Panzer VI Tiger - a costly failure ?

[cegorach]

The more I learn about the way it was used and about its numerous defects the more I am convinced the project called Panzer VI (Tiger) was a failure.

Of course I know it a very good tank, but let me present why I think the entire project contributed to the earlier end of the war.

1. The tank was simply too heavy - in Europe the continent with so many rivers only a small number of bridges could be used by these armoured vehicles.
Its weight seriously limited its use everywhere and made it almost impossible in Eastern Europe during autumn and spring - exactly the place were it was so important.

2. Engine - devoured too much fuel, was plagued by numerous defects which meant the tanks spent a lot of time in repair workshops.
Also it provided a useful weak spot for enemy (even Molotov cocktails could all to easily destroy the tank).

3. Vulnerable to mines - it is incredible, but Germans completelly underestimated this danger - sure it is hard to destroy such tank using this weapon, but every explosion of a mine meant more days in repair.

4. No evacuation equipment - a damaged Tiger was a nightmare to the entire unit. It required THREE tractors to move it - one less and good by Tiger, one is damaged and start again, not to mention how complicated it was. Often a fellow Tiger had to drag a damaged Pz VI with pretty large possibility it would be damaged as well ( obviously engine didn't tolerate over 100 tonnes...) - anyway it meant that 1 damaged Tiger meant 2 Tigers eliminated in one go...

5. Brainless commanders - Tigers were wasted in stupid missions so often that it seems almost suicidal... Even the very first use of Tiger at Leningrad in late 1942 was almost a joke on its own - narrow road, mud ( i.e. swamp-like trap for Tiger) on both sides and heavy artillery ahead = no results except several damaged Tigers.


6. Too expensive - simply all things considering, keeping in mind all the points above the time and resources spent on Tigers was a waste and it was a very costly waste of resources the Third Reich couldn't afford.:yes:


Your opinions ?

[Sarmatian]

I would agree with you. It was a logistic nightmare... That was limiting it's use on the offensive (which was supposed to be it's purpose). It performed admirably on the defensive, though.

If you consider it as a tank that was supposed to turn the tide of the war, then yes, I would agree that it was a costly failure.

[Marquis of Roland]

Despite all that, it can still easily blow away any MBT of the time, at a range where almost all opposing tanks could not reach.

Granted it was too heavy, had mechanical problems and such, but not to the point where it was an ineffective piece of junk. As far as salvaging goes, you wouldn't be in a position to salvage any vehicle or equipment off the battlefield unless you win the battle and/or are left in control of the battlefield. In such a case heavy salvaging equipment and vehicles can be moved up without relative danger (assuming you just secured the area by winning the battle, and assuming your country has the capacity to put out such supporting forces). As far as mines, I'm not sure any tank in WWII were invulnerable to mines, so that can't really be counted. As far as being disabled by molotov cocktails, this really would only happen if you send your tank into an urban environment with no supporting infantry, which is a big no-no.

The Tiger was too expensive and construction too complicated for Germany to effectively produce at the time (the Panther and Tiger tanks were rushed into production without the usual rounds of field testing the Germans normally would do; one would have to assume that if given the proper time to finish the product, the Germans would have produced a VERY reliable Tiger I). That doesn't mean it was a bad tank; imagine if the Americans were building Tiger I's instead of Germany. Fuel consumption and logistics may still have been a problem, but only a tiny fraction of the problem Germany in her weakened industrial state had to deal with in operating a Tiger.

So while I agree that the Tiger was too expensive a vehicle and required too much additional support for the Third Reich to effectively handle at the time, I still don't think that this reason makes it a bad tank in itself, rather it was a bad decision for Germany to produce such a weapon at the time, of which I am in agreement.

Also, bad commanders don't make the tank a bad tank; if I gave you a wrench to hammer in a nail, that doesn't mean the wrench is a bad tool, just means I'm a bad commander :laugh4: In the hands of a good commander, such as Michael Wittman at Villers-Bocage, you can see that it is indeed a very lethal weapon.

All in all, IMO the Tiger I was a superb combat vehicle that did its job (again when used properly as a tank) exceedingly well when given the proper support (i.e. supporting infantry and artillery, good logistical system for fuel and ammunition as well as repair, etc.). It had excellent armor and arguably the best gun of the war (88mm).

Perhaps we can compare the Tiger I to a medieval European knight, being supported by his pages, squires, and servants, heavily armed and armored but slow, all this work for 1 man to perform a very specific duty on the battlefield, which he did very well.

[cegorach]

[QUOTE]
As far as mines, I'm not sure any tank in WWII were invulnerable to mines, so that can't really be counted.

