Battle outcomes against all odds

[Rodion Romanovich]

As the title says, importance of the result of the battle doesn't matter, all that matters is whether the battle outcome was different from what someone would guess beforehand. Someone who had all the information that was available to the commanders at the start of the battle. There are many models for judging the strength of armies including models which take into account morale, fatigue, training, equipment and terrain advantage - everything a skilled and experienced commander could use in his judgement about whether to fight or not. If we use a fair judgement of that kind rather than looking at for example numbers alone, are there any battles which can still be considered to have had a very unexpected outcome, and if so, which ones would you say?

[Kraxis]

I'll start out with a very classical battle. No wonder it is classical as it really was something out of the ordinary.

Cannae...

While Hannibal's forces were likely better than their Roman foes on a one to one basis (Roman losses had been considerable until then), they weren't that much better. A very significant part of his force was comprised of unruly and not terribly wellequipped Gauls.
The terrain was not for his army's preferance either. No open spaces for cavalry, the entire Roman army filled the space between the hills and the river.

By all means Hannibal should have been beaten soundly as the initial contacts went. And if we had seen the battlefield and the forces prior to the battle without knowing the leaders or circumstances of that battle, then I would say that the Romans should have won... Easily.

A lot has been made of the Roman command, and it's lack of cooperation and such. But really that wasn't that bad. They made the right decision. Bulk up, smash the enemy center and make sure the flanks are well protected. They did the things that would reinforce the usual Roman strengths, while in the case of that battlefield gave up nothing. Hindsight (and common knowledge of minute flaws) in the case of Cannae is a terrible thing as it blinds us to the 'how would/should any commander have reacted'.
Also, the popularity of this particular battle has lead to a lot of people scoffing at it, disliking it more for it's popularity than it's actual value.

The losses Hannibal's forces suffered indicate just how tough the Romans were. They were disproportionally high for the winning side in an ancient battle. Also the battle seems to have lasted a fairly long time, indicating that the cavalry didn't so much actively engage the Roman rear as much as keep them pinned while the infantry grinded into them. So had things not played out perfectly like they did, Hannibal would have been a most interesting general for specialists, but generally an unknown entity.

[Rodion Romanovich]

I agree after hearing your description. Any other battles which deserve mention in this category? Perhaps worth beginning the search among more of the major, famous battles? Apart from Cannae so far, I can always think of some excuse why not to mention different battles that come to mind, though I haven't gone through that many yet... ~:shrug:

[Kansas Bear]

Alesia 52 BCE

[TinCow]

When you say


Someone who had all the information that was available to the commanders at the start of the battle.

do you mean information available to one side or the other, or the cumulative knowledge of both sides? I can think of plenty of battles where one side expected to win easily and were then handily defeated, but many are due to poor intelligence about the true strength of their enemies. If you are talking about more of an omniscient view that presumes knowledge of evey aspect on both sides of the battle, the list becomes far, far smaller.

Assuming you are talking about the latter, one that comes immediately to mind is Rourke's Drift. Even with the British advantage in training and firepower, the Zulus had a numerical advantage of almost 40:1, and that's counting several dozen men who were injured/sick and support personnel. If you list just the active duty military personnel, you're talking more in the region of a 60:1 numerical advantage. Combine this with the morale boost and loss on the respective sides from Isandlwana, the addition of firearms to the Zulu army, and the relative inexperience of the two British officers, one of whom was practically deaf, and you have a very unlikely result, at least in my opinion. True, numbers aren't everything, but in a situation like this, most military commanders probably would have expected them to be the deciding factor.

[Paradox]

I'll start out with a very classical battle. No wonder it is classical as it really was something out of the ordinary.

Cannae...

While Hannibal's forces were likely better than their Roman foes on a one to one basis (Roman losses had been considerable until then), they weren't that much better. A very significant part of his force was comprised of unruly and not terribly wellequipped Gauls.
The terrain was not for his army's preferance either. No open spaces for cavalry, the entire Roman army filled the space between the hills and the river.

By all means Hannibal should have been beaten soundly as the initial contacts went. And if we had seen the battlefield and the forces prior to the battle without knowing the leaders or circumstances of that battle, then I would say that the Romans should have won... Easily.

A lot has been made of the Roman command, and it's lack of cooperation and such. But really that wasn't that bad. They made the right decision. Bulk up, smash the enemy center and make sure the flanks are well protected. They did the things that would reinforce the usual Roman strengths, while in the case of that battlefield gave up nothing. Hindsight (and common knowledge of minute flaws) in the case of Cannae is a terrible thing as it blinds us to the 'how would/should any commander have reacted'.
Also, the popularity of this particular battle has lead to a lot of people scoffing at it, disliking it more for it's popularity than it's actual value.

The losses Hannibal's forces suffered indicate just how tough the Romans were. They were disproportionally high for the winning side in an ancient battle. Also the battle seems to have lasted a fairly long time, indicating that the cavalry didn't so much actively engage the Roman rear as much as keep them pinned while the infantry grinded into them. So had things not played out perfectly like they did, Hannibal would have been a most interesting general for specialists, but generally an unknown entity.
Don't you mean Trebia?

[Kagemusha]

Battle of Kawagoe and battle of Okehazama come quickly to mind.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Okehazama

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kawagoe

[Rodion Romanovich]

do you mean information available to one side or the other, or the cumulative knowledge of both sides?

I think I mean something like the maximum amount of information that one side could find out before battle about the opponent, if he had done as good reconnaissance as was practically possible. He should also be a general who knows as much as would be realistically possible to know about the warfare of his time. If the battle victory depended partially on bad moves from the opponent, these bad moves should be attributeable to the victor and not to stupidity of the opponent.

---

Of those mentioned so far, I think that Cannae, Kawagoe and maybe Okehazama fit the description I had in mind. About Rourke's Drift I don't know enough. About Alesia, it's a matter of definition. The Gallic relief forces were given an interesting dilemma: either besiege Caesar and let their own people in the city die too, or conduct an assault for which the odds weren't too good. Once they chose to assault, the odds clearly were in Caesar's favor, even though it was probably a very hectic defense battle. What do you think would have been the odds in case of a Gallic siege of the circumvallatio? If you count Caesar's construction of the circumvallatio outside the odds, then they are clearly in favor of the Gallic forces, however.

Okehazama and Kawagoe both follow a somewhat similar pattern, I think: using confusion/night/thunderstorm and deception, in combination with launching an aggressive attack with the element of surprise on a small portion at the edge of the enemy army camp. Do you think they were originally intended as a hit-and-run attack followed by withdrawal? In any case, it developed into a total rout - not expected from the odds prior to the battle - as the confusion and lack of information probably made the enemy believe the opposing army to be much larger than it was. At least in Kawagoe, it seems like the defeated opponent was not in an extremely bad fighting condition beforehand, while in Okehazama it is claimed that it was. It's a quite nice deception: since besiegers usually expect relief attacks to come only from larger armies, the probably most clever response (for the opponent) given the lack of available information, was in fact to do the very thing that created the victory for the winning side!

[Duke John]

How about the Battle of Marengo in 1800? Napoleon had his forces spread out and didn't expect an attack. He lost the first round of the battle only to be saved by a good last stand and general Dessaix arriving with reinforcements and an excellent one-liner: "This battle is completely lost, but it is only two o'clock, there is time to win another." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Marengo

[Justiciar]

Though not technically a battle, I'd say Gibraltar's Great Siege.

[TinCow]

I think I mean something like the maximum amount of information that one side could find out before battle about the opponent, if he had done as good reconnaissance as was practically possible. He should also be a general who knows as much as would be realistically possible to know about the warfare of his time. If the battle victory depended partially on bad moves from the opponent, these bad moves should be attributeable to the victor and not to stupidity of the opponent.

Ok, I like that definition. Here is another nomination:

Chancellorsville - Union forces were double the size of the Confederates, better supplied, better rested, and had a good terrain advantage. The only things the Confederates could claim superior were more experienced soldiers, better commanders, and balls the size of small nations. I doubt many men would have predicted a total Union rout under those circumstances. The result was almost entirely due to the decisions (good and bad) made by the leadership on both sides and they ran contrary to what would have been expected based on composition, supply, morale, terrain, etc.

[Paradox]

Battle of Kawagoe and battle of Okehazama come quickly to mind.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Okehazama

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kawagoe
Don't forget Sekigahara, the eastern army should've lost, but the battle was lost all because the west's general wasn't exactly loved by his army. Hideyoshi's campaigns on Chugoku and Kanto also had unexpected outcomes.

