View Full Version : The Error that is Man
Well, gentlemen and few ladies, the time has come for me to open a thread in the Backroom which is something I haven't done for many a moon. It regards man. Let us criticize man and for those who wish to oppose they may fend off the critique.
Man -- humankind -- is truly a primitive creature: it operates on emotion, passions, desires, irrationality, unconscious instincts, and more rubbish. It is a violent hostile species that is capable and willing to destroy. Shallow and simpleminded. It even does so for fun or entertainment. It usually has a lack of intellectual capabilities to ascend to higher states of being, to achieve peace and prevent conflict, to know truth, to achieve the richness of wisdom.
Oh please, damn: Man.... man (I type it with a small m instead of a capital M because it is unworthy of even that) is truly a primitive beast. Put a human next to a lion and I still see two animals.
Instead of utilizing his efforts, energy, to achieve intellectual superiority, truth, peace, objectivity, and so on, he uses them to destroy, for self-gain, to achieve or wield (destructive) power over others, consumerism and greed. To fuel his own negative traits and sustain them.
The average human mind is advanced compared to those of other animals, yet a primitive one as most still operate with certain aforementioned aspects. For instance, I recall one person -- a fellow student from my college -- with whom I debated about some topic. He actually gave me his opinion and his belief. Why would his subjective opinion and belief be of any interest? :inquisitive: There are many examples.
What a wretched filthy race it is. After so many ages where are we? Centuries have passed, yet the majority of man is still primitive in nature and it would seem it would remain so: war/conflict, emotion, hedonism, anti-intellectualism, etcetera. The existence of man must be an error. The existence of man must be a bad joke.... nay: existence of nature, physics, itself as we know it, and us part of it, must be an error.
I know my post is very light-hearted and not heavy at all: I have taken precautions to make it sound nice enough so it would not be difficult to read. I am even avoiding the use of sarcasm, as you can see in this current paragraph you're reading, heheheh :laugh4:
Now, let your misanthropy commence.
Craterus
11-25-2007, 22:23
Do you consider yourself one? Or are you enlightened?
considering our dominance as a species in this planet all I have to say is..
Whether you like it, or you don't like it, learn to love it, because it's the best thing going today. :laugh4:
I am God-like. Obviously not an error. :P
Papewaio
11-25-2007, 22:39
Centuries is a rather short time frame. :bow:
Warmaster Horus
11-25-2007, 23:02
In the words of Basil Fawlty: "We're stuck with it, I guess."
I don't think you can categorize the whole of man like that. We're all different, even though we've got the same instincts. I do admit lying, maybe once or twice cheating, but have otherwise tried to be exemplar. Of course, I'm only 16, so my view of the world is rather limited, but all the same...
I don't understand one thing, though:
For instance, I recall one person -- a fellow student from my college -- with whom I debated about some topic. He actually gave me his opinion and his belief. Why would his subjective opinion and belief be of any interest?
You were debating about something, and he told you what he thought of it. What's wrong in that? And how would the "debate" move on, without his input?
KukriKhan
11-25-2007, 23:57
The existence of man must be an error. The existence of man must be a bad joke.... nay: existence of nature, physics, itself as we know it, and us part of it, must be an error.
Perhaps. But by whom?
'Error' implies its opposite: correct. We've read your examples of human error; what would be human correctness (or correct function?)?
Justiciar
11-26-2007, 00:16
Rabid monsters, brutal parasites, thoughtless drones.. meh. It's a valid existence. Besides, as a species our flaws are more than made up for. I mean.. look at this.. I'm communicating with you, directly, from what may the other side of the world. Let's see a Dolphin do that!
Ayachuco
11-26-2007, 00:24
Hey! What about the Wo-Man in the world. I support the feminist movement b/c my Mom dominates me and my dad.
:focus:
Perhaps it is our primitiveness is what makes us so great. If you strip away our emotions, passions, and vices you are left with a robot. It may be perfect, yes, but it has nothing to strive for. It doesn't question or improve; it only performs its task and gets it done w/o thinking about the consequences or benefits of its actions.
My Mom is once again dominating me and telling me to get off the computer so I will add more once I get more time.
Papewaio
11-26-2007, 00:37
I'm communicating with you, directly, from what may the other side of the world. Let's see a Dolphin do that!
Would you
a) Have a swim, eat seafood and have copious quantities of sex.
OR
b) Communicate on the internet.
Louis VI the Fat
11-26-2007, 01:40
Most people are fine. Some are schoolboys with a near clinical narcistic superiority complex based on absolutely nothing whatsoever. One can only hope they seek help or grow out of it.
