Going against my History Professor

[anubis88]

Hi... I've just bought a new book published by my Greek History teacher about the Roman Republic. Since I'm much in to hellenistic kingdoms myself i found some of his statements wrong.

The one that bugs me the most is the way he describes the battle of Magnesia. He's book (which is considered practically to be law in my country:clown: ) states that the battle was between 30.000 Roman troops + a few allies against an at least 70.000 man strong seleucid force. He also mentions that the seleucids outnumbered the romans at least 2:1, and that the Seleucids lost at least 50.000 men, a disaster which he compares to the Roman defeat a Cannae.

I know much(relatively speeking) about the Seleucid, and from what i've read, the Romans fielded around 50.000 men (if one counts the pergamese and other allies).

So my plan is to confront my professor with this facts. What i need is a few historyans, which would give me something to back my claims up, so that I may confront my professor without any fears of failing at my study( sometimes they fail you just out of spite:furious3: )

I've already read the accounts of Appian, and the WIKI~:joker:

So any help would be apreciated.

And also correct me if I'm wrong:beam: :duel:

THANKS!!!!

[cmacq]

Please, don't bother. This is very common, most are LIFERs at best. Lazy Inconsiderate Fu**ers Expecting Retirement. They can't really help you, just hurt you.

But, simply the Roman defeat a Cannae was not a mortal wound, yet the Seleucid loss at Magnesia was indeed over time very fatal. I can't actually see how one could compare Cannae with Magnesia? Other than the fact Hannibal was close at hand? Maybe he just needed a few more words to finish the book? Its also very possible his comments about Magnesia were ripped off of a former student paper?

[Kham]

I wouldn't do it.

Being a history professor who has written a book about the stuff, he is aware of differing theories about army strengths and casulty numbers in such a battle. And has given some thoughts about which ones to take. There also might be different "schools of thought" about how to make proper estimates, which kind of sources to trust (more) and so on. These choices determine the estimates.

Being renowned in your country he must have been around for some time. This also means that he has chosen a side in these debates. And has had quite a lot discussions about it. Probably enough to be annoyed by them now.

A student who challenges him should be aware about why he has choosen these estimates and why he thinks he can proof them (and the underlying "school" choices) wrong. If you are very well prepared and he is in a good mood, you might earn some reputation with him.

But the danger of appearing as an insolent sod who is daring to bother him AGAIN with this age-old question, without even knowing what he is talking about ,is quite high.

It might even be worse if he is not that renowned. From my experience (though from a differnt discipline), the mediocre to bad profs are VERY easily offended if they are criticized. Especially from a student.

[Danest]

I think you need to know why he believes in these particular troop number estimates, and, why the other side (you) believes in their estimates. It's probably better to confront premises and evidence, than to just confront a conclusion (not saying this is what you're doing, just rambling). But it won't matter if he's not interested in having his work contested by a student anyway (it's why I love philosophy... my professors _required_ that you try to put down their work, and loved it if you did a good job of it). And yeah, this professor is probably well aware of the argument and estimates you're bringing to him, and the evidence supporting them... so you probably won't be saying anything he hasn't already considered and disregarded, for whatever reason.

[anubis88]

Yeah i know... I can't just play a smartass... It wouldn't be good. But perhaps an interesting conversation might emerge from this. He may even have some resources who he would willing to share... We could become friends:laugh4:

On the other hand he may just dismiss me as a nuisance:dizzy2:

God how I hate myself... Why do i always find something to challange my history teachers?

Any ideas how to talk about this in the most polite and secure manner?:idea2:

[bovi]

"I noticed you mentioned a force of only 30000 Romans plus allies in the battle of Magnesia. I've heard greater numbers elsewhere and understand there naturally is some uncertainty about them. Could you point me to the sources that you used, and why you have trusted these before others?"

That's more or less the way I would go about starting a discussion without making him feel attacked. You might get a "I don't have time for this", and then you should probably drop the issue for your own sake. If he chooses to respond with information, let him present his views and show interest. He'll probably be more inclined to have a constructive discussion when you mention the other sources then, rather than if you come up with an equivalent to "Hey I saw some other research saying you're wrong", which your post here basically says.

You should be particularly careful about labeling your own numbers as facts. The soldiers didn't line up to be counted by the historian before the battle, and the historian would also likely pad the numbers. Be prepared to defend why you think these other numbers are more precise, again something you don't do here except by saying you know it, another inflammable word.

[Frostwulf]

Magnesia-Ad-Sipylum(190,December)
War against Antiochus
John Drogo Montagu-"Battles of the Greek & Roman Worlds"