What I meant is the lack of equipment to deal with mines on the battlefield - the Allies and the Soviets had wargear to detonate these despite the fact they had more than a dozen of medium tanks for every Tiger.
Germans seemed to have in general quite easy-going attitude towards mines - from first episode on the 1st (or 2nd) September 1939 when 'Kempf' division charged through a minefield...
At Kursk mines disabled almost the entire Panther brigade and there are many more episodes...



As far as being disabled by molotov cocktails, this really would only happen if you send your tank into an urban environment with no supporting infantry, which is a big no-no.

I meant it was vulnerable to numerous factors, even such primitive. But even close explosions could damage the engine and it was happening quite often.



With the rest I agree.:book:

[RabidGibbon]

Short point in favour of Tigers.

The simple existence of Tigers had a psychological impact. A sort of mystique built up around them, particularly in Normandy to the point where almost any tank reported to Headquarters would be an Tiger, in the way any anti tank guns reported would be an 88.

Imagine being an allied tank commander and hearing "enemy armour ahead" or "enemy armour expected" and knowing that it might be a Tiger tank, which if it can see you can probably kill you, and all you can do is bombard the beast with snow balls. It would certainly cramp my style and make me very cautious (Not of course that I've ever been a tank commander but I imagine it would).

[Marquis of Roland]

[QUOTE=Marquis of Roland]




What I meant is the lack of equipment to deal with mines on the battlefield - the Allies and the Soviets had wargear to detonate these despite the fact they had more than a dozen of medium tanks for every Tiger.
Germans seemed to have in general quite easy-going attitude towards mines - from first episode on the 1st (or 2nd) September 1939 when 'Kempf' division charged through a minefield...
At Kursk mines disabled almost the entire Panther brigade and there are many more episodes...




I meant it was vulnerable to numerous factors, even such primitive. But even close explosions could damage the engine and it was happening quite often.



With the rest I agree.:book:

Well, its probably not fair to blame the designers for German High Command's not putting emphasis on anti-mine tech. Had the Tiger been built by the U.S. for example, it would have been privy to all the niceties supplied to U.S. tanks:yes:

As far as close explosions disabling Tigers, is there a link or reference I can look at for that, because now I'm thinking if that was true, why didn't Allied tankers (and/or anti-tank gun crews) just use HE rounds on Tigers instead of using their normal ammo?

Also, when comparing the effectiveness of Tigers, we should probably factor in the psychological factor, as most opposing tankers feared the Tiger (I believe there was incidents when allied tankers mistook skirted panzer IV's for a Tiger and ran away).

Doh, Gibbon beat me to the psychological issue LOL

[PanzerJaeger]

I generally agree with Marquis of Roland.

It is important to remember that the Tiger was never supposed to be the standard German MBT. That went from the Pz. IV to the Panther.

The Tiger was, as mentioned, much like a medieval Knight. It was a specialized weapon meant for very specific missions.

When supplied and used correctly, it performed its tasks exceedingly well. Tigers broke entire russian armored brigades that would have run over an equal amount of Pz. 4's. The allied tanks faired no better.

What brought the tank down were issues that were not really the tank's fault. Hundreds were lost due to air attack, while hundreds more were lost due to not being supplied/maintained properly. I believe far more tigers were scuttled than destroyed by enemy armor.

So - no, the Tiger was no failure. However, the cost of production and maintenance probably could have been spent elsewhere more effectively.

PS. I was surprised to see..


5. Brainless commanders - Tigers were wasted in stupid missions so often that it seems almost suicidal... Even the very first use of Tiger at Leningrad in late 1942 was almost a joke on its own - narrow road, mud ( i.e. swamp-like trap for Tiger) on both sides and heavy artillery ahead = no results except several damaged Tigers.

...until I read the description.


It is very true Tigers were deployed into situations they should not have been. Its important to make the distinction between strategic commanders and the actual commanders of the tanks. The Tiger crews were the best tankers in history, and they often turned those poor deployments into victories despite the conditions. :yes:

[Oaty]

Well another thing, was it common knowledge back then that tanks performed poorly in urban environments. It was well known that tanks needed to be escorted during WWII. It's easy now that all the data has been compiled. So Was it common knowledge back then for tank commanders to know that urban warfare was deadly for the tank?

[Samurai Waki]

I have little doubt that Commanders of the period probably didn't like an urban scenario, its true that before this time period Urban Combat was relatively restricted, but it did happen on occasion. Given a choice, I'm sure most Commanders at the time would have preferred to encircle a city with armor and artillery and allow the infantry to clear it out. But in the case of Stalingrad and Leningrad they didn't really have the logistical capabilites to do anything else. To send in tanks to support the infantry was a rather Damn-the-Torpedoes decision that had to be made, and it did pay off on occasion, but would be generally regarded as an option made exclusive for the most dire situations.