Strike For The South
11-26-2007, 01:48
Most people are fine. Some are schoolboys with a near clinical narcistic superiority complex based on absolutely nothing whatsoever. One can only hope they seek help or grow out of it.
https://img104.imageshack.us/img104/579/nburnointlgoz5.th.jpg (https://img104.imageshack.us/my.php?image=nburnointlgoz5.jpg)
Mongoose
11-26-2007, 04:08
Would you
a) Have a swim, eat seafood and have copious quantities of sex.
OR
b) Communicate on the internet.
Would you rather be on the internet or in a tuna net? The dolphin, delicious though it may be, has nothing on us.
As for the topic, we might be in immoral species, but on a whole we're better than most other forms of life on this planet. Obviously, nobody is perfect, but we're still better than anything else that we know of on this planet, so there's no need to single out humanity. I, for one, would like to see an essay on the evils and moral failings of bears for a change.
And if we've learned anything from George Orwell's Animal Farm, it's that if we give them the chance, animals like pigs and dogs will act just as badly as we do. And as if that wasn't bad enough, they're also communists!
Papewaio
11-26-2007, 04:15
Better not use Goldilocks as a character witness to humanity vs bears.
GeneralHankerchief
11-26-2007, 04:17
Why would his subjective opinion and belief be of any interest?
How is your subjective opinion and belief of any interest?
Eh, screw it...
Why do you hate freedom?
Big King Sanctaphrax
11-26-2007, 05:03
Most people are fine. Some are schoolboys with a near clinical narcistic superiority complex based on absolutely nothing whatsoever. One can only hope they seek help or grow out of it.
Critical hit!
It's super effective!
Sasaki Kojiro
11-26-2007, 05:46
Most people are fine. Some are schoolboys with a near clinical narcistic superiority complex based on absolutely nothing whatsoever. One can only hope they seek help or grow out of it.
:laugh4: :thumbsup: :laugh4:
The original post is 100% correct, however, the original post neglects to note the root cause of why this is so, why this always has been so, and why this always will be so.
That root cause is sin nature which has been passed down to every human being after the fall of the first human beings, Adam and Eve. Sin nature dictates that every human will have selfish, impure lust and desires and believe that his or her purpose of existing on Earth is to gratify them as much as possible, no matter how immoral the pursuit of those lusts and desires are.
Rodion Romanovich
11-26-2007, 10:09
The original post is quite good, but focuses too much on the weaknesses in human nature that are difficult or impossible to solve, and those aren't rational to focus on. Such weaknesses as those in human nature are not problems, if you are just clever enough to know about their existence and counter or circumvent them. Man is not suited to living in civilization, since her instincts are adapted to act rationally in the society form that existed before it. Unfortunately, most human beings expect rationality in themselves and fellow members of their species.
That is the one and only weakness in man that is rational to criticise: that she doesn't realize that all society forms she has had since the birth of civilization (the historical counterpart to Adam and Eve's eating of the apple) are not suited to her. That she keeps criticising the weakness of herself (or more often: of all other members of the species but not himself/herself), rather than the one true weakness she has. For truly it isn't rational to believe that she is a 100% rational being in any environment, or should aspire to reach this impossible or nearly impossible goal, while ignoring and forgetting the simplest of all ways to avoid defeat: to avoid battle. It is irrational to expect or hope for 100% rationality in human beings: mankind has no rationale for being 100% rational in any environment- it is enough to be as rational as possible in the environments she is adapted to live in. What strikes me as the deepest form of stupidity in this species is how it constantly out of pride ignores the simple fact that she isn't perfectly rational, and that she stubbornly keeps creating society forms for a type of being that does not exist. That she keeps putting her own society form above her species, and claims it is individuals who are faulty, when the society form that was intented to be created for mankind, turned out to not suit it well.
So why concentrate on criticising an animal for being an animal? Instead concentrate on criticising an animal for trying to be some endlessly rational, unrealistic being that it is not! And for time after time be surprised when a society created without any thought of compensating for or circumventing the weaknesses in human nature, causes trouble when you put real people in it.
Papewaio
11-26-2007, 11:26
If we 100% kept to one strategy we would be as predicatable as the TW AI and just as dead.
'Irrationality', emotions, fear, greed are all switches and motivating forces so that our genes may survive. Too passive or too sure about ourselves and the swimmers will never get to meet their other half.
Most people are fine. Some are schoolboys with a near clinical narcistic superiority complex based on absolutely nothing whatsoever. One can only hope they seek help or grow out of it.
Gee Louis you really do have to stop, soon your going to come off as a cynical old man.
Beautiful though, should be the description for the backroom. Minus the "schoolboys" and add in any objectionable adjective you like.
Yet another HOF worthy post. :thumbsup:
In the words of Basil Fawlty: "We're stuck with it, I guess."