"Having robbed Antiochus of any control at sea, the Romans were bent on completing the destruction with a victory on land. Although the king had a large force of 60,000 foot and 12,000 horse he was apprehensive. He withdrew across the river Phrygius [Kum Cay] and established a strongly fortified encampment near Magnesia-ad-Sipylum[Manisa]. The consular army, with a total strength of about 30,000 advanced across the river and encamped about 2 to 3 miles away from the enemy. After several days of inaction in which the king refused to accept any challenge, the consul moved his camp nearer to the enemy and lined up for battle with his left wing against the river. The king accepted the challenge for fear of shame. The action started on the Roman right wing which was opposed by a mixed mass of light cavalry, preceded by scythed chariots and camels. Eumenes II, on the Roman right, took the initiative by sending his slingers and archers against the chariots, creating panic in the horses and disrupting the enemy wing. a charge by his cavalry followed and extended the disorder, which spread to include the whole of the flank. The Roman legions seized the opportunity to make a direct frontal attack on the enemy phalanx, which was in the centre of their line with elephants posted between the sections. In the meantime, Antiochus, who was in command of a large body of elite cavalry on the right wing, had noted that the enemy had thought it unnecessary to post any cavalry on their left, which was covered by the river. He executed the manoeuvre on which he had staked his chances by charging the infantry and outflanking them along the riverside and then driving them back to their camp. In this extended pursuit he threw away any chance of victory by failing to support his phalanx in its hour of need. It was driven back behind the rampart. Attalus who was with his brother Eumenes on the Roman right, saw the situation on the opposite flank along the river. Being at that time unengaged, he charged across the field to the assistance of the camp guard and forced Antiochus back. The king, seeing that his whole army was giving way, fled. His reputed losses were 50,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry against a loss on the Roman side of 350 men. After this total disaster Antiochus sent envoys to sue for peace."
Livy 37: 37(6)-44(2); Appian, Syrian Wars, 30-36
-pg. 131-132

[Intranetusa]

My history teacher is just like that - except he goes by the popular conception that the Gauls/Germans/etc were all naked uncivilized barbarians...which is far worse


He literally stated that barbarians were all smelly, diseased ridden savages who never bathed (even though they had soap - whereas Romans aristocrats used olive oil >.>)

[Watchman]

He literally stated that barbarians were all smelly, diseased ridden savages who never bathedThat is, sadly, a rather accurate description of later Medieval Europeans... :sweatdrop:

[Centurion Crastinus]

I would just suck it up and hold your tongue. No use pissing off the man and making enemies with him. But, if you have an "A" in the class, what is the worst he can do. If you do confront him, be sure to be tactful and respectful.

[abou]

Anubis, ask your professor if he has read The Roman War of Antiochos the Great by Grainger. It is relatively new so it is distinctly possible that he hasn't, but Grainger's work certainly helps answer some questions and is well grounded.

[Sarkiss]

Magnesia-Ad-Sipylum(190,December)
War against Antiochus
John Drogo Montagu-"Battles of the Greek & Roman Worlds"
-pg. 131-132
Livy you say? him, Appian, Plutarch... Roman propagandists.
i am not going to argue about what happened at Magnesia, but from a little research i have done on Roman - Armenian war it is amazing how different the numbers given by above mentioned big mouth "historians" and other sources can turn out to be.
a good example is battle of Tigranokert. both Plutatch and Appian give Armenian side a number of over quarter of a million:
Appian - 250000 foot and 50000 horse.
Plutarch - 55000 horse, 20000 slingers and archers, 150000 heavy infantry, etc, etc.
whilst there is one refference that has always been overlooked:
Phlegon of Tralles:
"At that time [ie. the 177th Olympiad, 72-69 BC] Lucullus was besieging Amisus, but having left Murena with two legions to carry on the siege, he himself set out with three others against the territory of the Cabiri, where he went into winter quarters. He also ordered Hadrian to make war against Mithradates, who was defeated... In the fourth year of this Olympiad Tigranes and Mithradates, having collected an army of 40,000 foot and 30,000 horse, who were drawn up in the Roman order of battle, engaged Lucullus and were defeated; Tigranes lost 5000 killed, (on contrary to over 100000 dead Armenians with only 5 Roman dead and 100 wounded according to Plutarch!) a large number of prisoners, besides a promiscuous rabble".

[Boyar Son]

Sarkiss-" who were drawn up in the Roman order of battle"

is this true that the pontic forces at one time decided to use Roman battle order? (checker board formation)

[Ibn-Khaldun]

That is, sadly, a rather accurate description of later Medieval Europeans... :sweatdrop:

yup .. so who were the greater barbarians in the matter of washing themselfs .. the gauls in 1rst century BC or the knights in 11th century AD :beam:

[Tellos Athenaios]

That's an easy one. The knights.

[Watchman]

It's more like a win by default really.

[Sarkiss]

Sarkiss-" who were drawn up in the Roman order of battle"

is this true that the pontic forces at one time decided to use Roman battle order? (checker board formation)
combined Pontic-Armenian forces were.
Mithridates had some Roman officers sent by Sertorius from Spain. they helped to train Pontic infantry in Roman fashion, which was later applied to some extend to the Armenian forces as well.

[Sakkura]

I can't actually see how one could compare Cannae with Magnesia?
Maybe not compare, but you certainly can contrast them.

Cannae was a far greater tactical achievement, yet strategically, it achieved nothing. Magnesia was, on the other hand, perhaps not such a huge tactical achievement, but it broke the back of an otherwise revitalized empire.

[Intranetusa]

yup .. so who were the greater barbarians in the matter of washing themselfs .. the gauls in 1rst century BC or the knights in 11th century AD :beam:

Didn't the medieval Europeans believe that taking bathes would wash away your soul - so they would never take baths? :/ ??

whereas the Gauls actually had soap...

[lobf]

Maybe not compare, but you certainly can contrast them.

Cannae was a far greater tactical achievement, yet strategically, it achieved nothing. Magnesia was, on the other hand, perhaps not such a huge tactical achievement, but it broke the back of an otherwise revitalized empire.