[Kagemusha]

Don't forget Sekigahara, the eastern army should've lost, but the battle was lost all because the west's general wasn't exactly loved by his army. Hideyoshi's campaigns on Chugoku and Kanto also had unexpected outcomes.

Yes,but these werent against all odds. In Sekigahara both sides had chances. While Ishida Mitsunari had more troops in Sekigahara before final battle one reason for it was also that Tokugawa Hidetada was bogged down with 38000 men in besieging Sanada Masayuki's Ueda Castle. If these troops would have been present when the battle started the numerical superiority would have been on Tokugawa Ieasy´s side and inaction particularly of the Mori and their related contingents, Kikkawa and Kobyakawa would not made such a large impact on the battle.
For me the campaigns of Hideyoshi would be too broad of a term talk about within this instance as for example the surprise peace that was struck at the time strongest Western Clan Mori and Hideyoshi after the sudden death of Nobunaga, which freed Hideyoshi to confront Akechi Mitsuhide and beat him in order to succeed Nobunaga is hardly good material for the thread in hand so does speak.:smash:

[Paradox]

Yes,but these werent against all odds. In Sekigahara both sides had chances. While Ishida Mitsunari had more troops in Sekigahara before final battle one reason for it was also that Tokugawa Hidetada was bogged down with 38000 men in besieging Sanada Masayuki's Ueda Castle. If these troops would have been present when the battle started the numerical superiority would have been on Tokugawa Ieasy´s side and inaction particularly of the Mori and their related contingents, Kikkawa and Kobyakawa would not made such a large impact on the battle.
For me the campaigns of Hideyoshi would be too broad of a term talk about within this instance as for example the surprise peace that was struck at the time strongest Western Clan Mori and Hideyoshi after the sudden death of Nobunaga, which freed Hideyoshi to confront Akechi Mitsuhide and beat him in order to succeed Nobunaga is hardly good material for the thread in hand so does speak.:smash:
At first, the western army did outnumber Ieyasu's side, and Ishida Mitsunari was certainly confident of a western victory. Kikkawa, Mouri, and Koboyakawa had a VERY large impact on the battle IMO. When Koboyakawa defected, the Takahashi of Kyushu immediately switched sides to support the Koboyakawa out of fear and they weren't the only ones. Otani Yoshitsugu's death was because of Hideaki's defection in the first place, and he played a major role in the battle.

Kikkawa and Mouri also had a large impact on the battle, had it not been for Kikkawa, the Mouri would've advanced through Mt. Nangu and probably would have dealt some damage to the Tokugawa.

I think Hideyoshi's campaigns did have unexpected outcomes too, he did so much as to reach the home provinces of the Mouri, very close to occupying Aki. He overcame the Bessho, Ukita, Kikkawa, and many others in battle by either starving them to death and flooding them. I only included the Odawara campaign because of Mitsunari's flood strategy against the Hojo.

:bow:

[Kagemusha]

At first, the western army did outnumber Ieyasu's side, and Ishida Mitsunari was certainly confident of a western victory. Kikkawa, Mouri, and Koboyakawa had a VERY large impact on the battle IMO. When Koboyakawa defected, the Takahashi of Kyushu immediately switched sides to support the Koboyakawa out of fear and they weren't the only ones. Otani Yoshitsugu's death was because of Hideaki's defection in the first place, and he played a major role in the battle.

Kikkawa and Mouri also had a large impact on the battle, had it not been for Kikkawa, the Mouri would've advanced through Mt. Nangu and probably would have dealt some damage to the Tokugawa.

I think Hideyoshi's campaigns did have unexpected outcomes too, he did so much as to reach the home provinces of the Mouri, very close to occupying Aki. He overcame the Bessho, Ukita, Kikkawa, and many others in battle by either starving them to death and flooding them. I only included the Odawara campaign because of Mitsunari's flood strategy against the Hojo.

:bow:

I didnt say Mori,Kikkawa and Kobayakawa didnt have large effect on the battle. I sayd their contributions wouldnt have been so decisive had Tokugawa Hidetada arrived in the scene when he was supposed to. That would have turned the numbers of roughly 100000 men on Ishida´s side versus 80000 on Tokugawa´s side to 100000 Ishida against almost 110000 Tokugawa warriors.

I agree that Hideyoshi was successful on his campaign against Mori. But he was not outnumbered, but infact had lots of resources against Mori. Also it should be noted that the campaign never culminated in decisive battle against the main Mori army. Also in the Odawara campaign, it was infact the Hojo who were completely outnumbered atleast to 4:1, while Hojo had about 50000 men in their disposal, Hideyoshi had huge army of almost 200000 men in the siege.:bow:

[Paradox]

I'm curious about where you got the information about the amount of troops Hideyoshi had against the Mouri and Hojo.:inquisitive:

[Innocentius]

100000, 80000, 100000, 50000, 200000

Those all sound like greatly overestimated numbers, especially for Japan. Are you sure your source is younger than the 19th century?

[Paradox]

If the source came from Geocities, I wouldn't trust it. I've seen those numbers on a Geocities article and I don't think it's accurate, it doesn't even cite a source.

[IrishArmenian]

I'm not too familiar with many historical battles but I am always in awe of the Fedayee victories under Zoravar Andranik, Kevork Chavush, Sepasdatsi Murat, etc. against the Ottoman forces-- talk about stalked odds.
Anyway, I think that there's one thing wrong with your theory, Rodion: the unpredictable nature of life.
That, along with other elements make commanding a tough, no-learning curve, straining and frantic business.

[Kagemusha]

Those all sound like greatly overestimated numbers, especially for Japan. Are you sure your source is younger than the 19th century?

Sekigahara and Siege of Odawara were together with Osaka summer and winter campaigns about the largest battles/ sieges in pre modern Japanese History. My information comes from various books, since i have been enthusiastic hobbyist of Japanese history for well over 15 years. These three are very well documented as they were culminations of the late Sengoku Jidai period, first the Odawara campaign was the point in which after no one could question Toyotomi Hideyoshis authority as the unifier of Japan. After the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi the Sekigahara campaign resulted in supremecy of Tokugawa Ieasy who took the title of Shogun and started the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Osaka campaign were Ieasy´s act to remove last threat to his Shogunate in form of Toyotomi Hideyori and his supporters. In these battles the forces were gathered from almost all corners of Japan and were very much different then the normal Sengoku period battles that consisted usually of no more then few thousand men on each side.
Innocentius how much have you studied Japanese history of that era? You can easily for example compare the figures how many men Hideyoshi dispatched to Korea in his invasion which is called Imjin War also and these troops were mainly only gathered from The Kuyshu daimyos. The thing about Japanese medieval history is that there are lots of documents still remaining unlike in many other countries, because no single event has effected Japan so much that those would have been lost, for example there is lot of original documents surviving and even personal letters between Daimyos, Iriki In documents, which partly can be found on net also are a good example of surviving original documents. If you want to further read about these battles there are lot of good books covering each. For example one i recently read:

Sekigahara 1600 by Anthony J. Bryant

or for General information about the era

Samurai Sourcebook by Stephen Turnbull

Also Osprey publishing has printed lots of good books concerning the era and if you want to find good online information here is your link:

http://samurai-archives.com/

[Innocentius]

Innocentius how much have you studied Japanese history of that era? You can easily for example compare the figures how many men Hideyoshi dispatched to Korea in his invasion which is called Imjin War also and these troops were mainly only gathered from The Kuyshu daimyos.

That, or I could just figure out that Japan is an island and that the world's population in the late 16th century wasn't very big.


The thing about Japanese medieval history is that there are lots of documents still remaining unlike in many other countries, because no single event has effected Japan so much that those would have been lost, for example there is lot of original documents surviving and even personal letters between Daimyos, Iriki In documents, which partly can be found on net also are a good example of surviving original documents. If you want to further read about these battles there are lot of good books covering each. For example one i recently read:

Well, there are pretty detailed sources and surviving documents and letters from Europe as well from this era, so I don't really see the difference.

[Kagemusha]

That, or I could just figure out that Japan is an island and that the world's population in the late 16th century wasn't very big.
Well, there are pretty detailed sources and surviving documents and letters from Europe as well from this era, so I don't really see the difference.

So you are claiming that the figures presented and accepted by majority of Historians are false,because you say so? Are you also saying that the figures of men participating in battles in Europe during 16th century are false? Well im not sure what to answer to your reply other then good for you.:no:

[Innocentius]

So you are claiming that the figures presented and accepted by majority of Historians are false,because you say so? Are you also saying that the figures of men participating in battles in Europe during 16th century are false? Well im not sure what to answer to your reply other then good for you.:no:

One should always be critical. Who are these historians of which you speak? How many are they? Are they by any chance Japanese? Are they by any chance nationalists? Did they by any chance live 60+ years ago? What other opinions on the figures are there? Who speaks in favor of those figures? Where do all these historians get their figures from? How are the men counted?