I don't think you can categorize the whole of man like that. We're all different, even though we've got the same instincts. I do admit lying, maybe once or twice cheating, but have otherwise tried to be exemplar. Of course, I'm only 16, so my view of the world is rather limited, but all the same...
I don't understand one thing, though:
You were debating about something, and he told you what he thought of it. What's wrong in that? And how would the "debate" move on, without his input?
You have given the answer yourself more or less: the same instincts. Only different when we regard the little details and physical differences and so on, but these details are not so important. It is the big picture we focus on, and this big picture shows us that many are alike which is sufficient information. Only if really necessary the subtle differences are to be checked.
What is wrong with that person in question is the fact he contributed his opinion and beliefs which are "subjective" in nature. How will you determine what is true or false with opinions and beliefs? You won't. Consistent logic will.
---
Perhaps. But by whom?
'Error' implies its opposite: correct. We've read your examples of human error; what would be human correctness (or correct function?)?
The control of primitive natural aspects (emotion, passion, selfish desires, conflict (inner and outer)), the ascension to high intellect, truth, wisdom, peace, logic, spirituality, morality, science.
---
Perhaps it is our primitiveness is what makes us so great. If you strip away our emotions, passions, and vices you are left with a robot. It may be perfect, yes, but it has nothing to strive for. It doesn't question or improve; it only performs its task and gets it done w/o thinking about the consequences or benefits of its actions.
You are saying it is my position that a "robot" -- here defined by YOU -- would be perfect?
---
How is your subjective opinion and belief of any interest?
Eh, screw it...
Why do you hate freedom?
You are saying I gave my subjective opinion and belief in the original post? Can you prove I have done so? When reading that post one should detect facts and some words some would consider pessimistic, but not opinion nor belief.
You are telling me -- and it is disguised as a question -- my position or part of my position is that I hate freedom? First define what freedom is. Then can you prove I hate it?
---
The whole point is that even with intellect that is superior to other animals we know of this Earth, generally man is still a primitive beast after all these many many ages. Technology is one thing, but the human itself is another. Our technology level is being increased, but we leave our basic human primitivity to exist. We know -- and many probably do not or don't even THINK -- of this wretched (human) nature, so let us do effort to learn the truth and eliminate these wretched human aspects. The basic intellect is there, now... use it to ascend already.
If one does not, one is primitive ~:rolleyes:
Innocentius
11-26-2007, 15:47
I basically agree with the original post, but then again it's all pointless and there's nothing worth anything, so it doesn't really matter.
You are saying I gave my subjective opinion and belief in the original post? Can you prove I have done so?
Can you prove you haven't done so?
I'd say most people here enter their own opinion, those who don't should prove that they don't. But then it's hard to find out what's really going on in your head either way.
When reading that post one should detect facts and some words some would consider pessimistic, but not opinion nor belief.
That's the problem, your opinion, and yes I call it that, seems to stem from some bad experience or whatever and my experience differs, thus I don't think you provided any universal facts. They may or may not apply to certain people but they're definitely not universal.
The whole point is that even with intellect that is superior to other animals we know of this Earth, generally man is still a primitive beast after all these many many ages.
Believe it or not but some or many of those beasts seem to be happier than higher beings like you. There's nothing wrong with being primitive or stupid as long as it makes you happy. Also if we're actually that primitive than maybe we're too primitive to become better. We're there to be and stay primitive, it's our destiny and you're just some weird artifact, trying to revolt but ultimately destined to fail and be unhappy. ~;)
We know -- and many probably do not or don't even THINK -- of this wretched (human) nature, so let us do effort to learn the truth and eliminate these wretched human aspects. The basic intellect is there, now... use it to ascend already.
If one does not, one is primitive ~:rolleyes:
We should introduce a happy monkey day to celebrate our stupid feelings, emotuions and all the other stuff that makes us happy, primitive monkeys. :2thumbsup:
We should introduce a happy monkey day to celebrate our stupid feelings, emotuions and all the other stuff that makes us happy, primitive monkeys. :2thumbsup:
Are you mocking my avatar again?
:brood:
Vladimir
11-26-2007, 17:11
It's beyond me how anyone can call man primitive. Is there another species to compare us to? Preferably one that isn't tasty, low in fat, and high in protein.
The existence of man must be an error. The existence of man must be a bad joke.... nay: existence of nature, physics, itself as we know it, and us part of it, must be an error.
There is some sort of irony in such statements. :thinking:
If it's an error something must have made it otherwise it's just a series of unfortunate events, I never took you for the religious type Bijo ~;)
Rodion Romanovich
11-26-2007, 19:57
If we 100% kept to one strategy we would be as predicatable as the TW AI and just as dead.