[Mount Suribachi]

Interesting discussion. What I find most interesting is that despite the effect it had on the mindset of Allied tankers, production ceased in 1944 after only 1355 had been built. Clearly the Germans were aware of its limitations. But as a slightly mobile, defensive pillbox it was excellent for the Normandy campaign.

The Tiger II was even lower, 485. And I would definately class that as a failure. Its armour was brittle and prone to cracking. Fuel consumption was horrendous. Gearbox + transmission couldn't cope and broke down regularly, wheels cracked under the weight, and it was barely moveable off-road. The Russian report on captured Tiger IIs makes interesting reading (on battlefield.ru)

[cegorach]

[QUOTE=cegorach]

[QUOTE]Well, its probably not fair to blame the designers for German High Command's not putting emphasis on anti-mine tech. Had the Tiger been built by the U.S. for example, it would have been privy to all the niceties supplied to U.S. tanks:yes:

THey didn't put much effort into anti-mine wargear, or actually NO effort at all, but you have numerous scratch-made anti-tank destroyers, specialised tanks and armoured cars etc, so why not deal with the bloody mines - and for the WHOLE war - there are several cases of German tanks running cherfully over minefields in 1939 in Poland - why is that they didn't learn from those very early mistakes ?


As far as close explosions disabling Tigers, is there a link or reference I can look at for that, because now I'm thinking if that was true, why didn't Allied tankers (and/or anti-tank gun crews) just use HE rounds on Tigers instead of using their normal ammo?

It probably was mentioned in 'Tiger I Heavy Tank 1942-45' (1993) - I had the information from a Polish book which mentiones this source for example.
I can't say for certain, though.

HE rounds could be more efficient, but from heavier cannons, I think.
The problem is that such ammunition had the nasty effect to Tiger's engine, especially its cooling system.




Overall I would say that Tiger had:

- excellent weaponry,

- very good armour (but pretty inefficiently designed),

- terrible engine, gearbox etc

- huge cost,

- too large weight,

- was too vulnerable to mines and had too little support in the matter of logistics, evacuation equipment etc


Not the smartest investment when you are fighting the whole world...:book:

[Stig]

Tiger (And later Königstiger) had the problem that it teared open the road. One Tiger could ride over it, but the second already had problems ... not to speak of transports that had to use the road later on.
Tigers had problems with functioning in cities, as said they were slow and heavy. I believe in Arnhem (and Oosterbeek) alone about 5 Tigers were easely destroyed due to the fact that they couldn't move and the AT-crews could.
Next to that, they could be destroyed by a simple 6-ponder granate.

[Kagemusha]

Im little puzzled here about the critisism of Tiger´s ability to withstand HE rounds. Did you guys know that the main way for antitank action for the Finnish was Kasapanos= Satchel charge. Basicly explosives tied over a stick hand granade. During WWII there was no tank that could withstand a 6kg satchel charge when placed on the tanks engine deck.
About vulnerability against mines. Again there was no tank that could withstand a detonation of 10kg antitank mine.Immobilization was always atleast the minimal result when a tank drove over one.

[cegorach]

So call it lack of wargear to deal with mines and generally lack of caution in this matter.

What is the point to have so good tank if you move it over minefiled ('cause noone cares) immobilising it and having no equipment to evacuate the tank ?

[KrooK]

We should divide war on 2 theaters - western front and eastern front.
Tigers were much better on western front IMO. Supply lines were shorter, opponents less experienced and roads were better (which is very important with so heavy tank). Furthermore American tanks were generally much worse than Russian and they were easy pray for tiger on open area.
On eastern front Tiger wasn't so useful. There were less of good roads, long supply lines, weather was more changeable (from +30*C to -30*C). Russian tanks were much better and they could drive almost everywhere.

Talking about Tiger armour we can't forget about big construction mistake - armour plates (especially fron plate) were mounted upright - bullets always hit amour, never slip over it. And driver view-finder was into front plate what caused lesser reliatibility (same like into first version of Panther).

All in all - best german tank was panther IMO :)

[PanzerJaeger]

The biggest failure that cost German armor the most was that of the Luftwaffe, not the Panzer Corps.

I dont have hard numbers, and correct me if Im wrong, but I believe more German armor was destroyed by allied aircraft than anything else.

The entire Normandy campaign could have turned out differently had the German armor not been bombed to pieces everytime it moved. The Eastern front was slightly better, but not much. (See the excellent IL-2 Sturmovik)

[cegorach]

Well, Pz VI was designed for eastern front - to WIN here so we should judge its performance there and that was hardly worth such efforts.

