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In the Iraq war, there are often many comparisons to the Vietnam War. However, the Philippine-American war tends to never be mentioned despite its close parallels as it was a harder guerilla war than the conventional war which took the Philippines. I suppose one difference is that we took far longer to grant independence to the Philippines. However, why is it that Vietnam seems to be compared far more other than the fact that it was more recent?
Probably because Vietnam is closer to the Iraq war in terms of technology and strategy. Also Vietnam like Iraq had the element of foreign support for guerrilla fighters while in the Philippines the guerrillas had no outside support.
Additionally the US strategy in the Philippines was pretty damn heavy handed, more akin to what you'd imagine a soviet suppression of a revolt would be. Though there are a lot of civilian casualties in Iraq they are not intentionally caused by the US, most are from ethnic groups fighting each other while others would be 'collateral damage.' The US was definitely brutal against the Filipinos that resisted.
Another point would be that the US was occupying Philippines with true Imperial attempt, it was to become another colony. The Iraq war despite all the reasons of 'empire' that I've heard is not intended by the US to become any sort of colony or even a puppet power. The closest that the US can hope for something of this sort in Iraq is a presence in the form of a permanent air base or something, an issue which would surely be denied to the US by the Iraqi government.
The emotional currents surrounding Vietnam still echo strongly in US politics and the media, which is why it gets hit so often that it's become a cliche. Vietnam is also overwhelmingly obvious evidence of the unimaginable idiocy of allowing politicians to run a war. Plus it's the clearest defeat of the US on the battlefield in recent memory.
Don't forget either that no few of the politicians who run our country now are related to or indebted to the politicians of that generation (Some are, or were recently, the exact same politicians in fact).
This is a case where the impact of the event far outweighs the realistic ability to compare it to Iraq.
:egypt:
'Gotta disagree with you there. The US military was never defeated on the battlefield in South Vietnam, despite all sorts of advantages given the North Vietnamese via Johnson, ill-suited strategy and tactics, and some pretty poor leadership, and would have had very few troubles taking Hanoi. In fact, IIRC, it was 2 years after the vast majority of US forces had left that the NVA took the South.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ramses II CP
As you indicated, Vietnam was a terrible example of politicians creating an atmosphere of inevitable failure. They thought that Ho Chi Men would be comfortable with a Korea-like situation, but it should have been clearly obvious after a year or three that he would have to be clearly defeated or the US should no longer invest their containment resources in Vietnam. The legacy of that war led Kennedy and later Johnson to embrace the idea of "limited war" and create and a worst-case scenario where the communist forces were allowed half the nation to plan and train for all of their (failed) assaults, not to mention resupply the VietCong. Worse, by the time Nixon - who would have had no qualms about trouncing the NVA in NV and letting China sort them out - was elected, there was no public will left to do so.
In a war like Vietnam winning on the battlefield is irrelevant .Quote:
'Gotta disagree with you there. The US military was never defeated on the battlefield in South Vietnam,
I agree. The US did not achieve its political goals in Vietnam, and everyone knows that battlefield victories are only a means to a political end.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tribesman
However, when threads like this pop up, I think its important to set the record straight. Too many people know little more than what they saw in Apocolypse Now or what they were told by a less than informed (or objective) media. Watching Dan Rather's coverage on youtube and comparing it to what was actually going on in the engagements he was involved in is both sad and quite laughable. The hysteria and recrimination of the media coverage during that conflict - which marked a distinct departure from the likes of Earnie Pyle - has come to define war reporting ever since.
So today we get the classic archetype of the young, black, unwillingly drafted, drug-addled marine trekking through some jungle plotting to surprise his CO with a grenade in his tent for making him leave camp and massacre a village full of innocent children, all the while in constant fear of an unseen (and often tree-bound :laugh4:) guerilla warrior - a master of the jungle - the dreaded Viet-Cong.
In reality, moral was quite high throughout the conflict, even remaining remarkably resilient during the final withdrawal years. The vast majority of those who served on the ground were volunteers, which naturally meant that most of those killed were not draftees. In fact, blacks, or any other minorities were not disproportionately represented. Drug use was a far smaller occurrence in rear areas than in the States, and practically nonexistent in combat areas - as was the media-induced "epidemic" of fragging.
And who could forget My Lai? As John Kerry would say, American troops were nothing less than the second coming of the horseman of Genghis Khan. Young, strung out American boys pulled from their cushy suburban lives and forced to fight in such a senseless conflict must have taken out a lot of anger on the helpless civilians around them, who of course could never be trusted. It all plays out like a great Hollywood story - which, of course, it is. There are only two documented cases of war crimes committed by American personnel in Vietnam. In both cases, the men were court-martialed and found guilty. And while the LA Times tried to make a big deal out of the 1994 declassified working group files, the numbers turned out to be a fraction of those seen in WW2 and Korea.
The most disappointing aspect of the "Vietnamization" of American culture for me, however, is that people don't even know how it was fought. Its really an interesting case study for the military history enthusiast. The tactics and strategies employed by both sides, some successfully and some not so much, are fascinating. It was hardly a bunch of guys running around screaming in a jungle.
