View Full Version : Regarding Atheism, Agnosticism, Humanism, Rational Skepticism, etc...
But you could show Borat a spike, then a tooth, then a whisker, and then an eye an he would say "All very nice, but I want to see the hedgehog".
If a spike, tooth, whisker and eye were all disperse then Borat would have a point. If not, then I could indeed show him (assuming one of the rodents was in the area). Concepts and physical objects are ontically distinct.
This is how I understand noumena: they are objects of the mind...
This is not correct. Noumena are neither part of the categories or the transcendental. They are not objects of the mind or mental events. Noumena constitute the necessary ontic grounding for phenomena (the Ding an sich) that allow the subject to escape solipsism and have experiential knowledge beyond the self. Concepts alone lack noumenal content. To quote from Kant: "Concepts without sensations are empty"
edit: i just read your post with the analogy to the Harvard University. I think Im inclined to be more atomistic in my view of the world. To me Harvard University, The Earth or any country could be viewed as abstract, following your reasoning. To me, however, they aren't. Since I think of them also as unities. Denmark consists of seperate parts, true, but these parts brought together constitutes Denmark and that consitution is valid. A hedgehog has legs, spikes, snout and whatnot - these brought together makes a hedgehog. Im aware the the analogy perhaps isnt entirely valid, however, I think it is cogent and that it conveys my position.
Denmark is a political designation and as such is a mental construct. There is nothing in the Jutland Peninsula (and surrounding Islands) that suggest or require the posit. In other words, you can't kick Denmark while you could kick a hedgehog.
Sasaki Kojiro
12-12-2006, 19:45
If a spike, tooth, whisker and eye were all disperse then Borat would have a point. If not, then I could indeed show him (assuming one of the rodents was in the area). Concepts and physical objects are ontically distinct.
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&safe=off&q=define%3Aontically&btnG=Search
:sweatdrop:
Sjakihata
12-12-2006, 21:49
This is not correct. Noumena are neither part of the categories or the transcendental. They are not objects of the mind or mental events. Noumena constitute the necessary ontic grounding for phenomena (the Ding an sich) that allow the subject to escape solipsism and have experiential knowledge beyond the self. Concepts alone lack noumenal content. To quote from Kant: "Concepts without sensations are empty"
I think you misunderstand me. Im not saying they a category. What Im saying is, that they only make sense thinking of them (with the mind), since they cannot be discovered. Noumena are indeed ding an sich, whereas the phenomenon is the ding für uns. What I mean is that it doesnt make sense to say something has noumenal content, since we cannot know if they have it or not. It is only supposing and I do not agree with the kantian theory since I find it hollow and senseless, although rather complex.
And the definition I quoted was taken by a danish scholar, expert in Kant and Hegel, Im sure it is valid.
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&safe=off&q=define%3Aontically&btnG=Search
:sweatdrop:
Ontically is the adverbial usage of the adjective ontic which itself is derived from the Greek ont or ontos. This is the root of the word ontology that refers to the study of being.
I think you misunderstand me. Im not saying they a category. What Im saying is, that they only make sense thinking of them (with the mind), since they cannot be discovered.
I see. That is not what "they are objects of the mind..." leads one to typically understand.
What I mean is that it doesnt make sense to say something has noumenal content, since we cannot know if they have it or not.
This is incorrect. Any phenomenal object, by that designation, has ipso facto a noumenal component insofar as it has being.
And the definition I quoted was taken by a danish scholar, expert in Kant and Hegel, Im sure it is valid.
There are no quotes in your post.
Papewaio
12-13-2006, 03:24
If a spike, tooth, whisker and eye were all disperse then Borat would have a point. If not, then I could indeed show him (assuming one of the rodents was in the area). Concepts and physical objects are ontically distinct.
Noob Alert:
So should we qualify this argument by saying we are talking about the concept of the universe rather then the visible/measurable/quantifiable/ known portion of it that we have access to it.
I could state that there is no physical phenomena in the known portion of our universe that states that the concept of God is a physical object. But that does not preclude either the concept or physical object of God existing in the concept of the universe.
Would this be parallel in scope to saying that just because I see a field with no cattle, that it is conceptually possible that there are cattle in another field.
No, it does not. You do not understand. The argument is valid. You're dismissing your own 'logic argument' for the existence of God as "begging the question" then. It's why I said "putting it in the premise" in the first place.
Chronology does not impact the meaning. Atheism is conceptually distinct. Atheism and neutrality regarding Deity are not the same. So a person who was born before L. Ron Hubbard was an Axenuist even before scientology was invented. So everyone was an Axenuist before the word Xenu and its accompanying 'meaning' was even invented? God is just a three-letter word.
This comment: "It's a claim based on absence of proof or evidence. Without any evidence or proof there would be no knowledge, no understanding, no definition nor any claim at all." is a non sequitur. No it is not. Without any evidence, proof, knowledge and understanding you cannot define anything. Hence, no definition, no claim.
However, there is a definition and claim borne out of a knowledge-void, hence it is already wrong and it does not exist.
It is worse that a totally blind guy defining color, thunder or blackholes without any evidence, proof, knowledge or understanding.
Worse since color, thunder and blackholes are all physical phenomenon following the laws of physics while your baseless God is metaphysical and does not abide any laws of physics.
Blind & Deaf guy: Colors smell bad, it exist.
Blind & Deaf guy: Thunder is sweet, it exist.
Blind & Deaf guy: Blackholes are soft to the touch, it exists.
They can't even define it hence, whatever they define as colors, thunder or blackholes do not exist! Just as the way you define god.
I have never made this comment: "you say that God sends signals straight to your head that you characterise as one-way..." neither does it relate to the topic.It has everything to do with the topic. Your god claim is dependent on your 'knowledge' that a God performed a supernatural phenomenon on your head.
This does not relate to the topic. Neither does it show me saying: "you say that God sends signals straight to your head that you characterise as one-way..." Either your memory was poor or you did not understand. Given what you posted and the series of partial quotes my guess is you did not understand. For example your use of God sending signals that are "one way". Note my original post and what it was in response to: It does relate. Why would I mention it if it doesn't? I say, no proof, then it doesn't exist. No proof, then no KNOWLEDGE. You claim your knowledge is derived from God itself. I say, you have no knowledge of God as you claim.
Hence, I can continue with the "No proof, hence it does not exist" line.
Now, unless one wishes to argue science can and does breach the metaphysical barrier this seems a rather obvious point.
I provided a good number of posts in the thread you cited which should have been (and I think remain) useful. This was the last posted by me to yourself: The universe follows the laws of physics. You claim, God can manipulate the physical world by rules that DO NOT follow physics (hence, 'one-way'), as it did inside your head (this revelation event that happened to you).
As an analogy of your claim, God can 'click' the mouse without using any physical force. That's impossible.
I continue to insist you would be better served if you actually studied logic before making pronouncements about the discipline. It appears by your posts since that time, this has not occurred. It also appears you would rather pursue private agendas since none of your posts to me relate to the focus of the thread. This also is unfortunate. You just dismissed your very own 'logic' for God as 'begging the question'.
Divinus Arma
12-13-2006, 06:38
Stupid nature.
At the end of the day, those of you who have convinced yourself that it is not possible that God exists (Quietus, et. al) or thiat is not possible to logically fathom whether God exists or not (Sasaki, et. al.) have commited the same error of logic that you accuse believers in God of.... you have precluded the possiblity that you might be wrong. LOL. Nice wording Don Corleone.
Atheism is a rejection of Theistic claim. Hence, you convinced me to reject your claim that God exists.
If I reword my questions to Del Arroyo using your sentiments, then:
1) Name as many, entities/beings/things that you've convinced yourself
that does not exist.
2) How did you convinced yourself they do not exist?
3) What's the difference between these entities/beings/things that do not exist and God that exists.
There is nothing, no evidence, no proof that I could provide to Quietus that would convince him that God's non-existence is in fact erroneous. You use the same to reject Tom Cruise, Heaven's Gate, the Pastafarians, Ghosts and Jedi, etc.
Any evidence on the matter (and at the end of the day, faith is belief in the absence of empirical evidence) would be rejected through one interpretation of facts or another. I sadly suspect even an encounter with the Almighty Himself would be rejected. Likewise, Sasaki would sit, judgement neutral, refusing to commit, even under such circumstances.
I'm not picking you two out to embarrass you. I just find that you two make as glib arguments for your respective positions as anyone, so I'm making you symoblic figureheads of your respective camps.
To all in either of these 2 camps, I just want to ask you two simple questions? 1) Is it possible you might be wrong? 2) What would it actually take to convince you that you are? 1) When it is possible for a totally blind & deaf guy to define colors, thunder and blackholes, without evidence, proof, knowledge or understanding then it could be possible (defining God is actually far, far worse than that since it doesn't follow the laws of physics) 2)God, as it is defined, has to appear physically
I can in fact freely admit that it's very possible that I am wrong and God doesn't exist. For me, question 2 is more difficult to answer, but I suppose it would come down to an absence of the personal, anecdotal 'evidence' (and it's not empirical evidence, I just use that term for a lack of a better word). You see, I truly see prayers answered in my life. Sometimes I don't recognize them as such, but upon further reflection, I do. Were I to describe these events to you, I'm sure they would sound like campfire ghost stories, but there is a sense of authenticity, at a fundamental level, that I look for and recognize. It's not just random events, and it's not always a favorable outcome. Were these reinforcing, incredibly unlikely, meaningful 'coincidences' (I guess that's the best way to describe it to you) cease, I suppose my faith would falter and I would have to entertain the notion that I had previously been wrong and I had misinterpreted meaningful twists of fate. Don Corleone, what are your thoughts on Xenu, Jedi and Leprechauns etc. Do they exist?
How about you? Could you be wrong? When would you begin to suspect that you are? See the comment above about the totally Blind & Deaf people.
Papewaio
12-13-2006, 22:44
Stupid nature.
If we are the best it can come up with billions of years of evolution, I am inclined to agree.
Big_John
12-13-2006, 23:12
in the case of nature, i'd go with "mindless" over "stupid". moreover, i think sentient beings with enough awareness to consider the nature of reality and send their thoughts across a planetary communication network ain't half bad for a couple billion years. nicely done nature. :thumbsup:
Watchman
12-14-2006, 10:48
Given that the evolutionary principle doesn't actually care about anything more than the members of the species managing to procreate and the offpring managing the same - and even viruses, which don't quite qualify as "living things" in the stricter senses to begin with, can do that much - I'd say we're not a half bad product.
Noob Alert:
So should we qualify this argument by saying we are talking about the concept of the universe rather then the visible/measurable/quantifiable/ known portion of it that we have access to it.
The universe is an abstract concept. It is a concept used to provide a certain context and meaning to a host of objects: planets, stars, hedgehogs etc.
I could state that there is no physical phenomena in the known portion of our universe that states that the concept of God is a physical object. But that does not preclude either the concept or physical object of God existing in the concept of the universe.
Would this be parallel in scope to saying that just because I see a field with no cattle, that it is conceptually possible that there are cattle in another field.
Yes, one could argue that. This is not a standard view of Deity under most theologies however. God is typically seen as distinct from and independent of the created order (that which is contingent).
No, it does not. You do not understand. The argument is valid.
You're dismissing your own 'logic argument' for the existence of God as "begging the question" then. It's why I said "putting it in the premise" in the first place.
The above doesn't follow. See the previously noted reference and commentary:
There is a reference in Brothers Karamazov where Russian students are considered unique in that they combine absolute arrogance with total ignorance. The example is then given: if an Astronomer handed a map of the solar system to a Russian student, the student would return the map with corrections on it.
You have continued to engage on a subject matter that you are clearly unfamiliar. Your comments on basic logic are incoherent... (Such a consistent) approach suggest(s) an attitude that prohibits productive discussion which is unfortunate. I can do nothing further for you. I must leave you to your dogma. Alas.
I continue to insist you would be better served if you actually studied logic before making pronouncements about the discipline. It appears by your posts since that time, this has not occurred. It also appears you would rather pursue private agendas since none of your posts to me relate to the focus of the thread. This also is unfortunate.
Dogmatic non sequiturs are not interesting.
Claudius the God
12-22-2006, 02:05
I thought I would have missed a whole lot more since I was here last, but the discussion slowed down to a complete stop from the philosophizing and nit-picking.
anyway...
Theists can't produce any moral or intellectual reasons for faith that are any better than those moral and intellectual reasons for the rejection of faith...
in nine pages of heated debate, I have yet to find even one good reason to become a Theist and abandon Secular Humanism/Agnosticism/Atheism... not one reason why it is in any way better than Secularism.
is anyone reading (or has already read) Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion ? - I found an audiobook version I'm going to listen to later...
and Happy Festivus and Merry X-mas to everyone celebrating over the next few days...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Festivus
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X-mas
I personally an celebrating Christmas/X-mas with my family, but because there is absolutely nothing religious about the occasion, the term 'Festivus' is probably just as valid a term for the occasion (though there is no 'Festivus pole', and the 'airing of grievances' is usually kept to a minimum, and 'the feats of strength' is usually replaced with a game of cricket)
we have a decorated Christmas trees (no angels or jesus-related ornaments though) and will exchange presents and have a family banquet... yum!
...no jesus, no prayer, no church... everybody is happy...
I'm getting my little brother Monty Python's: The Life of Brian on DVD, I don't think he's seen it yet...
Theists can't produce any moral or intellectual reasons for faith that are any better than those moral and intellectual reasons for the rejection of faith...
in nine pages of heated debate, I have yet to find even one good reason to become a Theist and abandon Secular Humanism/Agnosticism/Atheism... not one reason why it is in any way better than Secularism.
Hi Claudius,
This is not the issue you put forward. When I asked what your issue was you asked: "Do Atheists and Agnostics and Humanists, etc. need to have a more organized community structure?" This was answered. The above is a different focus. In the above you raise two points: 'intellectual and moral' reasons for a theistic or secular stance. If intellectual means rational then that has been covered. I have already shown how strong atheism is an absurdity (logically incoherent) and weak atheism is irrelevant. I have also given in the course of the thread a simple proof for god that none have been able to show was invalid and was in fact recognized as valid by several would be skeptics. This would seem to solve the first issue. Regarding the moral question that can be dealt with if you wish.
Whether you want to pursue the topic further or no you should be aware that atheism is not a new idea, but in the 2500 year course of the Western Intellectual Tradition it has had few supporters. There are reasons for this. You may wish to note there are no examples of full atheistic philosophical systems. The view is philosophically problematic.
Note: you made a remark about nit picking. I'm not sure what you were thinking, but be aware that rationality is concerned with rigor, rigor means a more narrow focus is often necessary.
Claudius the God
12-22-2006, 04:59
Hi Claudius,
This is not the issue you put forward. When I asked what your issue was you asked: "Do Atheists and Agnostics and Humanists, etc. need to have a more organized community structure?" This was answered. The above is a different focus. In the above you raise two points: 'intellectual and moral' reasons for a theistic or secular stance. If intellectual means rational then that has been covered. I have already shown how strong atheism is an absurdity (logically incoherent) and weak atheism is irrelevant. I have also given in the course of the thread a simple proof for god that none have been able to show was invalid and was in fact recognized as valid by several would be skeptics. This would seem to solve the first issue. Regarding the moral question that can be dealt with if you wish.
Whether you want to pursue the topic further or no you should be aware that atheism is not a new idea, but in the 2500 year course of the Western Intellectual Tradition it has had few supporters. There are reasons for this. You may wish to note there are no examples of full atheistic philosophical systems. The view is philosophically problematic.
Note: you made a remark about nit picking. I'm not sure what you were thinking, but be aware that rationality is concerned with rigor, rigor means a more narrow focus is often necessary.
Hey Pindar,
okay rephrasing... Would Atheists, Agnostics, Humanists, etc benefit considerably from an organized yet secular community structure?
You mention a simple proof of god... which simple proof of god is this? I either missed it or forgot about it... IF it's the argument of determinism then I already posted that article several pages ago by Richard Dawkins (Why there is almost certainly no god) which directly criticized the deterministic argument.
I don't see strong Atheism as logically incoherent, and I do see weak Atheism as still relevant. your arguments for those two points were not convincing.
I'm very aware that Atheism is an old idea, I've studied a bit of ancient philosophy...
the 'nit-picking' is just a comment that the discussion seemed far more about Hedgehogs and the definition of 'The Universe' than it did about Atheism and other secular views.
and keep in mind please that I'm a Humanist - which has a quite extensive philosophy... Atheism by itself doesn't really need such an extensive philosophy as a separate ideology from that of Humanist philosophy.
if you want to argue that Theism/Religion is ethically superior to Atheism and similar views (ie: Humanism), then go ahead... I don't see much evidence to support that though...
Hey Pindar,
okay rephrasing... Would Atheists, Agnostics, Humanists, etc benefit considerably from an organized yet secular community structure?
Howdy,
To what end? As previously explained: atheism and agnosticism are epistemic stances concerning an Absolute. The stances alone need no organization. Humanism is a rhetorical focus. It does not require an organization either.
You mention a simple proof of god... which simple proof of god is this?
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinite regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
The Dawkins' piece you posted did not respond to the argument. The Dawkins' piece was a rant that showed no familiarity with philosophical discourse. An argument is either valid or invalid. If you believe the above is invalid demonstrate it. If you cannot then the argument holds.
I don't see strong Atheism as logically incoherent...
Then you did not understand. This is the stance again: "The strong form (of Atheism) is making a truth claim about reality: there is no god. This is a universal positive assertion about a negative particular which is logically problematic: one cannot prove a negative." If you believe one can prove a negative do so, otherwise the argument holds.
(A)nd I do see weak Atheism as still relevant.
This is the criticism of the weak form: "The weak form makes no claim on the larger universe. It simply states the personal penchant of the subject ..." A belief position that makes no knowledge claim about the larger universe is irrelevant as it is simply self reflective.
your arguments for those two points were not convincing.
Whether you are convinced is not my concern. Rationality revolves around logic which is independent of personal opinion.
I'm very aware that Atheism is an old idea, I've studied a bit of ancient philosophy...
Then you should be very aware of the various problems with the view.
and keep in mind please that I'm a Humanist - which has a quite extensive philosophy... Atheism by itself doesn't really need such an extensive philosophy as a separate ideology from that of Humanist philosophy.
Humanism and atheism are not the same. The one does not entail the other. Atheism as part of a larger philosophical rubric implodes which is why there are no philosophical belief systems that include it. Atheism as a stand alone epistemic claim faces the problems already noted.
if you want to argue that Theism/Religion is ethically superior to Atheism and similar views (ie: Humanism), then go ahead... I don't see much evidence to support that though...
I have no particular wants. I'm not asking any questions. If the moral issue interests you we can explore that, but first I would rather you are clear on your first claim(s) which are readdressed above.
Note: simply citing random sites off the internet is not helpful. It does not demonstrate any understanding of the issue(s). It is better to exercise your own faculties to come to a defendable conclusion or accept the rational alternative.
macsen rufus
12-22-2006, 14:35
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinite regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
I seem to have overlooked this thread, and now my head's swimming. Anyway this looks like an interesting formulation, so can I ask for some definitions, Pindar?
Does "being" have the strict sense of a lifeform, or is it merely referencing a thing which exists? On what basis does #4 work, that only "beings" can be causes, and assuming beings are lifeforms, does this not imply that "non-beings" have no consequences, or is it explicitly defining beings as the only cause of beings? Is the Universe regarded as a being?
I'm sure these seven points are just a contraction of a treatise in 25 volumes, so I want to sort out short-hand from its essentials :2thumbsup:
EDIT: after a quick think, I believe the crux of my questions can be summed up as: does this mean the existence of LIFE proves the existence of God, or that existence itself proves it?
EDIT: after a quick think, I believe the crux of my questions can be summed up as: does this mean the existence of LIFE proves the existence of God, or that existence itself proves it?
Hello macsen,
The proof is not life specific, but concerned with being as such.
(Given Claudius resurrected this thread and is the source of the questions I'm waiting to see if he has any counter arguments to the points he challenged. )
macsen rufus
12-22-2006, 18:50
Thanks Pindar; I have a gut feeling there's still an assumption buried in there somewhere, but it'll take some thinking about, and I'll be offline for the next week or so, so hope I get back before the thread's totally dead and buried.
Hmmm, if I understand correctly, a necessary being is a being which can't not exist, but I don't yet see how this necessarily makes it "God" in the accepted sense. Surely our rules of logic are derived from within the Universe, this necessary being would have to be 'outside' the Universe and beyond any frame of reference we have, ergo we can't make any deductions concerning the nature of the necessary being itself? Our reasoning concerning what occurs 'beyond' the Universe is untestable, so I can't see that it is a proof.
Watchman
12-22-2006, 19:12
Dunno 'bout you, but steps #4 and #5 bug me something fierce. They seem to be based on the unstated premise that "contingent beings" must result from the 'action(s)' (or whatever; this whole "causality" thing here seems a little vague) of another being. And this looks suspiciously like the conclusion being its own premise to me, in other words a circular argument...
In any case the premises of the whole thing would seem to be rather incompatible with the basic premise of the atheistic view, which I would sum up roughly as "shit happens" (ie. no cause, as the above seems to use the term with certain undettones suggesting intentionality, is required as such; merely circumstances). The "why" and "how" is WIP, but the progress on the topics thus far at the very least appears to me as rather less fundamentally narcissistic and downright naive than the various postulations citing "divine" actors (ie. "non-contingent beings" - or this is what I take the term to be under the make-up job).
Thanks Pindar; I have a gut feeling there's still an assumption buried in there somewhere, but it'll take some thinking about, and I'll be offline for the next week or so, so hope I get back before the thread's totally dead and buried.
Oki Doki
Hmmm, if I understand correctly, a necessary being is a being which can't not exist, but I don't yet see how this necessarily makes it "God" in the accepted sense. Surely our rules of logic are derived from within the Universe, this necessary being would have to be 'outside' the Universe and beyond any frame of reference we have, ergo we can't make any deductions concerning the nature of the necessary being itself? Our reasoning concerning what occurs 'beyond' the Universe is untestable, so I can't see that it is a proof.
Necessity is part and parcel of the meaning of God. Something warranting the title cannot be dependent on some other and still be God. If one wants to put forward some other candidate that has necessary being that is fine. Earlier in the thread one suggested the universe, but this suffers from the reification fallacy.
Rationalists hold that Logic applies to all truth claims independent of the physical universe. Logic is formal. It is not dependent on testability. Rather, it operates off of validity. Validity means the conclusion cannot not be given the premises. The only reason I put forward the proof at all was because an earlier poster said all strong statements about God are illogical. He was mistaken. I simply gave an example after he asked. The real thrust of the thread is not concerned with proofs for God, but the standing of atheism which is what I was focused on.
Dunno 'bout you, but steps #4 and #5 bug me something fierce. They seem to be based on the unstated premise that "contingent beings" must result from the 'action(s)' (or whatever; this whole "causality" thing here seems a little vague) of another being. And this looks suspiciously like the conclusion being its own premise to me, in other words a circular argument...
Hi Watchman,
Step 4 is an either or position: insofar as there is a contingent X that X is either caused by another contingent X or a non-contingent X. This does not seem particularly remarkable. Step 5 points out the reductio issues if one posits only contingent Xs which does end up begging the question.
In any case the premises of the whole thing would seem to be rather incompatible with the basic premise of the atheistic view, which I would sum up roughly as "shit happens" (ie. no cause...
Atheism does not require believing things come into being ex nihilo. Such a view would of course undercut the whole of science.
Watchman
12-22-2006, 19:33
Did you miss the further clause "...as the above [line of reasoning, ie. #1-7] seems to use the term with certain undertones suggesting intentionality..." ? I'm not stupid, thankyouverymuch.
Causality does not require intention, now does it ?
Did you miss the further clause "...as the above [line of reasoning, ie. #1-7] seems to use the term with certain undertones suggesting intentionality..." ? I'm not stupid, thankyouverymuch.
Causality does not require intention, now does it ?
Sorry, I didn't follow your point. There is no reference to intention in the proof.
Sjakihata
12-22-2006, 20:56
Just an observation/clarification:
It seems to me that Pindar and some of his opponents has a different take on God. As I see this discussion some confuse Pindars understanding of God (at least regarding this debate). To me Pindar is refering to God as the First Mover we find in Aristotle, while some thinks he is referring to the christian God.
A first mover is indeed used in some philosophical system to avoid the infinite regression, which does cause a problem, at least in classical metaphysics.
If Pindar indeed refers to the christian God then forget my comment.
logic is finding validity (or in most cases the lack of) by proving that the arguments form can have true premises and a false conclusion, not as much the contents of the argument but the form. Logic isnt complete and it suffers great difficulties and it certainly isnt a tool with which to make convincing arguments, they can be true but they can go horribly wrong as well. Especially with the Fregean predicate logic you cannot prove validity, only semi-validity which constitutes a major problem. Also the difference on the realist logic and the idealist logic makes two very different perspectives. Just a note on logic and that it isnt bullet proof.
edited: for to form
Reenk Roink
12-22-2006, 22:23
logic is finding validity (or in most cases the lack of) by proving that the arguments for can have true premises and a false conclusion, not as much the contents of the argument but the form. Logic isnt complete and it suffers great difficulties and it certainly isnt a tool with which to make convincing arguments, they can be true but the can go horribly wrong as well. Especially with the Fregean predicate logic you cannot prove validity, only semi-validity which constitutes a major problem. Also the difference on the realist logic and the idealist logic makes two very different perspectives. Just a note on logic and that it isnt bullet proof.
Excellently put Sjakihata. :bow:
And here I was trying to discount logic altogether to respond to that statement. :tongue3:
Watchman
12-22-2006, 22:32
If Pindar indeed refers to the christian God then forget my comment. If he doesn't he should really use less misleading terminology. And not give the reasoning #1-7, above, when asked to demonstrate, quote, simple proof of god, unquote.
Sorry, I didn't follow your point. There is no reference to intention in the proof.Don't know about you, but it is very difficult for me to not interpret "non-/contingent being" in this context as what might be termed as actor, ie. an entity that acts with at least a degree of purpose. A subject, the opposite of an object.
I may be misinterpreting something here, but as things stand your 'proof' lights in my head the alarms of a circuitious argument where the existence of a "noncontingent being", in practice a deity, is part of both the premises and the conclusion.
Sjakihata
12-22-2006, 22:41
If he doesn't he should really use less misleading terminology. And not give the reasoning #1-7, above, when asked to demonstrate, quote, simple proof of god, unquote.
This it where it goes wrong. He did indeed prove the existence of a god or a necessary being, and that phrase leads me to think of a first mover, not the christian god. When he says god you immeadiately associate that with the christian god, which I think was not exactly what pindar wanted to prove.
Whether it is or isnt the christian god doesnt per se make a difference, as long as the god in question have the capacity to start the chain so to speak.
Kanamori
12-22-2006, 22:45
As I said earlier, God necessarily implies other qualities than those that are in the necessary being; my point is that, regardless of whatever you want to call it, the necessary being has no religious qualities attached to it. A proof of soccer ball is not proof that the only soccer ball you think of, viz the one you know of in your hand, is the one that was used to win the world cup.
My position, as related to religion in general and God already been stated. It is not worth my finite time to place necessarily poor guesses on what ought to be worshiped and how.
Watchman
12-22-2006, 23:07
As said, I may be merely misunderstanding parts of the terminology used. Nevertheless I can't shake the feeling the reasoning has its own conclusion at least partially included in its premises.
That aside, if we take "necessary being" to be an abstract concept with no divine relations we're hardly talking about "god" as the term is normally used and understood - particularly in the context of atheism, which by itself merely denies the existence of the divine. Right ?
:stupido3:
Just an observation/clarification:
It seems to me that Pindar and some of his opponents has a different take on God. As I see this discussion some confuse Pindars understanding of God (at least regarding this debate). To me Pindar is refering to God as the First Mover we find in Aristotle, while some thinks he is referring to the christian God.
Correct. There is nothing sectarian in my posts. Neither is the proof sectarian. Personal animus for religion in general or Christianity specifically are irrelevant to the particular focus which is theism.
logic is finding validity (or in most cases the lack of) by proving that the arguments form can have true premises and a false conclusion, not as much the contents of the argument but the form. Logic isnt complete and it suffers great difficulties and it certainly isnt a tool with which to make convincing arguments, they can be true but they can go horribly wrong as well.
Logic isn't about truth, but validity. Rationalists assume logic is a vehicle to the true (that truth is rational). Rationalists and non-rationalists cannot dialogue as they have no common ground.
If Pindar indeed refers to the christian God then forget my comment.
If he doesn't he should really use less misleading terminology. And not give the reasoning #1-7, above, when asked to demonstrate, quote, simple proof of god, unquote.
There is nothing misleading in my posts. There are no references to Christendom. The proof is a proof for God. Nothing sectarian is mentioned.
Don't know about you, but it is very difficult for me to not interpret "non-/contingent being" in this context as what might be termed as actor, ie. an entity that acts with at least a degree of purpose. A subject, the opposite of an object.
What is non-contingent may or may not be an agent, such is irrelevant to the proof which revolves around contingent and necessary being.
I may be misinterpreting something here, but as things stand your 'proof' lights in my head the alarms of a circuitious argument where the existence of a "noncontingent being", in practice a deity, is part of both the premises and the conclusion.
There is nothing circular. There are no premises that assert the conclusion.
As I said earlier, God necessarily implies other qualities than those that are in the necessary being...
God may or may not have other qualities, insofar as necessity is an essential quality and distinct then that faculty alone is sufficient for the purpose.
my point is that, regardless of whatever you want to call it, the necessary being has no religious qualities attached to it...My position, as related to religion in general and God already been stated. It is not worth my finite time to place necessarily poor guesses on what ought to be worshiped and how.
The proof is not concerned with devotion. Your personal conviction or the lack therefor are not at issue.
That aside, if we take "necessary being" to be an abstract concept with no divine relations we're hardly talking about "god" as the term is normally used and understood -
Necessary being has always been an attribute of Deity which is clear from the definition of God. This has been the case from the foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition. This can be seen in Plato forward.
...particularly in the context of atheism, which by itself merely denies the existence of the divine. Right ?
:stupido3
Atheism does deny the existence of God. I have already discussed the logical issue with atheism in both its strong and weak forms.
Sjakihata
12-23-2006, 02:15
Logic isn't about truth, but validity.
Yes, I know that. And the only smart way of proving whether a specific logical form is valid, is by proving that the form can have true premises and a false conclusion, then the form is rendered invalid. You do that either by making a table, asserting different values (true or false) to each item (P,Q,R,S etc) or by making a tree, the result is the same. Im not speaking of truth, but true and false within the realm of logic not connected with anything else.
On a side note, logic must be empirical, as a formal system like that cannot be its own content, it must infer from something, the outside world, showed by Gödel.
Claudius the God
12-23-2006, 03:04
Howdy,
To what end? As previously explained: atheism and agnosticism are epistemic stances concerning an Absolute. The stances alone need no organization. Humanism is a rhetorical focus. It does not require an organization either.
no matter, I thought perhaps the previous question was too narrow. don't worry about it.
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinite regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
okay, this argument of yours essentially looks like Thomas Aquinas' first three 'proofs' of God's existence - all involving an infinite regress: I found this following quote which rebutes this argument/s for God to my satisfaction at least.
quote -:
Thomas Aquinas first three proofs that God exists:
1 The Unmoved Mover. Nothing moves without a prior mover. This leads us to a regress, from which the only escape is God. Something had to make the first move, and that something we call God.
2 The Uncaused Cause. Nothing is caused by itself. Every effort has a prior cause, and again we are pushed back into regress. This has to be terminated by a first cause, which we call God.
3 The Cosmological Argument. There must have been a time when no physical things existed. But, since physical things exist now, there must have been something non-physical to bring them into existence, and that something we call God.
All three of these arguments [and yours too Pindar], rely upon the idea of regress and invoke God to terminate it. They make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress. Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins, and reading innermost thoughts.
...
it is more parsimonious to conjure up, say, a 'big bang singularity', or some other physical concept as yet unknown. Calling it God is at best unhelpful and at worst perniciously misleading.
:- endquote
The Dawkins' piece you posted did not respond to the argument. The Dawkins' piece was a rant that showed no familiarity with philosophical discourse. An argument is either valid or invalid. If you believe the above is invalid demonstrate it. If you cannot then the argument holds.
sorry, perhaps I was thinking about a different article or was concentrating on a different argument, I can't remember which right now.
Then you did not understand. This is the stance again: "The strong form (of Atheism) is making a truth claim about reality: there is no god. This is a universal positive assertion about a negative particular which is logically problematic: one cannot prove a negative." If you believe one can prove a negative do so, otherwise the argument holds.
one can't prove a negative like this (that it's impossible), but one can argue that it is certainly highly improbable that god exists:
along the lines of the argument that "god must exist because everything looks as though it had been designed" - a favourite of Intelligent Design proponents... the counter argument goes:
"However statistically improbable the entity you seek to explain by invoking a designer, the designer himself has got to be at least as improbable"
I'm trying to find a good summary Of Dawkins' "Ultimate 747" Gambit arguing this point, but can't find a great one as yet. here is a small wikipedia summary of the argument, though it may not be detailed enough for some.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_God_Delusion#Why_there_almost_certainly_is_no_God
apparently this sort of argument is two centuries old and has yet to find a theological rebuttal.
This is the criticism of the weak form: "The weak form makes no claim on the larger universe. It simply states the personal penchant of the subject ..." A belief position that makes no knowledge claim about the larger universe is irrelevant as it is simply self reflective.
only fundamentalists take a position and state that is is absolute truth, this is true for both Theism and Atheism. and there are far more theistic Fundamentalists than Atheistic Fundamentalists by far...
This continuous spectrum (with seven representative milestones of "belief/non-belief percentage" in an individual) is useful IMO:
moderate atheism is just as sensible as moderate theism. it's when you start dealing with absolutes that you get the nut-jobs on the fringes.
quote -:
1. Strong theist. 100 per cent probability of God. In the words of C. G. Jung, 'I do not believe, I know.'
2. Very High probability but short of 100 per cent. De facto theist. 'I cannot know for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that he is there.'
3. Higher than 50 per cent but not very high. Technically agnostic but leaning towards theism. 'I am very uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God.'
4. Exactly 50 per cent. Completely impartial agnostic. 'God's existence and non-existence are exactly equiprobable.'
5. Lower than 50 per cent but not very low. Technically agnostic but leaning towards atheism. 'I don't know weather God exists but I'm inclined to be skeptical.'
6. Very low probability, but short of zero. De facto atheist. 'I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.'
7. Strong Atheist. 'I know there is no God, with the same conviction as Jung "knows" there is one.'
:- endquote
I personally am somewhere between 5 and 6. where would you be Pindar (or anyone else)?
Whether you are convinced is not my concern. Rationality revolves around logic which is independent of personal opinion.
see above.
Then you should be very aware of the various problems with the view.
and theism (in all its various forms) doesn't have problems? i hardly see that as a disincentive from Atheism Agnosticism or Humanism or whatever other non-theistic views one could list. Personally I'm happy where I already am and will very likely have no regrets about being a secular humanist for the rest of my life (and beyond if such a thing is possible, though I doubt there is an afterlife - and I'm okay with not having an afterlife to hope for or fear about).
Humanism and atheism are not the same. The one does not entail the other. Atheism as part of a larger philosophical rubric implodes which is why there are no philosophical belief systems that include it. Atheism as a stand alone epistemic claim faces the problems already noted.
I'm not familiar with the detailed philosophical discussions regarding Atheism, I only have my own experiences to go on...
for 20 perhaps 21 years of my life I considered myself an Atheist if anything at all. I was not taught either that thers is a god or that there is none. I was and still am completely free to have my own belief system and make up my own mind. two or three years ago I heard or read about Secular Humanism for the first time (it was never a topic at either home or school or among friends or peers) when I investigated Humanist philosophy I found that it is exactly what I already thought when I defined myself as simply an Atheist. I was unchanged by Humanist/secular humanist philosophy except for a new word or two to define my views more clearly for others.
to put it simply, from my experiences and from others i've met and become friends with in university, Atheism + Secular Ethics = Secular Humanism with very little changing between the two.
I hope that is a satisfactory answer.
I have no particular wants. I'm not asking any questions. If the moral issue interests you we can explore that, but first I would rather you are clear on your first claim(s) which are readdressed above.
later then
(Given Claudius resurrected this thread and is the source of the questions I'm waiting to see if he has any counter arguments to the points he challenged. )
have at thee! :smash: :laugh4:
Rationalists hold that Logic applies to all truth claims independent of the physical universe. Logic is formal. It is not dependent on testability. Rather, it operates off of validity. Validity means the conclusion cannot not be given the premises. The only reason I put forward the proof at all was because an earlier poster said all strong statements about God are illogical. He was mistaken. I simply gave an example after he asked. The real thrust of the thread is not concerned with proofs for God, but the standing of atheism which is what I was focused on.
but is it not also illogical to base the argument on a foregone conclusion before consulting the evidence? it's certainly not rational...
also see above the spectrum of belief and non-belief if you haven't already.
This it where it goes wrong. He did indeed prove the existence of a god or a necessary being, and that phrase leads me to think of a first mover, not the christian god. When he says god you immeadiately associate that with the christian god, which I think was not exactly what pindar wanted to prove.
Whether it is or isnt the christian god doesnt per se make a difference, as long as the god in question have the capacity to start the chain so to speak.
would the 'first mover' be the Deist God? - that is, quantum physics, astrophysics and various other types of physics (probably excluding metaphysics) personified as a deity?
There is nothing circular. There are no premises that assert the conclusion.
there is a conclusion for which there is no evidence, only an argument. the 'first cause' is labelled God when it could just as easily be labeled as something else - like the big bang singularity or the Flying Spaghetti Monster or something else. To put 'God' as the first cause implies something sentient, probably physical or that interacts with the physical world, and more often than not implies absurd things such as answering prayers, a moral absolute, omnipotence, omniscience, breaking its own universal laws in the form of 'miracles', and often an obsession with sinful behaviour and that humans worship it.
Kanamori
12-23-2006, 06:57
God may or may not have other qualities, insofar as necessity is an essential quality and distinct then that faculty alone is sufficient for the purpose.
We are in agreement then, if we switch our words around.:book: ~:grouphug:
The proof is not concerned with devotion. Your personal conviction or the lack therefor are not at issue.
I am not concerned with the proof, it was a stand alone statement related to the thread Regarding Atheism, Agnosticism, Humanism, Rational Skepticism, etc... it is my own belief system in something that makes sense...
Watchman
12-23-2006, 08:52
Necessary being has always been an attribute of Deity which is clear from the definition of God.Meaning ?
As for the contingent/noncontingent being proof thing, and leaving aside possible dodgy issues with its premises, doesn't it actually boil down to the statement of roughly "for things to exist, the universe must exist, and the universe must have come from something" ? While this would certainly seem to be rather difficult to dispute it would also appear to be a really rather trivial observation - stating the obvious, as it were. And gets us nowhere.
Yes, I know that.
The comment wasn't necessarily directed at you. You have to indulge me. I'm responding to several posters.
On a side note, logic must be empirical, as a formal system like that cannot be its own content, it must infer from something, the outside world, showed by Gödel.
If A then B
A
Therefore B
The above is not empirical yet valid.
okay, this argument of yours essentially looks like Thomas Aquinas' first three 'proofs' of God's existence - all involving an infinite regress: I found this following quote which rebutes this argument/s for God to my satisfaction at least.
It is much much older than St. Thomas.
All three of these arguments [and yours too Pindar], rely upon the idea of regress and invoke God to terminate it. They make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress.
The argument revolves around necessity and contingency not regress. The reductio issue is problematic because it begs the question. To posit God is contingent is oxymoronic as God by definition is self existent.
one can't prove a negative like this (that it's impossible), but one can argue that it is certainly highly improbable that god exists..
Atheism is not "God probably doesn't exist". It is a denial of God's existence: there is no God (-X). An improbability schema on the other hand is a skepticism. Skepticism means one doubts a thing. This is distinct from denial of a thing. In admitting one can't prove a negative you have admitted strong atheism is an absurdity.
only fundamentalists take a position and state that is is absolute truth, this is true for both Theism and Atheism. and there are far more theistic Fundamentalists than Atheistic Fundamentalists by far...
No doubt.
I personally am somewhere between 5 and 6. where would you be Pindar (or anyone else)?
Based on your personal ranking you are agnostic, not atheistic.
I'm a theist.
and theism (in all its various forms) doesn't have problems?
Your focus was atheism/ agnosticism with humanism thrown in.
I'm not familiar with the detailed philosophical discussions regarding Atheism, I only have my own experiences to go on...
That's fine. As I mentioned before, I think you would be better served in that regard if you moved away from internet willowing to support a predisposed view and simply thought over the respective issues, regardless the conclusion. Dogmatism is usually a bad thing regardless the object defended. There are strong counter arguments to theism that could be put forward, but you don't know any of them. What you have referenced thus far have been quite shallow. This isn't your fault, but given the lack of formal study on the issue a more authentic approach would be more profitable I think.
to put it simply, from my experiences and from others i've met and become friends with in university, Atheism + Secular Ethics = Secular Humanism with very little changing between the two.
I hope that is a satisfactory answer.
Secular Humanism doesn't require atheism.
Rationalists hold that Logic applies to all truth claims independent of the physical universe. Logic is formal. It is not dependent on testability. Rather, it operates off of validity. Validity means the conclusion cannot not be given the premises. The only reason I put forward the proof at all was because an earlier poster said all strong statements about God are illogical. He was mistaken. I simply gave an example after he asked. The real thrust of the thread is not concerned with proofs for God, but the standing of atheism which is what I was focused on.
but is it not also illogical to base the argument on a foregone conclusion before consulting the evidence? it's certainly not rational...
also see above the spectrum of belief and non-belief if you haven't already.
The above doesn't relate to my quoted post.
would the 'first mover' be the Deist God?
If you are referring to historical Deism then no. Conceptually one could make ties.
that is, quantum physics, astrophysics and various other types of physics (probably excluding metaphysics) personified as a deity?
No.
there is a conclusion for which there is no evidence, only an argument.
This is a category mistake. Logic is not science. It is formal. It is theoretical.
the 'first cause' is labelled God when it could just as easily be labeled as something else - like the big bang singularity or the Flying Spaghetti Monster or something else.
The issue isn't simply assigning labels, but the meaning of the ascription. That is how the point is approached.
To put 'God' as the first cause implies something sentient...
No, it does not. Do not confuse a sectarian understanding with the focus.
(That was a long post!)
God may or may not have other qualities, insofar as necessity is an essential quality and distinct then that faculty alone is sufficient for the purpose.
We are in agreement then, if we switch our words around.
I don't follow the second clause.
I am not concerned with the proof, it was a stand alone statement related to the thread Regarding Atheism, Agnosticism, Humanism, Rational Skepticism, etc... it is my own belief system in something that makes sense...
I see. Previously you were concerned with the proof. If your recent post was simply a testimony then I will leave it as it stands.
Necessary being has always been an attribute of Deity which is clear from the definition of God.
Meaning ?
Meaning this comment: " if we take "necessary being" to be an abstract concept with no divine relations we're hardly talking about "god" as the term is normally used and understood" was ill considered.
As for the contingent/noncontingent being proof thing, and leaving aside possible dodgy issues with its premises, doesn't it actually boil down to the statement of roughly "for things to exist, the universe must exist...
No.
Claudius the God
12-24-2006, 00:00
It is much much older than St. Thomas.
I won't dispute this, I simply found his first 3 'proofs' as being very similar. I don't know where exactly these arguments originated.
The argument revolves around necessity and contingency not regress. The reductio issue is problematic because it begs the question. To posit God is contingent is oxymoronic as God by definition is self existent.
the two arguments look extremely similar to me, but I'll bite... what exactly would the difference be between the 'regress version' and the 'necessity and contingency version'? - and how would this make the question and therefore the answer different?
Atheism is not "God probably doesn't exist". It is a denial of God's existence: there is no God (-X). An improbability schema on the other hand is a skepticism. Skepticism means one doubts a thing. This is distinct from denial of a thing. In admitting one can't prove a negative you have admitted strong atheism is an absurdity.
this is almost a straw man. you're saying that the only atheists in the world are those fundmentalists (I know of no example of such a person) who claim to know for a fact that God (by any definition) does not exist and never has or will exist.
this is like saying that the average theist - like most people of moderate religious faith are not actually theists but are only agnostics, and that the only real theists are the ones who claim to know the existence of 'God' is an absolute fact.
to go back above to the belief spectrum I posted above (post 290), look at number 6 - De Facto Atheist:
Very low probability, but short of zero. De facto atheist. 'I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.'
strong Atheism is an absurdity just as strong Theism is an absurdity (points 1 and 7 on the spectrum)... the difference is that there are many thousands or perhaps millions of people who would be strong Theists while very few who would be strong Atheists like this. However point 6 - 'De Facto Atheism' is not an absurdity.
I hope it has helped to use that belief spectrum thing, I would encourage people to use it to avoid misunderstandings when talking about different levels of belief and non-belief.
Based on your personal ranking you are agnostic, not atheistic.
I'm a theist.
so you are saying that you put yourself at position number 1: Strong theist. 100 per cent probability of God. In the words of C. G. Jung, 'I do not believe, I know.'
because by classifying every position inbetween 1 and 7 as Agnosticism, you are directly saying here ("I'm a theist.") that you see the existence of God as an undeniable 100% fact - essentially this makes you a fundamentalist. I don't say this in an insulting way, and if I've concluded incorrectly I'll apollogise. - but this looks to be exactly what you are saying.
Would you describe points 2 and 3 as Agnosticism because they don't regard the existence of god as absolute 100% fact?
Your focus was atheism/ agnosticism with humanism thrown in.
that doesn't answer the question.
anyway - are there serious problems with De Facto Atheism (point 6 - see above) in your view?
I know you see serious problems with point 7, and I mostly agree. this is because of that can't prove a negative thing.
perhaps it would help if I clarify something. to me (and many others), weak Atheism is point 5 and strong Atheism is point 6. point 7 is the extremist view and is often irrelevant to most (perhaps all) Atheists and Agnostics who appreciate Logic and Reason and the Scientific Method and so on, because we can't proove a universal negative this view is largely irrelevant.
That's fine. As I mentioned before, I think you would be better served in that regard if you moved away from internet willowing to support a predisposed view and simply thought over the respective issues, regardless the conclusion. Dogmatism is usually a bad thing regardless the object defended. There are strong counter arguments to theism that could be put forward, but you don't know any of them. What you have referenced thus far have been quite shallow. This isn't your fault, but given the lack of formal study on the issue a more authentic approach would be more profitable I think.
sure, as I said, I'm not an expert.
Secular Humanism doesn't require atheism.
agreed. as I said though, this is based on the personal experiences of myself and several friends, it's not an absolute thing at all.
The above doesn't relate to my quoted post.
not direrctly no; it relates to the 'proof' you gave for God's existence based on necessity and contingency.
No, it does not. Do not confuse a sectarian understanding with the focus.
what is the alternative then? what do you see as the 'first cause'? and why should it be considered first? - and what similarities or differences does it have to a Creationist God or Intelligent Designer?
I won't dispute this, I simply found his first 3 'proofs' as being very similar. I don't know where exactly these arguments originated.
The base argument comes from Plato, though Aristotle's formulation is more well known.
the two arguments look extremely similar to me, but I'll bite... what exactly would the difference be between the 'regress version' and the 'necessity and contingency version'? - and how would this make the question and therefore the answer different?
You do not understand. It is not a question of version, but the focal point of the argument. The reductio is simply a consequence of a single line of inquiry. If one posits a contingent X and then is asked for the source of that X then either the source is another contingent X or something non-contingent. A causality rubric of simple contingency: as in X, X-1, X-2, X-3 etc. begs the question as there is no point within the sequence that does not already posit the very thing in question.
Atheism is not "God probably doesn't exist". It is a denial of God's existence: there is no God (-X). An improbability schema on the other hand is a skepticism. Skepticism means one doubts a thing. This is distinct from denial of a thing. In admitting one can't prove a negative you have admitted strong atheism is an absurdity.
this is almost a straw man. you're saying that the only atheists in the world are those fundmentalists (I know of no example of such a person) who claim to know for a fact that God (by any definition) does not exist and never has or will exist.
No, it is not a straw man, it is the correct understanding of the issue. Atheism and theism in logical terms are knowledge claims. The words themselves indicate as much. Moreover, an improbability schema is a simple skepticism. I previously explained how atheism can be divided into strong and weak forms. The weak form qualifies itself as a belief of the subject. A knowledge claim that is simply self-reflective can be dismissed as irrelevant. The problem with the multi-point breakdown you put forward (aside from the fundamentalist label which is typically a negative label applied to the religious zealot) is the focus is the individual's penchant as opposed to the logic of the knowledge claim as such. Belief, regardless the passion, is still self-reflective and does not speak to the larger universe.
strong Atheism is an absurdity just as strong Theism is an absurdity...
No, it is not. The simple proof I gave is valid. It is not an absurdity. It was because of presumptive comments like this I gave the proof originally.
so you are saying that you put yourself at position number 1: Strong theist. 100 per cent probability of God. In the words of C. G. Jung, 'I do not believe, I know.'
I don't think the measuring rod of conviction you put forward has any value when it comes to epistemology. I said I'm a theist. The reasons are many. I gave one simple proof that stands independent of probability.
that doesn't answer the question.
Perhaps not, but it is loyal to your thread's focus. The problems a theism faces are different.
anyway - are there serious problems with De Facto Atheism (point 6 - see above) in your view?
Yes.
not direrctly no; it relates to the 'proof' you gave for God's existence based on necessity and contingency.
This comment: "but is it not also illogical to base the argument on a foregone conclusion before consulting the evidence? it's certainly not rational...
also see above the spectrum of belief and non-belief if you haven't already." doesn't relate to the proof either. Using evidentiary language for logic is to commit a category mistake. To charge a foregone conclusion is erroneous as the premises are all clearly laid out with no concluding assumption implied or indicated.
what is the alternative then? what do you see as the 'first cause'? and why should it be considered first? - and what similarities or differences does it have to a Creationist God or Intelligent Designer?
The first cause would be God. It is considered first by definition (both of necessary being and godhood). The difference between a first cause simplicitur and a creative/designing god is the activity of the being in question. This is again distinct from any attending worship.
Sasaki Kojiro
12-28-2006, 23:08
Pindar, what do you think of this quote:
"I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours."
Pindar, what do you think of this quote:
"I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours."
Hi Kojiro,
I think it demonstrates neither an understanding of the topic or any sophistication of thought. In short, it is a vacuous comment.
Hi Kojiro,
I think it demonstrates neither an understanding of the topic or any sophistication of thought. In short, it is a vacuous comment.
Actually, jumping into this thread late, i'd be inclined to agree that he has a point there.
The same way that each religion dismisses the others is the same way atheists dismiss them all.
Rodion Romanovich
01-01-2007, 15:03
Why to people even bother to say "God doesn't exist" or "God exists"? If God exists, the following is true:
1. God will act deterministically, in the sense that he will always choose what is most good, according to his measure of what is good. His measure of what is good is according to all religious people an absolute, unchangeable truth
2. therefore, since God is a deterministic factor, his actions would be included into all statistics just like any other factors, and therefore statistic models would still not be less accurate (or more accurate) for prediction than if God didn't exist.
3. the God concept doesn't need to be included in the scientific models because by Occam's razor there's no use to mix in more variables and factors than are needed to get a simple description of the world, a description that is simple enough to allow us to make calculations for predictions, dimensioning of technological products, and other things that scientific models (and less formal models such as those used in ethics, philosophy etc) are used for.
And if God doesn't exist, we have an almost exactly similar situation.
So there's really no difference between the two cases, and as such it's of academic interest whether God exists or not. There are really only two situations where it's actually debated whether it matters whether God exists or not:
The debate of whether it's of any use to pray to God, and whether you actually get any benefits from believing in God as opposed to not believing in him. If God is good, he certainly would care much less about whether people believed in him or not, than he would care about people believing that acting good will in the end bring them more greatness than acting evil will do. Then, God differs little from a panteistic being, or a description of a phenomenon. And since God will always deterministically choose what is most good, praying will not affect his will - it would be heresy to say so. So we can probably conclude that the prayer's function is more of meditation and gaining of strength to solve problems alone, than to actually indulge the God.
The other question of interest regards whether God can be killed or not, i.e. if the current state of things - that the most cruel forms of evilness and hypocrisy tend to in the end be punished - could ever be disrupted so that some form of pure evilness would win in the end. I don't think so, but I do think that evilness is fully capable of eliminating and extincting all good from the planet, at the cost of destroying itself. And that good can't extinct evil completely, but good must learn to live with it, and strive to limit its power, rather than striving for extincting it. Here, the religion seems to agree that God can die through Armageddon, and as a result, also here it matters little whether God exists or not, but there are some religious interpretations that state that God can never die - but all of these also state clearly that it's necessary to fight for what is good and no just passively expect God to do all the work. In fact, if humans are degraded to such laziness that they can't defend good values such as peace, justice, freedom and equality, they are problably the ones that stand on the side of the warriors of evil on the battlefield of Armageddon, and then if God would truly deterministically do what is most good, he would make sure they are struck down and are defeated in the end. So even here, religion agrees with rationality - that good values must be worked hard for and defended, and that good can indeed be defeated if people support evilness or not actively fight for defending values such as justice and peace.
Thus the only people that really worry me are thus people who are neither rationalists, nor people who have truly read and understood their religious texts.
The one thing that can be said for religion is that, regardless of whether it's fact or fiction, it generally teaches people to act well and treat others fairly.
Red Peasant
01-02-2007, 15:06
As the historian Stephen Henry Roberts (1901-71) once said: “I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.”
Actually, jumping into this thread late, i'd be inclined to agree that he has a point there.
The same way that each religion dismisses the others is the same way atheists dismiss them all.
Hello,
The issue is not the dismissing of another idea, but the rationale behind any such rejection. The rhetorical posture that divides the Muslim from the Trinitarian Christian from the devotee of the Gods of Olympus is not the same as the base separation between theism and atheism. As was pointed out previously: an atheism that asserts a universal knowledge claim about a negative particular is a logical absurdity. This is not the case with theistic assertions.
Why to people even bother to say "God doesn't exist" or "God exists"? If God exists, the following is true:
1. God will act deterministically...
Hello,
Asserting God exists and that God will act are not the same. The creative God of the Judeo-Christian Tradition certainly acts, but not all theistics systems have such a requirement.
3. the God concept doesn't need to be included in the scientific models because by Occam's razor there's no use to mix in more variables and factors than are needed to get a simple description of the world, a description that is simple enough to allow us to make calculations for predictions, dimensioning of technological products, and other things that scientific models (and less formal models such as those used in ethics, philosophy etc) are used for.
The question of God is not a scientific category.
As the historian Stephen Henry Roberts (1901-71) once said: “I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.”
The quote demonstrates neither an understanding of the topic or any sophistication of thought. In short, it is a vacuous comment. Hopefully, Roberts was a more careful historian.
Rodion Romanovich
01-02-2007, 20:36
Asserting God exists and that God will act are not the same. The creative God of the Judeo-Christian Tradition certainly acts, but not all theistics systems have such a requirement.
If God doesn't act he's certainly not anything else than a panteistic labelling of one or many phenomenons, in which case all my comments still apply.
The question of God is not a scientific category.
The question of whether God exists or not can be translated into questions of the form "is there any difference between a scenario where God exists and one where he doesn't?" for all scenarios where the believer thinks it matters whether God exists or not. There's no interest in knowing if something called "asdasfsdg" exists if you don't know what it is, or if something called "dfsgsdhstwerwofgfjlas" exists 1,000 billion lightyears away from here and "dfsgsdhstwerwofgfjlas" has no measurable effect whatsoever on your life or on the decisions you make. To quote Confucius: "why do you want to serve the souls, when you can't serve the humans? Why do you want to understand death, when you don't understand life? Why understand the stars when you can't understand earth?"
Whether a God exists or not has seldom any practical relevance to any activity in normal life. The only things that have relevance in religion are the other questions, such as what ethics system to follow. Some religious people use the claim that God exists as an argument to impose their own ethics systems on other human beings, while the choice of ethics system is highly unrelated to the question of the existence of God, and is only related to what the consequences are of choosing a particular ethics system. There's no reason to accept an ethics system that brings self-destruction and injustice argumented for by statements such as "God exists and he gave us this system to follow, and those who won't follow it will end up in hell after they die. Yes you will suffer like **** in life if you follow our system and the system will promote great injustice more often than justice and freedom, but no suffering is comparable to that coming after your death if you didn't follow our rules - nobody comes back from the dead so you can't really take the risk because perhaps there is a life after death after all, or... *sadistic laughter*?"
A better measure of an ethics system is it's consequences in this life, unless someone can give me proof of the existence of an afterlife. There are more things to prove before anyone can claim the ethics system suggested by the Bible should be followed:
1. that the Bible is the words of someone who doesn't makes mistake and has infinite wisdoms of which ethics system would be best for humans to follow to create a good world that triumphs over evilness
2. that some texts of the Bible were at all intended as a book of laws and rules, and not as a chronicle
3. show which parts are law, and which aren't. Is it the case that this God's infinite wisdom can be summarized in as brief comments as "thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal", or do you need to read the surrounding text to be able to understand what was really meant?