It wast there were ALL flaws of Tiger were evident - tanks were lost due to lack of evacuation equipment, on minefields, because were too heavy to move across a river, because there was no fuel left, after mechanical failures and finally in combat.:book:

[Kagemusha]

I tryed to reply earlier,but becouse the board was down i couldnt.Cegorach,where do get the idea that there was no evacuation equipment for the Germans? There were Bergepanzers that were modified panzers that were used on towing damaged tanks. There were also modified Tigers among those.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_recovery_vehicle

About the minefields,how can an Tank model be accused of bad tactics? When an armoured spearhead came to contact with Pak front a tight concentration of Anti tank guns.They only had the choice of rushing the Pak front or retreat.It doesnt differ anyway then the option that infantry company had when they got into guarded minefield.Go through or retreat, you cant stay put or you die. The main problem with German armour was that it was very expensive and becouse of that and weak military economy that resulted into weak production figures,the losses were very hard to replace.
If you think that Tigers didnt have battle value in Eastfront here is a link to chart of loss ratio of the Panzer units that were made mostly of Tigers and also overall loss ratio between German and Soviet tanks:

http://www.alanhamby.com/losses.html

That shows aproximetely 5.75 destroyed Soviet tanks for single destroyed Tiger. When compared to the total kill/ loss ratio of German tanks of 3.25 per one german tank destroyed its lot better then the average so i would hardly call it an complete failure.

[Watchman]

Given how few Tigers there were compared to other German tanks though, was it really worth the expense ?

Anyway if I've understood correctly the Tiger was conceived as a heavy "linebreaker", able to wade through most of the incoming fire and open way to more mobile formations less suited to breaching heavy defences. And worked well enough in the role, given the circumstances.

Whether it was a cost-efficient machine for the job is a bit another issue, but then Reich resource allocation blew chunks anyway.

[Spino]

The Tiger was not very cost efficient but I'd hardly characterize it as a failure. Had the Tiger failed to demonstrate its effectiveness on the battlefield and make any kind of impression on its enemies then it would have been wholly dismissed as a failure by countless historians as opposed to being one of the most famous and discussed tanks of all time.

I find it amazing that the basic Tiger design remained unchanged throughout the war. Sure, it was upgraded and refined as the war progressed but why in blazes didn't they apply the lessons learned from captured T-34s and save some weight by lessening it's armor thickness and sloping the hull and turret to compensate? Because of the insistence on vertical armor protection the vehicle was ridiculously heavy and needlessly so. Sloping the armor would have greatly improved the odds that incoming rounds would be deflected, thus eliminating the need for the vertical armor to be thick enough to reliably stop all incoming rounds in the first place.

As far as the Eastern front is concerned the Tiger was remarkably effective in Russia and eastern Europe because of the nature of the terrain. Russia's plains and steppes allowed the Tiger's 88L56 cannon to wreak havoc on Russian vehicles from incredible distances. Forests and marshes were especially tough on Tigers but that terrain is unkind to vehicles in general.

The Tiger's vulnerability to mines was exacerbated by the fact that it was always at the spearhead of such foolish endeavors such as Kursk where attacks were directed into thoroughly prepared positions. The fact that the Tiger was such a lauded and expensive tank made its losses to mines a bigger point of contention than if a similar number of Pz-IVs were lost instead.

The Tiger gets much of its plenty of praise for inspiring fear into the enemy. Enemy infantry and armor dreaded having a Tiger appear on the scene as most anti-tank measures of the day were completely inneffective against it unless they were uncomfortably close or were afforded a lucky flank or rear shot. Talk about a psychological weapon!

The Panther is easily Germany's most effective tank during the second half of the war. It took the lessons learned from the T-34 to a whole new level. It was much lighter, faster, mobile and reliable than the Tiger and while it didn't sport the infamous 88mm cannon it's long barrel 75mm was still remarkably effective against most late war tanks at long ranges.

If anything production of the Tiger and Panzer IV should have ceased altogether after the Panther was introduced. Both tanks were decidedly cost-ineffective when compared to the Panther; the Tiger was too expensive and the Pz-IV practically obsolete.

[Sarmatian]

That shows aproximetely 5.75 destroyed Soviet tanks for single destroyed Tiger. When compared to the total kill/ loss ratio of German tanks of 3.25 per one german tank destroyed its lot better then the average so i would hardly call it an complete failure.

There are cases when a single tiger destroyed 20 soviet tanks, but when it was in the defensive position. It didn't prove to have this kind of effectiveness when it was used on the offensive. Since it's original purpose was to be used in the offensive actions, as a linebreaker, you could say that in that regard, it failed admirably.