Figures of participants in Europan battles during the 16th century are most certainly false to a degree. The only way to know the real truth is to invent the time machine, go back in time and count.

History is what we make it, and if I say that only twelve men fought in Sekigahara, that's one version of the truth. The figure might have nothing to do with what really happened, but if I told some random person I met that Sekigahara was a skirmish in Japan with some twelve men involved, that would probably be what that person would regard as the truth (unless the person is of course clever enough to check it up, and find some sources and investigate them). Since you appear to know much about Japan in this era, might I ask how many people actually lived in Japan at the time? How many would have been able-bodied men? How many of those would the lords of Japan be able to enlist in their armies (how far did their authority reach)? How many would've stayed at home? How many deserters and casualties from starvation and disease would there have been pre-battle? Answer all those questions for me, and put forward some realiable sources ("Historians", and two books by western historians ain't good enough, I want to see documents from the 15th century), and I shall regard what you say as the truth, and I will fully believe in the figures that you present to me on Sekigahara.

Or, to be honest, I don't really care. I'm not very interested in Japanese history other than the Mongol invasions. I just wanted to point out that you shouldn't just accept any figures presented to you by someone else.

[Kagemusha]

One should always be critical. Who are these historians of which you speak? How many are they? Are they by any chance Japanese? Are they by any chance nationalists? Did they by any chance live 60+ years ago? What other opinions on the figures are there? Who speaks in favor of those figures? Where do all these historians get their figures from? How are the men counted?

Figures of participants in Europan battles during the 16th century are most certainly false to a degree. The only way to know the real truth is to invent the time machine, go back in time and count.

History is what we make it, and if I say that only twelve men fought in Sekigahara, that's one version of the truth. The figure might have nothing to do with what really happened, but if I told some random person I met that Sekigahara was a skirmish in Japan with some twelve men involved, that would probably be what that person would regard as the truth (unless the person is of course clever enough to check it up, and find some sources and investigate them). Since you appear to know much about Japan in this era, might I ask how many people actually lived in Japan at the time? How many would have been able-bodied men? How many of those would the lords of Japan be able to enlist in their armies (how far did their authority reach)? How many would've stayed at home? How many deserters and casualties from starvation and disease would there have been pre-battle? Answer all those questions for me, and put forward some realiable sources ("Historians", and two books by western historians ain't good enough, I want to see documents from the 15th century), and I shall regard what you say as the truth, and I will fully believe in the figures that you present to me on Sekigahara.


Innocentius.Thank you for yet another sermon of yours about critical thinking here in Monastery. Do you really think i will start counting all the historians who have written about Sengoku Jidai period Japan? You must be kidding yourself, specially because it seems you know next to nothing about the subject yourself. All you had to do was to google "Iriki In documents" and you would have gained access to documents starting from 1135, but you failed to do so. Which tells a lot about your intrests to engage in this discussion.But lets give you the first figures:

According to Taiko Land Survey ordered by Toyotomi Hideyoshi the population of Japan was estimated by modern academics between 7-18 million, these estimates are based on Kokudaka, a feudal measure of income.

You can read more about it on The 'Cultural Atlas of Japan' by Collcutt, Jansen and Kumakura

With your attitude im not inclined to tell you anything else about the subject at hand since i refuse to spend my precious free time on people who are obviously here to boost their ego´s and being obnoxious. Im not here to teach you about anything, i was here to talk about what this thread was about. If you really think that you are the only person here who can think and observe issues neutrally, you seem to have a bad case of superiority complex or you are delusional. In either case have a nice day.

[Innocentius]

Wow, someone took this too seriously...


Innocentius.Thank you for yet another sermon of yours about critical thinking here in Monastery.

You're most welcome.


Do you really think i will start counting all the historians who have written about Sengoku Jidai period Japan?

No. I didn't even ask for that, but I wasn't expecting/demanding anything from you. I thought it was quite clear that I didn't really mean you should dig all those sources up - I just meant you should probably have checked them out before presenting any figures as facts (especially if they seem to be exaggerated, one of the most common historical errors in military history).


You must be kidding yourself, specially because it seems you know next to nothing about the subject yourself.

I never claimed that I did, did I? I even wrote that I'm not very interested in the subject.


All you had to do was to google "Iriki In documents" and you would have gained access to documents starting from 1135, but you failed to do so. Which tells a lot about your intrests to engage in this discussion.

Now, how was I supposed to know exactly what (seemingly random and unknown to me as a layman) Japanese phrase to focus on and Google? Of course it was very obvious to you who already knew it...


According to Taiko Land Survey ordered by Toyotomi Hideyoshi the population of Japan was estimated by modern academics between 7-18 million, these estimates are based on Kokudaka, a feudal measure of income.

You can read more about it on The 'Cultural Atlas of Japan' by Collcutt, Jansen and Kumakura

Great!


With your attitude im not inclined to tell you anything else about the subject at hand since i refuse to spend my precious free time on people who are obviously here to boost their ego´s and being obnoxious.

In my opinion, my post was written in a very neutral tone, but that's just me and it's very difficult to interpret the feelings in texts. And who's got a big ego by the way? "I know this, but my time is too precious to waste on telling you" - even though it was pretty obvious that I didn't really mean you should dig up all info about medieval Japan there ever was.


Im not here to teach you about anything, i was here to talk about what this thread was about.

And I never asked you to do anything else. All I asked was from where and when your sources originated, as the figures seemed almost outrageous. Further, I only pointed out some very basic elements on source criticism, since apparently you didn't care much for them.


If you really think that you are the only person here who can think and observe issues neutrally,

I can't, and never said I could. Where'd you get that from?

Man can never be truly neutral or objective, since the only thing we know is ourselves, and our own views on things. Thus, we can never achieve full objectivity, but that's more of a philosophical question.


you seem to have a bad case of superiority complex or you are delusional. In either case have a nice day.

Very much possible. And the same to you (even though it's ten PM).

[Paradox]

http://shogun.royalarmouries.org/press/biography.asp

Innocentius, read "The Alliance of Tokugawa Ieyasu and Toyotomi Hideyoshi" and "The Siege of Osaka Castle" parts, Kagemusha is right, and you aren't giving a good impression by denying something you know little to nothing about, research yourself, and you'll find the "truth" you seek instead of rambling about things that have nothing to do with the arguement.

[Paradox]

Now, how was I supposed to know exactly what (seemingly random and unknown to me as a layman) Japanese phrase to focus on and Google? Of course it was very obvious to you who already knew it...
This shows that you haven't read Kagemusha's previous post:


for example there is lot of original documents surviving and even personal letters between Daimyos, Iriki In documents,

[Innocentius]

http://shogun.royalarmouries.org/press/biography.asp

Innocentius, read "The Alliance of Tokugawa Ieyasu and Toyotomi Hideyoshi" and "The Siege of Osaka Castle" parts, Kagemusha is right, and you aren't giving a good impression by denying something you know little to nothing about, research yourself, and you'll find the "truth" you seek instead of rambling about things that have nothing to do with the arguement.

Are you being serious? I would've tried to keep a friendly tone (at least I thought I was doing so) but this is getting annoying:

What have I denied? Have I ever claimed I knew anything really? All I did was question the seemingly high figures of men in these wars. If being critical gives a bad impression of me, then I'm pretty happy I'm not giving a good impression, since that would probably mean to blindly accept "facts". How is Kagemusha suddenly "right"? Just because a webpage cites the same figures as he did, does that mean that's 100% correct, or could it possibly be so that those numbers are the popularly accepted ones since nobody really knows and everyone prefers if past battles were great and grand? And research myself about what? I put forward a simple question, that's that. You weren't even obliged to answer it in the first place. What truth am I seeking? When did I ever say I was seeking for the truth? Didn't I even write that we will never know the truth?

Nothing to do with the argument? Now, how is that possible? Sure, none of this has any relevance to the thread's subject, but since my question was the very reason this argument began, I can't see how it could be irrelevant. I put forward a simple question regarding source criticism, and you start speaking of how uneducated on the subject I am (which I am, and have no trouble admitting). It was Kagemusha who had the good taste to insult me and to rant about how bad a person I am (again, I am, but that hasn't got :furious3: to do with the discussion). Also, the site you linked to doesn't present any sources that I can see. I'm sure the main site is very nice and all, but linking to a webpage isn't actually going to prove anything (which I never even asked you to do).