4. did the author of the Bible, assuming no. 1 is true, write in riddles or in clear text? Did he intend for us to follow the rules by the word, or follow the principles? Which principles then - the explicitly stated principles, the principles deduced from the examples (such as Job, Jonah etc.), or principles on an even higher level, such as "strive for good intentions, rather than specific actions", which could make it a teaching of anything from rule ethics to consequence ethics
5. that the Bible hasn't changed meaning when being copied and translated
6. that the Bible hasn't changed meaning by the language changing so things are interpreted differently even if the copying was errorfree
7. but if people by experience see people who don't follow these ethics rules generally ending up with better lives than they do, the existence of an afterlife with hell and heaven must also be proven before there's any reason to accept these ethics without further reasoning. Proving or disproving the existence of an afterlife is not related to proving the existence or nonexistence of God, because there are religions that don't believe in an afterlife, and religions that do believe in an afterlife.
So again, it is extremely irrelevant whether God exists or not, and it's really another question that the answer is sought to. The only reason why someone would argue that God exists is to use the existence of God as an argument that all other parts of the religion would be true, which is a logical fallacy. As in claiming that "God exists, therefore no. 1 to no. 7 above are true, and therefore I must follow the words of the Bible".
It's important to remember that every statement the religion makes must be proven separately, and no unjustified deducations may be made, unless you assume a certain set of premises to be true, but then you should always be aware of which premises you have assumed to be true, because your deductions are not guaranteed to be true unless those premises are true. In the example above, you need not one premise, but 7 premises, to be able to justify that the Christian ethics would be superior to other ethics. The question of whether God exists or not is irrelevant to the question about being for or against the Christian ethics. God exists does not imply afterlife exists, God exists does not imply you will burn in **** if you don't do as the bible says, etc. etc.
Similarly, the only reason why someone would argue that God doesn't exist is to be able to dismiss all ideas related to the religion without having to provide real arguments for his ideas. Saying that Christian ethics should be dismissed because it comes from people who believe a God exists, even though the reasoning lying behind Christian ethics provide some very interesting insights into ethics, sociology, psychology and society philosophy and politics, and many who advocate the removal of Christian ethics usually have nothing to replace it with other than pure egoism and brutality.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-02-2007, 21:22
Hello,
The issue is not the dismissing of another idea, but the rationale behind any such rejection. The rhetorical posture that divides the Muslim from the Trinitarian Christian from the devotee of the Gods of Olympus is not the same as the base separation between theism and atheism. As was pointed out previously: an atheism that asserts a universal knowledge claim about a negative particular is a logical absurdity. This is not the case with theistic assertions.
You are referring to Atheism, the quote refers to Atheists. Atheists dismiss all religions in the same way that Christians dismiss Buddhism etc. This is much more applicable than irrelevant theoretical discussion.
If God doesn't act he's certainly not anything else than a panteistic labelling of one or many phenomenons, in which case all my comments still apply.
This is not correct. It doesn't follow that a non-acting God is thereby pantheistic.
The question of whether God exists or not can be translated into questions of the form "is there any difference between a scenario where God exists and one where he doesn't?"...has no measurable effect whatsoever on your life or on the decisions you make.
The question of God can be given a pragmatic taint, but such is hardly required. At best it is one avenue to the question.
Whether a God exists or not has seldom any practical relevance to any activity in normal life.
Given the impact theology has had and does have on individual devotees the above is incorrect.
So again, it is extremely irrelevant whether God exists or not, and it's really another question that the answer is sought to. The only reason why someone would argue that God exists is to use the existence of God as an argument that all other parts of the religion would be true...
This thread alone stands as a counter to the above charge. I have given a proof for God, but offered nothing by way of sect specific truth claims.
You are referring to Atheism, the quote refers to Atheists. Atheists dismiss all religions in the same way that Christians dismiss Buddhism etc. This is much more applicable than irrelevant theoretical discussion.
Alas, the silly Roberts quote revolves around why one dismisses a thing, not the dismissal itself. Assuming a rational context, the why therefore becomes a theoretical question. The reason a Muslim rejects a Trinitarian conception of God is not the same as why an atheist rejects the base notion God.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-02-2007, 21:56
Alas, the silly Roberts quote revolves around why one dismisses a thing, not the dismissal itself. Assuming a rational context, the why therefore becomes a theoretical question. The reason a Muslim rejects a Trinitarian conception of God is not the same as why an atheist rejects the base notion God.
It's a theoretical question but not irrelevant. The base notion of god is what is irrelevant. Atheists reject religions in the same way religious people do, and that's what's important.
Rodion Romanovich
01-02-2007, 22:04
This thread alone stands as a counter to the above charge. I have given a proof for God, but offered nothing by way of sect specific truth claims.
A proof of God? Wow, then you must be a unique theological genius, because nobody has succeeded in it before without redefining the meaning of God so that he becomes something very different from what he initially was. Can you please repeat this proof of yours?
Also, my comment doesn't apply to all believer, but I have met many believers who automatically assume that certain things must be right because of their assumption that God exists. For example people saying that global warming shouldn't be stopped, because God will save us when we're destroying ourselves. Or that people should be stoned to death. Or that heathens should be killed. Etc. etc. If you want to be a responsible follower of your religion it's necessary to denounce that - to clearly hold the point of view that such things don't follow from your assumption that God exists, because they don't. And that also anything deduced from the statement "God exists" to be true requires that God exists to be guaranteed to be true.
And finally out curiosity - what if your motive for wanting to prove God's existence? What statements do you think follow from the statement "God exists", if we hypothetically assume it to be true?
It's a theoretical question but not irrelevant. The base notion of god is what is irrelevant. Atheists reject religions in the same way religious people do, and that's what's important.
Kojiro,
Either you do not understand or you are being argumentative. If the discussion is atheism then the base notion of God is not irrelevant as that is the topic by which and through which atheism has meaning.
I don't understand the second sentence: are you saying religious people reject themselves?
Sasaki Kojiro
01-02-2007, 22:11
Kojiro,
Either you do not understand or you are being argumentative. If the discussion is atheism then the base notion of God is not irrelevant as that is the topic by which and through which atheism has meaning.
Irrelevant to life in general.
I don't understand the second sentence: are you saying religious people reject themselves?
Christians reject islam for reason A, muslims reject christianity for reason B, Atheists reject both for reasons A and B. Their reason for rejecting the religions is used by religious people.
A proof of God? Wow, then you must be a unique theological genius, because nobody has succeeded in it before without redefining the meaning of God so that he becomes something very different from what he initially was. Can you please repeat this proof of yours?
The above statement has a number of qualifiers that are suspect.
You've not read the thread it appears.
Read posts: 114 (both the quotes and the replies for context), 115, 120.
Also, my comment doesn't apply to all believer, but I have met many believers who automatically assume that certain things must be right because of their assumption that God exists.
I see. This moves beyond my focus or the thread.
Irrelevant to life in general.
I don't understand the above except as more argumentativeness. The base notion of God is relevant when discussing atheism as atheism is meaningful only within that larger context.
Christians reject islam for reason A, muslims reject christianity for reason B, Atheists reject both for reasons A and B. Their reason for rejecting the religions is used by religious people.
Alas no. A Christian must reject Islam because Islam does not recognize Jesus as the Christ by whom and through whom salvation is derived. A Muslim must reject Trinitarian Christianity as it deifies Jesus and thus compromises the singularity and uniqueness of God. These are not reasons an atheist rejects the claims of Christianity or Islam. Roberts view was flawed.
If someone thought God was irrelevant, the term atheist certainly wouldn't apply to them would it? An atheist believes God does not exist, not that He doesn't matter.
Claudius the God
01-02-2007, 23:38
The base argument comes from Plato, though Aristotle's formulation is more well known.
good to know...
You do not understand. It is not a question of version, but the focal point of the argument. The reductio is simply a consequence of a single line of inquiry. If one posits a contingent X and then is asked for the source of that X then either the source is another contingent X or something non-contingent. A causality rubric of simple contingency: as in X, X-1, X-2, X-3 etc. begs the question as there is no point within the sequence that does not already posit the very thing in question.
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinite regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
here are several criticisms of this argument I got from a group of debating philosophers of various types:
quotes -
The logical failure occurs in number 4. It is not necessary that a being be caused by a being.
It is, on the other hand, necessary that some being was not caused by another being.
The "cause" of a contingent being can be a long chain of evolutionary steps leading back to abiogenesis from chemical evolution, leading all the way back to the big bang, which didn't need a being, necessary or otherwise, to cause it.
1) God is a necessary being and exists in all logically possible worlds.
2) God is supposedly omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent
3) Therefore , suppose a omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being exists in all possible worlds
4) Many logically possible worlds contain large amounts of suffering with no redeeming features.
5) Therefore these logically possible worlds do not contain a being who would alleviate pointless suffering
6) Therefore there are logically possible worlds that do not contain an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being.
7) But this contradicts 3, showing that there is no necessary omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being
the argument falls apart at 4. There is no logical following that one must posit a "being" as the cause of another contingent being.
There is no being that designed the Grand Canyon, but the Grand Canyon is a result of the gradual eroding of the earth by running water and small collisions of solid matter being carried by the water as a result of gravitational forces and such.
The Grand Canyon, which could very well be considered a contingent being (dependent upon which definition of being you choose to accept--some prefer to only attribute being to a mind, others to something merely existant, but that's an entirely different can of worms), is a contingent object that is the result of an arbitrary process.
A contingent being can also be the result of an arbitrary process. In the case of life on earth, the overwhelming evidence points toward that process being evolution.
Because everything we see in the Universe looks like it is contingent. None of it exists necesarily. Bertrand Russell offered a defence against this which pointed out that properties of parts don't always apply to wholes. Bricks are made of brick and whole brick walls are also made of bricks. However, just because sodium and chlorine are harmful to humans, it does not follow that sodium chloride is harmful to humans. Russell applied this to the property of contingency. Just because all the individual things in the universe are contingent, he claimed, it does not follow that the whole universe taken together is contingent
It stops at the second statement:
2- Contingent beings have a cause
Why?, you should ask. The only reason to assume a cause is to assume a god first. That renders the argument useless.
It is a human sentiment to expect a reason behind things.
The flaw is that when something might exist it might as equally well not exist. If you attach a cause to one outcome, you must attach a cause to the other. If therefore, as in the original 'proof', you base the existence of a god on the fact that something has a cause there would always be a god, no matter what outcome.
The problem with this argument is that you are making this leap that there is something, when there could be nothing, and therefore there must be some kind of "non-contigent being" to make something. And it really falls apart right there, its simply special pleading for the existence of a non-contigent being. Either things can just exist, or they can't. If they can, than the universe can. If they can't, the non-contingent being can't. Its pretty basic.
Furthermore, the "contingency" of the universe itself is far from certain. It could be that for reasons we do not currently understand, the universe as we know it must exist, or that some universes must exist, and this particular one just happens to. Or, it could be that the universe contains the seeds of its own creation. You don't know and neither do I. I am hypothesizing, but since you are too, there is no reason to prefer your brand of B.S. to mine, and no reason to accept your conclusions.
- endquotes
No, it is not a straw man, it is the correct understanding of the issue. Atheism and theism in logical terms are knowledge claims. The words themselves indicate as much. Moreover, an improbability schema is a simple skepticism. I previously explained how atheism can be divided into strong and weak forms. The weak form qualifies itself as a belief of the subject. A knowledge claim that is simply self-reflective can be dismissed as irrelevant. The problem with the multi-point breakdown you put forward (aside from the fundamentalist label which is typically a negative label applied to the religious zealot) is the focus is the individual's penchant as opposed to the logic of the knowledge claim as such. Belief, regardless the passion, is still self-reflective and does not speak to the larger universe.
the extent to which the term Atheism is a knowledge claim of saying that 'there is no God' or whatever is entirely dependant on the knowledge claim of Theist arguments and disagreeing with them.
Atheism does not make a knowledge claim that there are no gods by any definition. Atheism makes the claim that the Gods as defined by Theism do not exist.
it is because of Theist arguments for gods that are often highly absurd, irrational, illogical, and unscientific that Atheism makes the claim that surely they do not exist as the Theists claim they do.
it also depends on the definition of God in the context of Theism, if one were to cut away at the idea of what a God is down to something such as a 'non-contingent being' with no other defining qualities, then that changes the definition of Theism for which Atheism argues against. The burden of proof in the debate between Theism and Atheism is put upon the Theists because they make the knowledge claim and the Atheists disagree with the theist argument. Atheism does not make a knowledge claim until after Theism makes one. As Theist arguments are often unscientific, the Atheist argument has many reasons to speak up and disagree.
Atheism does not make an original knowledge claim, it disagrees with the unscientific (or worse) knowledge claims of Theism. The burden of proof is on the Theists. There is no burden of proof on Atheists until after Theism has defined exactly what the definition of a God/Deity is.
No, it is not. The simple proof I gave is valid. It is not an absurdity. It was because of presumptive comments like this I gave the proof originally.
as much as I disagree with the argument, I have to admit that it is a useful argument for Theism... with enough jargon to make it appear like a rational or scientific argument. unfortunately it is not.
I don't think the measuring rod of conviction you put forward has any value when it comes to epistemology. I said I'm a theist. The reasons are many. I gave one simple proof that stands independent of probability.
this spectrum of belief (for lack of a better term) is entirely valid in defining the extent to which an individual is in their Theist or Atheist mindset.
You seem to be criticizing it in order to define Atheism according to your own prejudices.
I would like to hear more reasons as to why this spectrum is a poor construct... here it is again:
quote -:
1. Strong theist. 100 per cent probability of God. In the words of C. G. Jung, 'I do not believe, I know.'
2. Very High probability but short of 100 per cent. De facto theist. 'I cannot know for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that he is there.'
3. Higher than 50 per cent but not very high. Technically agnostic but leaning towards theism. 'I am very uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God.'
4. Exactly 50 per cent. Completely impartial agnostic. 'God's existence and non-existence are exactly equiprobable.'
5. Lower than 50 per cent but not very low. Technically agnostic but leaning towards atheism. 'I don't know weather God exists but I'm inclined to be skeptical.'
6. Very low probability, but short of zero. De facto atheist. 'I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.'
7. Strong Atheist. 'I know there is no God, with the same conviction as Jung "knows" there is one.'
:- endquote
Perhaps not, but it is loyal to your thread's focus. The problems a theism faces are different.
true, the burden of proof is on Theism for a start...
Yes.
What are your criticisms of De Facto Atheism then?
This comment: "but is it not also illogical to base the argument on a foregone conclusion before consulting the evidence? it's certainly not rational...
also see above the spectrum of belief and non-belief if you haven't already." doesn't relate to the proof either. Using evidentiary language for logic is to commit a category mistake. To charge a foregone conclusion is erroneous as the premises are all clearly laid out with no concluding assumption implied or indicated.
repeating this quote:
It stops at the second statement:
2- Contingent beings have a cause
Why?, you should ask. The only reason to assume a cause is to assume a god first. That renders the argument useless.
The first cause would be God. It is considered first by definition (both of necessary being and godhood). The difference between a first cause simplicitur and a creative/designing god is the activity of the being in question. This is again distinct from any attending worship.
which god exactly?
and what exactly makes this god/being/entity non-contingent if everything else is contingent?
does this god have a physical existence or manipulate physical reality?
does this god have sentience? is it a living thing? did it have a 'choice' in causing everything (directly or indirectly)?
I hope you answer these questions Pindar - after all, you made the knowledge claim and posed the contingency argument...
The issue is not the dismissing of another idea, but the rationale behind any such rejection. The rhetorical posture that divides the Muslim from the Trinitarian Christian from the devotee of the Gods of Olympus is not the same as the base separation between theism and atheism. As was pointed out previously: an atheism that asserts a universal knowledge claim about a negative particular is a logical absurdity. This is not the case with theistic assertions.
Atheism does not make a universal knowledge claim about a negative. It argues against the Theist knowledge claims that have next to nothing in the way of scientific evidence required to make such a knowledge claim in the first place.
The question of God is not a scientific category.
it most certainly is a scientific category.
You yourself are putting 'God' as a first cause/non-contingent position in the development of a supposedly contingent universe. by that model the scientific category of this God would be one of undeniable importance.
here are several criticisms of this argument I got from a group of debating philosophers of various types...
Claudius, you do have a penchant for rather long posts. You also have a penchant for citing others. I commented on this before. Regarding the multi-colored criticisms: tell me which you think is compelling and I'll respond. I don't feel a need to reply to random long citations that I'm not sure the poster actually understands nor do I appreciate a shotgun approach to topics.
the extent to which the term Atheism is a knowledge claim of saying that 'there is no God' or whatever is entirely dependant on the knowledge claim of Theist arguments and disagreeing with them.
No, atheism is not a parasitic position. It can be understood on its own terms independent of any actual theism or theist.
as much as I disagree with the argument, I have to admit that it is a useful argument for Theism... with enough jargon to make it appear like a rational or scientific argument. unfortunately it is not.
There is no jargon in the proof. The terms are quite standard for metaphysical discourse. The proof is rational as it operates off of reason (in this case deduction) and is valid.
this spectrum of belief (for lack of a better term) is entirely valid in defining the extent to which an individual is in their Theist or Atheist mindset.
You seem to be criticizing it in order to define Atheism according to your own prejudices.
I would like to hear more reasons as to why this spectrum is a poor construct...
The problem is the list is basically a breakdown of a subject's conviction. As such, the focus is on the subject rather than the knowledge claim. If one only wishes to know how confident a given fellow is this may be useful, but such is a psychological question, not a philosophical one. Atheism and theism respectively are epistemological stances. Personal conviction is not relevant to the claims as such.
true, the burden of proof is on Theism for a start...
Any knowledge claim has a burden of proof. Atheism is a knowledge claim. Agnosticism is not.
What are your criticisms of De Facto Atheism then?
It cannot ground moral judgments.
This comment: "but is it not also illogical to base the argument on a foregone conclusion before consulting the evidence? it's certainly not rational...
also see above the spectrum of belief and non-belief if you haven't already." doesn't relate to the proof either. Using evidentiary language for logic is to commit a category mistake. To charge a foregone conclusion is erroneous as the premises are all clearly laid out with no concluding assumption implied or indicated.
repeating this quote:
It stops at the second statement:
2- Contingent beings have a cause
Why?, you should ask. The only reason to assume a cause is to assume a god first. That renders the argument useless.
Causality is not unique to theism. Causality is central to science for example. If you challenge the idea that contingent beings have a cause then the only option is to assume things come into being ex nihilo. This is a problematic stance and it would place you outside the bounds of the rational tradition and science.
which god exactly? does this god have a physical existence or manipulate physical reality? does this god have sentience? is it a living thing? did it have a 'choice' in causing everything (directly or indirectly)?
These are sect specific issues and thus separate from the base question of existence.
and what exactly makes this god/being/entity non-contingent if everything else is contingent?
God is non-contingent by definition.
Atheism does not make a universal knowledge claim about a negative.
Yes, it does. To assert: "there is no God" is to do just that.
it most certainly is a scientific category.
You yourself are putting 'God' as a first cause/non-contingent position in the development of a supposedly contingent universe. by that model the scientific category of this God would be one of undeniable importance.
No, Science deals with physical phenomena and the physical universe. If you wish to argue God is in the physical universe then you would be correct. This is not the standard view of God however.
Claudius the God
01-03-2007, 03:40
Claudius, you do have a penchant for rather long posts. You also have a penchant for citing others. I commented on this before. Regarding the multi-colored criticisms: tell me which you think is compelling and I'll respond. I don't feel a need to reply to random long citations that I'm not sure the poster actually understands nor do I appreciate a shotgun approach to topics.
please respond to any of them you like...
No, atheism is not a parasitic position. It can be understood on its own terms independent of any actual theism or theist.
Theism defines deities/Gods - not Atheism. that is why it is called Atheism rather than "non-deityism" or whatever.
Theism defines gods as something and Atheism disagrees on weather they exist or not. there would not have been any Atheists until there were already Theists going around defining and promoting deities.
for one who is arguing about contingent beings I think this would be pretty simple to understand - Atheism is caused by Theism over a philosophical difference of opinion on this matter...
There is no jargon in the proof. The terms are quite standard for metaphysical discourse. The proof is rational as it operates off of reason (in this case deduction) and is valid.
quote -
the argument falls apart at 4. There is no logical following that one must posit a "being" as the cause of another contingent being.
- endquote
The problem is the list is basically a breakdown of a subject's conviction. As such, the focus is on the subject rather than the knowledge claim. If one only wishes to know how confident a given fellow is this may be useful, but such is a psychological question, not a philosophical one. Atheism and theism respectively are epistemological stances. Personal conviction is not relevant to the claims as such.
it is still relevant for defining strong and weak Atheism.
the fact that so few people classify themselves as '100% sure that there is no god' is because this is a universal knowledge claim of a negative. anyone with an appreciation for science, evidence, logic and rationality has enough sense to see the absurdity of arguing this.
to get back to the original argument though, "point 6: de facto Atheism" is strong Atheism compared to "point 5: agnostic but leaning towards atheism" which is obviously weaker.
whatever epistemological stances you define the argument around are not necessarily the same as what an Atheist defines the issue as.
Any knowledge claim has a burden of proof. Atheism is a knowledge claim. Agnosticism is not.
As I said earlier, the Atheist knowledge claim is dependant on the original Theist knowledge claim for the precise definition of the subject matter (Deities)
the only reason why there is anything remotely like an "Atheist knowledge claim" is because the Theist knowledge claim is so bad at providing the proof that is its burden to give...
It cannot ground moral judgments.
please explain this in detail - why De Facto Atheism is unable to ground moral judgements?
and why would any other stance me better at making moral judgements?
and why a moral judgements are the exclusive province of belief or non-belief?
Can't morality come from somewhere besides religious belief or lack thereof?
Causality is not unique to theism. Causality is central to science for example. If you challenge the idea that contingent beings have a cause then the only option is to assume things come into being ex nihilo. This is a problematic stance and it would place you outside the bounds of the rational tradition and science.
contingent beings are not always created by other beings (contingent or otherwise).
God is non-contingent by definition.
prove it.
quote -
The problem with this argument is that you are making this leap that there is something, when there could be nothing, and therefore there must be some kind of "non-contigent being" to make something. And it really falls apart right there, its simply special pleading for the existence of a non-contigent being. Either things can just exist, or they can't. If they can, then the universe can. If they can't, the non-contingent being can't. Its pretty basic.
- endquote
Yes, it does. To assert: "there is no God" is to do just that.
try reading the second sentence as well:
Atheism does not make a universal knowledge claim about a negative. It argues against the Theist knowledge claims that have next to nothing in the way of scientific evidence required to make such a knowledge claim in the first place.
see the various points made above... I'm too tired to repeat all the points i've already made...
No, Science deals with physical phenomena and the physical universe. If you wish to argue God is in the physical universe then you would be correct. This is not the standard view of God however.
within the physical universe or not, if this God is the singular cause of all contingent beings then it is within the realm of rational scientific inquiry.
[EDIT]
one last thing: To be an atheist is by definition NOT believing in god; and it's a big difference from believing that there is no god. The universal knowledge claim only applies to the later category (point seven on that belief spectrum). this is perhaps why you are confusing the issue regarding Atheism.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-03-2007, 07:42
If someone thought God was irrelevant, the term atheist certainly wouldn't apply to them would it? An atheist believes God does not exist, not that He doesn't matter.
See below about god vs god.
I don't understand the above except as more argumentativeness. The base notion of God is relevant when discussing atheism as atheism is meaningful only within that larger context.
The problem is that people say 'god' when referring to an unprovable being, and say 'god' when referring to a very specific 'thou shalt not for it is written' being. You would probably say it's not rigorous or something. Atheists reject the latter and dismiss the former as irrelevant or choose to believe it doesn't exist.
Alas no. A Christian must reject Islam because Islam does not recognize Jesus as the Christ by whom and through whom salvation is derived. A Muslim must reject Trinitarian Christianity as it deifies Jesus and thus compromises the singularity and uniqueness of God. These are not reasons an atheist rejects the claims of Christianity or Islam. Roberts view was flawed.
Ah, now what was that Roberts quote? "When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods...". It's apparent you don't understand.
please respond to any of them you like...
I would rather respond to something you think is compelling than guess.
Theism defines deities/Gods - not Atheism. that is why it is called Atheism rather than "non-deityism" or whatever.
Theism does not define deities/Gods. Theism is not a definition. Theism simply asserts such exist. Atheism asserts the opposite.
for one who is arguing about contingent beings I think this would be pretty simple to understand - Atheism is caused by Theism over a philosophical difference of opinion on this matter...
I understand what you what to say, it is simply wrong. It is also irrelevant.
There is no jargon in the proof. The terms are quite standard for metaphysical discourse. The proof is rational as it operates off of reason (in this case deduction) and is valid.
quote -
the argument falls apart at 4. There is no logical following that one must posit a "being" as the cause of another contingent being.
- endquote
Are you attempting to argue contra causality? Are you asserting things come into being ex nihilo? If so, make the argument. If you like I’ll give you an object to demonstrate your case. Take an apple: most would argue apples come from apple trees. Your view seems to challenge this idea. So, explain the source of apples.
it is still relevant for defining strong and weak Atheism.
the fact that so few people classify themselves as '100% sure that there is no god' is because this is a universal knowledge claim of a negative. anyone with an appreciation for science, evidence, logic and rationality has enough sense to see the absurdity of arguing this.
Atheism in its standard form is an absurdity quite right. If atheism is simply a belief (as I explained several times previously) which seems to be your focus then it doesn’t matter as the position simply speaks to the view of the subject and not reality proper. Belief informed atheism is weak atheism.
Any knowledge claim has a burden of proof. Atheism is a knowledge claim. Agnosticism is not.
As I said earlier, the Atheist knowledge claim is dependent on the original Theist knowledge claim for the precise definition of the subject matter (Deities)
Alas no. You are confused. Atheism is not a parasitic position. Let me give you an example: primitive and Theravada Buddhism are atheistic faiths. Neither was/is dependent on theists to be meaningful. A Buddhist does not need to know theists or theism in order to embrace Buddhist teaching.
please explain this in detail - why De Facto Atheism is unable to ground moral judgements?
It is unable to demonstrate the essential ‘ought’ or deontic basis of moral claims.
contingent beings are not always created by other beings (contingent or otherwise).
I don't’ think you understand what contingent means. In any case, give me an example of ex nihilo contingent being. If you cannot then we can dispense with the above.
God is non-contingent by definition.
prove it.
Prove a definition? When people commonly refer to God, the concept refers to a thing that is supreme. This refers to essential qualities and being status. What is God thereby is necessarily independent. As this relates to its being status: the object is thereby self-existent. What is self-existent cannot be contingent. If something is contingent, it is dependent and thus not God.
quote -
The problem with this argument is that you are making this leap that there is something, when there could be nothing, and therefore there must be some kind of "non-contingent being" to make something. And it really falls apart right there, its simply special pleading for the existence of a non-contingent being. Either things can just exist, or they can't. If they can, then the universe can. If they can't, the non-contingent being can't. Its pretty basic.
- endquote
Contingency and necessity are logical terms relating to ontology. Insofar as something exists (I assume you agree something does exist) then that thing is either contingent or necessary. This line of thinking is foundational to the Western Intellectual Tradition tracing back to Parmenides. If one accepts there is a something, then there is no third option.
Now you could argue nothing exists (which would make this discussion rather odd) or you can accept something exists. Agreeing something exists means one can then determine the nature of its existence. Lets use our hedgehog from earlier in the thread. Is there something about a hedgehog that says it cannot not be? Is there a logical necessity to our hedgehog? If not then it is contingent. If it is contingent then its source comes into question. Now given some of what you’ve posted earlier you may assert hedgehogs simply appear from nowhere (ex nihilo). This is not a standard view. Most people agree hedgehogs come from other hedgehogs. An evolutionary biologist would and could probably suggest a proto-hedgehog ancestor. This line of thinking is a contingent object X preceded by another contingent X that acted as the causal agent. This is exactly what was indicated in the proof I gave. Now an infinite series of contingent Xs in logical terms leads to the reductio absurdity I previously explained. Now one can accept the absurdity and thereby move outside the bounds of reason or they must accept (as the proof demonstrates) a primary non-contingent source must exist. It’s that simple.
try reading the second sentence as well:
Atheism does not make a universal knowledge claim about a negative. It argues against the Theist knowledge claims that have next to nothing in the way of scientific evidence required to make such a knowledge claim in the first place.
see the various points made above... I'm too tired to repeat all the points i've already made...
God is not a scientific question.
within the physical universe or not, if this God is the singular cause of all contingent beings then it is within the realm of rational scientific inquiry.
The above doesn’t follow.
Now Claudius I want you to consider the position you now find yourself in. You have agreed strong atheism is an absurdity. The tenor of what remained (your seven schema you are loyal to) falls within the belief form of atheism. This is weak atheism. As such, it really only concerns the penchant of the subject (you in this case). This means the focus is simply you and no longer the reality of what actually is. The focus has thus turned into psychology and is no longer philosophy.
The other strains of your posting seems to have you rejecting basic causality, embracing ex nihilo stances, and making wild charges on God as a science project. These views seem more examples of passion than considered thought. They also make you appear more dogmatic than reflective.
See below about god vs god.
The post saying 'see below' doesn't answer Xiahou's post.
I don't understand the above except as more argumentativeness. The base notion of God is relevant when discussing atheism as atheism is meaningful only within that larger context.
The problem is that people say 'god' when referring to an unprovable being and say 'god' when referring to a very specific 'thou shalt not for it is written' being. You would probably say it's not rigorous or something. Atheists reject the latter and dismiss the former as irrelevant or choose to believe it doesn't exist.
The above doesn't relate to my post. Moreover, I have given you a proof you admitted was valid.
] Alas no. A Christian must reject Islam because Islam does not recognize Jesus as the Christ by whom and through whom salvation is derived. A Muslim must reject Trinitarian Christianity as it deifies Jesus and thus compromises the singularity and uniqueness of God. These are not reasons an atheist rejects the claims of Christianity or Islam. Roberts view was flawed.
Ah, now what was that Roberts quote? "When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods...". It's apparent you don't understand.
I'm uncertain about the use of the second person pronoun above, but are you suggesting the two stances regarding Muslims and Christians are not mutually exclusive? If so demonstrate the compatibility. If not, a clear incompatibility is demonstrated and we can dismiss the uncharitable Robert's view as vacuous.
Christians reject islam for reason A, muslims reject christianity for reason B, Atheists reject both for reasons A and B. Their reason for rejecting the religions is used by religious people.
Alas no. A Christian must reject Islam because Islam does not recognize Jesus as the Christ by whom and through whom salvation is derived. A Muslim must reject Trinitarian Christianity as it deifies Jesus and thus compromises the singularity and uniqueness of God. These are not reasons an atheist rejects the claims of Christianity or Islam. Roberts view was flawed.
Look at it this way - a Christian rejects Islam because he does not respect or believe in its gods. A Muslim rejects Christianity because he does not believe in its particular god. An atheist rejects both Islam and Christianity because he does not believe in the gods of either religion.
It's the same difference.
Look at it this way - a Christian rejects Islam because he does not respect or believe in its gods. A Muslim rejects Christianity because he does not believe in its particular god. An atheist rejects both Islam and Christianity because he does not believe in the gods of either religion.
It's the same difference.
Hi Sapi,
See post 311.
See below about god vs god.Rejecting the Christian God doesn't make one an atheist. A Christian who converts to Hinduism doesn't become an atheist. An atheist says God does not exist- full stop.
Kralizec
01-03-2007, 10:30
Alas no. A Christian must reject Islam because Islam does not recognize Jesus as the Christ by whom and through whom salvation is derived. A Muslim must reject Trinitarian Christianity as it deifies Jesus and thus compromises the singularity and uniqueness of God. These are not reasons an atheist rejects the claims of Christianity or Islam. Roberts view was flawed.
The Roberts quote seems to use an older definition of atheism, one regarding specific faiths: a christian is an atheist to pagan Hellenes, a christian is an atheist in respect to Hinduism, etc. This is how the term was used in antiquity.
The examples you quoted aren't very useful in this context, since Allah and JHWH are generally considered to be the same god. Nevertheless...
In your examples the people reject god because of preconceived notions- like how a Christian rejects Islam because it contradicts the doctrine of his own faith.
There of course are atheists who do the same- because they adhere to "strong atheism" and don't have the slightests intention of converting, they reject religion because of their preconceived notions.
There also are agnostics -"weak atheism"- who educate themselves on different religions and decide that they're not convinced by the "what this book says is true because it says so" argument.
People reject religions because they assume they're not true. The inevitable conclusion is that those who had a major hand in founding the religion were either delusional or purposefully deceitful, and that those after them simply perpetuate the religion by clinging on to what they've been led to believe.
Personally I believe that applies to any organised religion.
Banquo's Ghost
01-03-2007, 12:07
Gentlemen, I believe that you have made the mistake of engaging Pindar on ground of his own choosing. Rather cleverly, he is distracting you with his tight focus.
Pindar's proof is robust. The problem is that it says nothing about theism.
It may help to examine the language. "Being" is central to the proof. Yet the word "being" has no association with a conscious or supernatural entity. It merely means the state or fact of existing. Try replacing the word "being" in the proof with the word "phenomenon" and you will feel less emotive about the argument. (Note that the words are not exactly inter-changeable as a phenomenon requires observation, but the exercise is valid in reducing the distraction of the word "being" when you return to it).
Theism is the belief in one or more gods. A god is defined as a supernatural being which is worshipped as the controller of some part or agency of the universe. A god is a very specific being, not any old unexplained oddity. Therefore, any god requires some degree of consciousness or will. Without consciousness implicit in the definition, the laws of physics become gods. Pindar admits that his proof is non-sectarian. He did not go further and acknowledge that it is non-theistic.
Pindar's proof addresses causality and contingency. There is no requirement for consciousness or conscious decisions to create. Therefore it holds no relevancy to theism, since it supports a natural non-contingent being as much as a supernatural one.
Atheism is a perfectly valid philosophy since it looks to a natural, unconscious non-contingent being as explanation, instead of a supernatural and conscious first mover.
Claudius the God
01-03-2007, 12:14
I would rather respond to something you think is compelling than guess.
okay... here are three from the earlier list:
1 - The logical failure occurs in number 4. It is not necessary that a being be caused by a being.
It is, on the other hand, necessary that some being was not caused by another being.
2 - the argument falls apart at 4. There is no logical following that one must posit a "being" as the cause of another contingent being.
There is no being that designed the Grand Canyon, but the Grand Canyon is a result of the gradual eroding of the earth by running water and small collisions of solid matter being carried by the water as a result of gravitational forces and such.
The Grand Canyon, which could very well be considered a contingent being (dependent upon which definition of being you choose to accept--some prefer to only attribute being to a mind, others to something merely existant, but that's an entirely different can of worms), is a contingent object that is the result of an arbitrary process.
A contingent being can also be the result of an arbitrary process. In the case of life on earth, the overwhelming evidence points toward that process being evolution.
3 -
The problem with this argument is that you are making this leap that there is something, when there could be nothing, and therefore there must be some kind of "non-contigent being" to make something. And it really falls apart right there, its simply special pleading for the existence of a non-contigent being. Either things can just exist, or they can't. If they can, than the universe can. If they can't, the non-contingent being can't. Its pretty basic.
Furthermore, the "contingency" of the universe itself is far from certain. It could be that for reasons we do not currently understand, the universe as we know it must exist, or that some universes must exist, and this particular one just happens to. Or, it could be that the universe contains the seeds of its own creation. You don't know and neither do I. I am hypothesizing, but since you are too, there is no reason to prefer your brand of B.S. to mine, and no reason to accept your conclusions.
Theism does not define deities/Gods. Theism is not a definition. Theism simply asserts such exist. Atheism asserts the opposite.
by asserting that something exists it needs some form of definition for reasons of specificity, otherwise the assertion that something (without a definition) exists is completely meaningless.
Further, Atheism in practice doesn't assert the opposite - no matter how you try to twist the definition of Atheism to your own aims. - as I just said in my last post: "To be an atheist is by definition NOT believing in god; and it's a big difference from believing that there is no god."
I understand what you what to say, it is simply wrong. It is also irrelevant.
Then please explain how Atheism (by your negative knowledge claim interpretation) preceeded Theism...
Are you attempting to argue contra causality? Are you asserting things come into being ex nihilo? If so, make the argument. If you like I’ll give you an object to demonstrate your case. Take an apple: most would argue apples come from apple trees. Your view seems to challenge this idea. So, explain the source of apples.
For clarification, I'm not intentionally describing contra causality nor ex nihilo. To be honest I don't know exactly what these terms mean. (this is not an invitation for a one sided explanation either, thank you)
Your apple example is deliberately unhelpful, not all things are necessarily caused... many things go through arbitrary processes of development over time.
repeating an earlier quote:
The "cause" of a contingent being can be a long chain of evolutionary steps leading back to abiogenesis from chemical evolution, leading all the way back to the big bang, which didn't need a being, necessary or otherwise, to cause it.
Further, you have yet to give any reason as to why your God must be a non-contingent being responsible for all further developments in the universe.
Atheism in its standard form is an absurdity quite right. If atheism is simply a belief (as I explained several times previously) which seems to be your focus then it doesn’t matter as the position simply speaks to the view of the subject and not reality proper. Belief informed atheism is weak atheism.
Atheism in practise is the lack of belief in deities rather than a belief that there are no deities. Please notice the difference. I'm tired of repeating this point time and time again.
How sure an individual feels about the issue can be different from another individual, that's why some people's non-belief is closer to Agnosticism or closer to De Facto Atheism.
Atheism can't be described as "simply a belief" when it is a non-belief in the first place.
Alas no. You are confused. Atheism is not a parasitic position. Let me give you an example: primitive and Theravada Buddhism are atheistic faiths. Neither was/is dependent on theists to be meaningful. A Buddhist does not need to know theists or theism in order to embrace Buddhist teaching.
I didn't describe Atheism as parasitic, I explained that it is dependant upon Theists for a precise definition of the subject matter. If you see this as parasitic then perhaps you can evaluate the following point...
Do these Buddhists sects you describe promote the idea that deities, gods, and other supernatural ideas (Santa Claus, leprechauns, tooth fairies, easter bunny, fairies, and dragons) do not exist? - if so, wouldn't that require a prior knowledge of some sort of what exactly leprechauns, etc. are?
It is unable to demonstrate the essential ‘ought’ or deontic basis of moral claims.
in laymans terms?
repeating myself with emphasis:
please explain this in detail - why De Facto Atheism is unable to ground moral judgements?
I don't’ think you understand what contingent means. In any case, give me an example of ex nihilo contingent being. If you cannot then we can dispense with the above.
irrelevant. The presupposition that there is a non-contingent being responsible for the first contingent being and therefore all other is purely hypothetical. there is no real evidence to back up this notion. All this argument is is simply special pleading for the existence of a non-contigent being.
The only reason to assume a cause is to assume a god first. That renders the argument useless.
Prove a definition? When people commonly refer to God, the concept refers to a thing that is supreme. This refers to essential qualities and being status. What is God thereby is necessarily independent. As this relates to its being status: the object is thereby self-existent. What is self-existent cannot be contingent. If something is contingent, it is dependent and thus not God.
you misunderstand - prove that "God" is non-contingent and also the cause of the first contingent/dependant being...
why is it self-existent?
- you're going to have to elaborate your above statement - it mainly just sounds like jargon...
Contingency and necessity are logical terms relating to ontology. Insofar as something exists (I assume you agree something does exist) then that thing is either contingent or necessary. This line of thinking is foundational to the Western Intellectual Tradition tracing back to Parmenides. If one accepts there is a something, then there is no third option.
Now you could argue nothing exists (which would make this discussion rather odd) or you can accept something exists. Agreeing something exists means one can then determine the nature of its existence. Lets use our hedgehog from earlier in the thread. Is there something about a hedgehog that says it cannot not be? Is there a logical necessity to our hedgehog? If not then it is contingent. If it is contingent then its source comes into question. Now given some of what you’ve posted earlier you may assert hedgehogs simply appear from nowhere (ex nihilo). This is not a standard view. Most people agree hedgehogs come from other hedgehogs. An evolutionary biologist would and could probably suggest a proto-hedgehog ancestor. This line of thinking is a contingent object X preceded by another contingent X that acted as the causal agent. This is exactly what was indicated in the proof I gave. Now an infinite series of contingent Xs in logical terms leads to the reductio absurdity I previously explained. Now one can accept the absurdity and thereby move outside the bounds of reason or they must accept (as the proof demonstrates) a primary non-contingent source must exist. It’s that simple.
So why define this theoretical non-contingent entity as a god?
I will return to this point later...
God is not a scientific question.
the only reason to suggest this is because such a hypothesis can't stand up to proper scientific inquiry.
The above doesn’t follow.
any entity that exists or affects the physical universe is within the realm of scientific study.
Now Claudius I want you to consider the position you now find yourself in. You have agreed strong atheism is an absurdity. The tenor of what remained (your seven schema you are loyal to) falls within the belief form of atheism. This is weak atheism. As such, it really only concerns the penchant of the subject (you in this case). This means the focus is simply you and no longer the reality of what actually is. The focus has thus turned into psychology and is no longer philosophy.
Atheism is an absense of belief in deities, not a belief that deities do not exist. Regardless, I used the belief/non-belief spectrum to prove a point regarding the absurdity of 100% belief that deities do not exist compared to the less absurd positions of De Facto Atheism and Agnosticism leaning towards Atheism...
The other strains of your posting seems to have you rejecting basic causality, embracing ex nihilo stances, and making wild charges on God as a science project. These views seem more examples of passion than considered thought. They also make you appear more dogmatic than reflective.
Even with your argument of contingent beings, you have had to redefine "God" down to some simplistic non-contingent entity with no other qualities whatsoever - which you also claim is impossible to investigate scientifically. Not only is this highly absurd but it doesn't even make a good argument for Theism - only Agnosticism.
As I've already defined my position as De Facto Atheist - (Very low probability, but short of zero. De facto atheist. 'I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.') - my opinions on the matter are unchanged... nor could they be by such unscientific reasoning... the hypothesis of a non-contingent entity/first cause requires evidence that it is in fact non-contingent. Without such evidence the conclusion that it is "God" for whatever reason is pure speculation...
To tack on to Banquo's Ghost's post, Religion is philosophy. It does not need scientific proof to exist. Arguements toward scientific proof of God develop into logical fallacies concerning both sides of the issue.
One must approach Religion from the philosophical view first before attempting any other course. Pinder I believe is taking just that course where others are attempting to intermix science and logic and they lose themselves in the philosophical arguement.
Pinder if I ever get arrested I want you to be my defense lawyer.
Rodion Romanovich
01-03-2007, 19:30
The above statement has a number of qualifiers that are suspect.
You've not read the thread it appears.
Read posts: 114 (both the quotes and the replies for context), 115, 120.
Ok, here's a summary of your so-called "proof":
"All strong positions on god are illogical."
"No, they are not."
Name one then, don't make me post again
Kojiro my good man, If you are familiar with the literature on the subject a variety of examples should come to mind. If you are not then your earlier comment was presumptive. In any case, as a simple example I'll give you a form of an argument that finds reference in Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz.
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinate regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
The above is a simple valid argument.
But when someone takes a strong position what can they mean but that they believe it to be true?
The issue is not simply belief that a given X is true, but whether a stance entails an actual claim about reality itself.
What? If I say I believe something how is that not a claim that it is true? No one goes around believing in things they think are false.
You do not understand. To say "I believe X" the predicate reflects back on the subject. The statement makes no demand that the X has existential standing.
There's no difference between your strong and weak atheism.
Yes, there is: one is an absurdity, the other an irrelevancy.
You should try doing something logically absurd sometime, it's fun. By irrelevancy do you mean god is irrelevant in atheism? If so you are closer than many religious people get. It cracks me up when people take it so seriously.
Would you care to explain where in this mess I can find the thing that you call a proof of the existence of God?
===
In the meantime I can point out the first fallacies that I could help but notice when skimming through those posts of yours:
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
A huge fallacy! Have you ever heard of feedback systems or recursion? About 80% of all engineers today work with feedback systems or recursion on a daily basis, and no biologist or chemist worth the name would agree to your statement that things can't cause themselves.
Here's an introduction to the subject of feedback: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feedback
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
Since 3 isn't correct, 4 isn't correct either
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
This doesn't follow from any of the previous statements
The above is a simple valid argument.
No
Rejecting the Christian God doesn't make one an atheist. A Christian who converts to Hinduism doesn't become an atheist. An atheist says God does not exist- full stop.
Quite.
The Roberts quote seems to use an older definition of atheism, one regarding specific faiths: a christian is an atheist to pagan Hellenes, a christian is an atheist in respect to Hinduism, etc. This is how the term was used in antiquity.
That may be. The examples of Celsus' and Origen's exchanges would illustrate the point. Of course, if that were Robert's position it is anachronistic.
The examples you quoted aren't very useful in this context, since Allah and JHWH are generally considered to be the same god.
Actually, I know large numbers of Christians who reject that Allah and the God of the Testaments are the same.
Pindar's proof is robust. The problem is that it says nothing about theism.
It may help to examine the language. "Being" is central to the proof. Yet the word "being" has no association with a conscious or supernatural entity. It merely means the state or fact of existing. Try replacing the word "being" in the proof with the word "phenomenon" and you will feel less emotive about the argument. (Note that the words are not exactly inter-changeable as a phenomenon requires observation, but the exercise is valid in reducing the distraction of the word "being" when you return to it).
Theism is the belief in one or more gods. A god is defined as a supernatural being which is worshipped as the controller of some part or agency of the universe. A god is a very specific being, not any old unexplained oddity. Therefore, any god requires some degree of consciousness or will. Without consciousness implicit in the definition, the laws of physics become gods. Pindar admits that his proof is non-sectarian. He did not go further and acknowledge that it is non-theistic.
This is a much more interesting reply than what I've been dealing with thus far. Of course, the response would include the following: the notion God does not require any attending worship. Second, being is indeed the focus, the rub is contingent and necessary being. Necessary being is considered synonymous with God as no other being has thus far qualified as necessary. The Laws of Physics (like the previously mentioned universe in the thread) are mental constructs: they do not have being status.
Atheism is a perfectly valid philosophy since it looks to a natural, unconscious non-contingent being as explanation, instead of a supernatural and conscious first mover.
One can't claim atheism is valid unless they deal with the absurdity of strong atheism. So far this hasn't happened.
okay... here are three from the earlier list:
1 - The logical failure occurs in number 4. It is not necessary that a being be caused by a being.
It is, on the other hand, necessary that some being was not caused by another being.
2 - the argument falls apart at 4. There is no logical following that one must posit a "being" as the cause of another contingent being.
I asked you to choose one. Even so, your 1) and 2) seem to be the same argument and something I've already addressed. If you really believe a being can come into existence independent of another causal agent then you have my apple or hedgehog references to deal with. What brings about an apple or a hedgehog? If you assert they arrive ex nihilo (from nothing) we will deal with the consequences of that view. If you posit any other being as causal then my original point stands. The one reference to the Grand Canyon (or rather the rock strata) being formed by running water and collisions of solid matter illustrate my point: both are contingent.
3 -
The problem with this argument is that you are making this leap that there is something, when there could be nothing, and therefore there must be some kind of "non-contigent being" to make something.
It's true the whole argument does assume that there is something. Do you disagree? Do you wish to argue that in reality there is nothing? If you agree there is something then (as I mentioned in the last post) we can qualify the being of that thing. If a thing is contingent then its source can be called into question. This points us down the road already explained.
Furthermore, the "contingency" of the universe itself is far from certain.
The universe isn't a being, but a label for the collective amount of stuff 'out there': planets, stars, the Death Star etc.. In short, it is a mental construct. This was previously discussed.
Theism does not define deities/Gods. Theism is not a definition. Theism simply asserts such exist. Atheism asserts the opposite.
by asserting that something exists it needs some form of definition for reasons of specificity, otherwise the assertion that something (without a definition) exists is completely meaningless.
That's fine. The point remains: theism is not a definition, but an epistemological assertion about a metaphysical absolute. Atheism is the opposite assertion.
Further, Atheism in practice doesn't assert the opposite - no matter how you try to twist the definition of Atheism to your own aims. - as I just said in my last post: "To be an atheist is by definition NOT believing in god; and it's a big difference from believing that there is no god."
No, atheism is the assertion God(s) does not exist. If you assert atheism is simply the absence of belief then you cannot distinguish between atheism and agnosticism or the mental state of a hedgehog. Atheism is a decided position distinct from agnosticism or the lack metaphysical posturing of rodents. This has been discussed.
Then please explain how Atheism (by your negative knowledge claim interpretation) preceeded Theism...
I've made no chronological claims. I have simply explained that atheism is conceptually distinct.
For clarification, I'm not intentionally describing contra causality nor ex nihilo. To be honest I don't know exactly what these terms mean. (this is not an invitation for a one sided explanation either, thank you)
I don't know what a one sided explanation means: are saying you don't want me to explain what causality or ex nihilo mean?
Your apple example is deliberately unhelpful, not all things are necessarily caused... many things go through arbitrary processes of development over time.
The apple example is not deliberately unhelpful. It is meant to be helpful. Now if you believe there are contingent things that are uncaused give an example.
The "cause" of a contingent being can be a long chain of evolutionary steps leading back to abiogenesis from chemical evolution, leading all the way back to the big bang, which didn't need a being, necessary or otherwise, to cause it.
The Big Bang is not a thing but a posited event. If you want to venture down this path ask the question: what exploded? The existence of whatever thing exploded (made the bang) needs to be explained. If you posit nothing existed and then suddenly there was the big bang then you have indeed embraced an ex nihilo position which is a logical absurdity. Now I will grant there are scientists who will unwittingly adopt just this very posture. They are examples of the paucity of logical thinking that can be found in the sciences ever since natural philosophy became so separated from philosophy proper and basic logic was no longer taught.
Further, you have yet to give any reason as to why your God must be a non-contingent being responsible for all further developments in the universe.
I don't understand the personal pronoun. I have no ownership of God. I have explained that God, as necessary being, acts as the ontic grounding for contingent being.
Atheism in practise is the lack of belief in deities rather than a belief that there are no deities. Please notice the difference. I'm tired of repeating this point time and time again.
How sure an individual feels about the issue can be different from another individual, that's why some people's non-belief is closer to Agnosticism or closer to De Facto Atheism.
Atheism can't be described as "simply a belief" when it is a non-belief in the first place.
As described in this post and previously described earlier in the thread: atheism as lack of belief fails for its lack of rigor in making distinction between agnosticism and hedgehog mental states.
I didn't describe Atheism as parasitic, I explained that it is dependant upon Theists for a precise definition of the subject matter.
This is what parasitic means.
Do these Buddhists sects you describe promote the idea that deities, gods, and other supernatural ideas (Santa Claus, leprechauns, tooth fairies, easter bunny, fairies, and dragons) do not exist? - if so, wouldn't that require a prior knowledge of some sort of what exactly leprechauns, etc. are?
Buddhism has no connection to Santa Claus, leprechauns, tooth fairies, the Easter Bunny or fairies: such are European/Western in origin. Your posts are suggesting a growing hostility and/or emotionalism that is unwise. As far as Buddhism, atheism and leprechauns are concerned: understanding a concept that is then rejected isn't at issue. Most certainly an atheist must understand what God the concept means in order to reject it.
in laymans terms?
repeating myself with emphasis:
please explain this in detail - why De Facto Atheism is unable to ground moral judgements?
My original statement was in layman's terms: 'unable to ground moral judgments' is not technical vernacular. I don't see what detail is needed. If something cannot be done, it cannot be done. It is not a complex judgment.
contingent beings are not always created by other beings (contingent or otherwise).
I don't’ think you understand what contingent means. In any case, give me an example of ex nihilo contingent being. If you cannot then we can dispense with the above.
irrelevant. The presupposition that there is a non-contingent being responsible for the first contingent being and therefore all other is purely hypothetical. there is no real evidence to back up this notion. All this argument is is simply special pleading for the existence of a non-contigent being.
The above is not irrelevant. You made a charge "contingent being are not always created by other beings" I asked for an example. Regarding what you did post: you continue to use the wrong vocabulary: what I put forward is not hypothetical its theoretical. Logic and philosophy are concerned with the theoretical. That is the domain of this discussion. Evidence refrains are to misunderstand the subject matter. Such is not a scientific affair.
The only reason to assume a cause is to assume a god first. That renders the argument useless.
Causality is not a purely theological stance. As already explained: causality is part and parcel of science. Science is not a theologically bound discipline.
God is non-contingent by definition.
prove it
Prove a definition? When people commonly refer to God, the concept refers to a thing that is supreme. This refers to essential qualities and being status. What is God thereby is necessarily independent. As this relates to its being status: the object is thereby self-existent. What is self-existent cannot be contingent. If something is contingent, it is dependent and thus not God.
you misunderstand - prove that "God" is non-contingent and also the cause of the first contingent/dependant being...
why is it self-existent?
- you're going to have to elaborate your above statement - it mainly just sounds like jargon...
I don't think I misunderstood. You asked me to prove a definition. I don't believe my answer is jargon. The language used is quite simple, I think. In any case: God is non-contingent because contingency indicates dependency, what is God cannot be dependent under the standard meaning of the term. The proof for God being prior to and underscoring contingent being is the proof given so many pages ago.
So why define this theoretical non-contingent entity as a god?
Because nothing else has been proffered that fits the criteria.
God is not a scientific question.
the only reason to suggest this is because such a hypothesis can't stand up to proper scientific inquiry.
No, the reason to suggest this is because science cannot broach the question as it is confined by the parameters that make science what it is.
any entity that exists or affects the physical universe is within the realm of scientific study.
You do not understand the logic of science.
Atheism is an absense of belief in deities, not a belief that deities do not exist.
It is not. Agnostics are not atheists. Hedgehogs are not atheists. Rocks are not atheists.
Even with your argument of contingent beings, you have had to redefine "God" down to some simplistic non-contingent entity with no other qualities whatsoever
The proof does not deny any other qualities of/for God. It focuses on one sufficient quality: necessary being.
As I've already defined my position as De Facto Atheist - (Very low probability, but short of zero. De facto atheist. 'I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.') - my opinions on the matter are unchanged... nor could they be by such unscientific reasoning... the hypothesis of a non-contingent entity/first cause requires evidence that it is in fact non-contingent. Without such evidence the conclusion that it is "God" for whatever reason is pure speculation...
What you believe is not my concern. The post quoted above turns on a category mistake which indicates a basic failure to understand the issue.
To tack on to Banquo's Ghost's post, Religion is philosophy. It does not need scientific proof to exist. Arguements toward scientific proof of God develop into logical fallacies concerning both sides of the issue.
One must approach Religion from the philosophical view first before attempting any other course. Pinder I believe is taking just that course where others are attempting to intermix science and logic and they lose themselves in the philosophical arguement.
Just so.
Pindar if I ever get arrested I want you to be my defense lawyer.
:bow: If I can get O.J. off I can get anybody off. "If it doesn't fit you must acquit".
Ok, here's a summary of your so-called "proof":
Would you care to explain where in this mess I can find the thing that you call a proof of the existence of God?
"so called", "mess"? Your post seems fairly hostile.
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
A huge fallacy! Have you ever heard of feedback systems or recursion? About 80% of all engineers today work with feedback systems or recursion on a daily basis, and no biologist or chemist worth the name would agree to your statement that things can't cause themselves.
Here's an introduction to the subject of feedback: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feedback
You do not understand. Feedback systems do not posit spontaneous generation or ex nihilo creation. The existence of a given X must be accounted for not simply assumed.
Papewaio
01-04-2007, 03:31
Were do virtual particles stand and the resulting pair production in vacuum ... if they can do it why not a larger particle, a seed for a universe?
Beren Son Of Barahi
01-04-2007, 06:25
After reading most of the thread, and a lot of books and such on matters of this nature. there is a few things that i feel should be said.
To think one can forcefully change another beliefs through arguing points is silly, that goes both ways.
there is a massive difference between a belief in a god and religion. There is a Huge difference between feeling that there is no god and feeling unmoved by religion.
the question of god is a different question to religion. the question of religion is a lot more open to arguement.
the question of god is similar to the question of : Is the same colour red i see the same colour red you see, (if you were seeing through my eye/ brain would you be calling my red blue?). it is a question that is as far as most people can determine without a solid answer.
my personal take on things just to be clear is as follows.
i don't care about god, i don't believe in one, i think most religions or beliefs based on a god or gods are too easy for people to manipulate, and therefore are not relevant to my life. i think god/s and religion should be something that is between someone and themselves.
morality is a position hijacked by religions and is very selective at best. the idea someone who doesn't believe in a god or indeed a religion can not have a sense of right and wrong or be a moral person is completely insane, the same way someone believing that following some rules, religion or otherwise makes them a good person.
i class myself as a person and member of earth. what i believe in, is not as important as what i do, who i sleep with is not as important as my interactions with others. others would class me as a straight, male, white, tall, humanitraian that is full of Rational Skepticism...
Rodion Romanovich
01-04-2007, 08:12
"so called", "mess"? Your post seems fairly hostile.
Well, can you show your "proof" or not?
You do not understand. Feedback systems do not posit spontaneous generation or ex nihilo creation. The existence of a given X must be accounted for not simply assumed.
You make four fallacies:
1. assume that things can't have existed forever, i.e. that they must have been created at some point, without supporting that statement at all
2. assume that an infinite number of causes is impossible
3. assume that even IF hypothetically there was a causa prima non causata from which all causes originate, which means feedback systems were also created, then that causa prima non causata isn't necessarily God (as you claim), but could be Big bang or any other theory. That he can be prayed to, that he would be good or allmighty, for instance, hasn't been proven if you would have a proof that a causa prima non causata exists.