'Irrationality', emotions, fear, greed are all switches and motivating forces so that our genes may survive. Too passive or too sure about ourselves and the swimmers will never get to meet their other half.
Was this post in response to mine? Then, let me rephrase my statement and ask, is it a good strategy for an animal to create an environment for herself, to which she cannot adapt? That is the thing that mankind is doing, that no other animal is stupid enough to do. And in the process, she calls herself rational. And she thinks she's having control over her creation, even though she does not. Adaption is a given part of the (subconscious or not) strategy of any animal. But changing the environment to undo all adaption capability, is not so common. In fact, mankind is evolution's first try at an animal that can dramatically change its environment. We shouldn't expect ourselves to be very good at it when we do it in the semi-random, crazy way we're doing it now.
is it a good strategy for an animal to create an environment for herself, to which she cannot adapt?
But we can and we do, we are just too good at it. I mean humans have been alive on places where they could never have been, the moon, the bottom of the ocean, the netherlands is manmade land that lies below sea, and humans will one day colonise other planets, we can control them because we understand how our bodies work, no other animal can so we can create the enviroment or at least know what it should be in the future. We don't need to adapt.
Rodion Romanovich
11-26-2007, 20:08
I disagree - adaption is a necessary and good thing. In fact, it seems mankind is doing it's best in societies where survival is barely granted - on some piece of floating ice near the North pole or in some isolated rain forest with poisonous snakes and frogs.
But we are really bad at adapting to having a too easy time surviving - then competition, bloodshed, war, genocide, rape, slavery, repression and fundamentalism arises. The only changes we've seen since the dark ages is different labels for the same concepts, and slightly more complex methods for in the short term demming it up (to create larger avalanches of evilness and atrocities once the dams break). And in the process, we create our own unnatural selection which in each generation selects two types of people: the most evil, and the most obedient, doglike droners who can't question madness when they see it from a feet's distance. The two types of people, that are least capable of changing the civilization development so that it stops continuously favoring evilness and lack of critical perspective.
Ironside
11-26-2007, 20:11
So Bijo, how's your plan going to join the enlightment, like the rest of us? Following the contradictions of the original statement, I would say that it doesn't like it, but I'm not the man that judge people on insufficient data.
In fact, it seems mankind is doing it's best in societies where survival is barely granted - on some piece of floating ice near the North pole or in some isolated rain forest with poisonous snakes and frogs.
But we are really bad at adapting to having a too easy time surviving - then competition, bloodshed, war, genocide, rape, slavery, repression and fundamentalism arises.
While a few these requires a larger society to "function", most if them stem from having too much compition from limited resources.
But we are really bad at adapting to having a too easy time surviving - then competition, bloodshed, war, genocide, rape, slavery, repression and fundamentalism arises.
All make of these make sense from an evolutionary point of view, we are herd-animals, it's nature not human nature. How we deal with eachother is directly linked with the recources at hand.
Rodion Romanovich
11-26-2007, 20:24
That's the point of course! We're adapted to starting to fight when resource shortage occurs, since that is the best thing to do once the competition situation has arisen. The problem is how we keep creating resource shortage situations over and over again - and thus conflict reasons - by the way our society systems work.
In nature, there are more clever ways of ensuring resource shortages don't occur or come so suddenly. Or that conflicts between millions of people are built up over decades, centuries or even millennia. We are extremely bad at planning ahead, probably because our instincts are adapted for the type of planning ahead that is needed in pre-civlization society, and rational reasoning abilities aren't very good for planning in complex, large systems over a longer scope of time. Do you agree with me about the following core premise in my reasoning:
- human rational thought abilities are excellent and accurate when it comes to dealing with small, isolated models with very few factors to take into account
- a neural network gone through evolutionary improvement over millions of years to work well in a particular, nearly static (but not entirely static) environment E is better suited for long-term planning in an environment that isn't too much different from E, than a rational reasoning capability (that is unable to take more than 10 factors at most into account at the same time) can ever be.
If you agree with this statement, it's hopefully clear to you how the rest of my statements follow from it.
First you have to understand why conflicts arise, recources isn't everything, equal distribution, there is the stag hunt problem and the prisoners dillema, what you want would include a world governement controllign every aspect, not going to happen, and I prefer it like that I think.
Conradus
11-26-2007, 20:52
What is wrong with that person in question is the fact he contributed his opinion and beliefs which are "subjective" in nature. How will you determine what is true or false with opinions and beliefs? You won't. Consistent logic will.
How can you debate if you aren't allowed to use opinions and beliefs? You can't/shouldn't debate on facts.
Kagemusha
11-26-2007, 20:57
Bijo, do you consider yourself a man/ human?