Thank you.

[Innocentius]

This shows that you haven't read Kagemusha's previous post:

And you apparently didn't read what I wrote:


Now, how was I supposed to know exactly what (seemingly random and unknown to me as a layman) Japanese phrase to focus on and Google? Of course it was very obvious to you who already knew it...

[Paradox]

So than if you saw it in his post than why didn't you go ahead and google it? Maybe if you had searched it, it wouldn't be so "random" to you. I never said you failed to keep a friendly tone, in fact, I think your post was neutral.

But since I am not obliged to answer your question, than fine...

[Kagemusha]

Are you being serious? I would've tried to keep a friendly tone (at least I thought I was doing so) but this is getting annoying:

What have I denied? Have I ever claimed I knew anything really? All I did was question the seemingly high figures of men in these wars. If being critical gives a bad impression of me, then I'm pretty happy I'm not giving a good impression, since that would probably mean to blindly accept "facts". How is Kagemusha suddenly "right"? Just because a webpage cites the same figures as he did, does that mean that's 100% correct, or could it possibly be so that those numbers are the popularly accepted ones since nobody really knows and everyone prefers if past battles were great and grand? And research myself about what? I put forward a simple question, that's that. You weren't even obliged to answer it in the first place. What truth am I seeking? When did I ever say I was seeking for the truth? Didn't I even write that we will never know the truth?

Nothing to do with the argument? Now, how is that possible? Sure, none of this has any relevance to the thread's subject, but since my question was the very reason this argument began, I can't see how it could be irrelevant. I put forward a simple question regarding source criticism, and you start speaking of how uneducated on the subject I am (which I am, and have no trouble admitting). It was Kagemusha who had the good taste to insult me and to rant about how bad a person I am (again, I am, but that hasn't got :furious3: to do with the discussion). Also, the site you linked to doesn't present any sources that I can see. I'm sure the main site is very nice and all, but linking to a webpage isn't actually going to prove anything (which I never even asked you to do).


Thank you.

I apologize for making a personal attack against you, which was unnecessary. I have a pretty bad temper sometimes and i admit that fault in my character. Nevertheless you must understand that it would be tiresome for me to start providing with you with a huge chunk of information starting from how much this period is studied and the basic construction of feudal Japanese society, into the basic concept of warfare and recruitment during the late Sengoku Jidai period. While you are not yourself even interested about the subject. Therefore continuing this discussion seems futile. I hope we can both agree to that.

[Innocentius]

So than if you saw it in his post than why didn't you go ahead and google it? Maybe if you had searched it, it wouldn't be so "random" to you. I never said you failed to keep a friendly tone, in fact, I think your post was neutral.

Yes, I suppose I could have Googled it, but imagine this: I tell you something about event A, and present som facts of some kind, B. While doing this, I mention these things X, Y and Z. Now, if you really had no clue about what A in the first place, how would you know what to look up?

Anyway, we'd probably better drop this discussion (at least in this thread) now.


I apologize for making a personal attack against you, which was unnecessary. I have a pretty bad temper sometimes and i admit that fault in my character. Nevertheless you must understand that it would be tiresome for me to start providing with you with a huge chunk of information starting from how much this period is studied and the basic construction of feudal Japanese society, into the basic concept of warfare and recruitment during the late Sengoku Jidai period. While you are not yourself even interested about the subject. Therefore continuing this discussion seems futile. I hope we can both agree to that.

Apologee accepted, and I also apologize for coming across as egocentric and/or annoying. And yes, I agree; continuing this discussion seems rather futile. Let's get this thread back on topic instead.

Rodya: I find the question nearly impossible to answer, since there are quite simply too many things that need to be taken into account. Also, as has already been brought up by TinCow, depending on how you define "all the information available" the list of battles fitting the description varies greatly.

Anyway, one battle that comes to mind is the Battle of Parma in 1248, where the Lombards, seemingly by surprise, sallied out against the besieging Imperial troops and routed them while the Emperor was off hunting. This battle wasn't really "against all odds", but it certainly was a very unpredictable victory, and brought Frederick's campaign to a sudden end. There are more battles of the same kind, where one of the opponents decides to strike during the brief absence of the enemy's leader. If this alone is enough to determine the outcome of a battle is a question of debate, though.

[Rodion Romanovich]

I'm not too familiar with many historical battles but I am always in awe of the Fedayee victories under Zoravar Andranik, Kevork Chavush, Sepasdatsi Murat, etc. against the Ottoman forces-- talk about stalked odds.
Anyway, I think that there's one thing wrong with your theory, Rodion: the unpredictable nature of life.
That, along with other elements make commanding a tough, no-learning curve, straining and frantic business.
The point of the thread was to explore
1. battles which were displays of truly great tactics, and
2. battles where chance played a great part
My initial thesis was that most battles are determined at the time the participants come to the battlefields, but I didn't mean to claim there were no exceptions - rather, I wanted to open a discussion on the very subject of exceptions. As for unpredictability of warfare, I think strategical and diplomatical uncertainties play a more important role than uncertainty in particular battles, for example: how many men you actually manage to bring to the battlefield is not only a matter of assembling as much as you can since fielding more soldiers costs more and your fielding of a monstrous army allows the enemy to simply avoid battle while you lose upkeep money, then strike you when you're forced to decrease your army size. So it's also a matter of guessing how many men the opponent brings so you can outmatch him by the right amount - neither too much nor too little.

[Furious Mental]

It seems to me that historically most military leaders have simply tried to raise the largest army possible, and if that put a strain on their finances, to make up the difference with loans or, what is more common, looting. Since the spoils of victory were often sufficient to pay off the largest army that could possibly be raised it made sense to make such a gamble. No doubt there are states that have been bankrupted by spending overspending on military forces that fail to deliver victory. Charles V made a point of avoiding battle with English expeditionary armies, so they eventually ran out of food and left. I don't think it bankrupted Edward III, but it put his finances in an awkward position.

[Rodion Romanovich]

Well, if you think you have spent everything you can on army size, you can usually pressure for even more. Say, if your enemy has 5,000 men, and you already have 20,000, you won't start confiscating property from individuals and the churches, and drive up taxes to the border of starvation to get funding for more troops. So the armies aren't really the theroetical largest possible in many cases. Also in cases when army sizes on both sides are almost equal, will there be similar conditions when both sides start reaching the verge on what is acceptable. There's a point when your victory in the war is worth less than avoiding the suffering of your own people that you need to win. When both sides have pressured themselves closer to their limits, again there is really no incentive to pressure for a slightly larger army unless you can be sure they can create a quick, decisive advantage. But what if the opponent is thinking the same, and will also make such an increase at the very same time? Perhaps you can pressure even more? Etc. Eventually you come again to a turning point in spending, where the one who spends less can actually be the winner, by economically wearing down the opponent while concentrating on siege defenses and avoiding open battle.

So it's not only about fielding as large army as possible all the time. Surely all armies strive hard to decrease recruitment and upkeep costs and logistics to be able to concentrate troops in one spot for a campaign, but there's also the resource limit, which creates a game of the type I said: spend as little as possible while at the same time outmatching the enemy. It's a real cruel and difficult game, often driving both sides to increasing expenses far beyond what they initially would have thought the war was worth. Say, starting with a weak casus belli expecting to grab some land, then ending up driving the own population to starvation to fight over a few acres of worthless land, with the opponent doing the same, and the war often ending with unchanged borders of a weakening that allows a retaking of the very same acres within 100 years, after massive expenses for both sides...

So it's a matter of definition whether it's an attempt to gather the largest army. Locally and campaign wise it's of course true, but resource wise and overall it's not quite as simple.

[Furious Mental]

I realise that sometimes the best strategy is one of attrition, that's why I pointed out Charles V's strategy of "concentrating on siege defenses and avoiding open battle." It just seems to me that historically when military leaders choose to actually seek battle they have tended to splurge and spend as much as possible within the limits of political acceptability and gamble on victory. Often losing a battle in the field was a total disaster so it made sense to raise the largest possible army since a loss would spell the end of a campaign and possibly an entire war effort.

[Rodion Romanovich]

Ok, I think we just used different words for the same thing in that case

[Incongruous]

I didnt say Mori,Kikkawa and Kobayakawa didnt have large effect on the battle. I sayd their contributions wouldnt have been so decisive had Tokugawa Hidetada arrived in the scene when he was supposed to. That would have turned the numbers of roughly 100000 men on Ishida´s side versus 80000 on Tokugawa´s side to 100000 Ishida against almost 110000 Tokugawa warriors.