4. you say that the existence of a given X must be accounted for and not simply assumed, while in fact you assume the existence of a causa prima non causata without any other proof than another set of dubious assumptions
Logic tells us that:
- either there is a causa prima non causata
- or there isn't a causa prima non causata
In the first case, this can be either God, big bang or anything else. It's therefore up to the one who wants to prove the existence of an allmighty, good and wise God to also (apart from showing there at all is a causa prima non causata) show that the causa prima non causata must be an allmighty, good and wise being, before he has proven the existence of the God he claims exists. Until that has been done, God can neither be proved nor disproved.
If there isn't a causa prima non causata, a God as a creator of the universe can't exist, but there could still exist a God that has some of the other properties that Gods are often claimed to have. But until it has been shown that such a God exists without there having to be a causa prima non causata, God can neither be proved nor disproved.
Claudius the God
01-04-2007, 12:10
One can't claim atheism is valid unless they deal with the absurdity of strong atheism. So far this hasn't happened.
the fact that so few people who call themselves Atheists do not hold this idea as 100% truth as a religious person should speak for itself. 100% Atheism is not even relevant to Atheists. It is a hypothetical maximum of just how 'Atheist' an individual can be.
Please tell me Pindar, seeing as though you need this point repeated to you so many times - have you ever met or heard about anyone who claims that "there is no god" is a 100% fact? - apart from anything else a precise definition of what exactly a god is is required for absolute certainty...
I asked you to choose one. Even so, your 1) and 2) seem to be the same argument and something I've already addressed. If you really believe a being can come into existence independent of another causal agent then you have my apple or hedgehog references to deal with. What brings about an apple or a hedgehog? If you assert they arrive ex nihilo (from nothing) we will deal with the consequences of that view. If you posit any other being as causal then my original point stands. The one reference to the Grand Canyon (or rather the rock strata) being formed by running water and collisions of solid matter illustrate my point: both are contingent.
I'm going to let someone else take this one... you are obviously very well educated in philosophy whereas I don't have any philosophy education beyond high-scool. I don't know the terminology nor do I know how such arguments as these should be adequately investigated. LegioXXXUlpiaVictrix and Banquo's Ghost seem to know what they're talking about. I don't think I can contribute much further than I already have on this specific argument.
It's true the whole argument does assume that there is something. Do you disagree? Do you wish to argue that in reality there is nothing? If you agree there is something then (as I mentioned in the last post) we can qualify the being of that thing. If a thing is contingent then its source can be called into question. This points us down the road already explained.
:book:
The universe isn't a being, but a label for the collective amount of stuff 'out there': planets, stars, the Death Star etc.. In short, it is a mental construct. This was previously discussed.
:book:
That's fine. The point remains: theism is not a definition, but an epistemological assertion about a metaphysical absolute. Atheism is the opposite assertion.
I'm not saying that Theism IS a definition. I'm saying that the terms God/Deity need to be precisely defined. look at what you yourself have done, you've taken a theistic concept usually associated with one or another sectarian belief, sliced away at it until all is left is "non-contingent being" with no other defining qualities... it doesn't even specify if it exists physically or not... it's hardly even worth hypothesizing about IMO.
No, atheism is the assertion God(s) does not exist. If you assert atheism is simply the absence of belief then you cannot distinguish between atheism and agnosticism or the mental state of a hedgehog. Atheism is a decided position distinct from agnosticism or the lack metaphysical posturing of rodents. This has been discussed.
Atheism depends on a definition (a theistic definition) of God/Deity - this definition changes so much that Atheism must be able to change just as much. there are different varieties of Atheism just as there are different varieties of Theism.
In the end, Atheism is just a word people use to define not believing in something specific. We don't have such words for not believing in fairies or leprechauns or interplanetary kitchenware.
your use of the word 'Atheism' is far too limited a definition and is only being used in this way to criticize Atheism as a whole with your difficult-to-comprehend non-contingent being argument.
If one were to define the unknown contents of a cedar chest as 'God' and say that all other uses of the word 'God' are incorrect, would you say that this definition is too limited a term to describe God/Deity? - it's basically the same thing.
your non-contingent being is hardly a 'God' at all anyway...
I've made no chronological claims. I have simply explained that atheism is conceptually distinct.
there is no reason to use the term Atheism unless there is a Theism to be contrary to... this shouldn't be difficult to understand. The concepts/subject matter involved in Atheism come from elsewhere... there is no use in having a term for not believing in something if there is no conceptual idea of what you are not believing in...
I don't know what a one sided explanation means: are saying you don't want me to explain what causality or ex nihilo mean?
If I choose to investigate these definitions further, I will look them up myself rather than take your definitions on face value. no offence...
The apple example is not deliberately unhelpful. It is meant to be helpful. Now if you believe there are contingent things that are uncaused give an example.
this is a trick question.
while I'm going to ponder this problem a bit more, can you please explain further why there must be some non-contingent being to somewhere stop an infinite regress? - and why you label this thing 'god' without a second thought? to imply that a specific deity is this hypothetical non-contingent being sounds rather absurd to me...
The Big Bang is not a thing but a posited event. If you want to venture down this path ask the question: what exploded? The existence of whatever thing exploded (made the bang) needs to be explained. If you posit nothing existed and then suddenly there was the big bang then you have indeed embraced an ex nihilo position which is a logical absurdity. Now I will grant there are scientists who will unwittingly adopt just this very posture. They are examples of the paucity of logical thinking that can be found in the sciences ever since natural philosophy became so separated from philosophy proper and basic logic was no longer taught.
:book:
I don't understand the personal pronoun. I have no ownership of God. I have explained that God, as necessary being, acts as the ontic grounding for contingent being.
You have specified a 'god' that is outside the realm of scientific inquiry for your non-contingent being. You have yet to explain why or give any defining characteristics to this being. the question of why it is a non-contingent being as opposed to another contingent being has yet to be answered.
As described in this post and previously described earlier in the thread: atheism as lack of belief fails for its lack of rigor in making distinction between agnosticism and hedgehog mental states.
then 100 % Atheism is unreasonable since such evidence cannot be found, and all types of Theism from weak to strong to 100% Theism are also unreasonable because they are claims with no evidence to support them either. Therefore the only reasonable claims are agnosticism 50% and anything between this and 100% not including 100% itself. This is what the evidence suggests.
therefore my views are unchanged.
any argument or knowledge claim without evidence to support it is an unreasonable argument or knowledge claim.
This is what parasitic means.
whatever, regardless - you should then agree that the definition of Atheism relies of Theism for definition. Unless you can give an example of Atheism without any conceptual idea of what Theism/God/Deity is...
Most certainly an atheist must understand what God the concept means in order to reject it.
finally... therefore some form of Theism must exist before any form of Atheism can...
My original statement was in layman's terms: 'unable to ground moral judgments' is not technical vernacular. I don't see what detail is needed. If something cannot be done, it cannot be done. It is not a complex judgment.
you are assuming that either some form of Theism or perhaps an irrational 100% Atheism is required to make any form of moral judgement. This is incorrect, and is almost insulting.
here is how an agnostic or an 'agnostic swinging towards Atheism' or a 'De Facto Atheist' can approach ethics and moral questions
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secular_ethics
a specific measure of belief or non-belief in Theistic concepts is not a prerequisite for morality...
The above is not irrelevant. You made a charge "contingent being are not always created by other beings" I asked for an example. Regarding what you did post: you continue to use the wrong vocabulary: what I put forward is not hypothetical its theoretical. Logic and philosophy are concerned with the theoretical. That is the domain of this discussion. Evidence refrains are to misunderstand the subject matter. Such is not a scientific affair.
until you elaborate further on the nature of the hypothetical or theoretical non-contingent being and give a sensible explanation as to why it is non-contingent, I don't think I can go much further with this argument. too many loopholes and unknown variables in need of definition or explanation...
Causality is not a purely theological stance. As already explained: causality is part and parcel of science. Science is not a theologically bound discipline.
:book:
I don't think I misunderstood. You asked me to prove a definition. I don't believe my answer is jargon. The language used is quite simple, I think. In any case: God is non-contingent because contingency indicates dependency, what is God cannot be dependent under the standard meaning of the term. The proof for God being prior to and underscoring contingent being is the proof given so many pages ago.
this still doesn't give any reasonable evidence as to why this God (however you define it) is non-contingent. Until there is some evidence for its non-contingent nature, it is nothing but an imagined solution to a gap that I at least don't know how to fill... I would ask someone else...
Because nothing else has been proffered that fits the criteria.
the definition of 'God' changes so much and there is no evidence of such a thing existing, which makes such a thing pure speculation. until evidence is provided that this thing is non-contingent, it can't fit the criteria.
No, the reason to suggest this is because science cannot broach the question as it is confined by the parameters that make science what it is.
You have suggested that something exists or once existed and that just about everything originates from this one thing. It has to be in the realm of scientific investigation. You're just arguing that science should stay away from such questions because the answer may be different from what you assume.
You do not understand the logic of science.
I'm a Historian, not an astrophysicist, but that is beside the point. You have made a case that there is or was some non-contingent being, you have placed immense importance on it, and now you're suggesting that Scientific inquiry should avoid investigating what it is or was.
It is not. Agnostics are not atheists. Hedgehogs are not atheists. Rocks are not atheists.
The Consise Macquarie Dictionary (from the bookshelf right next to me):
Atheism:
1. the doctrine that there is no god.
OR
2. disbelief in the existence of a god (or gods)
Therefore, an Agnostic person can be an Atheist if he does not believe in one or more gods (especially when considering different gods specifically)
Hedgehogs I doubt would have a conceptual framework for what a god is - though if you were able to find one smart enough to understand, chances are it may not believe in such an absurd concept, especially without any evidence.
Rocks as far as I know have no sentience and would be neither Agnostic, not Atheist, nor Theist. Rocks are irrelevant in this matter.
The proof does not deny any other qualities of/for God. It focuses on one sufficient quality: necessary being.
and besides philosophical speculation and argument, one cannot even provide evidence that it is a necessary being and not contingent like everything else...
What you believe is not my concern. The post quoted above turns on a category mistake which indicates a basic failure to understand the issue.
your argument for 'god' still isn't good enough...
Banquo's Ghost
01-04-2007, 12:18
This is a much more interesting reply than what I've been dealing with thus far. Of course, the response would include the following: the notion God does not require any attending worship. Second, being is indeed the focus, the rub is contingent and necessary being. Necessary being is considered synonymous with God as no other being has thus far qualified as necessary. The Laws of Physics (like the previously mentioned universe in the thread) are mental constructs: they do not have being status.
Hi Pindar,
Well, it wasn't interesting enough to be dealt with seriously.
Language is important in any logical discussion. The definition I gave for a god is that of the Oxford English dictionary. Whereas the requirement of worship is part of that definition, it is not germane to this discussion, so I'll let it go. The consciousness and will of that god is, however. You sidestepped the issue of consciousness.
If you have a different definition of god, where the necessary being is not necessarily conscious - as it appears you are arguing, I should be glad to see it, for then we can discuss using agreed terms.
The second part of your rebuttal indicates a biased frame of reference. The laws of physics are mental constructs that explain observable phenomena. Surely however, god is a mental construct that is used in the same way? Of course the laws of physics have status - or are you arguing that "being" requires a consciousness? If you are, your proof fails as support for god (conscious, supernatural) because it applies equally to the laws of physics (without consciousness, natural) as one can demonstrate by changing the word being for something less emotive.
One can't claim atheism is valid unless they deal with the absurdity of strong atheism. So far this hasn't happened.
No, you simply haven't accepted the arguments. Again, the OED definition of theism is the belief in one or more gods. Atheism is defined as the rejection of belief in god or gods. The rock is not an atheist because it has no consciousness to reject the premise. Your contention is such rejection is logically absurd based on the proof you offer.
Your proof addresses necessary being. I am arguing that necessary being can be without conscious will (normally associated with the noumenon "god") which allows your proof, but with no impact on the existence or otherwise of god. I contend therefore that strong atheism is valid, because it rejects a conscious necessary being in favour of a non-conscious one.
If you are using different terms, as it appears you may be from this response to Claudius:
The proof does not deny any other qualities of/for God. It focuses on one sufficient quality: necessary being.
where it seems that you are content with god meaning anything that simply exists as a necessary being (which would include the singularity of Big Bang Theory, for example, since you argue incorrectly there are no other contenders for the role of necessary being) - then I would appreciate you defining them so the rest of us can discuss your ideas on common ground.
Banquo's Ghost
01-04-2007, 12:27
Hi Claudius,
This response of yours made me smile:
I'm not saying that Theism IS a definition. I'm saying that the terms God/Deity need to be precisely defined. look at what you yourself have done, you've taken a theistic concept usually associated with one or another sectarian belief, sliced away at it until all is left is "non-contingent being" with no other defining qualities... it doesn't even specify if it exists physically or not... it's hardly even worth hypothesizing about IMO.
Pindar has an exceptional mind and has indeed got us arguing about the number of angels that might dance upon a pin. He's a lawyer, you know. :wink:
Definitions are important here, otherwise we are wasting our time, and you hit the nail (or pin :beam:) squarely on the head.
Let's see if we make progress.
Reenk Roink
01-04-2007, 22:18
Sorry for stepping in here again, but I've been following this thread and want to raise a few points:
Claudius: I can't help but notice that some of the content of your posts (namely the seven degrees of religious belief) are derived from or influenced by Dawkins' The God Delusion.
I generally feel that Dawkins' arguments leave something to be desired, in both persuasiveness and tact. I only got through Chapter 2 of his book (reading is usually bad and I had other things to do), but I got a basic gist of what he was going on about.
I would like to take the opportunity to post a review of Dawkins' book by Professor Thomas Nagel, a contemporary philosopher. I think he brings up some excellent points:
The Fear of Religion
Richard Dawkins, the most prominent and accomplished scientific writer of our time, is convinced that religion is the enemy of science. Not just fundamentalist or fanatical or extremist religion, but all religion that admits faith as a ground of belief and asserts the existence of God. In his new book, he attacks religion with all the weapons at his disposal, and as a result the book is a very uneven collection of scriptural ridicule, amateur philosophy, historical and contemporary horror stories, anthropological speculations, and cosmological scientific argument. Dawkins wants both to dissuade believers and to embolden atheists.
Since Dawkins is operating mostly outside the range of his scientific expertise, it is not surprising that The God Delusion lacks the superb instructive lucidity of his books on evolutionary theory, such as The Selfish Gene, The Blind Watchmaker, and Climbing Mount Improbable. In this new book I found that kind of pleasure only in the brief explanation of why the moth flies into the candle flame--an example introduced to illustrate how a useful trait can have disastrous side effects. (Dawkins believes the prevalence of religion among human beings is a side effect of the useful trust of childhood.)
One of Dawkins's aims is to overturn the convention of respect toward religion that belongs to the etiquette of modern civilization. He does this by persistently violating the convention, and being as offensive as possible, and pointing with gleeful outrage at absurd or destructive religious beliefs and practices. This kind of thing was done more entertainingly by H.L. Mencken (whom Dawkins quotes with admiration), but the taboo against open atheistic scorn seems to have become even more powerful since Mencken's day. Dawkins's unmitigated hostility and quotable insults--"The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction"--will certainly serve to attract attention, but they are not what make the book interesting.
The important message is a theoretical one, about the reach of a certain kind of scientific explanation. At the core of the book, in a chapter titled "Why There Almost Certainly Is No God," Dawkins sets out with care his position on a question of which the importance cannot be exaggerated: the question of what explains the existence and character of the astounding natural order we can observe in the universe we inhabit. On one side is what he calls "the God Hypothesis," namely that "there exists a superhuman, supernatural intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, including us." On the other side is Dawkins's alternative view: "any creative intelligence, of sufficient complexity to design anything, comes into existence only as the end product of an extended process of gradual evolution. Creative intelligences, being evolved, necessarily arrive late in the universe, and therefore cannot be responsible for designing it." In Dawkins's view, the ultimate explanation of everything, including evolution, may be found in the laws of physics, which explain the laws of chemistry, which explain the existence and the functioning of the self-replicating molecules that underlie the biological process of genetic mutation and natural selection.
This pair of stark alternatives may not exhaust the possibilities, but it poses the fundamental question clearly. In this central argument of Dawkins's book, the topic is not institutional religion or revealed religion, based on scripture, miracles, or the personal experience of God's presence. It is what used to be called "natural religion," or reflection on the question of the existence and nature of God using only the resources of ordinary human reasoning. This is not the source of most religious belief, but it is important nonetheless.
In a previous chapter, Dawkins dismisses, with contemptuous flippancy the traditional a priori arguments for the existence of God offered by Aquinas and Anselm. I found these attempts at philosophy, along with those in a later chapter on religion and ethics, particularly weak; Dawkins seems to have felt obliged to include them for the sake of completeness. But his real concern is with the argument from design, because there the conflict between religious belief and atheism takes the form of a scientific disagreement--a disagreement over the most plausible explanation of the observable evidence. He argues that contemporary science gives us decisive reason to reject the argument from design, and to regard the existence of God as overwhelmingly improbable.
The argument from design is deceptively simple. If we found a watch lying on a deserted heath (William Paley's famous example from the eighteenth century), we would conclude that such an intricate mechanism, whose parts fit together to carry out a specific function, did not come into existence by chance, but that it was created by a designer with that function in mind. Similarly, if we observe any living organism, or one of its parts, such as the eye or the wing or the red blood cell, we have reason to conclude that its much greater physical complexity, precisely suited to carry out specific functions, could not have come into existence by chance, but must have been created by a designer.
The two inferences seem analogous, but they are very different. First, we know how watches are manufactured, and we can go to a watch factory and see it done. But the inference to creation by God is an inference to something that we have not observed and presumably never could observe. Second, the designer and the manufacturer of a watch are human beings with bodies, using physical tools to mold and put together its parts. The supernatural being whose work is inferred by the argument from design for the existence of God is not supposed to be a physical organism inside the world, but someone who creates or acts on the natural world while not being a part of it.
The first difference is not an objection to the argument. Scientific inference to the best explanation of what we can observe often leads to the discovery of things that are themselves unobservable by perception and detectable only by their effects. In this sense, God might be no more and no less observable than an electron or the Big Bang. But the second difference is more troubling, since it is not clear that we can understand the idea of purposive causation--of design--by a non-physical being on analogy with our understanding of purposive causation by a physical being such as a watchmaker. Somehow the observation of the remarkable structure and function of organisms is supposed to lead us to infer as their cause a disembodied intentional agency of a kind totally unlike any that we have ever seen in operation.
Still, even this difference need not be fatal to the theistic argument, since science often concludes that what we observe is to be explained by causes that are not only unobservable, but totally different from anything that has ever been observed, and very difficult to grasp intuitively. To be sure, the hypothesis of a divine creator is not yet a scientific theory with testable consequences independent of the observations on which it is based. And the purposes of such a creator remain obscure, given what we know about the world. But a defender of the argument from design could say that the evidence supports an intentional cause, and that it is hardly surprising that God, the bodiless designer, while to some extent describable theoretically and detectable by his effects, is resistant to full intuitive understanding.
Dawkins's reply to the argument has two parts, one positive and one negative. The positive part consists in describing a third alternative, different from both chance and design, as the explanation of biological complexity. He agrees that the eye, for example, could not have come into existence by chance, but the theory of evolution by natural selection is capable of explaining its existence as due neither to chance nor to design. The negative part of the argument asserts that the hypothesis of design by God is useless as an alternative to the hypothesis of chance, because it just pushes the problem back one step. In other words: who made God? "A designer God cannot be used to explain organized complexity because any God capable of designing anything would have to be complex enough to demand the same kind of explanation in his own right."
Let me first say something about this negative argument. It depends, I believe, on a misunderstanding of the conclusion of the argument from design, in its traditional sense as an argument for the existence of God. If the argument is supposed to show that a supremely adept and intelligent natural being, with a super-body and a super-brain, is responsible for the design and the creation of life on earth, then of course this "explanation" is no advance on the phenomenon to be explained: if the existence of plants, animals, and people requires explanation, then the existence of such a super-being would require explanation for exactly the same reason. But if we consider what that reason is, we will see that it does not apply to the God hypothesis.
The reason that we are led to the hypothesis of a designer by considering both the watch and the eye is that these are complex physical structures that carry out a complex function, and we cannot see how they could have come into existence out of unorganized matter purely on the basis of the purposeless laws of physics. For the elements of which they are composed to have come together in just this finely tuned way purely as a result of physical and chemical laws would have been such an improbable fluke that we can regard it in effect as impossible: the hypothesis of chance can be ruled out. But God, whatever he may be, is not a complex physical inhabitant of the natural world. The explanation of his existence as a chance concatenation of atoms is not a possibility for which we must find an alternative, because that is not what anybody means by God. If the God hypothesis makes sense at all, it offers a different kind of explanation from those of physical science: purpose or intention of a mind without a body, capable nevertheless of creating and forming the entire physical world. The point of the hypothesis is to claim that not all explanation is physical, and that there is a mental, purposive, or intentional explanation more fundamental than the basic laws of physics, because it explains even them.
All explanations come to an end somewhere. The real opposition between Dawkins's physicalist naturalism and the God hypothesis is a disagreement over whether this end point is physical, extensional, and purposeless, or mental, intentional, and purposive. On either view, the ultimate explanation is not itself explained. The God hypothesis does not explain the existence of God, and naturalistic physicalism does not explain the laws of physics.
This entire dialectic leaves out another possibility, namely that there are teleological principles in nature that are explained neither by intentional design nor by purposeless physical causation--principles that therefore provide an independent end point of explanation for the existence and form of living things. That, more or less, is the Aristotelian view that was displaced by the scientific revolution. Law-governed causation by antecedent conditions became the only acceptable form of scientific explanation, and natural tendencies toward certain ends were discredited. The question then became whether non-teleological physical law can explain everything, including the biological order.
Darwin's theory of natural selection offered a way of accounting for the exquisite functional organization of organisms through physical causation, an explanation that revealed it to be the product neither of design nor of hopelessly improbable chance. This is the positive part of Dawkins's argument. The physical improbability of such complexity's arising can be radically reduced if it is seen as the result of an enormous number of very small developmental steps, in each of which chance plays a part, together with a selective force that favors the survival of some of those forms over others. This is accomplished by the theory of heritable variation, due to repeated small mutations in the genetic material, together with natural selection, due to the differential adaptation of these biological variations to the environments in which they emerge. The result is the appearance of design without design, purely on the basis of a combination of physical causes operating over billions of years.
To be sure, this is only the schema for an explanation. Most of the details of the story can never be recovered, and there are many issues among evolutionary biologists over how the process works. There are also skeptics about whether such a process is capable, even over billions of years, of generating the complexity of life as it is. But I will leave those topics aside, because the biggest question about this alternative to design takes us outside the theory of evolution.
It is a question that Dawkins recognizes and tries to address, and it is directly analogous to his question for the God hypothesis: who made God? The problem is this. The theory of evolution through heritable variation and natural selection reduces the improbability of organizational complexity by breaking the process down into a very long series of small steps, each of which is not all that improbable. But each of the steps involves a mutation in a carrier of genetic information--an enormously complex molecule capable both of self-replication and of generating out of surrounding matter a functioning organism that can house it. The molecule is moreover capable sometimes of surviving a slight mutation in its structure to generate a slightly different organism that can also survive. Without such a replicating system there could not be heritable variation, and without heritable variation there could not be natural selection favoring those organisms, and their underlying genes, that are best adapted to the environment.
The entire apparatus of evolutionary explanation therefore depends on the prior existence of genetic material with these remarkable properties. Since 1953 we have known what that material is, and scientists are continually learning more about how DNA does what it does. But since the existence of this material or something like it is a precondition of the possibility of evolution, evolutionary theory cannot explain its existence. We are therefore faced with a problem analogous to that which Dawkins thinks faces the argument from design: we have explained the complexity of organic life in terms of something that is itself just as functionally complex as what we originally set out to explain. So the problem is just pushed back one step: how did such a thing come into existence?
Of course there is a huge difference between this explanation and the God hypothesis. We can observe DNA and see how it works. But the problem that originally prompted the argument from design--the overwhelming improbability of such a thing coming into existence by chance, simply through the purposeless laws of physics--remains just as real for this case. Yet this time we cannot replace chance with natural selection.
Dawkins recognizes the problem, but his response to it is pure hand-waving. First, he says it only had to happen once. Next, he says that there are, at a conservative estimate, a billion billion planets in the universe with life-friendly physical and chemical environments like ours. So all we have to suppose is that the probability of something like DNA forming under such conditions, given the laws of physics, is not much less than one in a billion billion. And he points out, invoking the so-called anthropic principle, that even if it happened on only one planet, it is no accident that we are able to observe it, since the appearance of life is a condition of our existence.
Dawkins is not a chemist or a physicist. Neither am I, but general expositions of research on the origin of life indicate that no one has a theory that would support anything remotely near such a high probability as one in a billion billion. Naturally there is speculation about possible non-biological chemical precursors of DNA or RNA. But at this point the origin of life remains, in light of what is known about the huge size, the extreme specificity, and the exquisite functional precision of the genetic material, a mystery--an event that could not have occurred by chance and to which no significant probability can be assigned on the basis of what we know of the laws of physics and chemistry.
Yet we know that it happened. That is why the argument from design is still alive, and why scientists who find the conclusion of that argument unacceptable feel there must be a purely physical explanation of why the origin of life is not as physically improbable as it seems. Dawkins invokes the possibility that there are vastly many universes besides this one, thus giving chance many more opportunities to create life; but this is just a desperate device to avoid the demand for a real explanation.
I agree with Dawkins that the issue of design versus purely physical causation is a scientific question. He is correct to dismiss Stephen Jay Gould's position that science and religion are "non-overlapping magisteria." The conflict is real. But although I am as much of an outsider to religion as he is, I believe it is much more difficult to settle the question than he thinks. I also suspect there are other possibilities besides these two that have not even been thought of yet. The fear of religion leads too many scientifically minded atheists to cling to a defensive, world-flattening reductionism. Dawkins, like many of his contemporaries, is hobbled by the assumption that the only alternative to religion is to insist that the ultimate explanation of everything must lie in particle physics, string theory, or whatever purely extensional laws govern the elements of which the material world is composed.
This reductionist dream is nourished by the extraordinary success of the physical sciences in our time, not least in their recent application to the understanding of life through molecular biology. It is natural to try to take any successful intellectual method as far as it will go. Yet the impulse to find an explanation of everything in physics has over the last fifty years gotten out of control. The concepts of physical science provide a very special, and partial, description of the world that experience reveals to us. It is the world with all subjective consciousness, sensory appearances, thought, value, purpose, and will left out. What remains is the mathematically describable order of things and events in space and time.
That conceptual purification launched the extraordinary development of physics and chemistry that has taken place since the seventeenth century. But reductive physicalism turns this description into an exclusive ontology. The reductionist project usually tries to reclaim some of the originally excluded aspects of the world, by analyzing them in physical--that is, behavioral or neurophysiological--terms; but it denies reality to what cannot be so reduced. I believe the project is doomed--that conscious experience, thought, value, and so forth are not illusions, even though they cannot be identified with physical facts.
I also think that there is no reason to undertake the project in the first place. We have more than one form of understanding. Different forms of understanding are needed for different kinds of subject matter. The great achievements of physical science do not make it capable of encompassing everything, from mathematics to ethics to the experiences of a living animal. We have no reason to dismiss moral reasoning, introspection, or conceptual analysis as ways of discovering the truth just because they are not physics.
Any anti-reductionist view leaves us with very serious problems about how the mutually irreducible types of truths about the world are related. At least part of the truth about us is that we are physical organisms composed of ordinary chemical elements. If thinking, feeling, and valuing aren't merely complicated physical states of the organism, what are they? What is their relation to the brain processes on which they seem to depend? More: if evolution is a purely physical causal process, how can it have brought into existence conscious beings?
A religious worldview is only one response to the conviction that the physical description of the world is incomplete. Dawkins says with some justice that the will of God provides a too easy explanation of anything we cannot otherwise understand, and therefore brings inquiry to a stop. Religion need not have this effect, but it can. It would be more reasonable, in my estimation, to admit that we do not now have the understanding or the knowledge on which to base a comprehensive theory of reality.
Dawkins seems to believe that if people could be persuaded to give up the God Hypothesis on scientific grounds, the world would be a better place--not just intellectually, but also morally and politically. He is horrified--as who cannot be?--by the dreadful things that continue to be done in the name of religion, and he argues that the sort of religious conviction that includes a built-in resistance to reason is the true motive behind many of them. But there is no connection between the fascinating philosophical and scientific questions posed by the argument from design and the attacks of September 11. Blind faith and the authority of dogma are dangerous; the view that we can make ultimate sense of the world only by understanding it as the expression of mind or purpose is not. It is unreasonable to think that one must refute the second in order to resist the first.
There is also one other question I would like to ask you (and others):
I assume (correct me if I am wrong) the the reason you do not to believe in God is because the arguments for His existence are weak/flawed.
If this is true, would you also not believe in free will/moral responsibility given that the arguments for them are also weak?
And
Should our beliefs be based on reason?
Kanamori
01-04-2007, 23:10
There is also one other question I would like to ask you (and others):
I assume (correct me if I am wrong) the the reason you do not to believe in God is because the arguments for His existence are weak/flawed.
If this is true, would you also not believe in free will/moral responsibility given that the arguments for them are also weak?
And
Should our beliefs be based on reason?
I know that I do not know about God's existence, nothing else has to be said. Beleiving either way despite that observation is silly. I have made the only relevant observation that I can make; crossing into the realm of unreasoned belief serves no purpose besides the religious, and I have already exlpained why I rejected that.
So, if you want to know that your beliefs actually mean anything, yes, they should be based on reason. If you don't, there's really no reason to carry on the first second you are in pain or discomfort. Of course, one can carry on any way, but not trying to have reasoned thoughts would probably result in being hit by a bus sometime in the city after you've decided you don't need or want reasons and predictions. ..
Not only does the being in proof not necessarily have any sort of deity-like qualities, but there is nothing in it that says there must not be more than one necessary being. I feel no need to argue something when things already established will simply be ignored a few posts down in some other argument; I only enjoy discussion for the benefits it may bring as far as realisations are concerned, not for making someone admit something that they already know.
Reenk Roink
01-05-2007, 00:56
I know that I do not know about God's existence, nothing else has to be said. Beleiving either way despite that observation is silly. I have made the only relevant observation that I can make; crossing into the realm of unreasoned belief serves no purpose besides the religious, and I have already exlpained why I rejected that.
So, if you want to know that your beliefs actually mean anything, yes, they should be based on reason. If you don't, there's really no reason to carry on the first second you are in pain or discomfort. Of course, one can carry on any way, but not trying to have reasoned thoughts would probably result in being hit by a bus sometime in the city after you've decided you don't need or want reasons and predictions. ..
OK, thanks first of all for answering the question. :smiley:
Now, we have this statement of yours: "yes, [beliefs] should be based on reason"
Now, I would like to point out that this statement is itself a belief. A meta-belief perhaps, but a meta-belief is a belief.
How would one justify this belief?
Using reason to justify the belief is circular.
I do not know of any external "thing" one could use to justify it.
Saying "reason is reasonable" is a meaningless tautology.
We must therefore, irrationally accept and presuppose reason in order to employ it.
Doesn't that defeat the purpose?
Not only does the being in proof not necessarily have any sort of deity-like qualities, but there is nothing in it that says there must not be more than one necessary being. I feel no need to argue something when things already established will simply be ignored a few posts down in some other argument; I only enjoy discussion for the benefits it may bring as far as realisations are concerned, not for making someone admit something that they already know.
Um... Is this directed at me?
To think one can forcefully change another beliefs through arguing points is silly, that goes both ways.
Hi Beren,
I agree. Forceful change through argument itself is an odd notion. I think for most people Hume's idea applies: "Reason is... only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office..." thus people emotionally invest in a position and seek out reasons to justify that investment. The emotional commitment trumps any contrary argument. Alas.
In addition to the above, one could note that the persuasive aspect of rhetoric does not necessarily need to focus on changing the stance of the interlocutor. Rather, the interlocutor is simply a tool to illustrate a position to a larger audience. The adversarial court system of the U.S. illustrates the point: one plays to the jury or judge, not to the one cross examined.
Finally, argument need not be focused on persuasion at all. One may engage a position simply to observe reaction(s).
Well, can you show your "proof" or not?
Given you have already attempted to engage the proof on several points I can only assume you are being factitious.
You do not understand. Feedback systems do not posit spontaneous generation or ex nihilo creation. The existence of a given X must be accounted for not simply assumed.
You make four fallacies:
1. assume that things can't have existed forever, i.e. that they must have been created at some point, without supporting that statement at all
Actually the stance is that contingent beings are caused and thus have a beginning. The same doesn't apply to necessary being. If you have an example of an uncaused contingent being present it.
2. assume that an infinite number of causes is impossible
Regarding contingent beings, an infinite causality is an absurdity as it begs the question. This was explained previously.
3. assume that even IF hypothetically there was a causa prima non causata from which all causes originate, which means feedback systems were also created, then that causa prima non causata isn't necessarily God (as you claim), but could be Big bang or any other theory. That he can be prayed to, that he would be good or allmighty, for instance, hasn't been proven if you would have a proof that a causa prima non causata exists.
The above doesn't sound like an assumption I've made. It sounds more like an attempted rejoinder. Regardless, as things relate to necessary being: the Big Bang is an event not a being. This is one rather obvious disqualifier. A second is the Big Bang by definition has a beginning. It therefore cannot be a necessary being.
4. you say that the existence of a given X must be accounted for and not simply assumed, while in fact you assume the existence of a causa prima non causata without any other proof than another set of dubious assumptions
That a necessary being exists is the conclusion of the proof. It is therefore not an assumption.
the fact that so few people who call themselves Atheists do not hold this idea as 100% truth as a religious person should speak for itself. 100% Atheism is not even relevant to Atheists. It is a hypothetical maximum of just how 'Atheist' an individual can be.
Please tell me Pindar, seeing as though you need this point repeated to you so many times - have you ever met or heard about anyone who claims that "there is no god" is a 100% fact?
I've met vast numbers of self described atheists who claim point blank 'there is no God'. A person who makes no claim 'God does not exist' is not an atheist, they are something else i.e. an agnostic.
I'm going to let someone else take this one... you are obviously very well educated in philosophy whereas I don't have any philosophy education beyond high-scool. I don't know the terminology nor do I know how such arguments as these should be adequately investigated. LegioXXXUlpiaVictrix and Banquo's Ghost seem to know what they're talking about. I don't think I can contribute much further than I already have on this specific argument.
OK.
That's fine. The point remains: theism is not a definition, but an epistemological assertion about a metaphysical absolute. Atheism is the opposite assertion.
I'm not saying that Theism IS a definition. I'm saying that the terms God/Deity need to be precisely defined. look at what you yourself have done, you've taken a theistic concept usually associated with one or another sectarian belief, sliced away at it until all is left is "non-contingent being" with no other defining qualities... it doesn't even specify if it exists physically or not... it's hardly even worth hypothesizing about IMO.
Obviously one should know what they accept or reject.
The notion God is not exclusive to the religious arena.
I have not sliced away anything about God. I simply have focused on one traditional aspect of God. My stance has not been exclusionary, simply focused.
No, atheism is the assertion God(s) does not exist. If you assert atheism is simply the absence of belief then you cannot distinguish between atheism and agnosticism or the mental state of a hedgehog. Atheism is a decided position distinct from agnosticism or the lack metaphysical posturing of rodents. This has been discussed.
Atheism depends on a definition (a theistic definition) of God/Deity - this definition changes so much that Atheism must be able to change just as much. there are different varieties of Atheism just as there are different varieties of Theism.
I'm not sure what you are trying to say. Atheism is conceptually distinct. An atheist does not have to know theists, theistic notions etc., to be an atheist. She simply has to have a base notion of the concept she is rejecting. The base meaning of God (within the larger Western Intellectual Tradition) has been quite consistent on a base set of properties for millennia.
your use of the word 'Atheism' is far too limited a definition and is only being used in this way to criticize Atheism as a whole with your difficult-to-comprehend non-contingent being argument.
The explanation I've given of strong and weak forms of atheism are standard for the subject matter. The notions/distinctions do not arise with me.
The idea of contingency and necessity are close to 2500 years old. They are not new ideas.
If one were to define the unknown contents of a cedar chest as 'God' and say that all other uses of the word 'God' are incorrect, would you say that this definition is too limited a term to describe God/Deity? - it's basically the same thing.
your non-contingent being is hardly a 'God' at all anyway...
Insofar as I have discussed God I have looked at one standard aspect of the notion: God's necessity. The idea God is ontically self-sustaining and cannot not be is not novel. In philosophical discourse there are no examples I can think of where God does not have this essential property.
there is no reason to use the term Atheism unless there is a Theism to be contrary to...
Why? An atheist cannot be an atheist unless she has a theist to be contrary to? This doesn't follow.
If I choose to investigate these definitions further, I will look them up myself rather than take your definitions on face value. no offence...
I see.
The apple example is not deliberately unhelpful. It is meant to be helpful. Now if you believe there are contingent things that are uncaused give an example.
this is a trick question.
No, it isn't. An apple is an example of a common object that demonstrates contingent being. A contingent being has a cause. This is the case for stuff all around. Looking for the origin of this stuff is what ultimately points to a necessary being as the source.
while I'm going to ponder this problem a bit more, can you please explain further why there must be some non-contingent being to somewhere stop an infinite regress? - and why you label this thing 'god' without a second thought? to imply that a specific deity is this hypothetical non-contingent being sounds rather absurd to me...
OK. The point is a logical one tied to contingency and necessity. The issue with an infinite regress means that for a contingent object/being (like our apple above) it lacks logical necessity (there is nothing logically that requires its existence) yet it exists. The fact it exists means there is a cause for that existence (say an apple tree). If the cause is similarly contingent (the apple tree) then we have the same issue of no logical necessity to exist, yet it ( the cause: the apple tree) does exist. As this standard is traced backwards say using this schema: X, X-1, X-2, X-3, etc. The is no point at which a rational explanation of origin can be given as each stop along the line already posits the very thing in question (contingent being): a thing that does not need to be, but is. Thus, a purely contingent regress begs the question as it invariably assumes the very thing under question. This circularity is the logical absurdity.
You have specified a 'god' that is outside the realm of scientific inquiry for your non-contingent being. You have yet to explain why or give any defining characteristics to this being. the question of why it is a non-contingent being as opposed to another contingent being has yet to be answered.
It is not my non-contingent being. I have given a defining characteristic: necessary being. Other Divine characteristics are superfluous to my present focus. I have explained several times why a being warranting the title God cannot be contingent.
then 100 % Atheism is unreasonable since such evidence cannot be found, and all types of Theism from weak to strong to 100% Theism are also unreasonable because they are claims with no evidence to support them either.
It isn't a question of evidence, but logic. Strong atheism on its face is an absurdity. Weak atheism says nothing about the wider world so it does not matter as a truth claim. Recall, weak atheism is any stance where the belief of the subject is given priority.
whatever, regardless - you should then agree that the definition of Atheism relies of Theism for definition. Unless you can give an example of Atheism without any conceptual idea of what Theism/God/Deity is...
Atheism does not rely on any theism. Theism is the assertion there is a God. Atheism does not require this assertion, or an asserter, to reject the idea of God.
My original statement was in layman's terms: 'unable to ground moral judgments' is not technical vernacular. I don't see what detail is needed. If something cannot be done, it cannot be done. It is not a complex judgment.
you are assuming that either some form of Theism or perhaps an irrational 100% Atheism is required to make any form of moral judgement. This is incorrect, and is almost insulting.
No, I said nothing about inability to form moral judgments. I said one failing of de facto atheism is it cannot ground moral judgments. This is a theoretical stance, not a practical one.
until you elaborate further on the nature of the hypothetical or theoretical non-contingent being and give a sensible explanation as to why it is non-contingent, I don't think I can go much further with this argument. too many loopholes and unknown variables in need of definition or explanation...
The above doesn't relate to your charge: "contingent being(s) are not always created by other beings" and my request for an example. In any case, non-contingent being or necessary being doesn't have any loopholes or variables. The concept is understood by its definition: something that cannot, not be. It is that simple.
I don't think I misunderstood. You asked me to prove a definition. I don't believe my answer is jargon. The language used is quite simple, I think. In any case: God is non-contingent because contingency indicates dependency, what is God cannot be dependent under the standard meaning of the term. The proof for God being prior to and underscoring contingent being is the proof given so many pages ago.
this still doesn't give any reasonable evidence as to why this God (however you define it) is non-contingent. Until there is some evidence for its non-contingent nature, it is nothing but an imagined solution to a gap that I at least don't know how to fill... I would ask someone else...
Evidence does not apply. This has been explained. The issue is theoretical, conceptual. Logic, philosophy theology etc. are theoretical enterprises. God is non-contingent by definition.
the definition of 'God' changes so much and there is no evidence of such a thing existing, which makes such a thing pure speculation. until evidence is provided that this thing is non-contingent, it can't fit the criteria.
There are no systems within the context of the Western Intellectual Tradition that posit a non-necessary being as God. The view is quite consistent.
You have suggested that something exists or once existed and that just about everything originates from this one thing. It has to be in the realm of scientific investigation. You're just arguing that science should stay away from such questions because the answer may be different from what you assume.
No, I said what I said because I understand the logic of science: what it can and cannot do.
I'm a Historian, not an astrophysicist, but that is beside the point. You have made a case that there is or was some non-contingent being, you have placed immense importance on it, and now you're suggesting that Scientific inquiry should avoid investigating what it is or was.
No, I'm not saying science should avoid anything. I'm saying science cannot address a topic that is beyond its purview. I'll give you another example: science cannot address the nature of the number 4. The number 4 is a concept. Science is confined to the physical/temporal arena.
Atheism is an absense of belief in deities, not a belief that deities do not exist.
It is not. Agnostics are not atheists. Hedgehogs are not atheists. Rocks are not atheists.
The Consise Macquarie Dictionary (from the bookshelf right next to me):
Atheism:
1. the doctrine that there is no god.
OR
2. disbelief in the existence of a god (or gods)
Therefore, an Agnostic person can be an Atheist if he does not believe in one or more gods (especially when considering different gods specifically)
Hedgehogs I doubt would have a conceptual framework for what a god is - though if you were able to find one smart enough to understand, chances are it may not believe in such an absurd concept, especially without any evidence.
Rocks as far as I know have no sentience and would be neither Agnostic, not Atheist, nor Theist. Rocks are irrelevant in this matter.
One should never use a dictionary when discussing concepts. Even so, your dictionary does not support the idea atheism is the absence of belief in God, were that the case then agnostics, hedgehogs and rocks would all be atheists. Atheism is the rejection there is a God. It is a decided cognitive stance. Agnostics do not make this claim. Hedgehogs and rocks are unable to perform this act.
and besides philosophical speculation and argument, one cannot even provide evidence that it is a necessary being and not contingent like everything else...
The question of God is a philosophical question not a scientific question.
your argument for 'god' still isn't good enough...
It would seem to be, given none have shown an invalidity and some professed atheists have admitted its validity/robustness.
That was long.
Hi Pindar,
Well, it wasn't interesting enough to be dealt with seriously.
Language is important in any logical discussion. The definition I gave for a god is that of the Oxford English dictionary. Whereas the requirement of worship is part of that definition, it is not germane to this discussion, so I'll let it go. The consciousness and will of that god is, however. You sidestepped the issue of consciousness.
If you have a different definition of god, where the necessary being is not necessarily conscious - as it appears you are arguing, I should be glad to see it, for then we can discuss using agreed terms.
Howdy BG,
The definition was poor. There is nothing about the concept God that requires worship. Worship is an issue of prudence distinct from the notion proper. Even so...
I am making a sufficiency argument. This means I am arguing necessary being is itself adequate for the label God. I have not addressed any other standard attribute of God as they do not relate to my focus. This would include any will, moral excellence, maximal knowledge etc.
The second part of your rebuttal indicates a biased frame of reference. The laws of physics are mental constructs that explain observable phenomena. Surely however, god is a mental construct that is used in the same way? Of course the laws of physics have status - or are you arguing that "being" requires a consciousness? If you are, your proof fails as support for god (conscious, supernatural) because it applies equally to the laws of physics (without consciousness, natural) as one can demonstrate by changing the word being for something less emotive.
Being status requires ontic distinctiveness. Mental constructs lack this property.
One can't claim atheism is valid unless they deal with the absurdity of strong atheism. So far this hasn't happened.
No, you simply haven't accepted the arguments.
What argument are you thinking of? I don't recall any argument that rebuts my claim strong atheism is a logical absurdity as it is a universal claim about a negative particular.
Again, the OED definition of theism is the belief in one or more gods. Atheism is defined as the rejection of belief in god or gods.
I agree. This has been my stance.
The rock is not an atheist because it has no consciousness to reject the premise. Your contention is such rejection is logically absurd based on the proof you offer.
No, I used agnostics, hedgehogs and rocks to demonstrate defining atheism as a simple absence of belief in God was inadequate as it lacks rigor.
where it seems that you are content with god meaning anything that simply exists as a necessary being (which would include the singularity of Big Bang Theory, for example, since you argue incorrectly there are no other contenders for the role of necessary being) - then I would appreciate you defining them so the rest of us can discuss your ideas on common ground.
Do you want to argue singularities have necessary being by which we mean they have ontic distinctiveness? If so, which one, there are several proffered? What quality of a singularity makes it necessary?
Banquo's Ghost
01-05-2007, 22:30
Ah well, and I thought we might be getting somewhere. Clearly consciousness is not something you want to discuss, and I can only conclude your god could be anything at all that qualifies by your own personal definition. This is, at least, consistent with all religious thought I have encountered.
Thank you Pindar, for a fascinating, if ultimately pointless discussion. I liked the proof and your defence of it - certainly a challenging area for further reflection.
:bow:
Sasaki Kojiro
01-05-2007, 23:49
Gentlemen, I believe that you have made the mistake of engaging Pindar on ground of his own choosing. Rather cleverly, he is distracting you with his tight focus.
I tried, but he kept saying something about mental rigor or hedgehogs :embarassed:
Kanamori
01-06-2007, 00:41
I think for most people Hume's idea applies: "Reason is... only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office..." thus people emotionally invest in a position and seek out reasons to justify that investment. The emotional commitment trumps any contrary argument. Alas.
You've snared me again. The only emotional investment I make when engaging my reasoning is to get to the bottom of something, cut out the fat, describe exactly what is happening, turn it into a big picture, and see then how the various arguments should be weighed, based on how every part fits in the whole, how holistic the 'whole' really is and how well it works... Reasoning can clearly be refined, as is evident w/ most philosophers... The ultimate goal of my use of reasoning is to interpret the situation in the most unbiased manner, and to continually gain new perspective. Such a refined version will necessarily be more inclusive and accurate than a more simplistic one, and so there really is some point to it all beside affirming what a person already wants to believe, if they want to believe anything at all... That is why I think it's silly to make and hold beliefs where there is no reason or evidence to show that one should hold it.
Reenk Roink, your position is thought provoking, and I am always compelled to give a meaningful response. I do not have one now, but I am working on it. No, the latter part was not adressed to you.
Ah well, and I thought we might be getting somewhere. Clearly consciousness is not something you want to discuss...
On the contrary, I'm not opposed to discussing consciousness in the least: it simply isn't a part of the proof I put forward. If you want to discuss consciousness we can do so.
...and I can only conclude your god could be anything at all that qualifies by your own personal definition. This is, at least, consistent with all religious thought I have encountered.
I don't think what I have proffered is idiosyncratic in the least. Quite the contrary, working within a rational context, I have used a very traditional notion of God that is found in Plato, Aristotle, enmeshed itself into Christian thinking with the adoption of neo-platonic metaphysics, was employed by the Scholastics ala St. Thomas, the Enlightenment with Leibniz on down to the present.
Thank you Pindar, for a fascinating, if ultimately pointless discussion. I liked the proof and your defence of it - certainly a challenging area for further reflection.
:bow:
Sorry you felt it was pointless. :bow:
I tried, but he kept saying something about mental rigor or hedgehogs :embarassed:
Ahh, Kojiro man good man: reason without rigor is of no value, one shouldn't discount it. As for hedgehogs and understanding in general:
“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”
You've snared me again. The only emotional investment I make when engaging my reasoning is to get to the bottom of something, cut out the fat, describe exactly what is happening, turn it into a big picture, and see then how the various arguments should be weighed, based on how every part fits in the whole, how holistic the 'whole' really is and how well it works... Reasoning can clearly be refined, as is evident w/ most philosophers... The ultimate goal of my use of reasoning is to interpret the situation in the most unbiased manner, and to continually gain new perspective. Such a refined version will necessarily be more inclusive and accurate than a more simplistic one, and so there really is some point to it all beside affirming what a person already wants to believe, if they want to believe anything at all...
My comment was not personally directed. I will point out that most people like to think they are rational when the reality is something else.
That is why I think it's silly to make and hold beliefs where there is no reason or evidence to show that one should hold it.
Is this a jab at the Democratic Party?
Kanamori
01-06-2007, 05:29
Pindar,
My comment was not personally directed.
I know. I'm a person that I know, and I'm person who thinks that reasoning has been improved in himself. Thus, I was a relevant example.
I will point out that most people like to think they are rational when the reality is something else.
I know. I'm person who's thought he's been right about something, only to think I've been wrong about the same thing later on. That's why I try to get it right over and over again, learning from those mistakes in a systematic way. Seems a little obsessive, but I'm trying to find out if the obsessiveness will pay off sometime.:beam:
Is this a jab at the Democratic Party?
No. (I don't want to put out the effort to make a clever response, because it didn't work on the first try and will have no relevance anyway, sorry. Reenk's got me troubled:whip: )
Rodion Romanovich
01-06-2007, 10:58
Given you have already attempted to engage the proof on several points I can only assume you are being factitious.
Then I assume your numbered list was the "proof"?
Actually the stance is that contingent beings are caused and thus have a beginning. The same doesn't apply to necessary being. If you have an example of an uncaused contingent being present it.
You're basically making a circular proof here: you define the following entities:
- necessary being = a being that doesn't need to be created
- contingent being = a being that needs to be created
And from this you make the conclusion: a necessary being doesn't need to be created, and a contingent being needs to be created. That's a circular proof, that you have attempted to camouflage by hiding half of the circle in a definition.
Regarding contingent beings, an infinite causality is an absurdity as it begs the question. This was explained previously.
For an infinite number of causes to not be necessary requires that:
- time is bounded in the future
- time is bounded in the past
- time is discrete
If time is unbounded in any direction, or hasn't got a finite number of "steps" within each time unit, then an infinite number of causes is a necessity - anything else would be an absurdity to claim.
If everything is caused by something, we have one of two cases:
- the definition is recursive and gives an infinite recursion if you follow it backwards in time, in which case the universe need not have been created at all, but has existed forever
- it's a contradiction to the basic definition to state that some being wasn't at all created, so we must introduce a new concept - an entity that is different from all other events, that could have been the cause of the first few entities of the normal type. To at all introduce such an entity is dubious at best because we have absolutely nothing suggesting the existence of such a thing. It's also impossible for us to measure whether a certain entity qualifies or disqualifies to this role, because we have no clue whatsoever how to measure it, no tool with which it can be measured. All arguments that a certain entity is of this special type are necessarily based on faith until someone devises a way to somehow measure if something wasn't caused by something else before. What says that God, if he exists, wasn't created by something else? The thought of his to create the universe probably also would have had a cause, or? How can you prove that God doesn't need to have been caused by something?
You also make the fallacy of ruling out the infinite recursion without any argument other than stating that in your opinion it's absurd. In fact it's a greater contradiction to all observations to claim that there can exist something that wasn't caused by another entity, than it is to claim infinite recursion. To state that the universe was at all created is to jump conclusions. We can however have different definitions of "universe". Earth can be universe to some, the solar system and the closest stars can be universe to some (perhaps that's the only part of the universe the ancient people knew, and therefore called only that by the name universe?), or everything in existence - matter, energy, space and time (and possibly even more things). Now the cause that created the solar system and the closest stars - a Big explosion according to all observations - could be labelled with the word God. That that thing would be a being with an own "will" and "goals" is something that must be proven by someone who wishes to claim that.
The above doesn't sound like an assumption I've made. It sounds more like an attempted rejoinder. Regardless, as things relate to necessary being: the Big Bang is an event not a being. This is one rather obvious disqualifier. A second is the Big Bang by definition has a beginning. It therefore cannot be a necessary being.
You claim that only beings can be caused. However also things, events and phenomenons can be caused, and cause other beings, events, things and phenomenons. You take advantage of this lie in the step where you claim Big Bang not to be a valid causa prima non causata because it isn't a being, but a phenomenon. This is a huge fallacy from your part. Big bang is not at all disqualified by your argument, it's your argument that is disqualified due to not following the rules of logic.
That a necessary being exists is the conclusion of the proof. It is therefore not an assumption.
It's a "conclusion" based on assumptions many of which aren't true. If you attempt to make a conclusion based on lies and/or statements of unknown truth value, the conclusion you derive (even if the derivation of it follows the laws of logic) has no guarantee at all to be true.
Rodion Romanovich
01-06-2007, 11:49
If this is true, would you also not believe in free will/moral responsibility given that the arguments for them are also weak?
This is a good question. I however believe the arguments for morality are strong:
- not following the moral rules that have been translated into laws can give you punishments unless a successful revolt against the leaders if being carried out at the time, or you're at war
- some behaviors are simply not practical assuming everybody would be freely allowed to do them, given how the society looks. For instance theft isn't a problem in a monkey herd because nobody really owns any things (only very small exceptions). However in modern western society that is formed around capitalism and ownership, you can just imagine what chaos we would get if free thieving would be allowed. But an interesting situation is when a few people break the rules and benefit a lot from it because the majority doesn't break the rules to counter the benefit they made. Here, law is often used.
- some behaviors are biologically unpractical, and don't serve the individual in the long run even if they seem to do so in the short term. That we despise murder of a completely innocent individual that is neither dangerous, evil or criminal according to our perceptions of that individual, is because herds and packs won't work if individuals go kill each others to the left and right all the time and reduce the size of the herd/pack which makes hunting more difficult, and reduces the genetical variety and causes inbreeding in the long run. In modern society however we have an abundance of individuals to cooperate with - most people are expendable and replaceable in their professions - and we have serious overpopulation which forces destruction of the environment in order to feed all individuals. In such a society it could in the future become long term benefitial with murder and mass murder, which would be a disaster for mankind. The reason why we still punish mass murder and murder despite the fact that reduction of overpopulation in itself can be a good thing, is that murder removes trust and threatens to break peace and order in a way that could result in more massive destruction than anyone could imagine - the political consequences among other things are very difficult to predict.
- emotionally it's difficult to break moral rules because of conscience. This conscience is based both on it being biologically impractical to do certain things, and on experience - that we're taught when we grow up to feel ashamed if we did something bad, and that we suffered revenge from other kids if we attacked them first without justifiable reason. And is also based on rational reasoning - even if average Joe hasn't tried murder, he can probably deduce from his experiences with small-scale fights from childhood, as well as learning about the punishments for murder given by law, what the consequences would be.
So I think there are a lot of strong arguments why people should follow most of the moral codes in modern society. The only exception (according to the actions of mankind in the past and the present) is when someone tries to use law to own advantage, making law and/or moral codes repressive to the average citizen and using them as tools for power. In those cases, despite the risk it means to upheave part of morality (because then almost all of morality can end up being upheaved), they must react for their own survival. In times of misery when there isn't bread for everyone, revolution and killing sprees often take place. Often it's difficult to stop these massive actions and a lot of innocents get hurt, but compared to the state of things before the revolutions, that might often be preferable to the masses since the repression can tend to get excessive. So when the reasons given above (for following morality) still are applicable to the situation, i.e. that it is most benefitial to follow the morality, nobody who is rational and experienced has any reason to break it. However in the case when chaos and oppression reigns, many people in the past and the present say that breaking morality and law is a necessity, and I'm inclined to agree - not many would willingly accept their destruction. The problem of a power elite making morality and law repressive is comparable to the example I mentioned above with the few thieves who test the limits and putting society and mankind at the verge of feeling forced to abandon morality to not be at a disadvantage to those that have abandoned it. While we have law to stop the thief, we have constitutional law to stop the madman self-interest serving politician. Unfortunately while law has been developed a lot, constitutional law is still in its beginnings and unfortunately doesn't prevent the problem of self-interest serving politicians yet.
As for free will - if the world is deterministic/theistic (i.e. everything today has cause and effect), then human beings can have no free will. Then all actions are based on how we're born, what perceptions we have at the time of acting, and our entire history of perceptions of reality (including our education). Some claim this means law and punishment isn't justified, but I claim the opposite - if and only if the punishment will cause undesirable actions (such as murder etc) to become less common, then it's justified. However punishment as a holy ritual of "justice and punishing of evilness" becomes less justified. Prison would be safekeeping rather than punishment. For any form of truly free will to exist, nondeterminism is a necessity. But nondeterminism is the same as randomness, and randomness would make the free will not our own will, but the will of the randomness that caused our actions. In that case, is our will truly free? I'd say free will is an illusion.
Claudius the God
01-06-2007, 13:11
Hi Claudius,
This response of yours made me smile:
...
Pindar has an exceptional mind and has indeed got us arguing about the number of angels that might dance upon a pin. He's a lawyer, you know. :wink:
Definitions are important here, otherwise we are wasting our time, and you hit the nail (or pin :beam:) squarely on the head.
Let's see if we make progress.
Thanks...
Sorry for stepping in here again, but I've been following this thread and want to raise a few points:
Claudius: I can't help but notice that some of the content of your posts (namely the seven degrees of religious belief) are derived from or influenced by Dawkins' The God Delusion.
correct. I found that spectrum (seven degrees of belief model) to be a useful one when discussing the different types of belief and non-belief.