Cannae could have meant something, though, right? Had Hannibal followed through and moved on Rome then Cannae would be looked at as an important historical battle, am I wrong?

[Sarkiss]

Cannae could have meant something, though, right? Had Hannibal followed through and moved on Rome then Cannae would be looked at as an important historical battle, am I wrong?
:laugh4:
it is an important historical battle. it is so important it is still studied in military academies. the most brilliant example of encirclement ever.
and everyone seem to forget that it is Cannae (one of the reasons) that allowed Hannibal to ravage Italy for 17 years and let to defection of entire Southern Italy (except citadel of Tarentum, iirc, that is).
marching straight for Rome? five days of non stop riding from Cannae? thats what Maharbal suggested. but there is a good example of doing just that with insufficient forces and failing: Phyrrus.
it could all be very different if not for Hanno and his peace party who would send reinforcements and aid anywhere but to Hannibal:furious3:

[Watchman]

Eh, Hannibal was hardly someone to sit on his butt letting opportunities sail by. The fact is, as brilliant a victory as Cannae was it wasn't total - a decent chunk of the Roman army including most of the cavalry got away, and had started reorganising in a matter of days - and it had put a severe dent in Big H's manpower pool, chiefly in the infantry arm; the Iberians and Gauls who'd had the somewhat questionable honour of holding up the massive Roman column in the center had suffered their share of casualties. Neither had the destruction of the trapped Roman foot been exactly a cakewalk.

Quite simply, Hannibal's army was in no condition to do much anything impressive before some R&R, nevermind now with a mobile Roman force at loose in the vicinity. The latter may not have been even remotely strong enough to be any threat to Hannibal's force in a straight fight, but it takes a lot less to be a major problem and limiter in strategic terms.


Didn't the medieval Europeans believe that taking bathes would wash away your soul - so they would never take baths? :/ ??Not really. I don't quite recall the exact reasoning involved, but it was more that bathing simply wasn't considered important; most people did it in some form at least every now and then, just very rarely. Only some reigious ascetics, such as some monestic sects, actually wholly declined to bathe - resulting in a strong whiff of what was termed odour sancte...

That sounds somewhat like you're mixing the matter with early superstitions about photography you know...

[Sarkiss]

Eh, Hannibal was hardly someone to sit on his butt letting opportunities sail by. The fact is, as brilliant a victory as Cannae was it wasn't total - a decent chunk of the Roman army including most of the cavalry got away, and had started reorganising in a matter of days - and it had put a severe dent in Big H's manpower pool, chiefly in the infantry arm; the Iberians and Gauls who'd had the somewhat questionable honour of holding up the massive Roman column in the center had suffered their share of casualties. Neither had the destruction of the trapped Roman foot been exactly a cakewalk.

quite correct, but i still consider its important to underline that Cannae is the bloodiest battles in Ancient and Medievil history. there is no parallels up until modern times.
the description you provided, however revives in memory battle of lake Trasimene rather than Cannae.

[Watchman]

Nobody said victories, no matter how impressive, weren't also rather exhausting even to the winner. It's a lot of hard work to demolish an army with hand weapons after all.

[CirdanDharix]

:laugh4:

and everyone seem to forget that it is Cannae (one of the reasons) that allowed Hannibal to ravage Italy for 17 years and let to defection of entire Southern Italy (except citadel of Tarentum, iirc, that is).
marching straight for Rome? five days of non stop riding from Cannae? thats what Maharbal suggested. but there is a good example of doing just that with insufficient forces and failing: Phyrrus.
it could all be very different if not for Hanno and his peace party who would send reinforcements and aid anywhere but to Hannibal:furious3:
Actually, much of Southern Italy remained loyal to Rome, or else in the expectative. It took Hannibal a year or two to get the Lucanians to switch sides after Cannae, and even longer until he got a foothold in Taras for completely unrelated reasons (Romans execute hostages for trying to run away; out of spite, hostages' families contrive a cunning plan to let Hannibal in). This was due to Roman garrisons, hostages, and simple inertia. Hannibal had kicked some Roman arse but he hadn't threatened the Urbs itself yet, and everyone in Italy knew how much manpower was available just in the Latium. Taking Rome by storm would have possible, but success in such an operation was by no means a foregone conclusion.

As to Hannibal lacking reinforcements, it can't really be blamed on Hanno. It appears that when Mago Barca came back with a bag full of Roman gold rings, Hanno was left completely isolated in the senate. That Mago and his army, originally intended to reifnorce Hannibal, ended up in Spain is the fault of their brother Hasdrubal (or of the elder Publius Cornelius Scipio and his brother Cnaeus, depending on how you look at things). The other two fronts that were opened in 215--Sicily and Sardinia--where logical, since recapturing the lost islands was one of Carthage's major war aims (although dispersing her forces was probably a strategical mistake). Hannibal was also, to some extent, a victim of his own success--since he was doing fine in Italy, why send him troops that were very much needed elsewhere?