Rodion Romanovich
11-26-2007, 21:05
First you have to understand why conflicts arise, recources isn't everything, equal distribution, there is the stag hunt problem and the prisoners dillema, what you want would include a world governement controllign every aspect, not going to happen, and I prefer it like that I think.
No, it wouldn't require a world government. It would require, among other things, that people stop trying to establish world governments and empires. And that people would actually use some of the knowledge mankind has discovered (including the stuff you mentioned in your post)... A simple ethics system, developed with among other things the following requirements:
1. unlike most religious ethics, shouldn't rely on, as a basic assumption, that every single human being will follow it
2. that it is sufficient that a certain percentage follows it. This percentage has to be as low as possible so that it's realistic to assume that a large enough percentage follows it
3. that going from not following it to following it will bring an advantage in most cases, assuming the previous condition holds.
If we stop making religious ethics sytems based on the inverse of no. 1, we'll have good chance of succeeding.
No, it wouldn't require a world government. It would require, among other things, that people stop trying to establish world governments and empires. And that people would actually use some of the knowledge mankind has discovered (including the stuff you mentioned in your post)...
That would be anarchy, but anarchy on a place where recources aren't equilly distributed because some parts of the world have more natural resources, what do you think will happen? Can't erase our instincs, even in te best system people will go for two days at the expense of somebody else's tomorow. Look at the bright side, we have come a long way. The world has never been such a gentle place as it is now.
Bijo, do you consider yourself a man/ human?
He might be an octosquid agent! :fainting:
I don't think derailing threads is an emotion so I should not make myself look any more stupid by this. :clown:
Papewaio
11-26-2007, 23:29
Was this post in response to mine? Then, let me rephrase my statement and ask, is it a good strategy for an animal to create an environment for herself, to which she cannot adapt? That is the thing that mankind is doing, that no other animal is stupid enough to do. And in the process, she calls herself rational. And she thinks she's having control over her creation, even though she does not. Adaption is a given part of the (subconscious or not) strategy of any animal. But changing the environment to undo all adaption capability, is not so common. In fact, mankind is evolution's first try at an animal that can dramatically change its environment. We shouldn't expect ourselves to be very good at it when we do it in the semi-random, crazy way we're doing it now.
Not true. We aren't the only organism to change the environment so much that we die off. Nor would I say we call ourselves rational, we might say that we have access to a rational tool... but most of us don't use reasoning on everything we do in either the short or long term. Intuition is an interesting thing in of itself... to have such understanding of a situation that we can come to the correct conclusion without conscious effort.
Pop Quiz. Why does wine have to be fortified to become Port?
AntiochusIII
11-26-2007, 23:39
*cough* Undergraduate Philosophy Student *cough*
Also, *ahem* pseudo-evolutionary science *ahem*
He might be an octosquid agent! :fainting:
STOP GIVING OPINIONS! ~:argue:
:clown:
Rodion Romanovich
11-27-2007, 16:17
That would be anarchy, but anarchy on a place where recources aren't equilly distributed because some parts of the world have more natural resources, what do you think will happen? Can't erase our instincs, even in te best system people will go for two days at the expense of somebody else's tomorow. Look at the bright side, we have come a long way. The world has never been such a gentle place as it is now.
No, not anarchy. Today's society system is one example of how you can build an ethical system. Laws and morals are ways of identifying, at an as early stage as possible, someone who is enough danger to order and the common good, that it is best to take joint action against this person, by a legal sentence. Everything ranging from anarchy to totalitarianism fits into the definition of "ethical system". It's the additional requirements that are important for narrowing down the definition. In reality, if we consciously try to make the best thing possible, we will most likely end up with something similar to today's society, but applying its nicest tricks more consistently, and on the top of that trying to simulate, stimuli-wise, something more similar to pre-civilization society. Although similar in many ways on the surface, it would be dramatically different in all fields that matter.
The list in my post above is not the entire list of requirements necessary for a good ethics system. There are more things. In general, we must simply try to, in as many situations as possible that are similar to the "prisoner's dilemma", as hard as possible prevent people from pushing things towards the witness/witness situation. Three additional good basic principles (again: an incomplete list) should be followed are:
- never let injustice, suffering or other causes of disproportionate revenge-actions, or conflict scenarios, accumulate/grow over time
- if someone in a prisoner's dilemma-like situation where witness/witness is unacceptable chooses "witness" (this is quite similar to the definition of crime btw), especially if he is the first one to choose this option, then that person must be dealt with by joint actions, for example police or law. In cases where witness/witness is acceptable, encourage all to choose witness.