I generally feel that Dawkins' arguments leave something to be desired, in both persuasiveness and tact. I only got through Chapter 2 of his book (reading is usually bad and I had other things to do), but I got a basic gist of what he was going on about.
I listened to the Audiobook...
I would like to take the opportunity to post a review of Dawkins' book by Professor Thomas Nagel, a contemporary philosopher. I think he brings up some excellent points:
There is also one other question I would like to ask you (and others):
I assume (correct me if I am wrong) the the reason you do not to believe in God is because the arguments for His existence are weak/flawed.
If this is true, would you also not believe in free will/moral responsibility given that the arguments for them are also weak?
And
Should our beliefs be based on reason?
interresting review.
don't get me wrong, even though I found some of the information in this book to be useful in this thread, I don't agree with everything that Dawkins suggests. for example, I don't have much problem with moderate/liberal religious people who keep their faith private... I'm more enthusiastic about mutual respect between faith and science rather than on the 'undeserved respect' that religion often claims...
as for your questions, I was never brought up to believe in God/s in the first place, and I have never found arguments for faith to be even remotely convincing. I mainly find such things as either far too exploitative or simply a waste of time. Sometimes a faith can even be intellectually embarrassing...
I'm not a student of philosophy, so I don't know much about the fundamentals of free will and those sorts of arguments. while I don't really see any reason to get involved in another heavy philosophical debate, I guess I could say that I have an appreciation for free will and moral responsibility.
Should our beliefs be based on Reason? - I certainly don't think that it is a bad thing to base one's beliefs and decisions on the use of Reason. As biassed as I am, I have to say that I see far more problems associated with taking things on faith rather than using Reason and rational skepticism.
I know that I do not know about God's existence, nothing else has to be said. Beleiving either way despite that observation is silly. I have made the only relevant observation that I can make; crossing into the realm of unreasoned belief serves no purpose besides the religious, and I have already exlpained why I rejected that.
So, if you want to know that your beliefs actually mean anything, yes, they should be based on reason. If you don't, there's really no reason to carry on the first second you are in pain or discomfort. Of course, one can carry on any way, but not trying to have reasoned thoughts would probably result in being hit by a bus sometime in the city after you've decided you don't need or want reasons and predictions. ..
agreed.
Using reason to justify the belief is circular.
I do not know of any external "thing" one could use to justify it.
Saying "reason is reasonable" is a meaningless tautology.
We must therefore, irrationally accept and presuppose reason in order to employ it.
Doesn't that defeat the purpose?
This isn't the same sort of belief as a religious belief would be. The use of Reason, skepticism, the Scientific method, etc. are far more reliable and accurate than a belief based simply on faith can be. We know this from a great wealth of experience... the great intellectual development known as The Scientific Revolution didn't happen because of a belief in a new and different faith, it happened largely because people refused to simply take things on faith and decided instead it would be better to know for certain...
...so perhaps the aquisition of huge amounts of accurate knowledge and positive social experience justify the use of Reason over faith. This is not an argument to abandon faith completely, just an opinion held by many including myself of what our priorities should be...
Why? An atheist cannot be an atheist unless she has a theist to be contrary to? This doesn't follow.
An Atheist cannot be an Atheist unless he understands the basic concept of theism and is contrary to this... and in a realistic setting, it would almost certainly require a theistic person of some sort whose basic argument the Atheist disagrees with.
OK. The point is a logical one tied to contingency and necessity. The issue with an infinite regress means that for a contingent object/being (like our apple above) it lacks logical necessity (there is nothing logically that requires its existence) yet it exists. The fact it exists means there is a cause for that existence (say an apple tree). If the cause is similarly contingent (the apple tree) then we have the same issue of no logical necessity to exist, yet it ( the cause: the apple tree) does exist. As this standard is traced backwards say using this schema: X, X-1, X-2, X-3, etc. The is no point at which a rational explanation of origin can be given as each stop along the line already posits the very thing in question (contingent being): a thing that does not need to be, but is. Thus, a purely contingent regress begs the question as it invariably assumes the very thing under question. This circularity is the logical absurdity.
repeating with emphasis:
while I'm going to ponder this problem a bit more, can you please explain further why there must be some non-contingent being to somewhere stop an infinite regress? - and why you label this thing 'god' without a second thought? to imply that a specific deity is this hypothetical non-contingent being sounds rather absurd to me...
You say that the concept of god is the only thing that can fit the criteria of non-contingent being/necessary being. but this is a concept based on imagination, not on any scientific evidence. it is an irrational answer to what appears to be a rational and near-unbreakable philosophical argument...
God is non-contingent by definition.
Please provide a detailed reference for this statement/definition - a credible encyclopaedia or dictionary of some sort explaining why exactly this is the case...
No, I said what I said because I understand the logic of science: what it can and cannot do.
That's not a good reason for baseless speculation in attributing "God" as the answer...
Sorry I don't have the time to respond to the rest of your statements Pindar, perhaps later... it's almost midnight now where I am...
I do however have two articles written about this topic. While I'm not very educated in this subject, they may at least provide further food for thought...
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/branden.htm
THE CONCEPT OF GOD
The following argument by Nathanial Branden does, I think, counter successfully ANY "creationism" or "big bang" idea: "FIRST CAUSE" IS EXISTENCE, NOT GOD
Question: Since everything in the universe requires a cause, must not the universe itself have a cause, which is god?
Answer:
There are two basic fallacies in this argument. The first is the assumption that, if the universe required a causal explanation, the positing of a "god" would provide it. To posit god as the creator of the universe is only to push the problem back one step farther: Who then created the god? Was there still an earlier god who created the god in question? We are thus led to an infinite regress - the very dilemma that the positing of a "god" was intended to solve. But if it is argued that no one created god, that god does not require a cause, that god has existed eternally - then on what grounds is it denied that the universe has existed eternally?
It is true that there cannot be an infinite series of antecedent causes. But recognition of this fact should lead one to reappraise the validity of the initial question, not to attempt to answer it by stepping outside the universe into some gratuitously invented supernatural dimension.
This leads to the second and more fundamental fallacy in this argument: the assumption that the universe as a whole requires a causal explanation. It does not. The universe is the total of that which exists. Within the universe, the emergence of new entities can be explained in terms of the actions of entities that already exist: The cause of a tree is the seed of the parent tree; the cause of a machine is the purposeful reshaping of matter by men. All actions presuppose the existence of entities - and all emergences of new entities presuppose the existence of entities that caused their emergence. All causality presupposes the existence of something that acts as a cause. To demand a cause for all of existence is to demand a contradiction: if the cause exists, it is part of existence; if it does not exist, it cannot be a cause. Nothing cannot be the cause of something. Nothing does not exist. Causality presupposes existence; existence does not presuppose causality. There can be no cause "outside" of existence or "anterior" to it. The forms of existence may change and evolve, but the fact of existence is the irreducible primary at the base of all causal chains. Existence - not "god" - is the First Cause.
Just as the concept of causality applies to events and entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole - so the concept of time applies to events and entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole. The universe did not "begin" - it did not, at some point in time "spring into being." Time is a measurement of motion. Motion presupposes entities that move. If nothing existed, there could be no time. Time is "in" the universe; the universe is not "in" time.
The man who asks, "Where did existence come from?" or "What caused it?" is the man who has never grasped that existence exists. This is the mentality of a savage or a mystic who regards existence as some sort of incomprehensible miracle - and seeks to "explain" it by reference to non-existence.
Existence is all that exists, the nonexistent does not exist; there is nothing for existence to have come out of - and nothing means nothing. If you are tempted to ask, "What's outside the universe?" - recognize that you are asking, "What's outside of existence?" and that the idea of "something outside of existence" is a contradiction in terms; nothing is outside of existence, and "nothing" is not just another kind of "something" - it is nothing. Existence exists: you cannot go outside it; you cannot get under it, on top of it, or behind it. Existence exists - and only existence exists: There is nowhere else to go.
-- Nathaniel Branden
http://www.hedweb.com/witherall/zero.htm
The Zero Ontology - David Pearce on Why Anything Exists
Arthur Witherall
What is the Zero Ontology?
David Pearce has described a proposal which outlines an explanation space within which the question "Why is there something instead of nothing?" can be given a legitimate answer. This is how he describes his endeavour, and he makes it clear that his ideas are purely speculative. He does not have a straightforward answer to the question, nor even a theory. All that he has is a sketch of what a theory which "explains existence" might be like, and how it might arrive at its conclusions. While I must admit that I find his sketch compelling in many ways, there are problems and paradoxes lurking in the very idea that one could explain why the world exists. In the case of Pearce's proposal, the explanation takes the form of showing that there is (in a sense) nothing to explain. As such, it is similar to necessitarian responses to the problem, which claim that there is no alternative to the existence of the world since something - God, for example - exists as a matter of logical necessity. Pearce does not exactly endorse a traditional necessitarian theory, but he comes awfully close. In my opinion, there is a recognition of balance and proportion in his thesis which makes his thesis more appealing than any reliance upon a deus-ex-machina.
What makes his suggestion interesting, in my opinion, is that it invokes a powerful intuition that the totality of the real, "substantial" world (the world of physical things) is ultimately indistinguishable from the void. That is, the substance of the world as a whole is identical with nothingness, and reality is interpreted as the realisation of Zero. This Zero, however, need not be interpreted as a number. Whether it is a number or not, it has more complexity, in this context, than has hitherto been imagined, for it includes the entire universe - indeed it is the "final result" of all the properties and processes of the universe. It is the ultimate emptiness of existence. Pearce sometimes uses terminology which reflects the fact that 0 is to be treated as a state of affairs rather than a number, when he says that his hypothesis is "that zero is the case".
This "Zero ontology", an interpretation of the void which treats it as the summation of all substantial reality (or vice versa - an interpretation of substantial reality in terms of the void), appears as either unintelligible or highly counter-intuitive from the perspective of our everyday worldview. We are used to dealing with substantial things, and we tend to think of 0, or the void, as the absence of things rather than their ultimate "summation". But this may be a problem of language rather than intelligibility. We do not have the right terms at present to describe the great totality of the world, considered as a single unit when all of its properties are taken into account. Such an entity is beyond our experience, and certainly beyond our powers of manipulation. When modern physics tells us that the ultimate value of the conserved constants of the physical universe is exactly zero, or as Pearce puts it:
"In the Universe as a whole, the conserved constants (electric charge, angular momentum, mass-energy) add up to/cancel out to exactly 0. There isn't any net electric charge or angular momentum. The world's positive mass-energy is exactly cancelled out by its negative gravitational potential energy. (Provocatively, cryptically, elliptically, "nothing" exists)"
our normal conceptual resources seem to stall. Does this really mean that the substance of the world is not really substantial at all, or is it a bizarre mathematical trick which should be interpreted in some other way? It is important to understand, of course, that there really is some positive mass-energy in certain parts of the world. That is not being denied. When it is said that the quantity of mass-energy is Zero, this is only true for the world as a whole. We think that mass-bearing material things exist because we are located in a particular part of the world where they appear to exist. Only when we have a perspective on the whole world can we see that they are effectively wiped out in the overall structure of things.
Pearce's position is similar to other philosophies of the void, including Buddhist mysticism and western nihilism, but there are also important differences. There were apparently three tenets in the philosophy of the ancient Greek philosopher Gorgias: 1) nothing exists; 2) if anything does exist, it cannot be known, and; 3) if anything does exist and can be known, it cannot be communicated. This is nihilism at its most stark, but also its most implausible. Gorgias is too extreme. Pearce's position is distinguishable from it, and from the Buddhist version of nihilism, in at least one significant respect. It employs physics and mathematics, and addresses the question of existence within this context. Recent theories about black holes, the Big Bang, and the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics, are brought in to explicate his thesis. I have nothing much to say about his use of these theories. In fact, I am less impressed with the scientific aspects of his proposal than I am with the overall picture he paints, although I do appreciate the necessity for explaining the physical details of the world. What we really want is an explanation space which can account for why the world exists as well as the equally perplexing question of why it is exactly the way it is. If we are going to address the problem of existence properly, it does seem that we will have to explain everything else as well, at least in a general way. Existence is not an isolated topic of investigation.
Pearce's proposal has the virtue, if only it could be worked out properly, of wrapping everything up in a completed explanatory framework. It would account for all that we experience, all that we theorise, and all that there is to the substance of the cosmos. All of this, according to his picture, must somehow work itself out to be equal to zero. That is, all of the properties of things must cancel themselves out completely, leaving nothing at all to explain. The number zero itself is recast in a new conceptual and ontological garb, so that it is not merely nothingness but also at the same time somethingness (ie. substance). When properly worked out, this means that all of the properties of substances must be taken into account in the final equation or calculation, which is the final explanation, simply because they must all be used together to "sum up" to zero. As such, when this explanation is forthcoming, it will necessarily account for all of the properties of everything that exists. If anything is missing, the summation might be different, and the explanation would not go through.
With such an magnificent picture of the cosmos on the cards, and so many details to uncover, we must surely pause before crying "contradiction!" at his paradoxical mode of expression (ie. in saying that nothingness or Zero is ultimately identical with the world-as-a-whole). We must pause, not merely because so much is at stake - an explanation-space for existence - but also because Pearce clearly knows that he is using a paradoxical mode of expression, and is not trying to be deliberately obtuse. He is envisaging a space for which we have yet to develop the right concepts. Paradox is inevitable, so we may let it go as long as we can make some sense of his proposal.
A Theory of Absolute Nothingness?
My first inclination is to defend the proposal that, in some yet-to-be-fully-devised theoretical structure, the properties of everything in reality add up to or cancel out to zero. This inclination comes from a particular interpretation of what it means, and my intuitive comparison of the ideas it employs. It seems to me that in this context we are not to compare "something" with "nothing" as quantificational idioms, but instead we should compare totalities. That is, we should look at the world and the void, and ask whether they could in some way be equivalent. The totality of the world, that is the real world whatever it includes (eg. planets, people, numbers, feelings, Everett's "branch-worlds", and so on), shares certain features with absolute nothingness, which is the total emptiness of everything (to be expressed in a way as yet inconceivable to us). Comparing them reveals that they could be identical, although it does not reveal a perspicuous way of expressing this identity in the English language.
To begin with, Pearce provides us with a fairly good image of his explanation space by comparing it with the system of numbers. As he says, if you literally add up all of the numbers, positive and negative, the result is 0:
"… the summed membership of the uncountably large set of positive and negative numbers, and every more fancy and elaborate pair of positive and negative real and imaginary etc terms, trivially and exactly cancels out to/adds up to 0."
This is not very interesting by itself, but it supplies a way of imagining a more inclusive role for 0. Given that we can extrapolate and imagine things that are yet to be done, we can envisage a system of mathematical equations which perfectly describe the physical world, and which have the feature that all of the substantive quantities of the universe add up to 0. Then, just like the series of numbers, we will have a perfect symmetry of magnitudes (though not of a mathematical kind) with 0 in the exact centre of the symmetry. This is what the Zero ontology proposes: that reality, understood as the totality of our experiential and theoretical knowledge (ie. mathematics, physics, and phenomenology), is "equal" in some sense to 0. Perhaps we could say that reality is perfectly "centred" on 0. And perhaps we can understand this as asserting that the universe has no bumps or hairs, no outstanding inexplicable features. The properties of all substantial entities, like the properties of the totality of the positive and negative numbers, are all different and related to each other in a complex manner, but in the end they are so perfectly balanced that they wipe each other out. Thus we end up with Zero.
It could be argued that really it is the notion of symmetry that does all of the work here. We have a profound intuition, expressed again and again in science and art and in everything else, that symmetry needs no explanation. It is already perfect, and perfectly in accord with itself. Asymmetrical structures and facts, on the other hand, are "odd". They have to be woven into an explanatory story that squashes the bumps and shaves off the hairs. When we originally consider the question "Why is there something instead of nothing?" it seems that we are confronting a massive and terrifying asymmetrical fact. It is asymmetrical because there is apparently no fuzziness or in-between state when we are dealing with being and nothingness. Either there is something, which is the case, or there is nothing, which is not the case, but there is no intelligible compromise between them (or so it seems). Furthermore, there is no reason for one instead of the other. Our minds are immediately stalemated by the question. Nothing compels us towards thinking that there must be something, or that there must be nothing. We are also stalemated by the fact that any particular thing that explains why something exists will itself be something, which rules out our standard explanations - for example, it rules out causal explanations (unless there is a self-caused entity, a conjecture few are prepared to make).
The Zero ontology restores the symmetry to this situation, so that instead of thinking only that there is something, we may also think that there is nothing, although in a different way. The exact sense in which this is so cannot be envisaged until the details of the ultimate (grand, unified, and true) theory of the physical world are available. However, if we are to imagine it, we may imagine the position of 0 in the series of numbers. It is the summation of them all, yet they are distinct from it and have complex relationships with each other. Better still, in the structure of the numbers both being and nothingness have been included in a single structure, for Zero includes both the absolute void and all of the numbers within itself, that is within its arithmetical structure. Zero is only meaningful in the context of the other numbers and their mathematical relationships. Thus it must "include" them all in some sense. Pearce's proposal is that the totality of physical entities and their properties adds up to 0, and is in this logico-mathematical-theoretical way "identical" with total nothingness. Nevertheless, at the same time he does not wish to deny that there are lots of distinct things in the world. As he puts it:
"In a (as yet cognitively inaccessible) rigorous, technically defined sense, nihilism and plenism, it is here proposed, are to be taken as physically and logico-mathematically equivalent."
In this way, it seems to me, he defends a restoration of the symmetry of being and non-being. He does so by claiming that there is some sense to actually equating them, but he does not say what kind of theory will be able to establish that this equation holds. Perhaps this is a pipe-dream approach to the problem, but it does not seem that way. For one thing, there are measurements of physical quantities, cited earlier, which suggest otherwise.
The void and the world of existents are both abstract totalities. They do not belong to the world we experience, but somehow they act as "boundaries" around which we can make sense of things. To unite them into one boundary by claiming that Zero has rich properties that allow it to be at once "empty" and yet "full of infinite possibilities" [as in the Tao Te Ching] is to make sense of the two together, working as a single totality which requires no explanation. However, when one of the derived properties of Zero is considered in isolation from the whole system, then it does demand explanation, for it must then be seen as something "independent". In truth there is no independence, but it is a necessary fiction used for dealing with the deceptive appearance of hairs and bumps. As Pearce says, 42 would demand an explanation, but 0 does not. The explanation of isolated objects, or the realisation of quantities other than 0 emerges in showing how a derived property of 0 (ie. a thing or property) is related to the rest of the cosmos, and thus how it too cancels out in the process to express the ultimate 0 of reality. To actually show this may involve an enormous calculation, if it is feasible at all. All that we can do is marvel at the idea of it, yet this marvelling is important.
[ see The Fundamental Question" ]
Following on from the previous point, these two totalities (the void and the world) share a further feature. When they are considered in isolation, each appears transcendent, in that it goes beyond what we can feel or imagine, and possibly unintelligible (at least by the lights of present-day conceptual resources). The totality of the world is beyond our experience, beyond our epistemic access, and beyond our wildest dreams. It is larger and more complex than we could possibly think. It is an absolute, and perhaps the concept of the world-as-a-whole is something like Kant's concept of "noumena", in that it is used only to curb the pretensions of our sensibility and not to describe anything. In any case, we do not have any ordinary descriptions of the totality of the world other than descriptions of our feelings about it [cf. Quentin Smith], and it is difficult to find a descriptive phrase synonymous with "the world as a whole". It just isn't an ordinary thing, like the sort of thing you would meet on the street. It is a transcendent thing; it transcends our experiences even though it encompasses them. Likewise with 0, or absolute nothingness. This too, considered by itself, is unimaginable and indescribable, though it does not appear immediately as incoherent or inconsistent. We cannot "decide" between these two totalities on purely intellectual grounds, nor explain why there should be one rather than the other. If we know that something substantial exists, it is because we think that we see and feel substantial things, not because we can analytically extract this information from the concept of "the world-as-a-whole" (which is one of the themes of Kant's philosophy).
The Zero ontology gratuitously helps itself to both totalities, both absolute nothingness and substantial somethingness. But then, either one on its own is just as gratuitous as both together. Neither seems to explain the other unless they are both taken to be aspects of some third thing. Pearce suggests, without a hint of Hegel, that this "third thing" is what we have previously called the number 0. We had thought that 0 was a simple thing, but it is not. It is highly complex, and includes all of mathematics and all of the physical world. Pearce also claims that it includes the whole of the phenomenal world, but this is not well defended (he uses the example of the colours "adding up" to white, a non-colour, but this does quite fit). In my view, the world of phenomenal feelings and mental states cannot be absorbed into the zero ontology unless there is a comprehensive identity between minds and all forms of physical stuff. That is, unless we adopt a version of panpsychism. Pearce employs this panpsychist identity, again highly speculative, into his sketch of an explanation space for existence, but of course it needs a full-scale philosophical defence of its own.
[ See Cosmic Consciousness For Tough Minds ]
How does the Zero Ontology Explain Why Anything Exists?
Even if we can make sense of the idea that Zero is the case, or that Zero lies in the centre of symmetry for the universe, the question of whether this actually explains anything, and in particular whether it can answer the question of why anything exists, is yet to be properly considered. What then is the explanation-space for existence? How would existence get "explained" within this kind of picture?
The answer is that there are several ways in which one might explain (or "explain away") the existence of "something instead of nothing" using the Zero ontology. Perhaps the most obvious is to discard the question itself as illegitimate, but to do so on solid grounds rather than positivist waffle. That is, one can argue that the question presupposes that there cannot be BOTH something and nothing, which is what the Zero ontology asserts. Hence it is already prejudiced against the truth, or uses a false dichotomy, and can be laid aside as ill-formed. The question presumes that there is an asymmetry to explain, whereas the explanation is that there is no asymmetry in the first place. It follows from this position, however, that the original question can be replaced by the equally perplexing problem of "Why is there both-something-and-nothing-together?". However, this question cannot be answered by the Zero ontology unless it turns out to be a self-supporting theory or it can explain its own truth in demonstrating that the substances of the world cancel themselves out. Before we can determine how this matter proceeds, we will need to have an actual theory to deal with, instead of conjectures and possibilities.
Pearce himself makes at least two distinct suggestions as to the way in which existence is to be explained by the Zero ontology. The first is implicit in a statement I paraphrased earlier, when he compares the cancellation of physical properties like mass-energy to the self-cancellation of the number series:
"[Yet why not, say, 42, rather than 0? Well, if everything - impossibly, I'm guessing - added up/cancelled out instead to 42, then 42 would have to be accounted for. But if, in all, there is 0, then there just isn't anything substantive which needs explaining.]"
A curt summation of this idea is that the existence of things is explained by a demonstration that nothing really exists. All of the things we thought were there are in fact mere appearances, whose apparently substantive features are all derivable from the properties of Zero. This must include ourselves, and thus the "mere appearances" that constitute the world are not just appearances in our own minds. They are appearances that necessarily flow from the central reality of Zero. Our minds are also appearances, and also derive from the properties of Zero. In fact, Zero becomes a sort of First Cause, given this sort of explanation. But if the demonstration that nothing exists works, then it really does account for the existence of each particular thing. Thus the "why" question is given an answer.
The second suggestion that Pearce makes is less decisive, and clearly allies him with the necessitarian approach. He says:
"Indeed an implication of the position to be argued here is that anything else other than what exists is, were what exists properly understood, logically incoherent, including the notion of unrealised ontic possibility itself. For perhaps in all but a heuristic sense there is no difference between x and necessarily x. Given this is the case, then the notion of real contingency turns on a psychologistic misconception of the link between possibility and the imagination, because everything must be exactly how it is on pain of lapsing into incoherence. In the case of the notion of nothing ever having existed when construed as a real possibility, then even the link with imagination breaks down. This is because one can't imagine nothing whatsoever existing."
There may be a confusion here if Pearce means that we cannot imagine that nothing exists. For he is himself asserting that this may be the case, at least under a particular interpretation in which it is also true that something exists. But it seems plausible to assert that the kind of explanation offered by the Zero ontology will turn out to be a necessitarian one. The explanation will show that the existence of the world, in the only way that it could intelligibly exist (ie. as a world of apparent substances which are themselves ultimately intelligible as derivations of Zero), is necessary given the postulate that "Zero is the case". Even when this is demonstrated, of course, we are left with the question of why we should assume that Zero is the case, the answer to which must lie beyond the resources of any explanation which proceeds on the assumption that it is the case.
We are on uncertain but well-trod ground in contemplating the question of why anything exists. There are already well developed metaphysical systems which reduce the contingency of existence to some kind of necessity in an attempt to answer this question, among them the philosophies of Leibniz and Spinoza. However, in the case of these thinkers, it is arguable that they are not quite "smooth" enough. They insist that one being - God - exists without requiring explanation. But this being is a substantial being, a substance with distinctive features. As such, it stands out (the original meaning of "exists" comes from the Latin "ex-sistere" which means "to stand out") as a distinctive thing, and thus it becomes difficult to see why its existence does not need to be explained. The Zero ontology, on the other hand, is a purer system. It removes every last trace of substance from the world by cancelling it out in the context of the whole. There are no bumps and hairs, no gods, no substances, no things that are just there without explanation. The universe swallows itself up in the same act by which it releases itself into being.
This "explanation space" for existence is really a space in which theories, such as those of mathematics, physics, and philosophy, come together and show, in conjunction with each other, that no explanation is needed for the fact that the world exists. The only sense in which this constitutes an explanation is that in which a simple hypothesis (that Zero is the case) replaces a hopeless conundrum, which means that it is explanation by simplicity. We can always be left in doubt that the explanation actually works, at least until the combination of theories is devised which demonstrates that everything adds up to 0. Before this comes about, we are left with the perplexity of the fact "something exists rather than nothing", and only a sketch, a vague picture, of how this might not be perplexing (ie. if Zero is the case). So in this way, were there to be the right combination of 0-entailing theories, it would constitute a removal of perplexity, and in this minimal sense, an explanation.
I like to think of the Zero ontology in a slightly different way, as a perfect combination of rationalism and mysticism. Zero in this case is the greatest and most perfect whole, for it wraps up all of the substances of the world and reveals that they were never truly substances, never truly independent entities at all. But they had to appear in the world, in the guise of substances, for otherwise there would be no "adding-up" procedure, and thus no realisation of Zero. Without this realisation of Zero as the summation of things, the substances of the world would not be effectively combined with nothingness. They would then always remain problematic, for we could always say "well why not nothingness?" instead of "ah, clearly there is nothingness within the heart of the world".
Rationalism is involved here in relying upon the process of calculation. In order to believe in the Zero ontology as a possibility, we have to believe that mathematical physics, at least, accurately describes reality. Thus reality must have a rational, mathematical structure. Rationalists have always maintained this to be true. Mysticism is involved here in the final step, the step which claims that when everything gets wrapped up and added up, it is all tantamount to Nothingness. It plays no part in the theoretical structure used to make the calculation, but it is expressed by the final result of the calculation, and by the way that we interpret this result. The variety of mysticism which is particularly appropriate here is atheistic Taoism, which explicitly claims that there is a profound relationship, even an identity between being and non-being. The Tao Te Ching expresses this wisdom in poems rather than calculations:
We join spokes together in a wheel,
but it is the centre hole
that makes the wagon move.
We shape clay into a pot,
but it is the emptiness inside
that holds whatever we want.
We hammer wood for a house,
but it is the inner space
that makes it livable.
We work with being,
but non-being is what we use.
[Tao Te Ching, Chapter 11]
There are other religions which endorse similar ideas, but it is reasonably clear that western thought has been absorbed in the notion of substance, without being able to see how substantial things can dissolve into nothingness. This makes it particularly difficult for western philosophers to find the Zero ontology meaningful. In my view, there is a real and tantalising possibility that western physicists, if not western philosophers, will be able to show us the errors of treating substance so seriously.
Reenk Roink
01-07-2007, 00:14
Hey LegioXXXUlpiaVictrix, I just wanted to point out that I have only quoted a select part of your post simply to stay on the free will/moral responsibility topic. I did read the part of the reasons to accept morality, and it is quite interesting. However, I hope you don’t mind me keeping my focus on the relation of free will and moral responsibility.
As for free will - if the world is deterministic/theistic (i.e. everything today has cause and effect), then human beings can have no free will. Then all actions are based on how we're born, what perceptions we have at the time of acting, and our entire history of perceptions of reality (including our education).
Yep, this is the position of determinism. However, compatibilists/soft determinists hold that free will is reconcilable with determinism. Still, given your statement, you, like me, are a closet incompatibilist. :wink:
For any form of truly free will to exist, nondeterminism is a necessity. But nondeterminism is the same as randomness, and randomness would make the free will not our own will, but the will of the randomness that caused our actions. In that case, is our will truly free? I'd say free will is an illusion.
Yes, that is why the dilemma argument cuts through simple indeterminism. Now, there are libertararian theories of the free will that try to bypass the randomness of simple indeterminism, but the positions face problems of their own.
Some claim this means law and punishment isn't justified, but I claim the opposite - if and only if the punishment will cause undesirable actions (such as murder etc) to become less common, then it's justified. However punishment as a holy ritual of "justice and punishing of evilness" becomes less justified. Prison would be safekeeping rather than punishment.
Yes, there is a place for punishment within hard and soft determinist frameworks, however, like you pointed out, one cannot be punished because he is “bad” or the like. This becomes quite problematic (for most) when you realize that in a place without free will/moral responsibility, our punishment would become akin to punishing a dog for pooping on the carpet.
Another problem in a deterministic world without free will/moral responsibility is that nobody can be praised for anything...
Reenk Roink
01-07-2007, 00:48
This isn't the same sort of belief as a religious belief would be. The use of Reason, skepticism, the Scientific method, etc. are far more reliable and accurate than a belief based simply on faith can be. We know this from a great wealth of experience... the great intellectual development known as The Scientific Revolution didn't happen because of a belief in a new and different faith, it happened largely because people refused to simply take things on faith and decided instead it would be better to know for certain...
...so perhaps the aquisition of huge amounts of accurate knowledge and positive social experience justify the use of Reason over faith. This is not an argument to abandon faith completely, just an opinion held by many including myself of what our priorities should be...
OK, there are two things here.
One, I'm going to have to disagree with you on your claim of "This isn't the same sort of belief as a religious belief would be" as I do not see any difference (besides what the belief should be based on of course) between these two beliefs:
Belief 1: Our beliefs should be based on reason.
Belief 2: Our beliefs should be based on religious scripture.
Both are meta-beliefs concerning the nature of our beliefs.
Now for two.
I will understand your position as the "reason works" response. It is the common response to this problem, and in fact, my first response as well. Of course, we cannot get by the fact that we are still irrationally presupposing reason, but we like the results that it has gotten us.
You have claimed that reason gives us two things (sorry, for the vague diction, but I have hard time verbalizing my thoughts sometimes):
1) Positive "things" (you pointed out that the scientific method and reason have brought us technology)
2) Accurate knowledge
There are a couple of objections to the "reason works" response.
One, someone who holds religious beliefs can also say that his beliefs "work" in the fact that they bring positive things to the table. Perhaps his beliefs give him existential comfort, meaning in life, a moral compass, etc. Also, his beliefs give him the use of reason as well, since reason is from God.
Two, reason will only "work" to bring "accurate knowledge" in its own framework. This is a difficult point for me to elucidate, and I probably will clarify in a later post when I have had more time to reflect, but for now, think of it as calling reason "reasonable", i.e, a meaningless tautology.
For example, if someone just busted out a new system of mathematics, where 2+2=5, then his system would bring accurate knowledge. Of course, the knowledge is only accurate within the frameworks of the system itself, and that system is being presupposed...
(I know this is kind of jumbled, and I will clarify in some time)
Claudius the God
01-07-2007, 01:35
OK, there are two things here.
One, I'm going to have to disagree with you on your claim of "This isn't the same sort of belief as a religious belief would be" as I do not see any difference (besides what the belief should be based on of course) between these two beliefs:
Belief 1: Our beliefs should be based on reason.
Belief 2: Our beliefs should be based on religious scripture.
Firstly, I would replace "religious scripture" in Belief 2, to 'faith' instead - in this context, defining the alternative as "religious scripture" isn't exactly fair... some people's religious or spiritual faiths are not based on any scripture or set dogma...
I would like you to elaborate on why you don't see any difference between beliefs in Faith and Reason.
to me, there are several quite important differences between the two...
there are issues of evidence, proof, the nature of reliability and accuracy, the need for skepticism, the need to challenge how we think about things, personal and society-wide experiences, the historical development of civilization from medieval times up to the modern scientific and technological age, the question of weather simply having faith or instead investing in reliable knowledge improves happiness and morality in society, there are issues of the best way to educate people, and so on...
Both are meta-beliefs concerning the nature of our beliefs.
Now for two.
I will understand your position as the "reason works" response. It is the common response to this problem, and in fact, my first response as well. Of course, we cannot get by the fact that we are still irrationally presupposing reason, but we like the results that it has gotten us.
You have claimed that reason gives us two things (sorry, for the vague diction, but I have hard time verbalizing my thoughts sometimes):
1) Positive "things" (you pointed out that the scientific method and reason have brought us technology)
2) Accurate knowledge
There are a couple of objections to the "reason works" response.
One, someone who holds religious beliefs can also say that his beliefs "work" in the fact that they bring positive things to the table. Perhaps his beliefs give him existential comfort, meaning in life, a moral compass, etc. Also, his beliefs give him the use of reason as well, since reason is from God.
Two, reason will only "work" to bring "accurate knowledge" in its own framework. This is a difficult point for me to elucidate, and I probably will clarify in a later post when I have had more time to reflect, but for now, think of it as calling reason "reasonable", i.e, a meaningless tautology.
For example, if someone just busted out a new system of mathematics, where 2+2=5, then his system would bring accurate knowledge. Of course, the knowledge is only accurate within the frameworks of the system itself, and that system is being presupposed...
(I know this is kind of jumbled, and I will clarify in some time)
perhaps faith does more to improve the mentality of an individual (providing some level of order and comfort), whereas the use of Reason does far more to improve society as a whole, even those people who don't use Reason themselves...
What would one say to the person praying to God for his sick friend to get better when in hospital? - which is more important? - a religious conviction that praying hard enough to God will make them better? - or instead valuing Reason and scientific progress in the medicinal sciences?
this is a fairly typical question evaluating which one is better to trust - Reason or Faith?
without going into a deep philosophical debate about the nature of belief, in the end, the choice between Faith and Reason is an individual choice and some people are more realistic than others...
Reenk Roink
01-07-2007, 02:02
Claudius, you are missing the point. I'm not talking at all about faith vs. reason. I'm speaking of how we irrationally presuppose reason...
Claudius the God
01-07-2007, 02:09
Claudius, you are missing the point. I'm not talking at all about faith vs. reason. I'm speaking of how we irrationally presuppose reason...
okay, sure...
What argument can be made to say that people who invest in Reason and the Scientific Method are irrational to do so?
- and what is the better alternative?
Reenk Roink
01-07-2007, 02:27
What argument can be made to say that people who invest in Reason and the Scientific Method are irrational to do so?
My question has been how can we justify reason itself? So far I have not gotten a different answer aside from the hypothetical ones I myself posited (which were lacking).
I have made the point a couple of times in the thread.
1 (https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1325393&postcount=20)
2
(https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1374930&postcount=347)
- and what is the better alternative?
This becomes irrelevant with the first question.
Claudius, may I bother you to read this (I understand you have already invested a great deal of time in this thread)?
It is an essay by Wesley C. Salmon entitled "An Encounter with David Hume" (http://individual.utoronto.ca/weisberg/phl355/readings/salmon.pdf).
It focuses on the scientific method, but its argument can be applied to my point about reason as well. Salmon is able to make the point with an elocution and perspicacity that I cannot hope to match.
I think you will understand what I have been trying to say after reading it.
Here are some important excerpts if you do not have the time right now:
A little tired, but basically in a cheerful mood, you arrive at your philosophy class on Monday
morning. You meet the professor a few minutes before class outside the room, and you tell her
very briefly of your conversation with the physics professor. You explain that you now
understand why it is that scientific laws can never be considered completely certain, but only as
well-confirmed hypotheses. With her help, and with that of Professor Salvia, you now
understand what Hume was driving at – and you see, moreover, that Hume was right. She smiles,
and you both go into the classroom, where she begins her lecture.
“Last Friday, as you may recall, we had quite a lively discussion about the status of scientific
laws – the law of conservation of momentum, in particular. We saw that such laws cannot be
proved conclusively by any amount of experimental evidence. This is a point with which, I am
happy to report, many (if not most) contemporary scientists agree. They realize that the most
they can reasonably claim for their hypotheses is strong confirmation. Looking at the matter this
way, one could conclude that it is wise to believe in scientific predictions, for if they are not
certain to be true, they are a good bet. To believe in scientific results is to bet with the best
available odds.
“However,” she continues, “while this view may be correct as far as it goes, Hume was
making a much more fundamental, and I should add, much more devastating point. Hume was
challenging not merely our right to claim that scientific predictions will always be right, but also
our right to claim that they will usually, or often, or indeed ever, be correct. Take careful note of
what he says in Section IV:
Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without
some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue
so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past
experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence,
may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens
sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always and
with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you
against this supposition?
He is saying, as I hope you understood from your reading, that no matter how reliably a law
seems to have held in the past, there is no logical reason why it must do so in the future at all. It
is therefore possible that every scientific prediction, based on any law or laws whatever, may
turn out to be false from this moment on. The stationary billiard ball that is struck by a moving
one may remain motionless where it is – while the moving ball may bounce straight back in the
direction from whence it came, or it may go straight up in the air, or it might vanish in a puff of
smoke. Any of these possibilities can be imagined; none of them involves any logical contra-
diction. This is the force of Hume’s skeptical arguments. The conclusion seems to be that we
have no reason to believe in scientific predictions – no more reason than to believe on the basis
of astrology, crystal gazing, or sheer blind guessing.”
You can hardly believe your cars; what is she saying? You raise your hand, and when you are
recognized, you can hardly keep your intense irritation from showing as you assert, “But
certainly we can say that scientific predictions are more probable than those based, for example,
upon astrology.” As you speak, you are reminded of the remark in contemporary problems last
Wednesday concerning the coming of the Age of Aquarius. Science has got to be better than that! As these thoughts cross your mind Professor Philo is saying, “... but that depends upon
what you mean by ‘probable,’ doesn’t it?”
...
“That brings up a question I’ve wanted to ask,” you say. “Hume seems to think that people
necessarily reason in that way – inductive reasoning, I think it is called – but I’ve noticed that
lots of people don’t seem to. For instance, many people (including a student in my current
problems course) believe in things like astrology; they believe that the configuration of the
planets has a bearing on human events, when experience shows that it often doesn’t work that
way.” The professor nods in agreement. You continue, “So if there is no logical justification for
believing in scientific predictions, why isn’t it just as reasonable to believe in astrological
predictions? “
“That,” replies the Prof, “is a very profound and difficult question. I doubt that any philosopher has a completely satisfactory answer to it.”
...
The Wednesday philosophy lecture begins with a sort of rhetorical question, “What reason do we have (Hume is, at bottom, asking) for trusting the scientific method; what grounds do we
have for believing that scientific predictions are reliable?” You have been pondering that very
question quite a bit in the last couple of days, and – rhetorical or not – your hand shoots up. You
have a thing or two to say on the subject.
“Philosophers may have trouble answering such questions,” you assert, “but it seems to me
there is an obvious reply. As my physics professor has often said, the scientist takes a very
practical attitude. He puts forth a hypothesis; if it works he believes in it, and he continues to
believe in it as long as it works. If it starts giving him bad predictions, he starts looking for
another hypothesis, or for a way of revising his old one. Now the important thing about the
scientific method, it seems to me, is that it works. Not only has it led to a vast amount of
knowledge about the physical world, but it has been applied in all sorts of practical ways – though
these applications may not have been uniformly beneficial – for better or worse they were
successful. Not always, of course, but by and large. Astrology, crystal gazing, and other such
superstitious methods simply do not work very well. That’s good enough for me.”
“That is, indeed, a very tempting answer,” Professor Philo replies, “and in one form or
another, it has been advanced by several modern philosophers. But Hume actually answered that
one himself. You might put it this way. We can all agree that science has, up till now, a very
impressive record of success in predicting the future. The question we are asking, however, is
this: should we predict that science will continue to have the kind of success it has had in the
past? It is quite natural to assume that its record will continue, but this is just a case of applying
the scientific method to itself. In studying conservation of momentum, you inferred that future
experiments would have results similar to those of your past experiments; in appraising the
scientific method, you are assuming that its future success will match its past success. But using
the scientific method to judge the scientific method is circular reasoning. It is as if a man goes to
a bank to cash a check. When the teller refuses, on the grounds that he does not know this man,
the man replies, ‘That is no problem; permit me to introduce myself – I am John Smith, just as it
says on the check.’
“Suppose that I were a believer in crystal gazing. You tell me that your method is better than
mine because it has been more successful than mine. You say that this is a good reason for
preferring your method to mine. I object. Since you are using your method to judge my method
(as well as your method), I demand the right to use my method to evaluate yours. I gaze into my
crystal ball and announce the result: from now on crystal gazing will be very successful in
predicting the future, while the scientific method is due for a long run of bad luck.” You are
about to protest, but she continues.
“The trouble with circular arguments is that they can be used to prove anything; if you assume
what you are trying to prove, then there isn’t much difficulty in proving it. You find the scientific
justification of the scientific method convincing because you already trust the scientific method;
if you had equal trust in crystal gazing, I should think you would find the crystal gazer’s
justification of his method equally convincing. Hume puts it this way:
When a man says, I have found, in all past instance, such sensible qualities
conjoined with such secret powers: And when he says, Similar sensible qualities
will always be conjoined with similar secret powers, he is not guilty of a
tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You can say that the
one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the
inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To
say it is experimental is begging the question. For all inferences from experience
suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that
similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities.
If the assumption that the future is like the past is the presupposition of the scientific method, we
cannot assume that principle in order to justify the scientific method. Once more, we can hardly
find a clearer statement than Hume’s:
We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation
of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from
experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the
supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour,
therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments
regarding existence, must evidently be going in a circle, and taking that for
granted, which is the very point in question.
“The principle that the future will be like the past, or that regularities which have held up to
the present will persist in the future, has traditionally been called the principle of uniformity of
nature. Some philosophers, most notably Immanuel Kant, have regarded it as an a priori truth.
It seems to me, however, that Hume had already provided a convincing refutation of that claim
by arguing that irregularities, however startling to common sense, are by no means inconceivable
– that is, they cannot be ruled out a priori.
Recall what he said:
. . . it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an
object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with
different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body,
falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet
the taste of salt or feeling of fire? . . . Now whatever is intelligible, and can be
distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by
any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori.
“Other philosophers have proposed assuming this principle (or something similar) as a postulate; Bertrand Russell, though not the only one to advocate this approach, is by far the most
famous.
But most philosophers agree that this use of postulation is question-begging. The real
question still remains: why should one adopt any such postulate? Russell himself, in another
context, summed it up very well: The method of ‘postulating’ what we want has many
advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil."
Claudius the God
01-07-2007, 06:47
Claudius, may I bother you to read this (I understand you have already invested a great deal of time in this thread)?
It is an essay by Wesley C. Salmon entitled "An Encounter with David Hume" (http://individual.utoronto.ca/weisberg/phl355/readings/salmon.pdf).
It focuses on the scientific method, but its argument can be applied to my point about reason as well. Salmon is able to make the point with an elocution and perspicacity that I cannot hope to match.
I think you will understand what I have been trying to say after reading it.
okay, I understand what you're saying now... I will think on this...
Perhaps the Scientific Method is simply the best method we have available to us until such time as the traditional rules of the universe are broken (quite a horrific thought... we would probably die because of such a thing occurring anyway), or until we have some reliable access to something resembling omniscience...
personally I see such things as highly outlandish anyway...
Reenk Roink
01-07-2007, 17:00
Perhaps the Scientific Method is simply the best method we have available to us until such time as the traditional rules of the universe are broken (quite a horrific thought... we would probably die because of such a thing occurring anyway), or until we have some reliable access to something resembling omniscience...
That position (resembling the "reason works" position) was already advanced by the student in the essay, and also responded to by the professor...
Then I assume your numbered list was the "proof"?
More factitiousness I see.
You're basically making a circular proof here: you define the following entities:
- necessary being = a being that doesn't need to be created
- contingent being = a being that needs to be created
And from this you make the conclusion: a necessary being doesn't need to be created, and a contingent being needs to be created. That's a circular proof, that you have attempted to camouflage by hiding half of the circle in a definition.
A definition is not a proof. A definition is an explanation of the meaning of a word/concept. Necessary and contingent being are not new ideas. Both notions are part and parcel of the earliest logical inquiries into ontology going back over two millennia.
I noted you didn't give any examples of uncaused contingent beings so I assume you would agree such is absurd.
Regarding contingent beings, an infinite causality is an absurdity as it begs the question. This was explained previously.
For an infinite number of causes to not be necessary requires that:
- time is bounded in the future
- time is bounded in the past
- time is discrete
If time is unbounded in any direction, or hasn't got a finite number of "steps" within each time unit, then an infinite number of causes is a necessity - anything else would be an absurdity to claim.
This comment doesn't relate to my post. It is also a non sequitur.
If everything is caused by something, we have one of two cases:
No such claim has been made. I should also make you aware that Aristotle, who is perhaps the most famous source for the proof, believed the earth was eternal (this of course was a major issue for Christian Medievals like St. Thomas to deal with). Your post suggests you do not understand the position. Maybe I haven't explained it well or maybe your hostility is blinding you to the argument.
You claim that only beings can be caused. However also things, events and phenomenons can be caused, and cause other beings, events, things and phenomenons. You take advantage of this lie in the step where you claim Big Bang not to be a valid causa prima non causata because it isn't a being, but a phenomenon. This is a huge fallacy from your part. Big bang is not at all disqualified by your argument, it's your argument that is disqualified due to not following the rules of logic.
An event is something that happens. An action (a verb) requires something that acts ( a noun). If you wish to argue that there are non-being actors we can discuss that idea, otherwise events are not separate from beings. The same applies to phenomena.
The Big Bang is an event. The bang relates to something banging, as it were. If you believe there was a bang, but nothing was banged then one would have to wonder how it relates to the universe which includes a whole host of somethings taken as the outcrop of a banging. Of course, the other point I made on the Big Bang also still applies: the Big Bang has a beginning. This additionally rules it out as any kind of candidate for necessary being which has no beginning.
Note: the lie reference is a bit disturbing in its invective. Your hostility is starting to sound more like simple oppositionism.
It's a "conclusion" based on assumptions many of which aren't true. If you attempt to make a conclusion based on lies and/or statements of unknown truth value, the conclusion you derive (even if the derivation of it follows the laws of logic) has no guarantee at all to be true.
Logic doesn't turn on truth. It turns on validity. Regardless, a conclusion is not an assumption which is where your original charge was confused.
An Atheist cannot be an Atheist unless he understands the basic concept of theism and is contrary to this... and in a realistic setting, it would almost certainly require a theistic person of some sort whose basic argument the Atheist disagrees with.
This is quite wrong. Let's see if I can demonstrate the problem another way: Imagine an Island where yourself and a few others were raised by a robotic care system named Robert Graves. One day one of your fellow Islanders named Barry asks: "Claudius, what does the latter part of your name mean?" "I'm referring to the attending article and noun: the God?" "It sounds like a title, but what kind of title?' Not sure, you decide to ask the computer. The computer (Robert Graves) then explains the wherefore of the title in regards to literature ala the Classicist Graves' work (who the robot is named after), Roman apotheosis and the base meaning of God itself. It explains the last notion as a supposed supreme being that is the maximal expression of all positive traits: knowledge, morality etc. often taken as a devotional locus. After hearing this Barry explains "That's dumb! How could anyone ever believe in such a thing." You and a few others who had gathered to listen to Robert Graves' explanation then laugh exclaiming "Quite so, it's an amazing idea, but clearly primitive." Now according to your position neither yourself, Barry or any other on the Island could be atheists despite the fact they understand the meaning God and reject it because there are no theist supporters to stand in opposition.
OK. The point is a logical one tied to contingency and necessity. The issue with an infinite regress means that for a contingent object/being (like our apple above) it lacks logical necessity (there is nothing logically that requires its existence) yet it exists. The fact it exists means there is a cause for that existence (say an apple tree). If the cause is similarly contingent (the apple tree) then we have the same issue of no logical necessity to exist, yet it ( the cause: the apple tree) does exist. As this standard is traced backwards say using this schema: X, X-1, X-2, X-3, etc. The is no point at which a rational explanation of origin can be given as each stop along the line already posits the very thing in question (contingent being): a thing that does not need to be, but is. Thus, a purely contingent regress begs the question as it invariably assumes the very thing under question. This circularity is the logical absurdity.
repeating with emphasis:
while I'm going to ponder this problem a bit more, can you please explain further why there must be some non-contingent being to somewhere stop an infinite regress? - and why you label this thing 'god' without a second thought? to imply that a specific deity is this hypothetical non-contingent being sounds rather absurd to me...
Hmmm, I assume the logical absurdity is clear from the above. Looking at your emphasis: the proof establishes the existence of necessary being. God is by definition a necessary being and no other coherent alternative to necessary being has been put forward. Thus, the identified necessary being is God. As I explained to BG: in the proof I am making a sufficiency argument.
You say that the concept of god is the only thing that can fit the criteria of non-contingent being/necessary being. but this is a concept based on imagination, not on any scientific evidence. it is an irrational answer to what appears to be a rational and near-unbreakable philosophical argument...
It is not based on imagination, but logic. Science doesn't apply.
God is non-contingent by definition
Please provide a detailed reference for this statement/definition - a credible encyclopaedia or dictionary of some sort explaining why exactly this is the case...
Claudius my good fellow, are you aware of any intellectual system concerned with Deity that posits God as caused or dependant? Since this seems a major concern of yours, note the following quote and works for reference:
The “classical” conception of God includes God's necessary existence." This is from Christopher Menzel, “Theism, Platonism, and the Metaphysics of Mathematics". as found in Michael Beaty', Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1990.
A few more references:
Morris, Thomas. Anselmian Explorations. Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1987.
Plantinga, Alvin. Does God Have a Nature? Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980.
Adams, Robert. "Divine Necessity." Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 741-746.
You have suggested that something exists or once existed and that just about everything originates from this one thing. It has to be in the realm of scientific investigation. You're just arguing that science should stay away from such questions because the answer may be different from what you assume.
No, I said what I said because I understand the logic of science: what it can and cannot do.
That's not a good reason for baseless speculation in attributing "God" as the answer...
Your comment doesn't relate to my comment which replies to why science cannot address the topic.
Sorry I don't have the time to respond to the rest of your statements Pindar, perhaps later... it's almost midnight now where I am...
OK.
Rodion Romanovich
01-08-2007, 21:39
More factitiousness I see.
Is that the proof or not? You're avoiding the question instead of answering it with a simple yes or no.
A definition is not a proof. A definition is an explanation of the meaning of a word/concept. Necessary and contingent being are not new ideas. Both notions are part and parcel of the earliest logical inquiries into ontology going back over two millennia.
I never stated that a definition was a proof. On the contrary, I stated that you try to abuse the ability to define words to make conclusions that don't follow from your statements. You define a word X (which often means something else Z in its daily usage) to mean something that requires it to have a certain property Y, then you state that you've proved that all Z have property Y, when you actually said that in order for it to be an X it must have property Y, and called X by the name usually used for Z. I'll give an example of another way this can be applied:
1. Define an apple to refer to what is mostly referred to as a banana
2. Notice that what you're now calling apple looks like a banana
3. Make the conclusion that apples look like bananas
4. Present your findings as apple (now with apple referring to what most people call an apple) look like bananas
This is probably the most common type of fallacy I see in modern attempts at logical argumentation.
I noted you didn't give any examples of uncaused contingent beings so I assume you would agree such is absurd.
What is your definition of uncaused contingent being? What is your definition of contingent being? In order to be able to state that an X with property Y exists it's necessary to know what your definition of an X is. To demand that I have the burden of proof to show that an X with property Y exists is as if I now asked you to show a "fsagfadfgsd" that fulfills property "dfagfsd". What is the difference between a contingent and non-contingent being? What is a being as opposed to a non-being? Explain this, and I will be able to point out another fallacy in your argumentation, the place where the fallacy is will depend on how you've chosen to define these words.
This comment doesn't relate to my post. It is also a non sequitur.
The comment is very much related to le poste you made. It's a reductio ad absurdum of one of the premises you state are true and that you based your entire argumentation on.
No such claim has been made.
Now if not everything needs to have a cause, as you originally stated, then your "proof" falls apart because it no longer becomes any form of contradiction (which it never becomes anyway) because things no longer need an infinite chain of causes and effects.
I should also make you aware that Aristotle, who is perhaps the most famous source for the proof, believed the earth was eternal (this of course was a major issue for Christian Medievals like St. Thomas to deal with). Your post suggests you do not understand the position. Maybe I haven't explained it well or maybe your hostility is blinding you to the argument.
Maybe your paranoia is preventing you from seeing that I'm arguing against the logical fallacies in your post, and not attacking you as a person. That your logic is failing and that I've demonstrated your fallacies doesn't justify you making personal attacks on me, or accusing me of doing it on you. If you want to be a philosopher then debate like Socrates - attack arguments, not persons. Don't try to stir up conflict by accusing people or trying to hide the fallacies in your arguments rather than arguing why they aren't fallacies, or changing your position when it has been proven wrong. We're not having a fight here, we're evaluating a series of deductions.
An event is something that happens. An action (a verb) requires something that acts ( a noun). If you wish to argue that there are non-being actors we can discuss that idea, otherwise events are not separate from beings.
The event "apple falls in the head" doesn't require a God, human or other being to act. A stone falling from above is an actor that doesn't have a will and isn't an organism or being. It can be caused by something, and be the cause of things. A stone or apple falling in the head can cause the death of a being, even if the stone is not a being. A laboratory mix of non-organic matter with high temperature has spontanely given rise to self-replicating molecules, i.e. life - thus temperature and matter - not beings - can yield a being, life.
The same applies to phenomena.
Phenomenon denotes a state of things, or a pattern of changes of states of things, often recurring themes of cause-and-effect chains.
The Big Bang is an event. The bang relates to something banging, as it were. If you believe there was a bang, but nothing was banged then one would have to wonder how it relates to the universe which includes a whole host of somethings taken as the outcrop of a banging.
Obviously plenty of matter and energy colliding in one spot caused the bang, what else? Well, maybe something unknown that we have yet to discover. You tell me
Of course, the other point I made on the Big Bang also still applies: the Big Bang has a beginning.
Why? You could state that there was a bang caused out of nothing just as well as you can state that there was a God created out of nothing. Before you can show that God didn't need to be caused by something, Big Bang is just as good a candidate.
Note: the lie reference is a bit disturbing in its invective. Your hostility is starting to sound more like simple oppositionism.
Again please read Socrates' instructions for discussion. This is a philosophical discussion not a matter of showing who entered the discussion with the least flawed opinion. If you like me learn to change opinion when you "lose" a discussion, you'll refine your opinions and defeat prejudice, and thus win something from it. Accusations and intrigue might work in a lawyers position, but within philosophy nobody listens to anything but validity of arguments. The word lie in the context of logic refers to a statement that isn't true.
Logic doesn't turn on truth. It turns on validity. Regardless, a conclusion is not an assumption which is where your original charge was confused.
You seem to be forgetting some of the basics of logic. A conclusion is an implication of the form:
p1 ^ p2 ^... ^ pn => c
where p1..pn denotes premises and c denotes the conclusion. Thus, if p1..pn are true, then it follows that c is true. If p1..pn are false, then c is false. If the conjunction of p1..pn has an unknown truth value, the truth value of c is unknown. Logic provides an ability to check the validity of c assuming p1..pn are true, but contributes little to telling us whether the conjuction of p1..pn is true or not. However it tells us that it's necessary that p1..pn are true before c can be considered true. Thus it's a necessary but not sufficient condition for you to either choose p1..pn that are axioms accepted as true by everyone, or show that p1..pn can be deduced from axioms accepted by everyone, if you want to show that your conclusion is true in reality and not just in some imaginary, hypothetical, made up alternate universe that doesn't necessarily exist. The necessary and sufficient conditions are that both the premises are ture and the conclusion carried out by valid rules of deduction. Now in your "proof", I've shown that you fulfill neither of the requirements in your proof attempt. A proof attempt with neither correct deduction by the rules of logic nor correct premises is not acceptable to a philosopher or expert at logics.
Sjakihata
01-08-2007, 21:49
In formal logic you can actually have several premises that are false and a valid/true conclusion. As long as all premises arent false and the conclusion is true, it's not a problem.
Rodion Romanovich
01-08-2007, 21:58
In formal logic a conclusion is an implication from a conjuction of statements to a single statement. A conjunction is true if and only if all of the statements are true. However you can have premises of the form: (x or y), in which case either x or y need to be true for that premise to be true. So what you're saying is correct, but might confuse a beginner at logics. I'll give a few examples:
(each row above ==== is a premise, the row beneath ==== is the conclusion)
x or y
z
===
c
This one is true if either (x and z) or (y and z) is true, but y and z, respectively, can be false in these cases. However (x or y) is counted as a single premise by the normal terminology, therefore you can't say that a premise can be false for the conjuction to be true.