I agree that Hideyoshi was successful on his campaign against Mori. But he was not outnumbered, but infact had lots of resources against Mori. Also it should be noted that the campaign never culminated in decisive battle against the main Mori army. Also in the Odawara campaign, it was infact the Hojo who were completely outnumbered atleast to 4:1, while Hojo had about 50000 men in their disposal, Hideyoshi had huge army of almost 200000 men in the siege.:bow:

Where did you get those fugures?

I have read quite a few Turnbull books and have never come across such figures.

[Incongruous]

It seems to me that historically most military leaders have simply tried to raise the largest army possible, and if that put a strain on their finances, to make up the difference with loans or, what is more common, looting. Since the spoils of victory were often sufficient to pay off the largest army that could possibly be raised it made sense to make such a gamble. No doubt there are states that have been bankrupted by spending overspending on military forces that fail to deliver victory. Charles V made a point of avoiding battle with English expeditionary armies, so they eventually ran out of food and left. I don't think it bankrupted Edward III, but it put his finances in an awkward position.
No it didn't bankrupt him because he simply refused to repay the Italian banking families he had borrowed from, bankrupting them instead!:laugh4:
Kings were such chivalrous fellows.

[Kagemusha]

Where did you get those fugures?

I have read quite a few Turnbull books and have never come across such figures.

Well please share with me your figures, the siege of Odawara gives about 200000 to Toyotomi and 50000 to Hojo from all sources i have seen. The figures for Sekigahara change a bit, based on the perception for which troops should be included in the battle figures as some dont count the inactive forces in the total number of the battle. For example Bryant gives 88,888 men to Eastern side and 81,890 to the Western side and most modern scholars put the total amount of men in the battle between 170,000 and 200,000.So if you have not ever come across these figures its bit surprising.

[Incongruous]

Turnbull I s all I have ever read, since he is the only modern expert I know of.
It's been a while since I have read him.

[CrazyGuy]

We seem to be getting off discussion into a largely irrelevant point. I'm surprised nobody's mentioned this battles against the odds, although we aren't sure of the exact numbers:

The Battle of Watling Street.
Flodden, 42000 well-trained, well-rested, well-fed Scots with a superior artillery train against 20-25000 northern English 'peasants' (for want of a better word), who had walked 15 miles in the rain and made two river crossings before the battle. That's pretty impressive.

[Innocentius]

Flodden, 42000 well-trained, well-rested, well-fed Scots with a superior artillery train against 20-25000 northern English 'peasants' (for want of a better word), who had walked 15 miles in the rain and made two river crossings before the battle. That's pretty impressive.

Again, I'm sceptical about the number of participants, but let's leave that out. I think yeomen would be a better word than peasants. Also, you have to take into consideration that many men on both sides likely were veterans of war, and thus none of the forces was really worse than the other.

Had the Scots known that the English artillery was superior to their own, and had they not been "forced" away from their original position, and from there forces into a marsh, sure, then the victory would have been against all odds. Moreover, Surrey was more experienced than James when it came to warfare, being a veteran of the Wars of the Roses.

[CrazyGuy]

Sorry Innocentious, you seem to be mistaken. Surrey was a veteran, but he was over 70 at Flodden. His performance was remarkable bearing in mind his age (which would be 90 in these times). The Scots did know they had better artillery, or at least they were confident that their cannons were high quality thanks to imported engineers. (I concede that they blundered by sending their best gunners with the fleet)

Obviously, the numbers are never going to be exact, but all the sources I have read cite a 3:2 ratio in favour of the Scots, which as you accept should have led to a Scottish advantage as the English, on paper, had no massive advantage.

Again, why was James 'forced' to leave his position? Because of Surrey's daring march, a superb military action which won the battle before it was really fought.

[Innocentius]

Sorry Innocentious, you seem to be mistaken. Surrey was a veteran, but he was over 70 at Flodden. His performance was remarkable bearing in mind his age (which would be 90 in these times).

He was apparently very bright for 70:clown:


The Scots did know they had better artillery, or at least they were confident that their cannons were high quality thanks to imported engineers. (I concede that they blundered by sending their best gunners with the fleet)

I think there's a misunderstanding here, but if it is I who is misunderstanding you or you who are misunderstanding me I can't really tell.

Anyway, what I meant was that the English had the best artillery of the two forces. The Scots might have been (over)confident in their own artillery, if that's what you meant, but that wasn't information that was available to both commanders at the time.


Obviously, the numbers are never going to be exact, but all the sources I have read cite a 3:2 ratio in favour of the Scots, which as you accept should have led to a Scottish advantage as the English, on paper, had no massive advantage.

Yes, but the English were used to crushing the Scots in pitched-battles, even when numbers were odd. There were several battles in the 14th and 15th centuries in which outnumbered Englishmen achieved seemingly miraculous victories, even though they repeated the same tactic over and over again. The only occassion I can remember from the back of my head when the Scots won was at Otterburn (or something like that) in 1388 - a battle in which the English did not use their usual tactics, combining bills and longbows to great affect, as they did as Flodden.

Two centuries of more or less consequent defeats surely had an effect on morale.


Again, why was James 'forced' to leave his position? Because of Surrey's daring march, a superb military action which won the battle before it was really fought.

This is all true, but remembering that James could still have avoided battle by simply marching off (not really a viable option for any military commander in his position, but at least it was physically possible) and that he took battle nonetheless sort of nullify the effects of the pre-battle maneuvers, at least if you are only to measure whether a battle was won against all odds or not.

On top of all this, the Scots had abandoned their previous tactics against the English for the pike formation adapted from the Landsknechts. This was a yet untested tactic agains English longbow- and billmen, and with the inexperience of the Scots lead to disaster as they were unable to maintain formation in the unsuitable terrain, while under constant harrassment by bows and guns.

Considering all this, the battle of Flodden Field certainly was a victory against all odds - had the Scots won.

[CrazyGuy]

Innocentious, I agree you are factually correct. However, you are drawing the wrong conclusion from your facts.

I agree that the Scottish tactics at Flodden were 'wrong' or at least unsuitable for the battle, and I also agree that although James made no horrendous errors, Surrey was a 'better' commander.

However, to then state that this meant the Scots were fighting against the odds seems to be an exaggeration. Applying the same logic, Thermoplyae was a miraculous victory for the Persians. There tactics were wrong, their troops inferior and their leadeship inadequate (all of which you attribute to the Scots), yet we still claim that the Spartans were against the odds (despite the advantages of leadership, tactics you tacitly concede to the Greek forces). Why? Because they were not supposed to win.

The same is true at Flodden. The English were expected to lose, as on paper the advantage was with the Scots. The King was away with a large army, leading to the assumption that all the best fighting men were with him, the commander of the North was, with the best will in the world, an old man, his army was hastily conscripted and he was facing a well-fed, well-rested force in a supposedly impregnable position. On paper, the victory should have been the Scots. Now I don't deny that the reality was somewhat different, but it still remains true that Surrey won, indeed won handsomely, when he wasn't supposed to. That is why it is a victory against the odds.

[KrooK]

And of course battle of Orsza.
30.000 Poles vs 50.000 Russians waiting behind river. Poles made 2 field bridges then polish infantry crossed river while cavarly was swam between bridges, then Poles held Russian attack. And in the moment when Russian cav was regroupping Polish cavarly made devastating charge routing everything on their way.

Smaller army with good morale and good commander (kniaz Konstanty Ostrogski) crushed bigger army whom leader wanted take as many men as he can and put them straight on enemy. Victory was achieved due to cooperation beetwen infantry, artillery and cavarly and due to use modern warface tactic.

[Innocentius]

Innocentious, I agree you are factually correct. However, you are drawing the wrong conclusion from your facts.

I agree that the Scottish tactics at Flodden were 'wrong' or at least unsuitable for the battle, and I also agree that although James made no horrendous errors, Surrey was a 'better' commander.

However, to then state that this meant the Scots were fighting against the odds seems to be an exaggeration. Applying the same logic, Thermoplyae was a miraculous victory for the Persians. There tactics were wrong, their troops inferior and their leadeship inadequate (all of which you attribute to the Scots), yet we still claim that the Spartans were against the odds (despite the advantages of leadership, tactics you tacitly concede to the Greek forces). Why? Because they were not supposed to win.

The same is true at Flodden. The English were expected to lose, as on paper the advantage was with the Scots. The King was away with a large army, leading to the assumption that all the best fighting men were with him, the commander of the North was, with the best will in the world, an old man, his army was hastily conscripted and he was facing a well-fed, well-rested force in a supposedly impregnable position. On paper, the victory should have been the Scots. Now I don't deny that the reality was somewhat different, but it still remains true that Surrey won, indeed won handsomely, when he wasn't supposed to. That is why it is a victory against the odds.