[Watchman]

I find it amazing that the basic Tiger design remained unchanged throughout the war. Sure, it was upgraded and refined as the war progressed but why in blazes didn't they apply the lessons learned from captured T-34s and save some weight by lessening it's armor thickness and sloping the hull and turret to compensate? Because of the insistence on vertical armor protection the vehicle was ridiculously heavy and needlessly so. Sloping the armor would have greatly improved the odds that incoming rounds would be deflected, thus eliminating the need for the vertical armor to be thick enough to reliably stop all incoming rounds in the first place.They eventually did, you know. The result goes by the name Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf. B Tiger II, better known as Königstiger.

[Del Arroyo]

While I find it interesting that someone would consider the Tiger tank to be a failure, I cannot say I find this to be a fair or a correct characterization.

[King Kurt]

The figures that Kage put the link in for were very interesting. It is worth looking at some of the unit histories. Often it seemed that hardly any tanks were operational. A campaign would begin with all tanks available, but in a couple of weeks hardly any would be lost to enemy action but virtually all the tanks would be nonoperational. This does suggest that the main weakness was mechanical reliability and associated items.
Also on the same site was the actual cost of the tanks - about twice the cost of a Panther and 3 times that of a Mk 4 - so with a total production of just over 1,000 would the Germans have been better off with 2,000 more panthers? - I don't really think so.
I think that the real impact was the impact on Allied morale - tigerphobia. Just like every artillery piece the germans had were - in the Allied soldiers eyes - 88mms, every tank became Tigers, This impact probably tips the scales in the Tiger's favour. Just as the Stuka was the demon in the early war years, the Tiger seemed to become the pariah for the later war years. Ironically the Stuka to was significantly flawed - it was slow and very vunerable to fighters - but somehow its fame overshadows its shortcommings.
So for its morale effect alone, the Tiger was a significant tank of WW2 - however I still think the title of THE TANK of WW2 belongs to the T34 - it is one of those quintessential designs which sets the standard for evermore - so many elements of its design you still see in tanks today and until we stop using armoured vehicles there will always be a bit of the T34 in every design.

[Rodion Romanovich]

I think cegorach makes some interesting points here about the limited strategical options and logistics disadvantages of the Tiger. While the tactical loss rates per tank and morale impact were the advantages of the Tiger, the weight, lack of portability, high cost, fuel consumption and lack of strategical options were serious drawbacks which becomes most evident in its appearance on the eastern front.

1 Tiger costs the same as 2 Panthers, and 2 panther killed 6.5 tanks on average while a Tiger destroyed 5.75 tanks on average. That means the 1 Tiger on average isn't a better "standard issue" tank than 2 Panthers which cost the same amount to produce, but I'm quite sure the Tiger was much better than the Panther for special missions - perhaps line breakthrough or a strategical reserve against counter-attacking enemy armored spearhead attacks. Maybe reducing the Tiger production to 100-300 tanks and instead creating 1,400-1,900 more Panthers would have been better, and prioritizing the Tigers for the missions where the Tigers would have more efficient loss rates.

While fear can make enemies make mistakes on the tactical level, on the strategical level it can also make the enemy more careful, making sure to always provide air support when Tigers were deployed.

The most interesting issue is however the strategical impact of the Tiger. It's average kill rates were worse than the Panthers, meaning it wasn't suited to being a standard issue tank, but rather a better special weapon. Shortage of fuel was also problematic and historically there were hampering fuel supply problems on all fronts from the middle of 1942 and onwards. But that would likely have been a problem also with 2,000 more Panthers instead of 1,000 Tigers. The mobility problems were serious issues in crossing the river lines of USSR, and in that campaign the river line crossings turned out to be crucial since there the Soviets could deploy their heavy artillery, and the logistical problems of getting armored support over the rivers quickly enough always left the Germans slightly off balance right after every river crossing had begun. The slow speed and unreliable engine would also prevent it from being redeployed a lot as the other tanks could be, which must have given the Soviets perhaps if not great at least decent possiblities of predicting where the Tigers would appear next. It would also mean moving much responsibilities over to unescorted German infantry, since the Tigers couldn't be used in the way faster, lighter tanks could be. However that could be solved to some extent by using the Panthers for quick movements and the Tigers only for some of the targets, although it could still mean a disadvantage. The shortcomings of engine reliability etc. became an issue to the north, where such heavy breakthrough weapons were perhaps most important to have. I also believe that if the Tiger hadn't been produced in great numbers, many of the panther could have been upgraded with more powerful and greater range turrets. That would only leave armor thickness as the advantage of the Tiger compared to the Panther.