Now the second step is the implication, which has the truth table:
a b a=>b
F F T
F T T
T F F
T T T
which means that the conclusion can indeed be true even if the premises aren't true. But if the premises aren't true, then we have no GUARANTEE that the conclusion is true. I'll give an example:
the sun is blue
==============
bill gates is the devil
This isn't a valid logical argument, but it doesn't rule out the possibility that bill gates is the devil. However, to go claiming that you've proven that bill gates is the devil by this argument is not logically correct.
1+1=3
3+1=4
=====
1+1+1 = 4
The above is a perfectly valid deduction, but not true in the real world since one of the premises used isn't true in the real world.
1+1=3
3-1=1
=====
1+1-1=1
Here is an example of where a perfectly valid logical deduction based on false premises results in a correct deduction. However if we receive the statements 1+1=3 and 3-1=1 we have not guarantee whatsoever that any valid deductions we make from them will be true in real life, since 1+1=3 and 3-1=1 aren't true in real life. So if we make another attempt of using 1+1=3 and 3-1=1 we may for example get:
1+1=3
3-1=1
=====
(1+1-1)+1=3
which isn't true in real life. The lesson to be learnt is the following: if we have a series of statements of which not all are true, and try to prove things based on them, we have no guarantee whatsoever that our conclusion will be true. Occasionally we may get lucky and come to conclusions that are true, but only pure luck can result in true conclusions when not all of the premises are true. You basically can't claim that something is true if you've come up with it by deducing it from a set of lies. To go claim any of these things as if they were proven is a huge fallacy.
In formal logic you can actually have several premises that are false and a valid/true conclusion. As long as all premises arent false and the conclusion is true, it's not a problem.
In fact now that I think about, you forgot that in fact ALL premises can be false and the conclusion still correct, as my second last example above shows. The truth table of implications state that the implication is true if F => T.
Is that the proof or not? You're avoiding the question instead of answering it with a simple yes or no.
Am I to take the above as meaning you engaged specific points of something you weren't sure was an argument/proof? This was despite the fact I presented the context as well as the argument itself pages ago? If so, that is telling. It speaks to your understanding. As to the question above: the answer, which seems rather obvious to me, is: yes.
I never stated that a definition was a proof.
This seems to be saying just that:
"You're basically making a circular proof here: you define the following entities:
- necessary being = a being that doesn't need to be created
- contingent being = a being that needs to be created
And from this you make the conclusion: a necessary being doesn't need to be created, and a contingent being needs to be created. That's a circular proof, that you have attempted to camouflage by hiding half of the circle in a definition."
If that was not what you were saying then the above doesn't seem to have any clear meaning.
On the contrary, I stated that you try to abuse the ability to define words to make conclusions that don't follow from your statements.
Show me where I did this.
What is your definition of uncaused contingent being? What is your definition of contingent being?
I agree with the standard definition of contingent being: something whose existence is separate from its essence, something that could be otherwise meaning it has no logical ontic necessity, something caused etc. Perhaps the simplest definition is: something that depends on something else for its existence.
I think uncaused contingent being is an absurdity as the adjectives are self-refuting.
What is the difference between a contingent and non-contingent being?
Necessity and causality.
What is a being as opposed to a non-being?
A being is something with ontic standing. A non-being lacks this property.
The comment is very much related to le poste you made.
No, it doesn't connect to any position of mine, nor does it seem coherent.
Now if not everything needs to have a cause, as you originally stated, then your "proof" falls apart because it no longer becomes any form of contradiction (which it never becomes anyway) because things no longer need an infinite chain of causes and effects.
This comment doesn't relate to the argument.
Maybe your paranoia is preventing you from seeing that I'm arguing against the logical fallacies in your post, and not attacking you as a person. That your logic is failing and that I've demonstrated your fallacies doesn't justify you making personal attacks on me, or accusing me of doing it on you. If you want to be a philosopher then debate like Socrates - attack arguments, not persons. Don't try to stir up conflict by accusing people or trying to hide the fallacies in your arguments rather than arguing why they aren't fallacies, or changing your position when it has been proven wrong. We're not having a fight here, we're evaluating a series of deductions.
Typically, I have a hard time trying figuring out what your posts are trying to say. There is always plenty of verbiage and accusations about fallacies, but distilling a coherent stance from your posts is hard for me to do. The hostile quality seems fairly clear however, the repeated use of scare quotes and charges of lying are two simple examples. If that is not your intent I suggest a different tone.
An event is something that happens. An action (a verb) requires something that acts ( a noun). If you wish to argue that there are non-being actors we can discuss that idea, otherwise events are not separate from beings.
The event "apple falls in the head" doesn't require a God, human or other being to act. A stone falling from above is an actor that doesn't have a will and isn't an organism or being. It can be caused by something, and be the cause of things. A stone or apple falling in the head can cause the death of a being, even if the stone is not a being. A laboratory mix of non-organic matter with high temperature has spontanely given rise to self-replicating molecules, i.e. life - thus temperature and matter - not beings - can yield a being, life.
The above doesn't reply to my comment. An event whether a falling apple or falling rock still requires a being performing the act.
Phenomenon denotes a state of things, or a pattern of changes of states of things, often recurring themes of cause-and-effect chains.
Same point as above.
Obviously plenty of matter and energy colliding in one spot caused the bang, what else?
You have made my point.
Why? You could state that there was a bang caused out of nothing just as well as you can state that there was a God created out of nothing.
Ex nihilo creation with no prior being is an absurdity. If you hold this view then you are outside of the Rational Tradition.
The word lie in the context of logic refers to a statement that isn't true.
No such vernacular exists. A lie is a deception. To claim someone lied is to claim they have deceived.
Logic doesn't turn on truth. It turns on validity. Regardless, a conclusion is not an assumption which is where your original charge was confused.
You seem to be forgetting some of the basics of logic.
No, I have not. A conclusion is not an assumption. It is simply the consequent of its premises. The proper use of logic demonstrates validity not truth.
I didn't know Carnegie was an athiest. That's quite interesting.
Claudius the God
01-09-2007, 05:05
don't forget this one Pindar, I hoped you would respond to it:
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/branden.htm
THE CONCEPT OF GOD
The following argument by Nathanial Branden does, I think, counter successfully ANY "creationism" or "big bang" idea: "FIRST CAUSE" IS EXISTENCE, NOT GOD
Question: Since everything in the universe requires a cause, must not the universe itself have a cause, which is god?
Answer:
There are two basic fallacies in this argument. The first is the assumption that, if the universe required a causal explanation, the positing of a "god" would provide it. To posit god as the creator of the universe is only to push the problem back one step farther: Who then created the god? Was there still an earlier god who created the god in question? We are thus led to an infinite regress - the very dilemma that the positing of a "god" was intended to solve. But if it is argued that no one created god, that god does not require a cause, that god has existed eternally - then on what grounds is it denied that the universe has existed eternally?
It is true that there cannot be an infinite series of antecedent causes. But recognition of this fact should lead one to reappraise the validity of the initial question, not to attempt to answer it by stepping outside the universe into some gratuitously invented supernatural dimension.
This leads to the second and more fundamental fallacy in this argument: the assumption that the universe as a whole requires a causal explanation. It does not. The universe is the total of that which exists. Within the universe, the emergence of new entities can be explained in terms of the actions of entities that already exist: The cause of a tree is the seed of the parent tree; the cause of a machine is the purposeful reshaping of matter by men. All actions presuppose the existence of entities - and all emergences of new entities presuppose the existence of entities that caused their emergence. All causality presupposes the existence of something that acts as a cause. To demand a cause for all of existence is to demand a contradiction: if the cause exists, it is part of existence; if it does not exist, it cannot be a cause. Nothing cannot be the cause of something. Nothing does not exist. Causality presupposes existence; existence does not presuppose causality. There can be no cause "outside" of existence or "anterior" to it. The forms of existence may change and evolve, but the fact of existence is the irreducible primary at the base of all causal chains. Existence - not "god" - is the First Cause.
Just as the concept of causality applies to events and entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole - so the concept of time applies to events and entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole. The universe did not "begin" - it did not, at some point in time "spring into being." Time is a measurement of motion. Motion presupposes entities that move. If nothing existed, there could be no time. Time is "in" the universe; the universe is not "in" time.
The man who asks, "Where did existence come from?" or "What caused it?" is the man who has never grasped that existence exists. This is the mentality of a savage or a mystic who regards existence as some sort of incomprehensible miracle - and seeks to "explain" it by reference to non-existence.
Existence is all that exists, the nonexistent does not exist; there is nothing for existence to have come out of - and nothing means nothing. If you are tempted to ask, "What's outside the universe?" - recognize that you are asking, "What's outside of existence?" and that the idea of "something outside of existence" is a contradiction in terms; nothing is outside of existence, and "nothing" is not just another kind of "something" - it is nothing. Existence exists: you cannot go outside it; you cannot get under it, on top of it, or behind it. Existence exists - and only existence exists: There is nowhere else to go.
-- Nathaniel Branden
This is quite wrong. Let's see if I can demonstrate the problem another way: Imagine an Island where yourself and a few others were raised by a robotic care system named Robert Graves. One day one of your fellow Islanders named Barry asks: "Claudius, what does the latter part of your name mean?" "I'm referring to the attending article and noun: the God?" "It sounds like a title, but what kind of title?' Not sure, you decide to ask the computer. The computer (Robert Graves) then explains the wherefore of the title in regards to literature ala the Classicist Graves' work (who the robot is named after), Roman apotheosis and the base meaning of God itself. It explains the last notion as a supposed supreme being that is the maximal expression of all positive traits: knowledge, morality etc. often taken as a devotional locus. After hearing this Barry explains "That's dumb! How could anyone ever believe in such a thing." You and a few others who had gathered to listen to Robert Graves' explanation then laugh exclaiming "Quite so, it's an amazing idea, but clearly primitive." Now according to your position neither yourself, Barry or any other on the Island could be atheists despite the fact they understand the meaning God and reject it because there are no theist supporters to stand in opposition.
Clever, but flawed. the very term "the God" exists from prior ideas. the explanation offered by the robot comes from pre-existing human-based ideas and arguments for the existence of deities... just because you have a robot explaining a concept in an unbiased manner doesn't mean that it is the source of the idea. the idea would come from someone else, earlier, who would argue for the existence of one or more gods, the human characters would be Atheists because they disagree with pre-existing ideas. the very term "the God" would not come out of thin air, it would have to be based on an earlier idea... otherwise the term "the God" is completely meaningless in the first place...
you put a mechanical construct in place to put an unbiassed view. Atheists, Agnostics and Theists would not be unbiassed, even if they didn't "know for certain", or make an argument of some sort
Hmmm, I assume the logical absurdity is clear from the above. Looking at your emphasis: the proof establishes the existence of necessary being. God is by definition a necessary being and no other coherent alternative to necessary being has been put forward. Thus, the identified necessary being is God. As I explained to BG: in the proof I am making a sufficiency argument.
you have to give a good argument that "god is by definition a necessary being" first... (see below...)
it wouldn't need an alternative necessary being. you choose to put God as the necessary being because it is convenient to do so, not because there is proof that it is non-contingent in the first place. and further, please read the article at the beginning of this post if you haven't already...
It is not based on imagination, but logic. Science doesn't apply.
It is not logical to create an entity to answer an important problem/question when there is no evidence for its existence (the entity) in the first place. The question simply remains unanswered until such time as there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic answer. Yours is simply a 'God of the Gaps' argument hidden behind an argument that is flawed to begin with (see the article...)
Claudius my good fellow, are you aware of any intellectual system concerned with Deity that posits God as caused or dependant? Since this seems a major concern of yours, note the following quote and works for reference:
The “classical” conception of God includes God's necessary existence." This is from Christopher Menzel, “Theism, Platonism, and the Metaphysics of Mathematics". as found in Michael Beaty', Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1990.
A few more references:
Morris, Thomas. Anselmian Explorations. Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1987.
Plantinga, Alvin. Does God Have a Nature? Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980.
Adams, Robert. "Divine Necessity." Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 741-746.
even several religions have gods that are caused or dependant - a study of ancient egyptian mythology shows that several "parental" gods were invented to answer questions of where one or another god came from...
numerous polytheistic beliefs have one or more deities as the cause (child/children) of another deity or group of deities...
as more gods were invented to explain where others came from (the beginnings of an infinite regress) various alternative explanations were given to stop people from asking the questions of "where did God/s come from?"
as for your reference, it is neither detailed nor informative; and it deals with "necessity" rather than "non-contingent nature of..." deities. Any culture unable to answer important questions will have the divine or supernatural as "necessary" to explain the unexplainable. Such views are primitive and do more to stop people asking important questions rather than answering questions with any level of certainty or reliability.
Do these other sources of yours have better explanations of why "God is non-contingent by definition" ?
Rodion Romanovich
01-09-2007, 10:48
Am I to take the above as meaning you engaged specific points of something you weren't sure was an argument/proof?
Unlike you I don't engage in jumping conclusions, so I assumed it was the proof but couldn't be sure of it until you had confirmed it. It was still possible to point out fallacies while I awaited your response.
the answer, which seems rather obvious to me
One can't jump conclusions no matter how intuitively obvious they seem
This seems to be saying just that:
"You're basically making a circular proof here: you define the following entities:
- necessary being = a being that doesn't need to be created
- contingent being = a being that needs to be created
And from this you make the conclusion: a necessary being doesn't need to be created, and a contingent being needs to be created. That's a circular proof, that you have attempted to camouflage by hiding half of the circle in a definition."
If that was not what you were saying then the above doesn't seem to have any clear meaning.
It seems like you don't understand the mistake you're making. Definitions are never proofs, but you take advantage of definitions to make circular proof. Another example, since you still don't understand:
1. define apple as everything that is green
2. then somehow make the correct conclusion that a green car is an apple (according to the definition of apple you made)
3. go around bragging about having proven that green cars are apples. Well with the new definition of apple that would be true, but your reasoning is equivalent to claiming you've proven that green cars are apples where apples is used in the old meaning.
Show me where I did this.
Ok, I'll show you again: you're defining a non-contingent being as a being that doesn't have to have a cause. In the first step you (implicitly) define God as anything that isn't caused by something else, while later (after the 7 points) you let God denote a God that has other properties as well, such as that you can pray to him, that he is good, etc. In reality your proof, hypothetically assuming it is correct (which it isn't) would only prove the existence of ANY causa prima non causata, not necessarily God. You're using a circular proof by redefinition, one of the most common fallacies these days. Definitions of words must be fixed throughout the deduction. For example this is allowed:
1. define an apple as what is normally known as a banana
2. somehow prove the apple (with our new definition) is yellow
3. claim that it's been proven that an apple (with the new definition of apple) is yellow. But also be aware that this doesn't apply to the apple previously referred to as apple.
But if you present the conclusion in no. 3 with apple referring to apple using the old definition, then you've made a fallacy.
I agree with the standard definition of contingent being: something whose existence is separate from its essence, something that could be otherwise meaning it has no logical ontic necessity, something caused etc. Perhaps the simplest definition is: something that depends on something else for its existence.
By that definition, the contingent being can be both a phenomenon, a dead item, or a living creature.
Necessity and causality.
In your very definition you're assuming that it's necessary for a non-contingent being to exist. By adding the necessity into the definition you've already decided that it must exist, and you don't need a proof to show it. That's yet another example of cheating by using the power of defining the words. Here's an equivalent proof of God's existence:
1. define God as something that is necessary to exist
2. then it follows from the definition that God exists
As you can probably see this "proof" is obviously absurd. Your proof uses the same trick, but uses more steps in a way that hides this fallacy better, but it's quite obvious if you look for it carefully.
A being is something with ontic standing. A non-being lacks this property.
Fair enough, that means a being is everything that exists, which means it includes both phenomenons, dead items and living creatures.
No, it doesn't connect to any position of mine, nor does it seem coherent.
Yes it does. There is a perfectly equivalent reasoning regarding the Integer numbers, in which the accepted conclusion is that there is an infinite number of integers, not that there must be a largest possible integer. Let me phrase it in terms equivalent to your first 4 points:
1. integers exist
2. integers have a successor
3. the successor of an integer can't be itself as an iteger can't be its own successor
4. the successor of an integer must be another integer or a non-integer
From this, using your type of reasoning, you would come to the conclusion that the above is an infinite regress: a logical fallacy, which would make you consider it necessary for a largest possible integer to exist. However nobody today refutes that an infinite number of integers exist. They don't claim that there exists an integer larger than all other integers and that doesn't have a successor, or that the successor of some very large integer is a non-integer.
Here are your first four points for comparison. Can you spot any difference in the methodology?
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
This comment doesn't relate to the argument.
Yes it does. The validity of your introduction of an entity defined as something that must exist, then claiming that you proved that that thing must exist, is questionable to say the least.
Typically, I have a hard time trying figuring out what your posts are trying to say. There is always plenty of verbiage and accusations about fallacies, but distilling a coherent stance from your posts is hard for me to do. The hostile quality seems fairly clear however, the repeated use of scare quotes and charges of lying are two simple examples. If that is not your intent I suggest a different tone.
Can you please stop the personal attacks and accusations of personal attacks and concentrate of the topic being discussed? These ridiculous accusations won't make your incorrect arguments less fallacious. And if you think pointing out fallacies in a logical argument is a personal attack, then you obviously have little experience in philosophical discussions since getting his fallacies pointed out is normally something a philosopher is happy about.
The above doesn't reply to my comment. An event whether a falling apple or falling rock still requires a being performing the act.
So you mean every meteorite that falls to the ground requires a living creature to perform the act? An apple falling from a tree requiring a living creature to act?
Ex nihilo creation with no prior being is an absurdity. If you hold this view then you are outside of the Rational Tradition.
So if ex nihilo creation is an absurdity, how can God be created ex nihilo and not be an absurdity? You're attempting to refute my statements with arguments that would refute your own, but when I point out that they refute your own, you claim they don't apply. You've basically DEFINED God as something that can be created ex nihilo, but that definition isn't valid if you elsewhere claim that nothing can be created ex nihilo. For that definition of God to be legal in the logical reasoning, you must first show that something that is created ex nihilo can exist. It's not enough to simply define a word with the meaning "a thing that doesn't need to be created". That's abusing the ability to define words.
No such vernacular exists. A lie is a deception. To claim someone lied is to claim they have deceived.
You are apparently not familiar with the terminology within the subject. And neither do you seem familiar with the fact that the same words are sometimes used with different meanings, something that often (as in your failed proof above) leads to incorrect arguments that at first sight seem correct to beginners at logic and philosophy. To present such an incorrect argument as correct even after it has been shown to be against the rules of logic is nothing but deception.
No, I have not. A conclusion is not an assumption. It is simply the consequent of its premises. The proper use of logic demonstrates validity not truth.
My dear friend, stop putting words in my mouth. If you do it because you don't understand what I'm saying, then I forgive you for you do not know what you're doing. But if it's an attempt to hide the truth in a philosophical discussion then you should be ashamed - the purpose of philosophy is to find the truth - philo = love, sophia = truth/wisdom. A conclusion is a statement that is guaranteed to be correct assuming the premises are correct. To have a proof, you need to prove not only that the conclusion is correctly deduced from the premises, but also that every premise is either proven to be true, or an ontologic axiom.
A few examples of a valid logical argument with premises not proven to be correct, to show how absurd your statement is:
god exists
the sky is blue
=======
therefore god exists
1+1=3
3+1=5
=====
therefore (1+1)+1=5
gravity doesn't exist
no other forces that affect something floating in the air exist
============
therefore I'll not fall to the ground if I jump from a church tower
All these examples are perfectly valid logical arguments, but the premises are incorrect. If you base a conclusion on incorrect premises, the conclusion isn't guaranteed to be true, and most of the time isn't, although sometimes you get lucky. Furtherfore, if you haven't proven the premises to be true, the conclusion isn't proven to be true just because you showed a correct deduction from the premises. All you've proven is that ASSUMING the premises are true, the conclusion will be true.
Is it now finally obvious to you that you need to prove the correctness of not only the deduction but also your premises before you've proven the conclusion to be true? Once you agree to that I will go back to your proof attempt and summarize all of the most obvious fallacies in it.
Sjakihata
01-09-2007, 14:00
I
In fact now that I think about, you forgot that in fact ALL premises can be false and the conclusion still correct, as my second last example above shows. The truth table of implications state that the implication is true if F => T.
Of course it can, however, false premises and a true conclusion renders the form and thus the argument invalid. That is the only thing you are looking for in formal logic when examining truth tables or trees, false premises and a true conclusion. I know how it works, I have studied logic on university level.
Now the second step is the implication, which has the truth table:
a b a=>b
F F T
F T T
T F F
T T T
That truth table buggers me. This one is the right one:
A B A-->B
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
That is the truth table for the implication. A --> B is true, if and only if it is not the case that that A is true and B is false, false in all other cases.
I just wrote it the way I use to, starting with T.
Rodion Romanovich
01-09-2007, 15:45
however, false premises and a true conclusion renders the form and thus the argument invalid. That is the only thing you are looking for in formal logic when examining truth tables or trees, false premises and a true conclusion
Actually you can make a valid argument (an argument that follows the inference rules) based on false premises and still end up with a true conclusion, but that you end up with a true conclusion is just pure luck in that case. For example:
1+1=3
3-1=1
=====
1+1-1=1
Here's the definition of valid argument I'm using (and that I believe is the most widely spread definition): Let p be a conjunction of a set of premises and c be a statement. A valid argument is one where p => c has truth value true, and for that to happen it must be the case that either (a and c), (not a and c) or (not a and not c). That is, a valid argument only tells us that assuming that p is true for sure, c will be true for sure, otherwise we can't know whether c is true or not (note we can then neither state that c is false nor that it is true - it could be either).
Here's the definition of a proven argument I'm using: A proven argument is one where we know for sure that c is true. And for us to be able to without doubt state that the conclusion is true we need: (c or ((p => c) and p)) to be true. Calculating (c or ((p => c) and p)) gives exactly c. In order to calculate (c or ((p => c) and p)) we must either know that the conclusion is true beforehand, or we must know that both the premises are true and the argument is valid.
I think you're saying the same thing I'm saying, but using different words. While logic is mostly concerned with checking whether deductions follow the inference rules or not, logic also provides us with the necessary requirements for applying logic in a real life setting. The field of logic requires that our premises are true in real life if our proof is to be true for sure in real life. Now our premises can either be conclusions based on other premises, or axioms. If they're axioms, it's a matter of ontology to decide whether they're true or not. If they're conclusions based on other premises, it's however perfectly valid to apply logic to evaluate them. A paradoxical premise isn't a valid basis for an argument, for example.
don't forget this one Pindar, I hoped you would respond to it...
OK, The fellow presents two challenges. The first he answers himself: "But if it is argued that no one created god, that god does not require a cause, that god has existed eternally - then on what grounds is it denied that the universe has existed eternally?" He then ties the first challenge into the second: the universe has existed eternally. I assume this means be rejects the Big Bang as the start of the universe. He states: "(There is) the assumption that the universe as a whole requires a causal explanation. It does not. The universe is the total of that which exists." From this statement the author seems to recognize the universe as the name for a set that includes subsets (planets, stars, Bill Clinton etc.) This grouping of disparate entities into a larger whole is a mental activity. The labeling of a group is a mental construct. The label has no standing outside of that context. For example a baseball team representing the players: the team is the respective players but doesn't have a separate and distinct reality independent of the players, meaning it isn't a being itself, simply a label. In short, a baseball team or the universe isn't a being, but a label ( a mental construct). Therefore, the universe cannot be a contingent being let alone a necessary being.
Clever, but flawed. the very term "the God" exists from prior ideas. the explanation offered by the robot comes from pre-existing human-based ideas and arguments for the existence of deities... just because you have a robot explaining a concept in an unbiased manner doesn't mean that it is the source of the idea. the idea would come from someone else, earlier, who would argue for the existence of one or more gods, the human characters would be Atheists because they disagree with pre-existing ideas. the very term "the God" would not come out of thin air, it would have to be based on an earlier idea... otherwise the term "the God" is completely meaningless in the first place...
you put a mechanical construct in place to put an unbiassed view. Atheists, Agnostics and Theists would not be unbiassed, even if they didn't "know for certain", or make an argument of some sort.
You claimed: to be an atheist one has to have the concept God they reject and an attending theism or theist to disagree with. Note your earlier statement:
"An Atheist cannot be an Atheist unless he understands the basic concept of theism and is contrary to this... and in a realistic setting, it would almost certainly require a theistic person of some sort whose basic argument the Atheist disagrees with."
It's what follows the ellipsis that I reject. In my example there are no theists or theism put forward, simply an explanation of the concept by a robot. If our Island dwellers, based on their reaction to Graves' explanation, are atheists then your earlier charge about needing theists or theism is wrong.
you have to give a good argument that "god is by definition a necessary being" first... (see below...)
it wouldn't need an alternative necessary being. you choose to put God as the necessary being because it is convenient to do so, not because there is proof that it is non-contingent in the first place. and further, please read the article at the beginning of this post if you haven't already...
Understanding God is a necessary being is part and parcel of the meaning of God since the topic has found place in intellectual discourse. This is based on the logic of perfection that informs Greek Thought. God is perfect. The meaning of perfect includes many things. One of those things is an ontic independence. If something is dependent on another then it is lacking/deficient in some way. What is lacking cannot claim God standing.
It is not logical to create an entity to answer an important problem/question when there is no evidence for its existence (the entity) in the first place. The question simply remains unanswered until such time as there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic answer. Yours is simply a 'God of the Gaps' argument hidden behind an argument that is flawed to begin with (see the article...)
As explained before metaphysics is not amenable to science. Evidence is the wrong vernacular.
even several religions have gods that are caused or dependant...
I referenced intellectual systems. This means systems that are informed by reason. Necessary and contingent being are logical terms. They are only meaningful under that guise. There are no examples of a rational inquiry on God that I know of that uses contingency language for God as it would be incoherent.
Any culture unable to answer important questions will have the divine or supernatural as "necessary" to explain the unexplainable. Such views are primitive and do more to stop people asking important questions rather than answering questions with any level of certainty or reliability.
Necessary being and that notion equated to God is not a devotional construct. It's source is secular.
Do these other sources of yours have better explanations of why "God is non-contingent by definition" ?
Why God is non-contingent was explained above. Within rational (philosophical) discourse I believe this is universally accepted as definitionally necessary based on Divine perfection. It is tantamount to questioning why a square has four sides. If there is a God, then in order for the concept to be coherent certain properties apply.
Unlike you I don't engage in jumping conclusions, so I assumed it was the proof but couldn't be sure of it...
To assume is to conclude. I don't think your statement is credible. I think you were simply being factitious.
It seems like you don't understand the mistake you're making. Definitions are never proofs, but you take advantage of definitions to make circular proof.
The proof is not circular. Contingency and necessity are not novel terms. They are rather basic to ontic inquiry.
On the contrary, I stated that you try to abuse the ability to define words to make conclusions that don't follow from your statements.
Show me where I did this.
Ok, I'll show you again: you're defining a non-contingent being as a being that doesn't have to have a cause. In the first step you (implicitly) define God as anything that isn't caused by something else, while later (after the 7 points) you let God denote a God that has other properties as well, such as that you can pray to him, that he is good, etc.
Your comments do not reflect my argument. The first step is: "1- Contingent beings exist" There is no implicit definition of God noted there.
The proof is concerned with necessary being. I put the argument forward as a sufficiency argument. This means necessary being alone is taken as sufficient for a proof God exists. Other attributes of God are not relevant to the case.
By that definition, the contingent being can be both a phenomenon, a dead item, or a living creature.
Yes.
What is the difference between a contingent and non-contingent being?
Necessity and causality.
In your very definition you're assuming that it's necessary for a non-contingent being to exist.
You don't understand. There are only two traditional categories of being: necessary and contingent. What is necessary cannot be otherwise. The definition does not say such exists, but simply provides content/meaning to the notion. The argument does not assume a necessary being exists, it does conclude such however.
Fair enough, that means a being is everything that exists, which means it includes both phenomenons, dead items and living creatures.
Yes.
Yes it does. There is a perfectly equivalent reasoning regarding the Integer numbers, in which the accepted conclusion is that there is an infinite number of integers, not that there must be a largest possible integer. Let me phrase it in terms equivalent to your first 4 points:
1. integers exist
You are confused. Integers are not temporally laden. Integers do not exist (are not beings).
Now if not everything needs to have a cause, as you originally stated, then your "proof" falls apart because it no longer becomes any form of contradiction (which it never becomes anyway) because things no longer need an infinite chain of causes and effects.
This comment doesn't relate to the argument.
Yes it does. The validity of your introduction of an entity defined as something that must exist, then claiming that you proved that that thing must exist, is questionable to say the least.
I don't think you understand the argument.
Can you please stop the personal attacks and accusations of personal attacks
I object to your tone and charges of lying. Your posts need to be more sober.
The above doesn't reply to my comment. An event whether a falling apple or falling rock still requires a being performing the act.
So you mean every meteorite that falls to the ground requires a living creature to perform the act? An apple falling from a tree requiring a living creature to act?
No, an event, which means something happens, requires a something doing the act. If the event is a falling rock: the rock is the thing falling. There are no events outside of beings. Sentience is not relevant to the point.
So if ex nihilo creation is an absurdity, how can God be created ex nihilo and not be an absurdity?
It can't.
You've basically DEFINED God as something that can be created ex nihilo...
I have not made this claim.
No such vernacular exists. A lie is a deception. To claim someone lied is to claim they have deceived.
You are apparently not familiar with the terminology within the subject.
Actually, I'm very familiar. There is no logic specific vernacular for lie.
No, I have not. A conclusion is not an assumption. It is simply the consequent of its premises. The proper use of logic demonstrates validity not truth.
To have a proof, you need to prove not only that the conclusion is correctly deduced from the premises...
That is right. This correct relation between a conclusion and its premises is what is known as validity. Truth is not a factor.
Papewaio
01-09-2007, 21:49
You are confused. Integers are not temporally laden. Integers do not exist (are not beings).
So...
Would an integer be just a symbolic representation of something else. Just like a flag is a symbolic representation of something else. A flag of a country is not a country, but it is still a flag.
So I could hold 5 oranges but I could not hold the number 5 itself.
Rodion Romanovich
01-09-2007, 22:50
To assume is to conclude. I don't think your statement is credible. I think you were simply being factitious.
IIRC you stated in your previous post that:
No, I have not. A conclusion is not an assumption. It is simply the consequent of its premises. The proper use of logic demonstrates validity not truth.
This seems like a contradiction.
The proof is not circular. Contingency and necessity are not novel terms. They are rather basic to ontic inquiry.
Leprechauns isn't a novel term either, that doesn't make them more likely to exist. There are plenty of words in our language aimed at describing things that don't exist, most notably the word "nonexistence". And re the proof, it is indeed circular.
Your comments do not reflect my argument. The first step is: "1- Contingent beings exist" There is no implicit definition of God noted there.
Could you please tell me what type of God you've attempted to prove the existence of? Even IF your proof would be correct, the God you claim exists may be dead now for all we know, or evil, or not almighty, or neither of them. By the definition of God mostly used, that is not at all the same God your proof attempts to prove the existence of.
The proof is concerned with necessary being. I put the argument forward as a sufficiency argument. This means necessary being alone is taken as sufficient for a proof God exists. Other attributes of God are not relevant to the case.
The most common definition of God is someone who is good, almighty and exists today. Your proof, assuming it is correct (which it isn't) only proves that once there existed something that could be either good or evil, almighty or not almighty, and that doesn't exist today or doesn't exist today.
You don't understand. There are only two traditional categories of being: necessary and contingent. What is necessary cannot be otherwise. The definition does not say such exists, but simply provides content/meaning to the notion. The argument does not assume a necessary being exists, it does conclude such however.
No, you conclude it based on the notion that such a being can exist. Otherwise you can't conclude that it must exist in step 5. Because if a non-contingent being can't exist and is a contradiction, then any proof you present that the non-contingent being exists is based on the implicit assumption that it can exist.
You are confused. Integers are not temporally laden. Integers do not exist (are not beings).
I've never claimed them to be beings. I've shown an exactly similar form of argument where it isn't concluded that a first cause must exist.
I don't think you understand the argument.
I don't think you understand the argument.
I object to your tone and charges of lying. Your posts need to be more sober.
This isn't a court room, this is a philosophical debate. Coming with accusations and personal attacks as you do won't remedy the fact that your proof attempt isn't valid.
It can't.
So you're saying nothing can be created ex nihilo because it's an absurdity in your opinion, but God can be created ex nihilo?
Actually, I'm very familiar. There is no logic specific vernacular for lie.
You're proving here that you lack knowledge of the terminology. I used a word that is commonly used by all experts within the subject.
That is right. This correct relation between a conclusion and its premises is what is known as validity. Truth is not a factor.
That's sufficient for showing that the argument is valid. However, for the conclusion to be true you also need to show that the premises are true. Otherwise the deduction is worthless. A valid deduction on its own means: "assuming the premises are correct, c is correct". For that deduction to be a proof that something is true, that something exists etc., it's also necessary to show that the premises are true. Again I ask if you've understood this part. When you have understood that it's both necessary to show have premises that are true, and a valid deduction in order to prove that the conclusion is true, I will give a short summary of the fallacies in your argument. I hope you're happy that I'm sharing my knowledge in logics and appreciate what you learn here, otherwise the time I take to write down these basics about logic for you is wasted time. ~:cheers:
So I could hold 5 oranges but I could not hold the number 5 itself.
Correct.
So you're saying nothing can be created ex nihilo because it's an absurdity in your opinion, but God can be created ex nihilo?
I can take the liberty of answering that one, as it's obvious to me. God was not created- ex nihilo or otherwise.
Reenk Roink
01-09-2007, 23:15
The most common definition of God is someone who is good, almighty and exists today. Your proof, assuming it is correct (which it isn't) only proves that once there existed something that could be either good or evil, almighty or not almighty, and that doesn't exist today or doesn't exist today.
I think Pindar is saying that the God is the only one that could fit his necessary being (can you give another example?).
He is right that he does not need to speak of God's other attributes.
IIRC you stated in your previous post that:
To assume is to conclude. I don't think your statement is credible. I think you were simply being factitious... No, I have not. A conclusion is not an assumption. It is simply the consequent of its premises. The proper use of logic demonstrates validity not truth.
This seems like a contradiction.
Assumption are conclusions, but not all conclusions are assumptions. The one is a subset of the other. In the first, If someone says: I assume X. That X constitutes a judgment and in that sense involves a conclusion. In the second the focus is on logic. A conclusion is not an assumption, as say a premise may be, it is simply what cannot be otherwise given the premises.
The proof is not circular. Contingency and necessity are not novel terms. They are rather basic to ontic inquiry.
Leprechauns isn't a novel term either, that doesn't make them more likely to exist.
Does this mean you reject being exists or the logical designations: contingent and necessary? If you reject being then this discussion is rather odd. If you reject the logical designates for distinguishing the mode of being then you have rejected basic logic regarding ontology.
And re the proof, it is indeed circular.
No, it is not. To be circular one must assume the conclusion in a premise. The conclusion is: a necessary being must exist. No such premise is found in the proof.
Could you please tell me what type of God you've attempted to prove the existence of?
The standard notion of God as dictated in and through the Rational Tradition as first brought to the fore by the Greeks.
Even IF your proof would be correct, the God you claim exists may be dead now for all we know, or evil, or not almighty, or neither of them. By the definition of God mostly used, that is not at all the same God your proof attempts to prove the existence of.
The proof is correct. There are no examples of God in the larger Western Intellectual Tradition where necessity as an attribute is absent. This can be seen both in the secular and the rational religious tradition.
The most common definition of God is someone who is good, almighty and exists today. Your proof, assuming it is correct (which it isn't) only proves that once there existed something that could be either good or evil, almighty or not almighty, and that doesn't exist today or doesn't exist today.
A necessary being cannot cease to be by definition.
You don't understand. There are only two traditional categories of being: necessary and contingent. What is necessary cannot be otherwise. The definition does not say such exists, but simply provides content/meaning to the notion. The argument does not assume a necessary being exists, it does conclude such however.
No, you conclude it based on the notion that such a being can exist. Otherwise you can't conclude that it must exist in step 5. Because if a non-contingent being can't exist and is a contradiction, then any proof you present that the non-contingent being exists is based on the implicit assumption that it can exist.
You are confused. Step 5 cites the reductio absurdity if causality is solely from contingent beings. The rest of the above is incoherent.
I've never claimed them to be beings. I've shown an exactly similar form of argument where it isn't concluded that a first cause must exist.
If one asserts an X exists it must have being status. You claimed integers exist. This was a mistake. Further, integers are not temporally laden so they are not subject to cause: nothing requires integers have successors either. There is nothing about the number 4 that requires 5.
I don't think you understand the argument.
I understand my own argument. I also understand logic. I don't think you either understand the argument I put forward or logic.
This isn't a court room, this is a philosophical debate. Coming with accusations and personal attacks as you do won't remedy the fact that your proof attempt isn't valid.
I don't think our exchanges constitute a philosophical debate. I do think charging another with lying is inappropriate.
So you're saying nothing can be created ex nihilo because it's an absurdity in your opinion, but God can be created ex nihilo?
No, God cannot be created ex nihilo. Nothing can be created without a prior something: from nothing you get nothing.
You're proving here that you lack knowledge of the terminology. I used a word that is commonly used by all experts within the subject.
OK, let's have three citations.
That's sufficient for showing that the argument is valid. However, for the conclusion to be true you also need to show that the premises are true.
Validity is all logic is concerned with. A proof demonstrates validity. Truth is a separate criteria.
I hope you're happy that I'm sharing my knowledge in logics and appreciate what you learn here...
This will sound harsh, but your posts are mostly incoherent. I don't think you really understand even rudimentary logic. I'll give you some examples from your earlier posts:
god exists
the sky is blue
=======
therefore god exists
and
gravity doesn't exist
no other forces that affect something floating in the air exist
============
therefore I'll not fall to the ground if I jump from a church tower
The above are meaningless. Yet you asserted they are: "perfectly valid logical arguments...".
I can take the liberty of answering that one, as it's obvious to me. God was not created- ex nihilo or otherwise.
Correct.
I think Pindar is saying that the God is the only one that could fit his necessary being (can you give another example?).
Correct.
He is right that he does not need to speak of God's other attributes.
Also correct.
Beren Son Of Barahi
01-10-2007, 02:56
I was thinking about this whole topic, and i couldn't get my head around one aspect of it all...so i thought i would ask and see...
the thing is... the main problem with the big bang theory is as far as iv heard is that at some point there needs to be a start of things, i.e what was before the big bang? if thats so, why does it make more sense for there to be a god, and if so, what was there at the start of gods reign of terror? both theories fall over in the same way... except one says, we can't explain that yet, and the other says ah hah thats proof there is a god.
the other thing that strikes me is that both sides seem to focus on god rather then religions, to me if there is god or not is not nearly as important as religions role in the world, i think personally religion is what the athiest should be attacking/asking question about not weather there is a god or not.
I see myself as an athiest, but the main reason is not because i reject the idea of god (or belief in something, even one's self) but more so becuase i reject the religions attached to said god/s, my real issue isnt a god of some sort, but of religion. i see them as two separate and different issue. i can understand why people want religion, why people believe in god/s.
another thought i wanted to bring up is this: would you say it is fair to state that a higher portion of people who are : poor, uneducated, desperate, starving or poverty stricken have a higher likelihood to be deeply religious. If so why do you think thats the case?
Rodion Romanovich
01-10-2007, 11:39
@Pindar: You should realize that your position is quite weak here. Not only are you claiming to have proven the existence of God - something that the most renowned philosophers of history have failed at, but you also claim to be pointing out fallacies in "my statements" when what you truly criticise are things I've quoted right out of the literature on logic, accepted by all experts in the field of logic. When approaching a proof of God's existence, one must by nature be careful and critical, since nobody before has ever succeeded in proving his existence (or nonexistence for that matter). Since you were so stubbornly maintaining your view that you had proven his existence, I for a while thought that maybe you had made at least some progress in the field, but it turns out you haven't. It turns out that I've wasted my time. You've shown that you don't know the definition of the word "proof", yet you claim to have a proof of God's existence; you've shown that you don't understand the necessary conditions for a statement to be true, yet you claim to have proven a statement that God exists to be true; and you claim to know the terminology of logic, yet you don't understand it when I use it in my replies to your posts. Seeing as you repeatedly claim to know the terminology of logic rather than admitting you don't, I'll here explain in unambigious, precise terminology why you need to have both true premises and a correct deduction in order to have proven the conclusion to be true:
((p => c) and p) => (c is true),
but:
(p => c) => (c is either true or false)
If you understand logic you'll understand the above argument (which is a basic logical argument present in probably every textbook on logic that has been made), while if you don't understand logic terminology you can admit it and I can explain it again in natural language despite the ambiguousness and impreciseness of natural language. You're entitled to hold the opinion that all logic experts are wrong, but if you don't use correct logic rules throughout your conclusion and interpretation of the meaning of the result then you haven't made a conclusion by using logic. Then you have used your own rules, and you have proven the existence of God by arbitrary ontologic rules of your own making, and not by logic.
The above are meaningless. Yet you asserted they are: "perfectly valid logical arguments...".
If you don't even understand those examples, which are quite basic, I think you've proven beyond any doubt that your claims of knowing anything about logic are incorrect according to all textbooks on logic and all experts within the subject. If you don't understand the difference between valid logical argument and true conclusion I'm afraid you need to pick up a book on the basics of logic before you can understand anything of what I'm saying in this thread. They are meaningless, yes, but perfectly valid. They served to illustrate the definition of valid logical argument versus a logical argument that isn't meaningless.
As for your proof, a first necessary stop to be able to refute or confirm it is to rewrite it complete with three sections: first definitions of the words, then all assumptions made, then finally a part with the actual deduction steps divided in separate logical arguments. Since you keep refuting basic logic knowledge I throw at you, quoted directly from a logic textbook written by some of the most famous logic experts, I don't think you're capable of rewriting your proof in this way without first seeing an example of how it's done. I'll therefore do the first sketch of a rewriting for you and you can then change it if you think it doesn't mean the same thing as what you initially tried to say, until you're pleased with the argument in that it means what you initially tried to say, and I and all others who know something about logic and philosophy here are pleased with the completeness of the argument and the list of assumptions. After we've together presented your attempt at a proof into a formal and complete form and it according to your opinion means the same thing as your original incomplete "proof", the next step is to proceed and evaluate it.
PINDAR'S PROOF COMPLETED AND REWRITTEN IN A MORE FORMAL WAY
DEFINITIONS:
- contingent being - something that exists, and that has either existed always, or must have been caused by something else that existed at least at the time when the contingent being started to exist, but that cause doesn't necessarily have to still exist today. A contingent being can cause another contingent being.
- non-contingent being - something that exists, and that isn't caused by something else, but can cause a contingent being. What happens when the non-contingent being causes a contingent being isn't known, but unless more info is provided we can't know whether it's consumed and stops existing when it yields something, or continues to exist when it yields something
- necessary being - seems to have the same definition as non-contingent being. Therefore I'll replace it with non-contingent being where it occurs, in order to lower the level of confusion the proof attempt attempts to stir up to hide its fallacies
- God - is a non-contingent being, but a non-contingent being isn't necessarily God. A God has the additional properties of being almighty and good.
- being caused - you use it in the meaning "something else making something start to exist"
ASSUMPTIONS MADE:
a1. the cause and effect model is the exact truth. This is a dubious assumption since the continuous interaction model has mostly replaced cause and effect today - cause and effect is a discretized simplification of the continuous interaction model
a2. only things that exist at the time x is created can cause x
a3. no contingent being has existed forever (note this is necessary, because it suffices to have one contingent being that existed always to cause all other contingent beings)
a4. the definition of contingent being isn't a contradiction or otherwise impossible
a5. things that exist are either contingent or non-contingent beings. This must be listed as an assumption since contingent and non-contingent beings aren't exactly each other's complements in the properties outside the existence requirement, but only almost complements of each other. Not listing it under assumptions would be a fallacy.
a6. an infinite chain of the type mentioned in c4 below is impossible
PROOF ATTEMPT:
c1. contingent beings exist - this follows directly from the definition of contingent being and assumption a4
no contingent being has existed forever (a3)
contingent beings exist (c1)
only things that exist at the time x is created can cause x (a2)
==================
c2. a contingent being must thus have been caused by something else than itself, and that something must have existed at the time that the contingent being started to exist
contingent beings exist
c2
things that exist are either contingent or non-contingent beings (a5)
==================
c3. every contingent being must have been caused by either a contingent or a non-contingent being
c3
==================
c4. either there is an infinite chain of cause and effect, or at least one non-contingent being caused the first contingent being that existed, but that non-contingent being doesn't necessarily have to still exist today
c4
an infinite chain of the type mentioned in c4 is impossible
==================
c5. at least one non-contingent being must have existed at the time just before the first contingent being started to exist, but that non-contingent being doesn't necessarily have to still exist today
This is a valid and complete logical deduction, however the result of it isn't that God must exist, or that a non-contingent being must exist, or even that a non-contingent being must have existed by the time the first contingent being started to exist. It's a statement that says that "assuming the list of assumptions below are true, a non-contingent being must have existed once but doesn't necessarily exist now":
- the cause and effect model is the exact truth. This is a dubious assumption since the continuous interaction model has mostly replaced cause and effect today - cause and effect is a discretized simplification of the continuous interaction model
- only things that exist at the time x is created can cause x
- no contingent being has existed forever
- things that exist are either contingent or non-contingent beings. This must be listed as an assumption since contingent and non-contingent beings aren't exactly each other's complements in the properties outside the existence requirement, but only almost complements of each other. Not listing it under assumptions would be a fallacy.
- an infinite chain of the type mentioned in c4 below is impossible
- none of the definitions are contradictions in themselves or otherwise impossible
In order to prove that c5 is true it's necessary to first prove that all the assumptions that c5 is based on are true.
The above is an example of the sections needed in a complete proof in a serious philosophical discussion, so you should be able to mimic it and present your own proof in a similar way so that it is more complete and it's clear under which assumptions you claim your conclusion to be true, as well as a more clear division of the steps not into just the order if which they're performed, but into the separate logical deductions that are being carried out.
Banquo's Ghost
01-10-2007, 12:18
I don't think our exchanges constitute a philosophical debate. I do think charging another with lying is inappropriate.
I agree.
Any further accusations that people are lying when they are simply differing in opinion will be dealt with harshly.
This has been a constructive and fascinating debate, but is in new danger of sliding downhill. I would be loathe to lock it.
Let's keep to the arguments, and not attack the person behind them.
:bow:
Rodion Romanovich
01-10-2007, 12:24
Can you please also deal harshly with people who keep accusing others of personal attacks when they merely show fallacies in the arguments of the other? When I show a fallacy in Pindar's arguments it isn't a personal attack. But Pindar has accused me of personal attacks in every single post since I started showing the fallacies in his arguments. He probably knows I'm not making a personal attack on him when I'm showing the fallacies in his arguments.
Wiki: "A lie is an untruthful statement made to someone else with the intention to deceive. To lie is to say something one believes to be false with the intention that it be taken for the truth by someone else."
Thanks
:bow: :2thumbsup:
Banquo's Ghost
01-10-2007, 12:34
Can you please also deal harshly with people who keep accusing others of personal attacks when they merely show fallacies in the arguments of the other? When I show a fallacy in Pindar's arguments it isn't a personal attack. But Pindar has accused me of personal attacks in every single post since I started showing the fallacies in his arguments. He probably knows I'm not making a personal attack on him when I'm showing the fallacies in his arguments.
Wiki: "A lie is an untruthful statement made to someone else with the intention to deceive. To lie is to say something one believes to be false with the intention that it be taken for the truth by someone else."
Thanks
:bow: :2thumbsup:
I will deal fairly with everyone to the best of my ability.
As per your definition, I have seen no evidence from any direction of an intention to be deceitful, which is why accusations of lying are out of place.
Now, back to the debate.
:bow:
Rodion Romanovich
01-10-2007, 12:41
ok, I've edited out the word lie and replaced it with "incorrect according to all textbooks on logic and all experts within the subject". I hope this is an allowed phrasing :2thumbsup:
:bow:
Banquo's Ghost
01-10-2007, 13:36
ok, I've edited out the word lie and replaced it with "incorrect according to all textbooks on logic and all experts within the subject". I hope this is an allowed phrasing :2thumbsup:
:bow:
Much better, thank you. :bow:
Though I suspect you may need your list of references to hand. :wink:
@Pindar: You should realize that your position is quite weak here. Not only are you claiming to have proven the existence of God - something that the most renowned philosophers of history have failed at, but you also claim to be pointing out fallacies in "my statements" when what you truly criticise are things I've quoted right out of the literature on logic, accepted by all experts in the field of logic.
When one is quoting out of literature it is normally approiate to cite the reference, which I have yet to see in your posts.
PINDAR'S PROOF COMPLETED AND REWRITTEN IN A MORE FORMAL WAY
Actually I think Pinder's arguement follows this particlur course of logic then the one you are attempting to paint.
http://www.stats.uwaterloo.ca/~cgsmall/ontology.html
Rodion Romanovich
01-10-2007, 19:40
When one is quoting out of literature it is normally approiate to cite the reference, which I have yet to see in your posts.
It isn't normal to quote the source when using information that should be available in almost every single basic course text book on the subject. But it is normal to show some source when asked for it, and since you're doing so I'll provide wiki links, since it's the quickest way.
The meaning of a logical argument/valid deduction:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_argument
From wiki: "In logic, an argument is an attempt to demonstrate the truth of an assertion called a conclusion, based on the truth of a set of assertions called premises. The process of demonstration of deductive (see also deduction) and inductive reasoning shapes the argument, and presumes some kind of communication, which could be part of a written text, a speech or a conversation."
The meaning of a proof/evidence:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_proof
From wiki: "In mathematics, a proof is a demonstration that, assuming certain axioms, some statement is necessarily true"
What the sources say is exactly what I've been explaining: a valid deduction alone does not mean the conclusion must be necessarily true. A valid deduction AND true premises are required for the conclusion to be necessarily true. In order to prove something, it's necessary to both show that the premises are true and the form of the deduction is valid. I will give the examples again:
example 1 - valid argument but false premises giving a false conclusion
1+1=3
3+1=5
=====
therefore 1+1+1=5
example 2 - true premises but invalid deduction giving a false conclusion
1+1=2
2+1=2
=====
therefore 10+1=1000
example 3 - true premises AND valid deduction gives a conclusion that is necessarily true
1+1=2
2+1=3
=====
therefore 1+1+1=3
These examples should illustrate that both the requirements are necessary for the conclusion to be true.
Actually I think Pinder's arguement follows this particlur course of logic then the one you are attempting to paint.
http://www.stats.uwaterloo.ca/~cgsmall/ontology.html
Thanks for the link! I'll have a look at it, from a quick glance it seems to be about ontology and the connection between logic and ontology.
Edit: that link was very interesting. Indeed, it takes up some of the fallacies I spotted in Pindar's argument, including:
"The real problem is that the argument makes an assumption that is not brought out explicitly. It assumes that it is possible for an omniscient rational individual to exist, where omniscience includes knowledge about one's own existence. So what the argument really seems to show is that (for God as defined [this text used the definition that God is defined as an omniscient and rational individual, i.e. not the definition of the Judeo-Christian God]). IF it is possible for a rational omniscient being to exist THEN necessarily a rational omniscient being exists."
It isn't normal to quote the source when using information that should be available in almost every single basic course text book on the subject. But it is normal to show some source when asked for it, and since you're doing so I'll provide wiki links, since it's the quickest way.
You claimed that your view is from every known expert in the field, however it seems your missing the point that was demonstrated in the link provided. You can of course state you find that postion not to be valid - but that has not been your claim in this thread.
What the sources say is exactly what I've been explaining: a valid deduction alone does not mean the conclusion must be necessarily true. A valid deduction AND true premises are required for the conclusion to be necessarily true. In order to prove something, it's necessary to both show that the premises are true and the form of the deduction is valid. I will give the examples again:
That was not the question asked. Nor does it address Pinder's arguement, your claim is that his arguement is not valid - however his arguement uses a very basic form of logic and ontology, one that is easily followed, even if it does contain some fallacies in logic.
Thanks for the link! I'll have a look at it, from a quick glance it seems to be about ontology and the connection between logic and ontology.
Which is why I posted the linked given this quote;
If you reject the logical designates for distinguishing the mode of being then you have rejected basic logic regarding ontology.
You can of course reject ontology and the logic premise behind it - but your base claim toward Pinder's is indeed a false conclusion, based upon my own readings on philosophy, logic, and religion. You should address his arguement not his base of knowledge.
Edit: the last few postings by both you and Pinder have been an esclation in the tit for tat accusations based upon base of knowledge. Which I find normally derails a thread very quickly. As I read the thread I understand both of your arguements concerning the subject - however Pinder has remained consistent with his approach - he is not using science to prove or disprove religion or more important God. He is simply staying away from that course - he is approaching the subject soley on the Philosphocial and Metaphysical aspect of the subject, in this course he is staying true to the base logic used for centuries in arguing a pro postion for a diety. This is valid technique given the nature of the material. I do see you attempting to interject science into the discussion and his refusal to steer toward your arguement, which has lead to your frustation in the discussion.
I was thinking about this whole topic, and i couldn't get my head around one aspect of it all...so i thought i would ask and see...
the thing is... the main problem with the big bang theory is as far as iv heard is that at some point there needs to be a start of things, i.e what was before the big bang? if thats so, why does it make more sense for there to be a god, and if so, what was there at the start of gods reign of terror? both theories fall over in the same way... except one says, we can't explain that yet, and the other says ah hah thats proof there is a god.
Hi Beren (Isn't Beren the son of Barahir?)
There are different views on the highs and lows of the Big Bang, but your essential question is a good one. Any stance that posits an X as a beginning point needs to explain why that X occupies the first position. If the Big Bang is taken as the beginning then the issue: whence came the Big Bang is apparent. For the theist the same issue must be dealt with, but the posit God is not the same as the Big Bang. The difference is in the essential meaning of the things posited. God by definition is something taken as eternal, ontically independent and prior to any created (something with a beginning) order. The Big Bang lacks these traits. It therefore has serious coherence issues.
the other thing that strikes me is that both sides seem to focus on god rather then religions, to me if there is god or not is not nearly as important as religions role in the world, i think personally religion is what the athiest should be attacking/asking question about not weather there is a god or not.
If one is discussing atheism or theism then God is the natural focus. Religion is also interesting, but it is a different question.
I see myself as an athiest, but the main reason is not because i reject the idea of god (or belief in something, even one's self) but more so becuase i reject the religions attached to said god/s, my real issue isnt a god of some sort, but of religion. i see them as two separate and different issue. i can understand why people want religion, why people believe in god/s.
This doesn't sound like atheism, but a base rejection of religion.
another thought i wanted to bring up is this: would you say it is fair to state that a higher portion of people who are : poor, uneducated, desperate, starving or poverty stricken have a higher likelihood to be deeply religious. If so why do you think thats the case?
I think that is probably right. If you look at the list you provided I think there is a common denominator. I think this is dependence. Dependence, whether economic, educational, sociological, physical etc. could naturally lead one to seek meaning in the religious sphere. Conversely, as one feels independent the 'need' for religion dissipates.
One could argue the a dependence rubric informs most if not all religious stances. For example: in Christianity the devotee recognizes his dependence on Christ to overcome sin and death. In Buddhism the disciple recognizes his dependence on the Eight Fold Path in order to overcome dukka (typically translated as suffering).
@Pindar: You should realize that your position is quite weak here. Not only are you claiming to have proven the existence of God - something that the most renowned philosophers of history have failed at, but you also claim to be pointing out fallacies in "my statements" when what you truly criticise are things I've quoted right out of the literature on logic, accepted by all experts in the field of logic.
Proofs for the existence of God are quite old and varied. A number of philosophers have done this. To cite a few simple examples: Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas and Leibniz all put forward arguments that my one proof plays off of. The reason I gave the proof I have over other options is because it is accessible to a person who may not have formal study in philosophy.
If one claims they are quoting from the literature of logic then they should: one, use quotation marks. Two, provide the citation. You have not done so. If you would like to do this we can revisit what you consider coherent/relevant.
Attendant to this second point is your claim lying is a standard vernacular for logic used by "all experts within the subject". I asked for three citations...where are they?
You've shown that you don't know the definition of the word "proof", yet you claim to have a proof of God's existence...
I do know the definition of proof. A proof is a valid argument. A valid argument is something where the conclusion cannot be otherwise given the premises. I have done just this regarding the existence of God.
you've shown that you don't understand the necessary conditions for a statement to be true, yet you claim to have proven a statement that God exists to be true;
A proof is not concerned with truth. I have explained this. I have made no such claim that "God exists to be true". You are confused.
Seeing as you repeatedly claim to know the terminology of logic rather than admitting you don't, I'll here explain in unambigious, precise terminology why you need to have both true premises and a correct deduction in order to have proven the conclusion to be true:
((p => c) and p) => (c is true),
but:
(p => c) => (c is either true or false)
If you understand logic you'll understand the above argument...
A proof turns on validity not truth.
So you know: the above is not an argument. An argument means one needs to have a conclusion. Such is absent above. You have mixed up statements and arguments. Statements can be true or false. Arguments are valid or invalid.
Then you have used your own rules, and you have proven the existence of God by arbitrary ontologic rules of your own making, and not by logic.
The proof doesn't operate off of any invented rules from me. The proof is quite simple in its form and the terms are common for the topic being quite old i.e sourced to Aristotle.
They are meaningless, yes, but perfectly valid. They served to illustrate the definition of valid logical argument versus a logical argument that isn't meaningless.