[delablake]

It might even be worse if he is not that renowned. From my experience (though from a different discipline), the mediocre to bad profs are VERY easily offended if they are criticized. Especially from a student.[/QUOTE]


I can subscribe to that...there's nothing worse than a vain yet bad scientist who gets confronted with his blundering idiocy or anyone's different opinion...in my case, that $%/&( - hole cost me a year at university: He kept finding new "errors" in my term paper, and refused to accept it, but he gave top grades to a female colleague (whose paper I had written) because he liked her knockers
After the 5th rejection I told his secretary I'd go to the Dean, and magically the same old paper was OK...he didn't ever bother to examine it a last time, instead returned it to me totally crumpled with this note attached to it: Have you ever read a book?
Should I meet him again, say in a dark and lonely alley, I'd really kick his teeth in....
:skull:

[delablake]

quite correct, but i still consider its important to underline that Cannae is the bloodiest battles in Ancient and Medievil history. there is no parallels up until modern times.
the description you provided, however revives in memory battle of lake Trasimene rather than Cannae.

sorry..but what about Gaugamela?

[Watchman]

IIRC better part of the Persian army took a hike. One minor shortcoming in the Philippo-Alexandrian tactical system was that the majority of the troops weren't too hot for envelopement and pursuit - rather, Alex generally had to be pretty darn clever to keep his phalanx from getting enveloped while the corps de rupture heavy cavalry were busy deciding the fight. Phalangites were for fairly obvious reasons el mucho suckage for chasing anyone, so the pursuit was very much the job of the cavalry.

[Jaywalker-Jack]

That is, sadly, a rather accurate description of later Medieval Europeans... :sweatdrop:

If you have to live rough its actualy in your best interests not to wash too often. Grease keeps you warm!

[Sarkiss]

Actually, much of Southern Italy remained loyal to Rome, or else in the expectative. It took Hannibal a year or two to get the Lucanians to switch sides after Cannae, and even longer until he got a foothold in Taras for completely unrelated reasons (Romans execute hostages for trying to run away; out of spite, hostages' families contrive a cunning plan to let Hannibal in). This was due to Roman garrisons, hostages, and simple inertia. Hannibal had kicked some Roman arse but he hadn't threatened the Urbs itself yet, and everyone in Italy knew how much manpower was available just in the Latium. Taking Rome by storm would have possible, but success in such an operation was by no means a foregone conclusion.

As to Hannibal lacking reinforcements, it can't really be blamed on Hanno. It appears that when Mago Barca came back with a bag full of Roman gold rings, Hanno was left completely isolated in the senate. That Mago and his army, originally intended to reifnorce Hannibal, ended up in Spain is the fault of their brother Hasdrubal (or of the elder Publius Cornelius Scipio and his brother Cnaeus, depending on how you look at things). The other two fronts that were opened in 215--Sicily and Sardinia--where logical, since recapturing the lost islands was one of Carthage's major war aims (although dispersing her forces was probably a strategical mistake). Hannibal was also, to some extent, a victim of his own success--since he was doing fine in Italy, why send him troops that were very much needed elsewhere?
what i meant that it would not be possible to maintain a stable presence in Italy if things at Cannae went wrong. even Hannibal's Cisalpine Gaulic allies would probably turn back on him. he sought, a victory a decisive one and Cannae proved to be just that. it sealed his alies faith in his abilities and potential and taught his enemies a lesson.

yes, Hanno's party got outvoted, but even then he did create the base for what was yet to come, wasting menpower and resources just not to help Hannibal become all too powerful and successful.
why send troops to Italy if Hannibal is already successful? why would he ask for troops if he is in such a good situation then? Hannibal is well aware of Romans treathening Iberia and islands he does still ask for reinforcement and gets rejected. the reason he asks is: he cant take on Rome wtith what he got left, but the second and most important reason is that it seems that everyone else fails to understand a simple truth - the key to victory in this war lies in Italy, at Romes gates! it is not so important to hold other territories but to strangle them right there and then, in their heartland! do it there and need for reinforcing Spain will be no more.

[delablake]

[ he sought, a victory a decisive one and Cannae proved to be just that. i

are you really sure?
The decisive battle was won by Rome on the plains of Zama...

[delablake]

yup .. so who were the greater barbarians in the matter of washing themselfs .. the gauls in 1rst century BC or the knights in 11th century AD :beam:

every EB player knows the Gauls had soap-makers :yes:

[NeoSpartan]

Hannibal kicked butt in Canea, but he had 4 problems that stopped him from winning.

1. Rome did NOT agree to negociate a surrender, or terms for peace. THAT was Hannibal's aim. Anyother kingdom would have negociated some kind of settlement after such a crushing defeat.

2. He was not strong enough to besiege Rome WHILE at the same time being in hostile territory, and no supply lines.

3. He NEVER recieved reinforcements from either Carthege or Phillip V. Instead he was left to his own accord, in hostile land, with an enemy that refused to engage him.

4. His enemy only punished anyone who helped Hannibal. Therefore, Hannibla was unable to keep Italian people under his command when his army was elsewhere. (hannibal knew that IF he spread his forces to "secure" those italic people's loyalty his army would be destroyed by a larger roman force).

In other words... without support from the outside Hannibal was encaged in Italy, all he could do was roam around, pillage and whatnot.

[Intranetusa]

^ Yup, Italians did not defect to Hannibal's side as he had hoped due - due to Romans granting their allies citizenship and a large portion of Hannibal's army composed of "unappealing" barbarian mercenaries out to plunder.

[Watchman]

why send troops to Italy if Hannibal is already successful? why would he ask for troops if he is in such a good situation then?Since when did commanders not find extra troops useful ?

