Subject: H-WAR REVIEW: 'Rome's Imperial Moment in the East?'

I might add that I hold much the same view as presented below. I do not believe that the Romans were active imperialists at this early date, but that they would protect themselves against a percieved threat with ruthless brutality (which is where I agree with Harris). In a Danish text two months ago I argued that they embarked on the Second Macedonian War in order to avoid a new threat like Carthage rising. I think I posted some of it here as well summarised, but cannot recall as I am exhasuted. Nite all, enjoy the review.Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2009 10:42:34 -0400



Arthur M. Eckstein. Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to
Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230-170 BC. Malden
Blackwell Publishers, 2008. xi + 439 pp. $119.95 (cloth), ISBN
978-1-4051-6072-8.

Reviewed by Joseph Frechette
Published on H-War (March, 2009)
Commissioned by Brian G.H. Ditcham

Rome's Imperial Moment in the East?

Readers familiar with Arthur M. Eckstein's 2007 study, _Mediterranean
Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome_, will already be aware
of some of his interdisciplinary methodology. The present work
likewise makes a forceful argument for the utility of modern
international relations theory as a lens through which to study the
nuances of the growth of Roman power. That is, Eckstein's
methodology combines traditional classical scholarship with realist
theories of international systems. As in the previous volume,
Eckstein provides a useful corrective to the reigning understanding
of Roman imperial expansion east of the Adriatic in the third and
second centuries BC. He makes a good case for rehabilitating Maurice
Holleaux's thesis that the Romans had few interests east of the
Adriatic down to 201/200 BCE.[1] That is, it was not until envoys
from the Greek states threatened by Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus
III of the Seleucid Empire arrived at Rome with the news that the two
monarchs had made a pact to destroy the Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt
that the Senate decided to intervene in great strength in eastern
affairs.

Since Holleaux first put forth this notion in 1921, the importance of
the Pact Between the Kings has subsequently been disputed or simply
ignored by many modern scholars. Meanwhile, William V. Harris and
his intellectual heirs have argued that Rome was an exceptionally
aggressive imperialist state with dark and irrational roots, and that
no special explanation is needed for the Roman intervention in the
east.[2] In his 2007 study, Eckstein reacted against Harris's notion
of Roman exceptionalism. He examined the classical and Hellenistic
Greeks and found that many were deeply militarized cultures, but,
even more striking, regardless of size or political type, nearly all
were involved in endemic warfare. This led him to conclude that much
of this penchant for bellicosity must be due not to the attributes of
the states in the ancient international system, but to the
characteristics of the prevailing system as a whole. The eastern
Mediterranean state system, with which the Romans came into
increasing conflict not only seems to fit the modern realist model of
an international anarchy but also was a particularly stark example of
one. Rather than being unusually belligerent, the Romans were caught
up in an international system that fundamentally required ferocity
from all state actors simply as a matter of survival. Ruthlessness
on the part of any particular state was not exceptional or
necessarily evil. It was simply tragically typical.

Building on this foundation in the present volume, Eckstein seeks not
only to bring the Pact Between the Kings back into prominence but
also to highlight the tentative and hesitant nature of Rome's
expansion in the east. The book breaks down into three main
sections. The first covers the period 230-205 BCE and the first
hesitant Roman moves across the Adriatic. The second sketches the
events of 207-200 BCE and the crisis caused by the collapse of
Ptolemaic power that eventually drew the Romans east. The final
section covers 200-170 BCE, tracing the two rounds of hegemonic war
needed to subdue Philip and Antiochus and their immediate aftermath.
Roman hesitancy to become involved in the east is a constant theme.
Eckstein argues that after the defeat of Antiochus Roman victory
replaced the old tripolar system in the east with a new unipolar
system embracing the entire Mediterranean. But unipolarity did not
necessarily signify control, let alone empire.

Eckstein's examination of the situation created by the Roman victory
in the First Illyrian War (229-228 BCE) in the first section is
illustrative of his methodology. Modern reconstructions of Roman
relations with the polities on the Illyrian coast range from informal
control exercised on the basis of a patron-client relationship to
some form of clearly subjugated protectorate.[3] Eckstein disputes
this by carefully critiquing the ancient evidence and finding it far
from conclusive. The handful of disparate, geographically
noncontiguous polities brought under Roman protection did not
constitute anything approaching the coherent protectorate we should
expect to find if the Senate had more than minimal concerns in
maritime Illyria.

In this, he follows Karl-Ernst Petzold and Erich Gruen but reinforces
the point by noting two terms often used somewhat cavalierly by
classical scholars but precisely defined by political scientists:
"protectorate" and "sphere of influence."[4] Maritime Illyria was
not a "bordered political space that had lost both its sovereignty as
a whole and its internal administration into the control of an
imperial power," nor was it "a definite region within which a single
external power exerts a predominant influence which limits the
independence of freedom of action of states within it ... against the
influence of other comparable powers over the region" (pp. 51, 54).
Classical historians are often tempted to chastise others for using
imprecise translations of ancient sources. Eckstein makes the
salutary point that they should be equally precise in their use of
the modern terminology of imperial control.

