ICantSpellDawg
01-06-2006, 06:10
This is an article that is both a synopsis and critique of Alan Dershowitz's book: Rights From Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origin of Rights. I agree with the both the thesis of the book as it is summarized as well as the refutations of certain points brought up by the critic. It is short, simple and addresses an issue that tends to be ignored when people discuss their various concepts "Human Rights" and why many laws exist. I'd like to know what you think, just for the hell of it.
http://www.lists.opn.org/pipermail/org.opn.lists.skeptix/Week-of-Mon-20050912/001941.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
eSkeptic
the email newsletter
of the Skeptics Society
Tuesday, September 13th, 2005
---------------------------
To view this newsletter with graphics and formatting, visit:
---------------------------
In this week's eSkeptic Kenneth W. Krause reviews Rights From Wrongs: A
Secular Theory of the Origin of Rights by Alan Dershowitz (Basic Books,
2004, ISBN 0465017134).
Kenneth W. Krause lives with his wife Cindy, along the Mississippi
River in Wisconsin. Kenneth is a freelance writer with degrees in Law,
History, Literature, and Fine Art.
---------------------------
RIGHTS FROM WRONGS:
A SECULAR THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF RIGHTS
a book review by Kenneth W. Krause
Does a god or nature provide us with a source from which we can
"discover" our rights? Should human beings have rights even if nature
provides none and even if gods do not exist? If our rights cannot be
discovered, by what means should we create them?
These are among the questions presented in Rights From Wrongs, a
relatively uncomplicated book authored by Harvard law professor, Alan
Dershowitz. The book is basic in the sense that, to a considerably more
informed and rational American public, the answers to such questions
would, in general terms, be obvious.
Without squandering his readers' valuable time with metaphysical dicta,
Dershowitz correctly concludes that rights do not originate from any
god, "because God does not speak to human beings in a single voice."
Even the relatively idiosyncratic God of Abraham is variously named and
defined; first, according to the particular texts and traditions its
followers emphasize, second, according to such followers' geographical
and cultural circumstances, and third, according to each individual
follower's psychological needs and preferences.
Nor do our rights derive from nature, Dershowitz argues, "because
nature is value neutral." For example, few if any students of science
or history would contend that any law of nature provides for the
defense of the weak against the strong. Values, much like religious
beliefs, are and have always been culturally determined.
Dershowitz appears to understand that, when America's founding fathers
and their contemporaries professed a reliance on nature's prescription
for rights, they were mistaken at best, or, as Jeremy Bentham suggested
more cynically, simply trying to "get their way without having to argue
for it," that is, without having to first persuade typically
self-absorbed and short-sighted majorities.
Even if religionists could reduce their practices and texts, or even if
natural rights devotees could condense humanity's elemental character
down to a coherent canon of undeniable entitlements, should they?
Many progressives might argue affirmatively, urging that we ought to at
least pretend there exists a perfect and absolute source of rights in
order to thwart every majority's tendency to tyrannize minorities.
Dershowitz, by contrast, appears to believe that a rationally designed
and maintained constitutional republic would be both rigid enough to
withstand popular oppression and flexible enough to respond to evolving
historical contexts.
Many conservatives might reach the same conclusion, arguing that humans
require a divine or otherwise absolute source of rights because, in its
absence, we couldn't possibly resist or manage our baser instincts. As
Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor suggested, "If there is no God, all is
permitted," and as Catholic League president, William Donohue, averred
more recently, "If there are no moral absolutes, we're back to
different strokes for different folks." Dershowitz reminds us, however,
that fraud and other human failings is never an effective solution to a
problem, but in fact only an engraved invitation to additional and
perhaps more severe crises.
Nevertheless, the historical record is clear -- disasters ensue when
cultures submit to claims of divine command or natural law. Citing
slavery, anti-Judaism, anti-Catholicism, homophobia, inquisitions,
genocidal crusades, and contemporary terrorism, the author reminds us:
"God-talk only encourages the kind of theological warfare that has
plagued our world [for centuries] and now threatens our very
existence." Similarly, warns Dershowitz, the "elitist messages" of
natural law encourage disrespect for one's fellow man, and inevitably,
"self-righteous lawlessness."
But rights we must have if we intend to protect our minorities from
bigoted majorities, the constituents of which all too frequently
advocate for the curtailment of every citizen's rights in the name of
safety or convenience. And rights we must have if we intend to defend
democracy's sacrosanct and central element -- the free marketplace of
ideas. Dershowitz confirms that Americans must respect the Framers'
original intent with respect to our Constitution, which was to create
"an enduring charter of liberty capable of responding to changing
conditions."