Hannibal is well aware of Romans treathening Iberia and islands he does still ask for reinforcement and gets rejected. the reason he asks is: he cant take on Rome wtith what he got left, but the second and most important reason is that it seems that everyone else fails to understand a simple truth - the key to victory in this war lies in Italy, at Romes gates! it is not so important to hold other territories but to strangle them right there and then, in their heartland! do it there and need for reinforcing Spain will be no more.That sounds suspiciously like the benefit of hindsight talking. Nevermind presuming rather a lot, of both Hannibal's line of thinking, his and the Carthaginian view of the war aims in general, and of his assessement of the strategic situation in Italy. And given that the Romans had fresh armies shadowing his movements quite soon after Cannae, it is difficult indeed to see how he could have succesfully marched on the city itself, reinforcements or no - right in the still nearly untouched Latin heartlands, where the Carthaginian force would quite literally be in the middle of enemy territory much of which could if need be in an emergency called to arms against the invader.
A commander of his caliber could certainly discern that much, and decline to commit suicide in such fashion.

The Romans had learned their lessons from the bloodbaths Hannibal handed them. They refused to give him straight set-piece battles anymore, and isntead used their armies to shadow his movements and block and contain him strategically; reinforcements from Africa would not have changed this (indeed, they would only have made it that much more important to avoid a straight fight unless absolutely necessary), nor done that much to improve the odds of a succesful thrust against the Roman heartlands.
If they would have bettered his chances of dismantling the Roman "world-order" in Italy is another question. Personally I sometimes suspect the folks back in Carthage concluded he wasn't going to, and instead left him to tie down as much Roman resources and attention as possible while the war went on in other theaters. They may also have been hoping that the resulting drain of Roman manpower out of Italy might have allowed Hannibal to start unraveling the Roman political arrengements, for that matter.

[NeoSpartan]

I believe Hannibal fell victim to "internal politics" ....now I know this is a broad statement, but I'll get more specific:

Hannibal did not have 100% backing and support from Carthege. His expedition was largely a sefl-made thing.
--This means that although his cause was "good" for Carthege there were probably a lot of other prominent individuals and politicians who saw Hannibal's posible victory against Rome as a threat. Reason being that with such a grand success his popularity and the number of loyal soldiers would be so high that he could EASELY come "King" of Carthege.

Also, Hannibal's aim was not 100% in tune with the aim of other prominent individuals in Carthege. As stated before, retaking Scisily(sp) and expanding commercial influences in Iberia were goals other groups/individuals had. So instead of supporting Hannibal to defeat Rome, it is easier to leave Hannibal dragging Rome down while they make inroads in whatever other goals they had.

So in my eyes Hannibal was F***ed over by his own people.

I gotta say... I don't know why in the hell Hannibal didn't say:
F* it! after he was denied reinforcements from Carthege. (u know the time his brother took all those gold rings)
... and take his army and spoils out of italy, sail to North Africa, buy more mercenaries, and KILL his opposition in Carthege. Become ruler, implement whatever reforms are needed. And then, with a firm base of support, strike back at Rome.

[cmacq]

Maybe not compare, but you certainly can contrast them.

Cannae was a far greater tactical achievement, yet strategically, it achieved nothing. Magnesia was, on the other hand, perhaps not such a huge tactical achievement, but it broke the back of an otherwise revitalized empire.

Right, that was the point of my post above; ‘But, simply the Roman defeat at Cannae was not a mortal wound, yet the Seleucid loss at Magnesia was indeed, over time, very fatal.’

[cmacq]

I gotta say... I don't know why in the hell Hannibal didn't say:
F* it! after he was denied reinforcements from Carthege. (u know the time his brother took all those gold rings)
... and take his army and spoils out of italy, sail to North Africa, buy more mercenaries, and KILL his opposition in Carthege. Become ruler, implement whatever reforms are needed. And then, with a firm base of support, strike back at Rome.

I think it had to do with him feeling he was a republican and thus a servant of the government. Also he most likely understood the lesson of Sardinia, and knew the danger of too large a mercenary contingent.

[Sarkiss]

Hannibal kicked butt in Canea, but he had 4 problems that stopped him from winning.

1. Rome did NOT agree to negociate a surrender, or terms for peace. THAT was Hannibal's aim. Anyother kingdom would have negociated some kind of settlement after such a crushing defeat.

2. He was not strong enough to besiege Rome WHILE at the same time being in hostile territory, and no supply lines.

3. He NEVER recieved reinforcements from either Carthege or Phillip V. Instead he was left to his own accord, in hostile land, with an enemy that refused to engage him.

4. His enemy only punished anyone who helped Hannibal. Therefore, Hannibla was unable to keep Italian people under his command when his army was elsewhere. (hannibal knew that IF he spread his forces to "secure" those italic people's loyalty his army would be destroyed by a larger roman force).

In other words... without support from the outside Hannibal was encaged in Italy, all he could do was roam around, pillage and whatnot.
yep, keeping all those Southern cities garrisoned and running from one place to another was a real pain in the butt. thus reiforcements would make a difference. he could not, with a little he had, even succeed in helping besieged Capuans never mind march on Rome itself, which he eventually did to no effect.
Romes stubborn attitude really messed things up. it was complete opposite of Carthaginian reaction to when Scipio set foot in Africa. this Roman stubbornness and punishment of those ready to flee and surrender, really is what saved them in crucial moment.