The most effective thing to do would probably have been to produce maybe 100-300 Tigers, and use the rest of the production capability for more Panthers. Tigers deployed in smaller numbers and used for the most critical breakthrough missions (although not overestimated in that role) as well as defending against enemy armored attacks, would have been most effective both strategically and economically. Maybe inserted as a weapon used so seldom that it wasn't always expected, wasn't part of the calculations in the enemy plans, and inserted at the last moment when the opponent had already planned his moves based on the assumption that they wouldn't appear...

So I think that trying to deploy the Tiger as a standard issue tank instead of a special weapon was a failure, but not an as obvious failure as it might seem with the currently available information. 6.5 compared to 5.75 in kill-ratio-per-production-cost is not a very drastic difference, and wouldn't have become apparent to anyone unless they statistically analysed the data, and it would take several battles to make this evaluation and find out. And it was probably also believed at the time that thicker armor and better turret mattered a lot and would improve kill rates so significantly that lower cost efficiency and more limited strategical options would be outweighed by it. That's an assumption that is easy to make in that situation, considering that the German tank improvements that had so far led to improved kill ratios had all involved improving turrets and making the armor thicker. If anyone would have seen the figures 6.5 vs 5.75 at that time they would probably have regarded the statistics as an exception from the normal. And they would point to the cases where the Tiger was effective as a special breakthrough weapon.

[Uesugi Kenshin]

I read on wikipedia that the Panthers long-barreled 75mm cannon was more powerful than the 88mm mounted on the Tiger, but less powerful than the later and even longer 88's mounted on vehicles such as the Königstiger and Jagdtiger. The wiki article also contained, or linked to another wiki article with a table of different armor penetrations by the two guns at different ranges and with different ammunition. Is there any truth to that, or is this just an instance of wiki getting something completely wrong?


EDIT:
Tiger gun: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KwK_36

Panther gun:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_KwK_42

[MilesGregarius]

I read on wikipedia that the Panthers long-barreled 75mm cannon was more powerful than the 88mm mounted on the Tiger, but less powerful than the later and even longer 88's mounted on vehicles such as the Königstiger and Jagdtiger. The wiki article also contained, or linked to another wiki article with a table of different armor penetrations by the two guns at different ranges and with different ammunition. Is there any truth to that, or is this just an instance of wiki getting something completely wrong?


EDIT:
Tiger gun: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KwK_36

Panther gun:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_KwK_42

My only reference is from playing ASL, where the long barrelled 75 on the Panther was rated higher then the earlier 88 on the Tiger I, but lower than the later version on the Tiger II, so if wiki got it wrong, they aren't alone.

As for the main debate, the Tiger's biggest failing was the diversion of resources it, and all of the Reich's super-weapons, represented to an already threatened industrial base. Not only in terms of resources needed for individual Tigers versus individual Panthers/Mk. IVs, but also time spent in R&D, factory retooling, non-standardization of parts and the like.

WWII was industrial war at its most intense, and the essence of industrialization is standardization. For that reason, while I wouldn't call the Tiger a failure per se, it certainly wasn't an unqualified success. The Tiger was hands down a better fighting machine than the Sherman, but the underappreciated Sherman made for a better war machine as even if the Panthers and Tigers had doubled their kill ratios, yet more Shermans would have soldiered on. This obviously applies even more so to the T-34.

However, the Tiger's blatant (non-production) flaws notwithstanding, its battlefield record still validates some of its designers intentions. If the essence of armored warfare is shock, mobility, and firepower, the Tiger scores admirably on the third point and off the charts on the first. The opinions of combatants on both sides attest to the Tiger's successes. While Germany's haphazard tank production seriously impaired its war-fighting capacity, given Germany's situation from 1943 on, it's debatable whether simply cranking out servicable, if underwhelming, Mk. IVs or standardizing Panthers would have made enough of a difference to significantly alter the course of history. Arguably, given that Germany was bound to face overwhelming numbers no matter what tanks it produced, the Tiger, with its long-range firepower and clear psychological effects upon both friend and foe may have been the best of a series of bad options.

[Marquis of Roland]

I think the fair way to tell if Tigers were good tanks would be to take any of those combat situations with Tigers and substitute in any other WWII era tank to see how those tanks (conjecturally) would fare.

[yesdachi]

I don’t think the Tiger was a failure, being controlled by a country with such massive goals was the failure. Having its support spread too thin and loosing its air support did the Tiger in (same with Germany’s navy). Is the quarterback a failure if the offensive line doesn’t give him a chance to throw the ball?