Is the 'they' above referring to this response of mine with examples of your thought process:
"god exists
the sky is blue
=======
therefore god exists
and
gravity doesn't exist
no other forces that affect something floating in the air exist
============
therefore I'll not fall to the ground if I jump from a church tower
The above are meaningless. Yet you asserted they are: "perfectly valid logical arguments...".[/quote]
Meaningless means incoherent. The above are not valid. The first asserts its own conclusion (begs the question). The second has no logical entailment, but is a series of random statements. These are but two examples of a common pattern. I'm sure you feel logic is important and I would agree, but it seems clear you've never formally studied logic. Your statements are random and confused more often that not.
As for your proof, a first necessary stop to be able to refute or confirm it is to rewrite it complete with three sections...
No, the proof is quite simple and straight forward. It doesn't require any reworking. If you wish to challenge there are contingent beings, causality or something else that is fine. The proof concludes: there must be a necessary being. I proffered that such can only be God.
It isn't normal to quote the source when using information that should be available in almost every single basic course text book on the subject.
When one claims they are quoting a thing citation is standard.
What the sources say is exactly what I've been explaining: a valid deduction alone does not mean the conclusion must be necessarily true.
This claim has not been made.
Edit: that link was very interesting. Indeed, it takes up some of the fallacies I spotted in Pindar's argument, including:
"The real problem is that the argument makes an assumption that is not brought out explicitly. It assumes that it is possible for an omniscient rational individual to exist, where omniscience includes knowledge about one's own existence. So what the argument really seems to show is that (for God as defined [this text used the definition that God is defined as an omniscient and rational individual, i.e. not the definition of the Judeo-Christian God]). IF it is possible for a rational omniscient being to exist THEN necessarily a rational omniscient being exists."
My proof is not concerned with omniscience, rationality or any other aspect besides necessity: neither is the proof sectarian. This has been explained.
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 09:55
You claimed that your view is from every known expert in the field, however it seems your missing the point that was demonstrated in the link provided. You can of course state you find that postion not to be valid - but that has not been your claim in this thread.
No, my view agrees with the view in the linked document, as you can see. The linked position includes the ontological aspect of logic, which Pindar is forgetting. The link also discusses modal logic. Modal logic is an extension to formal boolean algebra, not a contradiction towards it. There's basically no such thing as a modal logic argument refuting a valid boolean algebra argument or valid classical logic argument.
That was not the question asked. Nor does it address Pinder's arguement, your claim is that his arguement is not valid - however his arguement uses a very basic form of logic and ontology, one that is easily followed, even if it does contain some fallacies in logic.
I'm claiming that both his argument is invalid, and that his premises are invalid. And that he needs to prove that both the argument is valid and the premises are true before he has proven his statement.
Which is why I posted the linked given this quote;
You can of course reject ontology and the logic premise behind it - but your base claim toward Pinder's is indeed a false conclusion, based upon my own readings on philosophy, logic, and religion. You should address his arguement not his base of knowledge.
Can you elaborate on that? What exactly is it you claim to be a false conclusion in my statements? And are you claiming that the truth value of the premises doesn't matter? Because if you do, then you've made the same fallacy Pindar has made in the last 3 posts, namely to think a logical argument is enough to prove a conclusion. A logical argument in itself only proves that if the premises are true the conclusion will be true.
Edit: the last few postings by both you and Pinder have been an esclation in the tit for tat accusations based upon base of knowledge. Which I find normally derails a thread very quickly. As I read the thread I understand both of your arguements concerning the subject - however Pinder has remained consistent with his approach - he is not using science to prove or disprove religion or more important God. He is simply staying away from that course - he is approaching the subject soley on the Philosphocial and Metaphysical aspect of the subject, in this course he is staying true to the base logic used for centuries in arguing a pro postion for a diety. This is valid technique given the nature of the material. I do see you attempting to interject science into the discussion and his refusal to steer toward your arguement, which has lead to your frustation in the discussion.
No, Pindar is claiming to be using logic to prove the existence of God. If he is to use logic to prove it, he must follow the rules of logic. Otherwise he hasn't used logic to prove the existence of God, but used something else. Whatever that is is up to him to quote the references for, but at the very least it's not true to state that it's logic he's using, since the rules of logic aren't followed in his argument, as I pointed out in my earliest replies to his posts.
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 10:29
Proofs for the existence of God are quite old and varied. A number of philosophers have done this. To cite a few simple examples: Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas and Leibniz all put forward arguments that my one proof plays off of. The reason I gave the proof I have over other options is because it is accessible to a person who may not have formal study in philosophy.
But all of their proofs have contained fallacies, and most of them have admitted it or have had the fallacies spotted by later philosophers. A correct proof of the existence of God has so far not been achieved by anyone except you, Pindar. :bow:
If one claims they are quoting from the literature of logic then they should: one, use quotation marks. Two, provide the citation. You have not done so. If you would like to do this we can revisit what you consider coherent/relevant.
You might as well have to quote which philosophers have proven God's existence.
Attendant to this second point is your claim lying is a standard vernacular for logic used by "all experts within the subject". I asked for three citations...where are they?
Read my post above and see the references. If I have forgotten any, tell me where it is and I'll be able to find a source.
I do know the definition of proof. A proof is a valid argument. A valid argument is something where the conclusion cannot be otherwise given the premises. I have done just this regarding the existence of God.
Yes, but you're claiming that you've proven the existence of God. You haven't. Let's hypothetically say your argument follows the rules of logic. In that case you have proven the existence of God assuming all your premises are true. That's not the same thing as having proven that God exists. Because it could very well be the case that the premises or other assumptions you've made aren't true. Until you know whether they're true or not, you don't know whether God's existence is true or not.
You are confused.
Stop the personal attacks.
A proof turns on validity not truth.
The wiki link I gave above states clearly that you can either call it a proof that:
- a statement is true because the conclusion followed from the premises and the premises have been shown to be true by a chain leading back to ontologically acceptable axioms, or
- a statement is true under the condition that the premises are true (and no claim is made as to whether the statement is true or not if the premises aren't true)
I'm using both of the definitions (with the context explaining which I'm using at which time) since they're both valid, but in the second case, which you are using, the final statement you're supposed to make after a logical argument isn't: "my conclusion is true", but "my conclusion is true assuming all my assumptions are true". So you haven't under any circumstances proven the existence of God. On the contrary you've proven: "assuming my assumptions are true, a non-contingent being exists", where a non-contingent being is something defined as "anything that hasn't been caused by something else".
So you know: the above is not an argument. An argument means one needs to have a conclusion. Such is absent above. You have mixed up statements and arguments. Statements can be true or false. Arguments are valid or invalid.
HAHAHAHAHA! Finally got you! All I know who have read something about formal logic would immediately recognize the above as the formal notation for a proof. The thing you quoted is indeed an argument, and it has indeed got a conclusion. A logical argument is an implication, which is denoted by =>, and the statement to the right of the "arrow" is the conclusion. Formal logic is a fool proof system to test the validity of an argument in first order logic or predicate logic, and can be extended by modal logic operators to allow ontological arguments (note that modal logic is an extension to formal logic, not a contradiction to it).
Here you have two introductions to the subject of formal logic:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbolic_logic
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_algebra
The proof doesn't operate off of any invented rules from me. The proof is quite simple in its form and the terms are common for the topic being quite old i.e sourced to Aristotle.
Yet you claim to have proven "the existence of God", rather than having proven "the existence of God on the condition that your premises are true". The difference is huge. I have, as you saw above in my examples, proven that "1+1+1=5 given that 1+1=3 and 3+1=5", but that doesn't mean I've proven that 1+1+1=5. In fact, I could do no such thing as the latter since it isn't true.
Is the 'they' above referring to this response of mine with examples of your thought process:
Wow, you're using my own example of why your reasoning is fallacious as "examples of your thought process". IIRC you've just made a strawman fallacy.
Meaningless means incoherent. The above are not valid. The first asserts its own conclusion (begs the question).
To assert your own conclusion is a valid logical argument, if you're only aware of what a valid logical argument means. It means: "if the premises are true, the conclusion must necessarily be true". And indeed, the following argument:
God exists
=======
therefore God exists
indeed lives up to that requirement. If God exists, then God must necessarily exist. The argument is valid, the fallacy that is called 'begging the question' is to claim that the conclusion is true. The fallacy is to claim: "the conclusion is true", the correct statement is: "assuming the premise is true, the conclusion is true". But since in the real world (where no assumptions are allowed) the premise God exists can be either true or false until more information is given, we can't know if the conclusion is true or false, and by formal boolean algebra we obtain that the truth value of the conclusion is undefined (either false or true is possible). I.e. we have gained no further information by making the conclusion.
Here's wiki saying the same thing I just said: "Begging the question in logic, also known as circular reasoning and by the Latin name petitio principii, is an informal fallacy found in many attempts at logical arguments. An argument which begs the question is one in which a premise presupposes the conclusion in some way. Such an argument is valid in the sense in which logicians use that term, yet provides no reason at all to believe its conclusion."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question
See? Exactly what I said - we have no reason to believe the conclusion, but the logical argument in itself is valid. The meaning of "valid logical argument" is simply that assuming the premises are true, the conclusion will be true. I think I'll put that in my signature seeing as I'd otherwise have to repeat it in every single post.
The second has no logical entailment, but is a series of random statements. These are but two examples of a common pattern. I'm sure you feel logic is important and I would agree, but it seems clear you've never formally studied logic. Your statements are random and confused more often that not.
Again it's fun that you use the examples I used to illustrate your fallacies to claim that I'm making incorrect logical conclusions.
No, the proof is quite simple and straight forward. It doesn't require any reworking. If you wish to challenge there are contingent beings, causality or something else that is fine. The proof concludes: there must be a necessary being. I proffered that such can only be God.
Your proof doesn't clearly list which assumptions it makes, yet makes several assumptions. Because a logical argument only states that the conclusion is true if the premises (i.e. assumptions) are true, it's necessary to know under which assumptions your conclusion statement is supposed to be true. You haven't proven that God must exist no matter the conditions. For that to be possible, you'd need a proof which doesn't make any assumptions at all, i.e. has no other premises besides trivial ones such as "either x is true, or x is false", after which you separately treat the case where x is true and the case where x is false.
This was just too funny so I had to quote it:
I have made no such claim that "God exists to be true".
there must be a necessary being. I proffered that such can only be God.
So again can you tell me what is the conclusion you make from your "proof"? Is it "A necessary being that can only be God exists", or is it "assuming , a necessary being that can only be God exists"?
I'll give you a hint on what an assumption is: "no contingent being has existed forever", is an assumption you need for your proof in step 1. Because assume that at least 1 contingent being existed forever. Then that contingent being could have been the cause of all other contingent beings. Thus no non-contingent being is required. The argument is completed by the fact that we don't know whether there is or isn't one or more contingent beings that have existed forever. That means that your "proof" has shown that "assuming no contingent being can have existed forever, and [insert list of other assumptions here], a necessary being that can only be God exists". As you can see, when the assumptions are explicitly stated - as they must be - the "proof" becomes much less impressive and convincing.
But you've picked a form of your argument that hides the above fallacy quite well. Because you [I]define a contingent being to be something that had a cause, it follows from the definition that it can't have existed forever. The fallacy however doesn't go away because you redefine the words - the definitions of the words don't affect the validity of an argument if the phrasing of the argument is changed accordingly to the change of words so the meaning is intact. The fallacy instead lies in the fact that your definition of non-contingent and contingent beings aren't each others complement (i.e. they don't cover all forms of beings), thus there can exist other forms of beings, for instance a type of being that was never created and have existed forever, let's call it "constant being" to simplify further discussion so I don't have to repeat the entire definition each time I use the word. The constant beings must be proven as not possible to exist before your proof can work, because assume there is a constant being that has existed forever. Then that constant being could have been the cause of all contingent beings. Then, no non-contingent being is necessary. Since we don't know for sure that no constant being exists, a non-contingent being isn't necessary.
The lesson I hope will finally be learnt is that if we don't state the assumptions we made in order to arrive at a particular conclusion, then it's possible to prove almost any statement, even things we know for sure are false, with a perfectly valid logical argument.
I'll also repeat what I orginally stated: nobody has proven the existence or non-existence of God yet, and religion is a matter of belief, not a matter of knowledge. And what really matters isn't whether the existence of God can be proven or not, but the other things that religion provides, such as comfort and ethical guidance. One could also ask - is the man who knows that God exists a Christian? The phrase in the bible which is claimed to define Christianity: "believe in me, and you'll get eternal life" uses the word believe. It doesn't say: "prove my existence and know it, and you'll get eternal life".
No, my view agrees with the view in the linked document, as you can see. The linked position includes the ontological aspect of logic, which Pindar is forgetting. The link also discusses modal logic. Modal logic is an extension to formal boolean algebra, not a contradiction towards it. There's basically no such thing as a modal logic argument refuting a valid boolean algebra argument or valid classical logic argument.
If my assumption about Pinder's use of the ontological model is correct, primarily because of his reference to such, are you arguing that for a person to use the model that they must always use the formal logic formula when discussing an issue versus referencing the model?
I'm claiming that both his argument is invalid, and that his premises are invalid. And that he needs to prove that both the argument is valid and the premises are true before he has proven his statement.
Yes indeed you have made such a claim but your attempts at proving your claim you are seemly focused on the individual not the arguement.
Can you elaborate on that? What exactly is it you claim to be a false conclusion in my statements? And are you claiming that the truth value of the premises doesn't matter? Because if you do, then you've made the same fallacy Pindar has made in the last 3 posts, namely to think a logical argument is enough to prove a conclusion. A logical argument in itself only proves that if the premises are true the conclusion will be true.
A simple elaboration using this quote of yours.
You ask a question, and then leap to an assumption not in evidence. This method demonstrates that you have alreadly established what you believe my stance to be, without the evidence to support such a conclusion being present.
Frankly what you just attempted is one of the very typical exambles that come to mind regarding false conclusions toward what Pinder has been using for his postion.
Do you really need someone to point out each and every one of these for you?
No, Pindar is claiming to be using logic to prove the existence of God. If he is to use logic to prove it, he must follow the rules of logic. Otherwise he hasn't used logic to prove the existence of God, but used something else. Whatever that is is up to him to quote the references for, but at the very least it's not true to state that it's logic he's using, since the rules of logic aren't followed in his argument, as I pointed out in my earliest replies to his posts.
Again your stuck on the man not the arguement. The basic premise he is using has been shown by Pinder disprove the premise and you invalidate the arguement. You do not invalidate his arguement by demonstrating a knowledge of formal logic.
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 15:14
If my assumption about Pinder's use of the ontological model is correct, primarily because of his reference to such, are you arguing that for a person to use the model that they must always use the formal logic formula when discussing an issue versus referencing the model?
First of all he hasn't provided any references to me. Secondly, if he uses something he must tell both that he is using it, and how he is using it.
Yes indeed you have made such a claim but your attempts at proving your claim you are seemly focused on the individual not the arguement.
You're making a red herring fallacy here.
You ask a question, and then leap to an assumption not in evidence. This method demonstrates that you have alreadly established what you believe my stance to be, without the evidence to support such a conclusion being present.
I asked "is x true? If it is, then..." which shows pretty well that the following statement was uttered only on the condition that x was true. If it wasn't, I made no statement. This is practical because it means I don't have to wait for a yes or no to the first question, and it explains already before I get the yes or no what the consequences would be if it was a yes and the consequences of a no, respectively. It would be a fallacy if I were to state it as: "is x true? Yes it is, and therefore ..."
Again your stuck on the man not the arguement.
Please stop the personal attacks.
The basic premise he is using has been shown by Pinder disprove the premise and you invalidate the arguement. You do not invalidate his arguement by demonstrating a knowledge of formal logic.
To disprove a statement such as "the conclusion of my logical argument is necessarily true", it's enough to do ONE of the following:
- show that at least one premise is false
- show that for at least one premise it isn't known whether it's true or false
- show that the argument doesn't follow the rules of logic
To disprove a statement such as "the conclusion of my logical argument is necessarily true assuming the premises are true", it's enough to do ONE of the following:
- show that the argument doesn't follow the rules of logic
Wikipedia is a poor source to put forth as a formal reference. It can be informative, but on the other hand, articles can be created and modified by virtually anyone. Again, it can be informative, but it's far from definitive.
I asked "is x true? If it is, then..." which shows pretty well that the following statement was uttered only on the condition that x was true. If it wasn't, I made no statement. This is practical because it means I don't have to wait for a yes or no to the first question, and it explains already before I get the yes or no what the consequences would be if it was a yes and the consequences of a no, respectively. It would be a fallacy if I were to state it as: "is x true? Yes it is, and therefore ..."
Now I understood your intent, but what is an if, then statement if not an assumption. If there is no evidence of such an assumption being valid - why ask the question?
Please stop the personal attacks.
Are you now calling pointing out a logical fallacy a personal attack?
Your proof doesn't clearly list which assumptions it makes, yet makes several assumptions. Because a logical argument only states that the conclusion is true if the premises (i.e. assumptions) are true, it's necessary to know under which assumptions your conclusion statement is supposed to be true. You haven't proven that God must exist no matter the conditions. For that to be possible, you'd need a proof which doesn't make any assumptions at all, i.e. has no other premises besides trivial ones such as "either x is true, or x is false", after which you separately treat the case where x is true and the case where x is false.
This is the correct method in my opinion to invalidate a premise. However I must ask because of the quotes. Did you take this statement,
I proffered that such can only be God.
To be Pinder's claim that God's existance must be true?
To disprove a statement such as "the conclusion of my logical argument is necessarily true", it's enough to do ONE of the following:
- show that at least one premise is false
- show that for at least one premise it isn't known whether it's true or false
- show that the argument doesn't follow the rules of logic
To disprove a statement such as "the conclusion of my logical argument is necessarily true assuming the premises are true", it's enough to do ONE of the following:
- show that the argument doesn't follow the rules of logic
Indeed this is correct - which leads me to ask once again?
Why the accusation of deception (lie) toward Pinder? Why the comments directed at the individual's knowledge versus demonstrating where the arguement is incorrect?
Again if pointing out a fallacy is not a personal insult - why are you taking the fact that I have pointed out the ad hominem fallacy you have made as a personal attack?
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 16:13
Wikipedia is a poor source to put forth as a formal reference. It can be informative, but on the other hand, articles can be created and modified by virtually anyone. Again, it can be informative, but it's far from definitive.
I agree. Wikipedia is however quite useful if you quickly want a source for a statement that you're sure should be available in pretty much any text book on a well known subject.
Reenk Roink
01-11-2007, 16:17
I'll also repeat what I orginally stated: nobody has proven the existence or non-existence of God yet
There are people who hold logical arguments for God/Deity as strong rational proof of his existence (the Kalam Cosmological Argument hasn't been mentioned in this thread). The Ontological argument still has quite a bit of support as well. The Teleological argument was buried for awhile by Hume (in it's watchmaker form) but consider the fact that Flew is a deist now (though he still holds the presumption of atheism and does not believe in the God of the religions) due mainly to forms of the argument (DNA is too complex, etc...).
Of course, many people are going to consider premises of arguments whose conclusions they do not like controversial, but to take things into context, one could easily say that nobody has "proved" the existence of the material world and that nobody has "proved" the existence of free will either, if one takes a sufficiently skeptical attitude. It's all about which premises to accept... People will believe what they want to believe, and then try to rationalize that belief.
Some people say that the existence of God has been proved, other will not...
Some people say that the existence of the material world has been proved, others will not...
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 16:19
Now I understood your intent, but what is an if, then statement if not an assumption. If there is no evidence of such an assumption being valid - why ask the question?
Simply because that I thought that maybe it wasn't entirely impossible that it would be true, and I thought it was in a sense fair for him to know what would entail from his claim that it would be true. It's a way of cornering him to state which assumptions he makes and which he doesn't make. When I know which his assumptions are, and his proof is presented in a complete and formal way, I can show whether it's correct or not according to the rules of logic. The rules of logic are deterministic in the sense that when two unrelated persons both apply them by the book the result will always be the same. Therefore, if two persons claim to have proven by logic statements that are each other's opposites, one of the two persons must be wrong. The problem is that I haven't made any claim yet, I'm waiting for him to present his complete proof with clearly stated assumptions, so that I can show whether it's correct or not according to the rules of logic. It should be noted that there are assumptions under which God's existence is a necessity, and assumptions under which God's existence is impossible. The whole business of proving God's existence is to find statements that with as few and as widely accepted assumptions as possible show that a being with at least some of God's properties can exist, and a few similar forms of arguments.
Again your stuck on the man not the arguement.
Please stop the personal attacks.
Are you now calling pointing out a logical fallacy a personal attack?
I fail to see how my begging for you to stop accusing me of carrying out personal attacks would be a logical fallacy. Or did you refer to another statement?
This is the correct method in my opinion to invalidate a premise. However I must ask because of the quotes. Did you take this statement,
To be Pinder's claim that God's existance must be true?
No, what I took as his claim that God's existence must be true was among other things this statement:
there must be a necessary being. I proffered that such can only be God.
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 16:34
Indeed this is correct
Thanks! :2thumbsup:
Why the accusation of deception (lie) toward Pinder?
I must apologize, it was because of my lacking English skills. In my native language the word lie refers to an untrue statement. I only found out the meaning of the word lie after I was told the meaning of the word by PM, and after that I edited it out since I didn't want to accuse him of being someone who said an untrue statement as an evil way of deceiving everyone, as the accusation of lying apparently means in English.
Why the comments directed at the individual's knowledge versus demonstrating where the arguement is incorrect?
Because first he accused me of personal attacks when I refuted his arguments. Then he told me that I was wrong when I basically quoted things that should be present in all beginner's course text books on logic. With his comments he made me look like I wasn't knowledgeable on the subject, which is a common lawyer's technique of undermining the other side's arguments. I had to respond and provoke him into making a statement that was easy to prove was incorrect according to sources that were easy to quote, such as wiki. So when he finally said something that was easy to prove wrong, I was happy and pointed out that all I know who have read about logic would immediately say the opposite of what he was saying. Since he initially in order to make me look less than knowledgeable in the subject had to state that he knew a lot about logic when he tried to make me look bad at logic, he would finally make a claim that something I said was wrong in a case when what I just said was right out of the books so that his claim could easily be demonstrated to be incorrect. Now things are even and the discussion can hopefully continue focused on the arguments, and without personal attacks, whether skillfully hidden or visible.
Again if pointing out a fallacy is not a personal insult - why are you taking the fact that I have pointed out the ad hominem fallacy you have made as a personal attack?
I don't see where I made a personal attack, other than when I used the word lie, but I edited that out in I believe all places where I used it.
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 16:42
There are people who hold logical arguments for God/Deity as strong rational proof of his existence (the Kalam Cosmological Argument hasn't been mentioned in this thread). The Ontological argument still has quite a bit of support as well. The Teleological argument was buried for awhile by Hume (in it's watchmaker form) but consider the fact that Flew is a deist now (though he still holds the presumption of atheism and does not believe in the God of the religions) due mainly to forms of the argument (DNA is too complex, etc...).
Of course, many people are going to consider premises of arguments whose conclusions they do not like controversial, but to take things into context, one could easily say that nobody has "proved" the existence of the material world and that nobody has "proved" the existence of free will either, if one takes a sufficiently skeptical attitude. It's all about which premises to accept... People will believe what they want to believe, and then try to rationalize that belief.
Some people say that the existence of God has been proved, other will not...
Some people say that the existence of the material world has been proved, others will not...
Exactly. No proof presented so far is without assumptions. Thus all the proofs say "if my assumptions are true, God must necessarily exist". Interesting that you should point out how people often choose to refuse premises that yield conclusions that they don't like. That's true, but the nice thing about logic is that the inference rules of logic are widely accepted and therefore as long as the argument is valid you can say for sure that "IF my assumption are true THEN my conclusion is true", and nobody can argue that without having to at least implicitly claim that the inference rules of logic are incorrect. Notice that in my rewriting of Pindar's proof in a post above, I don't refute that given the assumptions I made there, a non-contingent being must exist. So if the rules of logic says that the argument is valid, then I immediately accept that the conclusion is true under the assumption that the given assumptions are true. Whether I agree with the premises or not is a matter of opinion, which I've so far not been focused on discussing in this thread. In fact, I'm more interested in making a list of assumption sets under which the existence of God is necessary, possible and impossible, respectively. The rest is a matter of belief and opinion IMO.
Reenk Roink
01-11-2007, 16:51
Exactly. No proof presented so far is without assumptions. Thus all the proofs say "if my assumptions are true, God must necessarily exist". Interesting that you should point out how people often choose to refuse premises that yield conclusions that they don't like. That's true, but the nice thing about logic is that the inference rules of logic are widely accepted and therefore as long as the argument is valid you can say for sure that "IF my assumption are true THEN my conclusion is true", and nobody can argue that without having to at least implicitly claim that the inference rules of logic are incorrect. Notice that in my rewriting of Pindar's proof in a post above, I don't refute that given the assumptions I made there, a non-contingent being must exist. Whether I agree with the premises or not is a matter of opinion, but I've here not focused on discussing that. In fact, I'd rather make a list of assumption sets under which the existence of God is necessary, possible and impossible. The rest is a matter of belief and opinion.
I agree with all the above, but that was kind of a second point to my post.
My first point was:
"There are people who hold logical arguments for God/Deity as strong rational proof of his existence (the Kalam Cosmological Argument hasn't been mentioned in this thread). The Ontological argument still has quite a bit of support as well. The Teleological argument was buried for awhile by Hume (in it's watchmaker form) but consider the fact that Flew is a deist now (though he still holds the presumption of atheism and does not believe in the God of the religions) due mainly to forms of the argument (DNA is too complex, etc...)."
There are many people, and indeed, philosophers who hold that a strong rational proof of God has been achieved. It is not just Pindar.
Simply because that I thought that maybe it wasn't entirely impossible that it would be true, and I thought it was in a sense fair for him to know what would entail from his claim that it would be true. It's a way of cornering him to state which assumptions he makes and which he doesn't make. When I know which his assumptions are, and his proof is presented in a complete and formal way, I can show whether it's correct or not according to the rules of logic. The rules of logic are deterministic in the sense that when two unrelated persons both apply them by the book the result will always be the same. Therefore, if two persons claim to have proven by logic statements that are each other's opposites, one of the two persons must be wrong. The problem is that I haven't made any claim yet, I'm waiting for him to present his complete proof with clearly stated assumptions, so that I can show whether it's correct or not according to the rules of logic. It should be noted that there are assumptions under which God's existence is a necessity, and assumptions under which God's existence is impossible. The whole business of proving God's existence is to find statements that with as few and as widely accepted assumptions as possible show that a being with at least some of God's properties can exist, and a few similar forms of arguments.
Then the lesson to be learned is that one must be very careful in using if, then statements. This I know from exeperience. If, then assumptions cause more problems then they solve in debate. For computer programing they work well.
I fail to see how your accusing me of carrying out a personal attack would be a logical fallacy. Or did you refer to another statement?
I don't see where I made a personal attack, other than when I used the word lie, but I edited that out in I believe all places where I used it. Edit: Hehe, I understand your joke
Glad to see - I was hoping that I would not have to explain it.
When one argues against the arguement one remains focused, when one focuses on the individual the discussion becomes disjointed. Which I must commend you on accepting your error with your post #414.
I also see several Appeals to Authority being used by yourself - but that is not a point of debate between me and you - that is for you and Pinder to sort out.
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 17:29
Then the lesson to be learned is that one must be very careful in using if, then statements. This I know from exeperience. If, then assumptions cause more problems then they solve in debate. For computer programing they work well.
Maybe you're correct. Now that I think about it I seem to recall some previous discussion a while ago when conditional statements were misunderstood.
I also see several Appeals to Authority being used by yourself - but that is not a point of debate between me and you - that is for you and Pinder to sort out.
While you haven't pointed out the "Appeal to Authority" occurrences, I think I know what you're referring to, and I must point out that they actually aren't "Appeal to authority" fallacies. Appeal to authority fallacy is to say that "person x who is knowledgeable on the subject says y, therefore y must be true". In this case I'm stating that logic is a set of rules invented by Aristotle and others. If someone claims to be using logic, that person must follow the rules of logic, rules which have been invented by human beings, authorities.
By the way, it's quite difficult to have an entire philosophical discussion following all the rules of logic. Every quote to a reference would then be an "Appeal to Authority Fallacy", for example. What is therefore usually done in a philosophical discussion based on logic, is that regions of the text is written formally, and all regions that aren't written formally are treated as informal communication and not as arguments of any value to the discussion - arguments whose logical validity needn't be evaluated. If you think there's some point in an informal statement you ask the one who made that statement to rephrase his statement in formal terms. The problem is that such a formal statement must be written in terms of the original statement made, but since Pindar has made the original statement but didn't phrase it in formal terms, no formal refutation of it is possible. Only imprecise statements directed at his statement is possible, unless I take the responsibility or rephrasing his argument into more formal terms. And with imprecise statements communication text and texts containing arguments are easily mixed together, and it's easier for people who want to hide fallacies to hide them, and for people who by accident made fallacies to make them. If Pindar were to rephrase his argument in formal terms it would be easier and more constructive to discuss its validity. It's up to him to choose whether to do so or not. Anyway the point is that if a formal rephrasing is used it'll be easy to see what is actual claims, and what is simple communication statements such as "what did you mean there?", "can you rephrase that in formal terms", "I have no argument that you're statement is incorrect, but intuitively feel it is. I think I'll come up with an argument later, but let's take that when I come up with one, if I do, and let's concentrate on point 5". Only the actual claims need to be evaluated by logic. A claim would be something like "assumption 1 and assumption 2 are contradictions, therefore both can't be true"
what was before the big bang?
Seeing as time begins with the big bang, nothing.
But all of their proofs have contained fallacies, and most of them have admitted it or having the fallacies spotted by later philosophers. A correct proof of the existence of God has so far not been achieved by anyone except you, Pindar. :bow:
Who has admitted their proof for God contained fallacies? None of the fellows I cited have done so. You are mistaken. Your comment suggest an unfamiliarity with the Tradition.
You might as well have to quote which philosophers have proven God's existence.
I have given four examples in the last post.
Read my post above and see the references. If I have forgotten any, tell me where it is and I'll be able to find a source.
I don't see any citations to experts noting lying is a common vernacular in logic. I asked for three which should be easy given your claim....still waiting.
Yes, but you're claiming that you've proven the existence of God. You haven't. Let's hypothetically say your argument follows the rules of logic. In that case you have proven the existence of God assuming all your premises are true.
This is sufficient for my purpose. Do you wish to argue some of the premises are untrue?
Stop the personal attacks.
If you are confused, noting such is not a personal attack, it is simply noting the confusion.
- a statement is true because the conclusion followed from the premises and the premises have been shown to be true, or
- a statement is true if the premises are true
I'm using both of the definitions...
Then you are equivocating.
(B)ut in the second case, which you are using, the final statement you're supposed to make after a logical argument isn't: "my conclusion is true", but "my conclusion is true assuming all my assumptions are true". So you haven't under any circumstances proven the existence of God. On the contrary you've proven: "assuming my assumptions are true, a non-contingent being exists", where a non-contingent being is something defined as "anything that hasn't been caused by something else".
Actually, non-contingent being isn't found in the proof. The terms are contingent and necessary being.
You need to recall the context that led to the proof. Sasaki Kojiro having been confronted with the absurdity of strong atheism then claimed all strong statements about God were illogical. I told him this was incorrect which led to him asking for an example. The proof is a simple demonstration of a valid argument for God in answer.
Now, given your thrust and confusion note the following. Here is a simple argument:
Vulcans love to boogie
Spock is a Vulcan
Therefore Spock loves to boogie.
Is the above valid? The answer is yes. Now, what if someone, say yourself, objects: "There is no such things as Vulcans or Spocks or even boogie?" Does this claim, even were we to agree, invalidate the proof? The answer is no. The argument remains valid. Validity means the conclusion cannot be otherwise given the premises. This is the crux of the issue and the proof.
What then are we to make of the objection: "There is no such things as Vulcans or Spocks or even boogie?"? Assuming we agree with the sentiment, this means the proof is unsound. Soundness doesn't impact validity, it refers to whether the premises are true. You evidently have gotten hot and bothered about the soundness of the proof and have confused that opinion with validity itself. They are distinct.
Now, my focus has only been to demonstrate a valid argument. I've not been concerned with any larger truth claim. Even so, I think the proof's premises can withstand such a sound check as it were. If this is the sand box you wish to play in that is fine. Which premise(s) is false?
HAHAHAHAHA! Finally got you! If you had actually read something about formal logic you would immediately recognize the above as the formal notation for a proof. The thing you quoted is indeed an argument, and it has indeed got a conclusion. A logical argument is an implication, which is denoted by =>, and the statement to the right of the "arrow" is the conclusion.
Alas, => is a 'then' statement not a conclusion. What you referenced are statements not arguments (proofs).
Yet you claim to have proven "the existence of God", rather than having proven "the existence of God on the condition that your premises are true". The difference is huge. I have, as you saw above in my examples, proven that "1+1+1=5 given that 1+1=3 and 3+1=5", but that doesn't mean I've proven that 1+1+1=5. In fact, I could do no such thing as the latter since it isn't true.
You have not understood the point of the exercise. That point is explained above in the reference to Kojiro.
Wow, you're using my own example of why your reasoning is fallacious as "examples of your thought process". IIRC you've just made a strawman fallacy.
No, I'm demonstrating a pattern of thought.
To assert your own conclusion is a valid logical argument...
This is correct, but it is meaningless which was the basic point.
Again it's fun that you use the examples I used to illustrate your fallacies to claim that I'm making incorrect logical conclusions.
I always have a hard time trying to follow your posts. The above is an example.
Your proof doesn't clearly list which assumptions it makes, yet makes several assumptions.
Any standard statement with words makes assumptions. Your comment is uninteresting. If you wish to challenge contingent being or some other point in the proof you may do so.
This was just too funny so I had to quote it:
?
So again can you tell me what is the conclusion you make from your "proof"?
The conclusion is that necessary being exists. I then put forward that only God could fill that condition. As previously explained, it is a sufficiency argument.
I'll give you a hint on what an assumption is: "no contingent being has existed forever", is an assumption you need for your proof in step 1. Because assume that at least 1 contingent being existed forever. Then that contingent being could have been the cause of all other contingent beings. Thus no non-contingent being is required. The argument is completed by the fact that we don't know whether there is or isn't one or more contingent beings that have existed forever. That means that your "proof" has shown that "assuming no contingent being can have existed forever, and [insert list of other assumptions here], a necessary being that can only be God exists". As you can see, when the assumptions are explicitly stated - as they must be - the "proof" becomes much less impressive and convincing.
But you've picked a form of your argument that hides the above fallacy quite well. Because you define a contingent being to be something that had a cause, it follows from the definition that it can't have existed forever.
You seem to have answered your charge: contingent being is by definition caused (has a source) and thereby temporally fixed.
The fallacy instead lies in the fact that your definition of non-contingent and contingent beings aren't each others complement (i.e. they don't cover all forms of beings)...
Non-contingent isn't in the proof. The terms I use are contingent and necessary being. The two are inclusive. There is no third option. Your charge is flawed.
The lesson I hope will finally be learnt is that if we don't state the assumptions we made in order to arrive at a particular conclusion, then it's possible to prove almost any statement, even things we know for sure are false, with a perfectly valid logical argument.
The assumptions in the proof are mundane. They include the standard logical ontic distinctions: contingent and necessary and the standard belief in causality. Quite simple.
I proffered that such can only be God.
To be Pindar's claim that God's existance must be true?
Hi Redleg,
The scope and intent of the proof was simply to demonstrate a valid argument for God. It made no larger truth claim.
Legio XXX seems to be focused on is if the argument is sound or not and confused any soundness conclusion as an invalidation. This is a mistake. Even so, in the last post I told him I'm open to any challenge as to the truth claims of the premises. We'll see what he objects to.
I'll also repeat what I orginally stated: nobody has proven the existence or non-existence of God yet
There are people who hold logical arguments for God/Deity as strong rational proof of his existence (the Kalam Cosmological Argument hasn't been mentioned in this thread). The Ontological argument still has quite a bit of support as well. The Teleological argument was buried for awhile by Hume (in it's watchmaker form) but consider the fact that Flew is a deist now (though he still holds the presumption of atheism and does not believe in the God of the religions) due mainly to forms of the argument (DNA is too complex, etc...).
Quite correct.
Of course, many people are going to consider premises of arguments whose conclusions they do not like controversial, but to take things into context, one could easily say that nobody has "proved" the existence of the material world and that nobody has "proved" the existence of free will either, if one takes a sufficiently skeptical attitude. It's all about which premises to accept... People will believe what they want to believe, and then try to rationalize that belief.
Some people say that the existence of God has been proved, other will not...
Some people say that the existence of the material world has been proved, others will not...
Also correct.
Hi Redleg,
The scope and intent of the proof was simply to demonstrate a valid argument for God. It made no larger truth claim.
My understanding of the definition of the term proffered would confirm that - I did not see a truth claim in your statement only a suggestion or offer of a premise for the possiblity.
Legio XXX seems to be focused on is if the argument is sound or not and confused any soundness conclusion as an invalidation. This is a mistake. Even so, in the last post I told him I'm open to any challenge as to the truth claims of the premises. We'll see what he objects to.
We'll just have to wait and see.
Rodion Romanovich
01-11-2007, 21:05
Who has admitted their proof for God contained fallacies? None of the fellows I cited have done so. You are mistaken. Your comment suggest an unfamiliarity with the Tradition.
Please provide a reference which shows that anyone has made a proof of God they believed was true and that nobody has been able to show contained fallacies.
I have given four examples in the last post.
You need to provide a source for your quote before I'll accept that. And sources that show that logicians consider their arguments valid and without fallacies. If it is as I think it is, all these proofs of God are all necessarily true only under the condition that certain assumptions are true. Thus not a proof of God's existence, but a proof that assuming the premises are true, God exists. That isn't the same as a proof that God exists.
This is sufficient for my purpose. Do you wish to argue some of the premises are untrue?
Excellent, now we have made progress. Now you're aware that your proof means that "a non-contingent being exists if my assumption are true", you should also show which of your statements you believe to be your assumptions. Since we're free to make any assumption we like, I must know which are your premises and which are your conclusions before the validity of the argument can be discussed. I have spotted that one of your numbered points contains a "therefore", which suggests that maybe you're making several conclusion steps. It isn't clear to me exactly what you're claiming to be your assumptions and what you're claiming to be your deduced steps. So if you would be so kind and tell me which your assumptions are, I'll finally be able to determine whether your argument is valid or not. And as a second step, it's possible to also discuss whether the assumptions are justified or not, but that's another discussion, which I'll at the very least postpone until you've told me what your assumptions are so I can check the validity of your argument.
If you are confused, noting such is not a personal attack, it is simply noting the confusion.
That's the same as saying "if you're an idiot, noting such is not a personal attack, it is simply noting you're an idiot". It's a personal attack. You can state that an argument looks confused, but calling someone confused is a personal attack.
Then you are equivocating.
Equivocating is to use the same word in different meanings while either not understanding it has different meanings or not making clear from the context that they have different meanings. Since I'm aware that I use the word in different meanings and make clear from the context which definition I'm using, I'm not committing such a fallacy.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivocation
Wiki: "Also known as ambiguity, Equivocation is a logical fallacy. It is committed when someone uses the same word in different meanings in an argument, implying that the word means the same each time around."
Actually, non-contingent being isn't found in the proof. The terms are contingent and necessary being.
And what is a necessary being, according to your definition? The word "necessary" being part of the necessary being suggests that maybe you're assuming it to be necessary in which case a proof that a necessary being is necessary is redundant, a circular proof. But it might also be the case that you define necessary being as something else. Please tell me what definition of the word necessary being you're using in your proof.
What then are we to make of the objection: "There is no such things as Vulcans or Spocks or even boogie?"? Assuming we agree with the sentiment, this means the proof is unsound. Soundness doesn't impact validity, it refers to whether the premises are true.
Nice, you're learning. Well done!
Now, my focus has only been to demonstrate a valid argument. I've not been concerned with any larger truth claim.
Fair enough, now you're stating that openly. But you must understand that I couldn't help but think you were claiming the truth value of your conclusion when you didn't list any assumption and explicitly stated:
there must be a necessary being. I proffered that such can only be God.
Now it's not the proffer that it could be God that bothers me, but the claim that "there must be a necessary being". In this last post of yours you seem to however have explicitly stated that you don't make such a claim, but that you make the claim that "assuming my premises are true, a necessary being exists". But if someone doesn't list his premises clearly it's difficult to believe that that someone actually is aware of under which premises the conclusion holds. More so if that same person repeatedly makes the statement that his conclusion is true, without in the same context mentioning that it is necessary that certain assumptions are true for that conclusion to be true.
Anyway, if you've now admitted that your conclusion is only necessary true under the conditon that your premises are true, you need to explicitly show which your premises are, before the argument can be shown to be valid or invalid.
Even so, I think the proof's premises can withstand such a sound check as it were. If this is the sand box you wish to play in that is fine. Which premise(s) is false?
No, the purpose of pointing out that the premises need to be true in order for the conclusion to be true wasn't to justify a demonstration that a particular premise wasn't true. The purpose of it was to make you understand that you need to clearly and explicitly state under which assumptions you claim the conclusion to be true. I.e. a list of the premises. As your proof looks now, it's a mix of premises and deductions and definitions. Because the conclusion is necessarily true only if the premises are true, the result of a logical argument is "assuming my premises are true, is true". As you probably understand it's necessary then to know under which assumptions the conclusion is true.
Alas, => is a 'then' statement not a conclusion. What you referenced are statements not arguments (proofs).
A logical argument is by definition a 'then' from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion. The operator => is used for all forms of implication including logical argument, but proofs can also be expressed using other forms, such as a horizontal line between the premises and the conclusion. That a proof is an implication (i.e. the 'if-then' operator) is quite easy to see: a => b says "if a is true, then b is necessarily true", while a proof p => c says "if the premises p are true, then conclusion c is true".
It might be confusing at first that in boolean algebra => can be used in expressions as well, and that for example a => b has a truth value, just as the entire logical argument p => c then must have a truth value by the definition of the => operator. However this is just because math always strives for generality and to cover all cases. In fact, simplifying p => c as you simplify any other logical expression is one of many methods of checking whether a logical argument is valid or not. If p => c can be simplified to "true", then the logical argument was valid.
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No, I'm demonstrating a pattern of thought.
Here's the complete story: you make a claim, I respond to that claim by stating that I consider you to have made a fallacy. I illustrate how absurd the fallacy is by showing another example where that fallacy clearly stands out as absurd as it is. Then you claim that example to be my pattern of thought:
examples of your thought process
Then I ask you why you're using my own example of why your reasoning is fallacious as examples of my thought process. After which you state
No, I'm demonstrating a pattern of thought.
I don't think it's constructive to continue this particular track of our discussion and I think we should rather concentrate on the more constructive parts of it.
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This is correct, but it is meaningless which was the basic point.
I'm happy that you finally agree on this point and understand it.
Any standard statement with words makes assumptions. Your comment is uninteresting. If you wish to challenge contingent being or some other point in the proof you may do so.
Above in the post you say things that make it look as if you've realized that a logical argument shows that "if the premises are true, the conclusion is necessarily true" and not the fallacious "the conclusion is true". Because the conclusion is necessarily true only under certain assumptions, the final result obtained by making a logical argument isn't just the conclusion, but a conclusion and a list of the assumptions under which the argument says it must hold. The assumptions made are part of the result and should be listed along with the proof. Otherwise you've made an empty statement. Your statement now is "assuming some unspecified assumptions are true - I won't tell you which those assumptions are - a necessary being exists". I believe you can imagine how convincing such a statement sounds in the eyes of logicians or philosophers.
The conclusion is that necessary being exists. I then put forward that only God could fill that condition. As previously explained, it is a sufficiency argument.
Now you seem to have reverted to your previous claim that you've proven "a necessary being exists". [I]Under which assumptions, if I may ask? You've proven that assuming that some assumptions which you won't tell which they are are true, a necessary being must exist. That isn't a very convincing statement. It's against the rules of logic however to present it as a necessary being must exist. That's a half truth fallacy, since it leaves out the very important point that the statement "a necessary being must exist" is only necessarily true under certain assumptions. For it to be logically correct you must either list your assumptions, or rephrase your result as "assuming some assumptions which I won't tell which they are are true, a necessary being exists".
Non-contingent isn't in the proof. The terms I use are contingent and necessary being. The two are inclusive. There is no third option. Your charge is flawed.
For two concepts to cover all cases, their definitions must only demand a certain stance in one property, where the two concepts have opposite stances in that property. This is for example possibe if the definitions are:
- a contingent being is a being that was created
- a necessary being is a being that wasn't created
Are those the definitions you are using?
If those are the definitions used, it isn't entirely impossible that you can conclude that "a necessary being must necessarily have existed when the first of all contingent that exist or have existed came to be. That necessary being could possibly exist still today, but doesn't necessarily do so" from as weak assumptions as "assuming at least one contingent being has existed at one point in time, and a necessary being is possible". However I haven't checked that yet so this is no claim just a hypothesis at the moment! I will check that formally once you've stated what definitions you use. There are quite a few other candidates to chose from when it comes to the choice of defining the words, so I'll wait your answer before I move on. Here is a list of a few other possible choices of definition (combinations of which aren't guaranteed to cover all cases, in which case other concept may be necessary to introduce):
- contingent being - something that was created and exists today
- contingent being - something that was created and exists today and can cause other contingent beings
- necessary being - something that wasn't created and exists today and can cause contingent beings
The choice of definition will not affect the truth, but it may affect the truth value of any statement that contains that word. For example if you define apple as a car, then an apple has an engine. Now the thing that was previously called apple doesn't have an engine because of the choice of definition. The reason why your word definitions are so important is because your conclusion is a sentence containing the word "necessary being", and crucial proof steps may or may not be fallacies depending on the meaning of the word. In general, as a tool to avoid the risk of equivocation, it's always allowed to replace every occurence of a word with the definition of that word, and look at the resulting argument.
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I hope you can answer the questions about your definitions so we can make some further progress! If you would also state which your assumptions are, we would make even further progress, but you seem reluctant to state which assumptions you've made, so for now I'll be satisfied with an answer to what definitions you use. The assumptions part will become easier once the definitions have been fixed.
My understanding of the definition of the term proffered would confirm that...
Correct.
Please provide a reference which shows that anyone has made a proof of God they believed was true and that nobody has been able to show contained fallacies.
You didn't answer the question. Which of the fellows I've put forward in giving a proof for God admitted their proof was a fallacy? There are certainly objections some make to arguments, but an objection isn't relevant to the point.
You need to provide a source for your quote before I'll accept that.
You don't believe the four I mentioned put forward proofs for God? Interesting, OK here are the standard references:
Plato: Laws, 893-6
Aristotle: Physics (VIII, 4-6) and Metaphysics (XII, 1-6)
St. Thomas: Summa Theologica (I,q.2,a.3)
Leibniz: Monadology, (§32), (§36)
And sources that show that logicians consider their arguments valid and without fallacies.
This is foolish. Within the spectra of philosophy there are any number of opinions even among specialists. If universal assent is your standard then it will nigh impossible to say any logical stance is what it purports.
Excellent, now we have made progress. Now you're aware that your proof means that "a non-contingent being exists if my assumption are true", you should also show which of your statements you believe to be your assumptions. Since we're free to make any assumption we like, I must know which are your premises and which are your conclusions before the validity of the argument can be discussed. I have spotted that one of your numbered points contains a "therefore", which suggests that maybe you're making several conclusion steps. It isn't clear to me exactly what you're claiming to be your assumptions and what you're claiming to be your deduced steps. So if you would be so kind and tell me which your assumptions are, I'll finally be able to determine whether your argument is valid or not. And as a second step, it's possible to also discuss whether the assumptions are justified or not, but that's another discussion, which I'll at the very least postpone until you've told me what your assumptions are so I can check the validity of your argument.
This confuses me. There is post after post from you claiming the proof is invalid. Now, you say you will see the assumptions to check the validity. The only assumptions are something exists, this is qualified initially as contingent being.
If you are confused, noting such is not a personal attack, it is simply noting the confusion.
That's the same as saying "if you're an idiot, noting such is not a personal attack, it is simply noting you're an idiot". It's a personal attack.
Idiocy and confusion are not the same. You are confused about the meaning of the two words. So you don't feel too badly, I'm constantly confused by your posts. They are really hard to decipher. I didn't know you were a non-native English speaker. I think that is what explains it. What is probably in your head and what gets posted to be read I don't think are the same. My sense is you've taken up your sword over a misunderstanding.
Equivocating is to use the same word in different meanings while either not understanding it has different meanings or not making clear from the context that they have different meanings.
Your usage was not clear.
When writing it is important to be clear which is ultimately determined by the reader. The sheer verbosity of your posts often removes that possibility.
And what is a necessary being, according to your definition?
I'm using the standard definitions of the terms contingent and necessary. Both have already been explained.
A contingent being is: a being that may or may not exist: something whose existence is separate from its essence. There is nothing within or about it that requires is existence.
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be: something whose existence and essence are inseparable.
What then are we to make of the objection: "There is no such things as Vulcans or Spocks or even boogie?"? Assuming we agree with the sentiment, this means the proof is unsound. Soundness doesn't impact validity, it refers to whether the premises are true.
Nice, you're learning. Well done!
I'm glad you approve. Hopefully you also understood how this relates to your posture.
Now, my focus has only been to demonstrate a valid argument. I've not been concerned with any larger truth claim.
Fair enough, now you're stating that openly.
This should have been obvious from the beginning of your participation in the thread. I gave you the references that showed the whole thrust and rationale for the proof. It has always been a base logical question nothing more.
But you must understand that I couldn't help but think you were claiming the truth value of your conclusion when you didn't list any assumption and explicitly stated: "there must be a necessary being. I proffered that such can only be God."
You misunderstood. The above that you quote from me demonstrates the same in the verbiage: proffer means to put forward or propose.
Now it's not the proffer that it could be God that bothers me, but the claim that "there must be a necessary being". In this last post of yours you seem to however have explicitly stated that you don't make such a claim, but that you make the claim that "assuming my premises are true, a necessary being exists". But if someone doesn't list his premises clearly it's difficult to believe that that someone actually is aware of under which premises the conclusion holds.
The premises are everything in the proof that isn't a conclusion. They are quite clear. There is nothing more complicated than that.
Anyway, if you've now admitted that your conclusion is only necessary true under the conditon that your premises are true, you need to explicitly show which your premises are, before the argument can be shown to be valid or invalid.
The premise are numbered one through five with six as an intermediate conclusion and seven as a final conclusion.
No, the purpose of pointing out that the premises need to be true in order for the conclusion to be true wasn't to justify a demonstration that a particular premise wasn't true. The purpose of it was to make you understand that you need to clearly and explicitly state under which assumptions you claim the conclusion to be true. I.e. a list of the premises.
The proof isn't complicated. It is clear.
As your proof looks now, it's a mix of premises and deductions and definitions.
The proof hasn't changed. There are premises and deduced conclusions. No definitions are given as there in no special vernacular: contingent, necessary and causality are all used per the normal meaning.
Because the conclusion is necessarily true only if the premises are true, the result of a logical argument is "assuming my premises are true, is true". As you probably understand it's necessary then to know under which assumptions the conclusion is true.
The argument isn't concerned with truth, but validity. If one accepts that contingent beings exist then the rest follows.
A logical argument is by definition a 'then' from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion. The operator => is used for all forms of implication including logical argument, but proofs can also be expressed using other forms, such as a horizontal line between the premises and the conclusion. That a proof is an implication (i.e. the 'if-then' operator) is quite easy to see: a => b says "if a is true, then b is necessarily true", while a proof p => c says "if the premises p are true, then conclusion c is true".
That's right! This: ((p => c) and p) => (c is true) isn't an argument (which is what you stated). It is a statement. Its an explanation of the form of a proof, not a proof itself.
Here's the complete story: you make a claim, I respond to that claim by stating that I consider you to have made a fallacy. I illustrate how absurd the fallacy is by showing another example where that fallacy clearly stands out as absurd as it is. Then you claim that example to be my pattern of thought...
The complete story is your posts appeared incoherent and thus I couldn't follow what you were about.
I don't think it's constructive to continue this particular track of our discussion and I think we should rather concentrate on the more constructive parts of it.
I don't think there are any constructive parts to it. I think you misunderstood the argument and confused validity claims with soundness claims.
Above in the post you say things that make it look as if you've realized that a logical argument shows that "if the premises are true, the conclusion is necessarily true" and not the fallacious "the conclusion is true".Because the conclusion is necessarily true only under certain assumptions, the final result obtained by making a logical argument isn't just the conclusion, but a conclusion and a list of the assumptions under which the argument says it must hold. The assumptions made are part of the result and should be listed along with the proof. Otherwise you've made an empty statement. Your statement now is "assuming some unspecified assumptions are true - I won't tell you which those assumptions are - a necessary being exists". I believe you can imagine how convincing such a statement sounds in the eyes of logicians or philosophers.
Now you seem to have reverted to your previous claim that you've proven "a necessary being exists". [I]Under which assumptions, if I may ask? You've proven that assuming that some assumptions which you won't tell which they are are true, a necessary being must exist. That isn't a very convincing statement. It's against the rules of logic however to present it as a necessary being must exist. That's a half truth fallacy, since it leaves out the very important point that the statement "a necessary being must exist" is only necessarily true under certain assumptions. For it to be logically correct you must either list your assumptions, or rephrase your result as "assuming some assumptions which I won't tell which they are are true, a necessary being exists".
Your missing the mark. The argument is a proof for God. The proof's validity is dependent on the premises. There is no hidden anything. The premises and all they entail are present.
For two concepts to cover all cases, their definitions must only demand a certain stance in one property, where the two concepts have opposite stances in that property. This is for example possibe if the definitions are:
The base meaning of necessary and contingent being are the standard meaning. Under that rubric there is no third option of being.
There are quite a few other candidates to chose from when it comes to the choice of defining the words, so I'll wait your answer before I move on.
The two concepts are the standard definitions used by all who understand base ontology. There is nothing tricky or confusing about either.
I hope you can answer the questions about your definitions so we can make some further progress!
As explained ad nauseum: the two are the standard definitions.
If you would also state which your assumptions are, we would make even further progress, but you seem reluctant to state which assumptions you've made, so for now I'll be satisfied with an answer to what definitions you use. The assumptions part will become easier once the definitions have been fixed.
?
The base assumption is premise 1).
LegioXXX,
When I look back at your series of posts I'm struck by a few things: they are long, rather meandering and uninteresting. The coherence issues with your more involved segments I think are partially linguistic, but also due to a rudimentary misunderstanding of the proof itself: confusing soundness with validity proper. So, to avoid more of the same note the proof again:
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum.
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
You've asked about assumptions and word definitions. The base assumption is 1) which is a bald assertion. Everything else follows from that premise. The definitions of contingent and necessary being are not other than the standard definitions. For example:
A contingent being is: a being that may or may not exist: something whose existence is separate from its essence. There is nothing within or about it that requires is existence.
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be: something whose existence and essence are inseparable.
I put this forward as a valid argument. If you disagree post your objection. If you have issues try and present them is as tight a fashion as you can.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-12-2007, 03:48
https://img123.imageshack.us/img123/281/burgerking4mdtk1.jpg
http://euroross.blogspot.com/The%20King%20Scream%20Pic.jpg
Beren Son Of Barahi
01-12-2007, 06:16
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum.
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
A contingent being is: a being that may or may not exist: something whose existence is separate from its essence. There is nothing within or about it that requires is existence.
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be: something whose existence and essence are inseparable :gah:
this seems to me like the question/definitions are constructed to give the the answer your seeking... i.e start with your favored answer then work backwards to make your answer correct.
so if we replaced your defined words/subject matter with aliens and according to you, you have just proved aliens exist, if you define aliens as something that may or may not live somewhere in the universe...?
i am not a genius, but i plan (system designer be trade) things for a living so my logic is normally pretty sound.... and yet to accept your argument as a whole you need to accept point 1, that that seems to be the weakest part...or maybe beyond me.
also this seems to far as far removed from the judo style god there can be, almost the exact oppisite barring a complete rejection of any god/s?
Sjakihata
01-12-2007, 09:38
The whole notion on cause and effect, what being causing another etc. I think is deeply confusing. I'm thinking mainly of two things here: the problem of causation and the fact that a contigent being needs a cause makes only sense in strict metaphysical terms.
To broaden our subject into the 'real' life, that is away from strictly logical and metaphysical speculations, we cannot know if the universe has actually been there forever or if it actually was created from nothing. This doesnt make sense, in Pindars classical and logical line of reasoning, but how sure are we that the universe actually conforms to human invented logic? What I mean is, that it is possible that the universe have always been there and that it will remain to be here or that it was created from nothing - even though both appears absurd, we have no way of knowning.
To return to causation. The fact that we have no idea and can have no idea how or if causation works in the (meta)physical world or if it is just a way of associating in our head, a pattern of thought learnt through experience.
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 09:42
This confuses me. There is post after post from you claiming the proof is invalid. Now, you say you will see the assumptions to check the validity. The only assumptions are something exists, this is qualified initially as contingent being.
Correct, the reasoning already contains fallacies, but I need the assumptions and the definitions before I can show exactly where the fallacies lie. Until the definitions are fixed, there is a huge risk of equivocation. When the definitions are fixed in an argument that previously relied on equivocation, the argument often becomes obviously invalid. That's why it's important to state definitions clearly and fix them at the start of the discussion.
Your usage was not clear.
When writing it is important to be clear which is ultimately determined by the reader. The sheer verbosity of your posts often removes that possibility.
