Afrika Korps

I was reading in my history textbook about the German invasion of British occupied Egypt.
It seems it was like a tug of war... the UK was very successful pushing the Germans out until Hitler (from my textbook:) "sends a crack German tank force, the Afrika Korps."
Yet again another tug of war... finally ending in German victory and the renown of General Erwin Rommel being nicknamed the "Desert Fox".

What was so "crack" about this German Panzer Force? Was it the heavily armored tanks such as the Panther and Tigers? Were the crew trained exceptionally better than others?

Quality of the commander, veterans, up-to-date equipment, and most importantly, SO MUCH BETTER THAN THE ITALIANS.

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Originally Posted by A Very Super Market

Quality of the commander, veterans, up-to-date equipment, and most importantly, SO MUCH BETTER THAN THE ITALIANS.

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Very interesting...

Could you please tell me of famous achievements that Rommel performed, what battles the veterans come from, and what kind of tanks the German use? Basically some more interesting details :eyebrows:

I know I'm being lazy, but I also know there is better information from people, than your average Google search.

The Afrika Korps were not a "special forces" unit specifically trained for the job. They were regular Whermacht soldiers who found themselves deployed in Libya. Erwin Rommel distinguished himself as the commander of Seventh Panzer during the Invasion of France, and was given the job of blocking the British forces after they had destroyed the Italian army in North Africa.

Indeed, German soldiers had were still trying to cope with desert warfare during El Alamein. Much of the dysentry and disease came from inadequate medical development compared to Commonwealth forces.

However, Rommel made due with what he could. He often demanded much from his men, but was no arrogant and elitist, he often lead from the front, in his tank or Mammut command vehicle. He captured the hearts and minds of his men, who trusted his tactical expertise.

What made the Afrika Korps "crack" was her commander and what he did with the little resources he had. Tiger tanks were not even introduced in the African Theater until the Tunisian surrender.

+1 because they weren't Italians

Despite becoming the default designation for all German forces in North Africa in popular culture, the DAK actually refers to the small initial force commanded by Rommel of the 5th Light Division and elements of the 15th Panzer division sent to block any further advance of British forces against the Italians in Libya in 1941. This force was used in Rommel's first offensive which trounced the British and resulted in the capture of General Richard O'Connor, the man who so thoroughly defeated the Italians just months earlier.

The formation was expanded throughout the Desert War to include, at least nominally, 2 more Panzer Divisions (10th and 21st) and several light and full infantry divisions. As with all German forces in North Africa, it never achieved full strength. As the war progressed, the DAK became and ever smaller component of the larger Panzer Army Afrika - among other names given to the greater Italian-German force.

There's a lot that has been said about Rommel, the DAK, and the Italians - much of it incorrect. As is true every time the Allies came up against an enemy force that performed better, the DAK was made into an amazing/elite/technologically superior force of Aryan super-soldiers. Suffice to say, there was nothing special about the Afrikakorps or its commander. In actuality, the elite divisions of the German military (Großdeutschland, Panzer Lehr, etc.) and it's best commanders were sent into Russia.

The outstanding performance of the DAK and other German forces in Africa was simply a case of professionals entering a theatre of amateurs. Rommel's greatest attribute was not his tactical sense, but his willingness to take risks and throw himself completely at an objective. The tactics and strategies he employed were standard fare in German doctrine and duplicated on a much larger scale in France and Russia.

What is truly amazing about the Afrikakorps and Rommel was the effect such a small force had on the larger campaign. Most people don't know that North Africa was always an Italian theatre. Rommel was technically subordinate to the Commando Supremo much of the time and the vast majority of Axis troops, supplies, etc. were under Italian organization, including the troops under Rommel's direct command - who performed quite well under German leadership.

It truly speaks to the competence and abilities of the German military during the first years of the war that Rommel was able to use this small, outnumbered, under strength and undersupplied force as the proverbial "tip of the spear" to lead the - inarguably terrible - Italian Army to victory for several years in the Desert against numerically superior Allied forces.