Ok, I still don't agree entirely, although you do have a few points. To make it simple:

Terrain: In favour of the Scots, even after they were outmaneuvered. Both sides knew this.

Troops: Neither had an advantage as far as I can tell. Both sides ought to have had at least a few experienced men. Both sides knew this more or less well.

Arms & Armour: The English had their bills and their longbows, which had worked just fine until then. So I'd say that was in the favour of the English. Both sides were well aware that the Englishmen usually won using this tactic. The English army also had genereally better armour.

Artillery: The Scottish artillery was inferior to the English. Neither side could have known forehand that the English had the upper hand on this - it played a desicive part in the battle nonetheless.

Morale: Both sides were probably pretty demoralized after inconclusive maneuvering for weeks (I believe few of the regular "Joe's" in the English army realized exactly what advantage they had gained). The Scots also had the disadvantage of knowing that their anscestors had had their butts kicked by the English at quite a few occassions during the last 150 years, even though they probably prefered to talk about Stirling Bridge and Bannockburn. Neither side could know exactly how morale was in the opposite camp.

Tactics: The English tactic was well-tested and had worked time and again before. The Scots on the other hand were inexperienced and unacustomized to their knew tactic, which worked badly in the difficult terrain. Neither side could foresee what tactic the other would use, even though both sides probably expected a few obvious ingredients, such as guns, longbows and cavalry charges.

Command: Hard to tell. Of the two head commanders, I'd say Surrey was the better, although this wasn't obvious to those who were there. Both sides apparently had a few less than brilliant commanders, who wasted a lot of both sides' potential.

And the sum of this equation? Heck, I don't know. I'm a little feverish right now, so forgive me any spelling and/or grammar errors. I'll go back and read this through again once I'm better. Hopefully, I'll be able to continue the debate then:sweatdrop:

[Evil_Maniac From Mars]

The Battle of Klyastitsy, notable not for the battle itself, but for a certain "against-all-odds" event in the battle, when a group of Russian grenadiers charged across a burning bridge straight into French positions - and took the crossing.

[ShadesWolf]

One word
Agincourt

[Innocentius]

One word
Agincourt

Why? At Agincourt the English were at much better odds than at, for example, Crécy. The English had superior weapons, superior position, superior commanders, superior morale, superior tactics and superior experience. Numbers were pretty equal, at least if you compare with Crécy or Poitiers. The only thing against them was the dysentery that pained them. Heck, at Agincourt, the entire victory could be attributed to stupidity on the French side - not exactly a victory against all odds.

[CrazyGuy]

Innocentious, I'm afraid I must disagree with you, again! (there could be a sitcom in us).

You seem to be looking at battles with the benefit of hindsight, and concluding that most victories were expected and therefore not 'against all odds'. However, at the time Agincourt most certainly was a miracuolous victory.

Let's look at the cold hard facts. At Agincourt the English faced most, if not all the French nobility, so I don't know where the equal numbers come from.
Secondly, nobility were the tanks of the era. At the time the perception was that infantry, particularly light infantry, could 'never' stand against a cavalry charge. To say that the English had superior troops is to speak knowing how the devastating the longbow was, this wasn't common knowledge at the time and the French, and most of the English, expected the knights to win the day (as usual).

Secondly, you state the English had superior morale and superior leadership. Again, you state this with hindsight. Henry V had made a hash of the invasion up until Agincourt and his men were hungry, diseased, far from home and facing what was perceived to be a stronger army. I fail to see where the English would have gained greater morale.

I agree that at Agincourt the English possessed greater field position and superior tactics, but that is testament to Henry's military mind that he chose that spot. It was not an 'in-built' advantage that the English possessed regardless of the battle itself. And therefore cannot be classed as an 'advantage' to the English as it is very context specific.

I agree the French made a hash of it, but to state that the English were therefore expected to win is nonsense. Agincourt was most certainly a victory 'against all odds'.

[Rodion Romanovich]

superior weapons
Not really, the noble cavalry should count as superior to most of the troops the English had. I also believe the French had some pavise crossbowmen too which could, given a prolonged engagement, have managed to stand up quite well in missile duels with the longbowmen, and make them waste their arrows and so have little left for the cavalry and infantry.


superior position
The position was not so great, if the French had either begun by advancing their infantry, or "besieging" the English position to starve them into submission or forcing them to leave their defensive position and fight in a more open position, something which seemed to have been the initial French plan. Now, the battle begun by an English advance and opening fire with longbows on the French after both sides had stared at each other for a long time. A clever French commander could have chosen to retreat somewhat, thus forcing the English to either be drawn out of their position and become exposed, or stay in it and die. However, such a tactical retreat wouldn't have been considered acceptable to the attitudes of the noble cavalrymen of course, and haven't really been very common in warfare of non-nomadic tribes either...


superior morale
I can agree that the lack of retreat and escape option improved the fighting and refusal to break and rout. However, the French morale as in fearlessness was probably much greater.


superior commanders [...] Heck, at Agincourt, the entire victory could be attributed to stupidity on the French side - not exactly a victory against all odds.
In a way, you're right, but there are a few more points to consider:
1. the French had lost in the same way in many times. It would be reasonable to expect a change in their tactics this time. Among other things, they had a big infantry force this time. This certainly turned the odds against the English.

2. the French lack of command wasn't as much about incompetent generals, as about undisciplined cavalry that refused to follow orders. The mistake the commander did was to panic and quickly send support to the cavalry after they had charged without orders, afraid of losing too many cavalrymen. This caused all troops to arrive in a disorganized manner and let the English destroy the formations one by one, possibly with local superiority in numbers in many cases. A better idea would have been to let the most undisciplined cavalrymen continue the attack alone, die in large numbers, and the survivors rout back to the camp, then mount a new, organized coordinated attack after the surviving nobles had learnt why to follow orders. Such a ruthless (according to a rule ethics view) way of commanding would probably not be dared by most commanders in history, however. And the tale doesn't tell if the French commander actually suggested this, but got "outvoted" by the subcommanders aggressively saying that "we can't just leave the cavalry there alone to die, or we will lose". Probably a lot of communication and social factors counting in there, not just military aspects...

3. the English aggressive initial moves were crucial and can be attributed to the English command, especially the early advance and choice to open fire at the French. Given the typical impatient, undisciplined behavior of the French in previous battles in the 100 years war, that could be expected to likely trigger a headless noble cavalry charge, and was at least worth a try even if you would suspect the French to have changed their tactics and learnt from earlier defeats.

[Furious Mental]

Prior to the actual battle of Agincourt I would say the advantage was with the pursuing French. The English were outnumbered and essentially on the run to Calais and would have preferred to avoid a battle. All the contemporary accounts of the battle record that the English dreaded it. As it happened the battle was fought on a narrow, recently ploughed field which became a lake of mud, hemmed in by dense forests, so the complex plans which the French had developed to deal with the English archers fell by the wayside and it became a Crecy style uncoordinated charge against a prepared defensive position i.e. a disaster.

[Innocentius]

Let's look at the cold hard facts. At Agincourt the English faced most, if not all the French nobility, so I don't know where the equal numbers come from.

Anne Curry, whose word I'd take any day over the word of English 19th century historians, suggests the figure of 9,000 English vs. 12,000 French (that's 12,000 actually participating in the battle, the army might have been larger). The numbers 6,000 vs. 30,000 doesn't really go together with contemporary French sources, and not with the amount of French nobles able to participate in the campaign either.


Secondly, nobility were the tanks of the era. At the time the perception was that infantry, particularly light infantry, could 'never' stand against a cavalry charge. To say that the English had superior troops is to speak knowing how the devastating the longbow was, this wasn't common knowledge at the time and the French, and most of the English, expected the knights to win the day (as usual).

That, however, must be completely incorrect. By 1415, the knights dominating the battlefield was already a romanticised myth. The French had learnt that the hard way already at Courtrai in 1302, and after Poitiers, the French avoided pitched-battle with the English for good reasons.

The English were well aware that light infantry could easily crush a heavy cavalry force. They had done exactly that at Crécy and Poitiers, and had time and again beat the Scots using the same tactics (most recently at Homildon Hill). Heavy cavarly had begun losing its edge on the battlefield already by the late 13th century - at least in Western Europe - and was by the 15th century outclassed by halberds, pikes and longbows (given that they were used properly, unlike at Patay).