Factual terms within mathematics etc. are unambiguously defined and if used in the standard way and with the standard methods for making clear which definition you use (in the cases where there are several), it's always clear what is meant. Unless the reader isn't familiar with the standard notation. But if it confuses you, let's agree on which definition of the word "proof" to use from here on in this discussion.
I'm using the standard definitions of the terms contingent and necessary. Both have already been explained.
A contingent being is: a being that may or may not exist: something whose existence is separate from its essence. There is nothing within or about it that requires is existence.
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be: something whose existence and essence are inseparable.
Your current definitions are vague. Since necessary being with this definition is "something that can't not be", i.e. "something that must exist", it follows directly from the definition that a necessary being must exist. The entire logical argument is valid in a strict logical sense but meaningless because it tries to conclude that "something that must exist must exist". You've made a quite meaningless argument if you use this definition of the word necessary being.
You misunderstood. The above that you quote from me demonstrates the same in the verbiage: proffer means to put forward or propose.
No I didn't misunderstand. My comment objected to the first part, not the second part. I object to the statement "there must be a necessary being", not "I proffered that such can only be God". The second part I haven't said anything about yet, but I will probably do it later if we get that far. The first part is a fallacy because you present your result as a proof that "a necessary being must exist", without stating your assumptions. Now if you don't want to state your assumptions you can express that as "under some unspecified assumptions which I'm not going to tell which they are, I've shown that a necessary being must necessarily exist". However stating that your result is "a necessary being must exist" without clearly marking that it relies heavily on that certain assumptions are true, is a fallacy.
I know what might confuse you here. In for example math, all axioms of mathematics are implicitly added to your list of premises, which means at the end of a mathematical proof people use the shorthand notation "my conclusion is true", rather than "my conclusion is necessarily true if the axioms of mathematics are true". Ontology is a subject that lacks axioms, and therefore it's not valid to hide any assumptions. Logic is an ontologic standing that lacks any other implicitly assumed axioms than "the inference rules of logic are true". All premises that aren't the inference rules themselves must be stated.
The premise are numbered one through five with six as an intermediate conclusion and seven as a final conclusion.
This means your premises are:
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum.
Thanks, now it will be possible to check the validity of your claim. And possible to rephrase your result in the correct way. Your result isn't "a necessary being exists", but: "a necessary being must necessarily exist assuming that 1. contingent beings exist, 2- Contingent beings have a cause, 3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause, 4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being., and 5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum"
As you can see there's an important difference. The first sounds like a major achievement, while the latter isn't nearly as impressive. To state the first is a logical fallacy, to state the second is logically correct if the logical argument was correct.
The argument isn't concerned with truth, but validity. If one accepts that contingent beings exist then the rest follows.
Above you stated that you had 5 assumptions. Now you state that only your first assumption must be true for the rest to be necessarily true, which by definition is the same as claiming that you only have 1 assumption! Which is it - 1 or 5 assumptions?
That's right! This: ((p => c) and p) => (c is true) isn't an argument (which is what you stated). It is a statement. Its an explanation of the form of a proof, not a proof itself.
You're wrong. Every logical argument is in itself a statement. The statement that assuming the premises are true the conclusion is necessarily true. That's one of the consequences of generality of the logic operators.
The base assumption is premise 1).
Base assumption? What do you mean by "base assumption"? If you mean it's something from which the other 4 assumptions follow, then the other 4 "assumptions" aren't assumptions by definition. On the other hand if you mean that no. 1 is the only assumption, then why did you above state that there were 5 assumptions?
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 09:53
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum.
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
You've asked about assumptions and word definitions. The base assumption is 1) which is a bald assertion. Everything else follows from that premise. The definitions of contingent and necessary being are not other than the standard definitions. For example:
A contingent being is: a being that may or may not exist: something whose existence is separate from its essence. There is nothing within or about it that requires is existence.
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be: something whose existence and essence are inseparable.
I put this forward as a valid argument. If you disagree post your objection. If you have issues try and present them is as tight a fashion as you can.
Here we finally have a slightly more formal, though still somewhat imprecise and incomplete phrasing of your proof. It's sufficient to point out one fallacy for the logical argument to fail. But before checking for fallacies it's interesting to see what the argument actually claims.
You define a necessary being as "something that cannot not be", i.e. "something that must exist"*. Then your conclusion states that "therefore a necessary being must exist". Using the replacement of words with their definitions, it becomes strikingly clear that the conclusion is a meaningless statement: "therefore something that must exist must exist". It's a valid observation, but a meaningless one. And isn't at all closely related to proving the existence of God.
* the modal logic rule is: (not (M (not a))) <=> (L a), i.e. for example to say "x can't not have happened" is equivalent to saying "x must necessarily have happened"
Ser Clegane
01-12-2007, 10:53
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be
Just to avoid longer discussions about a misunderstanding...
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 12:47
Thanks :bow: for pointing it out, I must have been quite tired to miss that! I've now completed editing my last two posts accordingly.
I find the last exchange between Pinder and LegioXXXUlpiaVictrix interesting when I compare it to the text found at these two sites.
http://people.hofstra.edu/faculty/Stefan_Waner/RealWorld/logic/logicintro.html
http://people.uvawise.edu/philosophy/Logic%20Text/Contents.htm
Example 9 An Invalid Argument
To show that an argument is invalid we need to find a counterexample. This is an assignment of truth values to the variables that makes the premises true but the conclusion false, thus showing that the conclusion does not follow from the premises.
In this case, for the conclusion to be false we need p to be F. For the premises to be true we certainly need q to be T. All we need to do is check that both premises are then true: The first premise is pq, which is true when p is F and q is T. This is our counterexample.
A counterexample is more vivid if we illustrate it with concrete statements. For p, which must be F, let us take the statement "0 = 1." For q, which must be T, let us take the statement "The earth is round." Our argument then has the following, patently ridiculous, form:
If 0 = 1, then the earth is round. - True
The earth is round. - True
0 = 1 - False
And from the second Link
Validity and Logical Implication
Another way to define validity is in terms of logical implication. The premises of a valid argument logically imply the conclusion. This relation of logical implication between premises and conclusion can be demonstrated by truth tables. To do so, we conjoin the premises of an argument, making that the antecedent of a condition statement of which the conclusion is the consequent. If the argument is valid, the resulting conditional will be a tautology.
Given the argument form,
p ⊃ q
p____
∴ q
we construct the conditional statement, [(p ⊃ q) & p] ⊃ q. We then test the conditional with the truth table,
41
p q [(p ⊃ q) & p] ⊃ q
T T T T T
T F F F T
F T T F T
F F T F T
Since the resulting conditional is a tautology, the argument is valid. There is no possible substitution instance for the statement form where the antecedent, the conjunction of the premises, is true and the consequent, the conclusion, is false. The premises logically imply the conclusion.
So to invalidate Pinder's arguement does one not have to show the counter to his assumption to show that the assumption is incorrect?
What I conclude, from reading the two provided links, is that pointing out fallacies does not invalidate an arguement without providing the actual counters to the postion. The one expection to that statement would be the ad hominem fallacy. Now I do enjoy pointing out ad hominem fallacies because it urks some, (especially a certain individual who has now once again left the .org in a fit of self-destruction, but I gloat), but one must admit that it detracts from the discussion. Is it not better to address the arguement itself and provide the counters to the premise versus attempting only to address the fallacy you precieve to be in the premise? Would that not avoid the misunderstanding of terms and verbage. For examble in Pinder's points he listed.
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum.
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
Now call be naive in formal logic - but I do not believe this statement address the premise at all.
Here we finally have a slightly more formal, though still somewhat imprecise and incomplete phrasing of your proof. It's sufficient to point out one fallacy for the logical argument to fail. But before checking for fallacies it's interesting to see what the argument actually claims.
It reads like an aguement of form over substance. It does not read as a counter to the premise posed at all.
You define a necessary being as "something that cannot not be", i.e. "something that must exist"*. Then your conclusion states that "therefore a necessary being must exist". Using the replacement of words with their definitions, it becomes strikingly clear that the conclusion is a meaningless statement: "therefore something that must exist must exist". It's a valid observation, but a meaningless one. And isn't at all closely related to proving the existence of God.
What is the counter to the initial statement of "Contingent beings exist." What is the counter to "Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being)?" If an observation is deemed valid, how does one also determine it to be meaningless? Does not a valid observation has significance in logic?
Is not Pinder's definition of "necessary being" very similiar if not exactly the same as the one describe here which seems to be the accept standard due to the ability to find it on numerous publications.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-necessary-being/
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum.
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
A contingent being is: a being that may or may not exist: something whose existence is separate from its essence. There is nothing within or about it that requires is existence.
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be: something whose existence and essence are inseparable
:gah:
this seems to me like the question/definitions are constructed to give the the answer your seeking... i.e start with your favored answer then work backwards to make your answer correct.
so if we replaced your defined words/subject matter with aliens and according to you, you have just proved aliens exist, if you define aliens as something that may or may not live somewhere in the universe...?
i am not a genius, but i plan (system designer be trade) things for a living so my logic is normally pretty sound.... and yet to accept your argument as a whole you need to accept point 1, that that seems to be the weakest part...or maybe beyond me.
also this seems to far as far removed from the judo style god there can be, almost the exact oppisite barring a complete rejection of any god/s?
The proof moves from the assertion contingent beings exist to a necessary being exists. Both have being, but are not the same thing. An alien would be an example of a contingent being as would the The Death Star, celery or Tony Blair. In recognizing contingent being, it does not force us to recognize any particular contingent being: simply the logical status of any designate. Things so identified, insofar as they exist, are not logically required to do so. There is nothing that requires the Death Star or Tony Blair be. This is what the point of 1) is about: there are things out there (Tony Blair for example) but these things don't have to be there. This is the jumping off point for what follows.
I'm not sure I understood the judo style god comment. The focus on necessary being is to identify one aspect of God: God's judo or absolute fashion sense isn't being considered.
To broaden our subject into the 'real' life, that is away from strictly logical and metaphysical speculations, we cannot know if the universe has actually been there forever or if it actually was created from nothing. This doesnt make sense, in Pindars classical and logical line of reasoning, but how sure are we that the universe actually conforms to human invented logic?
Of course, if one rejects the rationalist assumption then there is no reason (excuse the pun) to believe in logic (which certainly is a construct) or its conclusions at all.
Correct, the reasoning already contains fallacies, but I need the assumptions and the definitions before I can show exactly where the fallacies lie.
Hmmm, if you need something before you can show a fallacy how do you know there is a fallacy prior to the having the something necessary to show the fallacy?
Factual terms within mathematics etc. are unambiguously defined and if used in the standard way and with the standard methods for making clear which definition you use (in the cases where there are several), it's always clear what is meant. Unless the reader isn't familiar with the standard notation. But if it confuses you, let's agree on which definition of the word "proof" to use from here on in this discussion.
What confused me are not factual terms, but your verbiage.
Your current definitions are vague. Since necessary being with this definition is "something that can't not be", i.e. "something that must exist", it follows directly from the definition that a necessary being must exist. The entire logical argument is valid in a strict logical sense but meaningless because it tries to conclude that "something that must exist must exist". You've made a quite meaningless argument if you use this definition of the word necessary being.
The definition of necessary being does assert the object cannot be otherwise. A definition is not a proof. There is nothing about the definition that requires one accepts there are indeed necessary being(s). In the proof there is no assertion that necessary beings do in fact exist. It does conclude they exist however.
The first part is a fallacy because you present your result as a proof that "a necessary being must exist", without stating your assumptions. Now if you don't want to state your assumptions you can express that as "under some unspecified assumptions which I'm not going to tell which they are, I've shown that a necessary being must necessarily exist". However stating that your result is "a necessary being must exist" without clearly marking that it relies heavily on that certain assumptions are true, is a fallacy.
There are no unstated assumptions. The conclusion is not "a necessary must exist". It is: a necessary being does exist. The conclusion does rely on what precedes it. This is the point of a proof.
This means your premises are:
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum.
Thanks, now it will be possible to check the validity of your claim. And possible to rephrase your result in the correct way.
The premises should have been obvious. The 'therefore' in 6) and 7) indicates a conclusion. The phrasing is correct.
Your result isn't "a necessary being exists", but: "a necessary being must necessarily exist assuming that 1. contingent beings exist, 2- Contingent beings have a cause, 3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause, 4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being., and 5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum"
This is obvious.
Above you stated that you had 5 assumptions.
Where did I state this?
You're wrong. Every logical argument is in itself a statement. The statement that assuming the premises are true the conclusion is necessarily true. That's one of the consequences of generality of the logic operators.
You do not understand. One doesn't typically refer to definitions, explanations, statements as arguments.
Base assumption? What do you mean by "base assumption"? If you mean it's something from which the other 4 assumptions follow, then the other 4 "assumptions" aren't assumptions by definition. On the other hand if you mean that no. 1 is the only assumption, then why did you above state that there were 5 assumptions?
Base means: initial, the beginning point, the ground of etc.
I didn't state the other 4 were assumptions.
Here we finally have a slightly more formal, though still somewhat imprecise and incomplete phrasing of your proof. It's sufficient to point out one fallacy for the logical argument to fail. But before checking for fallacies it's interesting to see what the argument actually claims.
I thought you had already concluded there were fallacies, why do you need to check for them?
You define a necessary being as "something that cannot not be", i.e. "something that must exist"*. Then your conclusion states that "therefore a necessary being must exist". Using the replacement of words with their definitions, it becomes strikingly clear that the conclusion is a meaningless statement: "therefore something that must exist must exist". It's a valid observation, but a meaningless one. And isn't at all closely related to proving the existence of God.
A definition isn't an argument. Because one defines a thing does not mean the thing defined therefore is (even if the definition makes the claim). A proof demands acceptance of its conclusion given the premises. The proof's conclusion is a necessary being exists. This is meaningful insofar as one accepts the premises and is interested in reason. Necessary being relates to God as necessary being as a standard attribute of God.
Redleg,
Counterexamples are the standard for refuting an argument.
As I read LegioXXX's posture thus far, it is a much ado about nothing. All the charges of ' it's invalid but I'm still checking the validity', the clear misunderstanding between soundness verses validity and the 'assumptions' verbiage has simply confused what is really a very straight forward and rather mundane proof. The same applies to the standard meaning of necessary being which has existed (and been accepted) in philosophical discourse since the time of Aristotle.
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 21:01
What I conclude, from reading the two provided links, is that pointing out fallacies does not invalidate an arguement without providing the actual counters to the postion.
Actually if the fallacy was a type of fallacy that was used to make an invalid argument valid, it's enough to point out the fallacy. However formally and generally it suffices to provide a counter example. Sometimes however we don't need to go all the way and insert truth values to find a counter example. For instance if the argument "p => c" can be simplified to a statement "x and not x", then it's obvious that we can find at least one assignment of truth values that invalidates the argument. In the case of "x and not x", both x=true and x=false will make the statement false. But - if someone isn't convinced by (x and not x), I must always be able to give a counter example where all literals, whose truth value isn't known, have been assigned to truth values chosen such that the argument can be simplified to "false". If I ever make a claim to have invalidated a logical argument and you ask me to provide a counterexample with literals inserted, I'll be able to do it (unless I made a mistake!).
It reads like an aguement of form over substance. It does not read as a counter to the premise posed at all.
If you refer to this statement:
Here we finally have a slightly more formal, though still somewhat imprecise and incomplete phrasing of your proof. It's sufficient to point out one fallacy for the logical argument to fail. But before checking for fallacies it's interesting to see what the argument actually claims.
...it's pure communication, not any form of logical argumentation. I explain what I'm going to do, and why, in very informal terms. In the paragraph following the quoted paragraph I do what I said I was going to do. In the third paragraph I summarize my opinion in informal terms.
What is the counter to the initial statement of "Contingent beings exist." What is the counter to "Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being)?" If an observation is deemed valid, how does one also determine it to be meaningless? Does not a valid observation has significance in logic?
As you can see in the first paragraph of my post, I said I wasn't going to at all check the validity of Pindar's argument, but only check what claim the argument made. As it turned out, the claim turned out to be much weaker than what it appeared to be in his previous, less formal argument. It turned out that he said nothing but a statement of the form "if x, then x", which is of course true. It turned out that since his argument now was a trivial and true observation, I had no reason to look for fallacies in it. It doesn't contain any fallacies, in fact "if x then x" is true, and no other assumption than the implicit "the axioms of logic are true" is needed for the observation to be true.
Is not Pinder's definition of "necessary being" very similiar if not exactly the same as the one describe here which seems to be the accept standard due to the ability to find it on numerous publications.
Yes, his definition is the standard one. But since using the standard one in the context he used it resulted in a meaningless and trivial claim, I was wondering if he really meant to use that definition. With the definition inserted, his claim ended up being "a being that must exist must exist". You don't need 7 steps to prove that, you need only 1 step.
Redleg,
Counterexamples are the standard for refuting an argument.
That has always been my understanding of debate and logic. Now pointing out fallacies has always been part of the process, but its my understanding that one cannot just claim its a fallacy, but one must demonstrate it as a fallacy and provide the logical counter to the premise that used the logical fallacy. Is this not correct?
As I read LegioXXX's posture thus far, it is a much ado about nothing. All the charges of ' it's invalid but I'm still checking the validity', the clear misunderstanding between soundness verses validity and the 'assumptions' verbiage has simply confused what is really a very straight forward and rather mundane proof. The same applies to the standard meaning of necessary being which has existed (and been accepted) in philosophical discourse since the time of Aristotle.
I read most of his posts as an arguement over form, not of the actual substance.
I see it as a rather weak attempt to invalidate your proffered premise, (If I may be so bold in attempting to use the word in a sentence). It is my understanding that a strong rebuttal of your premise would provide counters to your postion, along with the form and substance arguement that demonstrates where the fallacies are in your presentation of the proffered premise.
Actually if the fallacy was a type of fallacy that was used to make an invalid argument valid, it's enough to point out the fallacy. However formally and generally it suffices to provide a counter example. Sometimes however we don't need to go all the way and insert truth values to find a counter example. For instance if the argument "p => c" can be simplified to a statement "x and not x", then it's obvious that we can find at least one assignment of truth values that invalidates the argument. In the case of "x and not x", both x=true and x=false will make the statement false. But - if someone isn't convinced by (x and not x), I must always be able to give a counter example where all literals, whose truth value isn't known, have been assigned to truth values chosen such that the argument can be simplified to "false". If I ever make a claim to have invalidated a logical argument and you ask me to provide a counterexample with literals inserted, I'll be able to do it (unless I made a mistake!).
If one can invalidate a premise by pointing out the fallacy, one should demonstrate that their premise is valid concerning the fallacy in the arguement, is this not correct?
To put it simply does not one have to prove that the premise contains a critical fallacy that invalidates the arguement, by examble?
In your presentation of your arguement - I have failed to see or read the counter-examble that invalidates the arguement either by demonstration of the fallacy or the premise itself. Now it might be that I am rather simple minded in how I read things - ie I read the words as they are written, or I might have simply missed such a statement in my reading (which is also entirily possible given the course of the discussion, to much ebb and flow.)
If you refer to this statement:
...it's pure communication, not any form of logical argumentation. I explain what I'm going to do, and why, in very informal terms. In the paragraph following the quoted paragraph I do what I said I was going to do. In the third paragraph I summarize my opinion in informal terms.
Am I miss reading the statement - because it very much reads as a critical analysis of form, not of substance to me.
As you can see in the first paragraph of my post, I said I wasn't going to at all check the validity of Pindar's argument, but only check what claim the argument made. As it turned out, the claim turned out to be much weaker than what it appeared to be in his previous, less formal argument. It turned out that he said nothing but a statement of the form "if x, then x", which is of course true. It turned out that since his argument now was a trivial and true observation, I had no reason to look for fallacies in it. It doesn't contain any fallacies, in fact "if x then x" is true, and no other assumption than the implicit "the axioms of logic are true" is needed for the observation to be true.
Checking the claim and checking the validity of the arguement seems to be a tap dance around form over substance. Tap dance equates to avoiding answering the actual question.
Futhermore if I am understanding your use of the words correctly - you can not invalidate his arguement. I bolded exactly the wording that leads me to this conclusion.
Yes, his definition is the standard one. But since using the standard one in the context he used it resulted in a meaningless and trivial claim, I was wondering if he really meant to use that definition. With the definition inserted, his claim ended up being "a being that must exist must exist". You don't need 7 steps to prove that, you need only 1 step.
Once again this does not read as a counter to his arguement - only an arguement of form over substance. If I was to score the debate I would have to conclude from your statements here, where you state that the observation is true, but have not provided any counters that demonstrate that his conclusion is false, that yes indeed that Pinder has made a logical arguement for God's existance. So calling the previous discussion round 1 - I await a sound rebuttal to Pinder's arguement.
But I could be baised in that since I do believe in the existance of God.
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 21:16
Hmmm, if you need something before you can show a fallacy how do you know there is a fallacy prior to the having the something necessary to show the fallacy?
No matter what your answer would be, there would have been a fallacy, but in different places depending on what you answered. Your first claim was to have concluded that a being having the following properties existed for sure: "existed forever backwards in time, still exists today, and caused the first contingent being and possibly other contingent beings as well". Now with your previous definitions, your argument was a fallacy. With your new definitions, it was a fallacy to claim the conclusion to be that a being with the above properties exist. Thus in both cases a fallacy.
In the second case, looking at what the conclusion really says there's no fallacy. Your new argument only states that "something that must exist must exist", which is true.
The definition of necessary being does assert the object cannot be otherwise. A definition is not a proof. There is nothing about the definition that requires one accepts there are indeed necessary being(s). In the proof there is no assertion that necessary beings do in fact exist. It does conclude they exist however.
A definition is nothing but a choice of letting a word denote a complex phrase that we don't want to repeat each time we want to express it. As such, any word can be replaced by its definition without changing the meaning of the phrase. For example:
Example1:
Let's define God as something that is rational, good and almighty
With this definition, someone makes the claim "God exists". What claim did he make? He made the claim that "something that is rational, good and almighty exists".
Example2:
Let's define GAH as something that is evil, ugly and doesn't exist
With this definition, someone makes the claim "GAH exists". What did he claim? He claimed that "something that is evil, ugly and doesn't exist exists". The statement doesn't make much sense, since something that by definition doesn't exist can't exist.
We are free to choose any meaning we like to the words, but if we want to communicate our argument to others we must explain exactly which definitions we use. And someone who checks an argument made with certain word definitions is always allowed to replace the word with its definition.
Another example:
Let's define Abc as a car that was made after 1980
Someone makes a claim that "Abc was made after 1980". Is this claim true? A good first step in the process of checking whether the claim was true or not is by actually seeing what it says. This can be done by inserting the definitions in place of the words: "A car that was made after 1980 was made after 1980". Clearly a true statement.
and so on...
There are no unstated assumptions. The conclusion is not "a necessary must exist". It is: a necessary being does exist. The conclusion does rely on what precedes it. This is the point of a proof.
Yes, you're correct, the conclusion didn't need any assumptions (except the assumption that the inference rules of logic are correct, but that assumption is normally left out) in it's new form. However, it wasn't clear until you explained what your definition of "necessary being" was. Now that you've provided the definition of it it's clear that, using the replacement of words by their definition, your conclusion only stated that "something that must exist must exist". The only assumption that is required is therefore "the inference rules of logic are correct", which nobody ever bothers to state explicitly. However some of your previous remarks got me thinking that you used another definition of the word necessary being. You attributed to the necessary being the property that it could cause things. The new definition however doesn't make any claim about that. It simply defines a necessary being as something that must exist. Your new claim is "something that must exist must exist", which is obviously true.
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 21:25
To put it simply does not one have to prove that the premise contains a critical fallacy that invalidates the arguement, by examble?
Yes, if an informal argument doesn't convince the other part, and the other part asks for a complete and formal counter example, it's common place to provide one. However I haven't been asked to do this when I provided my quick informal comment. I've only been accused by Pindar of carrying out personal attacks and that I don't know anything about logic. However it seems a bit odd to me that someone who presents an informal argument would require a formal response to it. Responding formally to an informal argument can be quite difficult, so it's justified to in return require the first guy to rewrite his proof in a more formal way. Now that has finally happened after I explained to him the important place of assumptions, definitions and what a proof actually is. But now it turned out that with his new choice of definitions, the argument in itself only stated that "something that must exist must exist". I can't invalidate that argument, since it's a correct argument. However his previous statements presented his conclusion as something along the lines of (I don't recall the exact phrasing) "there exists a being that has existed forever and still exists, and caused the first contingent being". To state that "something that must exist must exist" is a completely different thing - it's an obvious truth. However to state that he has proven that "there exists a being that has existed forever and still exists, and caused the first contingent being" after providing an argument that only shows that "something that must exist must exist", is a fallacy. Now in which argument does this fallacy lie, you may ask? Not in the argument that concludes that "something that must exist must exist", that is clear. So where does it lie? It lies in an implicit argument he makes after concluding that "something must exist must exist". Where he claims that he just proved that "there exists a being that has existed forever and still exists, and caused the first contingent being", and not just that "something that must exist must exist". Since this argument isn't stated how can I refute it by a counterexample? All I can do is to show that his argument, with his new definitions of words, doesn't imply anything except "something that must exist must exist". I've now shown that, and Pindar so far hasn't said that I'm wrong in this. If Pindar now admits that his argument shows nothing more than "something that must exist must exist", then I'm happy with that result. Because then he has withdrawn the claim of having proven that "there must necessarily exist a being that has existed forever and still exists, and caused the first contingent being", which was the statement I objected to.
So my intention so far in the discussion hasn't primarily been to refute his argument, but to make him realize what his claims are, formalize his proof, and by providing the definitions of his words removing all risks of equivocation. I've succeeded partly in those goals. Now the next step is either to invalidate his argument if it's incorrect, and validate it formally if it's correct. The final step is to discuss how his conclusion relates to the bigger question "is there a God"? I don't think - and this is merely a matter of opinion - that the statement "something that must exist must exist" is a statement that convinces me of the existence of God much compared to how the texts in the Bible can convince me of the existence of God.
Futhermore if I am understanding your use of the words correctly - you can not invalidate his arguement. I bolded exactly the wording that leads me to this conclusion.
No, I can't invalidate the statement "something that must exist must exist", since it's a valid argument. However I could invalidate his previous statement "there exists a being that has existed forever and still exists, and caused the first contingent being". To clarify, that text isn't a quote of what he said, but a summary of what he claimed was true about his necessary being in his previous posts. If it's of any interest to the argument, I could provide exact quotes from his posts, but since he's chosen a new definition of the words now that's hardly necessary since he's withdrawn (if he ever held it) the claim that the old argument was true and replaced it with a new argument. Now he's made his claim formal and it turned out to be very different from what his initial claim SEEMED to be, judging from his phrasing of his initial claim. However I might have been incorrect in my understanding of what his initial claim was - it might be the case that his initial claim too was no more than: "something that must exist must exist".
If I was to score the debate I would have to conclude from your statements here, where you state that the observation is true, but have not provided any counters that demonstrate that his conclusion is false, that yes indeed that Pinder has made a logical arguement for God's existance.
The burden of proof lies on the person who makes a claim. Pindar needs to show that there doesn't exist any choice of truth value assignments that will make his argument invalid (that is exactly what a proof does - to say that an expression has truth value true is the same as saying that there can't exist any choice of truth values for the literals in it such that the expression can evaluate to false). While an invalidation of a proof requires you to show that there exists one counterexample, the validation of a proof requires you to show that there can't exist a counterexample. Valid proof and invalid proof are the negations of each other. The negation of "there exists an x" is "there can't exist an x".
As a Socratic question for you - what do you believe Pindar's latest argument actually says? The answer is obtained in a very clear form by replacing words by their definition - do you agree that it's valid to replace a word by its definition? The result then obtained is "something that must exist must exist". Is that a proof of God's existence? Now in his last step Pindar doesn't prove, but proffers that "a necessary being" can only be God. Again using replacement of words with their definiton, we see that his last step is to state that "I proffer that something that must exist can only be God". Would you consider this a proof of God's existence? Note that his initial word definitions implied other properties as well - it nearly fooled me too - but the new choice of definitions makes it quite clear that this isn't a proof of the existence of God. Or do you think otherwise?
Now if I'm guessing correctly, the moment Pindar realizes that his new choice of definitions mean that his conclusion is "something that must exist must exist", and not what he initially intended to conclude from his argument, he will change his definitions, or reprase his argument to argue that there exists "something that wasn't created by something else, whose existence backwards in time is unbounded, and that still exists today, and that can have created the first contingent being". That was what he initially made the impression that he wanted to prove, while his argument, after he revealed his definitions, turns out to state nothing but "something that must exist must exist". When someone's conclusion suddenly changes meaning or the argument for no apparent reason becomes invalided as soon as someone provides his definitions of his words, it smells equivocation fallacy long way. Indeed he seems to initially have used the equivocation of claiming that necessary being meant something else in its context in the conclusion, than it meant in his premises.
I can reveal already now that it's perfectly possible to validly prove something along the lines of "assuming cause and effect is correct and that not all entities have existed forever, it's a necessity that at least one entity's existence is unbounded backwards in time and caused the first entity that wasn't unbounded backwards in time, and it's a possibility that that entity still exists today." That's one of the closest things to a proof of God that have been achieved. But it isn't a proof of God, only a proof that something, that has a subset of the properties that God has, necessarily exists. Whether that thing is God or not is a matter of belief.
But I could be baised in that since I do believe in the existance of God.
You believe in God, you don't know in God - or do you?
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 22:10
You don't believe the four I mentioned put forward proofs for God? Interesting, OK here are the standard references:
Plato: Laws, 893-6
Aristotle: Physics (VIII, 4-6) and Metaphysics (XII, 1-6)
St. Thomas: Summa Theologica (I,q.2,a.3)
Leibniz: Monadology, (§32), (§36)
I provide here what you claim to be Leibniz' proof of God:
Leibniz: Monadology, (§32), (§36)
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/leibniz/monadology.html
32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. (Theod. 44, 196.)
36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact, that is to say, for the sequence or connexion of the things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created beings, in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of present and past forms and motions which go to make up the efficient cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which go to make its final cause.
This doesn't seem like a proof of God to me. He states that one shouldn't hold any statement true unless there is sufficient reason. He claims there must be a reason for the existence of all truths - he doesn't claim that that must be God. He doesn't prove anything, he just states his opinion. I strongly doubt that Leibniz would call this a proof.
Can you provide the text from the other sources you claim to be proofs of God?
Let me also point out that St. Thomas, being a monk, of course must be suspected of bias and carefully evaluated.
In my opinion you haven't provided enough support for your statement that anyone, except you that is, has made a valid logical proof of God.
I thought you had already concluded there were fallacies, why do you need to check for them? I'd certainly be interested in seeing them....
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 23:05
I'd certainly be interested in seeing them....
I'm afraid I must disappoint you then, because Pindar's new definition of the concept necessary being is "something that must exist". Because his conclusion is "a necessary being must exist", with the new definition of the word his conclusion says (when inserting the definition in place of the word) "something that must exist must exist". That is a perfectly valid argument, but a pointless one. Who doesn't already know that something that has a certain property for sure must have that certain property for sure?
The fallacies were found in his arguments when his definition of necessary being was "something that can cause other things, that can't be caused by something else, and that has existed forever and still exists today". Since his conclusion is phrased as "a necessary being exists", with the previous word definition, his conclusion meant "there exists something that can cause other things, that can't be caused by something else, and that has existed forever and still exists today". That conclusion didn't follow from his assumption.
As a side note, it's however possible to, from his assumption that "things that have been caused by something exist", and an additional assumption which he forgot to state: "the cause and effect model is true", conclude that "there must, by the time the first entity that was caused by something else, have existed an entity that wasn't caused by another entity and that could cause another entity. That entity may or may not still exist today".
You believe in God, you don't know in God - or do you?
Let me know when you are done editing so I can respond in detail if necessary. Your editing changes the scope of much of what I intially read in the first post.
However I will address the quoted comment.
One should be very careful of asking such questions, especially one where the sentence structure can have several meanings based upon the reader's interpation.
It seems to me that you have presented a basic arguement fallacy by taking this route with that particuler question.
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 23:24
Redleg, do you honestly believe every single word in a logical discussion is a logical argument? If I say "brb I'll visit the toilet" when I discuss with philosophers, should they start trying to look for fallacies in that phrasing (this was a demonstration of what the consequences would be of making the statement that "all statements in a logical discussion should be evaluated as logical arguments", if anyone were to make that statement)? I asked a question, a simple question. You aren't supposed to evaluate a question as if it was a logical argument! :wall: The purpose of the question was that I wanted to know what you answered. Let me ask it again: do you believe in God, or do you know in God, or both, or both or neither? Whether you want to answer or not is your choice.
Redleg, do you honestly believe every single word in a logical discussion is a logical argument? If I say "brb I'll visit the toilet" when I discuss with philosophers, should they start trying to look for fallacies in that phrasing (this was a demonstration of what the consequences would be of making the statement that "all statements in a logical discussion should be evaluated as logical arguments", if anyone were to make that statement)? I asked a question, a simple question. You aren't supposed to evaluate a question as if it was a logical argument! :wall: The purpose of the question was that I wanted to know what you answered. Let me ask it again: do you believe in God, or do you know in God, or both, or both or neither? Whether you want to answer or not is your choice.
Read what is actually stated not what you believe is to be stated.
One should be very careful of asking such questions, especially one where the sentence structure can have several meanings based upon the reader's interpation.
It seems to me that you have presented a basic arguement fallacy by taking this route with that particuler question.
Your response was to committ another assumption not evident in the statement. I find that rather interesting considering the failure of yours to catch several of the statements made by Pinder in his premise.
The actual question as asked in philosphy and in religion, is do you believe in God or do you Know God? The use of the word in protrays a meaning that is acidine on its face, and can be interpated in several ways by different readers.
Now attempt to read what is written versus the preception of what you believe is written.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-12-2007, 23:37
heh, this is why people believe in the devil:
https://img170.imageshack.us/img170/9349/eclipsefe1.jpg
Rodion Romanovich
01-12-2007, 23:44
Read what is actually stated not what you believe is to be stated.
One should be very careful of asking such questions, especially one where the sentence structure can have several meanings based upon the reader's interpation.
It seems to me that you have presented a basic arguement fallacy by taking this route with that particuler question.
I saw the words "you have presented a basic arguement fallacy". I interpreted that as you trying to say that in your opinion I had made a logical fallacy, in either asking the question at all or asking it with a phrasing that you didn't consider appropriate for some reason.
I saw the words "you have presented a basic arguement fallacy". I interpreted that as you trying to say that in your opinion I had made a logical fallacy, in either asking the question at all or asking it with a phrasing that you didn't consider appropriate for some reason.
That is the problem with internet discussion - interpatation of the written word because of one's own preconcieved opinion on the subject. This basic dilimenia has been presented several times by several posters on this subject. The sentence had no outside meaning other then what was written.
Know in God - does not carry the same meaning as Know God in the philosophical stance.
And Yes I know God because of my own experiences in life, ones that can not be held to any other standard then that of ancedotal evidence, which makes them irrelative to a discussion of his existance to a logic standard, since the evidence can not be replicated.
That has always been my understanding of debate and logic. Now pointing out fallacies has always been part of the process, but its my understanding that one cannot just claim its a fallacy, but one must demonstrate it as a fallacy and provide the logical counter to the premise that used the logical fallacy. Is this not correct?
There are two basic kinds of fallacies: formal and informal. Informal fallacies are the kind you see when someone makes an appeal to authority or begs the question. Formal fallacies speak to the basic logical structure of the argument. A simple example would be what known as affirming the consequent:
A then B
B
Therefore A
This is a fallacy because while A necessitates B, B alone does not require A. For example:
If its raining the rose bush is wet
the rose bush is wet
Therefore its raining.
The rose bush could be wet for any number of reasons aside from rain.
My interlocutor, as it were, would need to demonstrate I've committed a formal fallacy to make his case. This hasn't happened. Rather there has been endless mulberry bush dancing.
I read most of his posts as an arguement over form, not of the actual substance.
There has been no substance. You are correct.
I see it as a rather weak attempt to invalidate your proffered premise, (If I may be so bold in attempting to use the word in a sentence). It is my understanding that a strong rebuttal of your premise would provide counters to your postion, along with the form and substance arguement that demonstrates where the fallacies are in your presentation of the proffered premise.
Yes.
No matter what your answer would be, there would have been a fallacy, but in different places depending on what you answered.
Fascinating, so regardless the inability to indicate the fallacy, or fallacies as it were, they are nonetheless there.
Your first claim was to have concluded that a being having the following properties existed for sure: "existed forever backwards in time, still exists today, and caused the first contingent being and possibly other contingent beings as well". Now with your previous definitions, your argument was a fallacy. With your new definitions, it was a fallacy to claim the conclusion to be that a being with the above properties exist. Thus in both cases a fallacy.
There are no new definitions. I have repeatedly stated the meaning of both necessary and contingent are the standard definitions. This has never changed throughout the 'discussion'. This quote: "existed forever backwards in time, still exists today, and caused the first contingent being and possibly other contingent beings as well". Isn't anything I've said. I think you are quoting yourself which is lovely, but doesn't relate to my argument. Necessary being cannot cease to be by definition. Further as the proof indicates is the only possible ultimate source for any contingent reality.
In the second case, looking at what the conclusion really says there's no fallacy. Your new argument only states that "something that must exist must exist", which is true.
The above seems to fly in the face of the earlier comment of yours: "No matter what your answer would be, there would have been a fallacy, but in different places depending on what you answered."
There is no new argument. All seven steps remain as they have been since I posted them way back on page four of the thread.
The definition of necessary being does assert the object cannot be otherwise. A definition is not a proof. There is nothing about the definition that requires one accepts there are indeed necessary being(s). In the proof there is no assertion that necessary beings do in fact exist. It does conclude they exist however.
A definition is nothing but a choice of letting a word denote a complex phrase... that we don't want to repeat each time we want to express it. As such, any word can be replaced by its definition without changing the meaning of the phrase. For example...Example1...Example2...
Your comment doesn't relate the my post.
There are no unstated assumptions. The conclusion is not "a necessary must exist". It is: a necessary being does exist. The conclusion does rely on what precedes it. This is the point of a proof.
Yes, you're correct, the conclusion didn't need any assumptions (except the assumption that the inference rules of logic are correct, but that assumption is normally left out) in it's new form. However, it wasn't clear until you explained what your definition of "necessary being" was. Now that you've provided the definition of it it's clear that, using the replacement of words by their definition, your conclusion only stated that "something that must exist must exist.
The meaning of necessary being has always been clear. I offered no change in the standard meaning that has always attended the word. I have repeatedly said I was using the standard meaning when asked.
I provide here what you claim to be Leibniz' proof of God:
Leibniz: Monadology, (§32), (§36)
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl3...onadology.html
This doesn't seem like a proof of God to me.
My good fellow, the references I gave you are to Leibniz's sufficiency principle, which as those familiar with the philosophical tradition will tell you, is the key to understanding his proof for God. If you were really interested, what you should have done is actually read a little of what's is going on in the piece. Since you didn't do that allow me to point out what is going on. First the two references again:
32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. (Theod. 44, 196.)
36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact, that is to say, for the sequence or connexion of the things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created beings, in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of present and past forms and motions which go to make up the efficient cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which go to make its final cause.
To continue:
37. And as all this detail again involves other prior or more detailed contingent things, each of which still needs a similar analysis to yield its reason, we are no further forward: and the sufficient or final reason must be outside of the sequence or series of particular contingent things, however infinite this series may be.
38. Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God. (Theod. 7.)
39. Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of all this variety of particulars, which are also connected together throughout; there is only one God, and this God is sufficient.
40. We may also hold that this supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of it,- this substance, which is a pure sequence of possible being, must be illimitable and must contain as much reality as is possible.
Hopefully the point is clear.
Can you provide the text from the other sources you claim to be proofs of God?
While it seems I'm to act the pedagogue and have actually provided the references I see no need to do all your homework. Request denied.
Let me also point out that St. Thomas, being a monk, of course must be suspected of bias and carefully evaluated.
Your comment shows an ignorance of St. Thomas.
In my opinion you haven't provided enough support for your statement that anyone, except you that is, has made a valid logical proof of God.
My statement was: "Proofs for the existence of God are quite old and varied. A number of philosophers have done this." I then gave some examples. I also challenged you to show which of these fellows had admitted their proofs were fallacies. So you know, all the examples I gave are of a similar species of argument. There are other models as well. The point remains: proofs for God span the Philosophical Tradition. While there are always detractors there are also vast numbers who hold the various arguments as rationally demonstrative. So, your earlier statement nobody, but me has given a proof for God was wrong on its face. Sorry.
Yes, if an informal argument doesn't convince the other part, and the other part asks for a complete and formal counter example, it's common place to provide one. However I haven't been asked to do this when I provided my quick informal comment. .
Removed rest of paragraph for ease of reading.
Good summation of your point
However if I go back to Pinder's initial comment concerning his arguement I find this statement.
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1332173&postcount=120
Kojiro my good man, If you are familiar with the literature on the subject a variety of examples should come to mind. If you are not then your earlier comment was presumptive. In any case, as a simple example I'll give you a form of an argument that finds reference in Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz.
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinate regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
To hide data that many will not want to read again.
He then explains to an individual this statement
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1332863&postcount=147
followed by
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1334241&postcount=172
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1335499&postcount=193
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1335499&postcount=194
This statement is found in post 203
First cause does not appear in my argument. I used necessary being. If you wish to argue there is a necessary being other than god do so. If you cannot do so and insist on the distinction then you have created a false dichotomy. This is a fallacy. Within the Western Intellectual Tradition necessary being has been understand as synonymous with god.
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1335499&postcount=205
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1361294&postcount=275
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Now that was the initial postion of Pinder. For my ease of understanding point me to the specific post that fits within your claims in the initial paragraph that I only partily quoted - because frankly I did not see it in my review of the thread.
So my intention so far in the discussion hasn't primarily been to refute his argument, but to make him realize what his claims are, formalize his proof, and by providing the definitions of his words removing all risks of equivocation. I've succeeded partly in those goals. Now the next step is either to invalidate his argument if it's incorrect, and validate it formally if it's correct. The final step is to discuss how his conclusion relates to the bigger question "is there a God"? I don't think - and this is merely a matter of opinion - that the statement "something that must exist must exist" is a statement that convinces me of the existence of God much compared to how the texts in the Bible can convince me of the existence of God.
So is your initial premise one of form over substance? I ask solely for clarification.
No, I can't invalidate the statement "something that must exist must exist", since it's a valid argument. However I could invalidate his previous statement "there exists a being that has existed forever and still exists, and caused the first contingent being". To clarify, that text isn't a quote of what he said, but a summary of what he claimed was true about his necessary being in his previous posts. If it's of any interest to the argument, I could provide exact quotes from his posts, but since he's chosen a new definition of the words now that's hardly necessary since he's withdrawn (if he ever held it) the claim that the old argument was true and replaced it with a new argument. Now he's made his claim formal and it turned out to be very different from what his initial claim SEEMED to be, judging from his phrasing of his initial claim. However I might have been incorrect in my understanding of what his initial claim was - it might be the case that his initial claim too was no more than: "something that must exist must exist".
Please refer to the exact post number since it will insure I understand exactly what you are stating. It seems in my review of the thread - I am not seeing what you are.
The burden of proof lies on the person who makes a claim. Pindar needs to show that there doesn't exist any choice of truth value assignments that will make his argument invalid (that is exactly what a proof does - to say that an expression has truth value true is the same as saying that there can't exist any choice of truth values for the literals in it such that the expression can evaluate to false). While an invalidation of a proof requires you to show that there exists one counterexample, the validation of a proof requires you to show that there can't exist a counterexample. Valid proof and invalid proof are the negations of each other. The negation of "there exists an x" is "there can't exist an x".
Since he did not offer the arguement as a truth only a simple proof of God as used by earlier thinkers for the existance of God, I don't believe he necessarily has the burdern to prove his arguement as valid - since you are in essence challenging not only Pinder but the whole of the ontological arguement of God's existance (this is my understanding of the Premise that Pinder used), I believe the onus lies with you to prove the arguement is invalided. Nor did you ever demonstrate in this thread where the early ontological philosophers(SP) withdrew their premises because of a fallacy inherient in the logic.
As a Socratic question for you - what do you believe Pindar's latest argument actually says? The answer is obtained in a very clear form by replacing words by their definition - do you agree that it's valid to replace a word by its definition? The result then obtained is "something that must exist must exist". Is that a proof of God's existence? Now in his last step Pindar doesn't prove, but proffers that "a necessary being" can only be God. Again using replacement of words with their definiton, we see that his last step is to state that "I proffer that something that must exist can only be God". Would you consider this a proof of God's existence? Note that his initial word definitions implied other properties as well - it nearly fooled me too - but the new choice of definitions makes it quite clear that this isn't a proof of the existence of God. Or do you think otherwise?
I followed the initial arguement that stated the simple proof of God, based upon the ontological position. Some of the discussion between you and Pinder is lost in the arguement. So to comment futher I once again will need the specific post numbers that demonstrate the change in definition - since I once again do not necessarily see a change.
Now if I'm guessing correctly, the moment Pindar realizes that his new choice of definitions mean that his conclusion is "something that must exist must exist", and not what he initially intended to conclude from his argument, he will change his definitions, or reprase his argument to argue that there exists "something that wasn't created by something else, whose existence backwards in time is unbounded, and that still exists today, and that can have created the first contingent being". That was what he initially made the impression that he wanted to prove, while his argument, after he revealed his definitions, turns out to state nothing but "something that must exist must exist". When someone's conclusion suddenly changes meaning or the argument for no apparent reason becomes invalided as soon as someone provides his definitions of his words, it smells equivocation fallacy long way. Indeed he seems to initially have used the equivocation of claiming that necessary being meant something else in its context in the conclusion, than it meant in his premises.
I think Pinder alreadly addressed this speculation.
I can reveal already now that it's perfectly possible to validly prove something along the lines of "assuming cause and effect is correct and that not all entities have existed forever, it's a necessity that at least one entity's existence is unbounded backwards in time and caused the first entity that wasn't unbounded backwards in time, and it's a possibility that that entity still exists today." That's one of the closest things to a proof of God that have been achieved. But it isn't a proof of God, only a proof that something, that has a subset of the properties that God has, necessarily exists. Whether that thing is God or not is a matter of belief.
Then your back to the simple proof of God as shown in the initial post 120. The ontological arguement for the existance of God is valid.
Warning: A conclusion and a judgement contained below
Does this not support the conclusion that you focused on the form of the arguement not the substance, also known as Style over substance? Is that not in itself a basic logical fallacy for one to enter into? Hell, am I not committing the same fallacy myself with this statement?
I'd certainly be interested in seeing them....
Me too...
Now I didn't read the below response to your post initially, but I have now. It's fascinating.
I'm afraid I must disappoint you then, because Pindar's new definition of the concept necessary being is "something that must exist". Because his conclusion is "a necessary being must exist", with the new definition of the word his conclusion says (when inserting the definition in place of the word) "something that must exist must exist". That is a perfectly valid argument, but a pointless one. Who doesn't already know that something that has a certain property for sure must have that certain property for sure?
The fallacies were found in his arguments when his definition of necessary being was "something that can cause other things, that can't be caused by something else, and that has existed forever and still exists today". Since his conclusion is phrased as "a necessary being exists", with the previous word definition, his conclusion meant "there exists something that can cause other things, that can't be caused by something else, and that has existed forever and still exists today". That conclusion didn't follow from his assumption.
In the course of this experience there has been a vast array of charges the proof is invalid, and fallacies abound. Then the stance was there are fallacies, but they haven't been indicated 'yet' due to hidden definitions/assumptions, but the fallacies are nonetheless there. This latest version of Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds has the proof now valid, but only because the definitions changed. Amazing stuff!
There has been no change in definitions. This: "something that can cause other things, that can't be caused by something else, and that has existed forever and still exists today" is not a quote from me. I have repeated ad nauseum the definitions for both contingent and necessary being are the standard definitions. The same applies to the assumptions diversion. There is nothing hidden in the proof. The first point is an assertion which can constitute an assumption. That's it.
In between this flurry of charges there was the additional error of confusing soundness with validity and that my proof was somehow novel when it is quite mundane. I can only conclude that my earlier assessment was correct: this good fellow didn't/doesn't understand and what followed was a rush to judgment.
Good summation of your point
However if I go back to Pindar's initial comment concerning his arguement I find this statement....
Then your back to the simple proof of God as shown in the initial post 120. The ontological arguement for the existance of God is valid.
Damn Redleg!, That's quite a compilation and a commendable wade through an ever changing sea of charges.
Rodion Romanovich
01-13-2007, 10:47
Fascinating, so regardless the inability to indicate the fallacy, or fallacies as it were, they are nonetheless there.
I pointed out several fallacies. But they're no longer relevant since you've withdrawn that argument and replaced it with a new one. Your change of word definitions have changed the meaning of the conclusion. Now your conclusion only says the truism "something that must exist must exist". Previously it claimed the existence of a being that wasn't created, had the ability to create, and still exists today, and that such a being could only be God. Your new claim is that something that must exist must exist, and that thing can only be God.
There is no new argument. All seven steps remain as they have been since I posted them way back on page four of the thread.
With a change of definition of one of the words used in the conclusion, the argument changes meaning if the phrasing remains intact. Your argument uses the same words and is in a linguistic sense unchanged. But what you're claiming is now something different since the word you use in the conclusion now has a different meaning. You haven't supported that "something that must exist" can't be an atom, a human being, or something else. In fact, your conclusion is merely "something that must exist must exist", which is a truism.
Now that we all agree on what definitions you're using, we can all read your argument and see that your only claim is the truism "something that must exist must exist". This is a valid argument, but in fact your 7 points are redundant. That truism can be proven in a single proof step like this:
define necessary being as something that must exist.
Argument:
It follows directly from the definition that a necessary being must exist.
====
I've achieved a lot in this debate. You've been forced to fix your word definitions to avoid equivocation in the final proof step, I've forced you to make clear beyond doubt what your claim is, and I've taught you why assumptions matter. You have withdrawn your previous fallacious claim and now only claim something that is a truism. A truism which doesn't in any way whatsoever have anything to do with proving the existence of God. You originally had a falalcious claim related to the existence of God, now you have a valid logical argument but that isn't very related to the existence of God.
The discussion of the logical argument can thereby end, and now the informal discussion, based on opinion and not logic, can begin. A discussion of what place we think your result has in the subject of proving the existence of God.
In my opinion, stating the truism "something that must exist must exist" doesn't really convince me of the existence of a God. That's all I need to say in this discussion and evaluation of the significance of your argument.
Rodion Romanovich
01-13-2007, 11:03
In reply to Redleg's and Pindar's other posts:
Here's my full position:
Pindar initially was vague about his definition of necessary being. Since the word necessary being appeared in his conclusion, depending on his definition of the word, the conclusion would have different meanings.
Quotes like this demonstrates that his definitions were initially vague, and contrary to what his new definitions are:
Actually the stance is that contingent beings are caused and thus have a beginning. The same doesn't apply to necessary being. If you have an example of an uncaused contingent being present it.
Of course nobody can present an example of an uncaused contingent being if a contingent being is defined as "something that must be caused"! Note his previous definition which says that:
Actually the stance is that contingent beings are caused and thus have a beginning. The same doesn't apply to necessary being.
where he defines contingent being as something that is caused, and a necessary being as something that isn't caused.
However his latest definition says that:
contingent being is: a being that may or may not exist: something whose existence is separate from its essence. There is nothing within or about it that requires is existence.
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be [I demonstrated that this equivalent to: something that must be] [...]
These quotes demonstrates that his definitions have indeed changed.
Now since his conclusion uses the word "necessary being", this drastic change of word definitions drastically changes the meaning of the conclusion. His initial conclusion claimed that:
"something that wasn't caused must exist"
His new conclusion claims that:
"something that must exist must exist".
This is a drastic change in what his argument actually is trying to prove, don't you agree?
Now the fallacies I pointed out were fallacies found in his previous argument, which was invalid. His new argument is valid, but meaningless. For the rest of the discussion, I'll continue what I've been doing so far:
- If he again claims that the first argument is valid, I'll point out the logical fallacies in it
- If he sticks to only claiming the new argument, I'd like to make clear that it only says "something that must exist must exist", and that it is a truism that doesn't require 7 proof steps, but just a single proof step, and that the remaining cause-and-effect related comments in his argument aren't related to the proof and are just added to cause confusion. And that the argument can be stated as a simple:
Definitions:
- a necessary being is something that must exist
Argument:
- It follows from the definition that a necessary being must exist
Informal comments/Interpretation:
- The proof shows the truism that something that must exist must exist
I would also like to discuss informally, as a matter of opinion, how his new pretty pointless truism of an argument relates to the existence of God if at all it does. In my opinion, I don't think the truism "something that must exist must exist" supports the existence of a God. I'd also like to discuss Pindar's final step, where he says "a necessary being must exist. I proffered that such can only be God". Since the definition of necessary being is now "something that must exist", pretty much everything that exists, including human beings, cars, atoms, energy etc. can apply to the word "necessary being". As such, his "proffer that such can only be God" isn't justified.
Fisherking
01-13-2007, 13:48
Well, of course, I have read very little of what has been posted here but I am sure everyone is wrong except me.~;p
:knight: There is some universal power responsible for creating everything that is. There are universal truths. Every religion has some point or other right but for the most part are just wrong when they say that such and such is unforgivable. Sin is the invention of some cleric and the only way to Sin is to think you have. Jesus told the same thing to Peter in some what different words. There is no devil per se but there is negativity and dark thought. Call it Shadow if you will…just something unclear, or harmful to others. How does one avoid it? By telling it to go away! How do you live your life? Be all you can be and try to harm no one while doing it. There is more but that should be enough for now.:coffeenews:
How do I know it?~:doh: Oh so here we get into trouble. I reached a state of knowing. And how, the really hard part, I guess I got a direct download form the universe. In the end if you tell people these things some will hate you and want to burn you or nail you to a tree or something.:hide:
So, I know I am more right than wrong and in the end it doesn't matter what everyone else thinks.
Am I crazy? Well maybe, but I don't think so. In the end it really doesn't matter anyway.:dizzy2:
Rodion Romanovich
01-13-2007, 15:47
Since he did not offer the arguement as a truth only a simple proof of God as used by earlier thinkers for the existance of God, I don't believe he necessarily has the burdern to prove his arguement as valid
If he claims the argument to be correct and valid, he has the burden of proof.
since you are in essence challenging not only Pinder but the whole of the ontological arguement of God's existance
The ontological argument of God's existence isn't a logical argument, it's an argument in the informal sense the word argument is used outside of logic. The ontological argument is (wiki): "An ontological argument for the existence of God is an argument that God's existence can be proved a priori, that is, by intuition and reason alone".
Here is the ontolgical argument:
"Now we believe that [the Lord] is something than which nothing greater can be imagined."
Then Anselm asks: does God exist?
"Then is there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart: God is not?"
To answer this, first he tries to show that God exists 'in the understanding':
"But certainly this same fool, when he hears this very thing that I am saying – something than which nothing greater can be imagined – understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it is. For it is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding and another to understand that a thing is."
Anselm goes on to justify his assumption, using the analogy of a painter:
"For when a painter imagines beforehand what he is going to make, he has in his understanding what he has not yet made but he does not yet understand that it is. But when he has already painted it, he both has in his understanding what he has already painted and understands that it is.
"Therefore even the fool is bound to agree that there is at least in the understanding something than which nothing greater can be imagined, because when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding."
Now Anselm introduces another assumption:
"And certainly that than which a greater cannot be imagined cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is at least in the understanding alone, it can be imagined to be in reality too, which is greater."
"Therefore if that than which a greater cannot be imagined is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be imagined is something than which a greater can be imagined. But certainly this cannot be."
Anselm has thus found a contradiction, and from that contradiction, he draws his conclusion:
"There exists, therefore, beyond doubt something than which a greater cannot be imagined, both in the understanding and in reality."
Here's how formal logic has rewritten Anselm's initially messy argument into a more clear form where fallacies are easier to spot:
1. God is, by definition, a being than which nothing greater can be conceived (imagined)
2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind
3. God must exist in reality, if God did not then God would not be that which nothing greater can be conceived (imagined)
This on the surface seems to be a good argument, but consider these questions:
- can someone necessarily imagine everything that exists? No. Therefore, there can exist things greater than the greatest that can be imagined.
- can someone necessarily not imagine things greater than the greatest things that exist? Yes, you can invent your own completely unrealistic paradise in the mind.
- his definition is vague. Does he mean something greater than anything that any human can imagine? Or does he mean something greater than anything that the person he speaks to can imagine? In the latter case, he's basically saying "the greatest thing YOU can imagine in your mind does exist in reality". In the former case it's unclear what he means.
However some claim that this argument doesn't completely follow Anselm's argument. Instead the following formal rephrasing of Anselm's argument has been suggested:
1. God is the entity than which no greater entity can be conceived.
2. The concept of God exists in human understanding.
3. God does not exist in reality (assumed in order to refute).
4. The concept of God existing in reality exists in human understanding.
5. If an entity exists in reality and in human understanding, this entity is greater than it would have been if it existed only in human understanding (a statement of existence as a perfection).
6. from 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 An entity can be conceived which is greater than God, the entity than which no greater entity can be conceived (logical self-contradiction).
