Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert McNamara

[Zaknafien]

I'm considering ordering this documentary and wondering if anyone here's seen it. I've heard its very insightful to the Vietnam War. Here's a trailer if anyone hasn't heard of it.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8R1tYhNqt5E

[Kralizec]

This is the same guy who thought it was an excellent idea to bomb Cuba during the missile crisis, right?

[Gawain of Orkeny]

Wow I cant wait to see that. He was the Rumsfeld of my times and man did i hate him. It seems his concious has now gotten the better of him.
The line the whole thing was a complete mistake really makes me feel good that I served over there. War should not be entered easily. Ive said it a million times "if your not willing to fight with all your might then dont do it" We havent had that will since WW2. Again thats why I opposed the invasion of Iraq .

[Zaknafien]

it seems quite a turn around for him, indeed.. I wonder if one day we'll see a movie with cheney or rumsfeld making the same u-turn? mcnamara seems genuinely saddened by his hand in the vietnam war from the snippets of interview on the trailers.

here's a better trailer

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgA98V1Ubk8

[Pannonian]

Wow I cant wait to see that. He was the Rumsfeld of my times and man did i hate him. It seems his concious has now gotten the better of him.
The line the whole thing was a complete mistake really makes me feel good that I served over there. War should not be entered easily. Ive said it a million times "if your not willing to fight with all your might then dont do it" We havent had that will since WW2. Again thats why I opposed the invasion of Iraq .
That the Vietnam War was a mistake was reinforced by a conversation he had with a former Vietnamese (foreign?) minister some years later. The North Vietnamese were no more fond of Chinese (their historical enemies) and Soviets than the Americans were, and would gladly have joined the anti-Soviet bloc if asked or encouraged. But there was no dialogue, and hence no understanding. That's probably the most important lesson of the film.


Always keep talking, even to your deadliest enemy, even in the deadliest fight. Your POVs may not be as far apart as you originally thought they were.

Contrast with the absolutist "no talking with terrorists" stance.

[Grey_Fox]

I saw it and it's pretty damned good.

[Crazed Rabbit]

That the Vietnam War was a mistake was reinforced by a conversation he had with a former Vietnamese (foreign?) minister some years later. The North Vietnamese were no more fond of Chinese (their historical enemies) and Soviets than the Americans were, and would gladly have joined the anti-Soviet bloc if asked or encouraged. But there was no dialogue, and hence no understanding. That's probably the most important lesson of the film.


Always keep talking, even to your deadliest enemy, even in the deadliest fight. Your POVs may not be as far apart as you originally thought they were.

Contrast with the absolutist "no talking with terrorists" stance.

Do you have a link? I don't doubt you, that just sounds really interesting.

CR

[Pannonian]

Do you have a link? I don't doubt you, that just sounds really interesting.

CR
It's an anecdote in the film.

[Zaknafien]

McNamara on the Cuban Missle Crisis
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=So5yhfEm_dc

[Pannonian]

Do you have a link? I don't doubt you, that just sounds really interesting.

CR
Argument without end (http://www.amazon.com/Argument-Without-End-Answers-Vietnam/dp/1891620878)


Between 1995 and 1998, Robert S. McNamara led a series of blunt conversations between American and Vietnamese scholars and officials. "The discussions were frank and tough throughout, as befits the first-ever discussion by former enemies of this tragic war," writes McNamara, author of the controversial bestseller In Retrospect and the U.S. secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968. "Had this dialogue occurred in real time, rather than in retrospect, I believe the tragedy could have been prevented."

Erroneous mindsets, mutual ignorance and misunderstandings between Washington and Hanoi drove the escalation of of the Vietnam War, concludes former Secretary of Defense McNamara. Based on six sets of talks held in Hanoi between 1995 and 1998 that brought together U.S. and Vietnamese scholars, policy makers and former military officers. During the talks, McNamara writes, he was amazed to learn that Hanoi saw U.S. peace initiatives as part of a sinister plot to establish a permanent colonial regime in Saigon. Washington, misperceiving North Vietnam as a communist puppet bent on conquering all of Southeast Asia, let a mind-boggling number of opportunities slip by that might have averted war or brought a negotiated settlement. We learn that elements within Hanois top leadership wanted to accept a neutral Saigon coalition government; we are told that key escalation points (e.g., the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin attack) were not ordered by Hanoi to target Americans, as Washington assumed, but were decentralized decisions made for essentially local reasons.