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Originally Posted by SorBlade15

Very interesting...

Could you please tell me of famous achievements that Rommel performed, what battles the veterans come from, and what kind of tanks the German use? Basically some more interesting details :eyebrows:

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There are way too many battles to get into in detail right now. Gazala was arguably Rommel's greatest victory of the war. It was a textbook example of German maneuver warfare. The Brit's just couldn't keep up. Kasserine Pass was the first large scale encounter the Americans had with German forces. The battle was not particularly huge but had far reaching implications within the Allied command structure. Some have speculated that the American's learned and implemented more lessons from that single battle into their doctrine than the British did with all their combined experiences fighting in the Desert.

The vast majority of German tanks used in the desert were Panzer II and III models. Panzer IV models also saw action in significant numbers as well as a very, very few number of Tigers.

I've had this in my photobucket for a while and I believe it is the famous Bovington Tank Museum Tiger captured in Tunisia and still running today.

https://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y1...ITankTunis.jpg

Contrary to popular belief, German tanks in North Africa, excluding the Tigers, were not superior to their Allied equivalents in any particularly meaningful ways. It was the skill of the crews as well as their doctrine which resulted in the lopsided results.

As I understand it, the Panzer II and Panzer III models weren't superior to the British tanks they faced. They were faster, better coordinated, and some had bigger guns, but those appeared later in the war. The British Matildas had bigger guns, heavier armor, and there were frankly more Matildas.

Rommel and the Afrika Korp was so successful because Rommel could exploit his speed to outmaneuver the British troops, and punch through British piecemeal resistance. The 88s also helped Rommel defeat British counterattacks very easily.

If the British hadn't dispersed the troops, used their combined forces more effectively, and in general hadn't thought the Germans a bunch of rats who were gonna throw themselves onto minefields willy-nilly, then it wouldn't have been such a big deal.

Sweet posts guys. Thanks a lot, I'm lovin' the info. :bounce:

Problem was for Rommel was that he won the battle not the war in North Africa. Tactically he out maneuvered and out performed against the British. But at the end of the day he came up against the same problem that the Italians did which was logistics.The supply lines means this was more down to Navy power then Army. As long as you could make your opponent run and use up their fuel and food, it become a game of stamina not firepower.

Oh yes, and the desert itself suited massive maneuvreing and fuel usage. It lacked much strategic importance, so any failed battle would simply mean withdrawing until you found a large rock to entrench in. The British had fuel coming directly from the Middle East, and no amount of rebels there could curtail their transportation to Egypt, while Rommel had to make do with tiny amounts from Romania, the bulk of which were sent to the Eastern Front.

The majority of the logistics that Rommel had to put up with was shipped from Italy around British held Malta into Tripoli. Had the Italians successfully taken Malta, then Rommel would've had more material to wage war with, which would've tipped the scales in his favor.

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Originally Posted by Marshal Murat

The majority of the logistics that Rommel had to put up with was shipped from Italy around British held Malta into Tripoli. Had the Italians successfully taken Malta, then Rommel would've had more material to wage war with, which would've tipped the scales in his favor.

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A fair amount of supplies was interdicted from Malta, but most of the fuel was used up in the supply line from Tripoli and Benghazi. Even the capture of Tobruk didn't help too much, as it was too small to adequately land supplies for the Axis army. While the British commanded the eastern Mediterranean, the Axis would have inevitably run into the problem of the Alamein position sooner or later, where there would be no outflanking by sea or land, and where the British could just sit them out. The logistics and strategic situation meant the scales couldn't have tipped enough in Rommel's favour.

Had the supplies not been interdicted by RAF forces, Rommel would've had alot more men, tanks, and other logistical equipment that would've allowed him more depth of action. Had Rommel had more tanks and men, he could've continued assaults that stopped not only due to logistical problems but also due to the number of tanks and number of men fit for combat. Rommel himself said "Without Malta the Axis will end by losing control of North Africa".