The notion of having many other tanks for the cost of one tiger is interesting (I think fuel, maintenance/repairs and casualty rates would have soared) but I would rather have one Jedi than 100 battle droids.

[Fisherking]

The Tiger when it was introduced was a marvellous piece of engineering. There was nothing in its class for more than a year, and in such a war that is saying something.

One battle field axiom states that if it can be seen it can be hit, & if it can be hit it can be killed.

No piece of equipment is invulnerable. There is always a way to defeat it but it is obvious that some is better than others.

Did the Tiger become obsolete? Of course it did and should have, in a perfect world, been replaced in production by something better. Heavy Tanks themselves became obsolete when the Tiger did; it just took a few years to see it. Air power doomed the German war machine and when employed in the west the Tiger suffered badly, but still allied commanders figured a coast of 17 tanks for one Tiger. That is the loss of a full company of armor at that time for only one tank, and what is more it was standard practice. This is not only a statement to the praise of the Tiger but also a condemnation of allied R&D.

It has only been a few years sense the cry was that all tanks were obsolete because of antitank rockets, but inter the new generation of tanks with the M-1, Challenger, and Leopard II.

Germany made mistakes, thank god, in the war but building the Tiger was not one of them. Keeping it in service when better tanks were available may surely have been.

Anything can be misused in one way or an other but that is not the fault of the equipment nor of its concept.

[Spino]

Thanks for those kill ratios of the Tiger versus the Panther, fascinating stuff. However effectiveness versus enemy armor is one thing, effectiveness versus infantry is another thing entirely. Enemy armor was definitely more of a factor on the eastern front so I can see Panther's cost effectiveness, reliability and mobility paying serious dividends against Russia's mechanized forces. However given that the 88L56 fired a much bigger HE shell than the 75L70 I'm sure the Tiger was far more effective in the infantry support role. Buildings, bunkers, entrenched/dug-in infantry and emplacements were probably dispatched with greater effectiveness by the Tiger than the Panther. I guess I'm saying there might be a strong argument for the Tiger's greater effectiveness in the Western theater where the need for mobile anti-armor assets was not as dire.

[Alexander the Pretty Good]

I've always thought that the Tiger matched Germany's military situation from 1944. There the Germans were largely on the defensive, where mobility was important. A single Tiger held up an Allied armored column for hours at one point (too lazy to find the book on tanks I have), and I can see Tigers being monster ambushers.

If you want to talk about efficiency, though, the German StuGs were amazing (and the cutest tank/SPG evar!).

[Rodion Romanovich]

By the way, has anyone besides me heard of a famous battle (near Caen I believe it was), where one Tiger is said to have singlehandedly destroyed an entire allied armored formation? How many tanks did the allies have in that battle, and what tactics did the Tiger commander use?

[Kagemusha]

By the way, has anyone besides me heard of a famous battle (near Caen I believe it was), where one Tiger is said to have singlehandedly destroyed an entire allied armored formation? How many tanks did the allies have in that battle, and what tactics did the Tiger commander use?

I think you are talking about the battle of Villers-Bocage. It was a battle between about 200 allied tanks and 25 German tanks. In the opening moves of the battle,Michael Wittman,the most known German panzer "ace" attacked with his single Tiger a British armoured column in Villers-Bocage.Here is a detailed information about what actually happened:

"Wittmann watched the column of the 4th County of London Yeomanry leave Villers-Bocage and advance on his tanks on Point 213, nose to tail through a sunken road. The lead squadron halted on the road without deploying into a defensive position, allowing the halftracks and carriers of the accompanying infantry to pass. In the face of unreconnoitered terrain, this was a colossal mistake.

Wittmann saw his opportunity and decided to attack with one tank between Point 213 and Villers-Bocage, cutting off "A" Squadron of the 4th CLY and ordered his accompanying two operational tanks to hold their position. Wittmann counted on the effect of surprise to inflict the greatest possible losses on the British while waiting for reinforcements. Describing his actions Wittmann later said, "I had not been able to gather my company. I had to act very quickly because I must suppose that the enemy has already located us and intends to destroy us at the starting position. I left with my tank. I ordered the two other tanks to move back at once but to hold the terrain."

At 0900 Wittmann's Tiger attacked. A few minutes later, in the direction of Caen, he destroyed three tanks; a Sherman Firefly and a Cromwell tank on the right and another tank on the left, proceeding to Villers without pause and attacking the lightly armoured vehicles of The Rifle Brigade. During this engagement, he destroyed nine half-track vehicles, four Carden Loyd Carriers, two other carriers, and two 6-pounder anti-tank guns, then destroyed three Stuart light tanks and one half-track vehicle. Entering Villers-Bocage alone, he destroyed three of the four Cromwells in position at the top of the Lemonnier farm.