Although civil rights are an indispensable safeguard against popular
caprice, majority rule should prevail, the author writes, "[u]nless it
can be shown convincingly that a claimed right is necessary to prevent
serious wrongs." Once such a case is made, the right in question must
be elevated above the legislative process, though never so high that it
becomes completely unassailable.
Humans, then, must "invent" their rights, Dershowitz surmises, from a
list of "agreed-upon wrongs." Rights must be synthesized from our
collective experiences with past disasters we would never want to see
repeated. We should build our canon of rights not from a "top-down"
utopian perspective, but rather from a "bottom-up" dystopian view of
bygone tragedies. In short, the author concludes, we should "build
rights on a foundation of trial, error, and our uniquely human ability
to learn from our mistakes."
From the womb of historical injustice, then, a rational and informed
public would deliver liberties, the implementation of which should
warranty against the reoccurrence of such disasters. From slavery and
Jim Crow, from Know-Nothing nativism and World War II internment,
Americans would deliver equal protection and due process. From the
Alien and Sedition Acts and McCarthyism, we would deliver freedom of
expression; and from the Salem witch hunts and the Philadelphia riots
of 1844, we would deliver freedom of conscience.
Or would we?
Perhaps Dershowitz's theory is more utopian than he cares to admit. On
what basis does the author conclude that Americans could ever agree as
to which experiences constitute such wrongs? And in asking Americans to
so agree, is the author advocating that rights be invented according to
majority rule? Are average Americans sufficient to that task? These
questions, although unavoidable, are never effectively addressed in the
text.
Dershowitz contends that our actions in the wake of September 11, 2001,
verify that we have learned a durable lesson from our internment of
117,000 Japanese Americans during World War II. But this analogy fails
miserably. In 1941, for example, our allies were already at war --
struggling for their very existence -- and hardly in any position to
protest. And perhaps most significantly, the Japanese were not among
the most prolific producers and suppliers of Western oil.
On the other hand, abundant evidence suggests that we have not absorbed
history's lessons. After all, the Patriot Act and our former Alien and
Sedition Acts are not wholly incomparable in their paranoid spirit. And
the comments of our most prominent leaders, including President Bush
("We need commonsense judges who understand our rights were derived
from God"), House Majority Leader De Lay ("Only Christianity offers a
way to live in response to the realities that we find in this world"),
and Supreme Court Justice Scalia ("[G]overnment carries the sword as
'the minister of God,' to 'execute wrath' upon the evil doer"),
manifestly suggest that Americans have long ignored the tragic history
of religious establishments.
And what could ring more quixotic than a request that Americans base
their judgments on a sophisticated appreciation of the past? In order
to "learn from the mistakes of history," as Dershowitz suggests we do,
one must first have a working knowledge of that history, or, at the
very least, a discernible desire to acquire it. But, if the substance
of our popular media is any indication of the breadth and depth of such
knowledge, and of the intensity of such desire, Americans are about as
likely to know their history as George W. Bush is to familiarize
himself with the collected works of Voltaire, Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
and Bertrand Russell.
Nevertheless, Dershowitz is correct that "an experiential reaction to
wrongs is more empirical, observable, and debatable, and less dependent
on unprovable faith, metaphor, and myth than theories premised on
sources external to human experience." Adaptation is the key. Neither
gods nor natural laws, if they exist, have ever demonstrated an
appropriate capacity to expand or contract according to humanity's
evolving needs. As Dershowitz aptly observes:
The function of rights -- indeed, of law and morality -- is to
change that natural condition for the better: to improve upon
nature, to domesticate its wild beast, and to elevate us from the
terrible state of nature into a state of civilization. It is a
never-ending challenge. If the advocates of rights fall asleep at
the wheel for even one historical moment, there is danger that the
natural human condition will rear its ugly head, as it has so many
times over the millennia.
Judicious advice indeed, to a people whose current leaders shamelessly
campaign for the official implementation or maintenance of religious
establishment, political loyalty oaths, coercion and torture,
censorship, and the further degradation of the people's protections
from illicit searches and seizures. Judicious advice indeed, to a
people who generally regard television and periodical infotainment as
adequate sources of continuing education.
Alan Dershowitz's answers might be painfully obvious to many readers of
this review, and they are clearly imperfect. Nonetheless, they are
honest and, as such, the most helpful suggestions offered thus far.
---------------------------
The eSkeptic newsletter is published (almost) weekly by the Skeptics
Society, ISSN 1556-5696. Subscribe to eSkeptic by sending an email to
<join-skeptics at lyris.net>. Unsubscribe by sending an email to
<leave-skeptics at lyris.net>. Contact us at <skepticmag at aol.com>.