Had Rommel received all the supplies from Italy, Rommel would've had more striking power than what he had after the Battle of Gazala, and he could've carried the war on more effectively and in my view successfully.

Malta was not the real problem. Although it took losses to bring supplies to North Africa, the Italians managed to send enough. The real problem was lack of transport to the front.

http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb01/MS610.htm

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While the critical role of Malta as a base for British interdiction of the Axis strategic lines of communication is undeniable, the limited intratheater distribution system was the more important problem facing the Afrika Korps. The most significant weaknesses in this system were the limited capacity of the available ports and the inadequate capabilities of German and Italian overland transportation assets. These two factors alone contributed more to Rommel's final defeat at Alam El Halfa than did all other factors combined, including enemy action for much of the campaign.

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CBR

Excellent link CBR. The logistics is alway one of those things you "know" but never seem to take into consideration - something I was guilty of while following this discussion.

Rommel never got close to 100% supply at any point in the campaign. During 1941, when he did get a fairly good percentage, he made some of his greatest gains.

I agree, for the most part, with PJ's assessment. Rommel was a very good commander, and a favorite of Adolph Hitler, but not the greatest fielded by the Wermacht. Still, he had the basic audacity needed for panzers (stosstruppen leader in ww1 as well as the ghost division command in France) and he was tenacious.

His great "genius" however, was simply using mobility and the broadness of the desert -- there was always an open flank. This is good generaling, but not necessarily great. When confronted by a tougher tactical problem -- the narrow front at Alamein, the tenacious defense of Tobruk during the first assault, the defense of the Meuse in 1940 -- he was brave, energetic and usually effective, but not necessarily brilliant. History demonstrated that he was correct in his assessment of Allied airpower on Overlord and the Western Front -- but had the panzers been forward deployed, would they have been deployed near the correct beaches? In short, Runstedt's "Marshall Bubi" was too dismissive, but Churchill's "Desert Fox" was also a bit of P.R. to make the Brits look good for besting him eventually.

Still, the DAK fought well and long against adverse conditions and, for most of their campaign, superior numbers and resources. They were beaten more logistically than tactically.

The real key to their success was the same thing that made the Wermacht disproportionally effective against superior forces throughout most of the war -- solid tactics and a degree of combined arms thinking and flexibility that none of the Allies did more than approach before the end of 1944/early 1945. The Kampfgruppe concept alone is a hallmark of that thinking, and it is that body of tactics/approach that made them so deadly. Too many casual readers fixate on the "iron discipline" and "calculating" traits attributed to Germans in the movies. Die Soldaten der Wermacht were very much disciplined and trained, but the point was NOT rigidity and low cunning, but flexibility and adaptability under adverse conditions. They simply outperformed all comers.

I believe the US Army has come to equal that level of excellence and integrative thinking -- but I don't think it's ever been surpassed.

As already mentioned, German tanks in North Africa were often obsolete models sent to the least cared for front (North Africa never recieved much attention until Operation Torch), such as Panzer II's and III's. The real punch Rommel had with his force was his 88mm AntiAir guns that he placed in an AntiTank role. In fact, he did not invent this idea, as it was used during the Invasion of France. I am not sure how he came to the use of 88's as AntiTank weapons, but it devastated most Commonwealth armor.

Panzer IIs and were quite numerous in '39 and '40, and Panzer IIIs were quite mainstream until '42. Neither of them were ineffective in battle, and took down their share of Lees, Matildas, Stuarts, and Valentines. And Crusaders. Though that was more to do with combined arms than anything. The DAK also had a large amount of Panzer IVs, and even received some Tigers (In '43, no less) so I wouldn't say they were sent obsolete equipment. The only obsolete things they received were just anything the Italians armed themselves with.