[Sarkiss]

The Romans had learned their lessons from the bloodbaths Hannibal handed them. They refused to give him straight set-piece battles anymore, and isntead used their armies to shadow his movements and block and contain him strategically; reinforcements from Africa would not have changed this (indeed, they would only have made it that much more important to avoid a straight fight unless absolutely necessary), nor done that much to improve the odds of a succesful thrust against the Roman heartlands.
If they would have bettered his chances of dismantling the Roman "world-order" in Italy is another question. Personally I sometimes suspect the folks back in Carthage concluded he wasn't going to, and instead left him to tie down as much Roman resources and attention as possible while the war went on in other theaters. They may also have been hoping that the resulting drain of Roman manpower out of Italy might have allowed Hannibal to start unraveling the Roman political arrengements, for that matter.
reinforcement form Africa would force them to fight when city itself is besieged, thats the whole point. gather enough power for the final strike. no Roman allies were happy with ongoing war. constant pillage of the fields and rise of prices on simple thing like bread etc, kicked in stomach the Romans and their allies. heck, it even come to the point when these allies refused to field their part of the troops, arrangement that was always followed.
we forget how tense and difficult situatuion for Romans and their allies have become and inclined to only empasize Hannibals difficulties.
Romes armies shadowing him for years with those very few fools who dared to oppose him and lost. what would save Carthage iss further pressure on Rome and her allies WHITHIN Italy, where they recruit their amies. another Cannae, march on Rome. situation when no further lurcking abound is possible.
and the folks back in Carthage concluded wrong. situation didnt turn the way its been planned and they should have changed thir plans accordingly. the problem is they were never ready to go on fighting to such extend. Romes stubborness caught Carthage off guard.

[CirdanDharix]

what i meant that it would not be possible to maintain a stable presence in Italy if things at Cannae went wrong. even Hannibal's Cisalpine Gaulic allies would probably turn back on him. he sought, a victory a decisive one and Cannae proved to be just that. it sealed his alies faith in his abilities and potential and taught his enemies a lesson.

yes, Hanno's party got outvoted, but even then he did create the base for what was yet to come, wasting menpower and resources just not to help Hannibal become all too powerful and successful.
why send troops to Italy if Hannibal is already successful? why would he ask for troops if he is in such a good situation then? Hannibal is well aware of Romans treathening Iberia and islands he does still ask for reinforcement and gets rejected. the reason he asks is: he cant take on Rome wtith what he got left, but the second and most important reason is that it seems that everyone else fails to understand a simple truth - the key to victory in this war lies in Italy, at Romes gates! it is not so important to hold other territories but to strangle them right there and then, in their heartland! do it there and need for reinforcing Spain will be no more.

You seem to forget that Hannibal's request for reinforcements was not denied. By the end of 216, the Carthaginian senate had decided that 1) a powerful corps of about 15,000 men and several dozen elephants would be raised, and under Mago Barca, sent to Italy the following year and 2) Hasdrubal would gather his Iberian forces, destroy the Roman army in Iberia (since the Romans lacked any long-time allies or bases, the loss of their field army would have driven them out of Iberia) and then march on Italy. The weakness of this plan was that it underestimated the strength of the Scipio brothers' army in Iberia; near Dertosa on the Ebro, Hasdrubal was heavily defeated by the numerically superior Romans (but then, weren't the Romans always numerically superior?). As a result, not only was he forced to defend the Carthaginian holdings in Iberia, but Mago's army was used to reinforce him, instead of Hannibal (and this was a sound decision: losing Iberia meant losing the war, as we can verify with hindsight).

[Sarkiss]

You seem to forget that Hannibal's request for reinforcements was not denied. By the end of 216, the Carthaginian senate had decided that 1) a powerful corps of about 15,000 men and several dozen elephants would be raised, and under Mago Barca, sent to Italy the following year and 2) Hasdrubal would gather his Iberian forces, destroy the Roman army in Iberia (since the Romans lacked any long-time allies or bases, the loss of their field army would have driven them out of Iberia) and then march on Italy. The weakness of this plan was that it underestimated the strength of the Scipio brothers' army in Iberia; near Dertosa on the Ebro, Hasdrubal was heavily defeated by the numerically superior Romans (but then, weren't the Romans always numerically superior?). As a result, not only was he forced to defend the Carthaginian holdings in Iberia, but Mago's army was used to reinforce him, instead of Hannibal (and this was a sound decision: losing Iberia meant losing the war, as we can verify with hindsight).
you are correct, by being rejected i wasnt specific to this particular occasion but refferred to the Carthaginian policies as a whole.
there even was one tiny reiforcement including elephants but that was an exception to the rule where Hannibal mostly left to his own devises.

"For years past they have been trying to force me back by refusing me reinforcements and money; but now they recall me no longer by indirect means, but in plain words. Hannibal has been conquered not by the Roman people whom he defeated so many times in battle and put to flight, but by the envy and continual disparagement of the Carthaginian senate. At this unlovely and shameful return of mine it will not be Scipio who will be wild with triumph and delight, but rather Hanno, whose only way of ruining me and my house has been by ruining Carthage"

i rest my case.