Secondly, you state the English had superior morale and superior leadership. Again, you state this with hindsight. Henry V had made a hash of the invasion up until Agincourt and his men were hungry, diseased, far from home and facing what was perceived to be a stronger army. I fail to see where the English would have gained greater morale.

Like Rodya wrote, this was a do-or-die situation for the English. They had no way of retreat, and thus they had to win. Also, a century of victories in the field would have added to their self-esteem.


I agree that at Agincourt the English possessed greater field position and superior tactics, but that is testament to Henry's military mind that he chose that spot. It was not an 'in-built' advantage that the English possessed regardless of the battle itself. And therefore cannot be classed as an 'advantage' to the English as it is very context specific.

Agreed.


Not really, the noble cavalry should count as superior to most of the troops the English had. I also believe the French had some pavise crossbowmen too which could, given a prolonged engagement, have managed to stand up quite well in missile duels with the longbowmen, and make them waste their arrows and so have little left for the cavalry and infantry.

While I shouldn't really speculate in precise figures, the English - and all armies using bows of any kind, for that matter - carried with them thousands of arrows. Although each man didn't carry too many with him personally, there were plenty to get from the train.

At Crécy the French had pavise crossbowmen (although withouth their paves). They were outclassed and outranged.


The position was not so great, if the French had either begun by advancing their infantry, or "besieging" the English position to starve them into submission or forcing them to leave their defensive position and fight in a more open position, something which seemed to have been the initial French plan. Now, the battle begun by an English advance and opening fire with longbows on the French after both sides had stared at each other for a long time. A clever French commander could have chosen to retreat somewhat, thus forcing the English to either be drawn out of their position and become exposed, or stay in it and die. However, such a tactical retreat wouldn't have been considered acceptable to the attitudes of the noble cavalrymen of course, and haven't really been very common in warfare of non-nomadic tribes either...

The English could not be outflanked, and the ground between them and the French was muddy. Adding to that they could, as you say, provoke the French into a fight whenever they wished. I'd call their position, both geographically and tactically, superior.

[Rodion Romanovich]

At Crécy the French had pavise crossbowmen (although withouth their paves). They were outclassed and outranged.

Without the shield they're of course not much competition to longbows. With shields they can put up a very good fight.



The English could not be outflanked, and the ground between them and the French was muddy. Adding to that they could, as you say, provoke the French into a fight whenever they wished. I'd call their position, both geographically and tactically, superior.
A French retreat and setting up camp a bit further from the area where the English had so well covered flanks would have created a very strong position for the French. Then the English would have to choose to either stand still and rot in the defensive position, or move forward into exposed ground. With a French position far enough back, the English would have to move out so far from their covered position, that they couldn't get back if the French cavalry (moving faster than the English infantry) would attack. That would be a fight when the English wanted it, but where the French wanted it. Even the "when" aspect would be restricted for the English due to the dysentery and heavy rationing.

Perhaps, if the French commander had known his troops better, and had set up his camp that far back already from start, the English couldn't have provoked the undisciplined cavalry into a foolish charge without forcing the longbowmen to leave the best defensive ground between the two forests. Alternatively, if the commander had simply left the most undisciplined portions of the cavalry to charge to death and then mounted a coordinated attack, his advantage in numbers and quality were probably big enough to ensure victory even in an assault against a heavily fortified position.

It all amounts to how you count the odds, but it was far from certain the English would win.




That, however, must be completely incorrect. By 1415, the knights dominating the battlefield was already a romanticised myth. The French had learnt that the hard way already at Courtrai in 1302, and after Poitiers, the French avoided pitched-battle with the English for good reasons.

The English were well aware that light infantry could easily crush a heavy cavalry force. They had done exactly that at Crécy and Poitiers, and had time and again beat the Scots using the same tactics (most recently at Homildon Hill). Heavy cavarly had begun losing its edge on the battlefield already by the late 13th century - at least in Western Europe - and was by the 15th century outclassed by halberds, pikes and longbows (given that they were used properly, unlike at Patay).

The cavalry was still an extremely difficult force all the way up to the 17th century. The main reason why infantry begun to perform better against cavalry at that time, was not mainly better infantry or worse cavalry, but that commanders became more aware of the cavalry threat and chose their positions more carefully, and used field fortifications to improve the position further. All English victories in the 100 years war against massive cavalry opposition involve quite good choice of ground and often also field fortifications covering the flanks, the longbowmen and so on, for example. When a commander with strong cavalry could outmanouver the opponent and force a battle on difficult ground, even very small cavalry forces could beat far larger infantry forces.

The problem in western European cavalry forces at the time was that it was used as a shock force rather than as a highly mobile fighting unit, taking more advantage of couched charge to break morale, than of mobility and forming local superiority in numbers. A transition to steppe tactics was hardly possible for Agincourt if we are to be realistic, but simply making a different choice of where to put the camp could have changed the outcome of the battle dramatically...

[Innocentius]

The cavalry was still an extremely difficult force all the way up to the 17th century.

This is more of a sidenote, but both the use and the effiency of cavalry dropped dramatically in western Europe in the 15th century, only to rise again in the mid 16th century with the caracole. Wars such as the 100 years', the Hussite Wars and various conflicts in central Europe involving the Swiss or the Flemish proved over and over again that head-on cavalry charged wasn't the best way to defeat an enemy. By the early 17th century, cavalry charges again returned to the battlefields, reintroduced partly thanks to the Poles, and then later on the Swedes. Of course, curassiers and gendarmes were along all the time, but from sometime during the first half of the 15th century, the battlefields of Europe were dominated by halberds and pikes (and to some extent cannons).

[Rodion Romanovich]

I agree regarding the decrease in use of cavalry, and its lower efficiency in practise in most battles at that time, but its potential and theoretical efficiency under good circumstances remained high. Although there were not many battles in this period where the cavalry were used in such good ways, I found a few example battles which demonstrate just how good cavalry was even at this time:
- Battle of Grunwald, 1410
- Battle of Patay, 1429
- Vlad III's night battle, 1462
- Battle of Orsha, 1514
All of these examples included primarily manouvering with the cavalry rather than a foolish heads-on charge, which had become obsolete with the introduction of better field fortifications. Realizing that cavalry was not mainly a shock weapon, the winners of these battles used it as a manouvering weapon, to force the enemy into a worse position, to strike fast with element of surprise, or to perform fake retreats.

So, I think we agree to the facts, even if the phrasings are - again - different.

[Innocentius]

The battles between Ottomans and Wallachians is a somewhat different matter, as tactics and troops were much different from western Europe. Patay was actually just basically one foolish head-on charge, only this time the English didn't have the time to set up a good position. We've all played MTW (or at least some TW-game) and seen with delight as our cavalry smashes into the unprotected archers of the enemy, routing them instantly. That was more or less what happened at Patay: maneuvering before the battle decided the outcome. The same would've happened at Crécy had the English not been so well deployed. Stupidity on the English side resulted in their first major defeat in battle against the French since Crécy.

Grunwald however is more interesting since it involved such a great number of cavalry (from what I understand most of, if not all, the fighting took place on horseback). This lead me back on topic: was Grunwald/Tannenberg a victory against all the odds? Neither side had very favorable terrain, both sides had good commanders and numbers were pretty equal? Was it all skillful maneuvering that decided the day in favour of the "Commonwealth" (if you could call it that at such an early stage)?

CrazyGuy: Since our discussion on Flodden ran out of fuel, should we just agree to disagree? I can't think of more key factors in the battle, and I guess it's up to each and everyone to interpret the sparse information we have.

[Evil_Maniac From Mars]

Heck, at Agincourt, the entire victory could be attributed to stupidity on the French side - not exactly a victory against all odds.

I'd agree with that part, at the very least. The French did not even bother to scout their flanks. A full account of why this battle was a French blunder can be read in How To Lose A Battle by Bill Fawcett.

[Kansas Bear]

Heck, at Agincourt, the entire victory could be attributed to stupidity on the French side - not exactly a victory against all odds.


And an extremely muddy field!:skull:

[cegorach]

Grunwald however is more interesting since it involved such a great number of cavalry (from what I understand most of, if not all, the fighting took place on horseback). This lead me back on topic: was Grunwald/Tannenberg a victory against all the odds?

If the Teutonic Order won the battle it could be called this way.



Neither side had very favorable terrain, both sides had good commanders and numbers were pretty equal? Was it all skillful maneuvering that decided the day in favour of the "Commonwealth" (if you could call it that at such an early stage)?