I'll just chime in to agree with others in that Rommel was a good commander, but not the best. Really though, I think his biggest problem was the same as every other German commander- the meddlesome micro-managing of Hitler. :shrug:

The open terrain allowed for a combination of manuever and firepower that fitted the superior tactical skill of the Germans at lower and higher rank. With so much space to manuever battles were initially very fluent and ideal for the Auftragstaktik employed by thinking skilled junior officers. The responses of the allied forces would be quite slugghish in comparison. CAS was very important in the wide open areas of operation and fuel was in the "maneuver" battles the key compontent. In "set-piece" battles the light firepower caused by relative light armament in artillery and the insufficient supply of shells proved to be a huge problem against a well dung enemy. Light on tanks most tank engagements were initiated by German tanks but won by long-ranged AT guns like the 88 which were aranged in fireboxes/bases togheter with AA guns and artillery to whjch the light german tanks retreated.

Given the circumstances it is hard to believe that the German and the attached Italian forces were so successfull in this theater of operation. With the increased war effort by the Allies and the meatgrinder called Eastern front the superiority of the Allied forces in every aspect of war expect tactical and combat skill was vast. If this huge advantages was wielded with good skill by decent commanders with good troops the outcome could only be one.

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Originally Posted by A Very Super Market

Panzer IIs and were quite numerous in '39 and '40, and Panzer IIIs were quite mainstream until '42. Neither of them were ineffective in battle, and took down their share of Lees, Matildas, Stuarts, and Valentines. And Crusaders. Though that was more to do with combined arms than anything. The DAK also had a large amount of Panzer IVs, and even received some Tigers (In '43, no less) so I wouldn't say they were sent obsolete equipment. The only obsolete things they received were just anything the Italians armed themselves with.

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Good points.

The German II's were outclassed, but IIIh's would hold their own with the Stuarts, Lees and Crusaders -- only falling off in their ability to kill Matilda's and Valentines. The IIIj, with it's long barreled 50, was able to beat anything aside from a Matilda fairly readily up until the Brits started fielding the Churchills and Shermans. Of course, the Germans had begun to field IV's by that point.

The DAK also had Marder's with 75mm guns and the Italians had the Semovente SPG. Both of these were good in their roles and served well. The Italian M13/40 was a rolling coffin.

Germans were not loosing into Africa before Africa Corps because there ITALIANS NOT GERMANS.

Africa Corps was not better than other German Corpses. Count from veterans of polish and probably french campaign reitrained on Błędowska Desert in Poland. They had new equipment but what is more important, good commanders.
There were no Panthers or Tigers (maybe few at the end but practically no) but earlier German tanks.
And of course Africa Coprs go some luck because their first punch was in the moment, when british commanders had to send some units to Greece.

:poland:

What exactly were the combined arms tactics where the Germans excelled? The Panzer II’s were fast scout tanks that could actually defeat the thin armor of some of the British cruiser tanks at close range and chew up infantry with High Explosive rounds from its 20 mm main gun. The Panzer III’s were the mainstay and could defeat most of the slower Allied armor by outflanking them. When the panzers were outmatched, the 88 mm flak guns could defeat any Allied tank from a considerable range. The British tanks were equipped with guns that did not fire HE rounds, so the 88’s could fire at them with impunity (until the M3 and M4 showed up). The German Panzer IV’s short 75 mm HE gun on the other hand, was able to take out Allied AT gun crews. In place of set piece artillery, the Luftwaffe provided Stukas to pummel desert fortresses. So the DAK had an answer to most tactical situations that the Allies could provide.

Rommel fought a “guerrilla blitzkrieg”, which his contemporaries in Russia did not employ. He often took his force into deep flanking maneuvers without what most generals would consider adequate logistical support on the premise that he would overrun Allied supply depots and thus use Allied fuel for his panzers and Allied food and water for his troops. Possession of the battlefield was paramount as destroyed panzers were cannibalized to repair damaged panzers and fuel and ammo was always stripped away. Rommel was also not against using captured Allied equipment. Twelve British Matildas were used by the DAK, often to the confusion of both sides. Still, the Afrika Korps often had fewer than 100 panzers operational. Never have so few done so much with so little.