[anubis88]

"I noticed you mentioned a force of only 30000 Romans plus allies in the battle of Magnesia. I've heard greater numbers elsewhere and understand there naturally is some uncertainty about them. Could you point me to the sources that you used, and why you have trusted these before others?"


Thanx Bovi, this might be just what i needed... I'll try my luck on wednsday:sweatdrop:

I've noticed during the weekend that in my country professors believe practicaly everything the romans wrote about themselves!!:furious3:

I'll just have to change their minds:laugh4:

[Sarkiss]

Thanx Bovi, this might be just what i needed... I'll try my luck on wednsday:sweatdrop:

I've noticed during the weekend that in my country professors believe practicaly everything the romans wrote about themselves!!:furious3:

I'll just have to change their minds:laugh4:
good luck.
let us know how it went.
and sorry for hijacking your ttread.

[anubis88]

good luck.
let us know how it went.
and sorry for hijacking your ttread.

No problem.... found some interesting stuff in the thread nonetheless:beam:

[Michiel de Ruyter]

Well,

my few cents:

Hannibal's strategic assumption embarking on his war against the Romans was that he could induce the Roman allies to defect to him... providing him with a base and supplies to take on Rome.

This was based on the fact that not too long before the Romans had fought a civil war/war against their allies (and there would be a number of them in the centuries thereafter!). So his strategy was to crush the Roman forces, and hope that these defeats would induce the Roman allies to defect. Why this did not happen will never be known...

Hannibal had to resort to this strategy, and actively seek battle as he did not have the capabilities to besiege Rome.

To siege a city was (and still is) one of the hardest things to do, and many times the besiegers suffered as much as the besieged. Just as the besieged, the besiegers often suffered from disease and starvation. Even the Romans had serious problems with it, and major sieges were rare, and seemingly only resotrted to when physically feasible and storming the place was not an option. How many large scale (starvation) sieges are there in Roman history? Alesia, Numantia, Carthage, Jerusalem, Masada, and that might be pretty much it... and in some instances the Romans resorted to it only after attenpts to storm the settlement failed!

BTW, many nations time and again completely misunderstood the mindset of the Romans. to that extent Hannibal might have been one of the very few. The Romans were out to conquer (for much of their history until the reign of Augustus peace was rare!), waged total war (including rape, pillage and extermination) and might even have geared their society to that purpose (they seem to have recovered very quickly form the demographic onslaught that Hannibal caused among the male populationof military age).


*******

And as far as numbers of ancient historians goes, be very very careful. They had a tendency to round numbers (up or down depending on the side they were on), and exaggerate greatly... and most of them wrote a long time after the fact, and their reliability varies greatly. And to my knowledge, at least Livy and Plutarch are not considered among the most reliable... at least not to the standard of say Thucydides, Arrian or Ammianus Marcellinus (and even those have some serious flaws)!

[Treverer]

... I'll try my luck on wednsday:sweatdrop: ...
A tip:

first talk to one of his ASSISTANTS!

From my experience, the Professor's assistants (at least one of them) are more or less deeply involved into the process of book writing. At least my Professors used to do this (Political Science, Sociology & [East European] History).

I've found out that talking to one of them provided in most cases the same (sometimes even more) information than the later talk to the Professors. And both of us being students made the discussion more relaxed and less/not at all formal. In 99%, there was no further need for a talk to Professor ...

Yours,
Treverer

P.S. I've studied in Germany.

[anubis88]

A tip:

first talk to one of his ASSISTANTS!

From my experience, the Professor's assistants (at least one of them) are more or less deeply involved into the process of book writing. At least my Professors used to do this (Political Science, Sociology & [East European] History).

I've found out that talking to one of them provided in most cases the same (sometimes even more) information than the later talk to the Professors. And both of us being students made the discussion more relaxed and less/not at all formal. In 99%, there was no further need for a talk to Professor ...

Yours,
Treverer

P.S. I've studied in Germany.

The problem is that he doesn't have assistans... Dunno why... one of the few in my college... Perhaps they didn't agree with him as well:laugh4:

P.S I study a little more south than you:clown:

[Treverer]

The problem is that he doesn't have assistans... Dunno why... one of the few in my college... Perhaps they didn't agree with him as well:laugh4:

P.S I study a little more south than you:clown:
... and he doesn't even have "student-assistants" (called "HiWis" in German) ?? That would indeed be strange ...

T.

P.S. CH? A? I? Or even further south?

[anubis88]

... and he doesn't even have "student-assistants" (called "HiWis" in German) ?? That would indeed be strange ...

T.

P.S. CH? A? I? Or even further south?
Not as far as i know... It's still my first year though

P.S. Ch-South east, A south, I east :idea2:

[Mouzafphaerre]

.
Lichtenstein? :gah:
.

[cmacq]

Slovenia?

[anubis88]

Slovenia?
Bingo!!!

[GodEmperorLeto]

Not as far as i know... It's still my first year though

First, who is your professor? What is your university?


I've noticed during the weekend that in my country professors believe practicaly everything the romans wrote about themselves!!

What country are you from? And believing everything the Romans wrote? Some of them can be believed, but many historians think a lot of personal interpretation went into the records. For example Suetonius is generally considered by some to be the tabloids of his day, and to be taken with a grain of salt.

As for his book, start checking out journals. Go on J-Stor and search for his name and the book title, and see what his peers have to say about him. It might take a year for the reviews to really start seeing print, but it might be worthwhile.