- gaining of sufficient power to protect oneself from joint actions in response to ones crimes, should be considered a crime in itself
- there must be standardized ways of dealing with retaliation/revenge
- there must be compensation for the lack of clarity of our senses, such as when we misunderstand an accident as an offense, etc. Similarly, we can however not tolerate that someone who is constantly clumsy - perhaps out of arrogance and nonchalance, constantly causes damage by accident just because he doesn't really care about not doing so. Someone causing damage by accident must also pay some price for it, for example giving him the duty to repair the damages, but without any additional punishment or judgement, as with an unprovoked attack.
- the importance of consistently showing less acceptance for those who start the fight than for those who respond in it, is necessary to avoid accumulation of injustice. It is often those who consistently get no support when unrighteously, unprovokedly attacked, who go mad and respond with disproportionate revenge. Still, a lot of blame must be given to those who start it, since it is much easier for them to avoid doing their unprovoked attack, than it is for a repressed person to remain calm. The bully who works on reverse psychology to break down his victim for years when grownups look away, is a greater threat than the bully victim who happens to hit the bully back when the grownups look. Merely judging actions is one of the great curses of the moral systems created by human beings since the advent of civilization.
Rodion Romanovich
11-27-2007, 16:22
Not true. We aren't the only organism to change the environment so much that we die off.
Argh! I meant "to by conscious reasoning dramatically change".
Good that you brought up intuition - it doesn't naturally belong to either reasoning and instincts but probably lies in between. The problem is that no matter how good it is (too little philosophy and research has been done on its limits and guarantees, by the way), it's not accepted as a legitimate basis for any imortant decisions in modern society. Which is probably why it is often forgotten and was forgotten in my own post. ~:shrug:
Big fan of this guy; Hans J. Morgenthau. Power has been replaced by 'security' but I think all remains true. If you find this a bit cynical, all is true for economics.
SIX PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REALISM
1.Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure.
Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.
Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect. The fact that a theory of politics, if there be such a theory, has never been heard of before tends to create a presumption against, rather than in favor of, its soundness. Conversely, the fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or even thousands of years ag~as was the theory of the balance of power-does not create a presumption that it must be outmoded and obsolete. A theory of politics must be subjected to the dual test of reason and experience. To dismiss such a theory because it had its flowering in centuries past is to present not a rational argument but a modernistic prejudice that takes for granted the superiority of the present over the past. To dispose of the revival of such a theory as a "fashion" or "fad" is tantamount to assuming that in matters political we can have opinions but no truths.
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been.
Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy. In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics.
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere.
We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman--past, present, or future--has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.
The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.
To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?
Yet even if we had access to the real motives of statesmen, that knowledge would help us little in understanding foreign policies, and might well lead us astray. It is true that the knowledge of the statesman's motives may give us one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy might be. It cannot give us, however, the one clue by which to predict his foreign policies. History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms.
We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their success. If we want to know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not his motives. How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired?
Neville Chamberlain's politics of appeasement were, as far as we can judge, inspired by good motives; he was probably less motivated by considerations of personal power than were many other British prime ministers, and he sought to preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all concerned. Yet his policies helped to make the Second World War inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions of men. Sir Winston Churchill's motives, on the other hand, were much less universal in scope and much more narrowly directed toward personal and national power, yet the foreign policies that sprang from these inferior motives were certainly superior in moral and political quality to those pursued by his predecessor. Judged by his motives, Robespierre was one of the most virtuous men who ever lived. Yet it was the utopian radicalism of that very virtue that made him kill those less virtuous than himself, brought him to the scaffold, and destroyed the revolution of which he was a leader.
Good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies; they do not guarantee the moral goodness and political success of the policies they inspire. What is important to know, if one wants to understand foreign policy, is not primarily the motives of a statesman, but his intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as his political ability to translate what he has comprehended into successful political action. It follows that while ethics in the abstract judges the moral qualities of motives, political theory must judge the political qualities of intellect, will, and action.
A realist theory of international politics will also avoid the other popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter. Statesmen, especially under contemporary conditions, may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for them. Yet they will distinguish with Lincoln between their "official duty," which is to think and act in terms of the national interest, and their "personal wish," which is to see their own moral values and political principles realized throughout the world. Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.
It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience.
Deviations from rationality which are not the result of the personal whim or the personal psychopathology of the policy maker may appear contingent only from the vantage point of rationality, but may themselves be elements in a coherent system of irrationality. The conduct of the Indochina War by the United States suggests that possibility. It is a question worth looking into whether modern psychology and psychiatry have provided us with the conceptual tools which would enable us to construct, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics, a kind of pathology of international politics.