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Originally Posted by Agent Miles

What exactly were the combined arms tactics where the Germans excelled? The Panzer II’s were fast scout tanks that could actually defeat the thin armor of some of the British cruiser tanks at close range and chew up infantry with High Explosive rounds from its 20 mm main gun. The Panzer III’s were the mainstay and could defeat most of the slower Allied armor by outflanking them. When the panzers were outmatched, the 88 mm flak guns could defeat any Allied tank from a considerable range. The British tanks were equipped with guns that did not fire HE rounds, so the 88’s could fire at them with impunity (until the M3 and M4 showed up). The German Panzer IV’s short 75 mm HE gun on the other hand, was able to take out Allied AT gun crews. In place of set piece artillery, the Luftwaffe provided Stukas to pummel desert fortresses. So the DAK had an answer to most tactical situations that the Allies could provide.

Rommel fought a “guerrilla blitzkrieg”, which his contemporaries in Russia did not employ. He often took his force into deep flanking maneuvers without what most generals would consider adequate logistical support on the premise that he would overrun Allied supply depots and thus use Allied fuel for his panzers and Allied food and water for his troops. Possession of the battlefield was paramount as destroyed panzers were cannibalized to repair damaged panzers and fuel and ammo was always stripped away. Rommel was also not against using captured Allied equipment. Twelve British Matildas were used by the DAK, often to the confusion of both sides. Still, the Afrika Korps often had fewer than 100 panzers operational. Never have so few done so much with so little.

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Operation Compass. A British-Commonwealth force of around 35,000, with barely enough fuel to reach the Egyptian border, against an Italian force of around 150,000. Ended up clearing out the Italians from Cyrenaica, and would have continued into Tripolitania if the bulk of the force hadn't been transferred to Greece. A highlight of the campaign was the sending of a mobile column across open desert to cut off the retreat of the Italians, while simultaneously harassing them via the road route. I wonder if Rommel would have had the same success if O'Connor, who used Rommel's tactics before Rommel ever arrived on the scene, hadn't been captured early on.

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Originally Posted by Pannonian

I wonder if Rommel would have had the same success if O'Connor, who used Rommel's tactics before Rommel ever arrived on the scene, hadn't been captured early on.

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I'm almost sure of it.

O'Connor can't have been all that clever if he got captured early on. ~;)

Rommels first success was mostly because Britons did not respect his skills.
British generals had to send best units to Greece.
If we are comparing O'Connor and Rommel - O'Connor was better for me. Africa Corps and Britons into Africa had equal strenght at the beginning of that stage of war. O'Connor had to attack few times stronger enemy.

Anyway someone showed polish flag. Thx - looks like you are using tactic "I have no arguments so I will tell that he is Pole and uses polish propaganda". Imagine my friend that polish brigade defended Tobruk against Rommel.
And his great africa corps lost that battle (and appeared to be lower skilled than infantry brigade).

I don’t think that you can reasonably compare what O’Connor did to Il Duce's Italians to what Rommel did to the British Commonwealth forces. The Italians were led by incompetent officers and were poorly equipped. 7th Armoured Division had dozens of Matildas that were quite literally invulnerable to any and all Italian weapons. Rommel never had an advantage like that.

Of course you can compare them.


Rommel faced a higher quality of opposition, but not quite the disparity of numbers.

O'Connor faced lower quality opposition, but quite a disparity in numbers.

Both faced supply issues.

Everyone faced water issues.


EVERYONE, faced with a desert conflict during the era of mobility, has come up with the SAME grand tactic -- whip around wide on the desert flank. Allenby -- O'Connor -- Rommel -- Montgomery -- Schwarzkopf, have all gotten to the same solution.