In this conception, authority and control must be asserted and
asserted often in order to be authority and control. In Eckstein's
view, the sporadic and limited interventions east of the Adriatic
until 205 BCE were just that, limited and sporadic. Obviously, the
existential threat of the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE) helped
ensure that this was so. What's more, Eckstein argues that the
eastern diplomatic environment did not lend itself to large-scale
Roman intervention. In the First Macedonian War (214-205 BCE),
prominent Greek states, such as Ptolemaic Egypt, Rhodes, and Athens,
were involved in diplomatic maneuvers dramatically at variance with
Rome's interests. They left Rome isolated by brokering a separate
peace between Philip and Rome's main ally in Greece, the Aetolian
League. Within five years, however, some of these same states were
desperate for Roman intervention.

In his second section, Eckstein explains this diplomatic revolution
as a result of a power transition crisis. Internal unrest and the
ascension of a child to the Ptolemaic throne in 204 BCE ensured that
Egypt could no longer act as a balance against Macedonian and
Seleucid power. The attendant hegemonic war could have resulted in a
new bipolar structure in the east dominated by Philip and Antiochus
or even the eventual emergence of one or the other as a unipolar
hegemon. Instead, Rome, a power that was heretofore peripheral to
eastern affairs, defeated both, and what had been regional eastern
and western international systems came together into one
Mediterranean-wide system. That is, Polybius's emphasis on the
development of the _symploke_ (interconnectedness) of east and west
is precisely on point.

Eckstein argues that the proximate cause for this intervention is to
be sought, as reported by Polybius, in the pact between Philip and
Antiochus. Thus, he devotes an entire chapter to countering the
various modern criticisms of Polybius's account. Here Eckstein's
skills as a classical scholar come to the fore. He discusses the
Polybian narrative and manuscript tradition to establish that there
is no a priori reason for dismissing it as implausible. More
important, he then demonstrates that the practical operation of the
pact can be discerned. Eckstein not only argues that Philip
campaigned vigorously against Ptolemaic holdings in 201-200 BCE but
also adduces new epigraphic evidence to demonstrate that the kings
were in active cooperation. Eckstein posits that it was the pact
that accounts for a diplomatic revolution. The expansionist threat
posed by the kings drove the Ptolemies, Rhodians, Athenians, and
Pergamenes to turn to Rome. That is, focusing on Roman
aggressiveness only gives a partial picture. In Eckstein's view, we
will get a much clearer picture if we lift our eyes to the
international system as a whole and the stresses placed on it by the
interests and actions of all the actors, not just the Romans.

For Eckstein, the embassies of 201 BCE were no mere pretext for
continuing Roman aggression. They were a necessary catalyst that
galvanized the Senate into action because of the security threat
posed by the Pact Between the Kings. He notes that the actions of
the Roman government were not what we should expect of reflexive
imperialism. Instead, they were the typical response of a powerful
state concerned about its security in a threatening international
environment. The senatorial resolution in 200 BCE for what amounted
to preventive war against Philip was initially rejected by the people
when put to a vote in the _comitia centuriata_. Instead of imperial
aggression, Eckstein suggests that what moved the Senate and
eventually the Roman people was fear of a "worst-case scenario," the
unknown threat that would be posed by Philip and Antiochus after they
had digested Egypt. It was this that brought them the "cognitive
closure" that they had "no choice" but to wage a preventive war (p.
264). That is, that threat assessment may have been a critical
element in Roman decision making.

In his final section, Eckstein argues that, even after embarking on
the Second Macedonian War (200-196 BCE) and the Syrian Wars (192-188
BCE), the Romans were far from following a policy of formal
imperialism. He discerns three factors as the foundation of the
relationship between Greece and Rome after 188 BCE and the
explanation for the ambiguous nature of Roman predominance. First,
no single polity remained a serious challenge to Roman authority
after 188 BCE. The power of all other serious, first-tier polities
had been severely curtailed. Second, the hegemonic wars over Philip
V and Antiochus III had not been won by the Romans alone. Rather,
Rome was the central component of broad voluntary alliances of
smaller and mid-sized Greek polities. Third, the Romans completely
withdrew their forces west of the Adriatic and specifically did not
attempt to establish formal _provinciae_ in the east--what Eckstein
refers to as a policy of "smash and leave" (p. 305). Rome's allies
and erstwhile enemies were all free to pursue their own international
agendas and private wars so long as they did not run directly counter
to Roman interests.