[Cyclops]

Do not piss off your professor before you've graduated.

Criticise his work in a respectful way, noting points of difference with other authors if you have to, but do not make gutting his theses the basis of your work. He's only human and people don't like to be challenged by their own students.

University degrees are proof you can research and understand a range of information. Once you have proved you can research and understand his POV and have your degree, then load up and blow his work away.

I speak from experience.

I am no expert in history or miltiary matters, having only a humble BA. However my time at university led me to a couple of conclusions.

1. Many historians have embarrassingly little knowledge of military matters and are disingenuous and uncritical about battle descriptions, in a way they never would be about descriptions of social conditions, cultural acheivments or political situations.

Making a misjudgement about a battle doesn't make your Professor a bad historian. It just shows you where his attention is focussed and where you can perhaps add to his work for him.

2. An even higher proportion of Military historians seem to be amateurs and dabblers. Often their grasp of broader historical issues is shaky or incomplete, and there is a strong tendency to fixation or 'bee-in-the-bonnet-ism". Beware using such work as a resource.

If I read one more book about "decisive battles"....:furious3:

Take the Punic wars: in the first one, the Romans tended to defeat the Poeni on land but their sally to Africa was defeated: nevertheless their stamina ground the Poenis down and lead to a decisive victory and the acquisition of Sicily.

The second Punic war went differently, only the same. Hannibal won all these battles on land, especially Cannae (most beloved battle of military theoreticians), but the Roman invasion of Africa succeeded this time. Roman stamina ground the Kartis down and lead to a decisive victory and the acquisition of Spain.

How was Cannae decisive? How was Zama decisive? The outcomes were similar in both wars: I'd say the war was decided more politics and social issues than by economics and arms, (given of course that both sides managed a high standard of military proficiency).

I agree individual battles can "nudge" the course of events, and Hannibal is one of those utterly rare people whose talent seems capable of shifting the course of history, but even he failed to subdue the growing strength of the Roman system.

A bit Marxist I guess, somewhat determinist, but I don't give as much credence to battle outcomes as to the social and political aspect of the military.

[Mouzafphaerre]

Slovenia?
.
I read the coordinates in reverse direction. :wall:
.

[Treverer]

Oh, one last thing from me:

do talk to the secretary of the Institute (if she's nice/gentle and talkative) and/or talk to elder students or "students representatives" (sorry, dunno the English technical term; in German: "Fachschaft[svertretung]").

Both should be able to give you more information about your Prof., given you act diplomatically. So, please don't tell them (especially the secretary) first: "I want to challenge Professor XYZ."

Gather information, be nice and place some "strategic" questions here and there. After some time (= days or weeks or even months), you can ask more directly questions. Try to gain some "academic merits" (like good homeworks or good exam results).

Well, to resume: be patient and advance step by step.

Yours,
Treverer

P.S. But never underestimate your talking partners intellectually, after all, you are at university. Some might discover your "slow advance" immediately.

[cmacq]

Oh, one last thing from me:

do talk to the secretary of the Institute (if she's nice/gentle and talkative) and/or talk to elder students or "students representatives" (sorry, dunno the English technical term; in German: "Fachschaft[svertretung]").

Both should be able to give you more information about your Prof., given you act diplomatically. So, please don't tell them (especially the secretary) first: "I want to challenge Professor XYZ."

Gather information, be nice and place some "strategic" questions here and there. After some time (= days or weeks or even months), you can ask more directly questions. Try to gain some "academic merits" (like good homeworks or good exam results).

Well, to resume: be patient and advance step by step.

Yours,
Treverer

P.S. But never underestimate your talking partners intellectually, after all, you are at university. Some might discover your "slow advance" immediately.


Good idea.

Also...

Have you actually checked the Latin and/or Greek source texts in question? I mean the texts in their native language, not translations. My experience is that all translations have some errors, thats because of the nature of rendering one language into another. The question is, does a given translation have major errors that pertain to your argument.

You might just find that one side or the other has based their conclusions on an incorrect or spurious portion of a translation? I've seen translations that contain entire lines inserted, but not indicated, to explain what they understood to be an awkward word or phrase. Again, my advice is; keep your powder dry and always follow Roger's 30th rule; never take a chance you don't have to.

[anubis88]

Good idea.

Also...

Have you actually checked the Latin and/or Greek source texts in question? I mean the texts in their native language, not translations. My experience is that all translations have some errors, thats because of the nature of rendering one language into another. The question is, does a given translation have major errors that pertain to your argument.

You might just find that one side or the other has based their conclusions on an incorrect or spurious portion of a translation? I've seen translations that contain entire lines inserted, but not indicated, to explain what they understood to be an awkward word or phrase. Again, my advice is; keep your powder dry and always follow Roger's 30th rule; never take a chance you don't have to.

Well i don't believe that numbers where translated wrong:juggle2: ...
However, the professor didn't show up yesterday, apparently he had an urgent matter to attend to.... I'm gonna try speaking with him next week:knight:

[cmacq]

yes, he might have been attending the execution of the last lillyput-student that dared question him, the Magnificent Wizard of OZzzzzz?

[cmacq]

anubis88,

you didn't talk to your hisprof, about Magnesia did you?

If you have not please review this entire tread.
https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showthread.php?t=96784

You may find it informative?