The experience of the Indochina War suggests five factors such a theory might encompass: the imposition upon the empirical world of a simplistic and a priori picture of the world derived from folklore and ideological assumption, that is, the replacement of experience with superstition; the refusal to correct this picture of the world in the light of experience; the persistence in a foreign policy derived from the misperception of reality and the use of intelligence for the purpose not of adapting policy to reality but of reinterpreting reality to fit policy; the egotism of the policy makers widening the gap between perception and policy, on the one hand, and reality, on the other; finally, the urge to close the gap at least subjectively by action, any kind of action, that creates the illusion of mastery over a recalcitrant reality. According to the Wall Street Journal of April 3, 1970, "the desire to 'do something' pervades top levels of Government and may overpower other 'common sense' advice that insists the U.S. ability to shape events is negligible. The yen for action could lead to bold policy as therapy."
The difference between international politics as it actually is and a rational theory derived from it is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye; the painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it shows, or at least seeks to show, one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed.
Political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element. It knows that political reality is replete with contingencies and systemic irrationalities and points to the typical influences they exert upon foreign policy. Yet it shares with all social theory the need, for the sake of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational elements of political reality; for it is these rational elements that make reality intelligible for theory. Political realism presents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy which experience can never completely achieve.
At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success. Political realism wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait. Aware of the inevitable gap between good—that is, rational—foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.
Hence, it is no argument against the theory here presented that actual foreign policy does not or cannot live up to it. That argument misunderstands the intention of this book, which is to present not an indiscriminate description of political reality, but a rational theory of international politics. Far from being invalidated by the fact that, for instance, a perfect balance of power policy will scarcely be found in reality, it assumes that reality, being deficient in this respect, must be understood and evaluated as an approximation to an ideal system of balance of power.
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of all clashing interests." It was erected into a general principle of government by George Washington:
A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make it otherwise. No institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.
It was echoed and enlarged upon in our century by Max Weber's observation:
Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the "images of the world" created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.
Yet the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.
The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement.
Political realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions under which foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and the ever present threat of large-scale violence, cannot be changed. The balance of power, for instance, is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies, as the authors of The Federalist papers well knew; yet it is capable of operating, as it does in the United States, under the conditions of relative stability and peaceful conflict. If the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be duplicated on the international scene, similar conditions of stability and peace will then prevail there, as they have over long stretches of history among certain nations.
What is true of the general character of international relations is also true of the nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy. While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world.
The realist parts company with other schools of thought before the all-important question of how the contemporary world is to be transformed. The realist is persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we can bring about that transformation by confronting a political reality that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account.
4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it actually is.
Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself: "Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even if the world perish)," but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence-the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions-to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences. Classical and medieval philosophy knew this, and so did Lincoln when he said:
I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also.
The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations-in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself.
On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment.
6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound. However much the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.
Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles. The economist asks: "How does this policy affect the wealth of society, or a segment of it?" The lawyer asks: "Is this policy in accord with the rules of law?" The moralist asks: "Is this policy in accord with moral principles?" And the political realist asks: "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?" (Or of the federal government, of Congress, of the party, of agriculture, as the case may be.)
The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political ones. As political realist, he cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of politics. And he parts company with other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere. It is here that political realism takes issue with the "legalistic-moralistic approach" to international politics. That this issue is not, as has been contended, a mere figment of the imagination, but goes to the very core of the controversy, can be shown from many historical examples. Three will suffice to make the point.3
In 1939 the Soviet Union attacked Finland. This action confronted France and Great Britain with two issues, one legal, the other political. Did that action violate the Covenant of the League of Nations and, if it did, what countermeasures should France and Great Britain take? The legal question could easily be answered in the affirmative, for obviously the Soviet Union had done what was prohibited by the Covenant. The answer to the political question depends, first, upon the manner in which the Russian action affected the interests of France and Great Britain; second, upon the existing distribution of power between France and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and other potentially hostile nations, especially Germany, on the other; and, third, upon the influence that the countermeasures were likely to have upon the interests of France and Great Britain and the future distribution of power. France and Great Britain, as the leading members of the League of Nations, saw to it that the Soviet Union was expelled from the League, and they were prevented from joining Finland in the war against the Soviet Union only by Sweden's refusal to allow their troops to pass through Swedish territory on their way to Finland. If this refusal by Sweden had not saved them, France and Great Britain would shortly have found themselves at war with the Soviet Union and Germany at the same time.
The policy of France and Great Britain was a classic example of legalism in that they allowed the answer to the legal question, legitimate within its sphere, to determine their political actions. Instead of asking both questions, that of law and that of power, they asked only the question of law; and the answer they received could have no bearing on the issue that their very existence might have depended upon.