Again, Eckstein argues for precise terminology. He insists that if
the term "empire" is to be used meaningfully, it should be rather
narrowly construed as the direct control over both the external and
internal policies and politics of subordinated polities. "Empire is
not mere inequality of power among states" (p. 373). All-in-all,
Eckstein presents a compelling case that, despite achieving unipolar
status as the sole remaining "superpower" in the Mediterranean
international system, true Roman "empire" had to wait. Indeed,
Polybius noted (1.1.5, 3.4.2-3, and 6.2.3) that Roman supremacy was
only consummated over the course of a fifty-three-year period that
ran until 168 BCE and the close of the Third Macedonian War. It took
time for Rome's relationship with the Greek polities to evolve
through a continuum of hierarchical arrangements into imperial
control.

The conclusion of earlier scholars lacking Eckstein's grounding in
modern political theory has often been that following the peace of
188 BCE there was nothing left for the Greeks to do but submit
themselves to the Romans who were now the ultimate arbiters of
international relations, the "cops of the world."[5] Eckstein argues
that a situation of actual imperial rule had not yet come into being
because no such rule was either practiced by the Romans or recognized
by the Greeks. What is more problematic is tracing the precise
nature of this progression from unipolar power to imperial rule.
Long ago, Gruen made a convincing case that even after the complete
"emasculation" of Greece in 146 BCE, the Romans were still declining
to exercise "overlordship."[6] Eckstein's study supports this view
and would seem to indicate that in the east the Roman empire was the
product of a long process. Military victory may have been a
necessary condition of empire but was not sufficient without the
frequent assertion of authority and control that would come later.

Notes

[1]. Maurice Holleaux, _Rome, la Grèce et les Monarchies
Hellenistiques au IIIe Siècle avant J.-C. (273-205)_ (Hildesheim: G.
Olms, 1969).

[2]. William V. Harris, _War and Imperialism in Republican Rome
327-70 BC_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 46-53.

[3]. Ernst Badian, _Foreign Clientelae (264-70 BC)_ (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1958), 41-42, 53-54, 113; Jean-Louis Ferrary,
_Philhellénisme et Impérialisme: Aspects Idéologiques de la
Conquête Romaine du Monde Hellénistique_ (Rome: Ecole française de
Rome, 1988), 24-33; N. G. L. Hammond, "Illyris, Rome, and Macedon in
229-205 BC," _Journal of Roman Studies_ 58 (1968): 7-9; and Peter
Derow, "Pharos and Rome," _Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und
Epigraphik_ 88 (1991): 267-270.

[4]. Karl-Ernst Petzold, "Rom und Illyrien: Ein Beitrag zur
römischen Aussenpolitik im 3. Jahrhundert," _Historia_ 20 (1971):
206, 220-221; and Erich Gruen, _The Hellenistic World and the Coming
of Rome_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 78,
367-368.

[5]. Peter Derow, "From the Illyrian Wars to the Fall of Macedon," in
_A Companion to the Hellenistic World_, ed. Andrew Erskine (Malden:
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 65-66.

[6]. Gruen, _Hellenistic World_, 528.

Citation: Joseph Frechette. Review of Eckstein, Arthur M., _Rome
Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic
Mediterranean, 230-170 BC_. H-War, H-Net Reviews. March, 2009.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=23965

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.

Far out!
Thanks a lot!
:egypt:

Thanks for posting this. I will look for the book in my uni library.

I agree with his point about Romans being more eager to become/remain the dominating power politically and militarily in the Mediterranean rather then wishing to annex the eastern kingdoms. Afterall the whole process of integrating new lands into the empire is very complex and difficult matter. A fine example is Germanic lands: it may be argued that Romans had intentions of annexing those lands, but it proved to be too difficult and not worth the endeavour. While the lands of Greece are very different from ancient Germany it was still hard to incorporate them. However the policy of crushing the opponent on the battlefield is an entirely different matter. Such defeats brought on the enemy demolished not only its military might, but political one also thus enabling Rome to become a sole dominant power.

On the other hand I think that it's important to note that the legions which fought in Makedonia and at Magnesia were the veterans of Second Punic War so it was probably the best troops Romans had in the history of Republic and possibly the whole Empire. Furthermore this force was free to use in other theaters as soon as Punic war ended. So I do not think that it was exactly the fear of "worst case scenario", but an opportunistic chance to extend the military might of Rome over the East and at the same time crush the rivals.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Silence Hunter

Thanks for posting this. I will look for the book in my uni library.
On the other hand I think that it's important to note that the legions which fought in Makedonia and at Magnesia were the veterans of Second Punic War so it was probably the best troops Romans had in the history of Republic and possibly the whole Empire. Furthermore this force was free to use in other theaters as soon as Punic war ended. So I do not think that it was exactly the fear of "worst case scenario", but an opportunistic chance to extend the military might of Rome over the East and at the same time crush the rivals.

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In fact Brunt in his "Italian Manpower" has documented that only 6000 veterans re-enlisted. It puzzles me as well, but his sources are good.