7. Assumption 3 is wrong, therefore God exists in reality (assuming 1, 2, 4, and 5 are accepted as true).
He first says that nothing greater than God can be imagined. Then he says that something that both exists and is imagined in greater than something that is only imagined. Then God must exist by definition since if he doesn't exist he isn't the greatest thing that can be imagined. The argument contains subtle equivocacies because some words, such as know and imagine, aren't clearly defined but use the imprecise standard definitions these words have in natural language. The word "great" is also used in a dubious sense. In fact words containing a personal valuing of something are normally considered illegal in formal logic. Is the statement "ice cream is good" true or false? That isn't decided until you tie the statement to a person, like this: "does Pindar think ice cream is good?" That is either true or false (but I don't know which it is unless I get more information ~:) ). Also - why would something that exists be greater than something that we only imagine? Many people state that the things we dream of are the greatest things just because they don't exist in reality.
Now if we really look at Anselm's second argument, it becomes even more clear what folly his work is:
Anselm in his Proslogon 3 made another a priori argument for God this time based on the idea of necessary existence. He claimed that if God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, it is better to be necessary than contingent. Therefore God must be necessary, to sum it up:
God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
It is greater to be necessary than not.
God must be necessary.
God exists
To show how cracy his assumptions are, we can continue from his assumptions and his conclusion like this:
- It's greater that there exists 1000 naked chicks with very large boobs who want to have sex with me, than if that doesn't exist
- God must therefore be 1000 naked chicks with very large boobs who want to have sex with me
Anselm's ontological argument basically says that the greatest thing you can imagine exists in reality. Whether that's Leprechauns, a God, hundred God, or 1000 naked chicks, is up to you to decide. David Hume demonstrated several fallacies in his argument,
wiki says:
"Obviously Anselm thought this argument was valid and persuasive, and it still has occasional defenders, but many, perhaps most, contemporary philosophers believe that the ontological argument, at least as Anselm articulated it, does not stand up to strict logical scrutiny.[1] Others, like Gottfried Leibniz, Norman Malcolm, Charles Hartshorne, Kurt Gödel and Alvin Plantinga have reformulated the argument in an attempt to revive it.
However Plantiga, who has made one such attempt of revival is sceptic of using it to prove the existence of God:
wiki says: "Interestingly, Plantinga himself does not think the modal ontological argument is always a good proof of the existence of God". Plantiga, just like me, states that none of the arguments shown so far by anyone can prove either the existence or the non-existence of God.
===
BTW Pindar isn't using the ontological argument as far as I can see. He claims to be using Aristotle's sketch of an argument. I'll be back with info about that.
Rodion Romanovich
01-13-2007, 15:57
Now Gödel's proof:
wiki says: "Although Gödel was religious, he never published his proof because he feared that it would be mistaken as establishing God's existence beyond doubt. Instead, he only saw it as a logical investigation and a clean formulation of Leibniz' argument with all assumptions spelled out"
Wiki also says:
"There are several reasons Gödel's axioms may not be realistic, including the following:
It may be impossible to properly satisfy axiom 3, which assumes that a conjunction of positive properties is also a positive property; for the proof to work, the axiom must be taken to apply to arbitrary, not necessarily finite, collections of properties. Moreover, some positive properties may be incompatible with others. For example mercy may be incompatible with justice. In that case the conjunction would be an impossible property and G(x) would be false of every x. Ted Drange has made this objection to the coherence of attributing all positive properties to God - see this article for Drange's list of incompatible properties and some counter arguments. For these reasons, this axiom was replaced in some reworkings of the proof (including Anderson's, below) by the assumption that G(x) is positive (Pos(G(x)).
It was argued by Jordan Sobel that Gödel's axioms are too strong: they imply that all possible worlds are identical. He proved this result by considering the property "is such that X is true", where X is any true modal statement about the world. If g is a Godlike object, and X is in fact true, then g must possess this property, and hence must possess it necessarily. But then X is a necessary truth. A similar argument shows that all falsehoods are necessary falsehoods. C. Anthony Anderson gave a slightly different axiomatic system which attempts to avoid this problem.
In Anderson's system, Axioms 1, 2, and 5 above are unchanged; however the other axioms are replaced with:
Axiom 3': G(x) is positive.
Axiom 4': If a property is positive, its negation is not positive.
These axioms leave open the possibility that a Godlike object will possess some non-positive properties, provided that these properties are contingent rather than necessary.
Examples of contraarguments towards Gödel's argument:
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/incompatible.html
Version #1
1. If God exists, then he[2] is perfect.
2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.
3. A perfect being can have no needs or wants.
4. If any being created the universe, then he must have had some need or want.
5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe (from 3 and 4).
6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).
Version 2
1. If God exists, then he is perfect.
2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.
3. If a being is perfect, then whatever he creates must be perfect.
4. But the universe is not perfect.
5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe (from 3 and 4).
6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).
...which shows Gödel's proof to be either incorrect or have assumptions and/or definitions that makes the argument fail, or makes it so that the argument doesn't prove the existence of God but something completely different. Actually using the word "proof" to refer to Gödel's rewriting of Leibniz informal messy argumentation into a more formal phrasing with the assumptions clearly stated, is probably not something that Gödel would agree with. He never published it, and: "he only saw it as a logical investigation and a clean formulation of Leibniz' argument with all assumptions spelled out"
Rodion Romanovich
01-13-2007, 16:13
Finally we have the pantheistic argument. The pantheistic argument is the only proof of God I've seen that is actually waterproof. It states the following:
Definitions:
Define God as everything that exists
Assumptions:
The rules of logic are correct (usually not necessary to state explicitly since it's always automatically assumed when we make a logical argument)
Argument:
By definition, God must exist.
Interpretation:
The interpretation is the most important part of the panteistic argument. Since God is "everything that exists", God is all humans, all plants, all earth, all energy, all other matter, etc. etc. God is also all natural powers, all chains of cause and effect, etc. etc. The pantheistic argument is thus not a proof of the Judeo-Christian God, but simply a matter of putting a label on everything. Alternative suggested labels for everything are words such as "nature" or "the universe". The pantheistic argument with its definition of God basically doesn't embrace or refute any particular religion, nor does it state anything about the properties of the things that exist, or tries to show the existence or non-existence of something we don't already know exists. If someone is to consider the pantheistic argument a proof of God's existence, then it's necessary that that person uses the defininion that God is "everything that exists".
It's when people start assigning properties to God that the pantheistic argument fails. The pantheistic argument only works if God is defined as that which exists. If more properties are assigned to God, then a new argument is needed. If someone wishes to assign properties to "everything that exists" those properties must be demonstrated separately, or only be a matter of belief, as religion is.
One common way of trying to cheat the pantheistic argument is the following:
Define God as all that exists that is good
It follows from the definition that God exists
The fallacy here is to forget to explicitly state the assumption that "existing and being good are compatible properties". If the fallacy was allowed we would be able to make arguments such as:
Define Leprechauns as all that exists, lives under the earth, can perform magic, and have gold treasures
It follows from the definition that Leprechauns exist
The obvious interpretation of that argument, namely that there exists something that lives under the earth, can perform magic, and has gold treasures and possibly has other properties as well, is a fallacy. However the argument in itself looks correct at a quick glance. Formally, we could say that the fallacy is that of leaving out assumptions. In particular, the assumption that the properties of the leprechauns are compatible.
The pantheistic argument is only a argument for the existence of the God used in Naturalistic pantheism. People can however informally believe that it supports other forms of religious belief as well, although there are no guarantees for the existence of a God that has any more properties than that he exists.
Rodion Romanovich
01-13-2007, 16:34
Pindar seemed to initially in the discussion use something somewhat remniscent of the cosmological argument.
From wiki:
Framed as an informal proof, the first cause argument can be stated as follows:
1. Every finite and contingent being has a cause.
2. Nothing finite and dependent (contingent) can cause itself.
3. A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
4. Therefore, there must be a first cause; or, there must be something which is not an effect.
Wiki comments: "The cosmological argument can only speculate about the existence of God from claims about the entire universe, unless the "first cause" is taken to mean the same thing as "God." Thus, the argument is based on the claim that God must exist due to the fact that the universe needs a cause. In other words, the existence of the universe requires an explanation, and an active creation of the universe by a being outside of the universe—generally assumed to be God—is that explanation."
And continues with: "In light of the Big Bang theory, a stylized version of cosmological argument for the existence of God has emerged (sometimes called the Kalam cosmological argument, the following form of which was put forth by William Lane Craig):"
Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the universe had a cause.
As you can see, this argument makes the assumption that the universe was at all created. That isn't a premise that all people would agree to. Indeed, matter and energy wasn't created and can neither be created nor destroyed, according to many people.
The argument is however valid. The result of it is: "assuming the universe hasn't existed forever, and something needs to be caused by something else than itself in order to start exist, the universe was created by something". That the universe was created by something given that certain assumptions are true, isn't a strong argument for the existence of God. The thing that caused the universe could be Big Bang, God, Leprechauns, or many Gods. Similarily if the assumptions are believed to be false, matter and energy can have existed forever and only constellations of matter and energy are ever created. The proof therfore doesn't show that God must necessarily exist, but that under certain assumptions the universe must have been created by something unspecified. If this is to be seen as a proof of God, a lot of holes must be filled by belief to create a bridge between the result of the argument, and the claim that God exists. Furthermore, the proof doesn't rule out the possibility that there are more Gods than just one. It's therefore NOT a proof of God's existence using the most common definition of the word God. It's a proof of a much weaker claim, which neither makes God's existence necessary, nor does it rule it out.
I pointed out several fallacies. But they're no longer relevant since you've withdrawn that argument and replaced it with a new one.
There is no new argument any more than there was some new definition.
Your change of word definitions have changed the meaning of the conclusion.
There is no change in definitions.
You haven't supported that "something that must exist" can't be an atom, a human being, or something else.
This statement demonstrates you don't understand.
Argument:
It follows directly from the definition that a necessary being must exist.
This isn't the argument.
I've achieved a lot in this debate.
Your comments have been a singular display of misunderstanding, false charges and more misunderstanding. Nothing has changed by way of the argument, nothing. Your posts have contributed nothing save verbiage.
You've been forced to fix your word definitions to avoid equivocation in the final proof step, I've forced you to make clear beyond doubt what your claim is, and I've taught you why assumptions matter. You have withdrawn your previous fallacious claim and now only claim something that is a truism. A truism which doesn't in any way whatsoever have anything to do with proving the existence of God. You originally had a falalcious claim related to the existence of God, now you have a valid logical argument but that isn't very related to the existence of God.
The above is laughable. We've gone from charges the argument is fallacy, fallacy fallacy to "now you have a valid logical argument..."
In reply to Redleg's and Pindar's other posts:
Here's my full position:
Pindar initially was vague about his definition of necessary being. Since the word necessary being appeared in his conclusion, depending on his definition of the word, the conclusion would have different meanings.
Quotes like this demonstrates that his definitions were initially vague, and contrary to what his new definitions are:
Actually the stance is that contingent beings are caused and thus have a beginning. The same doesn't apply to necessary being. If you have an example of an uncaused contingent being present it.
Of course nobody can present an example of an uncaused contingent being if a contingent being is defined as "something that must be caused"! Note his previous definition which says that:
Actually the stance is that contingent beings are caused and thus have a beginning. The same doesn't apply to necessary being.
where he defines contingent being as something that is caused, and a necessary being as something that isn't caused.
However his latest definition says that:
contingent being is: a being that may or may not exist: something whose existence is separate from its essence. There is nothing within or about it that requires is existence.
A necessary being is: something that cannot not be..
These quotes demonstrates that his definitions have indeed changed.
This is dumb. Contingent beings are caused that is part and parcel of what 'may or may not exist' entails and why existence is separate from essence. The same applies to necessary being: as it isn't caused and cannot not be. Amazing simply bloody amazing!
LegioXXX in simple terms: you do not know what your talking about. Dilettantism is never a good thing.
Banquo's Ghost
01-13-2007, 19:37
Alas, after 469 posts of generally excellent quality, I fear we are getting tetchy.
To quote our glorious overlord,
The topic is tired and needs a rest.
I will re-open the thread in a few days should anyone PM me to ask for that to happen.
:closed:
Banquo's Ghost
01-15-2007, 10:44
I have received a number of requests that this thread be re-opened.
I’m happy to do so.
Let’s return to the discussion and address the points being made rather than the person behind them. If things get too frustrating, relax and go and have a cup of tea. One does not have to post in the thread – one does not persuade merely by having the last word.
Enjoy.
:bow:
LegioXXXUlpiaVictrix you did not address what was written by me. To recap the questions and the statements does not need to be done - just a simple statement by me.
For all this discussion you still have not invalidated Pinder's initial premise that was posted in post 120. You have made claims of changing definitions but have not included the specific post number where you claim the definition change has taken place, which I asked for in my previous post#459, this is telling to me concerning your arguement.
To validate one's arguement one should be able to reference where exactly the contradiction happened and when it happened. You invalidate another's arguement one must be able to demonstrate counter's to that arguement. I have stated that I believe Pinder is primarily using the the ontological arguement, which only he can deny or confirm. You can believe he is using another form, that is okay, but when one attempts to lecture on the different forms of proof of God's existance one is not invalidating the arguement, one is actually confirming that the arguement for the existance of God has multiple forms and has been done by other's. Basically what you have done is invalidate one of your earlier claims by showing the counters to your postion of (and I paraphrase since I am to lazy to actually dig up the post number) that only Pinder has proven the existance of god.
Well I lied I am not to lazy to dig up the actual posts.
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1372233&postcount=310
I have given a proof for God, but offered nothing by way of sect specific truth claims
Which you initially responded with
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1372264&postcount=313
A proof of God? Wow, then you must be a unique theological genius, because nobody has succeeded in it before without redefining the meaning of God so that he becomes something very different from what he initially was. Can you please repeat this proof of yours?
And then with this.
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1373454&postcount=332
The above is a simple valid argument.
No
It is interesting that while Pinder has stuck with the premise that he posted in post 120, that the individual who has changed their position on the arguement is yourself - with first claiming that it was not a valid arguement as you did in post 332, to one that states that it is a valid in post 446
So when I read the last 3 posts of your attempt at a lecture on the different arguements for God's existance I see the counter arguements to your claim here.
Is your attempt at lecturing on the different forms of arguement an attempt to appeal to authority because you are finding your initial premise to be weak because its an arguement of form over substance? As clearly stated in post 446 by yourself.
So my intention so far in the discussion hasn't primarily been to refute his argument, but to make him realize what his claims are, formalize his proof, and by providing the definitions of his words removing all risks of equivocation.
Then again you failed to address a question that was hidden in the spoil box. When one focus on style over substance is not one committing a fallacy in itself?
Rodion Romanovich
01-15-2007, 15:40
@Redleg: I'm not sure what you're referring to. I think my quotes demonstrate quite well that there was a change of word definitions. My post #463 explains my position.
Rodion Romanovich
01-15-2007, 15:56
Basically what you have done is invalidate one of your earlier claims by showing the counters to your postion of (and I paraphrase since I am to lazy to actually dig up the post number) that only Pinder has proven the existance of god.
To attempt to prove something is not the same as proving it. To prove something you must have made a successful proof. There is no contradiction since what I've been showing is that all proof attempts have failed, and if Pindar's proof wouldn't have failed, it would be unique in that sense.
@Redleg: I'm not sure what you're referring to. I think my quotes demonstrate quite well that there was a change of word definitions. My post #463 explains my position.
Negative - you claim to have proved something - you have not demonstrated it very well. When you use your own information it does not demonstrate the proof. Using the direct quotes and the post number where the quote came from would demonstrate the facts to insure that your interpation of the facts are correct. Several times in our discussion alone you have demonstrated the failure to probably read what was written because of your interpation and your assumption of what the statement means. How do I know that you have not done this with Pinder's statements if I do not see the direct quotes referenced with the post number it came from?
To attempt to prove something is not the same as proving it. To prove something you must have made a successful proof. There is no contradiction since what I've been showing is that all proof attempts have failed, and if Pindar's proof wouldn't have failed, it would be unique in that sense.
Arguements of form over substance does not prove your statement of all attempts have failed.
And I see that your still avoiding answering the question of isn't arguements of form over substance a logical fallacy in itself.
Rodion Romanovich
01-15-2007, 18:51
@Redleg: nobody before has every required me to show a post number in an Internet debate where I have provided the correct quotation of someone's post. This is something new. Frankly I have better things to do that go through the old posts, but you claim you aren't, so since my quotes are correct you'll be able to find the post numbers when you look for them.
===
Arguments of form over substance
Logic is a set of rules. An argument must follow those rules to be logically correct. The rules are nothing else than forms. But these forms are strongly tied to substance.
Here's something for you to think about:
- An argument without fallacies is true for certain
- An argument containing fallacies can be either correct or incorrect, i.e. it isn't necessarily correct. Remember that a proof is about showing that the argument is necessarily correct, so an argument that can be either correct or incorrect isn't acceptable. So if someone points out a fallacy, the burden of proof clearly lies on the one who attempts the proof.
- If an argument is valid AND contains fallacies, the fallacies must be of a type such that the argument doesn't depend on them, i.e. so that the fallacies can be removed from the argument so that an argument that is both valid and lacks fallacies is obtained. If a person wants to prove something by an argument, he should be able to remove any fallacies pointed out in his argument on request by his opponent, and present a revised argument where the fallacies have been removed. If his fallacies are inseparable from his argument, then his argument can never be any more than possibly correct, which isn't acceptable. A proof requires the argument to be necessarily correct.
===
Let me illustrate with an example that you're requiring something that isn't fair in any sense:
Person A makes the following invalid argument:
Define Leprechauns as the greatest thing that can be imagined
Leprechauns either exists or doesn't exist
Leprechauns are great, but they're even greater if they exist than if they don't doesn't
Therefore Leprechauns exists
Now person B points out:
In the first row you define a word that in the definition contains a value, which is an invalid form that usually causes errors that crucially disrupt the argument. As long as you make such a mistake the rest is an unreadable mess. Fix this and we will then discuss if what remains afterwards is acceptable.
Then Redleg says:
Person B, you're making a fallacy and arguing form over substance! You must show how person A's fallacy disrupts the argument, otherwise you're wrong! Person A has presented a valid argument but you argue form not substance!
The books say:
Redleg and person A are wrong! An argument containing fallacies may or may not be correct, but in order to have a proof you must have an argument that is necessarily correct. From the moment the fallacy is pointed out, until person A revises his argument to remove the fallacy, the argument is considered possibly correct, not necessarily correct, i.e. it's not a proof. If person A really has a valid argument, he should be able to remove the fallacies and present a revised argument. However if the fallacies are inseparable from the argument, then the argument isn't a valid proof, since it can never be necessarily correct.
Okay since most of your previous post is just arguementive and an attempt that smacks of aggorance I shall return the favor. It seems your no longer interested in honest discussion but wanting to one-upsmanship, I asked a question and asked for clarafication on issues but instead you chose to go a different route.
@Redleg: nobody before has every required me to show a post number in an Internet debate where I have provided the correct quotation of someone's post. This is something new. Frankly I have better things to do that go through the old posts, but you claim you aren't, so since my quotes are correct you'll be able the post number when you look for them.
In other words you can not. Its really rather a simple thing. I explained to you that I reviewed the whole thread and did not see any re-defining of words. If you are unwilling to demonstrate the actual words then I can only assume that the quotations that you used are paraphrased and based upon your interpations. You have alreadly demonstrated that you are prone to making this mistake and misunderstanding what was actually stated. So the assumption is sound.
Logic is a set of rules. An argument must follow those rules to be logically correct. The rules are nothing else than forms. But these forms are strongly tied to substance.
Here's something for you to think about:
- An argument without fallacies is true for certain
- An argument containing fallacies can be either true or false, i.e. it isn't necessarily true. Remember that a proof is about showing that the argument is necessarily true, so an argument that can be either true or false isn't acceptable. So if someone points out a fallacy, the burden of proof clearly lies on the one who attempts the proof.
- If an argument is valid AND contains fallacies, the fallacies must be of a type such that the argument doesn't depend on them, i.e. so that the fallacies can be removed from the argument so that an argument that is both valid and lacks fallacies is obtained. If a person wants to prove something by an argument, he should be able to remove any fallacies pointed out in his argument on request by his opponent, and present a revised argument where the fallacies have been removed. If his fallacies are inseparable from his argument, then his argument can never be any more than possibly true, which isn't acceptable. A proof requires the argument to be necessarily true.
Is this is an attempt at an appeal to authority, or an attempt to back out of answering the questions posed and to respond to the actual arguement? If you can not support your arguement with facts, I must assume that most of your arguement is based upon assumptions since I did not see the same issues with Pinder's words that you have. Attempts at providing a lecture versus actually answering the questions smacks of avoidance of the issue.
Let me illustrate with an example that you're requiring something that isn't fair in any sense:
Person A makes the following invalid argument:
Define Leprechauns as the greatest thing that can be imagined
Leprechauns either exists or doesn't exist
Leprechauns are great, but they're even greater if they exist than if they don't doesn't
Therefore Leprechauns exists
Now person B points out:
In the first row you define a word that in the definition contains a value, which is an invalid form that usually causes errors that crucially disrupt the argument. As long as you make such a mistake the rest is an unreadable mess. Fix this and we will then discuss if what remains afterwards is acceptable.
Then Bluearm says:
Person B, you're making a fallacy and arguing form over substance! You must show where person A is making his fallacy, otherwise you're wrong! Person A has presented a valid argument but you argue form not substance!
The books say:
Bluearm and person A are wrong! An argument containing fallacies may or may not be correct, but in order to have a proof you must have an argument that is necessarily correct. From the moment the fallacy is pointed out, until person A revises his argument to remove the fallacy, the argument is considered possibly true, not necessarily true, i.e. it's not a proof. If person A really has a valid argument, he should be able to remove the fallacies and present a revised argument. However if the fallacies are inseparable from the argument, then the argument isn't a valid proof, since it can never be necessarily true.
THis is not the approach you have taken in this arguement. I find it rather amusing that you attempt to lecture on a course of discussion that you yourself have not taken. Whats even more amusing is your attempting to change my statement to mean something else, I have been rather amused by the attempt. Here let me use the actual sentence again so maybe you will read the actual wording versus making an assumption of what was stated. And I see that your still avoiding answering the question of isn't arguements of form over substance a logical fallacy in itself? Lets see I have not made any claims about being an expert in logic, and you have. Neither have I attempted to reword your statements to mean or state something else, but in several recent occasions you have done so. So I must ask you what logical fallacy are you now committing?
What is even more telling is that you still have not answered the question.
Isn't arguements of form over substance a logical fallacy in itself? You might have attempted to answer the question with this statement, " Logic is a set of rules. An argument must follow those rules to be logically correct. The rules are nothing else than forms. But these forms are strongly tied to substance."
But you did not - it really is a yes or no question. Is not arguements over form in itself a logical fallacy?
Rodion Romanovich
01-15-2007, 20:08
@Redleg: look in my post #463 and look at the quotes. The quotes demonstrate his redefinition. But let's hypothetically say he had the latest definition all the way from the beginning. Then my answer to that case is to be found in post #463. Then let's hypothetically assume he originally had a different definition from start. Then my answer can also be found in post #463. Read the answer you think applies and tell me which case you chose, and whether you have any comments regarding the answer I gave.
===
Is this is an attempt at an appeal to authority, or an attempt to back out of answering the questions posed and to respond to the actual arguement?
Yes it's an appeal to authority! Logic is a set of rules, you need to listen to the rules and follow them in order to be able to say you're using logic. You're allowed to not use them if you like, but then you shouldn't claim to be using logic. Quite simple. Now if I may not appeal to authority for instructions on how to use rules invented by human beings, then how do I know what the logical rules are? Maybe we need to dig up Aristotle's texts and see them with our own eyes before we can say we're using logic? Or maybe it's good enough to do what I'm doing - following the rules of logic presented in at least 10 books that I've read on the subject. Please tell me what you think is a good method for finding out what the rules of logic are, if you think otherwise.
Isn't arguements of form over substance a logical fallacy in itself? You might have attempted to answer the question with this statement, " Logic is a set of rules. An argument must follow those rules to be logically correct. The rules are nothing else than forms. But these forms are strongly tied to substance."
But you did not - it really is a yes or no question. Is not logical arguements over form in itself a logical fallacy?
Pointing out a fallacy is never a fallacy, so the answer is "no". But claiming that the fallacy has a certain consequence (such as that it invalidates the entire opponent's argument) may or may not be a fallacy, depending on the context and the claim being made. The important thing is that arguments that contain one or more fallacies are usually unreadable and it's unclear what the remainder (if there is any remainder) after the fallacy has been removed really means. If he has a valid proof idea in his mind though, he should be able to rewrite his proof without the fallacies. If the argument is inseparable from the fallacies, his argument is possibly but not necessarily invalid, but a proof must be a necessarily valid argument, so the burden of rewriting the argument without the fallacy lies on him, if he still wants to claim the statement to be true.
@Redleg: look in my post #463 and look at the quotes. The quotes demonstrate his redefinition. But let's hypothetically say he had the latest definition all the way from the beginning. Then my answer to that case is to be found in post #463. Then let's hypothetically assume he originally had a different definition from start. Then my answer can also be found in post #463. Read the answer you think applies and tell me which case you chose, and whether you have any comments regarding the answer I gave.
Hmmm, seems things are moving again, though not progressing.
Post 463 is not something one trying to make a compelling stance would want to draw attention to. It demonstrates a flawed understanding. It is flawed in its failure to understand two standard concepts: necessary and contingent being. It then highlights that error with a contrived notion of redefinition(s) which does not exist. It is flawed in not actually understanding the argument. The argument is not simply an assertion of necessary thing. In short, it demonstrates a position that cannot be taken seriously.
What I recall is my confused "interlocutor" has:
-Asserted over and over invalidity and fallacies abound. This was then retracted. The argument has remained the same.
-Claimed charging lying was a vernacular standard in logic used by the experts. This was then retracted. The argument has remained the same.
-Claimed there were compelling hidden assumptions needing the light. This charge was retracted. The argument has remained the same.
-Misunderstood the difference between sound and valid. The argument has remained the same.
-Misunderstood the base meanings of necessary and contingent. The argument has remained the same
a) This despite it was pointed out repeatedly the standard meanings are how they should be understood.
b) Put forward in quotes as definitions statements, as if from me but not actually mine, i.e. "existed forever backwards in time, still exists today, and caused the first contingent being and possibly other contingent beings as well".
-Claimed the proof is novel, even unique, when it is quite mundane (this even after historical citations were given). The argument has remained the same.
-Presented long, dreary, irrelevant and self-refuting posts. The argument has remained the same.
In short, there was a rush to judgment that has served as its own refutation. I'm sorry, I cannot take any of this seriously.
Are there any other posters with challenges to the argument? Anyone?... Anyone?... Bueller?
As an aside, I noted this exchange:
A proof requires the argument to be necessarily true.
Is this is an attempt at an appeal to authority, or an attempt to back out of answering the questions posed and to respond to the actual arguement?
Maybe we need to dig up Aristotle's texts and see them with our own eyes before we can say we're using logic? Or maybe it's good enough to do what I'm doing - following the rules of logic presented in at least 10 books that I've read on the subject.
I don't believe you've actually read Aristotle's works on logic. I'm curious, Where in Aristotle does he make the claim you make above? Also, I'm curious, cite the sources with the quotes from the 10 books you've read on logic that claim "a proof requires the argument to be necessarily true". It sounds like this is an attempt to demonstrate a common notion in logic so the request shouldn't be taxing. Finally given this standard, explain this argument below I've already put forward:
Vulcans love to boogie
Spock is a Vulcan
Therefore Spock loves to boogie.
Is this a proof? If not, show why the conclusion doesn't hold. If it is a proof, is the argument necessarily true: Vulcans love to boogie including our good Mr. Spock? The reference to Aristotle and the 10 books notation are both attempts to assume some kind of authority in the field. The unfortunate reality is your terminology is all wrong. A proof's conclusion is not necessarily true. If the logic is correct then the proof is necessarily valid, not true. Truth is a separate category.
This aside is a simple demonstration of the comedy of errors that are all too much the standard.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-16-2007, 05:47
Given the usage of the prefix 'a'; "theist" and "atheist" should incorporate the entire spectrum. Thus anyone who does not believe in god is an atheist and anyone who does is a theist. This makes agnostics a subsection of atheists. Hedgehogs are also atheists. I don't see why Pindar has a problem with this, hedgehogs don't believe in god therefore they are atheists. So are rocks and trees if you want to be goofy about it. Now, I would divide atheists into 3 sections.
1) Atheists that have never considered god.
2) Atheists that believe god doesn't exist
3) Atheistic agnostics who haven't made up there mind/assert that god is unknowable.
Now, what initially brought me into this discussion was Pindar's narrow definition of atheism and his assertion that both kinds had "problems". Now, personally I think agnosticism has problems and #1 isn't particularly interesting so I'm mainly looking at #2 here. What possible problems could there be in not believing in something that is irrelevant?
It's not a "narrow" definition, it's the standard definition. Of the three you listed only #2 would be accurate.
Atheism isn't the lack of belief in God, but the belief in the lack of God.
Rodion Romanovich
01-16-2007, 13:18
I don't believe you've actually read Aristotle's works on logic. I'm curious, Where in Aristotle does he make the claim you make above? Also, I'm curious, cite the sources with the quotes from the 10 books you've read on logic that claim "a proof requires the argument to be necessarily true". It sounds like this is an attempt to demonstrate a common notion in logic so the request shouldn't be taxing. Finally given this standard, explain this argument below I've already put forward:
Vulcans love to boogie
Spock is a Vulcan
Therefore Spock loves to boogie.
Is this a proof? If not, show why the conclusion doesn't hold. If it is a proof, is the argument necessarily true: Vulcans love to boogie including our good Mr. Spock?
The given argument is true. More formally:
Let P(x) = x is a vulcan
Let Q(x) = x loves to boogie
Assumptions:
P(Spock)
for all x such that P(x) it's true that Q(x)
Argument:
P(Spock)
Q(x) is true for all x such that P(x)
==========
therefore Q(Spock)
Rewriting the argument as a statement, the statement evaluates to true:
p(Spock) ^ for all x such that P(x): Q(x) => Q(Spock)
This argument evaluates to true, i.e. is a "correct argument", or a "true argument", but it doesn't have a true conclusion. You need to learn the difference between true/correct argument and true conclusion. You've just demonstrated this by your own example with Spock the Vulcan, where we have a correct argument but not necessarily a correct conclusion.
The fact that you ask:
Is this a proof? If not, show why the conclusion doesn't hold. If it is a proof, is the argument necessarily true: Vulcans love to boogie including our good Mr. Spock?
seems to imply that you don't know the difference between argument, proof and conclusion. The conclusion is "Vulcans love to boogie including our good Mr. Spock", but that's not the argument. The argument is the statement that the conclusion follows from the premise(s), i.e. "assuming Spock is a Vulcan and all Vulcan's love to boogie, then Spock must love to boogie". Like I've shown many times before in this thread, you can have a valid argument with a false conclusions, and an invalid argument with a true conclusions, and any other combination of these two. If you want a proof of a statement, you must however be able to show that it's impossible for that statement to be false. This can be achieved either by stating a valid argument and not the conclusion of it as your result, i.e. like "my argument has proven that assuming Spock is a Vulcan and all Vulcan's love to boogie, then Spock must love to boogie" - this is true. Or you can prove the premises to be true, and the argument to be true, in which case you've proven the conclusion to be true. If you can't prove the premises to be true, you haven't successfully proven the conclusion.
===
The reference to Aristotle and the 10 books notation are both attempts to assume some kind of authority in the field. The unfortunate reality is your terminology is all wrong. A proof's conclusion is not necessarily true. If the logic is correct then the proof is necessarily valid, not true. Truth is a separate category.
Again read the definitions of proof, argument and conclusion. In your "Spock the Vulcan" example I'll demonstrate what is what:
Let P(x) = x is a vulcan
Let Q(x) = x loves to boogie
Assumptions:
P(Spock)
for all x such that P(x) it's true that Q(x)
Argument:
P(Spock)
Q(x) is true for all x such that P(x)
==========
therefore Q(Spock)
- The conclusion is: "therefore Spock loves to boogie", i.e. the final row: "therefore Q(Spock)"
- The result that you can present to others is: "I've proven that assuming Spock is a vulcan and all vulcans love to boogie, then Spock loves to boogie". But you can't say your result is "Spock loves to boogie", since that isn't necessarily true. It may be true, but we don't really know that for sure from reading your argument.
- The argument constitutes the rows below the word argument followed by a colon. Since we've defined some predicates P and Q, it's highly relevant to also look at the section of definitions above the argument, since without them it may be unclear what the argument wants to say. A true argument is one which when written in expression form evaluates to true and doesn't evaluate to false or a predicate function which requires more values to be inserted. "True argument" and "correct argument" refer to the same thing. A true/correct argument doesn't mean the conclusion is necessarily true. It means that the conclusion is true assuming the premises are true.
- A proof is something that shows that a statement can't be other than true. If you have a valid argument you have proven that: "assuming [insert list of assumptions here] is true, it's true that [insert conclusion here]". However if you want to prove the conclusion alone to be true, you must prove that the premises are true AND prove that the argument is true/valid.
In short: the argument is proven true/valid, i.e. it's proven that "assuming the premises are true, the conclusion is true". Whether the conclusion is true or not is unknown.
What I recall is my confused "interlocutor" has: [...]
-Presented long, dreary, irrelevant and self-refuting posts. The argument has remained the same.
In short, there was a rush to judgment that has served as its own refutation. I'm sorry, I cannot take any of this seriously.
Maybe this quotes shows well that you aren't reading my posts, since I repeatedly have to explain the difference between argument and conclusion. It also shows a lot of disrespect to the posts presented by those you're discussing with, and you also admit not taking it seriously. Well if you aren't taking the posts of others in this thread seriously should we take that as an indication that you don't read our posts, but simply assume them to be wrong right away just because they don't agree that what you dogmatically want to be proveable can be proven.
Are there any other posters with challenges to the argument? Anyone?... Anyone?... Bueller?
Maybe you should start reading the posts that demonstrate that you have failed to proven God's existence. You've only shown the truism that "something that must exist must exist". It's worth about as much as proving "something that is red is red", and if you want to claim your truism has anything to do with proving the existence of God you had better present it. In fact, let's skip these discussions where you keep saying that quotes out of logic text books are wrong, since they're meaningless. I can't convince you to read a book on logic, and you can't convince me that following the rules of logic is illogical. Let's instead just concentrate on this track of discussion: 1. have you understood and do you admit that with your current word definitions, the conclusion in your argument is merely the truism that "something that must exist must exist"? 2. do you think the truism "something that must exist must exist" proves the existence of God?
Given the usage of the prefix 'a'; "theist" and "atheist" should incorporate the entire spectrum. Thus anyone who does not believe in god is an atheist and anyone who does is a theist. This makes agnostics a subsection of atheists. Hedgehogs are also atheists. I don't see why Pindar has a problem with this, hedgehogs don't believe in god therefore they are atheists. So are rocks and trees if you want to be goofy about it. Now, I would divide atheists into 3 sections.
1) Atheists that have never considered god.
2) Atheists that believe god doesn't exist
3) Atheistic agnostics who haven't made up there mind/assert that god is unknowable.
Now, what initially brought me into this discussion was Pindar's narrow definition of atheism and his assertion that both kinds had "problems". Now, personally I think agnosticism has problems and #1 isn't particularly interesting so I'm mainly looking at #2 here. What possible problems could there be in not believing in something that is irrelevant?
Back to the original topic, that's good.
Xiahou's reply is spot on. Atheism is a cognitive stance. This means it is a decided position. This is what distinguishes it from our good hedgehog. It is the antithetical and opposing view to theism. Theism is the positive assertion about a metaphysical absolute: there is a God. Atheism, as indicated by the prefix, is the negation of theism, the denial of theism: the negative assertion about a metaphysical absolute: there is no God. Agnosticism, as opposed to either theism or atheism is the absence of any decided claim regarding the question. As the word indicates, it is a lack of knowledge regarding the question.
The above is a tad wordy, but the basic point remains both theism and atheism are assertions about a thing (God). In their strong forms they are epistemic stances. Agnosticism makes no assertion about the thing God. It is not an epistemic assertion, but a suspension of judgment.
The given argument is true...
This argument evaluates to true, i.e. is a "correct argument", or a "true argument", but it doesn't have a true conclusion.
An argument is the sum of the premises and conclusion. Premises without a conclusion is not an argument. A conclusion without premises is not an argument. If one makes a statement about the argument it ipso facto entails the conclusion.
Is this a proof? If not, show why the conclusion doesn't hold. If it is a proof, is the argument necessarily true: Vulcans love to boogie including our good Mr. Spock?
(This) seems to imply that you don't know the difference between argument, proof and conclusion. The conclusion is "Vulcans love to boogie including our good Mr. Spock", but that's not the argument. The argument is the statement that the conclusion follows from the premise(s), i.e. "assuming Spock is a Vulcan and all Vulcan's love to boogie, then Spock must love to boogie". Like I've shown many times before in this thread, you can have a valid argument with a false conclusions, and an invalid argument with a true conclusions, and any other combination of these two. If you want a proof of a statement, you must however be able to show that it's impossible for that statement to be false. This can be achieved either by stating a valid argument and not the conclusion of it as your result, i.e. like "my argument has proven that assuming Spock is a Vulcan and all Vulcan's love to boogie,
then Spock must love to boogie" - this is true. Or you can prove the premises to be true, and the argument to be true, in which case you've proven the conclusion to be true. If you can't prove the premises to be true, you haven't successfully proven the conclusion.
You didn't answer the question.
You've not responded to this question either: "Where in Aristotle does he make the claim you make above (a proof requires the argument to be necessarily true)? Also, I'm curious, cite the sources with the quotes from the 10 books you've read on logic that claim "a proof requires the argument to be necessarily true".
In short: the argument is proven true/valid, i.e. it's proven that "assuming the premises are true, the conclusion is true". Whether the conclusion is true or not is unknown.
True and valid are not synonyms.
The above is incoherent. You do not understand the vernacular.
Maybe this quotes shows well that you aren't reading my posts, since I repeatedly have to explain the difference between argument and conclusion. It also shows a lot of disrespect to the posts presented by those you're discussing with, and you also admit not taking it seriously.
I have read your posts. This is why I cannot take them seriously. I'm opposed to dilettantism.
Maybe you should start reading the posts that demonstrate that you have failed to proven God's existence. You've only shown the truism that "something that must exist must exist". It's worth about as much as proving "something that is red is red", and if you want to claim your truism has anything to do with proving the existence of God you had better present it. In fact, let's skip these discussions where you keep saying that quotes out of logic text books are wrong, since they're meaningless. I can't convince you to read a book on logic, and you can't convince me that following the rules of logic is illogical. Let's instead just concentrate on this track of discussion: 1. have you understood and do you admit that with your current word definitions, the conclusion in your argument is merely the truism that "something that must exist must exist"? 2. do you think the truism "something that must exist must exist" proves the existence of God?
Regarding 1): The conclusion is: a necessary being must exist. This is not simply a definition, or an assertion but a necessity if one accepts contingent beings exist.
Regarding 2): As explained previously, I made a sufficiency argument. Do you understand what that means?
Rodion Romanovich
01-16-2007, 21:17
Regarding 1): The conclusion is: a necessary being must exist. This is not simply a definition, or an assertion but a necessity if one accepts contingent beings exist.
Regarding 2): As explained previously, I made a sufficiency argument. Do you understand what that means?
Great, you've understood and admitted that you've proven "something that must exist must exist" and nothing else, and stated that you think that because something that must exist must exist, you proffer that something that must exist can only be God. I have nothing left to say, since you've finally understood the key point.
The key point being that you haven't proven God's existence, but proven that "something that must exist must exist". And filled the gap between "something that must exist must exist" and "God exists" with belief, since there's nothing saying that "something that must exist" can only be God. The last step is an opinion/belief, not a proven fact.
I have read your posts. This is why I cannot take them seriously. I'm opposed to dilettantism.
Logic is an exact science. To claim that I'm using dilettantism for saying that it's necessary to follow the rules of logic is a sign of ignorance on your part. Your accusation is no different from someone telling it's dilettantism to say that the following doesn't prove Goldbach's conjecture:
3+3=6
There is a reason why people like Andrew Wiles spend 40 years of their lives proving just a single theorem (Fermat's Last Theorem), and that is the fact that a proof is generally something a lot stronger than something you put together in 5 minutes. When it comes to trying to prove things that haven't yet been proven, it would be absolutely amazing if someone who doesn't know formal logic were to put together a complete and valid proof of God's existence in less than 5 minutes or less than 5 pages. Indeed, all proofs of God presented so far in history are either proofs of something else (that could be God but could also be something else) or fallacious arguments. In the former case, it's essential that the person who made the argument is aware that he hasn't proven God's existence, but something else that could be God, and that the step from the proof to "God exists" is a matter of belief, not a proven fact.
This discussion has been ruined to a great extent by your constant accusations of incorrectness even when I've written down info confirmed by several reliable sources. Your belief that you know better than all others, even all existing philosophers in history, sums up your disrespectful view of logic, philosophy in general, and the posts written by the other participants in the discussion. I haven't seen a single post by you that doesn't state your opponents' posts are boring, incorrect (without stating why or providing sources confirming your most unorthodox views on what logic is), or incoherent just because you don't understand them. I think you should show more respect, and above all don't accuse people of lying when they even provide sources for their claims, which you don't, just as you keep claiming to have achieved something all philosophers so far have failed at. Your view is both disrespectful, naive and disgusting IMO.
Great, you've understood and admitted that you've proven "something that must exist must exist" and nothing else, and stated that you think that because something that must exist must exist, you proffer that something that must exist can only be God. I have nothing left to say, since you've finally understood the key point.
The key point being that you haven't proven God's existence, but proven that "something that must exist must exist". And filled the gap between "something that must exist must exist" and "God exists" with belief, since there's nothing saying that "something that must exist" can only be God. The last step is an opinion/belief, not a proven fact.
"A light shineth in the darkness and the dark comprehended it not."
You don't understand what a sufficiency argument is do you?
Logic is an exact science.
Logic isn't a science. This is similar to that earlier gem: "a proof requires the argument to be necessarily true". Where is that reference from Aristotle and the citations from those ten books on logic you've read by the way? These two comments quoted are examples of dilettantism.
To claim that I'm using dilettantism for saying that it's necessary to follow the rules of logic is a sign of ignorance on your part.
Alas, I'm all for logic. Having read your many posts, I simply don't think you understand logic or its rules. This would be OK save for the pretense and the host of rather rudimentary errors that have attended that pretense.
Indeed, all proofs of God presented so far in history are either proofs of something else (that could be God but could also be something else) or fallacious arguments. In the former case, it's essential that the person who made the argument is aware that he hasn't proven God's existence, but something else that could be God, and that the step from the proof to "God exists" is a matter of belief, not a proven fact.
This comment demonstrates an ignorance of the philosophical tradition. This is also an example of dilettantism.
I think you should show more respect, and above all don't accuse people of lying when they even provide sources for their claims.
Charges of lying came from yourself. Note the quote: "You take advantage of this lie in the step where you claim Big Bang not to be a valid causa prima non causata because it isn't a being, but a phenomenon." I bolded it for you.
..., which you don't, just as you keep claiming to have achieved something all philosophers so far have failed at.
Proofs for God are many and varied. They span the history of philosophy. Your statement is another example of dilettantism.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-17-2007, 01:51
Back to the original topic, that's good.
Xiahou's reply is spot on. Atheism is a cognitive stance. This means it is a decided position. This is what distinguishes it from our good hedgehog. It is the antithetical and opposing view to theism. Theism is the positive assertion about a metaphysical absolute: there is a God. Atheism, as indicated by the prefix, is the negation of theism, the denial of theism: the negative assertion about a metaphysical absolute: there is no God. Agnosticism, as opposed to either theism or atheism is the absence of any decided claim regarding the question. As the word indicates, it is a lack of knowledge regarding the question.
The above is a tad wordy, but the basic point remains both theism and atheism are assertions about a thing (God). In their strong forms they are epistemic stances. Agnosticism makes no assertion about the thing God. It is not an epistemic assertion, but a suspension of judgment.
So what are people who believe in god called?
So what are people who believe in god called?
Theists.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-17-2007, 02:02
Theists.
Not weak theists?
Not weak theists?
Ahh, I misunderstood the thrust of your question: if belief is the operative, certainly.
Sasaki Kojiro
01-17-2007, 06:46
Ahh, I misunderstood the thrust of your question: if belief is the operative, certainly.
Interesting. So Pindar, you have strong atheism and weak atheism both of which have problems; I presume you would say then that strong theism and weak theism have problems. Is this correct?
Rodion Romanovich
01-17-2007, 16:38
@Pindar: Now you're making a fallacy again. First you have a valid argument proving that "something that must exist must exist". So far ok. Then you follow that argument with: "therefore God exists". That step is a logical argument, but you're not stating it explicitly:
something that must exist must exist
============
therefore God exists
This argument is invalid unless God by defininition is "something that must exist", since otherwise the premise and conclusion are completely unrelated. If you define God as "something that must exist", the argument becomes valid, but then it's simply the assertion that: "x is true, therefore x is true", which is basically a less elegant and longer version of the pantheistic argument. For my comments on the pantheistic argument see my post about it above, especially the part about the interpretation of it.
===
I know what a sufficiency argument is, and that it certainly isn't a part of the rules of logic, but that it is an informal argument proposed by Leibniz' stating that if the ontological view that cause and effect is a correct model of reality, it follows that the existence of at least 1 thing that is capable of causing other things must be unbounded in past time. Basically the cosmological argument proves that there could exist 0, 1 or more Gods, that could still exist today, or could be dead now but have existed once, for all we know.
Note however that in your attempt at formalizing your initial argument, which was basically a slightly rephrased version of the informal cosmological argument as put forth by Leibniz, you ended up transforming your argument into a pretty worthless truism that in fact states nothing else than what one of the laws of modal logic already states. If you want some tips on how to formalize the cosmological argument in a more meaningful way, I recommend you to read Kurt Gödel's formalization of the argument, which I have commented in a post above. His formalized argument is available here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_ontological_proof
Do you have anything to discuss regarding Gödel's formalization?
Last but not least, remember that nobody so far has successfully proven God's existence, so if you want to convince the masses you had better show us something more impressive and complex than for instance Gödel's proof:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_ontological_proof
No attempt to prove God has reached all the way, which means it's always necessary to fill out the gap between the argument and the "God exists" with belief.
I particularly like this bible passage:
Matt 24:23 Then if any man shall say unto you, Lo, here is Christ, or there; believe it not.
Matt 24:24 For there shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect.
The uncertainty of God's existence is a necessity (except for the times when God actually comes down to earth in person to save or punish), for if God's existence would be known for sure, everybody would without hesitation do what God wants in order to not burn in hell, and there would be no free will and no test in the earthly life. In order for life to be a test and for free will to exist, people must doubt the existence of God enough that it's a matter of belief whether they think God exists or not. People who don't know for sure whether God exists or not, can choose between: 1. living righteously and be saved in case God exists, and not saved if God doesn't exist, and 2. living unrighteously to please themselves because they don't believe enough to think the risk that God exists is great enough, and end up in hell if God exists, otherwise don't end up in hell
If God's existence would be known for sure there would be no free will. But free will is a necessary condition for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God according to the most popular solution to the paradox of how God can combine being almighty and God when the world contains so much evil.
I find it interesting that LegioXXXUlpiaVictrix has responded twice to Pinder but has failed to answer the two questions posed by him.
That is telling given the nature of the attempts at lecturing on logic that is very telling.
Rodion Romanovich
01-17-2007, 17:00
Which question? The fact that all you do in this discussion is to comment one of the posters is very telling IMO.
These are all questions I see in his posts:
You don't understand what a sufficiency argument is do you?
Where is that reference from Aristotle and the citations from those ten books on logic you've read by the way?
the answer to the first is yes (I already answered this in post #494). The second is a pointless question since boolean algebra, the formalization of Aristotle's work, was made by George Boole who was born in 1815.
Which question? The fact that all you do in this discussion is to comment one of the posters is very telling IMO.
Of course it is. Just like avoiding answering questions is telling. You have avoided several of them several times.
These are all questions I see in his posts:
Careful review of the posts demonstrates your error here.
the first is an insult.
For one who likes to point out fallacies of others arguements it seems you continue with a very basic failure. The statement and question was
As explained previously, I made a sufficiency argument. Do you understand what that means?
It seems you do not understand given the nature of your answer.
The second is a pointless question since boolean algebra, the formalization of Aristotle's work, was made by George Boole who was born in 1815.
If you would actually read the statements and questions versus attempting to interpate a different meaning of the statement or question you might find some enlightment
For instance the actual question Also, I'm curious, cite the sources with the quotes from the 10 books you've read on logic that claim "a proof requires the argument to be necessarily true"?
Pinder's follow up post contained this question.
This is similar to that earlier gem: "a proof requires the argument to be necessarily true". Where is that reference from Aristotle and the citations from those ten books on logic you've read by the way?
The question you attempted to answer with this post is based upon your failure to actually address the first question and your failure to probably understand the sentence structure used. It is obvious to me - with a medicore English Language sentence structure understanding that Pinder in his followup question was refering to the initial question that you failed to address.
Where is your answer to that question? Is this the answer that was to suffice for the question posed
The second is a pointless question since boolean algebra, the formalization of Aristotle's work, was made by George Boole who was born in 1815.
Because it does not answer the question posed. The question posed was to put it simply, to provide citiations (quotes and references) that answers the statement that "a proof requires the argument to be necessarily true"? Can you provide such information or not?
Hell while your at it I am still awaiting for an actual response to my requests and questions from you. I see your last post to me was to avoid the issue because you could not adequatily demonstrate your premise and conclusion. Refering to the post that caused me to raise the question does not address the question. But then you expected me to understand a hypothecial when you did not write the initial as a hypotheical.
But what is even more amusing is the pot calling the Kettle Black comment of yours.
This discussion has been ruined to a great extent by your constant accusations of incorrectness even when I've written down info confirmed by several reliable sources. Your belief that you know better than all others, even all existing philosophers in history, sums up your disrespectful view of logic, philosophy in general, and the posts written by the other participants in the discussion. I haven't seen a single post by you that doesn't state your opponents' posts are boring, incorrect (without stating why or providing sources confirming your most unorthodox views on what logic is), or incoherent just because you don't understand them. I think you should show more respect, and above all don't accuse people of lying when they even provide sources for their claims, which you don't, just as you keep claiming to have achieved something all philosophers so far have failed at. Your view is both disrespectful, naive and disgusting IMO.
I wonder if you realize what logicial fallacy you have demonstrated here.......
For one that accused another poster of lying this is rather telling. Given that I can show at least two posts of Pinder's that directly contradicts the sentence in blue.
The sentence in red demonstrates belies your own statements, in my review of the thread, I have not once seen statements from Pinder accusing another of a lie. So is your attempt here based upon incorrect information or is it a lie by you?
If your going to accusing others of calling another a liar at least attempt one that is not easily shown to be one of your own making.
So here is the "tell" from your second sentence of your previous post.
I have little use for individuals who in their attempt to "win" an arguement results to using easily proven false information that smacks of lying, especially given the nature of your own accusations toward another poster.
Rodion Romanovich
01-17-2007, 18:24
@Redleg: I've shown that an argument must evaluate to true. The argument may not evaluate to false. The argument may then either evaluate to the literal "true", or to a function that for all possible combinations of parameter values will evaluate to true. See the Modal logic article in wikipedia, the predicate calculus article, and possibly also lambda calculus, function theory, classical logic and boolean algebra. Again any textbook sources will confirm what I said:
In logic, the form of an argument is valid precisely if it cannot lead from true premises to a false conclusion. An argument is said to be valid if, in every model in which all premises are true, the conclusion is true. For example: "All A are B; some A are C; therefore some B are C" is a valid form.
A formula of logic is said to be valid if it is true under every interpretation (also called structure or model). See also model theory or mathematical logic.
A tautology, or tautologous formula, is truth functionally valid. Not all valid formulas of quantificational logic are tautologies. See also truth table.
Example
Consider the following argument form in which the letters P, Q, and A represent unanalyzed or uninterpreted sentences.
All P are Q
A is P
Therefore, A is Q
The validity of an actual argument can be determined by translating it into an argument form, and then analyzing the argument form for validity. (The argument form above is valid; see syllogism.)
If (all P are Q) and (A is P), then (A is Q).
Re requirements for more sources, it's odd that someone who hasn't quoted a single source would require sources from someone who has quoted source for 90%, and that repeatedly brings forward sources for everything he forgot to quote when asked for sources.
As for the fallacy you pointed out, first of all it was in response to Pindar's repeated accusations and insults. Secondly, it's found in communicational text, not in a logical argument part of my posts. Thus it doesn't invalidate any of my logical arguments. Your repeated habit of pointing out "fallacies" in text that isn't a logical argument shows that you don't know much about logic and is only seeking to inflame the discussion. Your accusation of "Pot calling kettle black" is quite ridiculous since Pindar started the accusations and insults, and you have come with nothing but personal attacks towards me in this discussion. I'm the kettle, not the pot.
Your accusation of liar statement shows that you haven't followed the discussion. I edited out the word liar since in English the word "lie" has more values than just "untrue statement". Bringing up the pre-edit contents of a post that I have edited and apologized for shows you're eager to bring up more confusion and stir up more accusations, hatred and removal of understanding in the debate.
Fact remains that your only contribution to the discussion has been to put forth accusations towards me and stating that in your opinion one of the debaters "won" rather than stating any opinion or any arguments.
Stop trying to hide the arguments - which are clearly in the favor of the view I stated - by using accusations and personal attacks. Perhaps that's the reason why you're using constant personal attacks rather than attacks on the arguments, because you know Pindar's view, which you're supporting (you even admitted you were biased towards his view), favors from removing all logic from the discussion and replacing it with personal attacks and accusations.
I see your last post to me was to avoid the issue because you could not adequatily demonstrate your premise and conclusion.
Is this a request for me to present the argument in a formal way? If you answer "yes", then I will accept the challenge since then you're trying to discuss in a serious way.
@Redleg: true implies necessarily true. Since I've shown that an argument must evaluate to true, I've already shown this part. See the Modal logic article in wikipedia.
However that was not his initial claim now was it. Refer once again to post #120. It seems your stuck on proving true - when the initial premise was a simple valid proof.
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinate regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
The above is a simple valid argument.
For all your posts you have not demostrated any failure of Pinder's initial premise. You however have demonstrated something. Care to guess what it is.
Re requirements for more sources, it's odd that someone who hasn't quoted a single source would require sources from someone who has quoted source for 90%, and that repeatedly brings forward sources for everything he forgot to quote when asked for sources.
Not at all - you made a specific claim which I had a question about. It seems that your still not answering the question.
As for the fallacy you pointed out, firt of all it was in response to Pindar's repeated accusations and insults. Secondly, it's found in communicational text, not in a logical argument part of my posts. Thus it doesn't invalidate any of my logical arguments. Your repeated habit of pointing out "fallacies" in text that isn't a logical argument shows that you don't know much about logic and is only seeking to inflame the discussion. Your accusation of "Pot calling kettle black" is quite ridiculous since Pindar started the accusations and insults, and you have come with nothing but personal attacks towards me in this discussion. I'm the kettle, not the pot.
You don't understand the anology. When you return the precieved insult your no longer the kettle, your the pot. Rather amusing this answer of yours. Once again are you attempting to deny that you called Pinder a liar first? Just because you edited it out because a moderator informed you do do so, does not change the fact. Nor does it change the fact that you used the word "lie" in a previous post that you have not edit.
Your accusation of liar statement shows that you haven't followed the discussion. I edited out the word liar since in English the word "lie" has more values than just "untrue statement". Bringing up the pre-edit contents of a post that I have edited and apologized for shows you're eager to bring up more confusion and stir up more accusations, hatred and removal of understanding in the debate.
Your answer demonstrates a falsehood once again. Do you need me to reference the post you have not edited out.
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1376481&postcount=359
Fact remains that your only contribution to the discussion has been to put forth accusations towards me and stating that in your opinion one of the debaters "won" rather than stating any opinion or any arguments.
Yep - just using the same arguement style that you yourself are using at another for grins and giggles. Especially given that you refuse to actually answer a question. Again this shows your failure to actually read before making conclusions. Shall I provide a post reference that demonstrates your inablity to tell fact from your own fiction.
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1325517&postcount=26
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showpost.php?p=1325517&postcount=331
Stop trying to hide the arguments - which are clearly in the favor of the view I stated - by using accusations and personal attacks. Perhaps that's the reason why you're using constant personal attacks rather than attacks on the arguments, because you know Pindar's view, which you're supporting (you even admitted you were biased towards his view), favors from removing all logic from the discussion and replacing it with personal attacks and accusations.
Ah again the pot calling the kettle black. Should you not review your own posts before making such statements? Did you not engage Pinder solely upon your own failure to actual read the initial premise? Did you not first accusing him of using a "lie?" Come on there, the truth will set you free......(A pun)
How many times now have you tried this tactic of accusing others of what you yourself are guilty of doing. It seems when one asks for clarification and proof of your statements you result to making accusations of personal attacks. Rather interesting isn't?
Again one should be very careful of attempting to be false about their own statements when its easily shown that they are. Now within the span of two hours (or so) I have clearly shown that you have attempted falsehoods about others.
I suggest you stop avoiding questions and actually answer them. It seems you have dug yourself a deep hole of your own making.
Rodion Romanovich
01-17-2007, 19:10
I've got better things to do than argue that logic works the way it does and fend of continuous personal attack. I'll start a new thread about discussion of proofs of God's existence and not post in this thread any more since you keep taking up all threads of hostility and personal attacks again and again to no end. Hopefully you'll avoid posting in my new thread unless you have something to say about the arguments rather than the persons.
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