While constantly played up in popular culture, the Vietcong was not the most significant threat to American forces, and had largely played itself out after the failed, and rather pathetic, Tet Offensive was rather easily crushed - despite the media coverage. The NVA - an organized and fairly traditional military - launched many offensives during the war which were soundly defeated by American troops in large scale, set-piece battles.
American politicians and even top military brass deserve all that comes their way in terms of derision, but American troops performed quite well in actuality - certainly living up to their performance in WW2 and I would say superior to that of the Korean adventure, which puts them at a solid 7 in terms of 1-10.
(Note, the preceding was for wider discussion purposes only. Please don’t take it as a lecture on Vietnam, as I know you’re well read in military history.)
Winning individual battles does not mean you've won on the battlefield. At the end of the war we held no territory, every field where every battle had been fought was surrendered to the enemy. There can be no better standard for defeat. Don't you think every army departing their latest defeat said to themselves 'Yeah, but we could have won...'Quote:
Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger
All of that said, I don't question that we had the military capacity to win the war. To be blunt a single nuclear weapon would have ended effective resistance immediately. For all of that, we lacked the will and most especially the leadership to use the power we possessed, and because of that lack we were, in fact, defeated on the battlefield. Even if you argue that it was never our goal to hold any battlefields I don't see any of our other goals that were effectively accomplished.
In the Phillipines campaign the will of that generation of Americans is clearly on display. Doing the 'right' thing came a logical second to doing whatever led to victory. IMHO communications plays the largest role in the changes that our military forays have undergone since those days. The fact that politicians (And many of our top military officials are now politicians) can communicate with commanders in the field on a day to day and even moment to moment basis has forever altered the nature of military intervention.
To invite further controversy let me also say that our defeat in Iraq is a function of that same problem. :beam:
:egypt:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Sorry for the double post, but to clarify my position on some of the points you raise here:
It isn't purposeful when comparing war scenarios to delink success in the field and success in the larger war. It is often the case in war that an apparent tactical victory becomes an obvious strategic defeat, so much so that to continue to refer to that battle as won becomes a mockery of the idea of winning. At every turn, at every stage America was defeated in Vietnam. To say that we 'won' at this spot, and handily turned back this offensive is meaningless in the proper context.
So I don't dispute the effectiveness of our forces where they were used. There was no military force in Vietnam the equal of our own, not by a substantial margin, and that fact is completely irrelevant. Any reasonable set of goals you could concoct for our forces in Vietnam we failed to accomplish. Such is the very definition of defeat.
I actually wrote a fair amount on the declassified documents back in '94 and '95, generally with the theme that they revealed nothing of consequence. As one would expect. As far as I'm concerned incidents recorded show a field force with exceptional discipline relative to the size and type of deployment. On a unit by unit basis there's simply no comparison with the type of force we sent to war in the 40's and 50's; the army in Vietnam was vastly superior. What changed was the nature of communication from the field to the populace back home, and that change contributed signficantly to our ultimate defeat because of the unavoidably swaybacked nature of our political leaders and their incessant intervention in the conduct of the war.
So, having said all that, our dispute is really just a matter of definition. We're working from the same facts, you're just taking the more 'bottom up' perspective of individual battles being a success or failure, while I'm more of the mindset that a 'top down' perspective eliminates success from being associated with any of our military work in Vietnam. If you refer back to the Phillipines campaign we entered that war with a relatively clear goal, worked to accomplish that goal, and spared few efforts along the path to victory. The occupation was not easy, but by the time it was over our primary purpose had been accomplished.
When comparing the two campaigns with the still unfinished (But IMHO inevitably failed) action in Iraq one must hope that we can somehow imitate the success of the Phillipines campaign far more than the 'success' of Vietnam, which was all I meant to imply in my first post. :beam:
:egypt:
This was two years after American forces had withdrawn. If America leaves Iraq and 2 years later it is invaded by Iran and defeated, it would be hard to say America was defeated on the battlefield.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ramses II CP
You could say that America failed to reach its political objectives. You could say that American will lost out to that of the communists. You could say that the America failed to create a stable and sustainable government in South Vietnam, and even that the American military failed in creating a fighting force capable of standing up to the NVA without support.
Due to all of that, you could rightfully say that America lost the Vietnam War. However, one statement I just do not feel is accurate is that Vietnam was a battlefield defeat.
Of course, that’s just semantics. I agree with your overarching point about disassociating military victories with the overall strategic/political situation. Iraq? I'm not so sure... ~;)
Battlefield victory is not measured by assaults repulsed, by territory seized/held, or by bodycounts. It's measured by imposing your will upon your opponent. The US failed categorically in this respect, ergo Vietnam is by definition a battlefield defeat.
Had the US been capable of imposing its will upon the North, the South's shortcomings and the discontent on the homefront would have been irrelevant. Instead, the US's inability to break the North's dogged determination made all of America's tactical successes irrelevant instead.
Let me quibble over wording: substitute "willing" for "capable", and you're correct. The U.S. had the capability to impose it's will on the North (witness the results of Operation_Linebacker_II, which forced the North back to the negotiating table), but lacked the will to use that capability to its full extent.Quote:
Originally Posted by MilesGregarius
You're absolutely right in that it was a strategic defeat for the U.S. (but at a staggering cost to the North), look who's still in control there! :yes:
not so, counter attacks by the NVA were battlefields. But yea in a way winning battles didnt really help the US notably.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tribesman