't know that one, InsaneApache, very interesting! psychological collapse due to the failure of the Guard. la garde recule!

[VAE VICTUS]

and i remember in cromwell, cornwall whatever author writes the sharpe series,
something about a prince of orange who did something dumb but cant remember what.
anything like that happen, or was it made up?

[matteus the inbred]

Bernard Cornwell, Sharpe's Waterloo...it may be true; the Prince of Orange held a divisional command at Waterloo. he was supposed to have exposed infantry in line to cavalry attack (which equals lots of dead infantry) at least twice during the battle and once at Quatre Bras as well...there is some evidence for this (it certainly happened, but whose fault it was is not clear). his appointment was a political one, in order to make Dutch-Belgian troops available to the allies during the campaign.

like Ney, there's no doubting his bravery (he led a cavalry charge and was later wounded by a sniper for getting recklessly close to the fighting at La Haye Sainte) but his tactical judgement was at best questionable.

appointments like his, and the low quality of the troops he brought with him (some of them had fought for Napoleon only the year before!) are one of the reasons why Waterloo was in no way unwinnable for the French despite the race against time and (overall, counting the Prussians) superior numbers.

[Watchman]

Ney tends to get rated as a "excellent subordinate, poor commander" sort - he ended up with responsibilities above his abilities, which rarely turns out well. Not that he'd have been the first capable officer in history who ended up messing up due to that...

I've also read that old "Bonie" himself just wasn't what he'd been anymore either - too much stress, hard campaigns and less-than-ideal lifestyle left him physically exhausted and with assorted health issues (he'd had those for a while, I understand), and started blunting his mental edge too if only out of sheer fatigue. Someone described it as "his opponents may have improved considerably by Waterloo, but he had also gotten worse" or something along those lines. Given his rather centralized way of running the army that would certainly have been a major drawback.

[English assassin]

To be fair to Ney he was a Cavalry commander put in charge of a whole army corps. I've read that he was so carried away with his cavalry charge that he forgot that his infantry would not move up behind unless he ordered it.

With the result that the British infantry were forced into square, with the gunners inside, but no one came up behind the French cavalry to capture the British guns, turn them on the British squares, or engage the squares with musket fire. Had they done so...well, as the Iron Duke himself said, it was a close run thing.

[Watchman]

Well, in his defense massed French cavalry had proven itself capable of demolishing - or rather rampaging through - formed infantry squares in the past - but then again that was the army *before* the ill-fated Russian sightseeing tour. Maybe he just wasn't quite up to date (or refused to acknowledge) about the capabilities of the troops he had at his disposal at the time ?

[VAE VICTUS]

i dont know much about napoleon, so ill ask this Q.
was he a good general by himself or did his field marshalls hold him up?

[Incongruous]

What is a general without soldiers? A loon
What is a general without staff? A madman
Was Napoleon incapable of commanding without his officer? Of course he was, just like any other commander.
But to say that he left it to all his divisionals and Marshals is insane, he was a great general. Unfortunatley what had swept Europe a few years before was no longer intuative and new, it had been proven in spain that French coloumns fell before British bayonets and volleys, he was no longer the great commander he was. Yet still capable of brilliance, he could have won at Waterloo if he had sent the Guard in earlier or at leats thats what I think.

[matteus the inbred]

some of the Marshals (Lannes, Davout, Massena, arguably Suchet) were almost as talented as Napoleon, but none of these were available at Waterloo. some of the Marshals were simply not up to the job, and had gotten lucky, but then war is largely luck anyway, and Napoleon always recognised this. he might have been facing generals who knew how to fight him, but Blucher still left all his men at Ligny positioned on the forward slope, thus exposing them to French artillery and got badly beaten for his troubles. Wellington was the exception rather than the rule.

Bopa the Magyar, i suspect if Napoleon had sent the Guard up earlier they'd have got shot down earlier, but who knows! the Guard were usually a last resort, and he was also using elements of them to keep the Prussians off his right flank. had he attempted to outflank the Allied force and push it from its position, he'd have won.

[Grey_Fox]

had he attempted to outflank the Allied force and push it from its position, he'd have won.