I think so. The decisive phases of the battle were:

- the battle in the center where Polish cavalry managed to hold its ground supported by three Smolensk standards and Bohemian knights,
- the victory on the left Polish flank where Teutonic line was broken which later resulted in encirlement of the entire Teuronic army,
- the return of Lithuanian army which managed to eliminate all those disorganised 'crusader guest' units and attack the flank of the last Teutonic assault so also the entire left flank of the Teutonic force ( Pol-Lit right flank).

This resulted in the massive encirclement and almost complete annihilation of the entire Teutonic army.


If there is a decisive factor it is the structure and quality of leadership - the Order lost its ability to control its army as the battle progressed.
The 'crusader guests' were lost in the forests and bushes trying to get the fleeing Lithuanians (even some managed to attack its cam which was very far away) and while the Grand Master decided to lead the final charge he at the same time lost all remaining ability to command the rest of the Teutonic army while Pol-Lit commanders didn't - Vytautas rallied the Lithuanians and came back, Jagiello was never engaged in fighting and Zyndam controlled the left flank.



This is more of a sidenote, but both the use and the effiency of cavalry dropped dramatically in western Europe in the 15th century, only to rise again in the mid 16th century with the caracole. Wars such as the 100 years', the Hussite Wars and various conflicts in central Europe involving the Swiss or the Flemish proved over and over again that head-on cavalry charged wasn't the best way to defeat an enemy.

True + a different environment too.



By the early 17th century, cavalry charges again returned to the battlefields, reintroduced partly thanks to the Poles, and then later on the Swedes. Of course, curassiers and gendarmes were along all the time, but from sometime during the first half of the 15th century, the battlefields of Europe were dominated by halberds and pikes (and to some extent cannons).


ONLY in the Western Europe (and not completely - French Gendarmes, Hugenot Millers, English Demilancers, Spanish lancers remained hard hitting, but their influence wasn't too large or perhaps not long lasting), it never lost its importance in any country dealing with steppe environment or the Ottomans.
Why so late ? Mainly because nor Poland neither Hungary were fighting western foes - Hungary virtually left the stage in the early XVIth century and Poland usually had its western border secured and peaceful.
Of course there were some, few clashes against the remnants of the Teutonic Order and as much as TWO battles against other, western enemies, but that wasn't enough.
Against the Teutonic Order there were as much as 2-3 field battles which mattered anything and even if for example the battle at Swieciano in 1462 can be called almost a masterpiece of commandship ( heavy cavalry disengaging to open line of sight for crossbowmen and handgunners in the wagonburg) especially compred to the lousy Azincourt - it was too few - the Tutonic Order later only closed itself in castles and the rest of fighting was conducted by numerous sieges....

Later we have a long, century long gap and while Polish army trashes pike and musket formations at Lubieszów (1577) and Byczyna (1588) those clashes are nothing more than incidents without even weakest impact.
So only a major conflict where one of the countries which kept its cavalry as hard-hitting force was engaged against a 'traditional' western army could chnge the situation - after all if those few clashes against the Poles didn't cause any changes, what can be said about even more remote battles fought by the Livonians, Lithuanians or Poles against Russians, Tartars or Moldavians...

That is why it was the Swedes from one side and Pappenheimer (served as a mercenary in Poland) from another who transformed the traditional tactics in Western Europe.

[Furious Mental]

Frankly I think the caracole was a dubious tactic and most of its contemporaries seem to have thought so too. Its supposed inventors, German cuirassiers, achieved many notable victories over the French after their debut in the 16th century. Most sources are vague about exactly how and when reiters were deployed in those battles, but generally speaking the French cavalry dissolved before massed formations of pistoleers, which then went on to ride down the demoralised infantry. More than likely they didn't employ the caracole because the first time it is mentioned is in 1562 by a French Catholic officer who states that it hadn't been used in a battle that year because it wasn't suited to use against other cavalry, and in any case accounts of past battles attribute to pistoleers an offensive style totally out of keeping with how the caracole was subsequently described. And that was its chief drawback; the purpose of heavy cavalry was to deliver a decisive and shocking blow; if all they did was fool around shooting pistols all day they were wasting time trying to do a job that was better suited to harquebusiers or dragoons. It also negated many of the advantages of the cuirassiers' equipment specifically. First there was the mobility which they had gained (even on horses of average quality) by giving up barding, the heavy lance and some of their armour and adopting disciplined formations. Second there was the pistol, which was a good weapon close up but relatively useless at a distance of more than a few metres; at the time military theorists were all essentially in agreement that pistoleers were most effective charging and in a melee because then they were "all shot" i.e. firing their pistols at everyone in sight.

"Heck, at Agincourt, the entire victory could be attributed to stupidity on the French side - not exactly a victory against all odds."

Personally I think that does make it a victory against the odds, maybe not totally impossible but improbable at least. English archers could beat heavy cavalry if they were fighting from a prepared position that broke the charge, which is how they fought at Agincourt and numerous other battles. If anything the English were aware chiefly that if they were caught out in the open they would be massacred, which is what happened at Patay. It wasn't the original intention of the French to charge the English head on, in fact their plan was to distract the archers with their crossbowmen while squadrons of cavalry wheeled around the flanks to avoid the obstacles which they expected the English to place in their way. When he advanced up a narrow lake of mud Henry V essentially gambled everything on the French charging rather than withdrawing to a more open position, and it paid off. If a couple of things had gone differently (different weather and French not becoming stupid) the outcome probably would have been completely different. Generally speaking, if the people who were actually there are said to have been expecting defeat, and they turn out to be victorious, then I'm inclined to consider it a victory against the odds.

[Gaius Scribonius Curio]

I'd have to say that Agincourt was an improbable victory, but I'm English so I'm biased:2thumbsup: .

Nobody's mentioned the siege of Malta, though (obviously) it was a siege rather than a battle. At the time few people expected a poor, weakly defended island to stand against the dominant power in the Mediterrean. As I understand it, the Viceroy of Sicily (entrusted with the reinforcement plan by Phillip of Spain) held off sending a force because he didn't want to lose them to (inevitable) defeat and thus be undefended later.

I don't know the exact figures but I thought that the Ottoman forces were 5-6 times the size of the defenders. Also many of the defenders were Maltese and had little training.

The Siege lasted four months before a relief force landed and desicively defeated the ottomans in a battle. However poor morale (sitting around for four months on a barren rock waiting out a small group of defenders isn't my idea of fun!) led to the Ottomans deciding to retreat after this loss (even though they still outnumbered there opponents.:wall:

After the Siege, the Grand Master of the Hospitallier Knights, Jean-Parisiot? de Vallette built a much better fortified town across the bay from the original defences, Valletta.

It was the first real setback for the Ottoman Empire in over a century. Suleiman the Magnificent vowed to raze Malta from the earth, and promptly died without preparing another force. Apart from the morale boost it gave to the West, the Siege of Malta wasn't really crippling for the Empire, but it was certainly an unexpected outcome.

[ShadesWolf]

Yet Agincourt was a grievous blow to French morale and to Charles VI’s capacity to resist. First, the outcome suggested to everyone that justice lay with the English. One chronicler ascribed the defeat to divine revenge. For the battle fell on the feast day of saints Crispin and Crispianus, closely associated with the city of Soissons, sacked by the Armagnoc faction a year earlier. The physical loss was immense too. Some 600 members of the baronage and knight class fell at Agincourt. Five Dukes, twelve counts and numerous other social and political leaders were in captivity. A French historian, Francoise Autrand, has calculated that one third of King Charles’s 1,400-strong political supporters were swept away by the catastrophe.
They all came from the northern provinces where the King recruited his military and civil servants. This ‘decapitation’ of royal military structure and disorganization of its resources seriously reduced the French Crowns capacity to resist English aggression. So, in that respect, it made Henry’s eventual victory the easier to achieve.
- Matthew Bennett (Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.)

I think the interesting fact to come out of this quote is
Some 600 members of the baronage and knight class fell at Agincourt. Five Dukes, twelve counts and numerous other social and political leaders were in captivity

This would not be a small army. Bennet suggests that Burnes estiate of 25,000 looks about right based on the many named lords.

Even if we ignore the size of the army and look at the other factors......
In Anne Currys book her introduction states
'the French were reasonably united in thier response. They brought Henry to battle while he gave every impression of trying to avoid it. They chose the battlefield'

We must remember Harfleur was a disaster. The siege lasted 5 weeks. Over 2000 men dead from dysentery. Another 2000 were sent home to recuperate, inc the duke of Clarence. On monday Oct 8 he set out from Harfleur. He had a weeks rations to do the 100 miles march to Calais, which should have been enough. The battle took place on 25th October after approx 180 miles march.