Contents are Copyright (c) 2005 Michael Shermer and the Skeptics
Society. Permission to print, distribute, and post with proper citation
and acknowledgment.
http://www.lists.opn.org/pipermail/org.opn.lists.skeptix/Week-of-Mon-20050912/001941.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
eSkeptic
the email newsletter
of the Skeptics Society
Tuesday, September 13th, 2005
---------------------------
To view this newsletter with graphics and formatting, visit:
---------------------------
In this week's eSkeptic Kenneth W. Krause reviews Rights From Wrongs: A
Secular Theory of the Origin of Rights by Alan Dershowitz (Basic Books,
2004, ISBN 0465017134).
Kenneth W. Krause lives with his wife Cindy, along the Mississippi
River in Wisconsin. Kenneth is a freelance writer with degrees in Law,
History, Literature, and Fine Art.
---------------------------
RIGHTS FROM WRONGS:
A SECULAR THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF RIGHTS
a book review by Kenneth W. Krause
Does a god or nature provide us with a source from which we can
"discover" our rights? Should human beings have rights even if nature
provides none and even if gods do not exist? If our rights cannot be
discovered, by what means should we create them?
These are among the questions presented in Rights From Wrongs, a
relatively uncomplicated book authored by Harvard law professor, Alan
Dershowitz. The book is basic in the sense that, to a considerably more
informed and rational American public, the answers to such questions
would, in general terms, be obvious.
Without squandering his readers' valuable time with metaphysical dicta,
Dershowitz correctly concludes that rights do not originate from any
god, "because God does not speak to human beings in a single voice."
Even the relatively idiosyncratic God of Abraham is variously named and
defined; first, according to the particular texts and traditions its
followers emphasize, second, according to such followers' geographical
and cultural circumstances, and third, according to each individual
follower's psychological needs and preferences.
Nor do our rights derive from nature, Dershowitz argues, "because
nature is value neutral." For example, few if any students of science
or history would contend that any law of nature provides for the
defense of the weak against the strong. Values, much like religious
beliefs, are and have always been culturally determined.
Dershowitz appears to understand that, when America's founding fathers
and their contemporaries professed a reliance on nature's prescription
for rights, they were mistaken at best, or, as Jeremy Bentham suggested
more cynically, simply trying to "get their way without having to argue
for it," that is, without having to first persuade typically
self-absorbed and short-sighted majorities.
Even if religionists could reduce their practices and texts, or even if
natural rights devotees could condense humanity's elemental character
down to a coherent canon of undeniable entitlements, should they?
Many progressives might argue affirmatively, urging that we ought to at
least pretend there exists a perfect and absolute source of rights in
order to thwart every majority's tendency to tyrannize minorities.
Dershowitz, by contrast, appears to believe that a rationally designed
and maintained constitutional republic would be both rigid enough to
withstand popular oppression and flexible enough to respond to evolving
historical contexts.
Many conservatives might reach the same conclusion, arguing that humans
require a divine or otherwise absolute source of rights because, in its
absence, we couldn't possibly resist or manage our baser instincts. As
Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor suggested, "If there is no God, all is
permitted," and as Catholic League president, William Donohue, averred
more recently, "If there are no moral absolutes, we're back to
different strokes for different folks." Dershowitz reminds us, however,
that fraud and other human failings is never an effective solution to a
problem, but in fact only an engraved invitation to additional and
perhaps more severe crises.
Nevertheless, the historical record is clear -- disasters ensue when
cultures submit to claims of divine command or natural law. Citing
slavery, anti-Judaism, anti-Catholicism, homophobia, inquisitions,
genocidal crusades, and contemporary terrorism, the author reminds us:
"God-talk only encourages the kind of theological warfare that has
plagued our world [for centuries] and now threatens our very
existence." Similarly, warns Dershowitz, the "elitist messages" of
natural law encourage disrespect for one's fellow man, and inevitably,
"self-righteous lawlessness."
But rights we must have if we intend to protect our minorities from
bigoted majorities, the constituents of which all too frequently
advocate for the curtailment of every citizen's rights in the name of
safety or convenience. And rights we must have if we intend to defend
democracy's sacrosanct and central element -- the free marketplace of
ideas. Dershowitz confirms that Americans must respect the Framers'
original intent with respect to our Constitution, which was to create
"an enduring charter of liberty capable of responding to changing
conditions."
Although civil rights are an indispensable safeguard against popular
caprice, majority rule should prevail, the author writes, "[u]nless it
can be shown convincingly that a claimed right is necessary to prevent
serious wrongs." Once such a case is made, the right in question must
be elevated above the legislative process, though never so high that it
becomes completely unassailable.