Not necessarily. Napoleon couldn't have outflanked the British Left at Mont St. Jean because that would have put his army between the Prussians and the British. He couldn't have outflanked the British right because the only way to do so was guarded by 17,000 prime troops at Nivelles (I believe that is the name of the crossroads). Wellington (and the whole of the British army for that matter) expected something cleverer than he got on the 18th of June.

What Napoleon should have done was concentrate on beating the British army at Quatre Bras. This would have forced the British to fall back on their lines of communication to the coast. Then and only then should he have attacked the Prussians.

By attacking the Prussians first Napoleon allowed the British to fall back on their own accord, and by giving the Prussians a 12-hour head start before sending Grouchy he allowed the British and Prussians armies to meet up.

Then there is the whole farce of D'Erlon's corps during the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, which spent the entire day marching from Napoleon to Ney and back again without fighting in either battle.

[matteus the inbred]

bang on the money Grey Fox, i'd forgotten about the troops at Nivelles (or Hal?)

although i think it was D'Erlon's corps that got an impromptu route march instead of a battle. Davout was back in Paris running the Ministry of War...and i doubt such a competent soldier as Davout would have allowed himself to be shuttled between two critical battlefields like that!
maybe Napoleon should have kept Grouchy's force closer at hand on the right, and used it to counter the Prussian advance? still, in sending it to tail the retreating Prussians he was only following standard practice, unfortunately he sent it the wrong way. Grouchy did engage the Prussian rearguard at Wavre, and then extricated his force very skillfully, but it was too late to salvage his reputation.

[Grey_Fox]

Ah yes, it was D'Erlon, not Davout, thanks for the correction :bow:

Can't remember the name of the crossroads, it could have been Hal but I'm not too sure. Always was terrible at placenames :san_embarassed:

People can blame rain, Grouchy, or his piles (for the love of God) but the main reasons for Napoleon's loss at Waterloo were mistakes he made both before and during the battle.

[matteus the inbred]

Can't remember the name of the crossroads, it could have been Hal but I'm not too sure. Always was terrible at placenames

god knows, it's all Belgian to me! better go check the map again.

yep, as we all know, mistakes tend to lose you battles sooner or later (in my case pretty much immediately...)! Napoleon had by the end of his life blamed almost everything possible for his defeat except himself. he had a poor day tactically and allowed the strategic initiative he had won to slip away amid the mud.

it's a fascinating campaign to study though, full of what-might-have beens (aren't they all), such as; what if Gneisenau had persuaded the Blucher to withdraw?

[econ21]

Did Napoleon lose or Wellington and Blucher win it? Napoleon certainly did not fight a very smart battle - he came on in the old fashion and was driven off in the old fashion, as Wellington said. But the odds were against him on the day. Try most wargames of the battle and it should be apparent. He did not outnumber Wellington by much and Wellington was in a fairly strong defensive position. I'm not sure about InsaneApache's claim about Napoleon's army outnumbering the enemy even when it routed - if you add Blucher's troops to Wellington's, I think there was a clear advantage to the allies.

Plus Wellington fought a pretty good defensive battle. The breaking of D'Erlon's assault and the defeat of the Guard were almost as nicely done as the French cavalry assaults were badly done. The fact is that Wellington had a pretty impressive record of defeating the French. Wellington had developed a tactical system and an army that could regularly defeat the Napoleonic style of attack. At Waterloo, the French showed none of the innovation or inspiration they would have needed to overturn that record.

Blucher, of course, did his part admirably. Whipping on his army to launch an attack on Napoleon was brave, loyal and very aggressive. I am pretty sure the Iron Duke - and perhaps even Napoleon himself - would not have done as well in his position. The ordinary Allied and Prussian soldiers also fought doggedly, while the French army rather unaccountably dissolved in adversity.

[matteus the inbred]

agreed, Simon, i have wargamed this and it's very hard to win with the French, even if the Prussians turn up late in the day. (although a Waterloo refight appeared in one of the more popular wargames mags of the 80s when the Allies not only managed to lose, but lose quite crushingly!)
troops numbers are hard to pin down, but modern estimates roughly agree that - Wellington had 65-70,000 (he sometimes stated as low as 60,000!)
Napoleon had around 75-80,000
the Prussians had i think 3 corps approaching the field, probably around 60,000. Napoleon had Grouchy's 30,000 chasing them, and Wellington had dispatched 17,000 infantry to some wretched location i can't remember the name of.
(ok, everyone may now rip these figures to shreds!!)