He followed Clémenceau Street where his tank destroyed two Sherman command tanks of the 5th Royal Horse Artillery before knocking out another scout car and half-track. As Wittmann arrived at the Jeanne d'Arc square, he ended up opposite the Sherman Firefly of Sergeant Lockwood of "B" Squadron. The Firefly, whose 17-pounder was the only Allied main tank gun capable of defeating the frontal armour of a Tiger in most circumstances, fired four shells at Wittman. One hit the hull of the Tiger, which returned fire and knocked down a section of wall on the Sherman. Wittmann then made a half-turn, his tank lightly damaged, and returned down Clémenceau Street. A surviving Cromwell tank, commanded by Captain Dyas, opened fire with its 75mm gun hitting Wittmann's Tiger twice without effect. Returning fire, Wittmann's tank put the Cromwell out of action with one shot.

As Wittmann proceeded on the road leaving Villers-Bocage, his left track was hit by a 6-pdr shell, forcing him to stop on the street in front of the Huet-Godefroy store. Wittman engaged targets in range. Thinking that the Tiger might be salvaged and repaired later, Wittmann and crew abandoned the tank without destroying it, leaving the area on foot but without weapons.

They ended up joining the headquarters of the Panzer Lehr Division, nearly 7 kilometres away. Consequently, 15 Panzer IV's of IInd Battalion of the 130th regiment left Orbois in the direction of Villers-Bocage under the command of Captain Helmut Ritgen with the aim of blocking the exits to the North. Before reaching their objective, they came under the fire of British anti-tank guns and their advance was blocked. Fritz Bayerlein, commander of Panzer Lehr, ordered the Panzer IVs to fall back and regroup at Villers-Bocage. The tanks took the direction of the castle of Parfouru on Odon, where, after repairs were made to the 14 survivors, they attacked under the command of Hannes Philipsen; four tanks from the south and ten by Clémenceau Street. Each of the two groups lost two tanks.

Wittmann was then brought back in his Schwimmwagen to Point 213, where he joined with Karl Mobius, commander of the 1st Company and discussed the second attack that the 101st Abteilung was about to deliver. The tanks of the 1st Company entered the city along the d'Evrecy Road and joined those of Panzer Lehr at the marketplace in order to coordinate their offensive. The forces were distributed so as to occupy the city from the Pasteur Street towards the Jeanne d'Arc square, on Saint-Germain Street, on Emile Samson and towards the crossroads of Jeanne Bacon Street and Joffre Boulevard. However, British resistance was by now organised as the Germans had lost surprise. One 6-pounder anti-tank gun of the 1/7th Queen's, placed in Jeanne Bacon Street, managed to score hits on three Tigers of which only one could be repaired.

Here is the full article about the battle:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Villers-Bocage

[Rodion Romanovich]

Thanks! I think that's the one I meant :2thumbsup:

[King Kurt]

The action at Villiers Bocage illustrates nicely the strengths and weaknesses of the Tiger.
Only one tank available - as a result no doubt of maintainence problems,the underlying cost of the tank and its movement problems as Whittmann could not wait for the other 3 tanks to join him.
That one tank does wonders, knocking out loads of tanks and vehicles - a tribute to its gun and armour and no doubt a good dose of Tiger fear. Then a measley 6 pounder knocks a track off and they have to abandon the tank - showing the tactical weakness of the low numbers of Tigers and the difficulty of recovery.
The later attack with more Tigers is beaten off as the British have got their act together and a single 6 pounder effectively knocks out 3 Tigers.
A final point is that, although the attack with 15 Mk 4s did not have the success of the single Tiger, they were able to withdraw, carry out some swift field repairs and come back with virtually a full complement. One wonders if the forces had been a bit better coordinated what the results would have been - if the 4 Tigers had attacked with the 15 Mk 4s, would they have cleared the village completely?
So, overall, the action is a good illustration of the strengths and weaknesses of the Tiger. There appeared to be an arrogant belief that the Tiger was some form of super tank and that it "could do it all by itself" Ultimately it could not - the tank was excellent, but its underlying faults repeatedly caught it out. I wonder if it would have been more effective distributed throughout the Panser divisions as opposed to being deployed in stand alone battalions. I can see lots of reasons not to do this - maintence and supply problems for example - but for the defensive role the german army was in from 1943, do you really need an expensive heavyweight breakthrough style of unit?

[Harald Den BlåToth]

The only thing I must ask is ..."Have you had a close look at Tiger and Leopard II lately?...
Well, ...I shall be excused, the second..."Have you had a close look at Leopard II and Abrhams lately?"

That's all