Humans, then, must "invent" their rights, Dershowitz surmises, from a
list of "agreed-upon wrongs." Rights must be synthesized from our
collective experiences with past disasters we would never want to see
repeated. We should build our canon of rights not from a "top-down"
utopian perspective, but rather from a "bottom-up" dystopian view of
bygone tragedies. In short, the author concludes, we should "build
rights on a foundation of trial, error, and our uniquely human ability
to learn from our mistakes."
From the womb of historical injustice, then, a rational and informed
public would deliver liberties, the implementation of which should
warranty against the reoccurrence of such disasters. From slavery and
Jim Crow, from Know-Nothing nativism and World War II internment,
Americans would deliver equal protection and due process. From the
Alien and Sedition Acts and McCarthyism, we would deliver freedom of
expression; and from the Salem witch hunts and the Philadelphia riots
of 1844, we would deliver freedom of conscience.
Or would we?
Perhaps Dershowitz's theory is more utopian than he cares to admit. On
what basis does the author conclude that Americans could ever agree as
to which experiences constitute such wrongs? And in asking Americans to
so agree, is the author advocating that rights be invented according to
majority rule? Are average Americans sufficient to that task? These
questions, although unavoidable, are never effectively addressed in the
text.
Dershowitz contends that our actions in the wake of September 11, 2001,
verify that we have learned a durable lesson from our internment of
117,000 Japanese Americans during World War II. But this analogy fails
miserably. In 1941, for example, our allies were already at war --
struggling for their very existence -- and hardly in any position to
protest. And perhaps most significantly, the Japanese were not among
the most prolific producers and suppliers of Western oil.
On the other hand, abundant evidence suggests that we have not absorbed
history's lessons. After all, the Patriot Act and our former Alien and
Sedition Acts are not wholly incomparable in their paranoid spirit. And
the comments of our most prominent leaders, including President Bush
("We need commonsense judges who understand our rights were derived
from God"), House Majority Leader De Lay ("Only Christianity offers a
way to live in response to the realities that we find in this world"),
and Supreme Court Justice Scalia ("[G]overnment carries the sword as
'the minister of God,' to 'execute wrath' upon the evil doer"),
manifestly suggest that Americans have long ignored the tragic history
of religious establishments.
And what could ring more quixotic than a request that Americans base
their judgments on a sophisticated appreciation of the past? In order
to "learn from the mistakes of history," as Dershowitz suggests we do,
one must first have a working knowledge of that history, or, at the
very least, a discernible desire to acquire it. But, if the substance
of our popular media is any indication of the breadth and depth of such
knowledge, and of the intensity of such desire, Americans are about as
likely to know their history as George W. Bush is to familiarize
himself with the collected works of Voltaire, Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
and Bertrand Russell.
Nevertheless, Dershowitz is correct that "an experiential reaction to
wrongs is more empirical, observable, and debatable, and less dependent
on unprovable faith, metaphor, and myth than theories premised on
sources external to human experience." Adaptation is the key. Neither
gods nor natural laws, if they exist, have ever demonstrated an
appropriate capacity to expand or contract according to humanity's
evolving needs. As Dershowitz aptly observes:
The function of rights -- indeed, of law and morality -- is to
change that natural condition for the better: to improve upon
nature, to domesticate its wild beast, and to elevate us from the
terrible state of nature into a state of civilization. It is a
never-ending challenge. If the advocates of rights fall asleep at
the wheel for even one historical moment, there is danger that the
natural human condition will rear its ugly head, as it has so many
times over the millennia.
Judicious advice indeed, to a people whose current leaders shamelessly
campaign for the official implementation or maintenance of religious
establishment, political loyalty oaths, coercion and torture,
censorship, and the further degradation of the people's protections
from illicit searches and seizures. Judicious advice indeed, to a
people who generally regard television and periodical infotainment as
adequate sources of continuing education.
Alan Dershowitz's answers might be painfully obvious to many readers of
this review, and they are clearly imperfect. Nonetheless, they are
honest and, as such, the most helpful suggestions offered thus far.
---------------------------
The eSkeptic newsletter is published (almost) weekly by the Skeptics
Society, ISSN 1556-5696. Subscribe to eSkeptic by sending an email to
<join-skeptics at lyris.net>. Unsubscribe by sending an email to
<leave-skeptics at lyris.net>. Contact us at <skepticmag at aol.com>.
Contents are Copyright (c) 2005 Michael Shermer and the Skeptics
Society. Permission to print, distribute, and post with proper citation
and acknowledgment.