Napoleon definitely had more guns, but they were not as effective as usual due to Wellington's reverse slope tactics. both side's cavalry had some successes (the controversial charge of the Union Brigade did in fact achieve it's objective of clearing D'Erlon's infantry attack away), but the French then likewise threw theirs away by being very silly...although the British saved their light stuff correctly for harassment and pursuit purposes, the Prussians did most of the pursuit work.

as for Blucher...well, he never, ever gave up, even despite being run over by French cavalry at Ligny! one of the great 'characters' of the Napoleonic Wars, his nickname was 'Old Vorwarts', or 'Marshal Forwards'.

[Templar Knight]

Has anyone here read 'Wellingtons Smallest Victory: The Duke, the Model Maker and the Secret of Waterloo' by Peter Hofschröer?

The book is about a British Officer William Siborne who made a huge diorama of the battle at its crisis point of about 7.00pm. On the model he placed the Prussians - as they were - on the battlefield just after 7pm. Wellington saw this as undermining his reputation, particularly as the detailed research that Siborne had conducted revealed flaws in the Duke's official account of the battle, the Waterloo Dispatch of 19 June 1815.

Wellington had always maintained that the Prussians had arrived late, after the battle was won, however research into Prussian orders and British orders said otherwise. With these Siborne could prove that they had actually become involved in the battle several hours earlier than Wellington claimed, and consequently had played a far greater part in the victory than was credited to them in the Dispatch. Wellington responded by insisting that Siborne was "mistaken" and demanding that most of the Prussian troops displayed on the model should be removed.


Siborne suffered the consequences. The funding of the model was blocked, he did not receive the promotion promised for this work and he was subjected to a vicious smear campaign that went on for years. Not only was his integrity brought into question, but also his ability. Even removing 40,000 of the 48,000 Prussians did not regain him Wellington 's favour. He died a broken and impoverished man. But history had been manipulated in a blatant fashion. The model, which today is on display in the National Army Museum in London , retains this fundamental flaw.

http://www.napoleonicsociety.com/english/book_Wellington_Hofschroer.htm

[matteus the inbred]

yeah, i've seen that diorama, it's incredible!
the Duke was responsible for quite a few mistaken pronouncements about the battle during his life, especially in his last years, and could be very nasty to people...

curiously, no mention of this model appears in Andrew Roberts' 'Wellington and Napoleon', when it would have been interesting to include it...

[English assassin]

On the wargaming point, there was a TV series a while ago where UK staff college officers refought various battles. I got the impression they were using the system actually used in training army officers. (which of course may or may not be a good one)

Anyway, "Wellington" lost Waterloo when they did this, or at least his army was driven off the field before the Prussians got there.

Can any UK poster remember the series, they did Balaclava as well. It was quite interesting. (It was NOT the horrible "Time Commanders", the generals were real army officers.)

[matteus the inbred]

Can any UK poster remember the series, they did Balaclava as well. It was quite interesting. (It was NOT the horrible "Time Commanders", the generals were real army officers.)

according to this link what i found - 'The latest and most highly developed attempt to put wargames on TV was Channel 4's series 'Game of War', which was broadcast in August 1997. The series consisted of three kriegsspiels - on Naseby 1645, Waterloo 1815 and Balaklava 1854 - using playing committees of real generals, military historians and defence journalists &c.'

don't remember it myself, but that looks like it.

[Templar Knight]

ignore this, bad post

[King Kurt]

The problem with most wargame reenactments of Waterloo is that the participants probably know the battle inside out and never make the mistakes the generals - especially Napoleon - made. The approach is get all your best troops into a massive attack - usually the Imperial Guard backed with loads of cavalry - and go straight up the middle before the Prussians arrive. No diversions taking farmhouses, no all cavalry attacks etc. Of course, Napoleon would never commit the Guard at the begining of an attack - in fact he rarely commited them at all, so most refights are flawed unless you restrict the French - and then they have to do the mistakes they did on the day.