The second example illustrates the "moralistic approach" to international politics. It concerns the international status of the Communist government of China. The rise of that government confronted the Western world with two issues, one moral, the other political. Were the nature and policies of that government in accord with the moral principles of the Western world? Should the Western world deal with such a government? The answer to the first question could not fail to be in the negative. Yet it did not follow with necessity that the answer to the second question should also be in the negative. The standard of thought applied to the first--the moral question—was simply to test the nature and the policies of the Communist government of China by the principles of Western morality. On the other hand, the second—the political question—had to be subjected to the complicated test of the interests involved and the power available on either side, and of the bearing of one or the other course of action upon these interests and power. The application of this test could well have led to the conclusion that it would be wiser not to deal with the Communist government of China. To arrive at this conclusion by neglecting this test altogether and answering the political question in terms of the moral issue was indeed a classic example of the "moralistic approach" to international politics.
The third case illustrates strikingly the contrast between realism and the legalistic-moralistic approach to foreign policy. Great Britain, as one of the guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium, went to war with Germany in August 1914 because Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium. The British action could be justified either in realistic or legalistic-moralistic terms. That is to say, one could argue realistically that for centuries it had -been axiomatic for British foreign policy to prevent the control of the Low Countries by a hostile power. It was then not so much the violation of Belgium's neutrality per se as the hostile intentions of the violator which provided the rationale for British intervention. If the violator had been another nation but Germany, Great Britain might well have refrained from intervening. This is the position taken by Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary during that period. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hardinge remarked to him in 1908: "If France violated Belgian neutrality in a war against Germany, it is doubtful whether England or Russia would move a finger to maintain Belgian neutrality, while if the neutrality of Belgium was violated by Germany, it is probable that the converse would be the case." Whereupon Sir Edward Grey replied: "This is to the point." Yet one could also take the legalistic and moralistic position that the violation of Belgium's neutrality per se, because of its legal and moral defects and regardless of the interests at stake and of the identity of the violator, justified British and, for that matter, American intervention. This was the position which Theodore Roosevelt took in his letter to Sir Edward Grey of January 22, 1915:
To me the crux of the situation has been Belgium. If England or France had acted toward Belgium as Germany has acted I should have opposed them, exactly as I now oppose Germany. I have emphatically approved your action as a model for what should be done by those who believe that treaties should be observed in good faith and that there is such a thing as international morality. I take this position as an American who is no more an Englishman than he is a German, who endeavors loyally to serve the interests of his own country, but who also endeavors to do what he can for justice and decency as regards mankind at large, and who therefore feels obliged to judge all other nations by their conduct on any given occasion.
This realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its subversion by other modes of thought does not imply disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought. It rather implies that each should be assigned its proper sphere and function. Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite of "economic man," "political man," "moral man," "religious man," etc. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but "moral man" would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence. A man who was nothing but "religious man" would be a saint, for he would be completely lacking in worldly desires.
Recognizing that these different facets of human nature exist, political realism also recognizes that in order to understand one of them one has to deal with it on its own terms. That is to say, if I want to understand "religious man," I must for the time being abstract from the other aspects of human nature and deal with its religious aspect as if it were the only one. Furthermore, I must apply to the religious sphere the standards of thought appropriate to it, always remaining aware of the existence of other standards and their actual influence upon the religious qualities of man. What is true of this facet of human nature is true of all the others. No modern economist, for instance, would conceive of his science and its relations to other sciences of man in any other way. It is exactly through such a process of emancipation from other standards of thought, and the development of one appropriate to its subject matter, that economics has developed as an autonomous theory of the economic activities of man. To contribute to a similar development in the field of politics is indeed the purpose of political realism.
It is in the nature of things that a theory of politics which is based upon such principles will not meet with unanimous approval-nor does, for that matter, such a foreign policy. For theory and policy alike run counter to two trends in our culture which are not able to reconcile themselves to the assumptions and results of a rational, objective theory of politics. One of these trends disparages the role of power in society on grounds that stem from the experience and philosophy of the nineteenth century; we shall address ourselves to this tendency later in greater detail.4 The other trend, opposed to the realist theory and practice of politics, stems from the very relationship that exists, and must exist, between the human mind and the political sphere. For reasons that we shall discuss later5 the human mind in its day-by-day operations cannot bear to look the truth of politics straight in the face. It must disguise, distort, belittle, and embellish the truth-the more so, the more the individual is actively involved in the processes of politics, and particularly in those of international politics. For only by deceiving himself about the nature of politics and the role he plays on the political scene is man able to live contentedly as a political animal with himself and his fellow men.
Thus it is inevitable that a theory which tries to understand international politics as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature, rather than as people would like to see it, must overcome a psychological resistance that most other branches of learning need not face. A book devoted to the theoretical understanding of international politics therefore requires a special explanation and justification.
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