This might seem a little harsh on Wellington, but he had shown himself capable of beating the french over and over again with basically the same tactic - so it was no surprise that the French acted as they did - even if Napoleon had piles!!:san_rolleyes:

[matteus the inbred]

the people they get on Time Commanders would probably manage to make the mistakes the French did, they always seem to do something totally suicidal.

that's why i don't like refighting historical battles; either you already know what not to do, or you get restricted by rules devices to ensure you have to make the mistakes that got made historically.

[Templar Knight]

In TC didn't the players always command the loosing side?

[matteus the inbred]

by the end of the battle, yes.

oh, sorry, i see what you mean. i'm not sure...i swear i recall them getting the side that won historically a few times...? i couldn't watch it after a while, it got too frustrating. or, as General Cambronne probably didn't say at the end of the battle of Waterloo upon being asked to surrender, 'merde'.

[King Kurt]

In TC didn't the players always command the loosing side?
The thing I always like about Time Commanders is that it is fronted by Mark Urban. I wargammed against him many years ago when he was about 16 and I steamrollered him out of sight - so I always feel smug when I see him.:san_laugh:

[matteus the inbred]

really? brilliant!
:san_tongue:

[English assassin]

'The latest and most highly developed attempt to put wargames on TV was Channel 4's series 'Game of War', which was broadcast in August 1997

That was it. Was it really 9 years ago, that's very scary I thought it was about a year ago.

[Templar Knight]

Nusbacher was good in TC, throwing blocks around :san_grin:

[matteus the inbred]

That was it. Was it really 9 years ago, that's very scary I thought it was about a year ago.

doesn't time fly when you have Total War!


Nusbacher was good in TC, throwing blocks around

yeah, always reminded me of the operations room in Battle of Britain...!

[Grey_Fox]

...or, as General Cambronne probably didn't say at the end of the battle of Waterloo upon being asked to surrender, 'merde'.

Actually, the legend has it that Cambronne said 'The Old Guard dies, but never surrenders'. What he really said was 'merde'. Either way, he still surrendered.

[King Kurt]

really? brilliant!
:san_tongue:
Yes - sadly it wasn't ancient warfare. In fact it was present day warfare. My combined artillery/ airpower tactics just blew him away. The spooky thing was the tactics were the same as the Americans used to invade Kuwait in the first Gulf War - a conflict that Mark covered for the BBC. It was really strange watching him on the TV talking about the very tactics I had used to beat him years before.:san_rolleyes:

[Spino]

This topic has been covered quite extensively here in the Monastery over the last few years but if I had to pick one single factor that contributed to the French loss at Waterloo it would have to be Napoleon's appointment of Marshal Ney as the commander of the Left Wing of L'Armee du Nord. Napoleon may have not brought his 'A' game to Waterloo but the massive bungling of one of his two main subordinates put the French in such a hole that only a miracle could have granted them a victory that day.

To Ney's credit he was fearless, aggressive, tenacious and an inspirational leader. To his discredit he was tactically unimaginative, barely competent in strategic matters and was seemingly incapable of effectively commanding a force greater than 10,000 men (a point I believe Napoleon made in his memoirs). Ney's lackluster performance during the campaigns of 1813/1814, especially his awful performance when granted independent command of the Army of Berlin in 1813, should have been all the proof Napoleon needed to severely limit his role and put him on a tight leash during the Waterloo campaign.

Beyond the battle of Waterloo the biggest 'what if?' of the 100 Days campaign is what would have happened had Napoleon taken the main body of L'Armee du Nord and chased Blucher instead of Wellington after the Prussian defeat at Ligny. For all his strengths Wellington was not nearly as aggressive as Blucher and possessed none of the hatred of the French his Prussian ally was so famous for. Furthermore the disposition of the British Army during the Waterloo campaign, from Wellington's prosecution of the battle of Quatre Bras to his apparent lack of support for the Prussian position afterwards, seems to imply a great deal of emphasis on self preservation instead of teamwork. I firmly believe that had Blucher and Wellington's roles been reversed at Waterloo the latter would have made only a half hearted attempt to assist his ally and at the slightest hint of a Prussian defeat would have beat a strategic withdrawal to the Belgium coast. I simply cannot envision Wellington moving heaven and earth to get at Napoleon's jugular as Blucher did at Waterloo.

[Franconicus]

The whole campaign of Napoleon was quiet desperate. He had collected his old burned out veterans and inexperienced youngsters. His army was not well trained. His staff has past its top and N himself was not at a very good condition.

N had to start a fight. He had to win before the joined forces of Russia, Austria and Prussia would appear. Even then he had little chance to win.

The Allied forces were not much better. Wellington had some elite phalanx (or musketeers :san_wink: ) but most of his soldiers were low quality.

Wellington's army was good in defense and so was their commander. Blücher's army was good in offensive and so was Blücher, too.

Both leaders promised to help each other in case Napoleon attacks.

N's plan was simple and good: Attack Blücher before he can join Wellington! At the battle of Ligny he could beat the Prussians. Wellington did not come in time. If N had attacked Wellington instead, Blücher had been faster to help Wellington probably.

So the Prussians had to run and N could turn to Wellington. Now something happened that was not according to the plan. Blücher did not retreat to his base in the east. He turned and tried to reach W. Weather helped him.

The battle of Waterloo (or Belle Alliance) was not Napoleon’s masterpiece. But it is funny: if you read the comments you see that Napoleon and his generals made one mistake after the other while Wellington choose a brilliant defensive position. However if you look at the numbers losses at both sides were equal. It is always good to write comments after the battle.

In the afternoon Wellington’s troops were exhausted and Napoleon was about to win. The attack of the Prussians changed the battle.

So there are many factors for the defeat: Napoleon’s weakness, the rain, Wellington’s stableness …. But the most important factor was Blücher’s maneuver and his will to beat Napoleon after the defeat at Ligny.

But this interpretation may be a bit German.:san_cool:

[econ21]

I remember the TV wargame of the Waterloo and was profoundly unconvinced by the victorious French grand tactics. The French team, led by a prominent British extremely senior ex-general, basically threw everything - including the Guard - against the ground between Hougomont and La Haye Sainte. Maybe that would have won on the principle of overwhelming force, but if you have wargamed Waterloo that ground is arguably the strongest part of the British line (it is also the ground the Imperial Guard broke against in the real battle). Hougomont and La Haye Sainte provide obstacles from which the allies could have enfiladed the French assault from both sides. The section of the line was held by the British Guard amongst others and they were backed by virtually all Wellington's reserves (he expected Napoleon to turn his right). The TV program had a very simplistic combat resolution system. In a boardgame such as SPI's Wellington's Victory, such grand tactics would not necessarily have led to victory. I confess I have an English scepticism of the ability of French Napoleonic infantry to break redcoats in a simple frontal assault. I think they would have had to do something pretty clever with combined arms to prevail and they seldom - never? - pulled such a thing off in Spain.

Also, the Allied team messed up. IIRC, they got Wellington trapped in a square, out of touch with his reserves and unable to influence the battle. By contrast, in the real battle, the accounts I have read (admittedly perhaps biased by Wellington's own writings), put him at the critical spot most times of the day - directing the artillery that shelled Bauduin's assault on Hougomont, directing the charge of the heavy cavalry, at the defeat of the Guard etc. One account I read said the only time in the battle Wellington was wrongfooted was at the fall of La Haye Saint (of course, he was wrongfooted several times in the campaign that led up to the battle).

[English assassin]

Well remembered SA. My memory was hazier, but I did recall thinking that the French had the advantage of knowing the battle had to be won quickly as Blucher would arrive around 4 pm, which Napoleon himself did not know.

Its the point made above I suppose, that you either have to have rules forcing you to make more or less the mistakes that were made historically, or you have to accept you aren't really "refighting" the battle because both sides apply the wisdom of hindsight.

[Grey_Fox]

I confess I have an English scepticism of the ability of French Napoleonic infantry to break redcoats in a simple frontal assault. I think they would have had to do something pretty clever with combined arms to prevail and they seldom - never? - pulled such a thing off in Spain.[quote]

At the Battle of Salamanca Clousel's counterattack broke through the Third Division before being repulsed by the Sixth Division. That, however, is the only instance I know of a French column beating the British line.

[QUOTE=Simon Appleton]in the real battle, the accounts I have read (admittedly perhaps biased by Wellington's own writings), put him at the critical spot most times of the day - directing the artillery that shelled Bauduin's assault on Hougomont, directing the charge of the heavy cavalry, at the defeat of the Guard etc.

All the accounts I have read say the same thing.